A victory of common sense: the corvettes are back! Bye for the pacific

259
A victory of common sense: the corvettes are back! Bye for the pacific

Corvettes 20380 were conceived as the basis of the naval surface forces in the near sea zone

On August 12, 2020, an event happened, which a huge number of sailors and simply not indifferent people have been waiting for for many years. At first without any hope, then with hope, albeit timid ... and so it happened.

Russian Defense Minister S.K. Shoigu, having visited the Amur shipyard, announced the construction of six more corvettes on it.



This is a landmark turn. And that's why.

Forgotten anti-submarine defense and corvettes


The main striking power of the Russian Navy is submarines. They are also a critical part of the nuclear deterrence system. Much has been written about this. But submarines cannot operate on their own. In order to leave the bases, and in the case of SSBNs, to make transitions to the areas designated for them to perform combat missions, they need various types of support. In particular, anti-submarine. And it is unthinkable without ships capable of fighting submarines.

In the old days, up to two brigades of small anti-submarine ships, several BODs (later retrained in the TFR) of Project 1135, a consolidated anti-submarine regiment could be involved in the output of one SSBN as a support force. aviation, diesel-electric submarines and one (occasionally two) multipurpose nuclear submarines. Such a large detachment of forces gave the chance that the "strategist" boat could safely move into the designated area of ​​combat patrol.

Disintegration fleet made the attraction of such forces impossible, but the more the importance of those forces that could still be attracted to PLO tasks grew. No less important is their significance after, in the course of carrying out operational-tactical tasks that are no longer related to the support of submarine operations. At the same time, small anti-submarine ships, which were the main class of PLO ships in the near sea zone, were aging, and they needed replacement.

In December 2001, a ship was laid down, which under other circumstances could have replaced the aging IPC - a corvette of the new project 20380. This ship was born hard. Instead of the minimum number of various experimental design developments, as originally planned, there were a lot of them in this project. Funding was volatile. The ship took a long time to build, and when the series was discussed, it turned out that the anti-aircraft missile and artillery system, which is the main air defense system on the lead ship of the Guarding project, is no longer produced.


The lead ship of the project, "Guarding", is distinguished by an anti-aircraft missile and artillery system. All serial ships have the Redut air defense system

The project of the ship was reworked several times, first under the Redut air defense system, then under the new radar complex, the corvettes being handed over to the fleet had huge quality problems and a lack of speed. Bringing the already built ships into a combat-ready state took years. It was a really tough project. Later, on the basis of 20380, project 20385 appeared, which was also born with problems, albeit of a different nature. This ship was originally supposed to be equipped with a German power plant, which subsequently came under sanctions. A ship with Kolomna diesels was being completed, as was the case with 20380. But - an important point - the decision that such ships will no longer be built was made even before the sanctions. The same decision was made for 20380.


"Thundering" of the project 20385. The decision to abandon the series was made even before the sanctions, officials say a lie. But the project really suffered from the sanctions

It was announced that instead of them construction of a series of other ships - project 20386 corvettes - would begin. Expensive, technically complex, overflowing with strange design solutions and having no superiority over 20380 in any weaponsnor in anti-submarine capabilities.

2016 was a milestone year in the Navy's approach to anti-submarine defense. This year, the last diesel corvettes 20380 and the lead corvettes 20386 were laid down. Since then, no other BMZ ANTI-WATER SHIP has been laid down in Russia. Four years later, in Russia, three (!) Corvette vital for the fleet remained in the construction, except for 20386, namely "Strict" project 20380, "Agile" project 20385 at "Severnaya Verf" and "Sharp" project 20380 at the ASZ. And that's it! And this is in a country whose potential adversary's power is based on nuclear submarines of outstanding combat qualities. It's just unthinkable. 6 units of 20380 were delivered to the fleet, two more corvettes of project 20380 are being prepared for mooring ("Zealous" at "Severnaya Verf" and "Aldar Tsydenzhapov" in the Pacific Ocean).

At the same time, the money for shipbuilding was quite allocated. "Monument to project 20386" has already spent huge amounts of money on itself, and, perhaps, "will ask for more." At the same time, the time of the ship's readiness is unknown and cannot be predicted, but the budgets for it have been mastered.

A series of "suitcases without handles" is under construction - patrol ships of Project 22160. They are under construction with very limited combat capabilities of MRK. In general, these three undertakings were very expensive for the country: they could completely upgrade the surface fleet at BMZ with multipurpose ships. These expenses cannot be called rational. But the fleet developed without any intelligible strategy, and what happened was happening. The anti-submarine defense was weak before our eyes, but there was a feeling that this did not bother anyone.

The basis of the future surface forces of the near sea zone in our country was announced project 20386. Which is still not a fact that it will work out, but then, in 2016, despite the formal foundation, it had not yet begun to be built.

Resistance


I must say that such a strange approach, in which a series of ships seemingly brought to a living state is sacrificed to an incomprehensible and strange project with a huge price, with a huge list of shortcomings and technical risks, caused quite a lot of bewilderment. And this perplexity began to grow even more when the fleets realized that after the construction of the already laid down 20380 and 20385, there would be no more new ships. While Moscow was happily counting the missile cells on the new MRKs being laid, the old IPCs were put on hold in the fleets, and there was no replacement for them. It is not hard to guess that awkward questions were asked somewhere “up the team”.

The Pacific Fleet was particularly affected by the decision to stop the 20380 and 20385 series. For all the time that has passed since the collapse of the USSR, the Pacific Fleet has received fewer new ships and boats than a man has fingers on his hands. And if we talk about the time after 2000, then in general there are three units: a missile boat and two corvettes 20380 - "Perfect" and "Loud".

At the same time, the military power of the Japanese neighbors, who have serious territorial claims to our country, is constantly growing, according to a number of parameters, their navy is already stronger than all our fleets put together. In such conditions, the renewal of the ship's composition was vital. Read more about this in the article "A serious military threat is latently ripening close to Russia".

But it didn't happen. Took place re-bookmark 20386, after its alleged processing, "patrolmen" were built, but nothing changed with the PLO. With the delivery of new ships to the Pacific Fleet too.

Rumors that the series of corvettes will nevertheless be resumed have begun to actively break into public space since 2019. At the end of 2019, in December, Rear Admiral Igor Korolev, Deputy Commander of the Pacific Fleet for Armaments, said during a speech at the ASZ:

“This plant is capable of fulfilling any series of orders. Including ten project 20380 corvettes, which are so necessary for our fleet in the Pacific Ocean. "

It was in some way a sign that there was a chance of a return to common sense. However, 10 units did not coincide with what can be built at the NEA for the state armaments program-2027. As a result, they will order, apparently, six - the same ones announced by the Minister of Defense.

The importance of the renewal of this series can hardly be overestimated. For a long time, the High Command denied any possibility of returning to "completed" projects. The new and supposedly advanced 20386 hung over the prospects of the domestic fleet, making the prospects for anti-submarine defense simply ephemeral. For "political" reasons, it was simply impossible to just pick up and return to the construction of a more or less worked out series - it would have to explain what the problem is with such an advertised supership 20386.


Project 20386 could become the gravedigger of the domestic anti-submarine defense. But he was unable even to do that. The future of the project is still in question. But its authors stole five years from the Navy

The restart of a series of corvettes means that the Ministry of Defense was able to overstep this issue. It doesn't exist anymore, doesn't matter. Now, after 20380, the chances are much higher that erroneous decisions in our military development will begin to be canceled in time, because since it happened with corvettes, then it can happen with anything else.

The second importance of restarting a series of corvettes is that it was in the Pacific that a powerful renewal of the ship's composition began: as many ships for the Pacific Fleet, as announced now, have never been built for this association in post-Soviet Russia.

Well, and third, already understandable: at last we remembered about anti-submarine defense. Better late than never…

Of course, all of the above does not mean that common sense has won finally. But this is definitely a claim that the victory of common sense is far from zero chances. And yes, this is a victory. Victory over stupidity and senseless dispersal of our not very large budgets.

The author is pleased to know that he also made his minimum feasible contribution to this event.

Personal initiative


Even before any work began on the allegedly laid 20386 (they began only at the end of 2018), the author wrote an article that simultaneously became both his first and his most resonant material in his career. This is an article “Worse than a crime. Construction of project 20386 corvettes - error "... This article highlighted in more or less detail the disadvantages of abandoning the 20380 series and starting the construction of the 20386 series and voiced a recommendation to abandon the expensive and pointless corvettes of the 20386 project, returning to the proven 20380 or 20385 series. As a more or less acceptable option, it was proposed to complete one 20386 and do not return to this series anymore, making ships based on project 20380 the basis of forces in the near sea zone.

The article received a huge distribution and, in general, on all the resources where it was published, its total number of views was close to a million. This is a lot for Russia, where the population's interest in naval issues is traditionally rather low.

Then the text of the article was revised by the author into a circulation sent to the presidential administration of the Russian Federation. From there it was forwarded to the Main Command of the Navy. After a while, in response to this appeal, a response was received.



In response to the letter of Vice-Admiral Bursuk, the author sent another appeal to his name, where he assessed the arguments against the construction of corvettes of old projects. It remained unanswered for three times longer than allowed by law, and, apparently, it would have remained so further.

However, at the end of 2018, another article was written, this time together with M. Klimov, in which the question of the need for a sound approach to ships in the near sea zone was once again raised in an acute form. This article was approved for publication in one major federal publication, but one day before its publication, information about the upcoming material reached the Ministry of Defense. As a result of a number of events, the material was removed from the press, and the officials responded to the author and the second appeal too, and the response with a significantly overdue date came early in the morning on the first working day of the new 2019 year.


The article, however, was published anyway, but already on the Military Review, in a slightly revised form under the title “Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam »... And, apparently, she again caused some reaction.

In the future, seeing the futility of repeated appeals, the author tried to bring into the mass consciousness of readers interested in naval issues the idea that, firstly, anti-submarine defense for our country is vitally important, and secondly, that warships that are being built for the Navy, must be multipurpose.

These theses were consistently voiced in articles "The most important ships for Russia need updating" in the business newspaper "Vzglyad" and in an article published in the newspaper "VPK-Courier" under the title "Defenseless Strategists" and dedicated to the need to upgrade ASW ships and their importance in ensuring the combat stability of NSNF. Due to the mass of strange editorial changes in places, the author considers it necessary to provide a link to the original text under the original title: Anti-submarine ships and nuclear deterrence.

Also, questions about the importance of anti-submarine defense and ships capable of performing ASW missions were raised in articles on Voennoye Obozreniye: "A step in the right direction: the project of the multipurpose" Karakurt " (PLO) " и “The light forces of the Navy. Their significance, tasks and ship structure ”.

Bearing in mind that a false thesis has been thrown into society about the impossibility of domestic industry to provide the required number of engines and gearboxes for new corvettes, the author published in the newspaper "VPK-Courier" material about the real possibilities of the domestic industry for the supply of main power plants (GEM) for ships of the near sea zone. It also raised the issue of the tasks of warships in BMZ.

It must be admitted that the thesis about the need to build at least some kind of anti-submarine forces and ensure the actions of SSBNs at the stage of deployment, in general, penetrated into society. Today he is present in public opinion.

Of course, the author is far from attributing to himself any single merits. Even in the press, there were other materials defending a similar point of view. In the Navy and the defense industry structures, the opposition to the idea of ​​"covering up" the construction of multipurpose BMZ ships for the sake of a technical adventure under number 20386 was, apparently, much more important. Nevertheless, the role of public opinion in our observed turn towards common sense was apparently nonzero, as were those who shaped this public opinion to the best of their ability.

Now we must not retreat.

First details


The same visit to S.K. Shoigu Amur Shipyard sheds some light on what the new ASZ corvettes will be like. In the proposed video (at the very beginning) there is a dialogue between the head of the United Shipbuilding Corporation A. Rakhmanov and S. Shoigu.



As you can see, the Minister of Defense promises the head of the USC that there will be no new ROC, which, according to A. Rakhmanov, will allow the corvettes to be built on time. That is, we are talking about what we so chronically lacked: serial production. The ships will be the same. This will certainly speed up their construction and help raise the quality.

The question arises: if the ships will be without ROC, then to which "sub-series" will they belong - to the analogues of "Perfect" and "Loud" or analogs of "Aldar Tsydenzhapov" with a multifunctional radar system? In truth, both are bad, and the latter is also very expensive. It would be logical to unify the corvette in terms of the radar system with the first series Karakurt MRK. This would make it possible to seriously reduce the cost of corvettes and, oddly enough, to strengthen (!) Their air defense. Does such a decision fall under the definition of “no OCD”? Strictly formally yes, because the complex has already been developed and is in the series.

But it may also be such that the customer will go for the most expensive option. This is not very good, but let's not criticize him in advance, so as not to frighten off such luck ...

As for the rest, it will probably be ordinary and familiar 20380 with all their disadvantages and advantages. At the NEA, these ships can turn out better than at the Severnaya Verf, at least, the Loud turned out.

It is also very unlikely that some version of 20385 with "Caliber" will be built at the ASZ. A similar ship with a simplified radar would be an ideal option, but the ASZ had not previously built 20385.

Of course, neither S. Shoigu nor anyone else directly said that 20380 would be built. But the fact that these corvettes were built there earlier, and the dialogue with A. Rakhmanov about ROC make the most probable that it will be 20380 with minimal changes. This is the most logical option.


"Aldar Tsydenzhapov" with a multifunctional radar. Most likely, the new corvettes will be the same

Corvette project 20380 in any of its options is not at all ideal. He has a lot of shortcomings. But today we have a choice between "nothing" and 20380. In such conditions, the renewal of the 20380 series is absolutely correct and uncontested.

However, the question of what the corvette should actually be for the forces of the near sea zone, what weapons and capabilities it should have, has not lost its importance. And in the near future, an analysis of the possibilities of building such ships in the form in which they are needed will be done.

In the meantime, let us congratulate the Navy on returning to the right path. Let's hope that this victory of common sense will be far from the only one.
  • Alexander Timokhin
  • TV "Zvezda", RIA "Novosti", TsMKB "Almaz", Wikipedia commons, PJSC "Shipbuilding plant" Severnaya Verf "
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259 comments
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  1. +40
    13 August 2020 06: 35
    Thanks to the author, and not only for the article. This is a living example of how a caring person can influence decision-making.
    1. +20
      13 August 2020 07: 19
      It would be nice to revive anti-submarine aviation ... can anyone write an article in general terms?
      1. +37
        13 August 2020 09: 12
        I wrote before, and will come back to this topic.
        1. +4
          13 August 2020 18: 06
          Reshpect and congratulations to the author!
          You become one of the famous Russian publicists on the VM topic - like Klado or Semenov!
          The road will be mastered by the walking! And good news inspires!
          We look forward to continuing!
          1. +5
            13 August 2020 19: 53
            Well, how far away is I to Klado. Probably not to catch up.
            What Semenova do you mean?
            1. 0
              13 August 2020 23: 41
              Vladimir Ivanovich, author of the Reckoning
        2. 0
          13 August 2020 19: 55
          as a pinjak, I hope that in the fight for the middle level against the bad, you know the milestones - the level of development of the fleets of "partners" in 2040 and beyond.
          I would "torment" the military-industrial complex-shipyard for future prospects, and not now plug the holes of the PLO
          1. +4
            13 August 2020 20: 32
            The war is small, at least, it can happen literally tomorrow. Holes must be plugged according to their importance. PLO BMZ is the most important task ...
            1. 0
              14 August 2020 08: 19
              for a small war, the words of GDP will be enough: "I am a decisive dictator and will not allow rattling weapons (etc.) near the borders of Russia, in the sea XXX" ???
              "I will use XXX missiles if you do not take them to my bases within 12 hours"
              a small war is small for "that" side too.
              "that" side considers its own and our Armed Forces not according to corvettes, but according to the possible damage from all weapons available in Russia (and in this direction)
              Is it possible or necessary to wait until the 30th? until the project is finished - or they put the "handlers" for flying by
  2. +13
    13 August 2020 06: 54
    Forgotten anti-submarine defense and corvettes

    Many, many, one could say, shouted that such powerful, important, striking means of our "vigorous" triad, submarines should be covered / guarded when they go on alert ...
    1. +11
      13 August 2020 09: 11
      And some people fueled these screams ...
      1. +4
        13 August 2020 09: 25
        All this is not pasta in the Navy, Schaub to warm them up.
        They just called for a return to common sense and real necessity!
        This is the merit of many people who are not indifferent to the security of our country.
        PPP ... but it's not over! There are many more topics that need to be given a boost, at least to indicate their importance to the fleet ...
        1. +23
          13 August 2020 09: 53
          Quote: rocket757
          This is the merit of many people who are not indifferent to the security of our country.

