Military Review

Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam

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The topic of necessity and expediency of building large series of ships was raised repeatedly by many authors and specialists. The world shipbuilding experience clearly speaks in favor of this. However, what is happening in our Navy is reminiscent of the orgy with a complete lack of adequate military and technical justification (and its substitution with various “advertising focuses” (and other “techniques”), such as “innovation” and “modularity”, etc.) .



Corvette 20386. There is an error on the image, there are two rapid-fire installations with an AK-306 gun. But everything else is correct.


This summer, one of the authors (A.T.) published an article “Worse than a crime. Construction of the corvettes project 20386 - error ", which caused a significant resonance (including among specialists). Then, on its basis and based on the results of the discussion, an appeal was sent (A.T.) to the presidential administration with a request to understand the feasibility of project 20386 and to resume production and modernization of the series already mastered by industry and fleet corvettes of the project 20380. Briefly, the main points:

1. Huge price of the project 20386. Known for the construction cost of the head, - more than 29 billion rubles, which is 70% more expensive than the serial corvette of the 20380 project and close to the cost of the modern frigate of the 22350 project.

2. Weak weapons. Despite a significant increase in displacement (from the 20380 and 20385 projects), the new “innovative” 20386 project lost the Caliber complex (installed on the 20385 project). The use of "Caliber" is possible only with the planned "container-modular" launch, temporarily installed to replace the helicopter (!) And with a decrease in ammunition twice from the project 20385. Also, under the pretext of “cheapening”, the hydroacoustic armament has been significantly simplified (with the rejection of the Zarya SJC and its replacement with the older and with the worst TTC GAS MG-335М). Given the importance of anti-submarine missions, incl. to ensure the deployment of the NSNF, such a weakening of the weapons of the “promising” corvette of the 20386 project does not have a reasonable explanation (especially considering its significantly increased displacement and cost).

3. Due to the new type of the main power plant of the corvette 20386 (gas turbine with partial electric propulsion), not only technical ununification with other ships of the near zone occurs, but also their combined use for the intended purpose is considerably complicated. At the same time, a partial electromotive does little; The power of the electric motors on the 20386 project is small for an effective search stroke (on the order of 18 knots), and the inevitable transition to turbines dramatically increases the noise, the cost of operation and reduces the cruising range.

4. For the sake of the 20386 project, the laying of the 20380 and 20385 projects mastered by the industry has already been stopped, and this already in the coming years will have very serious consequences for the fleet, as well as for industry.

5. The “concept of modularity,” which “justified” the 20386 project, failed in a number of countries (including the United States). At the same time, we “for some reason” ignore their successful experience in this field, for example, the MEKO concept, and all “modularity” for us has been reduced to sticking combat complexes into 20 and 40 foot containers (with a significant reduction in their performance characteristics). In the end - if you need to test this concept, then this can be done on any cheap cargo ship (and not on a special expensive “perekorvet-nedofregat”). So where is the real test of "our modules"?

6. High technical risk of the 20386 project. Here we can note the problem of stabilization of the radar beam due to significant and random deformations of the composite superstructure. The need to install radar on the superstructure is extremely controversial. After all, these are not only problems with beam stabilization, but also a significant reduction in the detection range of low-flying targets (from the 20385 project with the same radar, but on the mast). The reason for the placement of AN / SPY-1 radars in the USA is obvious - their weight and stability problems with their first carriers of the Ticonderox CD and LRD. But after the new radars have successfully placed on the 22350 project mast, “lowering” them (and the detection range of low-flying targets) on the 20386 project is beyond common sense. There is already a question about the “unofficial name” of the 20386 project, HBZ (I want to be Zumvolt), 20386’s imitation of this unfortunate US Navy project is too obvious (especially considering that the 20386 version with a wave-piercing nose ( as on “Zumvolte”) existed).

Corvette project 20386 and the US Navy destroyer Zumvolt
(The 20386 variant with a backward slope existed).

Declared the "advantages" of the ship project 20386 seaworthiness, speed and range. However, the growth of seaworthiness is insignificant compared to the 20380 project, and it begins to manifest itself only on the waves, where both projects are on the verge of loss of combat capability. The speed of the 20386 was derived from gas turbines (on diesel 20380 corvettes). At the same time, given the significant increase in 20386 displacement, the use of turbines on the original 20380 could have an even more significant effect on cost.
Range? But first of all it is necessary for the ships of the far zone. At the same time, the frigate of the 22350 project at a cost close to the 20386 project has incomparably higher combat capabilities. At the same time, a significant range on the 20386 project is achieved through a combined installation and the use of electric motors at the economist. The problem is that due to the low power of these electric motors, the speed spectrum of the corvette of the Navy does not correspond to them (for example, the task of searching for submarines), and in most cases the 20386 corvette will have to “become under the turbines” for this — with a sharp increase and noise and operating costs (and reduced range).

For the near-sea zone as a replacement for the 1124 IPC, the 20386 project ships are completely redundant. The main thing is that we need in the near zone a mass carrier of the most effective GUS today, the “Minotaur” (and with a long towed antenna).
To perform combat missions in this zone, a long range and autonomy for 20386 reserves are not needed. The increased speed does not make sense, due to the limitations of towed gas, and in a combat situation the ships will go with them (on display)! And you need a lower price, and the maximum possible anti-submarine capabilities at the lowest possible price (to ensure mass construction).

In fact, the ship of the project 20386, although it is called the word "corvette", but in terms of its displacement, seaworthiness and cruising range it is a "small frigate." And most importantly, it is a frigate (and “full-size”) and at the price too, and it is armed at the same time worse than the 20385 project corvette! Such is the “perekorvet-nedofregat”.

In response to an appeal to the presidential administration of the Russian Federation, a response from the Navy was received, the main points of which are given below.



Should comment on this answer Navy

Navy: The Corvette of the 20380 project was created at the beginning of the 2000-s and is gradually becoming obsolete with the trends of modern military shipbuilding.

Comment. It is pertinent to compare our “experience” with the corvettes of the project line: 20380 - 20380 with ZLASK - 20385 - 20386, with the US - a huge series of destroyers like “Arly Burk”, created a decade and a half ten years earlier than our 20386, and continuously improved (in within several subseries). We, without having completely eliminated the shortcomings of the serial 20380, grab onto new projects!

Navy: Further modernization of the 20380 corvette in terms of REV has already led to a significant increase in its value.

Comment. This is a well-known fact, and it is connected, first of all, with the installation instead of the Fourke and Puma radars of the new radar complex (ZLK) Zaslon. The question arises as to why this was done in the presence of the Positiv-M serial radar (satisfying the corvette’s requirements for TTX) and having an order of magnitude lower cost (from the Zaslon radar). In addition, it is completely incomprehensible why the radar “Zaslon”, with a sharp increase in cost (from the radar “Fourcade”), did not eliminate the most critical lack of air defense of the corvettes - the absence of a radio correction channel of the missile defense system?
Or is the information correct, that the installation of the ZLAS “Zaslon” on the corvettes took place only “for the sake of the“ ZLasn ”RLC itself (more precisely, its manufacturer)?


Screen advertising brochure RLC "Barrier". The solution of the problem of the lack of a line of radio correction of the ballast missile system, which is critical for corvettes of the 20380 and 20385 project, is not even announced or planned!

