Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam
The topic of necessity and expediency of building large series of ships was raised repeatedly by many authors and specialists. The world shipbuilding experience clearly speaks in favor of this. However, what is happening in our Navy is reminiscent of the orgy with a complete lack of adequate military and technical justification (and its substitution with various “advertising focuses” (and other “techniques”), such as “innovation” and “modularity”, etc.) .
This summer, one of the authors (A.T.) published an article “Worse than a crime. Construction of the corvettes project 20386 - error ", which caused a significant resonance (including among specialists). Then, on its basis and based on the results of the discussion, an appeal was sent (A.T.) to the presidential administration with a request to understand the feasibility of project 20386 and to resume production and modernization of the series already mastered by industry and fleet corvettes of the project 20380. Briefly, the main points:
1. Huge price of the project 20386. Known for the construction cost of the head, - more than 29 billion rubles, which is 70% more expensive than the serial corvette of the 20380 project and close to the cost of the modern frigate of the 22350 project.
2. Weak weapons. Despite a significant increase in displacement (from the 20380 and 20385 projects), the new “innovative” 20386 project lost the Caliber complex (installed on the 20385 project). The use of "Caliber" is possible only with the planned "container-modular" launch, temporarily installed to replace the helicopter (!) And with a decrease in ammunition twice from the project 20385. Also, under the pretext of “cheapening”, the hydroacoustic armament has been significantly simplified (with the rejection of the Zarya SJC and its replacement with the older and with the worst TTC GAS MG-335М). Given the importance of anti-submarine missions, incl. to ensure the deployment of the NSNF, such a weakening of the weapons of the “promising” corvette of the 20386 project does not have a reasonable explanation (especially considering its significantly increased displacement and cost).
3. Due to the new type of the main power plant of the corvette 20386 (gas turbine with partial electric propulsion), not only technical ununification with other ships of the near zone occurs, but also their combined use for the intended purpose is considerably complicated. At the same time, a partial electromotive does little; The power of the electric motors on the 20386 project is small for an effective search stroke (on the order of 18 knots), and the inevitable transition to turbines dramatically increases the noise, the cost of operation and reduces the cruising range.
4. For the sake of project 20386, the laying of the industrialized corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385 has already been stopped, and this in the coming years will have very grave consequences both for the fleet and industry.
5. The “concept of modularity,” which “justified” the 20386 project, failed in a number of countries (including the United States). At the same time, we “for some reason” ignore their successful experience in this field, for example, the MEKO concept, and all “modularity” for us has been reduced to sticking combat complexes into 20 and 40 foot containers (with a significant reduction in their performance characteristics). In the end - if you need to test this concept, then this can be done on any cheap cargo ship (and not on a special expensive “perekorvet-nedofregat”). So where is the real test of "our modules"?
6. High technical risk of the 20386 project. Here we can note the problem of stabilization of the radar beam due to significant and random deformations of the composite superstructure. The need to install radar on the superstructure is extremely controversial. After all, these are not only problems with beam stabilization, but also a significant reduction in the detection range of low-flying targets (from the 20385 project with the same radar, but on the mast). The reason for the placement of AN / SPY-1 radars in the USA is obvious - their weight and stability problems with their first carriers of the Ticonderox CD and LRD. But after the new radars have successfully placed on the 22350 project mast, “lowering” them (and the detection range of low-flying targets) on the 20386 project is beyond common sense. There is already a question about the “unofficial name” of the 20386 project, HBZ (I want to be Zumvolt), 20386’s imitation of this unfortunate US Navy project is too obvious (especially considering that the 20386 version with a wave-piercing nose ( as on “Zumvolte”) existed).
Corvette project 20386 and the US Navy destroyer Zumvolt
(The 20386 variant with a backward slope existed).
Declared the "advantages" of the ship project 20386 seaworthiness, speed and range. However, the growth of seaworthiness is insignificant compared to the 20380 project, and it begins to manifest itself only on the waves, where both projects are on the verge of loss of combat capability. The speed of the 20386 was derived from gas turbines (on diesel 20380 corvettes). At the same time, given the significant increase in 20386 displacement, the use of turbines on the original 20380 could have an even more significant effect on cost.
Range? But first of all it is necessary for the ships of the far zone. At the same time, the frigate of the 22350 project at a cost close to the 20386 project has incomparably higher combat capabilities. At the same time, a significant range on the 20386 project is achieved through a combined installation and the use of electric motors at the economist. The problem is that due to the low power of these electric motors, the speed spectrum of the corvette of the Navy does not correspond to them (for example, the task of searching for submarines), and in most cases the 20386 corvette will have to “become under the turbines” for this — with a sharp increase and noise and operating costs (and reduced range).
For the near-sea zone as a replacement for the 1124 IPC, the 20386 project ships are completely redundant. The main thing is that we need in the near zone a mass carrier of the most effective GUS today, the “Minotaur” (and with a long towed antenna).
To perform combat missions in this zone, a long range and autonomy for 20386 reserves are not needed. The increased speed does not make sense, due to the limitations of towed gas, and in a combat situation the ships will go with them (on display)! And you need a lower price, and the maximum possible anti-submarine capabilities at the lowest possible price (to ensure mass construction).