          I believe that in fact the role of ALL (including mine too) materials, as well as letters in this matter, is near-zero. Most likely it was so - that corvettes are needed, the Ministry of Defense understands (it was not for nothing that they were going to be built in dozens in GPV 2011-2020), while 20385 are too expensive, and 20386 are not only roads, but also clearly cannot be serially built (one niasil , what series is there?). So we returned to 20380.
          Alexander's articles are still very necessary and important. They, at least, informed people about the real state of affairs. But in order to really be able to at least influence something, the next step is required - not letters to the Moscow Region signed by A. Timokhin, but petitions with tens of thousands, but rather a hundred or two thousand signatures, are needed.
          That is, if we, citizens of the Russian Federation, begin to ask questions and demand clarifications in this form, there will be chances of getting sane answers (and not replies from Bursuk) and the fact that they will really be with us ... not something to be considered, but at least attention - will appear.
          1. +2
            13 August 2020 10: 13
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            I believe that in fact the role of ALL (including mine too) materials, as well as letters in this matter, is near-zero.

            Of course, the influence was exerted by persons whom, even if only, those to whom they listened listened!
            It is unlikely that our MO is guided by the opinion of social networks ... this is normal.
          2. +4
            13 August 2020 10: 25
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

            I believe that in fact the role of ALL (including mine too) materials, as well as letters in this matter, is near-zero. Most likely it was so - that corvettes are needed, the Ministry of Defense understands (it was not for nothing that they were going to be built in dozens in GPV 2011-2020), while 20385 are too expensive, and 20386 are not only roads, but also clearly cannot be serially built (one niasil , what series is there?). So we returned to 20380.

            hi It turns out that they did not guess with the time of order 20386 and its appearance. 20386 was not armed, it was proposed to compensate for this with modularity. But modularity makes sense with several types of modules and mass series. Otherwise, modularity comes out golden. The head 20386 comes with several OCD, the cost of these OCD could be offset by a mass batch. And so time and money are spent on OCD, and the series is not expected.
            NEA will pretty much unload this year. And if the Navy needs ships, then nothing stands in the way. You can continue the series 20380.
            Taking into account the tests "GRF Aldar Tsydenzhapov".
            1. +13
              13 August 2020 11: 36
              Greetings, dear Bashkirkhan! hi
              Quote: Bashkirkhan
              It turns out that they did not guess with the time of order 20386 and its appearance. 20386 was not armed, it was proposed to compensate for this with modularity.

              Everything is very complicated there. Klimov and Timokhin are sure that there was pure drinking and lobbying with a ship obviously unsuitable for the Navy. I’m not completely convinced of this, shall we say, also because I cannot understand some of the design features, and Klimov’s criticism doesn’t convince me - I’m afraid he may be biased here. But the fact is that 20386, even if (I emphasize if) he was optimally armed and equipped for the "corvette" service anyway for it obviously unsuitable, simply because it is too expensive, but rather weak for a frigate. At first I considered it to be something that could be serially built if Project 22350 frigates and 20380-20385 corvettes did not meet expectations, and maybe even test (electric propulsion), but, apparently, I was wrong.
              Complex and muddy story with this 20386. Not good.
              1. +5
                13 August 2020 12: 45
                Well, this brings us back to the question of why our fleet over the past 20 years needed to spend huge amounts of money on platforms of 2 kilotons and 3 kilotons and continue to dream of drinking a budget of 8 kilotons, and then 10 kilotons, when the insufficient efficiency of 8 kilotons is found out.
                And the question of permanent new power plants for these endless NIokrov ships, at a time when the old Soviet ships finish off the remnants of the resource.
                First, they built six 20380s, then let's build 20385, did not roll from 20385, let's turn 20380 into an analogue with a similar mast, and in parallel stir up 20386. 22350 have not yet done all four pieces and suddenly it turned out that the next four must certainly improve and generally need to aim to the new 22350M and some kind of Leader.
                I look at the United States with their running Ticks and Burks, which have almost the same platform and virtually a single power plant, and at our endless zoo with platforms and power plants. And I start to think once again about the naval from the point of view of the state economy
                By the way, the case for 20386 is already ready.
                1. +5
                  13 August 2020 14: 35
                  Not ready, the GEM has not been installed there yet, because it is not there. In that particular place, the hull is not formed, and the superstructure is not worth it.
              2. -4
                13 August 2020 18: 09
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                I'm not completely convinced of this, let's say

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                it is obviously unsuitable, simply because it is too expensive, and too weak for a frigate

                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                it is obviously unsuitable, simply because it is too expensive, and too weak for a frigate

                you are so consistent bully
                1. +1
                  14 August 2020 08: 24
                  Quote: DrEng527
                  you are so consistent

                  Why was it blurted out? The cost of 20386 is known and it is more expensive (although not several times) 20385 recognized as expensive
          3. +4
            13 August 2020 13: 25
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            So we returned to 20380.

            20380 project is not bad. But ... I think we need this corvette in the form of project 20387. Relatively inexpensive (slightly more expensive than 20380), and quite advanced to the level of at least 20385.
            As for the need to build corvettes ... I wrote a lot about this, and for me they need at least 4 units for 40 fleets, otherwise it makes no sense to start everything at all.
          4. +4
            13 August 2020 14: 32
            while 20385 are too expensive,


            22,5 billion, of which about 5 is RLC.
            With a simpler complex, such a ship would cost about 17-18 billion and it would not be "expensive".
            1. 0
              14 August 2020 20: 41
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              22,5 billion, of which about 5 is RLC.

              Perhaps due to the normal series \ serial production, the cost of the radar will decrease somewhat. As well as the cost of the ship as a whole. After all, the expected 6 corvettes for the Pacific Fleet will most likely be in the guise of Aldar Tsedenjapov.
              1. +2
                15 August 2020 11: 02
                The question arises - why such a radar on a corvette, which, purely due to the small ammunition load of the anti-aircraft guided missiles, will never repel a massive raid? And which one should be protected from air strikes anyway? For the money of 6 units of 20380 with a Zaronovsky radar, it would be possible to build at least 7 units with a simpler radar. And if we reduce the proportion of composites in the structure, then 8-9.
                Is there a difference - 9 ships or 6? With the same combat capabilities?
                This radar appeared on corvettes thanks to the connections of the bandit and the raider who drove the Screen.
                And thanks to his patron at the Military Industrial Commission.
                1. 0
                  15 August 2020 17: 12
                  Greetings to Alexander. hi
                  This is exactly what I proposed in previous discussions of this topic, when the appearance of the near-zone anti-submarine ship was discussed. Namely - "Pantsir-M" with its more powerful radar or the actual radar from "Pantsir-M". To make a full-fledged UNIVERSAL ship out of an anti-submarine ship in the near zone means to inflate its size and cost, and at the same time strongly compress it in ammunition.
                  But from some recent reports it followed that this is the look (like that of "Aldar Tsedenjapov") the Defense Ministry and the leadership of the Fleet consider the most promising (with the "Barrier").
                  It seems to me that such a radar would be better suited for a more or less budget frigate PLO VI 3500 - 4000 tons with a normal ammo for SAM, PLUR and anti-ship missiles in UKSK (16 pcs.), Good seaworthiness, autonomy and GAC. It is these PLO frigates with a moderate price tag, unified in armament with the existing samples and built by a good series, that could become a worthy (and fairly budgetary) replacement for the BOD 1155. A kind of air defense dried "Gorshkov".
                  And precisely as an PLO frigate, not a "universal ship DMZ". And let the station wagons for DMZ and OZ be 22350 and 22350M.
                  Corvettes, on the other hand, should be anti-submarine, inexpensive, massive and with moderate air defense - in BMZ, after all, the base aviation will cover them, and they usually go on a mission not alone, but at least in pairs, so that together the first wave will be beaten off, and there and the IA will catch up.
                  So the 20380 with the Pantsir-M radar and the SAM in the UVP is the optimal air defense system for a ship of this class and purpose.

                  But whether our Ministry of Defense will take the path of reasonable sufficiency in favor of mass, or will it remain true to its credo of "having no analogues" ... time will tell.
                  The contract has not been signed yet.
                  1. +1
                    16 August 2020 17: 02
                    I am spreading a similar article with Klimov on air defense of corvettes.
                2. 0
                  16 August 2020 16: 30
                  Quote: timokhin-aa
                  Is there a difference - 9 ships or 6? With the same combat capabilities?

                  9 ships have higher capabilities in all respects, but above all ammunition, and most importantly, the ability to be in 9 places, not 6 hi best the enemy of the good request
            2. -1
              16 August 2020 22: 34
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              22,5 billion, of which about 5 is RLC.
              With a simpler complex, such a ship would cost about 17-18 billion and it would not be "expensive".
              there it is still advisable to replace "Redoubt" with "Calm-1" (you see a couple of billions more minus), which is important (!), and something in the form of PLUR for effective fight against submarines (!), and "Packet-NK" is only for anti-torpedo protection. let's be honest with ourselves.
              And if not, then everyone will be better than 11664 (at the power plant and with the SJSC from 20380), there is initially less to fix / modify (!).
          5. -2
            14 August 2020 20: 48
            Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
            But in order to really be able to at least influence something, the next step is required - not letters to the Moscow Region signed by A. Timokhin, but petitions with tens of thousands, but rather a hundred or two thousand signatures.

            A naive proposal. These issues are not resolved by voting. Also call for strikes and protests. In any business, any research institute, laboratory, department of the ministry has its own gurus who understand the matter the way they see it. (I exclude cases of corruption). And, suddenly, from some newspaper, an Internet resource, they will write about what is categorically not included in their plans. What will be the result? Unfortunately, the direction of movement in such complex, confusing and costly issues changes only after another Tsushima.
          6. 0
            16 August 2020 00: 28
            From Maxim Klimov:

            1. You're wrong.
            2. See comments to the article about "Rubicon";)
            3. You are wrong about your articles, the resonance on them was very serious, both in the RF Ministry of Defense and "other instances." I personally came across this. And they were especially interested in your person at DIMK
            1. -1
              16 August 2020 01: 18
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              From Maxim Klimov:

              1. You're wrong.
              2. See comments to the article about "Rubicon";)
              3. You are wrong about your articles, the resonance on them was very serious, both in the RF Ministry of Defense and "other instances." I personally came across this. And they were especially interested in your person at DIMK

              Do not make a person look terrifying with your and Klimov's tales. A person clicks various garbage for his pleasure, and you will bring him to the zugunder for no reason.
              By nowadays, the glorious bodies are already imprisoned from idleness for a simple like on spy articles. Have a conscience and leave a person alone. He has children. This is for you old loafers.
              1. +1
                17 August 2020 07: 17
                Quote: Liam
                Don't scare a person

                Monsieur Liam!
                If YOU personally, when mentioning DIMK, do it in your pants (despite the fact that all normal people "in the village of Konashi" just laugh), then wear a diaper.
                And refrain from dragging its contents to the forum.
            2. +1
              16 August 2020 15: 13
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              From Maxim Klimov:

              1. You're wrong.

              I didn't doubt a bit laughing
              Quote: timokhin-aa
              And they were especially interested in your person at DIMK

              Okay, I'll have to write something interesting for them :))))))))))
              1. 0
                16 August 2020 17: 01
                Max told me for a long time that the series "sad look into the future" was noticed upstairs.
              2. +1
                17 August 2020 07: 18
                Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                Okay, I'll have to write something interesting for them :))))))))))

                I can drop a direct address "there" laughing
                1. +1
                  17 August 2020 07: 42
                  Quote: Fizik M
                  I can drop a direct address "there"

                  But what's the point? As I understand it, only public speaking can create some tension.
                  1. +2
                    17 August 2020 15: 36
                    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
                    As I understand it, only public speaking can create some tension.

                    this is his "public speech" in a "envelope" with a bow (and a brick laughing ) on the "village" "throw" angry
      2. +2
        15 August 2020 07: 55
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        And some people fueled these screams ...

        Thank you, Alexander, for heating
    2. +2
      13 August 2020 12: 04
      Who were they shouting to? Storetkin? Kitten rescuer?
    3. +1
      17 August 2020 08: 01
      Quote: rocket757
      Forgotten anti-submarine defense and corvettes

      Many, many, one could say, shouted that such powerful, important, striking means of our "vigorous" triad, submarines should be covered / guarded when they go on alert ...

      They can shoot straight from the base if that. Only Boreys need to be taken out
      1. 0
        17 August 2020 08: 14
        Quote: Pilat2009
        They can shoot straight from the base if that. Only Boreys need to be taken out

        They can smack, but "work" effectively, this is another calico.
        Yes, it is also important to disperse various striking means for a guaranteed retaliatory strike.
  3. +2
    13 August 2020 07: 50
    To reduce the cost of the IPC, it should abandon shock missile weapons. Or install the RCC optionally, modularly. It's just that the anti-submarine forces outfit include our favorite MRKs, and, if possible, a frigate. Also, the fleet needs coastal aviation, let it be the Su-30SM, since the fleet chose it ...
    1. +13
      13 August 2020 08: 56
      Quote: URAL72
      To reduce the cost of the IPC, it should abandon strike missile weapons.

      In theory, if you "register" the same 3C-14 on the IPC, one will not interfere with the other: in the anti-submarine version, 91R are charged, in the shock version - anti-ship missiles. This will allow not to produce different types of ships and not to suffer with modularity.
      1. +11
        13 August 2020 09: 11
        Exactly. UKSK solves all these issues.
    2. -2
      13 August 2020 10: 06
      Air defense needs to be simplified in order to reduce the cost, this is a ship of the near sea zone. Let 22350 air and aviation be engaged. But UKSK needs to be added.
      1. 0
        14 August 2020 03: 04
        I strongly disagree. Air defense cannot be simplified, even if it is a BMZ ship. In general, it is not particularly sophisticated on the 20380 project ...
    3. -1
      14 August 2020 20: 54
      Quote: URAL72
      To reduce the cost of the IPC, it should abandon shock missile weapons. Or install the RCC optionally, modularly. It's just that the anti-submarine forces outfit include our favorite MRKs, and, if possible, a frigate. Also, the fleet needs coastal aviation, let it be the Su-30SM, since the fleet chose it ...

      This will not make the ship cheaper, but will raise the cost of the squadron. To perform various tasks, you will need to introduce an additional number of specialized ships. But, at the same time, no one performs ALL tasks. Parts are different, yes. And, it turns out that in one period of operation some will be idle, and in another period, others. Management, costs more - opportunities for each individual weapon - less. Do not forget that the number of our ships is increasing, which increases the possibility of their destruction. Whether it is a harmoniously armed unit, with a minimum number of parasites on a hike, this is .....
      1. +2
        15 August 2020 15: 25
        Quote: Kuzmich Sibiryakov
        This will not make the ship cheaper, but will raise the cost of the squadron. To perform various tasks, you will need to introduce an additional number of specialized ships. But, at the same time, no one performs ALL tasks. Parts are different, yes. And, it turns out that in one period of operation some will be idle, and in another period, others.

        Which squadron? What are the varied tasks?
        IPC is the OVR. The OVR is busy 24/7/365 with the same task - ensuring the safety of approaches to the base. PLO and PMO - this is their lot, the only difference is in the outfit of forces at normal times and when ships exit / enter from / to the base.
        Why the hell is OVRovtsam strike missile weapons, if they work within the radius of the coastal SCRC? If a surface enemy appears in their zone, then the base with its coastal defense is no longer there.
        1. -1
          17 August 2020 14: 58
          Why the hell is the OVRovtsam strike missile weapons, if they work within the radius of the coastal SCRC?