Navy: Restricting the construction of 20385 was a necessary measure (sanctions).

Comment. However, they are being completed (two 20385 project enclosures) with a domestic Kolomna diesel power plant. At the same time, there is a prospect of increasing its capacity, however, in the current plans of the Navy, the plant is left without an order (diesel engines for surface ships of the Navy). If the problem for the Navy is to reduce the speed of the 20385 corvettes (with the Caliber complex), then a possible solution for placing the Caliber was indicated - placing it on inclined launchers (similar to the Uran complex) based on the “original” 20380 project.

Navy: Corvette project 20386 is a further development of the ships of the near sea zone. This ship project will be the main base platform for the next few decades. When developing the project, the best achievements in military shipbuilding were used.

Comment. These are meaningless, “advertising” phrases, and I couldn’t give a sane answer to any specific tactical or technical question on the obvious problems of the 20386 project of the Navy. With the 20386 project, a strong regression of the development level is evident: with a significant increase in displacement and cost, in terms of weaponry and combat qualities, the 20386 project is significantly inferior to the previous 20385 project.

Navy: The 20386 project is multifunctional, has a balanced armament (including modular) and is capable of solving problems in the near zone, as well as occasionally and far.

Comment. The above marked obvious critical flaws in the 20386 armament. The Navy was able to give only general phrases as an answer. Apparently, for justified objections to criticism of the 20386 project, the Navy simply does not have arguments and facts.

Navy: The high cost of the head corvette of the 20386 project is due primarily to the associated R & D on its creation.

Comment. The specified cost of the corvette of the project 20386 is taken from the annual report of JSC "Severnaya Verf". Taking into account the fact that the design and development work on the 20386 project is conducted by the Almaz All-Russian Industrial Airport Design Bureau, it is obvious that the real cost of the 20386 head corvette of the 29 project is much higher than the figures in the Severny Verf report in XNUMX billion.

Navy: In the future, the cost of 20386 project corvettes is planned to be reduced due to their high serial production.

Comment. The question arises: why the navy in general are defective ships (project 20386), and at a price close to the price of multiply more powerful frigates of the project 22350? What mass series can we talk about? And where are the guarantees of "price reduction", if the cost of previous corvettes (of the 20380 project) in the building process had previously only increased?

The main problem with the 20386 project is that, with weak combat capabilities, it disrupts the replacement of worn-out and outdated Navy ships in the near zone. It is the understanding of this fact that gave rise to the original appeal (A.T.)

So, there are simple technical and tactical "uncomfortable questions" on the 20386 project:

1. Why is the new project 20386 has extremely weak weapons with a significant increase in its displacement and cost?

2. What is the basis of the “logic of choice”: or “Caliber in a container” “or a helicopter” for this project, if the ship needs them together and almost simultaneously (especially considering its considerable displacement)?

3. What is the "feasibility" of building the 20386 project at a cost close to the serial frigate of the 22350 project (which has incomparably greater combat capabilities)?

4. “Expediency” of the introduction of a hybrid power plant, given the fact that the installed low-power electric motors are not able to provide even the search for 16-18 nodes?

5. "Expediency" of using on the ship of the near zone is extremely expensive RLC (and without a channel of radio correction Zur) and "gold" at the cost of Zour?

6. What prevented the development of a “modular concept” on any experimental vessel, in advance and at minimum cost (and with a supposedly “successful” result, convincingly present it to specialists and society)?

7. How can the near zone be provided (primarily in the antisubmarine respect) if, due to the very high cost of the new corvettes, their series are obviously insufficient for solving the tasks of the Navy? And about this he (!) Directly writes the chief designer of the 20386 project in his latest book (link below)!

8. Why, with the extreme importance of the anti-submarine defense task (including to ensure the NSNF), and the installation of an extremely expensive (and having a dubious rationale) RLC, was the hydroacoustics on the 20386 project “cut off” for “economy”?

The Navy actually evaded the answer to them (for obviously there is nothing to answer). In response to the formal reply, the author sent another appeal. With the text of this appeal, you can read here. I must say that for almost four months of waiting, no response was received to this repeated appeal. A little later, the Navy compiled a new reply, signed by the Chief of the Navy’s shipbuilding, V. Tryapichnikov, even more vapid, but less detailed about it.

Corvette 20386. Continuation of the scam


The question arises and to the author and chief designer of this project - IG Zakharov. Prior to his publication on the 20386 topic, the sharp questions of the project mentioned above were carefully avoided. At the same time, he understands everything, but does the exact opposite! Zakharov I.G .:
The need to create and maintain in the fleet of small corvettes is the result of rising costs and increasing the capacity of multi-purpose corvettes. ... the size of the naval composition of the Navy can be reduced by more than 60% ... The current situation can only be tackled by focusing on solving more clearly defined priorities, one of which is the creation of a junior class corvette and, consequently, lower cost. Due to these ships it will be possible to maintain the necessary number of surface fleet personnel


Perhaps this time he will find civic courage and give explanations for the 20386 project. And without forgetting about the problems with the 20380 project:

• “justification” of the use of Fourke radar (if it is capable of issuing target indications that are obviously not in compliance with the requirements of the Redut system);

• the absence (until now!) Of the radio-correction channel for the SAM on corvettes and the sense of using the SAM with 40 km range without a radio-correction channel (!);

• here: what range of capture of the Zour missile he personally hopes to get by the inconspicuous newest American anti-ship missile LRASM, and whether the Redut air defense system (in the configuration adopted for the corvette - with autonomous missiles with ARGSN) is able to provide an effective reflection of the raid of such targets (especially considering the fact that in all tests he worked only on targets with EPR by one or two orders of magnitude more than LRASM)?

• justification of the use of extremely expensive ZLASK (with an obvious “reduction” in the 20386 project for “saving” hydroacoustics).

Obviously, the real reasons for the “20386 project decisions” are not related to technology and “military considerations.” Among specialists in the field of shipbuilding and the creation of marine weapons long ago information has been circulating, which boils down to the following: the beginning of 2013, the Commander of the Baltic Fleet reports to the Chief of the Navy V. V. Chirkov. about the complete incapacity of the corvettes of the 20380 project, and at the same time I.V. Zakharov, agrees with V. Chirkov. TTZ on the new corvette project 20386 (and bypassing the specialists of the Navy).
Navy Specialist, 03.01.2015:
It is known that TTZ was passing on 20386 when Mr. Zakharov, the main enemy of our fleet, on behalf of Almaz brought TTZ to the Central Research Institute of the VK, signed with the chief and then immediately with the Commander-in-Chief. Nobody from the institute inside read anything. Then. Read later and ...



This is a photo from the bookmark. Mortgage section then lay for two years, and no one did anything with it. The construction actually began in 2018.


16.11.2006 Navy Specialist:
Criticism of the 20380 project ... no one is interested, but how these, no doubt, wonderful rockets will actually fly, in the absence of a radio correction line and disgusting target designation from Fourke ... So to speak, according to the “shot-and-forget” scheme. About what!!!!!!! About the goal? or about a rocket? ... the developers of the air defense system diligently bypass all sharp corners, such as:
And how will your missile attack see the target in case of targeting errors in the 1 area? ... The answer is - see ... etc.

... if we take the statement of I.G. Zakharova: We will not fight with anyone. We need a Corvette in order to demonstrate the flag of the need, then of course, all the way through.
And if tomorrow is war ...