In fact, the ship of the project 20386, although it is called the word "corvette", but in terms of its displacement, seaworthiness and cruising range it is a "small frigate." And most importantly, it is a frigate (and “full-size”) and at the price too, and it is armed at the same time worse than the 20385 project corvette! Such is the “perekorvet-nedofregat”.
In response to an appeal to the presidential administration of the Russian Federation, a response from the Navy was received, the main points of which are given below.
Should comment on this answer Navy
Navy: The Corvette of the 20380 project was created at the beginning of the 2000-s and is gradually becoming obsolete with the trends of modern military shipbuilding.
Comment. It is pertinent to compare our “experience” with the corvettes of the project line: 20380 - 20380 with ZLASK - 20385 - 20386, with the US - a huge series of destroyers like “Arly Burk”, created a decade and a half ten years earlier than our 20386, and continuously improved (in within several subseries). We, without having completely eliminated the shortcomings of the serial 20380, grab onto new projects!
Navy: Further modernization of the 20380 corvette in terms of REV has already led to a significant increase in its value.
Comment. This is a well-known fact, and it is connected, first of all, with the installation instead of the Fourke and Puma radars of the new radar complex (ZLK) Zaslon. The question arises as to why this was done in the presence of the Positiv-M serial radar (satisfying the corvette’s requirements for TTX) and having an order of magnitude lower cost (from the Zaslon radar). In addition, it is completely incomprehensible why the radar “Zaslon”, with a sharp increase in cost (from the radar “Fourcade”), did not eliminate the most critical lack of air defense of the corvettes - the absence of a radio correction channel of the missile defense system?
Or is the information correct, that the installation of the ZLAS “Zaslon” on the corvettes took place only “for the sake of the“ ZLasn ”RLC itself (more precisely, its manufacturer)?
Screen advertising brochure RLC "Barrier". The solution of the problem of the lack of a line of radio correction of the ballast missile system, which is critical for corvettes of the 20380 and 20385 project, is not even announced or planned!
Navy: Restricting the construction of 20385 was a necessary measure (sanctions).
Comment. However, they are being completed (two 20385 project enclosures) with a domestic Kolomna diesel power plant. At the same time, there is a prospect of increasing its capacity, however, in the current plans of the Navy, the plant is left without an order (diesel engines for surface ships of the Navy). If the problem for the Navy is to reduce the speed of the 20385 corvettes (with the Caliber complex), then a possible solution for placing the Caliber was indicated - placing it on inclined launchers (similar to the Uran complex) based on the “original” 20380 project.
Navy: Corvette project 20386 is a further development of the ships of the near sea zone. This ship project will be the main base platform for the next few decades. When developing the project, the best achievements in military shipbuilding were used.
Comment. These are meaningless, “advertising” phrases, and I couldn’t give a sane answer to any specific tactical or technical question on the obvious problems of the 20386 project of the Navy. With the 20386 project, a strong regression of the development level is evident: with a significant increase in displacement and cost, in terms of weaponry and combat qualities, the 20386 project is significantly inferior to the previous 20385 project.
Navy: The 20386 project is multifunctional, has a balanced armament (including modular) and is capable of solving problems in the near zone, as well as occasionally and far.
Comment. The above marked obvious critical flaws in the 20386 armament. The Navy was able to give only general phrases as an answer. Apparently, for justified objections to criticism of the 20386 project, the Navy simply does not have arguments and facts.
Navy: The high cost of the head corvette of the 20386 project is due primarily to the associated R & D on its creation.
Comment. The specified cost of the corvette of the project 20386 is taken from the annual report of JSC "Severnaya Verf". Taking into account the fact that the design and development work on the 20386 project is conducted by the Almaz All-Russian Industrial Airport Design Bureau, it is obvious that the real cost of the 20386 head corvette of the 29 project is much higher than the figures in the Severny Verf report in XNUMX billion.
Navy: In the future, the cost of 20386 project corvettes is planned to be reduced due to their high serial production.
Comment. The question arises: why the navy in general are defective ships (project 20386), and at a price close to the price of multiply more powerful frigates of the project 22350? What mass series can we talk about? And where are the guarantees of "price reduction", if the cost of previous corvettes (of the 20380 project) in the building process had previously only increased?
The main problem with the 20386 project is that, with weak combat capabilities, it disrupts the replacement of worn-out and outdated Navy ships in the near zone. It is the understanding of this fact that gave rise to the original appeal (A.T.)
So, there are simple technical and tactical "uncomfortable questions" on the 20386 project:
1. Why is the new project 20386 has extremely weak weapons with a significant increase in its displacement and cost?
2. What is the basis of the “logic of choice”: or “Caliber in a container” “or a helicopter” for this project, if the ship needs them together and almost simultaneously (especially considering its considerable displacement)?
3. What is the "feasibility" of building the 20386 project at a cost close to the serial frigate of the 22350 project (which has incomparably greater combat capabilities)?
4. “Expediency” of the introduction of a hybrid power plant, given the fact that the installed low-power electric motors are not able to provide even the search for 16-18 nodes?
5. "Expediency" of using on the ship of the near zone is extremely expensive RLC (and without a channel of radio correction Zur) and "gold" at the cost of Zour?
6. What prevented the development of a “modular concept” on any experimental vessel, in advance and at minimum cost (and with a supposedly “successful” result, convincingly present it to specialists and society)?
7. How can the near zone be provided (primarily in the antisubmarine respect) if, due to the very high cost of the new corvettes, their series are obviously insufficient for solving the tasks of the Navy? And about this he (!) Directly writes the chief designer of the 20386 project in his latest book (link below)!