          In my mind, far from the Navy, this is obvious.
          RCC radius is growing. It is very realistic in the near future to get a cover zone from surface forces of up to 1000 km. But it is not clear who will provide the PLO in the same radius. And our coastal complexes can be attacked just from under the water. As a result, we will lose both corvettes and bases and the coastal complexes themselves, and even radar. So we need ASW ships with minimal air defense (again, the radius of air defense systems is growing all the time)
          And many thanks to all the guys for the articles, I don't know how the naval headquarters are there, but the specialists in the research institutes (well, at least in the field of radar and electronics) read such articles. And so, drop by drop, an opinion is formed, which is then carried upstairs in a red daddy.
          1. 0
            17 August 2020 15: 02
            Quote: bk316
            RCC radius is growing. It is very possible in the near future to get a cover zone from surface forces of up to 1000 km.

            These are no longer the tasks of the OVR.
            PLO at the turn of 1000 km is the task of the DMZ ships. Moreover, it will not be possible to cover them with aviation from the shore, so the AB theme will again arise. smile
  4. +11
    13 August 2020 08: 15
    The news is definitely good. From this, Alexander's position is quite understandable to bypass some "problematic" moments in the project 20380 itself, which, however, do not make the project critically worse. Personally, as an outside observer, I still do not understand the desire of the Ministry of Defense to "register" on this ship as an air defense system exactly Redut, especially given the emergence of a very real alternative in the person of "Pantsir-M". Indeed, without Polyment antenna posts, we automatically limit the use of Redoubt only to 9M100 missiles, which have a maximum range of up to 15 km and an altitude of up to 8 km, thereby losing to the A57E6E missile of the Pantsir complex. Finishing the antenna mast to the level of "Aldar Tsydenzhapov" automatically entails a significant increase in the cost of the project, which is already more expensive from the outset than the cost of just a variant of the sea shell. At the same time, the Pantsir-M installation does not entail absolutely any costs associated with reworking the mast, since the Furke radar necessary for the operation of the complex is initially based on it (or its varieties, used, for example, in the Pantsir-SA / SM radar). In an extreme case, it was possible to implement the option, which is already being implemented on the extreme ships of project 22800, which successfully combine in one mast and elements of the Furke and Positive-MK radar. The only undoubted plus of the Redoubt is that 48 missiles are immediately available to us (12 cells of 4 9M100 missiles in each), while the Pantsir, even with an automatic loader, will take a certain time to reload. Plus, Redoubt has three times the number of targets fired at and eight times higher the number of guided missiles (the maximum number of simultaneously fired aerodynamic targets -16, ballistic -12; the maximum number of simultaneously guided missiles -32). However, this is true only when used in combination with the already mentioned Polyment, when transmitting data from the Furke radar, as it is implemented on the serial corvettes of Project 20380, this advantage is completely leveled and reduced to the same 4 simultaneously fired targets and 4 guided missiles.

    PLO remains another important gap. The package in its current state is rather a measure of protection of the ship itself from a torpedo attack, rather than a tool for clearing the water area from "foreign" elements in the face of enemy submarines. The best option was to place the 91RE1 torpedo missiles of the Caliber family on the corvette, which, although they also have certain kinds of problems, are being worked on to correct and, presumably, will eventually be completed. However, the placement of the ZS-14 required for the Caliber basing will increase the cost of the corvette to the skies. As a result, we will step on the same rake as in the case of 20385. The presence of an inclined launcher for Calibers, the need for which Alexander has already repeatedly said, could help here. After all, if you look closely at the view of the corvette 20380 from above, we will see that the Uranus occupy only half the width of the ship and it would be quite possible to find a place for mounting the inclined Caliber. But there are no inclined ones and are not expected, which means that there is only one way left - to improve the torpedoes of the Package to acceptable indicators. However, I do not know whether any research is being carried out in this direction; here it is necessary to consult with Klimov.

    Well, on the little things: not the most reliable engines and a small power reserve. And if we cannot do anything about the first point, then the second position could be solved, as it seems to me, by reducing the volume of the tank with aviation fuel. But this is no longer important.
    1. +7
      13 August 2020 08: 49
      Quote: Dante
      the desire of the Ministry of Defense to "register" the Redoubt as the SAM is still unclear, especially considering the emergence of a very real alternative in the person of "Pantsir-M"

      Some time ago, VO flashed articles criticizing the Pantsir: actual single-channel, unreliable destruction of high-speed targets at long ranges, etc. Apparently, the alternative to "Redoubt" is so-so.
      1. +2
        13 August 2020 09: 56
        Apparently, the alternative to "Redoubt" is so-so.

        If we talk about a combination of Redoubt + Furke + Polyment, then yes, Armor is not an alternative to it. If we are talking about a combination of Redoubt + Furke, without the PAA of Polyment, then there are not so many bonuses from the use of Redoubt missiles. In fact, we are talking about indicators comparable to ordinary Shell, only in prices exceeding it. Do you need such an overpayment for a dubious deal?

        In general, I would prefer to see a modernized Dagger on domestic corvettes (without these antediluvian drums of 41 tons each) - in my opinion, more than sufficient air defense for a ship in the near sea zone, besides, massive and cheap, time-tested and still demonstrating very decent performance in intercepting highly maneuverable targets. But this is purely my opinion, which, moreover, runs counter to the trends of the times.
        1. 0
          13 August 2020 10: 26
          Quote: Dante
          goes against the spirit of the times.

          This is not always reasonable, to go according to the trends of the times.
          Quote: Dante
          about a bunch of Redoubt + Furke, without the PAA of Polyment, then there are not so many bonuses from the use of Redoubt missiles.

          They just don't exist. For SAM with ARGSN can be successfully fired without radio correction at short distances. But only Polyment has radio correction.
        2. +2
          13 August 2020 10: 26
          Quote: Dante
          If we are talking about a combination of Redoubt + Furke, without the PAA of Polyment, then there are not so many bonuses from the use of Redoubt missiles

          I would venture to suggest that a partial unification with pr. 22350 will be an indirect bonus, which can be useful if their number is to be increased to some significant values. However, this is rather speculative.
          1. +3
            13 August 2020 12: 58
            I would venture to suggest that an indirect bonus will be partial unification with pr. 22350,

            I believe that in reality this was the main leitmotif of the Redoubt installation on the corvettes of pr. 20380, but as always good undertakings were smashed against the merciless stones of the harsh Russian realities.
            In truth: a miser pays twice, a stupid one - three times, and a sucker - always pays.
      2. -6
        13 August 2020 10: 05
        Quote: Kalmar
        "Redoubt" from it so-so.


        The redoubt itself is an extremely dubious thing to this day ...
      3. +1
        13 August 2020 11: 36
        You mean a famous report from 2012? This has practically nothing to do with the Sea Shell.
    2. 0
      13 August 2020 09: 05
      And what prevents you from sticking a pair of conventional 2-pipe TA, and charging PLURs into them? For the money, it will be cheaper anyway.
      1. +3
        13 August 2020 09: 09
        PLURs do not fire from torpedo tubes, they need RTPU - Rocket-trapedo launchers, as on "Petra", "Chabanenko" or 11540.
        1. +3
          13 August 2020 09: 48
          I remember they were called URTPU. Thirty years later, I don’t remember exactly, but, it seems, there was criticism - the torpedoes broke with excitement.
        2. 0
          13 August 2020 10: 06
          So on submarines, it is through the TA in the TPK that they are launched, or not?
          1. 0
            13 August 2020 10: 23
            Yes it is...
          2. +2
            13 August 2020 11: 37
            At 11442, the height was decent
        3. 0
          13 August 2020 10: 25
          Are you talking about waterfall launchers?
          1. +1
            13 August 2020 11: 26
            Absolutely.
          2. 0
            13 August 2020 11: 49
            In the same place, in theory, the only difference is in entering data into the ammunition.
    3. +10
      13 August 2020 09: 12
      An article is being prepared with an analysis of these issues.
    4. 0
      13 August 2020 10: 19
      (12 cells of 4 missiles 9M100 each)

      These rockets are very expensive.
      Quote: Dante
      not the most reliable engines

      Kolomna is a reliable thing
      Quote: Dante
      But there are no inclined ones and are not expected,


      Quote: Dante
      upgrade the torpedoes of the Package to acceptable performance.

      It won't solve the problem, from the word at all. Alternatively, you might want to think about creating 91Rcurts, that is, a short one, for use with Uranus PU
      1. +4
        13 August 2020 12: 51
        Namesake You misunderstood me. In the metal there are inclined installations, they have been tested, moreover, the modernization of submarines pr 949, which implies the installation of TPK in the existing glass from P-700 Granite, which is initially located (if my memory serves me) at an angle of 45 degrees, shows that there are no problems with an inclined start neither Caliber nor Onyx are tested. The problem is that inclined installations do not go into the series, they are not taken into account either when modernizing Soviet first ranks, or with a possible upgrade for ships already built in Russia.
        Kolomna is a reliable thing

        Now, after a while, they managed to achieve a more or less acceptable quality, but can you guarantee that there will be no rollback or someone from the chain of intermediaries will not cheat with the quality of raw materials or components. Knowing our realities, I cannot guarantee this. And the motor, if made in accordance with all the standards, is essentially not bad, although there are not enough stars from the sky.
        It won't solve the problem, from the word at all. Alternatively, you might want to think about creating 91Rcurts, that is, a short one, for use with Uranus PU

        Why not? quite a promising, in my not professional opinion, idea. The only thing I'm afraid is that the size of Uranus will severely limit us either in launch range or in charge weight. But anyway, why not give it a try?
        1. +3
          13 August 2020 13: 56
          Quote: Dante
          The problem is that inclined installations do not go into the series, they are not taken into account either when modernizing Soviet first ranks, or with a possible upgrade for ships already built in Russia.

          Well, considering what kind of modernization they zababahayu on Shapashnikov, I think badly about the mental abilities of the naval and Litte. No, rather very bad. However, a second option is possible, which is even worse ...
          Quote: Dante
          after a while they managed to achieve more or less acceptable quality,

          I was seven years old when I departed on a ship with Kolomna diesel engines, nothing and not a mechanic, but diesel locomotive 13D100 worked reliably on the whole, but on Project 20380 the problem was more likely to be with gearboxes ... Fortunately, the diesel engines themselves are spent diesel locomotives ...
          Quote: Dante
          Uranus will severely limit us either in launch range or in charge weight. But anyway, why not give it a try?

          In my opinion, it is possible to limit the launch range not to 50 km as now, but to 25-30 km if we proceed from the actual launch ranges of the product. It is better, of course, to have a long range, but for the BMZ ship, in the conditions of shallow areas near the bases, the solution is more than adequate
      2. 0
        15 August 2020 07: 07
        "Medvedka" to finish.
    5. +6
      13 August 2020 12: 50
      The main weapon of the fleet of the most perceived enemy is aviation. Conclusion - it's no fucking saving on air defense, otherwise it will be like on the Black Sea in the Great Patriotic War: the enemy has virtually no fleet, and our fleet cannot do anything serious - it is drowned from the air. The placement of the ZS-14 raises not only the price, but also the possibilities, which, given the rather modest number of ships in each of the fleets separately, is extremely important. And most importantly, the capabilities of our shipbuilding program are limited not only by money, but also by the capabilities of the industry. Conclusion - you need to make 20385 in the best configuration. And better - 22350 (comparable money, more opportunities).
      1. +2
        13 August 2020 13: 13
        Conclusion - it is necessary to make 20385 in the best configuration. And better - 22350 (comparable money, more opportunities)

        By the way, a pretty sensible proposal. No matter how we try to maintain a balance, in this displacement we still have to sacrifice something. Then it's better to really build strong middlings, capable of solving a wide range of problems. It was on this path that the Americans took. On the whole, the Chinese are following the same path, with the exception that so far they still cannot abandon massive, but simple ships in favor of more universal, but more technically sophisticated and complex projects, although gradually the balance is still shifting in their direction ... With regard to the domestic specifics, I would introduce a temporary moratorium on the construction of everything that does not exceed 1,5 thousand tons, but corvettes no longer fall into it, and they will still have to be built: well, all our shipyards can’t produce 22350, it’s banal there will be enough professional staff with the proper level of competence.
        1. 0
          13 August 2020 14: 00
          Price question. 1 ship pr. 22350 at a price approximately equal to two pr. 20380
          1. 0
            13 August 2020 14: 40
            Yes. Here are just 20386 - 400 million, and 22350 - 450 million.
            1. +1
              13 August 2020 16: 16
              That is why 20386 is worse than pr. 22350 in all positions
      2. +1
        13 August 2020 16: 49
        The potential enemy has 52 multipurpose nuclear submarines, this is the main threat. In the clean after (that is, the sea), at least strengthen the air defense of the corvettes, at least do not strengthen it - our fleet has no chances, but to enable our SSBNs to go to sea without receiving a pair of Virginias on the tail is precisely the main task of the fleet. at this stage. So KMK is better than 3 ships than 2, even if those two will have better air defense and "Calibers" in installations with equal capabilities in the area of ​​anti-aircraft weapons.
    6. +2
      13 August 2020 17: 41
      Reducing the volume of the tank with aviation fuel - This means turning the helicopter into a decoration on the deck. It is unlikely that this will add capabilities to the ship.
      1. +1
        13 August 2020 19: 46
        Yes, that's right. The 20380 has only 20 tons, which is about 5 full refuelings for the Ka-27 (I don't remember exactly, I might be wrong here). You cannot decrease it.
        1. +2
          13 August 2020 23: 56
          But Klimov asserted that the size of the tank for such a ship is excessive, or rather, in one of the comments he put it like this: the tank is simply huge. I did not find a figure anywhere about tonnage, so I proceeded exclusively from this comment. It is clear that if we are talking about 20 tons, they will not make much of the weather, but there is a feeling that the volume is still noticeably larger. It is enough to look at at least the layout of the premises and we will see that a significant space has been allocated to the containers for the augaz (at least in a two-dimensional form)

          But even if we proceed from 20 tons, the question arises: does a ship need 5 full refueling for a helicopter with an autonomy of 15 days, the main scene of which is the near sea zone?
          However, as I already noted above, this is already lyrics and conceptually does not affect the ship.
          1. +1
            17 August 2020 07: 22
            Quote: Dante
            But Klimov asserted that the size of the tank for such a ship is excessive, or rather, in one of the comments, he put it like this: the tank is simply huge.

            I DIDN'T WRITE THIS
            it was about the CELLAR OF THE AIRMOUNT
            which was used in 20385 to place missiles in the stern (by reducing this cellar)
    7. 0
      15 August 2020 12: 45
      Nothing good has been heard about 9m100 missiles for a long time. There is no video of their launches either. In addition, it is believed that the rocket has an ARLGSN, and not an IKGSN. According to the last video about the s-350, the 9m96 seeker locks the target at 10-15 km, at 9m100 the capture range will be even less due to the smaller antenna. That is, on the corvette 20380 it can only be used point-blank. So his real air defense is 12 9m96 missiles.
      1. 0
        17 August 2020 12: 37
        Quote: shtraib
        So his real air defense is 12 9m96 missiles.