Hex? However, these same persons all the problems of the 20380 project that the fleet encountered later (and which are not fully resolved so far!) Were named not just before their occurrence, but before they began to be embodied in hardware! Those. at the time of making “controversial decisions” for corvettes at the end of 2000x, their fallacy and disastrous consequences to specialists were immediately clear.

10.10.2011 Navy Specialist:
From my point of view, which has been repeatedly expressed here, (and how many times you can repeat it): there are no real opportunities to bring to mind the Redut air defense system on the corvette 20380 Н Е Т
The reasons have repeatedly been indicated and to list them again makes no sense.
Well, ok ... basic
1. This is not an air defense system. Not complex. This is a launcher + command module + rocket. No information subsystem.
2. Fourke has no chance to provide the Redut with the necessary accuracy information.
3. The only chance of work - according to "Puma" through the "Sigma".


Especially these estimates correlate with the information published in the article of K. Chulkov (“Version on the Neva”, 01.06.2017):
Apparently, the “Tower” in the document is the integrated antenna-tower mast complex (IBMK), which binds all navigation, weapon control, electronic warfare and reconnaissance of a warship into a single node .... the “Thunderer” and “Agile” corvettes of the 20385 series were built on the “Severnaya Verf”, the lead developer was the Almaz Central Metallurgical Bureau, which decided to order the “towers” ​​for corvettes of this series from “Leninitsa”, despite the fact that was not present and had no relevant experience .... But back to the document "Scheme of special relations on the Tower." According to the agreements with Almaz and Severnaya Verfyu, the document says, payments from the value of the contract without VAT are followed by Lysenko - 1%, ... As you know, Edward Lysenko is the deputy head of the Federal State Unitary Enterprise "Almaz"

Note: as of today, former deputy director of the Almaz Central Immigration Bureau for Armaments, E. Lysenko, was dismissed, leaving behind a long “train” of extremely strange decisions and “preferences”. This concerned not only the armament of the corvettes (although he was personally responsible for them, especially for problems with their air defense), but also for other ships. For example, it was he who “justified” (in quotes) the allegedly “inexpediency” of upgrading the 1265 project's mass minesweepers to the Mayevka complex (“Mayevka” did not stand up with the trawls, Lysenko preferred ancient and useless trawls).

Today, however, the 20380 corvettes situation has changed.

According to information from the Pacific Fleet, the 20380 corvettes significantly "added" to combat capability. The Uranus missile system perfectly strikes targets at a distance, the former A-190 cannon accurately and reliably hit targets, both naval and airborne, and ground-based, and Furke radar also performed well when observing airborne goals. The hydroacoustic complex works well, and the EW systems proved to be excellent.

Summarize. Despite the sharp exacerbation of the military-political situation with 2014, the 20380 corvettes of the project are still of limited combat effectiveness (and the main issues remain on the Redut system)! However, the industry carried out a large, hard, but productive work on fine-tuning the project and eliminating many of its shortcomings. At present, the prospects for quickly bringing the corvettes to a combat-ready state are quite real. Obviously, the key issue with regard to the air defense system is the introduction of the ZSD radio correction channel (including on all previously built ships with the Redut air defense system).

However, instead, a scam was launched with a new project (and with the transfer of key 20380 flaws to it, for example, the absence of a ZaR radio correction), which is also several times more expensive.

The question arises: is it possible to "completely" eliminate the shortcomings of 20380, or its modernization reserves are supposedly "exhausted"? Yes, the 20385 project has apparently completely selected the 20380 project stocks by load. However, "internal reserves" are available:

• use of simple and light inclined launchers for the Caliber complex, structurally similar to the launchers previously used on the Nakat small rocket ship;

• replacement of the heavy launchers of the “Package” complex with light ones, like Western Mk32, with the provision for storing spare ammunition in a common cellar with aviation;

• for use of boats (including unmanned ones) in difficult conditions - to reduce the height of installation of boats on the upper deck level (with the installation of modern launch and lift equipment), which is possible on newly built ships, provided that they are equipped with 324 mm lightweight torpedo tubes their transfer to a more convenient place for recharging.

Of course, it is necessary to solve the “problem of air defense missile systems”, with the provision of radio correction of missiles. Taking into account the short-range acquisition of ARLs of the GOS-ZUR of the unobtrusive targets of the LRASM type, it is obviously necessary to install the second Puma-type radar with the addition of control functions for the air defense missile system. Perhaps there is a sense in the Zuru series of reduced cost due to the abandonment of expensive ARLGSN, - using them as radio command teams. With the reflection of a “dense”, with a small time interval of the inconspicuous weapons destruction, the radio command air defense system with good multi-channel radar has a decisive advantage over the air defense system with autonomous air defense systems with ARLGSN - clearly controlling the situation, actual shelling and destruction of all targets. Formally, they are, “Pantsir-M” and “Top-2M”, however, their placement on the corvette means complete reworking of his project, and the possibility of using simple radio command modifications of XURUM 9М96 and 9М100 with standard starting from “Puma” is probably easier and more appropriate.

In order to reduce the cost of the corvette, it is advisable to standardize the new 20380 radar with the first two corps of the 22800 project's MRK (i.e., the installation of the Positive-M radar). The successful establishment of the Pella plant and the Almaz Central Metallurgical Bureau of the MRK of the 22800 project showed that ships can be built with us quickly and with moderate cost. The capabilities of the 22800 RLC project are quite enough for solving problems in the near zone (including for the 20380 project corvette).

To summarize:

1. The 20386 project does not have any serious military and technical justification. The Navy, which received it, “to put it mildly,” from the “back door”, does not have and is not able to bring any serious and worthy of attention arguments in its favor. Its serial construction is inexpedient.

2. The industry has done a lot of hard work and, to a large extent, successful work on fine-tuning the 20380 project, mastered its serial construction (even at the “problem” Amur shipbuilding plant).

3. The ships of the project 20380 began to go safely (including in the distant and ocean zone).

4. It is necessary to continue the series of corvettes of the 20380 project (5), with unconditional complete elimination of their shortcomings (including completion of the first ships of the series).

5. In order to reduce the cost, it is advisable to unify the RLK of 20380 projects (new buildings) and 22800 (the first two buildings of the series) and use (in perspective) unified control posts for various weapon systems.

6. The use of the products of the Caliber complex should be provided from oblique launchers of all corvettes (including the first hulls). First of all, this concerns anti-submarine missiles (the OVR corvette should not be a “game” for submarines, but a “hunter” on them!), As it was done, for example, on the Chinese OVR corvettes of the 056 project.

7. It is necessary to place promising robotic complexes and modern boats on board the corvettes of the 20380 project.

8. The search for "internal reserves" of reducing the displacement of 20380 ships for its revision (with the elimination of deficiencies), for example, replacing the heavy package "Launch" complex with light pneumatic torpedo tubes.

The construction of ships of the 20386 project must be stopped and not be allowed to continue spending money on such technical adventures.

Afterword 2019 of the year

This article was supposed to come out on New Year's Eve in one large edition and was written specifically for him. However, taking into account the significant resonance of the previous series of articles by the authors, measures were taken to ensure its absence in the media.