8. Why, with the extreme importance of the anti-submarine defense task (including to ensure the NSNF), and the installation of an extremely expensive (and having a dubious rationale) RLC, was the hydroacoustics on the 20386 project “cut off” for “economy”?
The Navy actually evaded the answer to them (for obviously there is nothing to answer). In response to the formal reply, the author sent another appeal. With the text of this appeal, you can read here. I must say that for almost four months of waiting, no response was received to this repeated appeal. A little later, the Navy compiled a new reply, signed by the Chief of the Navy’s shipbuilding, V. Tryapichnikov, even more vapid, but less detailed about it.
The question arises and to the author and chief designer of this project - IG Zakharov. Prior to his publication on the 20386 topic, the sharp questions of the project mentioned above were carefully avoided. At the same time, he understands everything, but does the exact opposite! Zakharov I.G .:
Perhaps this time he will find civic courage and give explanations for the 20386 project. And without forgetting about the problems with the 20380 project:
• “justification” of the use of Fourke radar (if it is capable of issuing target indications that are obviously not in compliance with the requirements of the Redut system);
• the absence (until now!) Of the radio-correction channel for the SAM on corvettes and the sense of using the SAM with 40 km range without a radio-correction channel (!);
• here: what range of capture of the Zour missile he personally hopes to get by the inconspicuous newest American anti-ship missile LRASM, and whether the Redut air defense system (in the configuration adopted for the corvette - with autonomous missiles with ARGSN) is able to provide an effective reflection of the raid of such targets (especially considering the fact that in all tests he worked only on targets with EPR by one or two orders of magnitude more than LRASM)?
• justification of the use of extremely expensive ZLASK (with an obvious “reduction” in the 20386 project for “saving” hydroacoustics).
Obviously, the real reasons for the “20386 project decisions” are not related to technology and “military considerations.” Among specialists in the field of shipbuilding and the creation of marine weapons long ago information has been circulating, which boils down to the following: the beginning of 2013, the Commander of the Baltic Fleet reports to the Chief of the Navy V. V. Chirkov. about the complete incapacity of the corvettes of the 20380 project, and at the same time I.V. Zakharov, agrees with V. Chirkov. TTZ on the new corvette project 20386 (and bypassing the specialists of the Navy).
Navy Specialist, 03.01.2015:
16.11.2006 Navy Specialist:
Hex? However, these same persons all the problems of the 20380 project that the fleet encountered later (and which are not fully resolved so far!) Were named not just before their occurrence, but before they began to be embodied in hardware! Those. at the time of making “controversial decisions” for corvettes at the end of 2000x, their fallacy and disastrous consequences to specialists were immediately clear.
10.10.2011 Navy Specialist:
Especially these estimates correlate with the information published in the article of K. Chulkov (“Version on the Neva”, 01.06.2017):
Note: as of today, former deputy director of the Almaz Central Immigration Bureau for Armaments, E. Lysenko, was dismissed, leaving behind a long “train” of extremely strange decisions and “preferences”. This concerned not only the armament of the corvettes (although he was personally responsible for them, especially for problems with their air defense), but also for other ships. For example, it was he who “justified” (in quotes) the allegedly “inexpediency” of upgrading the 1265 project's mass minesweepers to the Mayevka complex (“Mayevka” did not stand up with the trawls, Lysenko preferred ancient and useless trawls).
Today, however, the 20380 corvettes situation has changed.
According to information from the Pacific Fleet, the 20380 corvettes significantly "added" to combat capability. The Uranus missile system perfectly strikes targets at a distance, the former A-190 cannon accurately and reliably hit targets, both naval and airborne, and ground-based, and Furke radar also performed well when observing airborne goals. The hydroacoustic complex works well, and the EW systems proved to be excellent.
Summarize. Despite the sharp exacerbation of the military-political situation with 2014, the 20380 corvettes of the project are still of limited combat effectiveness (and the main issues remain on the Redut system)! However, the industry carried out a large, hard, but productive work on fine-tuning the project and eliminating many of its shortcomings. At present, the prospects for quickly bringing the corvettes to a combat-ready state are quite real. Obviously, the key issue with regard to the air defense system is the introduction of the ZSD radio correction channel (including on all previously built ships with the Redut air defense system).
However, instead, a scam was launched with a new project (and with the transfer of key 20380 flaws to it, for example, the absence of a ZaR radio correction), which is also several times more expensive.
The question arises: is it possible to "completely" eliminate the shortcomings of 20380, or its modernization reserves are supposedly "exhausted"? Yes, the 20385 project has apparently completely selected the 20380 project stocks by load. However, "internal reserves" are available:
• use of simple and light inclined launchers for the Caliber complex, structurally similar to the launchers previously used on the Nakat small rocket ship;
• replacement of the heavy launchers of the “Package” complex with light ones, like Western Mk32, with the provision for storing spare ammunition in a common cellar with aviation;
• for use of boats (including unmanned ones) in difficult conditions - to reduce the height of installation of boats on the upper deck level (with the installation of modern launch and lift equipment), which is possible on newly built ships, provided that they are equipped with 324 mm lightweight torpedo tubes their transfer to a more convenient place for recharging.