        Absolutely not enough
  5. Hog
    +1
    13 August 2020 08: 25
    Well, with a victory.
  6. Ham
    +4
    13 August 2020 08: 26
    to begin with, the shipbuilding industry had to be revived - and only then the fleet was to be built ... hence such terms are crazy! plus the "non-brothers" and the Deutsches threw in problems with their sabotage
    the next series will go much faster
    1. +3
      13 August 2020 09: 10
      In the case of corvettes, underfunding, which was of a regular nature, was strongly influenced.
      1. Ham
        0
        13 August 2020 14: 36
        "Underfunding" is a matter of course ... however, as experience shows, money alone cannot solve the problem if there are no technologies and a production base with qualified personnel ...
        the main shipbuilding facilities of the USSR navy were located in Ukraine and this played a major role in delaying the construction time ...
        in fact, new shipbuilding complexes had to be built in a new place, and those that existed had to be modernized ...
        shipbuilding, both military and civil in the Russian Federation, was created virtually from scratch
        1. +1
          13 August 2020 14: 36
          This did not apply to corvettes
          1. Ham
            +3
            13 August 2020 14: 44
            This did not apply to corvettes

            really?
            I have one of my close relatives working in Zelenodolsk (and there they are "only" building MRK) - he told how in the early 2000s the plant's management ran around Zelenodolsk in search of former employees ... persuading highly qualified workers to return to the plant;)
            because the money was like a fool of candy wrappers - and there was no one to work! it takes 5-6 years to train a skilled worker (not to mention engineers) ...
            It took 20 years of work to put at least corvettes on the stream ...
            And we were still lucky that the main enterprises engaged in the development and construction of nuclear power plants remained on the territory of the Russian Federation !!! very lucky!
            1. +1
              13 August 2020 14: 54
              Zelendolsk has nothing to do with the corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385, they cannot even be built there.
              1. Ham
                +4
                13 August 2020 14: 59
                the conversation is not for Zelenodolsk! this is so for example ...
                and talking about shipbuilding in general! or at those enterprises where corvettes are being built was different?)))
                talking about building a corvette is not trading with "bush legs" ...
                1. +2
                  13 August 2020 19: 49
                  At Severnaya Verf all this was to a lesser extent.
                  At the ASZ - in full growth.
                  As a result, the NEA does no better than the SV.
                  1. +2
                    13 August 2020 21: 20
                    I wonder why Severnaya Verf builds corvettes slower than the ASZ?
                    1. +2
                      13 August 2020 21: 38
                      The NEA was dispersed relatively recently, as I understand it, there were extensive landings. When the plant handed over "Gromkoy", there was not a single person in the commissioning team who had reached at least forty years of age. The staff at the plant has been updated.
                      Maybe that's the case.
                      1. +2
                        13 August 2020 22: 08
                        Yes, I also read that the overwhelming majority of Loud's respondents are under forty. By the way, one of the workshops of the ASZ was occupied by the "Kashalot" of project 971, which was excluded from the lists of the Navy on October 9, 2019. This year it was going to be disposed of at the enterprise, followed by transportation of the 3-compartment block along the Amur River to a long-term storage point. Space would be freed up for the construction of ships.
                    2. +1
                      15 August 2020 12: 37
                      The Northern Shipyard started a major modernization of capacities at the most crucial moment, which caused it to get into a financial ass, but only a couple of years ago everything was more or less settled. However, now it allows laying a couple of frigates per year.
  7. +6
    13 August 2020 08: 43
    A bit confused. The article repeatedly emphasizes the importance of ASW for the Pacific Fleet, but specifically for this parameter, 20380 looks rather pale: it carries only a "Packet-NK" (4 torpedoes, 4 anti-torpedoes) and a helicopter. It is clear that this is still much better than nothing at all, but still somehow a little.
    1. +12
      13 August 2020 08: 49
      Quote: Kalmar
      A bit confused.

      everything is very simple here. Now we have almost nothing at all, and so at least something will happen, despite the fact that if they suddenly decided to build 20386, there would be nothing at all. The bottom line is that 22160 is not good at all, 20385 and 20386 are too expensive, while 20386 is also constructively strange, that they still cannot build it.
      20380 is better than nothing. And given the relatively new GUS, the helicopter isn't too bad.
      1. 0
        13 August 2020 10: 01
        I still do not understand - is it possible to base only one rotorcraft on 20386?
      2. 0
        13 August 2020 10: 03
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        helicopter is not so bad


        We have a full OUT with them. All the more, uh, the Ka-27 is too heavy for a corvette. IMHO.
        1. +6
          13 August 2020 10: 18
          Quote: Cyril G ...
          We have a full OUT with them.

          Who's arguing? But the ability to fly not from the shore but with landing on a corvette is still worth a lot. Well, for the future, like a new helicopter undertook to create. It is clear that the ulita is traveling - someday it will be, but corvettes are not built for 10 years
          1. 0
            13 August 2020 10: 22
            Well, I still defend the following point of view. The main value of the runway on a corvette is the possibility of using corvettes as a jump airfield. In this case, 2 gas stations will be enough. But then the need for a hangar is questionable.
        2. -1
          13 August 2020 10: 41
          Quote: Cyril G ...
          We have a full OUT with them.

          And what "OUT" do you have with the helicopters?
          I may have missed something ...
          1. +1
            13 August 2020 10: 50
            And what is all right with them?
            According to rumors, an adequate modernization of the Ka-27 is not being carried out. So solid fiction ...
            1. 0
              13 August 2020 10: 55
              I do not think that with PLO helicopters
              everything is so good with us, just
              the word "OUT" alerted me, I thought
              everything collapsed. But it turned out - no, just
              everything is the same.
              Do you know something about Ka-27PL helicopters,
              or use information from open
              sources?
              1. 0
                13 August 2020 11: 03
                Quote: Bez 310
                Do you know something about Ka-27PL helicopters,
                or use information from open
                sources?


                In this case, I will not answer. I do not know how reliable all this is, and the degree of openness of information, but I did not like it ...
                1. -1
                  13 August 2020 11: 24
                  I didn’t understand the answer, but I don’t need it either ...
              2. +2
                13 August 2020 11: 21
                In open sources, it is well described what was done to them.
              3. +1
                17 August 2020 08: 21
                Quote: Bez 310
                Do you know something about Ka-27PL helicopters, or do you use information from open sources?

                from open (public procurement)
                In the process of this "modernization", the ANTI-YOUTH SEARCH AND AIMING SYSTEM was CUT OUT and DROPPED out of the ANTI-WATER helicopter, "replacing" (in quotes) with two "CRAWS" - KGA "Kema" and KTS "Fazatron"
                Those. received an "anti-submarine helicopter" without ... PPS!
                Well, and a bunch of jambs ..
                1. 0
                  17 August 2020 09: 26
                  Are you too "vilifying"?
                  In the same place, in MA, not all are "lobbyists"
                  there are also normal people.
                  1. +1
                    17 August 2020 15: 33
                    Quote: Bez 310
                    Are you too "vilifying"?

                    I gave the FACTS
                    and the degree of degradation of the same department of the MA VMA just shocked me ...
                    before that, I remembered her IN AN EXTREMELY DIFFERENT ...
                    1. -1
                      17 August 2020 15: 41
                      Yeah...
                      It turns out that everything is much worse than I thought.
                      1. +1
                        17 August 2020 15: 43
                        Quote: Bez 310
                        It turns out that everything is much worse than I thought.

                        WORSE
                        all this "green" is actively "moldy"

                        and in terms of scope far beyond the "usual" in the Navy and Aerospace Forces
                      2. -1
                        17 August 2020 15: 46
                        To be honest, I know a little about the situation
                        deeds in MA, and your words only confirm
                        my knowledge. I would put it this way - in the foreseeable
                        there is nothing to hope for, to my great
                        unfortunately.
                      3. +1
                        17 August 2020 16: 00
                        Quote: Bez 310
                        I know a little about the situation
                        deeds in MA, and your words only confirm
                        my knowledge. I would put it this way - in the foreseeable
                        there is nothing to hope for, to my great
                        unfortunately.

                        there is something to hope for ... for example, the Navy very actively supported the "pirate action"
                        https://www.vpk-news.ru/articles/55595
                        with a categorically negative attitude of Kozhin (by the way, they say, he is already an "employee of Radar-MMS"), "fountains" and the department of the MA VMA ...
                        But it was strangled by one "fat cat of the OPK". And then Martirosov was gone
                      4. 0
                        17 August 2020 16: 51
                        Su-34 in the submarine version - nonsense, and on the Su-34 - naval
                        The Navy has no missile carriers and will not have money. Generally,
                        there is nothing to hope for.
                        All that remains is to play with three Be-200s ...
                      5. +1
                        17 August 2020 16: 53
                        Quote: Bez 310
                        Su-34 in submarine variant - nonsense

                        this is a VERY effective option (of course, it does not cancel normal PLO aircraft), and for very reasonable money
                      6. -1
                        17 August 2020 17: 06
                        In a past life, I did a little PLA,
                        I have an idea of ​​the use of PLA in
                        different conditions, so my opinion is
                        stupid things.
                        You may have a different opinion, but this
                        there is no exotic plane, and there will not be, and this
                        the conversation doesn't make sense.
                      7. +1
                        17 August 2020 17: 15
                        Quote: Bez 310
                        In a past life, I did a little PLA,
                        I have an idea of ​​the use of PLA in
                        different conditions, so my opinion is
                        stupidity

                        And why did you decide that on the "platypus" "Baku" going to put? wink
                        There is a completely different ideology of application and the concept of building the complex, and a lot has been developed by me.
                        Lightly and slightly touched on this in the article
                        The key feature of the proposed modernization of the Su-34 was supposed not only to increase combat capabilities and expand the range of tasks to be solved, but also to ensure close tactical interaction with ships through the use of modern communication facilities and the placement of special small-sized "information terminals for joint action" (ICD).
                        The composition of the aviation multipurpose complex was supposed to include Su-34M aircraft with a modernized on-board armament system, aviation weapons (new and promising), quick-change containerized means of support, information terminals joint action on ships and naval submarines.

                        And it was not "fantasy", tests of experimental samples of "entogo itself" were going to be carried out last summer!

                        Shl, just in case, I will note that I am a submariner (and a successful anti-submarine operator), and I also know very well the topic of PLO aviation (to the extent that I developed very non-trivial plans for joint search engines, it did not work out at sea, because it “hacked” the upper "flight bosses of the Elizovites)
                      8. 0
                        17 August 2020 17: 33
                        There are many words, words are modern and not always clear,
                        but it is not, and never will be. And the expression "subject
                        aviation PLO "I could not master. Sorry.
                      9. 0
                        17 August 2020 17: 36
                        Quote: Bez 310
                        no matter,

                        the project was slowed down at the last moment (despite the fact that the Navy "turned on the green light for it")
                        actions of one "fat cat" of the defense industry complex
                        actually why I wrote about it in the obituary to Martirosov
                        from the technical point of view, everything was absolutely real (and the Aerospace Forces for the Su-34 first episodes was not going to "hold on with my teeth")

                        And the expression "subject
                        aviation PLO "I could not master. Sorry.

                        sorry
                        for this is not only our "Baku", "Emeralds" and RSL-16, but also a good knowledge of "what and how" "beyond the river" bully
                      10. -1
                        17 August 2020 18: 51
                        Since the Su-34M project is closed, there is nothing to talk about.
                        Talk about equipment and tactics of submarines in the open
                        mode I'm not ready. I know there is a lot to learn
                        from open sources, but the old school does not order.
                        I will say very briefly - no breakthroughs in the work of the submarine
                        I don't see the Russian Navy on submarines, everything is at the Soviet level.
                      11. +1
                        17 August 2020 18: 58
                        Quote: Bez 310
                        Once the project Su-34M

                        Su-34M has nothing to do with what was conceived for the Navy
                        this is a completely different topic
                        Quote: Bez 310
                        Talk about equipment and tactics of submarines in the open
                        mode I'm not ready.

                        and I'm ready, in the "cage" article on this topic
                        Quote: Bez 310
                        I know there is a lot to learn
                        from open sources, but the old school does not order.

                        This is not the point, we are catastrophically lagging behind in the ideology of building the PPS (by the way, just for the "adventure" with the naval Su-34, I was planning a NEW one)!
                        and it is necessary not only to talk about this, but to beat the alarm!
                        Quote: Bez 310
                        I will say very briefly - no breakthroughs in the work of the submarine
                        I don't see the Russian Navy on submarines, everything is at the Soviet level.

                        And they are, and "fresh".
                        But the backlog of the USSR is completely outdated (except for "non-tradition")
                      12. -1
                        17 August 2020 19: 15
                        Quote: Fizik M
                        in the "clip" article on this topic

                        Read.
                        Quote: Fizik M
                        And they are, and "fresh".

                        We'll see.
                        Quote: Fizik M
                        we are catastrophically lagging behind in the ideology of building the PPP

                        Not surprised.
                        Quote: Fizik M
                        .. it is necessary not just to speak but to "beat the alarm"!

                        I would like to "glance at the calendar first."
                      13. 0
                        17 August 2020 19: 17
                        Quote: Bez 310
                        I would like to "glance at the calendar first."

                        I'm not going to substitute (and substitute a resource)
                        I know the boundaries of permissible very well, and what is very important, I am able to justify them
                      14. -2
                        17 August 2020 19: 31
                        I react briefly, but extensively - Duc!
      3. +4
        13 August 2020 10: 27
        How many are those helicopters? There is no production. Here, too, you need to move.
        1. +3
          14 August 2020 00: 00
          I would also add: how many pilots are there who can land a car on the deck of such a small ship? Something tells me that there are even fewer of them than the helicopters themselves.
          1. +1
            14 August 2020 00: 43
            Many yachts also have helipads. And civilian pilots put civilian helicopters on them.
            1. +2
              14 August 2020 08: 32
              Near the coast and in calm weather.
              1. 0
                14 August 2020 10: 38
                The range does not matter. Excitement will also create problems for the military pilot. At the very least, training / retraining will be easier than restarting machine production.
                1. 0
                  14 August 2020 12: 16
                  Only a military pilot is ready for these problems. Like his helicopter. So does the ship. So did the crew on deck.
                  Unlike a yacht and a civilian pilot on some Bell 206.
                  1. 0
                    14 August 2020 12: 49
                    So that's what we are talking about. Uv. Dante says there is a problem with the pilots. And I say that the problem is not so big. If civilian pilots are ready for such a risk, then specially trained military ones may well be ready. Moreover, the danger on warships was leveled by a trained team ready to come to the rescue.
      4. 0
        16 August 2020 23: 07
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        20380 is better than nothing... And given the relatively new GUS, the helicopter isn't too bad.
        and the worse, sorry, it would be 11664 ?! With the same GAS, at the same GEM ... With the UKSK already inscribed in the case, and not with Uraniums and Packet-NK ?! And if he will say with "Calm-1", and not with "Redoubt" ?! It can very realistically become a BETTER alternative than 20380 (!)... do not find ?! In my opinion, this is much more -
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        than nothing.
        ?! Zelenodolsk plant with its design bureau, and the area of ​​the Zaliv part leased by it ?! just North. the shipyard can be unloaded ... And at the Amur NW, there is nothing to build them (11664), because it is not more than 20380 by VI, and not even much less (and that means at the same power plant, it is quite possible it will be a little faster) ... ?!
    2. 0
      15 August 2020 07: 02
      "Medvedka" would not hurt him at all.
  8. +2
    13 August 2020 08: 55
    In the old days, up to two could be involved in the output of one SSBN as a support force. brigades of small anti-submarine ships, several BODs (later retrained in the TFR) of Project 1135, a consolidated anti-submarine aviation regiment, diesel-electric submarines and one (occasionally two) multipurpose nuclear submarines.

    The author does not even know that in the Soviet Navy there were NEVER BRIGADES of small anti-submarine ships. And there were OVR brigades, which included divisions of small anti-submarine ships and minesweepers! If you undertake to write such articles, then at least study the material!
    1. +1
      13 August 2020 09: 07
      Yes, he was in a hurry.
    2. +1
      17 August 2020 16: 55
      Quote: moreman78
      If you undertake to write such articles, then at least study the material!

      Any more objections to the author? Then you may be more careful to choose expressions? And if you have already "studied the material", then write yourself, we will compare wink
  9. +2
    13 August 2020 09: 55
    That is, we are talking about what we so chronically lacked: serial production.

    That's putting it mildly. Not just not enough, but sorely lacking for decades!
  10. +1
    13 August 2020 09: 56
    With a victory. Alexandra and common sense.
    Who else would bring common sense back to the economy? So that instead of many years of waiting for the mythical "Western investor" the government itself would determine and finance the development of the necessary industries, and not through commercial banks, but "effective managers" would provide a "zero cycle" for new enterprises by digging foundation pits.
  11. 0
    13 August 2020 10: 02
    It would be logical to unify the corvette in terms of the radar system with the first-series Karakurt MRK.