Negative consequences of the termination of the construction of a series of corvettes project 20380 (20385) are beginning to realize and leaders. In August, 2018-th A.V. Shlyakhtenko, General Director of the Almaz Central Design Bureau, gave an interview to TASS, in which he stated:
This year, the laying of corvettes 20380 and 20385 at the shipyard "Severnaya Verf" and the Amur shipyard is not planned. However, the Almaz Central Metallurgical Bureau is convinced that these combat surface ships due to their limited cost and powerful enough weapons that allow them to solve a wide range of combat missions, including in the remote sea and ocean zone, are the basis for the formation of the ship fleet of the surface fleet .... Therefore, their construction should be carried out continuously and at the highest possible pace. We hope that the decision on the laying of new ships of this class will be made by the state customer in the near future.


And what about the navy? “The Answer” (or rather its complete absence), - in the formal reply of the naval chief of shipbuilding V. Tryapichinkov ...


Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Korolev V.I. and his predecessor Chirkov V.V. the layout of the corvette project 20386. Chirkov, still when he was Commander in Chief, pushed through another useless project - 22160. And then he went to work in the management of USC.


Within three years, the “Bold” will remain alone on the stocks for an indefinite long time, as a monument to the end of such adventures.
Author:
Photos used:
TsMKB "Almaz", TASS
230 comments
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  1. Grandfather
    Grandfather 20 March 2019 05: 54
    +3
    money for the fleet is not enough say ...
    1. bayard
      bayard 20 March 2019 07: 29
      32
      In the best times for our Fatherland, yes, under the Father of the Nations, all these lobbyists and eyewitnesses would have been put up against the wall long ago, with confiscation and defeat in the rights of the closest relatives ... This is a form of sabotage, sabotage and obvious sabotage! With full confidence in their own impunity. This mournful song about the "modular corvette" has been going on for a year now, this is a mockery of common sense!
      The shipbuilding program has been disrupted radically, seriously and for a long time. Admirals are retiring to the warm offices of the firms they lobbyed, damaging the fleet’s combat readiness and the budget by hundreds of billions ... With the hope of inflicting it further, from the new - pension and lobbying offices ...
      1. Aristarkh Lyudvigovich
        Aristarkh Lyudvigovich 20 March 2019 07: 36
        12
        An urgent need to send a commission to the North Shipyard, headed by Lisa Peskova! Kamrad Timokhin write to her in In100gram, let her figure out why there is PR, but there are no corvettes. And then our naval commanders will produce a zoo.
        1. bayard
          bayard 20 March 2019 08: 31
          23
          With Lisa? bully Better Natalka Poklonskaya — and more aesthetically pleasing, and criminal matters would have appeared instead of honorary pensions ... Or better, a firing squad with the reincarnation of comrade Beria — chaosless and embezzlers — at an expense, and the rest involved in SHARASHKA, on pearl barley — until the ships sail ( I am aware that they walk). We have a solid hutspa with military shipbuilding ... Is this a conscious policy or the incompetence of the Ministry of Defense? If the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy fails, then where does the Minister of Defense look? If this does not undermine the combat readiness and security of the country, then why are the FSB and counterintelligence gentle? The prosecutor’s office?
          Solder 10-15 years with confiscation and sharashka - until everything is fixed! The ships went into series, the fleet was satisfied - amnesty. And so as not to climb out of the shops! Law enforcement practice should be tough and indicative - so that no one would be tempted.

          Small anti-submarine ship \ corvette is a budget ship of the near sea zone. This does not require any abstruse innovations. A body of suitable displacement is taken and saturated (like Lego) with everything necessary, since all the ingredients are available. Good GAK, Packet-NK, Caliber-PL, near-zone air defense (better "Calm"), helicopter, cannon, electronic warfare, helicopter. And no "long arm" for air defense - in the near zone it will fight off, and then the aviation will help, he will fight in the near sea zone. The main thing is serial production and high rates of construction, so all components must be mastered by industry. Hull 20380 \ 385 is quite suitable for this, and saving on sophisticated air defense will only lead to cheaper and faster construction.
          1. venik
            venik 20 March 2019 10: 33
            +3
            Quote: bayard
            And no "long arm" for air defense

            ====
            good I, too, to be honest, sincerely surprised by the desire to "shove" Polyment-Redoubt "on ships of the corvette class! They have no place there at all! To shoot down an enemy plane before, the range is not enough anyway ... Use the corvette as an "escort ship" ?? So, WHAT are we to "escort? Is it only" Kuzya "and" Petya "? So for these purposes frigates are better suited! To cover the landing forces? So, in view of the extremely limited ammunition, it is also somehow not very good? there "with a creak" to push, if it is there, sorry "in fig" is not needed!
            "Poliment-Redut", whatever one may say, is a complex for ships of the "frigate" or "destroyer" class (but not the atomic "Leader"). For ships of the "corvette" class - more than enough simple and reliable self-defense complex - "Torah" in combination with an AK-630 (well, or "Duet" or "Broadsword") with good ammunition - "what the doctor ordered"!
            Anyway, this 20386 is somehow completely incomprehensible to me! What is he - "not a candle to God, not a damn poker!" Obviously excessive (at the same time, low-effective, due to the lack of radio correction) air defense / missile defense, weakened (due to the lack of PLUR 91R "Caliber") anti-submarine component, and shock capabilities are an order of magnitude worse than in 20385 ("Uranus" a good thing, of course, but against ships equipped with modern air defense / missile defense - clearly "does not dance"!).
            One gets the impression that it was created according to the principle "I blinded you out of what was!"
            The truth raises questions: the authors' conviction that the "inclined" launchers "Caliber" will be lighter than the vertical ones "- so like the cells of the UKSK also do not look too massive ... Although I can not say anything here - maybe some massive deck reinforcements? ( request ). One thing I can say just like that, "Gauges" on inclined launchers do not put - you will have to seriously redo the software, probably the hardware part (with inclined and vertical launch, different algorithms are used). So, for example, "Calm" with a VPU is using DIFFERENT missiles, compared to the previous version.
            1. bayard
              bayard 20 March 2019 11: 12
              +4
              The author proposed inclined launchers rather not so much to save weight as to simplify ergonomics (a very dense layout in 20385 was obtained due to UVP). On the other hand, inclined PUs will clutter up the deck. But if instead of "Poliment" we put "Calm", the UVP will not be so constrained any more. The main thing is to optimize the ship for specific tasks and not chase the notorious versatility - it will be able to escort transports already having a cannon and "Calm", you can add "Uranians" in a pair of inclined vertical doublets - they will not take up much space, but they will help in self-defense.
              The main principle of the corvette is cheaply, angrily and as intended. Their job is to drive submarines, and everything else to frigates.
              1. venik
                venik 20 March 2019 16: 42
                0
                Quote: bayard
                The author suggested inclined PUs rather than so much to save weight, but to simplify ergonomics (a very tight layout in 20385 due to the UVP turned out)

                =====
                "Consonant"! Here are just "Calm" - also redundant for ships of this class and displacement ("corvette") system! The "chilled" "Thor" (along with a pair of AK-630s) will do quite well there!
                As for the "dense layout" - YES! This worsens "living conditions" ... But still - a combat ship, especially a small displacement, is not a "seaside rest house"! Somehow you can endure 2 weeks ... Moreover, modern technologies, even in a very limited space, allow you to create quite comfortable conditions (at least for 2 weeks of hiking!).
                ---
                Quote: bayard
                The main principle of the corvette is cheaply, angrily and as intended. Their job is to drive submarines, and everything else to frigates.