Of course, it is necessary to solve the “problem of air defense missile systems”, with the provision of radio correction of missiles. Taking into account the short-range acquisition of ARLs of the GOS-ZUR of the unobtrusive targets of the LRASM type, it is obviously necessary to install the second Puma-type radar with the addition of control functions for the air defense missile system. Perhaps there is a sense in the Zuru series of reduced cost due to the abandonment of expensive ARLGSN, - using them as radio command teams. With the reflection of a “dense”, with a small time interval of the inconspicuous weapons destruction, the radio command air defense system with good multi-channel radar has a decisive advantage over the air defense system with autonomous air defense systems with ARLGSN - clearly controlling the situation, actual shelling and destruction of all targets. Formally, they are, “Pantsir-M” and “Top-2M”, however, their placement on the corvette means complete reworking of his project, and the possibility of using simple radio command modifications of XURUM 9М96 and 9М100 with standard starting from “Puma” is probably easier and more appropriate.
In order to reduce the cost of the corvette, it is advisable to standardize the new 20380 radar with the first two corps of the 22800 project's MRK (i.e., the installation of the Positive-M radar). The successful establishment of the Pella plant and the Almaz Central Metallurgical Bureau of the MRK of the 22800 project showed that ships can be built with us quickly and with moderate cost. The capabilities of the 22800 RLC project are quite enough for solving problems in the near zone (including for the 20380 project corvette).
To summarize:
1. The 20386 project does not have any serious military and technical justification. The Navy, which received it, “to put it mildly,” from the “back door”, does not have and is not able to bring any serious and worthy of attention arguments in its favor. Its serial construction is inexpedient.
2. The industry has done a lot of hard work and, to a large extent, successful work on fine-tuning the 20380 project, mastered its serial construction (even at the “problem” Amur shipbuilding plant).
3. The ships of the project 20380 began to go safely (including in the distant and ocean zone).
4. It is necessary to continue the series of corvettes of the 20380 project (5), with unconditional complete elimination of their shortcomings (including completion of the first ships of the series).
5. In order to reduce the cost, it is advisable to unify the RLK of 20380 projects (new buildings) and 22800 (the first two buildings of the series) and use (in perspective) unified control posts for various weapon systems.
6. The use of the products of the Caliber complex should be provided from oblique launchers of all corvettes (including the first hulls). First of all, this concerns anti-submarine missiles (the OVR corvette should not be a “game” for submarines, but a “hunter” on them!), As it was done, for example, on the Chinese OVR corvettes of the 056 project.
7. It is necessary to place promising robotic complexes and modern boats on board the corvettes of the 20380 project.
8. The search for "internal reserves" of reducing the displacement of 20380 ships for its revision (with the elimination of deficiencies), for example, replacing the heavy package "Launch" complex with light pneumatic torpedo tubes.
The construction of ships of the 20386 project must be stopped and not be allowed to continue spending money on such technical adventures.
Afterword 2019 of the year
This article was supposed to come out on New Year's Eve in one large edition and was written specifically for him. However, taking into account the significant resonance of the previous series of articles by the authors, measures were taken to ensure its absence in the media.
Negative consequences of the termination of the construction of a series of corvettes project 20380 (20385) are beginning to realize and leaders. In August, 2018-th A.V. Shlyakhtenko, General Director of the Almaz Central Design Bureau, gave an interview to TASS, in which he stated:
And what about the navy? “The Answer” (or rather its complete absence), - in the formal reply of the naval chief of shipbuilding V. Tryapichinkov ...
Within three years, the “Bold” will remain alone on the stocks for an indefinite long time, as a monument to the end of such adventures.
Corvette 20386. There is an error on the image, there are two rapid-fire installations with an AK-306 gun. But everything else is correct.
This summer, one of the authors (A.T.) published an article “Worse than a crime. Construction of the corvettes project 20386 - error ", which caused a significant resonance (including among specialists). Then, on its basis and based on the results of the discussion, an appeal was sent (A.T.) to the presidential administration with a request to understand the feasibility of project 20386 and to resume production and modernization of the series already mastered by industry and fleet corvettes of the project 20380. Briefly, the main points:
1. Huge price of the project 20386. Known for the construction cost of the head, - more than 29 billion rubles, which is 70% more expensive than the serial corvette of the 20380 project and close to the cost of the modern frigate of the 22350 project.
2. Weak weapons. Despite a significant increase in displacement (from the 20380 and 20385 projects), the new “innovative” 20386 project lost the Caliber complex (installed on the 20385 project). The use of "Caliber" is possible only with the planned "container-modular" launch, temporarily installed to replace the helicopter (!) And with a decrease in ammunition twice from the project 20385. Also, under the pretext of “cheapening”, the hydroacoustic armament has been significantly simplified (with the rejection of the Zarya SJC and its replacement with the older and with the worst TTC GAS MG-335М). Given the importance of anti-submarine missions, incl. to ensure the deployment of the NSNF, such a weakening of the weapons of the “promising” corvette of the 20386 project does not have a reasonable explanation (especially considering its significantly increased displacement and cost).
3. Due to the new type of the main power plant of the corvette 20386 (gas turbine with partial electric propulsion), not only technical ununification with other ships of the near zone occurs, but also their combined use for the intended purpose is considerably complicated. At the same time, a partial electromotive does little; The power of the electric motors on the 20386 project is small for an effective search stroke (on the order of 18 knots), and the inevitable transition to turbines dramatically increases the noise, the cost of operation and reduces the cruising range.