    Then on the air defense complex. The Corvette Redoubt raises a lot of questions ...
  12. +4
    13 August 2020 10: 08
    Good news, but these are only plans for non-fulfillment
    which no one is responsible for. I don't remember anymore
    whence this expression: "As it has long been customary in Russia, nothing to
    the deadline was not done ... ".
    In general, I really like the active position of some authors
    VOs that do not stop at highlighting the shortcomings, but also
    persistently seek to eliminate them. Keep it up!
    But I am so arranged that I cannot pass by without spitting into the well ...
    Here - "... the exit of one SSBN as a support force could
    involve ... a combined anti-submarine aviation regiment ... ".
    There are no "consolidated" regiments, and they do not fly in regiments to provide an exit.
    1. +2
      13 August 2020 11: 22
      But I am so arranged that I cannot pass by without spitting into the well ...


      This is an unfortunate wording on my part. Anti-submarine aviation forces, both aircraft and helicopters, are roughly equivalent in number to a regiment. Somehow it was necessary to write.
      1. +1
        13 August 2020 11: 27
        No no no...
        Everything is much more modest.
        But I liked the article itself.
  13. +4
    13 August 2020 10: 09
    The author, you are not just a great author, you are a real man! Russian man! There would be more of them!
    1. +4
      13 August 2020 11: 23
      Thank. We will shake this palm further.
  14. +2
    13 August 2020 12: 29
    Where Big Money (in the form of a gift) is spinning, common sense, logic, zeal for the state budget is absent.
    Business, nothing personal.
    It is not known what will be built and for what money.
    Do not count your chickens before they are hatched.
    1. 0
      13 August 2020 14: 01
      They just have different performance indicators.
  15. +1
    13 August 2020 12: 39
    The author is a great optimist. He writes himself that
    Of course, neither S. Shoigu, nor anyone else directly said "head on" that it was 20380 that would be built.
    , but at the same time I am absolutely sure that these will not be his "favorites" 20386.
  16. +5
    13 August 2020 12: 56
    1. Many thanks to the author for an honest civil position (water wears away a stone).
    2. In my humble opinion, the more articles about the problems of the Navy and their discussion at the AO (despite the fact that there are enough inaccuracies, mistakes and all kinds of fantasies in the articles and, especially, in discussions), the more useful it is for the development of the Russian Navy.
    3. Sometimes one gets the impression that the "collective intelligence of the VO" is more competent than the official one.
    4. Let's continue in the same spirit. In addition to the benefits for the case (for the Russian Navy), no harm (subject to HRT).
    1. +1
      13 August 2020 14: 18
      subject to HRT


      By the way, it has already become a problem. After articles in different dialogues, people leak so much information that I am already forced to filter what I write in serious articles, collect links to open sources in order to know for sure that I have not blurted out too much by mistake.
      This, for example, was written by the collective mind of several people for a week and half of the time was spent checking whether it was in the public domain or not.
      https://vz.ru/society/2020/8/12/1054447.html
      1. +1
        13 August 2020 15: 08
        Previously, what was in the public domain began to disappear, this creates very great difficulties. Up to the point that you get some information from an open source, and then it goes "under the stamp".
        Do not you know.
    2. 0
      19 August 2020 14: 48
      For me personally, the last nail in the coffin of the minds of officials from the Navy - was the shameful modernization of the BOD Shaposhnikov. As far as I am a person far from the fleet and naval engineering, in comparison with the same author of the article, but my independent opinion about this "modernization" is such - horror.
  17. +2
    13 August 2020 13: 14
    It makes no sense to build further ships with budgetary, but low-power and subsonic anti-ship missiles Uranus. If we cannot compete with a probable enemy in quantity, we need to take quality, and for this new corvettes need to be built only with the Onyx and Caliber anti-ship missiles. It is necessary to refine the corvettes 20385 and launch them into series, or equip 20380 Onyx anti-ship missiles in deck containers, the same as those of the Uranus.
    1. +2
      13 August 2020 14: 05
      Uranus, in the form in which it stands at 20380, has one fundamental advantage - the ability to recharge the launchers at sea with a floating crane.
      1. -2
        13 August 2020 14: 43
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        the ability to recharge launchers at sea with a floating crane.
        For a corvette - not very relevant: the base is not so far away to justify the replacement of Onyx with Uranus.
        1. +1
          13 August 2020 14: 55
          It is very relevant in light of how long this base will last after the time of Ch.
          1. -1
            13 August 2020 14: 59
            This means that we need to make support ships capable of reloading 3s14 at sea: Uranus is not our main anti-ship missile.
            1. 0
              13 August 2020 15: 11
              This is a floating dock with a crane. Will not work
      2. 0
        13 August 2020 16: 21
        That is why PLUR-91Rkurts is needed, approximately in the dimensions of Uranus ... Plus, minus ...
        1. +2
          13 August 2020 20: 07
          In this size, only PLUR with nuclear warheads / depth charges will be obtained. An adequate torpedo with the necessary giblets will not fit. It is only 3850 long. This is not enough.
          1. 0
            13 August 2020 20: 23
            Quote: garri-lin
            It is only 3850 long.


            The length of the ship version of Uranus is 4450 mm (Or 4.4 m), the Kh-35U is probably longer
            For comparison, the length of Asroka-VLS is 4.89 m, with a flight range of 28 km, which, given the fact that MTT is the same size as Mk46, directly hints at the possibility of creating a PLUR in the dimensions I indicated. Moreover, as you know, Uraniums are recharged by replacing the entire PU, that is, the TPK can be somewhat longer.
            However, this is all IMHO, but a number of circumstances indicate that the creation of a PLUR in the dimensions of 3M24U is quite possible and moreover necessary
            1. 0
              13 August 2020 22: 07
              The length of the rocket is 3850. The rest is the accelerator for acceleration to the speed required to turn on the engine. He will not give range. Only speed at the initial stage. The range seems to have been increased with the same dimensions. The smaller engine made room for more fuels. But the elongated TPK may help. But here it is easier to make a new rocket.
              1. 0
                13 August 2020 22: 11
                On the asrok, the starter also takes up part of the length. Again, remember we offered for export shortened products of the Caliber complex.
                1. 0
                  13 August 2020 22: 28
                  In fact, PLUR is a torpedo. You need to look at the minimum possible torpedo necessary to defeat the enemy submarine. And then think about how to deliver it about 50 kilometers. And preferably even further. PLO corvettes will guard the "gate" of the SSBN exit. It is desirable to strike at maximum range. That the enemy could not "exchange". The range of PLUR is desirable to have an equivalent range of confident identification of enemy boats. By the way, there is another problem in shallow water. The closely spaced bottom interferes with the operation of the torpedo seeker. This can complicate the torpedo and affect the size.
                  1. 0
                    13 August 2020 22: 45
                    Quote: garri-lin
                    It is necessary to look at the minimum possible torpedo necessary to defeat the enemy submarine.


                    If a 324 mm torpedo hits, it will disable the submarine with a probability of 0.7-0.8 ....

                    And then think about how to deliver it about 50 kilometers.


                    What for? In good conditions, in the ocean Dobn.LF, GAS in "Echo" mode, if you are very lucky, it will reach 40, in shallow areas Dobn. will fall twice in comparable conditions. Considering that the main task is to work in the coastal zone, it is enough to have a Dpusk 25-30 km.
                    1. 0
                      13 August 2020 23: 02
                      324 mm. This is an allusion to MTT from the NK package. A good torpedo is only 3200 mm long. A bit big. Reducing the range from 20 to 10 kilometers will not greatly reduce the size.
                      I can't say anything about the detection range. I always believed that modern SACs can be heard from tens and hundreds of kilometers. It is not for nothing that since the 70s Blizzard, Trumpet and Waterfall have been striving for a range of 50 km.
                      1. +2
                        13 August 2020 23: 38
                        Quote: garri-lin
                        I can't say anything about the detection range.


                        This is the reality. This range is achieved in the Echo GAS mode at the low frequency mode in the 1st DZAO. The actual detection ranges of modern submarines in the ECHO mode are small.

                        There are no other options for the head of the PLUR than the MTT torpedo.
                      2. 0
                        14 August 2020 00: 41
                        Such ranges for any GAS? Or are there prospects for more sensitive ones?
                        MTT is good. But she's not small. 3200 for 400 kg.
                      3. 0
                        14 August 2020 00: 46
                        Only for powerful towed low and mid-range HAS. Sound in water does not propagate linearly, it depends on the depth and on the time of year, etc. All this cannot be explained in a nutshell. google if you are interested in something like a textbook of hydroacoustics for the fishing fleet. There is a theory ..
                      4. 0
                        14 August 2020 01: 49
                        I was just interested in theory. That is why I thought that the detection range was large. But the accuracy, with increasing range, drops significantly. Plus, no one can guarantee that because of the distortion of the sound in the heterogeneous thickness of water, that sound came not from around the corner. You kind of understand. Therefore, I will not argue. But I always thought so.
        2. 0
          15 August 2020 06: 58
          Or maybe it's better to finish Medvedka.
  18. +5
    13 August 2020 13: 54
    In Kamchatka, with ASW, everything is so sad that we don't even have to talk about the combat stability of our submarine missile carriers. ASW surface forces are represented by two (!) Albatrosses. Two !!! Who can they even cover?
    1. +5
      13 August 2020 14: 08
      I can't do anyone, that's the point.
    2. 0
      14 August 2020 05: 40
      No longer, one of the corvettes 20380 all the same got to us in Kamchatka.
      But one.
  19. +2
    13 August 2020 14: 19
    Quote: Shadow041
    It makes no sense to build further ships with budgetary, but low-power and subsonic anti-ship missiles Uranus. If we cannot compete with a probable enemy in quantity, we need to take quality, and for this new corvettes need to be built only with the Onyx and Caliber anti-ship missiles. It is necessary to refine the corvettes 20385 and launch them into series, or equip 20380 Onyx anti-ship missiles in deck containers, the same as those of the Uranus.

    And we will get another corvette - UNDEFRIGATED in several copies! And we need a massive PLO corvette, they need at least 4 pieces in each OVR brigade - Kamchatka, Vladivostok, Severomorsk, Sevastopol, Novorossiysk, Baltiysk, plus at least 2 pieces are needed - in the OVR brigade in Kronstadt and in separate OVR divisions in Severodvinsk and Sovetskaya Havana. In total we get - at least 30 pieces of corvettes! Now available - only 6 in service and 4 in construction.
    1. +1
      13 August 2020 14: 46
      To Vladivostok and Severomorsk it would be better to have 4 frigates each. But in the Baltic and in the Black Sea there, yes, you can get by with the cheapest 20380: they will be covered from the coast.
      1. 0
        13 August 2020 20: 30
        No, no better, frigates, as usual, are torn apart for long-range missions, and as expected, the OVR will remain with the number of ships equal to zero. And since Project 20380 costs about 2 times cheaper than Project 22350, everything is pretty obvious, isn't it? In addition, the creation of a relatively inexpensive Karrakurt clearly hints at the possibility of creating a relatively inexpensive IPC - the carrier of the Minotaur, which allows you to close the issue in a short time. Moreover, it is obvious that there will be essentially no differences in components - only the PTZ Package-NK complex and hydroacoustics are added. That is, for the price of a frigate we will get a minimum of 3.5 IPC. Bingo!
        1. 0
          14 August 2020 08: 31
          Only this weak IPC will be, to be honest. And with diesels, the problem has not gone away.
          1. +1
            14 August 2020 10: 00
            Minimally sufficient and cheap enough. For us, the main number of Minotaur carriers, albeit relatively weakly armed ...

            Another question with regards to the program for the construction of Karrakurt, you will of course excuse me, but if there was a desire, the naval command could, but did not want to, push through the installation of Packages and SACs on Karrakurt. But why in the fleet everything should finally be answered by the investigation. In my opinion, all these actions - hammering a bolt on PLO, PMO and MPO of the fleet forces are already pulling on the corpus delicti provided for by Article 275 of the Criminal Code of the Russian Federation.
    2. +2
      13 August 2020 14: 56
      In total we get - at least 30 pieces of corvettes!


      So much was originally planned 20380 - 30 units.
    3. +2
      14 August 2020 06: 30
      Quote: moreman78
      And we need a massive PLO corvette

      Is it necessary? What will such corvettes do in the area of ​​operation of at least the Polish fleet? Turkish or Japanese? A massive PLO corvette is needed if only other forces of the fleet: aviation, attack surface ships, submarines, will ensure dominance at sea for PLO corvettes. Do we have such powers? Or are they at least planned? If not, then it is more expedient that the corvette itself could fight for dominance at sea. Those. instead of the PLO 20380 corvette, the universal corvette 20385 would be more suitable. And the issue with the PLUR would be resolved.
  20. +4
    13 August 2020 15: 06
    Quote: bk0010
    To Vladivostok and Severomorsk it would be better to have 4 frigates each. But in the Baltic and in the Black Sea there, yes, you can get by with the cheapest 20380: they will be covered from the coast.

    Quote: bk0010
    To Vladivostok and Severomorsk it would be better to have 4 frigates each. But in the Baltic and in the Black Sea there, yes, you can get by with the cheapest 20380: they will be covered from the coast.

    Frigates are not OVR ships. The frigates are part of other formations - brigades and divisions of surface ships, which are based in the main naval bases - Vladivostok, Severomorsk, Sevastopol, Baltiysk. Ships OVR and ARE DESIGNED TO PROVIDE THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE MAIN FORCES OF THE FLEET (submarine and large surface ships).
  21. +2
    13 August 2020 17: 22
    Dante (Kirill), respected, maybe in Komsomolsk follow the path of Severodvinsk: how to create a research and production company at SEVMASH and Zvezdochka, together with factories and the RF Ministry of Defense, launch into a series of houses for young (and not very, but very necessary specialists ), for specialists from different universities of the Russian Federation to organize an internship, and those who have proven themselves in practice - to lure with the "buns" prescribed in the collective agreement to the plant and put a mortgage on the stream for workers at really ridiculous interest. The measures were tested as temporary in Severodvinsk and gave their results.
  22. +1
    13 August 2020 18: 29
    Common sense is to make effective decisions: maximum value for money available. The available resources must grow steadily.
    Decisions should be based on the achievements of industry science. The concept of "common sense" indicates the limitation of the intellectual resource, i.e. the decline of industrial science. But the scientific approach has no alternative.
  23. +1
    13 August 2020 19: 27
    I greet all VOshnikov and congratulate on a joyful event. Sound logic prevailed, which is immensely pleasing.

    Alexander,
    Happy holiday to you, I can imagine how bright it is for the soul when you see how your thoughts and aspirations come true. Especially those for which he fought and stood up.

    A very joyful event, I personally waited for it and believed drinks I sincerely hope for the continuation of the banquet laughing laughing laughing
    1. +2
      13 August 2020 19: 51
      Yes, the continuation of the banquet seems to be planned.
    2. -2
      13 August 2020 22: 14
      Another optimist. Why did everyone get the idea that it would not be 20386? He's also a corvette. And all the authorities consider him our main future corvette. Will you need a lot of money for 6 20386? But nothing was said about the fact that these would be cheap corvettes.
      1. 0
        13 August 2020 23: 45
        And no OCD Comrade. Evmenov. (c.) If we were talking about the Northern shipyard, this is one thing. Far East means Project 20380.
      2. 0
        15 August 2020 11: 24
        The fact is that the new corvettes must be laid down and paid for until 2027, while the GPV.
        And since 20386, this is obviously unrealistic.
  24. -1
    13 August 2020 20: 47
    I support the esteemed Alexander Timokhin, we need ships in the near zone poorly and nmo, because only submarines can operate in the far zone. the laying of a series of corvnts is caused by the objectivity of the Amur River, on which they can walk. The exit from the DMSD objectively covers the needs of all types of mrk, in favor of ships that are bad and nmo, which are not enough. It is optimal to have ships no larger than a frigate, because the time of attack surface ships has sunk into oblivion back in 1903-1905 ... in Tsushima. 80 380 not a bad ship BMZ
    1. +2
      13 August 2020 21: 40
      for the time of the attack surface ships has sunk into oblivion back in 1903-1905 ... in Tsushima.