                ======
                good Absolutely agree! That is why he wrote that the corvette really needs the UKSK "Caliber", and not because they can fire the CD, anti-ship missiles (Onyx and Caliber), but precisely because they can fire anti-ship missiles too !!! this is SERIOUS!). Even if there are not 8 (2 quadruple UKSK units), let only 4 (four!) - i.e. - 1 (one!) ... For PLUR - that's enough!
            2. timokhin-aa
              timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 11: 32
              -1
              The truth raises questions about the conviction of the authors that the "inclined" launchers "Caliber" will be lighter than the vertical ones "- so the cells of the UKSK also do not look too massive ...


              On 20380, there is simply no room for UKSC, and this is about it.
              1. Alex777
                Alex777 20 March 2019 15: 19
                +1
                On 20380, there is simply no room for UKSC, and this is about it.

                There is also no room for inclined PU Caliber. hi
                1. timokhin-aa
                  timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 18: 40
                  0
                  Instead of a Uranus launcher with a decrease in missiles to 4 units (two per board), it is quite possible.
                  1. Alex777
                    Alex777 20 March 2019 22: 02
                    +1
                    The length of the Caliber container is approximately 9m. Do not tell my hooves. laughing
                    And you also need a place for the most inclined installation, which no one even started to develop. Only Onyx has it.
                    1. timokhin-aa
                      timokhin-aa 22 March 2019 21: 32
                      0
                      Two times more than Uranus. Even less than two. Well, it will be strongly upward to hang around.
                      The example of Onyx TPK here is that creating an inclined PU of this type is quite possible.
              2. venik
                venik 20 March 2019 17: 12
                -4
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                On 20380, there is simply no room for UKSC, and this is about it.

                =======
                Yes, you can find places! It would be a desire!
              3. venik
                venik 20 March 2019 17: 18
                +2
                Quote: timokhin-aa
                On 20380, there is simply no room for UKSC, and this is about it.

                =======
                But on 20385 - FIND! Maybe it was worth THIS project to "finalize" ???
                1. Alex777
                  Alex777 20 March 2019 22: 06
                  +2
                  Well, look how much the VI 20385 differs from the VI 20380.
                  And with the German engines, which provided the necessary speed for 20385 - it did not work out. What, no one heard of this? And the Chinese did not go for quality. Still known. hi
                  1. timokhin-aa
                    timokhin-aa 22 March 2019 21: 34
                    0
                    And if you do not fill the ship with electronics to such an extent, do not put the mast with the RLC, and use the REV easier, leave him the same 12 SAM, instead of 16? Instead of a package light TA under the same torpedo? Etc.
                    There a couple of hundred tons you can throw a minimum.
          2. Machito
            Machito 21 March 2019 10: 14
            +5
            After the Navy, Roskosmos fell ill with Rogoznica.
        2. Angry
          Angry 24 March 2019 17: 48
          0
          A shame!!!! And these people will build a modern Navy ????
      2. Oden280
        Oden280 20 March 2019 08: 17
        -6
        Come on. Do you recall the USSR shipbuilding programs to create a large fleet? Complete utopia. Or projects of pre-war cruisers of project 26, which have no normal air defense. nor artillery and are intended for swimming in closed puddles.
        1. bayard
          bayard 20 March 2019 09: 06
          +2
          Don't talk nonsense. They were excellent cruisers, especially for their class and time. And their heirs, the "Chapaev" type, served until the beginning of the 90s. On all oceans.
          1. Oden280
            Oden280 20 March 2019 19: 52
            0
            Nothing great was in them. The main caliber did not give out the stated rate of fire and had a very large scatter, since all the guns were in the same cradle. SZA was finished only after the war, and only scare. About MZA and not worth talking about. The hull is lightweight, not suitable for operation in open seas. Kaganovich accident is an example of this. Cruisers pr. 68K were very unsuccessful. Only 5 units were built, by the 60th year everyone was transferred to the training and the last one was written off 27.09.1979/68/XNUMX. The XNUMX bis project has very little in common ..
        2. Earthshaker
          Earthshaker 20 March 2019 09: 23
          +6
          Everyone before the war underestimated the importance of MZA in the air defense of ships and japas, and the Americans. And only the Americans were able to solve the problem during the war. The claim is not counted. They could not establish a mass release of the ISA in the Union before the war - that’s the claim. And the small resource of the main caliber due to conversion for the sake of record performance in ballistics. But to say that there was no artillery is not true.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 20 March 2019 15: 50
            +2
            Quote: Earthshaker
            Everyone before the war underestimated the importance of MZA in the air defense of ships and japas, and the Americans.

            Not that they were underestimated ... The Japanese launched the 25 mm MZA back in the mid-30s and installed it on all IJN ships. The Yankees also had their own MZA - that's just with fine-tuning and production they shamelessly dragged on.
            The main failure of almost everyone was the absence of a heavy anti-aircraft machine gun of 35-40 mm caliber with power drives of the installation. The only ones who had something like this were limes. But the island gentlemen managed to spoil everything by saving on shells, having received for a fundamentally good installation a ridiculous initial velocity of shells and an effective firing range.
            Quote: Earthshaker
            They could not establish a mass release of the ISA in the Union before the war - that’s the claim.

            In fact, even in the United States for ten years they fought with a ship-borne anti-aircraft machine gun of their own design and were able to establish its release only in the early 40s. Moreover, the release went at such a pace that at the time of the US entry into WWII, part of the LC had in their slots the old 76 mm anti-aircraft guns installed instead of them - because there was simply no MZA.
            In addition, for 10 years the "Chicago piano" became morally obsolete - and the Yankees had to curtail its release and struggle for another two years over the adaptation to the conveyor belt production of honestly purchased products from Swiss and Swedish masters. For the resulting technology was replete with phrases like drill in place after assembly or finalize with a file during installation, and when processing parts, 90-95% of the mass of the workpieces should go into the chips.
          2. Oden280
            Oden280 20 March 2019 20: 00
            0
            He had all three guns located in one cradle and as a result of which there was a very large scatter. Only mattresses dealt with this problem during the war. In addition, the main caliber had a rate of 2 rpm instead of 6 stated. This problem was not sorted out. 100 mm anti-aircraft guns did not have MTP and could not effectively fulfill their functions. At the Pacific Fleet, 8 85 mm guns were inserted into the cruiser. that would be at least something. The guns were finished only after the war.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 20 March 2019 20: 35
              0
              Quote: Oden280
              He had all three guns located in one cradle and as a result of which there was a very large scatter.

              At that time - the standard scheme. The Yankees even had "three-barreled towers" on some of the LK.
              And the reason for the increase in dispersion is not in one cradle, but in the small distance between the trunks and the mutual influence (with a full salvo) of gases and shells from nearby trunks. It is treated simply - by half-salvos or by introducing a device for delaying shots from the middle barrel.
              In addition, it is very interesting - what was this "large spread" in terms of the MK-3-180 specifically?
              Quote: Oden280
              Only mattresses dealt with this problem during the war.

              Limey decided it before the war - in two steps. At first, when designing three-gun 152-mm turrets for KRL, the central gun was moved 76 cm back.