4. For the sake of project 20386, the laying of the industrialized corvettes of projects 20380 and 20385 has already been stopped, and this in the coming years will have very grave consequences both for the fleet and industry.
5. The “concept of modularity,” which “justified” the 20386 project, failed in a number of countries (including the United States). At the same time, we “for some reason” ignore their successful experience in this field, for example, the MEKO concept, and all “modularity” for us has been reduced to sticking combat complexes into 20 and 40 foot containers (with a significant reduction in their performance characteristics). In the end - if you need to test this concept, then this can be done on any cheap cargo ship (and not on a special expensive “perekorvet-nedofregat”). So where is the real test of "our modules"?
6. High technical risk of the 20386 project. Here we can note the problem of stabilization of the radar beam due to significant and random deformations of the composite superstructure. The need to install radar on the superstructure is extremely controversial. After all, these are not only problems with beam stabilization, but also a significant reduction in the detection range of low-flying targets (from the 20385 project with the same radar, but on the mast). The reason for the placement of AN / SPY-1 radars in the USA is obvious - their weight and stability problems with their first carriers of the Ticonderox CD and LRD. But after the new radars have successfully placed on the 22350 project mast, “lowering” them (and the detection range of low-flying targets) on the 20386 project is beyond common sense. There is already a question about the “unofficial name” of the 20386 project, HBZ (I want to be Zumvolt), 20386’s imitation of this unfortunate US Navy project is too obvious (especially considering that the 20386 version with a wave-piercing nose ( as on “Zumvolte”) existed).
Corvette project 20386 and the US Navy destroyer Zumvolt
(The 20386 variant with a backward slope existed).
Declared the "advantages" of the ship project 20386 seaworthiness, speed and range. However, the growth of seaworthiness is insignificant compared to the 20380 project, and it begins to manifest itself only on the waves, where both projects are on the verge of loss of combat capability. The speed of the 20386 was derived from gas turbines (on diesel 20380 corvettes). At the same time, given the significant increase in 20386 displacement, the use of turbines on the original 20380 could have an even more significant effect on cost.
Range? But first of all it is necessary for the ships of the far zone. At the same time, the frigate of the 22350 project at a cost close to the 20386 project has incomparably higher combat capabilities. At the same time, a significant range on the 20386 project is achieved through a combined installation and the use of electric motors at the economist. The problem is that due to the low power of these electric motors, the speed spectrum of the corvette of the Navy does not correspond to them (for example, the task of searching for submarines), and in most cases the 20386 corvette will have to “become under the turbines” for this — with a sharp increase and noise and operating costs (and reduced range).
For the near-sea zone as a replacement for the 1124 IPC, the 20386 project ships are completely redundant. The main thing is that we need in the near zone a mass carrier of the most effective GUS today, the “Minotaur” (and with a long towed antenna).
To perform combat missions in this zone, a long range and autonomy for 20386 reserves are not needed. The increased speed does not make sense, due to the limitations of towed gas, and in a combat situation the ships will go with them (on display)! And you need a lower price, and the maximum possible anti-submarine capabilities at the lowest possible price (to ensure mass construction).
In fact, the ship of the project 20386, although it is called the word "corvette", but in terms of its displacement, seaworthiness and cruising range it is a "small frigate." And most importantly, it is a frigate (and “full-size”) and at the price too, and it is armed at the same time worse than the 20385 project corvette! Such is the “perekorvet-nedofregat”.
In response to an appeal to the presidential administration of the Russian Federation, a response from the Navy was received, the main points of which are given below.
Should comment on this answer Navy
Navy: The Corvette of the 20380 project was created at the beginning of the 2000-s and is gradually becoming obsolete with the trends of modern military shipbuilding.
Comment. It is pertinent to compare our “experience” with the corvettes of the project line: 20380 - 20380 with ZLASK - 20385 - 20386, with the US - a huge series of destroyers like “Arly Burk”, created a decade and a half ten years earlier than our 20386, and continuously improved (in within several subseries). We, without having completely eliminated the shortcomings of the serial 20380, grab onto new projects!
Navy: Further modernization of the 20380 corvette in terms of REV has already led to a significant increase in its value.
Comment. This is a well-known fact, and it is connected, first of all, with the installation instead of the Fourke and Puma radars of the new radar complex (ZLK) Zaslon. The question arises as to why this was done in the presence of the Positiv-M serial radar (satisfying the corvette’s requirements for TTX) and having an order of magnitude lower cost (from the Zaslon radar). In addition, it is completely incomprehensible why the radar “Zaslon”, with a sharp increase in cost (from the radar “Fourcade”), did not eliminate the most critical lack of air defense of the corvettes - the absence of a radio correction channel of the missile defense system?
Or is the information correct, that the installation of the ZLAS “Zaslon” on the corvettes took place only “for the sake of the“ ZLasn ”RLC itself (more precisely, its manufacturer)?
Screen advertising brochure RLC "Barrier". The solution of the problem of the lack of a line of radio correction of the ballast missile system, which is critical for corvettes of the 20380 and 20385 project, is not even announced or planned!
Navy: Restricting the construction of 20385 was a necessary measure (sanctions).