      But what about the First and Second World Wars? Falklands? "Mantis"? Well, or look who is escorting Turkish recreation centers to Libya.
    2. 0
      16 August 2020 23: 32
      Quote: vladimir1155
      380 not a bad ship BMZ
      terribly unsuccessful and unbalanced initially on the SAM and submarine composition of weapons, - KOSYAK !!!
  25. +2
    13 August 2020 23: 50
    Quote: vladimir1155
    80 380 not a bad ship BMZ


    Not very much to be honest. I would cut the sturgeon.
    A-190 would be replaced with AK-176, Redoubt would be replaced with Pantsyr-M on the model of Project 22800, I would get rid of the expensive Barrier and hangar, leaving the runway. Pantsyr-M would have been installed in the stern, in the bow of the UKSK. Well, of course Packet-NK.
  26. -4
    14 August 2020 01: 02
    Why can't you master the project in the 20386 series?
    It is more progressive in architecture.
    I read the article and links to other articles "diagonally". The author considers a priori that project 20386 is difficult to master in a series. but why so is not clear.
    1. +3
      14 August 2020 08: 04
      It is under-armed and prohibitively expensive (the price is almost like that of a frigate with incomparably lower capabilities)
    2. +5
      14 August 2020 08: 28
      I have explained many times, in articles on the topic the risks are listed.

      Therefore, I will limit myself to stating a few facts.

      1. The star reducer has not been able to make the 6RP reduction gear for two years. It was supposed to be ready at the end of 2018. But it has not yet been done - and not because they are not trying.

      2. 6РП is made at the same industrial capacities as the Р055 reducer for frigates of project 22350. Therefore, the launch of the 20386 series automatically means the termination of the construction of 22350.

      3. The price of 20386 in the end is already approaching the price of 22350 and almost equals the price of TWO 20380 in the version "with a simple radar".

      4. There is reason to believe that the 20386 will not be able to run on the electric motors of the economy drive due to their low power. He will not be able to tow the GUS on them for sure.

      5. There is reason to believe that it will have too low combat survivability.

      6. He cannot use the cannon to fire forward on the course while repelling air raids, unlike other ships.

      7. There is a risk that the huge plastic superstructure will experience such large deformations that the radar antennas cannot be used to fire the air defense missile system.

      This is the minimum. I, of course, understand that for some people this is nonsense, because the boat is beautiful and the advertisement was good, but as for me, finishing off the fleet for this all, and even for a lot of money, is too much.

      And yes, where is progressiveness there, where is it? In my opinion, this is just a jumble of structures of some kind, not a ship.
  27. 0
    14 August 2020 08: 44
    Corvette project 20380 in any of its options is not at all ideal. He has a lot of flaws


    Imperfect against the background of what? Foreign classmates? So they suck very well in terms of characteristics and weapons. What is it all about?
    1. +1
      14 August 2020 12: 18
      And what about classmates? Not ideal in comparison with what is needed to perform combat missions as intended.
      And this is so, to put it mildly.
      Another thing is that there is no alternative.
      1. 0
        14 August 2020 13: 29
        Well, well, what is there? Someone lacks weapons and equipment, which some do not have on frigates?
        1. +1
          14 August 2020 14: 23
          There are no working means of GPA, no noise suppression systems, no, there is no possibility of recharging the RTPU, which are used there instead of TA (any tactically competent officer understands what this is fraught with in a war), this also implies the impossibility of using torpedoes with TU on him, whether such were created by us (not we have them), there is no small-sized missile defense system, which reduces the air defense missile system to 12 missiles, there is no radio correction of the missile defense system, which significantly increases the probability of missing a target without firing, the AK-630M firing sectors are very narrow, there is practically no mutual overlap of sectors, radar The UO is located far from the axis of the barrel blocks, which makes the shooting accuracy insufficient by modern standards.
          The range of frequencies that GAS "Zarya" "takes" is very suboptimal, low frequencies are not included in it, which gives the enemy the opportunity in some cases to evade detection with the help of the GPS.
          For this reason, the use of a BEC with a LF hydroacoustic illumination station is impractical, and there is nowhere to install it, while the enemy usually has such an opportunity technically.
          The most important thing is that there is no way to turn on the same radio range in which the RSL dropped from the aircraft work, there is no way to remove information from them directly, the BIUS will not "chew" it - and as a result, to solve a problem that in the west can be solved with one corvette we need about five or six.
          No PLUR.

          Is that enough for you, or else to throw in?

          But by the way ...

          There is no UAS, no programmable detonation projectiles, and no weapons that, in a difficult jamming environment and the presence of dense civilian traffic, could be used to hit the target with the first strike (see Combat in the Red Sea).
          The ship is underspeed, and very strong, incl. design, that is, with that little thing that the enemy (any) will thrust into us in BMZ at the first stage, it will be very difficult for him to fight. Nowhere to place the UAV.

          I will not decipher anything, judging by the daring remarks, you yourself should know everything.
          The rest, please yourself.

          And - temper your show-off. You, to put it mildly, are not in a position to "suggest an idea" to someone here and explain something to someone.

          War is not a sport, and in the performance characteristics of technology there is no competition for who flies next, and more on board, but there is the ability to perform combat missions or the inability.
          Or, as in the case of 20380, limited capacity.
          The joy is all here only because the alternatives to 20380 are even worse, and because it is better than nothing.
          1. 0
            14 August 2020 14: 50
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            the firing sectors of the AK-630M are very narrow, there is practically no mutual overlap of the sectors, the UO radar is located far from the axis of the barrel blocks, which makes the firing accuracy insufficient by modern standards.


            This is not, to put it mildly. The problems with the 630 were exactly eliminated by replacing the guidance drives, which actually solves the issue. The sectors there are sufficient and they cannot be called narrow. The problem of the location of the radar control system has been solved for a very long time with the help of a wired correction for parallax, although in ancient times when firing from a VC at such a training target as a barrel laughing it was desirable to maneuver the ship so that the line of sight passed through the target, gun and column ...
            1. +1
              14 August 2020 15: 08
              The sectors there would be normal if the trunks were higher than the hangar roof.

              No parallax correction can be compared to the radar above the barrel block - see the same Falanx or the Chinese seven-barrel guns.

              for such a training target as a laughing barrel, it was desirable to maneuver the ship so that the line of sight would pass through the target, cannon and column ...


              I will subtly hint that the effect will not be completely eliminated, although yes, you can already shoot at the barrels without problems, even with a fighter on the column, at least somehow else.
              1. 0
                14 August 2020 18: 10
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                No parallax correction can be compared to the radar above the barrel block - see the same Falanx or the Chinese seven-barrel guns.


                Of course, compare, if only because the radar operates in a comfortable environment, unlike the one on the gun. The problem was in the accuracy of the guidance drives ... Therefore, 2 AUs were fenced, where one was enough
                1. +1
                  14 August 2020 18: 15
                  The question arises why the Chinese did not go this way, why do the Americans use a separate radar even for RAM?
                  Because. Not everything is perfect.
                  1. 0
                    14 August 2020 18: 19
                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    why did not the Chinese go this way,

                    Well this is the Chinese, I liked it outwardly, copied it .. Not well, but Cho looks cool.

                    why do Americans use a separate radar even for RAM?

                    Do not pretend that you are not aware that Phalanx was used to create the RAM. The Americans love, unlike our naval woodpeckers, honed and time-tested solutions.
                    1. 0
                      14 August 2020 18: 29
                      Well this is the Chinese, I liked it externally, copied it ..


                      Duc their original design is not copied.

                      Do not pretend that you are not aware that Phalanx was used to create the RAM.


                      The first RAMs were just launchers. Then they blinded a SeaRAM with an abbreviated BC and a Phalanx fire control system. Officially - to get a completely autonomous system.
                      But for some reason they began to put it on "Burke". That kind of hints.
                      1. 0
                        15 August 2020 15: 32
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        Duc their original design is not copied.

                        But at the same time it is suspiciously reminiscent of "Goalkeeper". wink
                      2. 0
                        15 August 2020 20: 08
                        According to some external signs.
          2. -3
            14 August 2020 15: 19
            You are, to put it mildly, in the wrong position


            I didn't understand something. Who are you to decide who and what to write? Do you think you are an expert? Create your own website - there and be good. And yes, show me the perfect production corvette. Otherwise, your claims to 20380 are unfounded.
            1. +1
              14 August 2020 15: 37
              I did not understand something.


              You do not understand "something", you do not understand anything at all.

              Who are you to decide who and what to write?


              Something like this is just you - without even having a rudimentary knowledge of the subject, you climb here to teach literate people. Grow up a bit, take care of your education, then try to throw a show-off, preferably in front of those who are at least equal to you in level, otherwise it turns out funny somehow.

              Do you think you are an expert?


              Compared to you, he is quite an expert, no discounts laughing

              And yes, show me the perfect production corvette. Otherwise, your claims to 20380 are unfounded.


              Once again, for guys with square heads, it's not a sport to "compare corvettes". It is necessary to compare something else.
              For example, for a French corvette, the GPA device can take over an Algerian torpedo, some 53-65K, or whatever they have, it means it meets the required performance characteristics.
              And ours must deflect early Mk.48 torpedoes, European, Turkish, Japanese and Chinese torpedoes - otherwise it will not match. Moreover, its comparison with French does not matter. What matters is what our enemy is armed with.
              Is that clear or not?

              Although the one that 20380 does not start at all when discharged into water ...

              In short, child, go learn, do not annoy adults.
              1. -2
                26 August 2020 10: 45
                After the cool story about Japan. which supposedly can make 10 warheads, only those who are completely repulsed on their heads can consider you an expert. And on 000 I have completely different reviews from those who are closely dealing with them. They speak about the ship only from the positive side, and with the GAS everything is not so simple there. In principle, with many of your sketches, not everything is clear, but personally, this is enough for me
                1. +1
                  26 August 2020 14: 53
                  After the cool story about Japan. which supposedly


                  Why ostensibly?

                  And on 20380 I have completely different reviews from those who are closely dealing with them.


                  Judging by the level of thinking, these are schoolchildren who glue model 20380 from a box.

                  and with GAS everything is not so simple there.


                  Mu oink. What is there ambiguous? Everything is clear there, the GAS is good in principle, but the low frequencies are cut, which is a minus. That's all. You do not understand anything in the topic under discussion, stop.

                  Basically, with many of your sketches not everything is clear, but personally, this is enough for me


                  Straight by the officer's daughter, it was ambiguous, yeah.
                  To write about sketches, you need to be able to distinguish between sketches and non sketches, you have no such ability, at least there is no everyday understanding of the issues discussed, there is no idea of ​​anything outside Wikipedia, and accordingly there is no moral right to characterize this or that information as a sketch.

                  Go read books.
                  1. -1
                    26 August 2020 18: 38
                    These are the people who climbed these corvettes from top to bottom and speak very flatteringly about the GAS capabilities, noise, and driving performance.

                    To write about sketches, you need to be able to distinguish between sketches and non-sketches, you don't have this skill


                    For 10 years there was someone to train on.

                    at least there is no everyday understanding of the issues discussed, there is no idea about anything outside of Wikipedia


                    May I not say what word did these describe you and the level of your expertise?

                    Why ostensibly?


                    Because the level of your knowledge about the creation of nuclear weapons and strategic nuclear forces and Japan's capabilities in this area is at the level of those very schoolchildren. In general, you will roll out more than one thermonuclear vyser anyway, there will be something to neigh
                    1. +2
                      26 August 2020 20: 32
                      And nothing in essence.
                      Well, okay, schoolboy, gurgle on, mother your pride. You are nobody, your opinion means nothing.
                      Goodbye.
          3. +1
            17 August 2020 00: 47
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            War is not a sport, and in the performance characteristics of technology there is no competition for who flies next, and more on board, but there is the ability to perform combat missions or the inability.
            Or, as in the case of 20380, limited capacity.
            The joy is all here only because the alternatives to 20380 are even worse, and because it is better than nothing.
            correct remark, although I am no longer very versed in the specifics of the performance characteristics listed by you, but I think that is why 386 is only in one copy, and 380 in a series.
  28. -1
    14 August 2020 13: 30
    Spending on the 22160 project and RTOs is, of course, rational. The fact is that these ships are built at other enterprises than the 22380/5/6 corvettes. The goal is to load factories and at the same time replenish the fleet with secondary ships. Yes, this money could have been used to build several 22380 corvettes. However, Severnaya Verf and ASZ would not have enough capacity to carry out mass construction, because they are loaded with other projects. In addition, the money for the BMZ submarine was provided for in the state armaments program. This part of the Navy has also become thinner. The author of the article undertook too superficially to criticize the placement of orders in conditions when the project 20380 was born hard and long.
    1. +1
      14 August 2020 14: 30
      Spending on the 22160 project and RTOs is, of course, rational. The fact is that these ships are built at other enterprises than the 22380/5/6 corvettes. The goal is to load factories and at the same time replenish the fleet with secondary ships.


      Irrational. The same Zelenodolsk should have been given the development and construction of a series of new missile boats, which are also time for us to change (and no matter how important it seems to be more important than RTOs). Saturation of the fleet with 22160 scows is useless, without them it is stronger than with them.

      The money had to be spent differently. Not this nonsense.
      1. 0
        15 August 2020 12: 46
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The same Zelenodolsk should have been given the development and construction of a series of new missile boats, which are also time for us to change (and no matter how important it seems to be more important than RTOs). Saturation of the fleet with 22160 scows is useless, without them it is stronger than with them.

        What else is the development and construction of new missile boats ?? Again to breed a variety and a zoo? We already have "Buyans" and "Karakurt" - aren't they enough? A sufficient number of them will be built by 2025. To load Zelenodolsk's capacities and support the industry, we decided to order project 22160 - many countries have similar patrol ships, but the Russian Federation does not. They are the first casualties at the outbreak of war. Why? It's simple: the enemy fleet will not pass by the patrol ship and will destroy it on the first hit. The Russian Federation, of course, will wait for the first blow of the enemy - as an attack signal, after which a moral and diplomatic right to respond will appear. In this sense, it is not rational to hang a lot of expensive weapons on patrol ships. Also 22160 can be considered a special forces of the seas - to fight saboteurs and pirates. They are especially relevant in the Black Sea against Ukrainian provocations and the protection of oil platforms.
        1. 0
          15 August 2020 16: 05
          Quote: Volder
          In order to load Zelenodolsk's capacities, to support the industry, we decided to order project 22160 - many countries have similar patrol ships, but the Russian Federation does not.

          Other countries have patrol ships together with normal ships of the Navy. The Navy ordered the project 22160 instead normal ships.
          Glavkomat does not see prospects in the creation of ships, previously designated as "Corvette IAD". One of the main tasks of the OVR is to ensure the protection and defense of the naval forces in the areas of naval bases and in the adjacent territories. This task is now carried out by onshore observation means, stationary hydroacoustic stations and coastal missile-artillery troops, armed with anti-ship missiles of different ranges, as well as anti-submarine and strike aircraft.
          Rejecting the corvette, the Navy turned to the idea of ​​creating patrol ships - less armed, but with greater autonomy and versatility, capable, including, to go on long hikes. The design of the patrol ship will be handled by the North Design Bureau.
          © Navy Commander Chirkov. 2014
          As a result of ordering pr. 22160:
          - The Navy received ships that can only perform the tasks of the PSKR FSB (which they were according to the project), but not naval ships;
          - The Navy did not receive new OVR ships;
          - the surface forces of the OVR died, the air forces ("anti-submarine aviation") were never born (8 vehicles for 4 fleets);
          - naval bases remained without PLO (PMO died even earlier);
          - The Navy, having lost 6 years, is frantically trying to modernize the OVR Albatrosses, which still remember restructuring и new thinking (and with modernization they can only suck and on needles).
          Quote: Volder
          Also, 22160 can be considered the special forces of the seas - to fight saboteurs and pirates. They are especially relevant in the Black Sea against Ukrainian provocations and the protection of oil platforms.

          Security of the border and oil and gas platforms is the responsibility of the FSB. Because only the FSB has the right to detain violators - like on Prirazlomnaya.