              And then, having received a dispersion of 640 m at firing, in 1937 they conducted special tests, as a result of which they introduced a device for delaying shots from the central barrel with a full salvo.
              Quote: Oden280
              In addition, the main caliber had a rate of 2 rpm instead of 6 stated.

              There is one subtle point here - it is not known at which UVR the rate of fire was measured.
              1. Oden280
                Oden280 21 March 2019 07: 57
                -2
                This "standard" scheme was used only in three fleets: Italy, the USSR (licked from the Italians), and the US battleships until the 30s. the Americans partially cured this by installing a special device for slowing down the shot of a medium gun. We didn't have such a device. The probability of dispersion of one gun in range was over 220 m, and the side gun - over 32 m, theoretically. In practice, most likely even more.
                The manufacture of tower installations was carried out at the LMZ. He also carried out the installation of the first 3 towers on the Kirov CD, which ended in the third quarter of 1937, and the first firing was carried out on the cruiser on September 15-17, 1937. Nevertheless, the final ship tests of the MK-3-180 were carried out on the CD "Kirov" from June 4 to August 23, 1938. The conclusion of the commission read: "The final shipboard tests of the MK-3-180 took place in the period from July 4 to August 23, 1938. MK-3-180 is subject to composition and for military testing. The installation was handed over to the ship with a rate of fire of two rounds per minute instead of six according to the project. The artillerymen of "Kirov" could start to planned combat training with regularly working materiel only in 1940 "
                The 180-mm three-gun turret MK-3-180 had a fixed loading angle of 3 degrees.
                The photo is not correct. It depicts the tower of an English cruiser. The Americans did not move the guns back. they carried them as much as possible along the frontal plane.
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 21 March 2019 10: 50
                  +2
                  Quote: Oden280
                  This "standard" scheme was used only in three fleets: Italy, the USSR (licked off the Italians), and the US battleships until the 30s.

                  Plus the French. Three fleets from the first five, including the first fleet in the world.
                  Quote: Oden280
                  The probability of dispersion of one gun in range was over 220 m, and the side - over 32 m, theoretically. In practice, most likely more.

                  In practice (1940 shooting at KNIMAP), the median deviation for the B-1-P gun on the firing range was:
                  at a distance of 70 kbt - 46 m
                  at a distance of 90 kbt - 55 m
                  at a distance of 120 kbt - 78 m
                  at a range of 150 kbt - 106 m.
                  Source - article "Cruisers of the project 26 and 26 bis. Part 3. Main caliber" uv. Andrey from Chelyabinsk.
                  Quote: Oden280
                  The photo is not correct. It depicts the tower of an English cruiser.

                  So I wrote about the British.
                  About the fact that Royal Navy solved the problem of increasing dispersion before the war: first, moving the medium cannon back in the project, and when it didn’t help (the tests of 1937 showed that the dispersion is still too large) - introducing a delay coil for the shot from the medium cannon .
                  Quote: Oden280
                  The commission’s conclusion read: “The final ship tests of the MK-3-180 took place between July 4 and August 23, 1938. The MK-3-180 is to be transferred for operation to personnel and for military testing. The installation was handed over to the ship with a rate of fire of two rounds / min instead of six according to the design.

                  So I know this quote. But at which IOPs a rate of 2 rounds per minute was obtained? For the loading angle of the guns of the MK-3-180 turret is constant: 6,5 degrees.
                  1. Oden280
                    Oden280 21 March 2019 17: 21
                    0
                    Not 6,5, but 3 degrees. At other angles, loading is not possible. The mean deviation is not a scattering ellipse, it is the same crafty figure. as with increased survivability. 50% of the marks are taken and this deviation is built on them.
                    In the French, in three gun turrets, the guns were in different cradles. Two guns in one cradle stood in four gun turrets of the LC. But there the shooting scheme was different: one shot from each pair of guns.
                    Royal Navy had no problems with dispersion and they didn’t sin with the delayed shot devices. This is a purely American invention.
                    1. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 22 March 2019 17: 31
                      0
                      Quote: Oden280
                      In the French, in three gun turrets, the guns were in different cradles.

                      Yes, you are right - here I vainly hoped for navweaps, where these towers were designated as Triple mount - built towers. As it was written on the same navweaps, the triple turrets had their guns in a common slide (cradle) - at the constructed towers, all guns are installed in one cradle.
                      Quote: Oden280
                      Not 6,5, but 3 degrees.

                      Hmmm .... I relied on MK with the work of Chernyshev on pr. 26:
                      The loading angle was + 6,5 °.

                      Quote: Oden280
                      Royal Navy had no problems with dispersion and they didn’t sin with the delayed shot devices.

                      Hmmm ... On the same navweaps in the article on the 6 "/ 50 (15.2 cm) BL Mark XXIII gun, it is written that, despite the shift of the middle gun of the three-gun turret back by 760 mm, the early" Towns "suffered from dispersal problems reaching 640 m.According to the results of the 1937 firing, a shot delay device was introduced into the firing chain of the medium gun, which increased the distance between the shells in the salvo - As a result, a timing circuit was introduced which delayed the firing of the center gun, thus increasing the shell separation and reducing dispersion.
        3. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 20 March 2019 15: 02
          +5
          Quote: Oden280
          Or projects of pre-war cruisers of project 26, which have no normal air defense. nor artillery and are intended for swimming in closed puddles.

          The pre-war KRL is project 68. Project 26 is the first half of the 30s, the swan song of the "small fleet" program. And in the mid-30s, the air defense and artillery of pr. 26 and 26 bis were at the level of foreign counterparts.
          What about closed puddles - There were no complaints from the Pacific Fleet to the local 26 bis, EMNIP.
          1. Oden280
            Oden280 20 March 2019 19: 42
            -3
            Yeah, what did Kaganovich do after the storm? Ships with a weakened set are not suitable for operation in large water.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 20 March 2019 20: 46
              +2
              Quote: Oden280
              Yeah, what did Kaganovich do after the storm?

              Are you talking about the consequences of meeting the 1958 typhoon with a wind force of 12 points? Then "Kaganovich" was in the same position as the CA-68 "Baltimore" and CL-89 "Miami" after the "typhoon of three destroyers" in December 1944 - it required serious repairs.
              Apparently, the Yankees also built ships with a weakened set not suitable for operation in high water. smile
              1. Oden280
                Oden280 21 March 2019 07: 27
                -1
                But only he received permanent damage to the set of the case. After which he could not recover. Loss of extremities by the cruisers Gorky and Slava from one blasting of anchor mines also testifies to a weakened hull set. Classmates in such cases received a hole.
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 21 March 2019 11: 02
                  -1
                  Quote: Oden280
                  But only he received permanent damage to the set of the case. After which he could not recover.

                  And which permanent damage to the case got his brother - "Kalinin" - which was withdrawn from the fleet in 1956? wink
                  It's not about the damage. The fact is that the fleet in the mid-50s was forced to begin reducing the number of ships. And the first to be reduced were ships of pre-war and military construction, as well as trophies. If we take KRL pr. 26 and 26-bis, then "Maxim Gorky" and "Voroshilov" were withdrawn from the fleet in 1956, "Kirov" - in 1958, "Molotov" - in 1959,
                  1. Oden280
                    Oden280 21 March 2019 17: 51
                    0
                    Gorky was decommissioned 18.04.1958/4.04.1972/12.04.1963, Molotov 1964/1975/2.03.1973, Kalinin XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX, Kaganovich XNUMX, although he did not go out to sea anymore, Kirov XNUMX, Voroshilov XNUMX
                    They were transferred to training ships due to obsolescence and unsuccessful design.
                    1. Alexey RA
                      Alexey RA 22 March 2019 18: 02
                      0
                      Quote: Oden280
                      They were transferred to training ships due to obsolescence and unsuccessful design.