Comment. However, they are being completed (two 20385 project enclosures) with a domestic Kolomna diesel power plant. At the same time, there is a prospect of increasing its capacity, however, in the current plans of the Navy, the plant is left without an order (diesel engines for surface ships of the Navy). If the problem for the Navy is to reduce the speed of the 20385 corvettes (with the Caliber complex), then a possible solution for placing the Caliber was indicated - placing it on inclined launchers (similar to the Uran complex) based on the “original” 20380 project.
Navy: Corvette project 20386 is a further development of the ships of the near sea zone. This ship project will be the main base platform for the next few decades. When developing the project, the best achievements in military shipbuilding were used.
Comment. These are meaningless, “advertising” phrases, and I couldn’t give a sane answer to any specific tactical or technical question on the obvious problems of the 20386 project of the Navy. With the 20386 project, a strong regression of the development level is evident: with a significant increase in displacement and cost, in terms of weaponry and combat qualities, the 20386 project is significantly inferior to the previous 20385 project.
Navy: The 20386 project is multifunctional, has a balanced armament (including modular) and is capable of solving problems in the near zone, as well as occasionally and far.
Comment. The above marked obvious critical flaws in the 20386 armament. The Navy was able to give only general phrases as an answer. Apparently, for justified objections to criticism of the 20386 project, the Navy simply does not have arguments and facts.
Navy: The high cost of the head corvette of the 20386 project is due primarily to the associated R & D on its creation.
Comment. The specified cost of the corvette of the project 20386 is taken from the annual report of JSC "Severnaya Verf". Taking into account the fact that the design and development work on the 20386 project is conducted by the Almaz All-Russian Industrial Airport Design Bureau, it is obvious that the real cost of the 20386 head corvette of the 29 project is much higher than the figures in the Severny Verf report in XNUMX billion.
Navy: In the future, the cost of 20386 project corvettes is planned to be reduced due to their high serial production.
Comment. The question arises: why the navy in general are defective ships (project 20386), and at a price close to the price of multiply more powerful frigates of the project 22350? What mass series can we talk about? And where are the guarantees of "price reduction", if the cost of previous corvettes (of the 20380 project) in the building process had previously only increased?
The main problem with the 20386 project is that, with weak combat capabilities, it disrupts the replacement of worn-out and outdated Navy ships in the near zone. It is the understanding of this fact that gave rise to the original appeal (A.T.)
So, there are simple technical and tactical "uncomfortable questions" on the 20386 project:
1. Why is the new project 20386 has extremely weak weapons with a significant increase in its displacement and cost?
2. What is the basis of the “logic of choice”: or “Caliber in a container” “or a helicopter” for this project, if the ship needs them together and almost simultaneously (especially considering its considerable displacement)?
3. What is the "feasibility" of building the 20386 project at a cost close to the serial frigate of the 22350 project (which has incomparably greater combat capabilities)?
4. “Expediency” of the introduction of a hybrid power plant, given the fact that the installed low-power electric motors are not able to provide even the search for 16-18 nodes?
5. "Expediency" of using on the ship of the near zone is extremely expensive RLC (and without a channel of radio correction Zur) and "gold" at the cost of Zour?
6. What prevented the development of a “modular concept” on any experimental vessel, in advance and at minimum cost (and with a supposedly “successful” result, convincingly present it to specialists and society)?
7. How can the near zone be provided (primarily in the antisubmarine respect) if, due to the very high cost of the new corvettes, their series are obviously insufficient for solving the tasks of the Navy? And about this he (!) Directly writes the chief designer of the 20386 project in his latest book (link below)!
8. Why, with the extreme importance of the anti-submarine defense task (including to ensure the NSNF), and the installation of an extremely expensive (and having a dubious rationale) RLC, was the hydroacoustics on the 20386 project “cut off” for “economy”?
The Navy actually evaded the answer to them (for obviously there is nothing to answer). In response to the formal reply, the author sent another appeal. With the text of this appeal, you can read here. I must say that for almost four months of waiting, no response was received to this repeated appeal. A little later, the Navy compiled a new reply, signed by the Chief of the Navy’s shipbuilding, V. Tryapichnikov, even more vapid, but less detailed about it.
The question arises and to the author and chief designer of this project - IG Zakharov. Prior to his publication on the 20386 topic, the sharp questions of the project mentioned above were carefully avoided. At the same time, he understands everything, but does the exact opposite! Zakharov I.G .:
The need to create and maintain in the fleet of small corvettes is the result of rising costs and increasing the capacity of multi-purpose corvettes. ... the size of the naval composition of the Navy can be reduced by more than 60% ... The current situation can only be tackled by focusing on solving more clearly defined priorities, one of which is the creation of a junior class corvette and, consequently, lower cost. Due to these ships it will be possible to maintain the necessary number of surface fleet personnel
Perhaps this time he will find civic courage and give explanations for the 20386 project. And without forgetting about the problems with the 20380 project:
• “justification” of the use of Fourke radar (if it is capable of issuing target indications that are obviously not in compliance with the requirements of the Redut system);
• the absence (until now!) Of the radio-correction channel for the SAM on corvettes and the sense of using the SAM with 40 km range without a radio-correction channel (!);
• here: what range of capture of the Zour missile he personally hopes to get by the inconspicuous newest American anti-ship missile LRASM, and whether the Redut air defense system (in the configuration adopted for the corvette - with autonomous missiles with ARGSN) is able to provide an effective reflection of the raid of such targets (especially considering the fact that in all tests he worked only on targets with EPR by one or two orders of magnitude more than LRASM)?