          The Navy, having received a ship designed for the FSB, stubbornly climbs into someone else's field of tasks - apparently in order to somehow prove the need for this order.
          1. 0
            9 September 2020 09: 55
            Quote: Alexey RA
            Other countries have patrol ships together with normal ships of the Navy.
            If you mean the US and China, then YES, you are right. But many other countries do not have such large fleets, but they still have patrolmen.
            The Navy ordered the project 22160 instead normal ships.
            Not this way. It is ONLY about Zelenodolsk and its technical facilities. Therefore, Project 22160 - NOT instead of normal ships. There is no way to build "normal" ships at Zelenodolsk.
            As a result of ordering pr. 22160:
            - The Navy received ships that can only perform the tasks of the PSKR FSB (which they were according to the project), but not naval ships;
            Unarmed patrol ships of other countries, apparently, also cannot perform combat missions.
            - The Navy did not receive new OVR ships;
            They didn't make much sense.
            - the surface forces of the OVR died, the air forces ("anti-submarine aviation") were never born (8 vehicles for 4 fleets);
            Let's not drag in the airborne aircraft of the heavenly forces of the Navy here.
            - naval bases remained without PLO (PMO died even earlier);
            Specifically, for bases, ASW forces are quite enough. Outside the bases - not enough. Therefore, project 22160 was created, which was equipped with an anti-submarine helicopter, a hydroacoustic station - to monitor the situation. More details: https://iz.ru/1006220/aleksei-ramm-bogdan-stepovoi/vyzvali-patrul-vmf-smenil-taktiku-zashchity-morskikh-baz-ot-podlodok
            - The Navy, having lost 6 years, is frantically trying to modernize the OVR Albatrosses, which still remember restructuring и new thinking (and with modernization they can only suck and on needles).
            I do not share your alarmist pessimism. So far, they are not going to write off the IPCs, and their modernization will allow to pull the time required for putting into operation pr. 20380/85. One corvette replaces 2-3 IPC.
            Security of the border and oil and gas platforms is the responsibility of the FSB. Because only the FSB has the right to detain violators
            Is the FSB also engaged in the protection of ships at sea crossings? FSB boats can fight attack drones? The protection of naval bases is NOT the responsibility of the FSB. Well, anyone can detain pirates - just remember:
            in 2010, sailors from the Marshal Shaposhnikov artillery ship freed the Moscow University tanker seized by Somali pirates; during the operation, 10 pirates were captured;
            in 2009, the Admiral Panteleev ship was detained 15 miles east of the Somali coast, a ship carrying 29 pirates and weapons.
            The Navy, having received a ship designed for the FSB, stubbornly climbs into someone else's field of tasks - apparently in order to somehow prove the need for this order.
            The FSB cannot patrol the 200-mile economic zone on-line and non-stop. And Project 22160 can patrol far from the coast for 2 months, waiting and monitoring the situation.
            1. 0
              9 September 2020 10: 32
              Quote: Volder
              Not this way. It is ONLY about Zelenodolsk and its technical facilities. Therefore, Project 22160 - NOT instead of normal ships. There is no way to build "normal" ships at Zelenodolsk.

              It's not about Zelenodolsk's capabilities. The point is that the Navy closed the work on the "OVR corvette" for the sake of the patrol ships. After that, the OVR was left without new PLO ships, because without a project, there is simply nothing for any technical capacity to build.
              Having abandoned the corvette, the Navy turned to the idea of ​​creating patrol ships - less armed, but with greater autonomy and versatility, capable of, inter alia, go on long trips.

              Quote: Volder
              Unarmed patrol ships of other countries, apparently, also cannot perform combat missions.

              Other countries, in addition to patrol ships, have normal ships capable of performing these tasks. Our work on these normal ships was killed for the patrolman.
              Quote: Volder
              They didn't make much sense.

              Yea Yea. This is especially true against the background of the latest statements by the Navy about the modernization of the Albatross, almost all of which still remember the Tagged One. So there was no pointthat the fleet is now trying to revive 30-35 year old IPCs - only to keep the OVR afloat. smile
              Quote: Volder
              Let's not drag in the airborne aircraft of the heavenly forces of the Navy here.

              All claims are against the commander-in-chief of the Navy. It was he who decided to replace the surface ships in the OVR with aviation.
              Quote: Volder
              Specifically, for bases, ASW forces are quite enough. Outside the bases - not enough. Therefore, project 22160 was created, which was equipped with an anti-submarine helicopter, a hydroacoustic station - to monitor the situation.

              At 22160 there is no GUS PLO. It has an anti-sabotage GAS.
              However, in the article you mentioned, "Gibka" turns out to be an air defense system capable of providing anti-submarine air defense. While in real life it is a MANPADS on a pedestal, which is unable to hit even a helicopter with an ATGM, simply due to a lack of range.
              Quote: Volder
              So far, they are not going to write off the IPCs, and their modernization will allow to pull the time required for putting into operation pr. 20380/85.

              All IPCs were commissioned either under the USSR or in the first post-Soviet years. They are already 30-35 years old. And all this time they were actively exploited. They can only go out of modernization to suck.
              Quote: Volder
              Is the FSB also engaged in the protection of ships at sea crossings?

              Is it necessary to build a specialized ship for this? And at a time when we have nothing to ensure the withdrawal of SSBNs from the bases? Needless to say, we have a rich fleet.
              Quote: Volder
              FSB boats can fight attack drones?

              Can 22160? Than? Is the Agile with a shorter range than the Hellfire?
              Quote: Volder
              in 2010, sailors from the Marshal Shaposhnikov artillery ship freed the Moscow University tanker seized by Somali pirates; during the operation, 10 pirates were captured;
              in 2009, the Admiral Panteleev ship was detained 15 miles east of the Somali coast, a ship carrying 29 pirates and weapons.

              But there are no more pirates in those parts. It turned out to be cheaper and more efficient to hire PMCs to guard ships.
              Quote: Volder
              The FSB cannot patrol the 200-mile economic zone on-line and non-stop. And Project 22160 can patrol far from the coast for 2 months, waiting and monitoring the situation.

              22160 was designed for the FSB. And 60 days of autonomy is a requirement of the BOHR., Which later migrated to 22100.
              And since the FSB was entrusted with the duties of fish protection in the economic zone, they must patrol this zone 24/7/365.
              1. 0
                9 September 2020 12: 01
                Quote: Alexey RA
                It's not about Zelenodolsk's capabilities.
                And how to download Zelenodolsk? Have you thought about it? So the Ministry of Defense thinks about it, unlike you. There will be no more Buyanov-M bookmarks.
                The point is that the Navy closed the work on the "OVR corvette" for the sake of the patrol ships.
                Well, you yourself quoted the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Chirkov, from which it follows that the construction of pr. 22160 is NOT for the sake of the OVR corvettes, but for the sake of the greatest rationality and expediency.
                After which the OVR was left without new PLO ships
                Close to the bases, enemy submarines will not approach, and far from the bases, PLO aircraft, corvettes 20380, BOD 1155 are used ... Perhaps in the future they will finish the GAS "Minotaur-ISPN-M.2" for Project 22160, as the "Polyment-Redoubt" "for 22350 ...
                Other countries have normal ships in addition to patrol ships capable of performing these tasks.
                If you mean the US and China, then YES, you are right. But many other countries do not have such large fleets, but they still have patrolmen. Googled at your leisure, which countries have patrolmen, and which "normal" ships their fleets are composed of. I think you will be surprised ...
                Navy is now trying to revive 30-35 year old IPCs
                Do you propose to build new IPC instead of pr. 20380? The modernization of the MPK will allow to delay the time required for the commissioning of project 20380/85. One corvette will replace 2-3 IPC.
                All IPCs were commissioned either under the USSR or in the first post-Soviet years. And all this time they were actively exploited. They can only go out of modernization to suck.
                You shouldn't count on it. There are no prerequisites for this. After modernization, they will last another 10 years.
                Quote: Volder
                Is the FSB also engaged in the protection of ships at sea crossings?

                Quote: Alexey RA
                Is it necessary to build a specialized ship for this?
                Yes. To broaden your horizons, read the articles by A. Timokhin on this topic:
                1) https://vz.ru/world/2020/8/29/1057558.html
                2) https://vz.ru/world/2020/8/15/1055206.html
                Quote: Alexey RA
                And at a time when we have nothing to ensure the withdrawal of SSBNs from the bases?
                At "Army-2020" contracts were concluded for corvettes 20380/85 - in addition to those already under construction. So in 10 years we will have something to ensure the withdrawal of SSBNs from the bases. Until this wonderful moment, the IPC will remain in the ranks, and after that they will not be needed.
                Can 22160? Than? Is the Agile with a shorter range than the Hellfire?
                In combination with the Igla-S, the Gibka complex can intercept heat-contrast air targets, including various anti-ship missiles, UAVs and aviation; in the configuration with the 9M120-1 ATGM "Attack", it becomes possible to fight against small surface boats of the enemy, various coastal objects, as well as combat helicopters.
                But there are no more pirates in those parts. It turned out to be cheaper and more efficient to hire PMCs to guard ships.
                How will PMCs protect ships? For this, ships need a near and far sea zone. PMCs are overland guys.
                22160 was designed for the FSB. And 60 days of autonomy - this is the requirement of the security guard, which later migrated to 22100. And since the FSB was entrusted with the duties of fish protection in the economic zone, they must patrol this zone 24/7/365.
                For fish protection 24/7/365, you can use loitering drones. As soon as intruders appear, the FSB boats move forward to intercept. For this, FSB officers do not need to be at sea for 60 days. There was an optimization of the work of the FSB.
        2. +1
          15 August 2020 20: 06
          What else is the development and construction of new missile boats ?? Again to breed a variety and a zoo? We already have "Buyans" and "Karakurt" - aren't they enough?


          We are not talking about RTOs, which are just an evolutionary dead end, but about the fact that we simply do not have a simple and cheap attacking unit instead of "Lightning" as a class, despite the fact that all the terms for its existence are there.

          Well, how do you anticipate Arlie Burke's maneuver on RTOs? After all, it is FASTER than the MRK already on the 3-point wave. Plus the price - Karakurt with Shell is 10 billion.
          A little expensive for those who have to climb under fire. MRK and missile boat are completely different things, if you don't know.

          To load Zelenodolsk's capacities and support the industry, we decided to order project 22160 - many countries have similar patrol ships, but the Russian Federation does not. They are the first victims at the outbreak of war. Why? It's simple: the enemy fleet will not pass by the patrol ship and will destroy it on the first hit.


          You are very far from reality, I want to tell you. All these things are not done that way, in general.

          The Russian Federation, of course, will wait for the first blow of the enemy - as an attack signal, after which a moral and diplomatic right to respond will appear.


          The first strike will be immediately nuclear. Are the consequences clear? The entire survival strategy of the Russian Federation should be built on PREVENTING the enemy's actions, suppressing his attempts to carry out an attack and delivering a PREVENTIVE strike when the enemy is preparing an attack and this is reliably established.

          We simply have no other chances to stay alive, the forces are too unequal.

          Also 22160 can be considered a special forces of the seas - to fight saboteurs and pirates.


          It CANNOT be effectively used as such, technically.

          They are especially relevant in the Black Sea against Ukrainian provocations and the protection of oil platforms.


          The current legislation of the Russian Federation unambiguously defines these tasks as the prerogative of the FSB.
          1. 0
            9 September 2020 11: 09
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            we simply do not have a simple and cheap attacking unit instead of "Lightning" as a class, despite the fact that all the terms for its existence are there.
            "Lightning" is the last century. Replacing them - modern "Buyans" and "Karakurt". One such MRK is more powerful than two missile boats. From a combat point of view, it is more efficient to build precisely RTOs. By the way, the "Lightning" was built at a time when there was still no BRK "Bal" and "Bastion".
            Well, how do you anticipate Arlie Burke's maneuver on RTOs? After all, it is FASTER than the MRK already on the 3-point wave.
            The task of RTOs is NOT to catch up and maneuver, but to wait. The same "waiting" task for diesel-electric submarines of the "Varshavyanka" type.
            Plus the price - Karakurt with Shell is 10 billion.
            We will not stand behind the price. I would not recommend you at all to consider the question of price to justify the need / not need.
            MRK and missile boat are completely different things,
            Things are different, but the tasks are the same.
            The first strike will be immediately nuclear.
            Is not a fact. In addition, we are talking not only about the United States (not only about countries with nuclear weapons).
            The entire survival strategy of the Russian Federation should be built on PREVENTING the enemy's actions, suppressing his attempts to carry out an attack and delivering a PREVENTIVE strike when the enemy is preparing an attack and this is reliably established.
            Alexander, this is US strategy. It is the United States that is ready to attack first in order to forestall not only a reliably established, but also a very probable (highley like) attack on itself. Russia, knowing that the enemy is preparing for war, will not be the first to open fire. This was the case in 1941, but nothing has changed. From a legal and diplomatic point of view, the one who attacked first starts the war. And nobody cares that the "victim" was allegedly preparing an attack, go and prove ... Russia does not need such a reputation!
            We simply have no other chances to stay alive, the forces are too unequal.
            When exchanging strategic nuclear strikes, NO ONE has a chance to survive, because there is NO means of defense. By the way, our nuclear forces in accordance with START-3 are equal to the United States.
            It CANNOT be effectively used as such, technically.
            Well, the fact that the assault boat cannot enter the ship's under-deck hangar the first time is a problem, yes. However, here you need to understand that the boat will return back ONLY after completing the anti-piracy task. That is, the main thing is to lower the boat into the water, which is being done successfully. And after the reprisal against the pirates - you can no longer rush.
            The current legislation of the Russian Federation unambiguously defines these tasks as the prerogative of the FSB.
            FSB boats can fight shock drones and combat swimmers underwater? The protection of naval bases is NOT the responsibility of the FSB. Is the FSB also engaged in the protection of ships at sea crossings? The FSB cannot patrol the 200-mile economic zone on-line and non-stop. And Project 22160 can patrol far from the coast for 2 months, waiting and monitoring the situation. In addition, 22160 can operate in the far sea zone (up to 6000 miles). Perhaps, in the future, the GAS "Minotaur-ISPN-M.2" will be finished, as the "Polyment-Redut" was finished ...
      2. 0
        29 August 2020 17: 38
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The same Zelenodolsk should have been given the development and construction of a series of new missile boats, which we also need to change


        At the beginning of the 10410s, I sincerely believed that it was necessary to start building a new fleet with the introduction of the strike variant of Project 2 into the series. The model with 4x10410 PU Uranus looks pretty good to itself. And most importantly, the border guards continued to build 90 for themselves all 24s and zero. And its seaworthiness is more than acceptable. And the series could be built in an amount of at least XNUMX units
    2. 0
      14 August 2020 14: 51
      Quote: Volder
      22160


      Not rational from the word at all ...
    3. 0
      17 August 2020 00: 53
      Quote: Volder
      The goal is to load factories and at the same time replenish the fleet with secondary ships.
      a very strange target! ... let them make minesweepers or ... seiners, for example, you can order them a pretty decent Cheetah, or IPC. It is clear that the MRCs were going in a stream of bypassing the DRMSD.
  29. +3
    14 August 2020 13: 52
    And I will speak about all the frigates and corvettes.
    a feeling that the naval vaasche do not understand that the ship must first be designed.
    and then do it.
    And before you design a ship, you need to have the elements of the ship ready!
    And if there are elements, then you can design a ship.
    It's like a children's construction set from blocks - if there is a certain set, then we can make a certain desired product from this set.
    And if there are no cubes, then the product will not work.
    So it is with our boats - there is no GEM .. and the current of dancing with a tambourine.
    There is no ready-made air defense system - dancing with a tambourine.
    There is no means of PLO - dancing with a tambourine.


    We do not have ready-made elements that could form the basis for designing a ship.
    And therefore such torment with all types of ships.
    Constant desire to do something like better, faster, stronger[i] [/ i] (underline the required).
    The funny thing is that finances are allocated for these attempts !!!! But the result - there is no total, just zilch.