                      Not certainly in that way. All KR pr. 26 and 26 bis were withdrawn from the fleet in 1956-1959. and sucked. And only after some time they were re-opened and shoved into the training courts of the Kyrgyz Republic, and into the trial vessels.
                      1. Oden280
                        Oden280 22 March 2019 20: 03
                        0
                        The essence does not change
      3. NEXUS
        NEXUS 20 March 2019 11: 31
        +8
        Quote: bayard
        The shipbuilding program is disrupted radically, seriously and permanently

        Yes, there is no program as such. There are throwings on super-hyper projects, such as the destroyer Leader and more. In essence, even betting on the submarine fleet here is ridiculous, since we build nuclear submarines for a long time, and diesel submarines are not capable of performing all the tasks that are required. About submarines with VNEU or LIAB I generally keep quiet.
        And given the reduction in the defense budget, I am sure the fleet will remain on the rights of a beggar, to whom nothing will break off.
        After laying, all projects turn into long-term construction, and it’s understandable why ... at these construction sites, bureaucrats and politicians make their fortunes by sawing the budget brazenly and not being afraid of anything.
        I once said, in fact, the whole elite of our helmsmen is the oath-criminals, so they, being in the USSR and swearing an oath to that country, betrayed her. So what can you expect from such people then?
      4. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 20 March 2019 14: 59
        +7
        Quote: bayard
        In the best of times for our Fatherland, and under the Father of Nations, all these lobbyists and fraudsters would have been put to the wall long ago, with confiscation and defeat of the rights of immediate relatives

        Seriously? And who was put to the wall for diverting the resources of the design bureau and industry for the development of projects and the construction of well-needed pre-war battleships, pr. 23, and heavy cruisers, pr. 69, that were necessary for the Soviet Navy? Or post-war LC pr. 24 and KRT pr. 82? wink

        I’m not talking about the fact that during an IVS, the domestic shipbuilding industry regularly handed over to the Navy not only what the fleet needed, but the fact that this shipbuilding industry could build without much stress. And the only victim in this situation was the People's Commissar of the Navy, who tried after WWII to demand from industry to stop stamping ships of pre-war projects and give the fleet ships that would take into account the experience of the Second World War.
        1. bayard
          bayard 20 March 2019 19: 19
          0
          Yes, under Stalin, no one would dare to push something like 20386, there would not be such an obvious and stupid pest. And in other industries there are as many examples as you like.
          In the 30s of the last century England was the enemy of Russia at sea - it was against her that the "Big Fleet" with battleships and battle cruisers was built, and these ships could not be obtained until the mid / late 40s. All plans were made up according to the readiness of the industry, in a logical sequence: destroyers, light cruisers, battleships, battle cruisers. In the war with Germany, the fleet, by and large, did not take part at all, sent only auxiliary functions, and if they built several destroyers and 26 bis more, there would be not much more sense. Perhaps more losses.
          In the post-war years, in a conversation with Sholokhov (if memory serves), Stalin said the phrase "d ..... there was Hitler. If they stood back to back, some feathers would fly from the Anglo-Saxons" ... In case of such a war, battleships of the "Soviet Union" type would fit just right. And so why talk about the fact that they did not have time?
          After the war, the industry simply could not build what the navy wanted. Namely, aircraft carriers. A lot of qualified personnel died, factories were badly damaged. Therefore, with a heart squeak, they launched into a large series the magnificent "Chapaev" type lxes. With excellent seaworthiness, excellent autonomy, excellent artillery (yes, only six inches, but what is the range and accuracy of fire). They were forged personnel for the future fleet, because after the losses in the Second World War, we have experienced sailors in general with a gulkin nose.
          With project 82, the greater stupidity was not its construction, but the fact that the unfinished buildings were cut and forgotten. The characteristics of the ship were revolutionary (speed, security, range of the main caliber), and given that in the future it could be equipped with shells in a special design ... Competencies and experience in designing a large ship, power plant with a capacity of 280 l / s, all this would help in the future in the creation of domestic aircraft carriers, the construction of which was planned under Stalin and even specialized carrier-based aircraft were designed.
          Khrushchev cut everything.
          To build a powerful ocean fleet, a time lag of 20 to 30 years is needed, no less. We have never had such a time. And almost every change of power led to the collapse of the previous program. Even at the time of the collapse of the Union, the fleet had not yet gained its planned power ... but by the end of the 90s ... the amers would become crowded on the oceans. .
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 20 March 2019 21: 04
            +5
            Quote: bayard
            Yes, under Stalin, no one would dare to push something like 20386, there would not be such an obvious and stupid pest

            * looks thoughtfully in the direction of "Tupolev's floats", the seaworthiness of which turned out to be insufficient to perform even basic tasks - work in coastal areas.
            * no less thoughtfully glances at wave control boats.
            * and looks with surprise at the fourth LK Pr. 23, which was laid at the unfinished factory number 402 and dismantled - due to a massive marriage to riveting. Moreover, the utopianism of the construction of two medical complexes in Molotovsk was immediately clear - there were not enough personnel even in old factories.
            Quote: bayard
            In the war with Germany, the fleet, by and large, did not take part at all, sent only auxiliary functions, and if they built several destroyers and 26 bis more, there would be little more sense.

            And if the money spent on the construction of pr. 23 and 69, infrastructure for them and modernization of production, would have been spent on the army? Are you aware that the estimated cost of the Ruchyi base alone for ave. 23 was 0,55 billion rubles? The estimated cost of plant No. 402 is 2,37 billion rubles.
            Quote: bayard
            After the war, industry simply could not build what the fleet wanted. Namely, aircraft carriers.

            What are the aircraft carriers ?! Kuznetsov requested at least destroyers with a universal caliber - like all the main fleets of that time. For which he was immediately accused of Nosenko that the People's Commissar of the Navy is against the interests of the working class and wants to leave shipbuilders without a salary. And Comrade Kuznetsov received a slightly turned pre-war Pr.30 - with one paired 85-mm anti-aircraft gun and six MZA. Not a bad ship for 1941, but in the yard it’s the end of the 40s!
            1. bayard
              bayard 20 March 2019 21: 58
              +2
              Well killed, give up. hi
              There was a lot of foolishness - from inexperience, there were no worthy naval commanders, nor shipbuilders ... And before the revolution it was not a lot, and only after ... Here it is only to learn from your own bumps that there is little other people's experience. So we studied. By the 80s, it seemed they had learned, gained experience ...

              But this cannot be attributed to the article; inexperience cannot be attributed. Here the intent is evil. Malicious. And it would be good only involved in the cut / theft ... But it looks more like sabotage. At least those who cut the divorce beat up the mercenary performers.
      5. 1Alexey
        1Alexey 21 March 2019 20: 36
        +1
        bayard
        The shipbuilding program has been disrupted radically, seriously and for a long time. Admirals are retiring to the warm offices of the firms they lobbyed, damaging the fleet’s combat readiness and the budget by hundreds of billions ... With the hope of inflicting it further, from the new - pension and lobbying offices ...