• justification of the use of extremely expensive ZLASK (with an obvious “reduction” in the 20386 project for “saving” hydroacoustics).
Obviously, the real reasons for the “20386 project decisions” are not related to technology and “military considerations.” Among specialists in the field of shipbuilding and the creation of marine weapons long ago information has been circulating, which boils down to the following: the beginning of 2013, the Commander of the Baltic Fleet reports to the Chief of the Navy V. V. Chirkov. about the complete incapacity of the corvettes of the 20380 project, and at the same time I.V. Zakharov, agrees with V. Chirkov. TTZ on the new corvette project 20386 (and bypassing the specialists of the Navy).
Navy Specialist, 03.01.2015:
It is known that TTZ was passing on 20386 when Mr. Zakharov, the main enemy of our fleet, on behalf of Almaz brought TTZ to the Central Research Institute of the VK, signed with the chief and then immediately with the Commander-in-Chief. Nobody from the institute inside read anything. Then. Read later and ...
This is a photo from the bookmark. Mortgage section then lay for two years, and no one did anything with it. The construction actually began in 2018.
16.11.2006 Navy Specialist:
Criticism of the 20380 project ... no one is interested, but how these, no doubt, wonderful rockets will actually fly, in the absence of a radio correction line and disgusting target designation from Fourke ... So to speak, according to the “shot-and-forget” scheme. About what!!!!!!! About the goal? or about a rocket? ... the developers of the air defense system diligently bypass all sharp corners, such as:
And how will your missile attack see the target in case of targeting errors in the 1 area? ... The answer is - see ... etc.
And how will your missile attack see the target in case of targeting errors in the 1 area? ... The answer is - see ... etc.
... if we take the statement of I.G. Zakharova: We will not fight with anyone. We need a Corvette in order to demonstrate the flag of the need, then of course, all the way through.
And if tomorrow is war ...
And if tomorrow is war ...
Hex? However, these same persons all the problems of the 20380 project that the fleet encountered later (and which are not fully resolved so far!) Were named not just before their occurrence, but before they began to be embodied in hardware! Those. at the time of making “controversial decisions” for corvettes at the end of 2000x, their fallacy and disastrous consequences to specialists were immediately clear.
10.10.2011 Navy Specialist:
From my point of view, which has been repeatedly expressed here, (and how many times you can repeat it): there are no real opportunities to bring to mind the Redut air defense system on the corvette 20380 Н Е Т
The reasons have repeatedly been indicated and to list them again makes no sense.
Well, ok ... basic
1. This is not an air defense system. Not complex. This is a launcher + command module + rocket. No information subsystem.
2. Fourke has no chance to provide the Redut with the necessary accuracy information.
3. The only chance of work - according to "Puma" through the "Sigma".
The reasons have repeatedly been indicated and to list them again makes no sense.
Well, ok ... basic
1. This is not an air defense system. Not complex. This is a launcher + command module + rocket. No information subsystem.
2. Fourke has no chance to provide the Redut with the necessary accuracy information.
3. The only chance of work - according to "Puma" through the "Sigma".
Especially these estimates correlate with the information published in the article of K. Chulkov (“Version on the Neva”, 01.06.2017):
Apparently, the “Tower” in the document is the integrated antenna-tower mast complex (IBMK), which binds all navigation, weapon control, electronic warfare and reconnaissance of a warship into a single node .... the “Thunderer” and “Agile” corvettes of the 20385 series were built on the “Severnaya Verf”, the lead developer was the Almaz Central Metallurgical Bureau, which decided to order the “towers” for corvettes of this series from “Leninitsa”, despite the fact that was not present and had no relevant experience .... But back to the document "Scheme of special relations on the Tower." According to the agreements with Almaz and Severnaya Verfyu, the document says, payments from the value of the contract without VAT are followed by Lysenko - 1%, ... As you know, Edward Lysenko is the deputy head of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Almaz"
Note: as of today, former deputy director of the Almaz Central Immigration Bureau for Armaments, E. Lysenko, was dismissed, leaving behind a long “train” of extremely strange decisions and “preferences”. This concerned not only the armament of the corvettes (although he was personally responsible for them, especially for problems with their air defense), but also for other ships. For example, it was he who “justified” (in quotes) the allegedly “inexpediency” of upgrading the 1265 project's mass minesweepers to the Mayevka complex (“Mayevka” did not stand up with the trawls, Lysenko preferred ancient and useless trawls).
Today, however, the 20380 corvettes situation has changed.
According to information from the Pacific Fleet, the 20380 corvettes significantly "added" to combat capability. The Uranus missile system perfectly strikes targets at a distance, the former A-190 cannon accurately and reliably hit targets, both naval and airborne, and ground-based, and Furke radar also performed well when observing airborne goals. The hydroacoustic complex works well, and the EW systems proved to be excellent.
Summarize. Despite the sharp exacerbation of the military-political situation with 2014, the 20380 corvettes of the project are still of limited combat effectiveness (and the main issues remain on the Redut system)! However, the industry carried out a large, hard, but productive work on fine-tuning the project and eliminating many of its shortcomings. At present, the prospects for quickly bringing the corvettes to a combat-ready state are quite real. Obviously, the key issue with regard to the air defense system is the introduction of the ZSD radio correction channel (including on all previously built ships with the Redut air defense system).