    And that's why we look with passion at Tiki and Bjorki (spyrens, etc.), which were built in such good series, which are unified in many elements.
    And we have - and we have a "hand to face" !!!!
    1. 0
      14 August 2020 18: 56
      You know, namesake, you are right.
      I sometimes look at these games with projects and think how long such a corvette will hold out against an old TFR or destroyer (of course, after modernization). And the feeling does not leave me that they are not intended to protect the Motherland, but will serve so that we do not scatter.
  30. +3
    14 August 2020 16: 41
    Many thanks to the author for the efforts. The anthill must have turned up pretty well. From my own experience, I can say that a review of articles should be done for whom. I have always been interested in the issue of reconnaissance and target designation for the strike weapons of the fleet. Where are you going to "shmol" when Tu-95RTs has long been in scrap metal? Of course, one can hope for satellites, but in the event of a serious conflict they will be taken out. There are, of course, Il-38 and Tu-142, but they are hopelessly outdated, and how many of them are left? Therefore, if there is material on anti-submarine aviation, it will be interesting to consider the function of these aircraft in terms of target designation reconnaissance. Here we must follow the same path of creating universal aircraft, only not floating ones. Otherwise, it turns out not an airplane, but a flying river tram, they certainly have the right to live, but enough in a narrow niche.
    1. 0
      14 August 2020 18: 18
      I have always been interested in the issue of reconnaissance and target designation for the strike assets of the fleet. Where are you going to "shmol" when Tu-95RTs has long been in scrap metal?


      The question is important and interesting. Their open sources so far are:

      https://dfnc.ru/c106-technika/korabli-samolyoty-i-shtaby-voenno-morskogo-flota-obedinyat-v-edinuyu-set/

      I can't say at what stage it is ...
      1. +1
        17 August 2020 08: 15
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        I can't say at what stage it is ...

        in UNCENSORED
        This is "movement in the right direction", but the fleet has nothing to do with it, it is FORCED to do it, practically kicks.
        It's good that there are those who "kick", but the bad thing is that it resembles "cutting out tonsils through the anus"
        1. 0
          17 August 2020 09: 08
          Well, at least so ...
  31. +3
    14 August 2020 21: 20
    Congratulations to the author, there is nothing to write about here. If the basis of our fleet is submarine forces, then anti-submarine weapons are also required. Otherwise, the enemy is too capable of cutting the capabilities of the submarine. Therefore, PLO ships are also needed, and without PLO ships of the near sea zone, it is generally difficult, if not impossible, to ensure the pilotage of boats.
  32. +3
    15 August 2020 04: 44
    I will do my little bit for the material provided by the author.
    The article contains many links to additional materials, and this is precisely how it shows that “indifference” has not taken root among the citizens of Russia.
    Thank you, Alexander Timokhin. hi
  33. +1
    15 August 2020 15: 20
    Good day! A question for Alexander Timokhin and Andrey from Chelyabinsk. You have written convincingly about the need to build ASW ships in the near zone. I met a similar thesis in the book known to you by Kuzin and the Nikolsky Navy of the USSR 1945-1991. But why such ships are not being built for the fleets of the USA, Japan, England and other countries, which also need to defend their naval bases and their SSBNs (which only Japan does not have). A question without a joke, though I wonder why they have everything among the types of ships, except for corvettes (frigates of the sea zone)?
    1. +4
      15 August 2020 20: 45
      But why are such ships not built for the fleets of the USA, Japan, England and other countries, which also need to protect their naval bases and their SSBNs (which only Japan does not have


      Important question. In the case of the United States, the answer is obvious - distance protects. Thousands of kilometers "listened to" by the SOSUS system (earlier) and the mass of local FOSS, allies on the deployment routes and the need for us to overcome narrows on the way to the enemy (except for actions from Kamchatka) lead to the fact that we simply cannot approach them.

      The second reason is that they are technologically superior to us. We need the OVR forces, they need one ship with a towed GAS and far enough away. After that, you just need to send your boat or anti-submarine aircraft to the boat discovered from a couple of hundred kilometers.

      The third reason is allies. The same Americans have NATO, in which there is nothing in the ASW unit, and they have a lot to form a force squad to search for our submarines, they just will have non-American ships.

      Well, and most importantly, there is a doctrinally different approach.
      Churchill said: "There are two lines of defense in the sea. One of them passes through the enemy bases, and the second - through your bases." The Americans and their allies have created a really effective "defense" system on the edge of our territorial waters. They do not need the forces of the OVR, simply because their fleet will take the first battle off our coast. And ours - with ours, because the idea of ​​an offensive use of forces does not find support from our population, and in the case of the United States, we do not have the resources for this.
      1. +1
        15 August 2020 22: 25
        Thank you very much, Alexander! Everything became much clearer.
      2. +1
        17 August 2020 01: 05
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        Churchill said: "There are two lines of defense in the sea. One of them passes through the enemy bases, and the second passes through your bases." The Americans and their allies have created a really effective system of "defense" on the edge of our territorial waters.
        unfortunately Alexander, you underestimate the enemy, Churchill's times have sunk into oblivion, after Churchill there was already W. Lippmann with his technologies that defeated the USSR and occupied our country, who appointed an occupation administration represented by the economic bloc of the "government of the Russian Federation" ... the line of defense has long moved to Moscow, including the General Staff of the Navy, who stubbornly spits on ASW and PMO, on naval aviation (or put everything on underwater sonars, which have a number of vulnerabilities like any system) ... Read Quiet Don as a traitor harassed cattle.
  34. 0
    15 August 2020 21: 11
    Such letters would not have been sent to the USSR. Everything was classified. I knew the names of the ships only from the NATO coding. And now you can even carry on correspondence with the MO.
    1. +1
      16 August 2020 17: 04
      Yes, this is a serious advantage of the Russian Federation over the USSR.
  35. +1
    16 August 2020 17: 13
    I liked the fact that sharp articles about Timokhin's fleet in the Main Command of the Russian Navy not only read, but also give answers. The money goes to the Navy, our people. I would like this money to be built efficient efficient ships. soldier
  36. +1
    16 August 2020 19: 41
    I'm not a military man, I'm just wondering if anything, hold your rotten tomatoes for the trolls, I see there are enough of them here). This is all very interesting, of course, the ships are frail and deaf, there are not enough planes, the General Staff has stumpy stumps (according to the author), thanks to which handsome strategists now slightly sparkle with their bare butts, and our incredible partners are mighty like clouds and, as always, are not averse to on occasion To take advantage of this gap ... but ... Isn't it easier to create a "spider network" of tracking installations (noise traps, noise generators, magnetometers, etc.), and stationary bottom torpedo installations in the areas where our submarines exit? Naturally, a cable network united into a single organism, signals from it are processed on the ground, and from them an indication of targets is issued to anti-submarine aircraft and ships. So that 500 kilometers from the base, this network with a guarantee spotted any boats, even at a very quiet speed and with a crew pretending to be statues, and, if necessary, deafen them with noise interference, forcing them to leave, and if necessary, launching torpedoes. As a result, ships and airplanes do not need to wander around the sea like scalded cats, sniffing out if another foreign sausage is quiet under water? Is there something like this? And if that is not enough, can it be expanded to an acceptable level? If I thought of this, I doubt that this option was not thought out in the naval design bureaus and in the navy.
    1. +2
      17 August 2020 08: 12
      Quote: Vlad Gore
      Isn't it easier to create a "spider net" of tracking installations (noise traps, noise generators, magnetometers, etc.) and stationary bottom torpedo installations in the areas where our submarines exit? Naturally, a cable network united into a single organism, signals from it are processed on the ground

      It was under this that Vitek Chirkov hacked the OVR corvettes.
      The problem is that:
      1. There are simply no such systems.
      2. Cable systems are easily cut not only by the enemy, but also simply by fishermen
      etc. - there are many more items
  37. 0
    17 August 2020 12: 44
    Quote: Alexey RA
    The Navy, having received a ship designed for the FSB, stubbornly climbs into someone else's field of tasks - apparently in order to somehow prove the need for this order.

    +1000
  38. 0
    18 August 2020 10: 16
    Authors journalists or admirals, retired captains of the 1st rank?
    Readers = commentators are also all retired commanders of rank 1,2, XNUMX ships?
    Judging by the numerous publications we have at the head of the army (navy), the design bureaus are amateurs.
    And we will discuss, decide (like Ilf and Petrov) and our fleet will surpass all the fleets of the world?
    Naturally, we want our fleet to be the best, but is it that simple?
    In addition to money, technologies and a developed industry are needed. Compared to other countries, we have practically manual labor, which makes the rise in price and terms delayed and the quality is lame. Maybe start with the civilian fleet, buy (this should have been done yesterday) technologies, equipment, to raise specialists.
    China in this example, first developed the industry, civil shipbuilding. But now destroyers are riveted as we assemble RTOs on time.
    1. 0
      19 August 2020 23: 04
      It would be better not to write anything. In the 90s, the EBN was at the head of the country - what are the results? By your logic, probably he was also an angel in the flesh, just because he held a high post?
    2. 0
      20 August 2020 03: 43
      Quote: Wanderer Polente
      Written by journalists or admirals

      feel
      Quote: Wanderer Polente
      Judging by the numerous publications we have at the head of the army (navy), the design bureaus are amateurs.

      crying
      Quote: Wanderer Polente
      Compared to other countries, we have almost manual labor

      wassat

      PS
      tell me, do you have a passport? or are you still vegetating in 4th grade? lol
      laughing
  39. 0
    21 August 2020 14: 04
    "Russia should seriously think about how our power capabilities correspond to the ambitions that we are demonstrating. Otherwise, it will have to turn back, as in 1962."
  40. 0
    3 September 2020 04: 05
    In our country, as usual, everything is on nepotism and kickbacks, only monetary interest, and these scum was responsible for the country's defense. Only one thing will help here - execution, as an enemy of the people: they investigated why this project, and not another, why we will build on this shipyard, and not on another, why this is a design decision, and not something else - if there is a corruption component under execution. These are the interests and finances of our country and our people, this is the protection of our future and the future of our children, here issues must be tackled tough ...
  41. 0
    8 October 2020 15: 38
    With all due respect to the principled and correct position of the author, project 20386 was hacked to death for a banal reason - the absence of a Russian-made gas turbine unit. Press releases from Saturn and UEC do not go to sea ...
  42. -1
    28 October 2020 18: 30
    The corvette of the project 20380 is an obsolete ship in terms of its armament. Having only 8 subsonic missiles is yesterday. To build this series until 2050 is to throw people's money down the drain.
    The project 22385 corvette is already a cut above the previous one, but it also has a drawback. I propose to consider a combined version of these two projects, which would look like this.
    On the tank gun mount A-190. Then, along the diametral plane (DP), the Redoubt air defense missile system is placed on 8 cells. Further, in front of the superstructure, across the DP there is a UKSK “Caliber” for 8 cells. Further behind the mast (tower) there are 2 RK "Uranus" for 8 missiles. At the stern, behind the hangar, in front of the helipad of the Redoubt air defense missile system, for 8 cells, 4 pcs. from each side. Well, two AK-630M cannons, as well as 2 Packet-NK, GEM complexes, if possible, instead of 4 diesels, install 2 diesels and 2 GTEs, increasing the power to 36 hp. There will be a strike ship, 000 missiles in a salvo. If, instead of the Uranus complexes, install the Medvedka complexes, then
    together PLUR ,, Caliber ,, we get a small anti-submarine ship. And if half of both - we get a universal ship. It will be more expensive, but worth it. And why not, but money is not down the drain.
    1. +16
      1 November 2020 14: 01
      You propose to shove a whole frigate into the corvette. Not a great idea.
      The British have a saying: "If you put 8 on a ship designed for 10 guns, then only 6 of them will be able to shoot"
  43. -1
    28 October 2020 18: 57
    In addition to the previous one. The complexes "Uranus" and "Medvedka" are easily interchangeable. Or you can put a 40-foot container instead of them or two 20-foot containers, with a surprise for the foe. Or some other module as needed.
  44. -1
    3 November 2020 15: 03
    Dear Mikhail, you misunderstood me. Maybe I am so incomprehensible expounding this. I was not going to push any frigate weapons into the corvette. I'll try to explain it in a simpler way. On the corvette of project 20385 there are 8 Calibers and 16 Redoubts, well, everything else. I also suggest installing 8 Gauges and 16 Redoubts and everything else, only in a different layout. On project 20385, all Redoubts are located at the stern and a hangar with a helicopter is also located there. One interferes with the other. Therefore, I propose to smash Redoubts. That is. Leave 8 cells at the stern, 4 pcs. install on each side and 8 cells on the tank. That's all. Corvette 20380 has a 12-cell Redoubt on the tank after the cannon along the DP. I propose to leave the first 8 cells under the Redoubt, and replace the last 4 cells with Caliber and add 4 Caliber cells from the sides to these 2 cells. A total of 8 cells. But they will already be located, as it were, across the DP in a general plan. In this case, the length of the ship does not increase. Next, we look at the last corvette of pr.20380, Hero Tsydenzhapov, He has already installed a tower instead of a mast. Behind the tower, on the upper deck, there are 2 Uranus complexes for 8 missiles. If it is expensive, then they do not need to be installed. But the platform behind the tower remains. The bow part of the ship is obtained from project 20380. Further, the stern part is obtained from project 20385, only it does not have 16 Redoubts, but only 8 because the remaining 8 went to the tank. That's all . The cost of building the ship remains the same.
    Now we additionally have the opportunity to install on the upper deck behind the tower:
    1) 2 complexes ,, Uranus ,, for 8 missiles to enhance the striking power of the ship,
    2) or instead of them 2 complexes ,, Medvedka ,, to strengthen the ship's PLO, if he is an anti-submarine,
    3) or 1 complex "Uranus" and 1 complex "Medvedka" for the versatility of the ship,
    4) or 2 complexes ,, Caliber ,, for 8 cells with an inclined launcher for anti-ship missiles or PLUR or tactical missiles,
    5) or your favorite 40-foot modular container, or 2 by 20-feet with various contents,
    6) or, for example, the Pantsir-M complex to enhance air defense,
    7) or some new set of weapons.
    All this is easily installed and replaced when the ship is parked in the base for 1-2 days.
    Now about the GEM. It remains the same. But in the future, when the domestic gas turbine engines and gearboxes for them are worked out, it will be possible to strengthen the power plant on subsequent corvettes under construction (for example, intermediate number 20384) so ​​that the corvette has a speed of 30 knots.
    The solution is simple. Without add. equipment price is the same as in 20385., but much cheaper than 20386. There is nothing new here. Everything has been tested and verified, and the reserve for modernization is huge. One option is a strike ship, the other is a small anti-submarine ship. And building yesterday's corvettes 2050 by 20380 is throwing people's money down the drain. It's criminal.
  45. 0
    10 October 2021 23: 43
    The towed GAS Minotaur-M, the lowered GAS-Anapa-M, the in-keel GAS Zarya-2 - all these anti-submarine detection systems inspire confidence. But Packet-nk 2x4 with 2 small-sized MTT torpedoes and 2 AT anti-torpedoes, which can only be replaced on the shore, I cannot understand if this is enough? At least 4x4. In the corvettes of the project 20385, there may be 91R anti-submarine missiles, a plus to the nk package. I'm not a specialist, but in my opinion it's just a crime. Okay, I will not say that a 100-meter ship and only 8 X-35 anti-ship missiles, of which 16 pieces can easily fit. , but with a small-sized Package - nk - the solution is generally not clear, to put it mildly.
  46. 0
    23 November 2021 14: 10
    As of today, the Ministry of Defense has already decided not to continue the series of corvettes of project 20386 in favor of project 20385. Due to the many problems with modular equipment, its storage, maintenance, constant replacement of a part of the crew, a part of the crew attached to the module remains on the shore with accommodation, etc. ... ... There are many reasons, even the US Navy has these big problems that were not previously seen. In addition, one corvette 20386 in cost is close to the cost of frigate 22350, but very much inferior to the latter in capabilities. It is not clear that some writers are enthusiastic about this project. The failure of the scam with the project allegedly "promising corvette and ship of the ocean zone" 20386 is obvious. Its accomplices are looking for a way to evade responsibility (for deliberately undermining the combat capability of the Navy, including the failure to ensure the combat stability of the NSNF). This must not be allowed - the guilty must answer.

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