However, instead, a scam was launched with a new project (and with the transfer of key 20380 flaws to it, for example, the absence of a ZaR radio correction), which is also several times more expensive.
The question arises: is it possible to "completely" eliminate the shortcomings of 20380, or its modernization reserves are supposedly "exhausted"? Yes, the 20385 project has apparently completely selected the 20380 project stocks by load. However, "internal reserves" are available:
• use of simple and light inclined launchers for the Caliber complex, structurally similar to the launchers previously used on the Nakat small rocket ship;
• replacement of the heavy launchers of the “Package” complex with light ones, like Western Mk32, with the provision for storing spare ammunition in a common cellar with aviation;
• for use of boats (including unmanned ones) in difficult conditions - to reduce the height of installation of boats on the upper deck level (with the installation of modern launch and lift equipment), which is possible on newly built ships, provided that they are equipped with 324 mm lightweight torpedo tubes their transfer to a more convenient place for recharging.
Of course, it is necessary to solve the “problem of air defense missile systems”, with the provision of radio correction of missiles. Taking into account the short-range acquisition of ARLs of the GOS-ZUR of the unobtrusive targets of the LRASM type, it is obviously necessary to install the second Puma-type radar with the addition of control functions for the air defense missile system. Perhaps there is a sense in the Zuru series of reduced cost due to the abandonment of expensive ARLGSN, - using them as radio command teams. With the reflection of a “dense”, with a small time interval of the inconspicuous weapons destruction, the radio command air defense system with good multi-channel radar has a decisive advantage over the air defense system with autonomous air defense systems with ARLGSN - clearly controlling the situation, actual shelling and destruction of all targets. Formally, they are, “Pantsir-M” and “Top-2M”, however, their placement on the corvette means complete reworking of his project, and the possibility of using simple radio command modifications of XURUM 9М96 and 9М100 with standard starting from “Puma” is probably easier and more appropriate.
In order to reduce the cost of the corvette, it is advisable to standardize the new 20380 radar with the first two corps of the 22800 project's MRK (i.e., the installation of the Positive-M radar). The successful establishment of the Pella plant and the Almaz Central Metallurgical Bureau of the MRK of the 22800 project showed that ships can be built with us quickly and with moderate cost. The capabilities of the 22800 RLC project are quite enough for solving problems in the near zone (including for the 20380 project corvette).
To summarize:
1. The 20386 project does not have any serious military and technical justification. The Navy, which received it, “to put it mildly,” from the “back door”, does not have and is not able to bring any serious and worthy of attention arguments in its favor. Its serial construction is inexpedient.
2. The industry has done a lot of hard work and, to a large extent, successful work on fine-tuning the 20380 project, mastered its serial construction (even at the “problem” Amur shipbuilding plant).
3. The ships of the project 20380 began to go safely (including in the distant and ocean zone).
4. It is necessary to continue the series of corvettes of the 20380 project (5), with unconditional complete elimination of their shortcomings (including completion of the first ships of the series).
5. In order to reduce the cost, it is advisable to unify the RLK of 20380 projects (new buildings) and 22800 (the first two buildings of the series) and use (in perspective) unified control posts for various weapon systems.
6. The use of the products of the Caliber complex should be provided from oblique launchers of all corvettes (including the first hulls). First of all, this concerns anti-submarine missiles (the OVR corvette should not be a “game” for submarines, but a “hunter” on them!), As it was done, for example, on the Chinese OVR corvettes of the 056 project.
7. It is necessary to place promising robotic complexes and modern boats on board the corvettes of the 20380 project.
8. The search for "internal reserves" of reducing the displacement of 20380 ships for its revision (with the elimination of deficiencies), for example, replacing the heavy package "Launch" complex with light pneumatic torpedo tubes.
The construction of ships of the 20386 project must be stopped and not be allowed to continue spending money on such technical adventures.
Afterword 2019 of the year
This article was supposed to come out on New Year's Eve in one large edition and was written specifically for him. However, taking into account the significant resonance of the previous series of articles by the authors, measures were taken to ensure its absence in the media.
Negative consequences of the termination of the construction of a series of corvettes project 20380 (20385) are beginning to realize and leaders. In August, 2018-th A.V. Shlyakhtenko, General Director of the Almaz Central Design Bureau, gave an interview to TASS, in which he stated:
This year, the laying of corvettes 20380 and 20385 at the shipyard "Severnaya Verf" and the Amur shipyard is not planned. However, the Almaz Central Metallurgical Bureau is convinced that these combat surface ships due to their limited cost and powerful enough weapons that allow them to solve a wide range of combat missions, including in the remote sea and ocean zone, are the basis for the formation of the ship fleet of the surface fleet .... Therefore, their construction should be carried out continuously and at the highest possible pace. We hope that the decision on the laying of new ships of this class will be made by the state customer in the near future.
And what about the navy? “The Answer” (or rather its complete absence), - in the formal reply of the naval chief of shipbuilding V. Tryapichinkov ...
Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Korolev V.I. and his predecessor Chirkov V.V. the layout of the corvette project 20386. Chirkov, still when he was Commander in Chief, pushed through another useless project - 22160. And then he went to work in the management of USC.
Within three years, the “Bold” will remain alone on the stocks for an indefinite long time, as a monument to the end of such adventures.
Information