        And where do the admirals? Not they are engaged in shipbuilding! There is a question for the government, why is it taking so long to build.

        For example, recently there was information that the St. Petersburg shipbuilding enterprise "Zvezda" opened a new shipyard in the Far East with 4000 jobs. And now in St. Petersburg and the whole country they are looking for someone to fill these places with.

        The question is, why did this have to be done? They would build a plant in St. Petersburg, for example, and the personnel issue would be quickly resolved.
        Why build factories where there is little population?

        And all because they want to kill 2 birds with one stone: to settle the Far East and build warships, and as a result they land between 2 chairs.

        People still do not want to move to the Far East and shipbuilding enterprises remain understaffed manpower. Already even part of conscripts, instead of service, began to be sent to work at defense shipbuilding plants in the Far East, in the hope that at least some of them would remain there later.

        Although, if such plants were built in densely populated regions of the country, then there would be no such problems.
        1. bayard
          bayard 22 March 2019 01: 54
          +1
          Quote: 1Alexey
          And where do the admirals? Not they are engaged in shipbuilding! There is a question for the government, why is it taking so long to build.

          The admirals claim because if the customer (fleet) says that they do not need the corvette 20386 for nothing, then no one can impose on them. But if the admiral has a couple of years left until retirement, and he is offered the position of vice-president of a shipbuilding company or some other warm place, then he will wipe any crap ... Alas, this has become the norm. Therefore, the main lobbyists of failed projects are those who should, on the contrary, cut off all nonsense.
          In the Far East, not just a shipyard or a settlement program is needed. A comprehensive development program for the region is needed there. This is not very cheap, but you need to immediately build cities with all the infrastructure, create a comfortable living environment, give good salaries with a regional coefficient. No one will go without it. Komsomol volunteers traveled not only for the smell of taiga, but also for a very long ruble, which was unrealistic to earn in the middle comfortable lane. And on a big rock, salaries are just ridiculous. Yes, in such a wilderness uninhabited.

          But it is necessary to build in the Far East, namely to develop shipbuilding - both civilian and military. They will become drivers of development and will pull along all other sectors. In the Soviet Union, they were able to solve such issues. And yet - in Primorye there should be its own shipbuilding institute in order to train personnel on the spot, and young people can also go to study from other places ... And they will.
          But the most important thing for success is that the standard of living in Primorye should be higher, higher than not just the average for Russia, higher. than in most shipbuilding centers in the country. And to raise salaries not to managers, but to the main working specialties - welders, fitters, ship electricians, mechanics, etc. Those who work with their hands.

          But for all this, completely different managers are needed.
          1. 1Alexey
            1Alexey 22 March 2019 02: 36
            0
            Regarding the admirals, you wrote about the shipbuilding program:
            The shipbuilding program has been disrupted radically, seriously and for a long time. Admirals retire to warm offices

            And whether they would have laid the corvette 20386 or not, this would have practically no effect on the shipbuilding program. Even without this corvette - it would still be torn down and not through the fault of the admirals, but through the fault of the manufacturers!

            What you offer regarding the Far East is a very long and very costly process. And now the result in the form of the same ships needs a quick one. And for this, shipbuilding plants need to be built in densely populated areas of the country.

            In addition, your proposal means a coordinated departure from market mechanisms. Ships of the same type built in the Far East and in St. Petersburg will have the same value. Why then should salaries in the Far East increase?

            In addition, after the rise in salaries, prices for everything (from urban transport to goods and products) would jump in the Far East. And what would be the benefit to the residents from raising salaries then?

            When state. regulation on salaries and prices, as was the case under socialism - incentives could be organized (provided there is good housing and a high infrastructure in the form of good education and medicine).
            And that would be limited incentive, because most people who have apartments in cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg would not abandon their apartments and move to the Far East.

            In Soviet times, for the sake of high earnings, on construction sites such as Kamaz and BAM, people from large cities traveled for a limited period (3-5 years), and not for permanent residence.

            But under today's liberal-market system of management, even stimulation to organize is not realistic.

            As a result, we have invested money in idle equipment of underloaded plants with a shortage of ship products and unemployment in densely populated areas of the country.

            Although all this could have been avoided if these plants were built in densely populated regions.
            1. bayard
              bayard 22 March 2019 03: 24
              +1
              Admirals are lobbying for adventurous projects and this is driving the program to build a series of corvettes into a dead end, as well as the idea of ​​unification. That is what I was talking about.
              The shipbuilding program was disrupted for a whole range of reasons, the analysis of which will take more than one article, and all of them have long been sucked up in the press and on forums. But to provide for all possible delicate places - Ukrainian turbines and gearboxes, German diesel engines, the imposition of sanctions, the unavailability of weapons systems and on-board equipment on time (Polyment-Redut, etc.). Experts spoke about this at the very beginning of the program, history itself shouts that as soon as we begin to build a large fleet, they begin to put pressure on us, impose sanctions, organize revolutions, and draw us into wars. So, starting such a program, you need to prepare your own base, and not rely on international cooperation.

              The current underload of shipyards due to the lack of marine engines, now it seems this is already a settled issue.
              Ships and ships for Pacific Fleet need to be built on the spot, so that it can be repaired, serviced, modernized, and received spare parts. parts - from the other end of the world you don’t particularly drive, the Russo-Japanese War is an example of this. The same is true for civil, commercial shipbuilding - vessels for servicing the Northern Sea Route, Yamal, Gazprom, Rosneft, etc. you need to build it there. There, to maintain, repair, upgrade.
              If we do not settle in the Far East, we won’t hold it.
              1. 1Alexey
                1Alexey 22 March 2019 03: 38
                0
                If we do not settle in the Far East, we won’t hold it.

                This is not true. Now there are other times and it is impossible to approach things from the perspective of the Russo-Japanese War.

                Nobody will take away any territory from a country possessing nuclear weapons (especially ones like ours).

                A good example is the DPRK: there is nothing at all about nuclear weapons there, but no matter how much the United States has not been afraid of, nothing has been decided.

                Are you ready to move to the Far East?

                And the underload of shipyards is associated not only with engines, but also with the reluctance of people to go live and work in the Far East.

                There are even videos on youtube, because because of this, conscripts are being sent instead of service to work at a shipyard in the Far East.
                1. bayard
                  bayard 22 March 2019 03: 59
                  +1
                  To want to live in the Far East, you need to either be born there, or live 10-15 years to adapt. My friend served in Primorye for about 15 years. At first I couldn’t adapt - everything else - climate, mentality, nature, fauna, the proximity of China and Japan to Korea and the infinitely distant Europe ... And then I got accustomed so that when I retired, everything was trying to return there - in the middle lane, everything not that pulls back.
                  It's too late for me, but I always wanted to get there.

                  And about the shortage of workers on Zvezda, then there are such salaries that they can’t even recruit even in Southeast Asia. And this is like sabotage.
                  You will go to hell with pies for 25 - 30 thousand rubles. ?
                  So Asians from the poorest countries do not go.
                  For such tricks, they had previously been shot with the defeat of relatives in rights.
                  1. 1Alexey
                    1Alexey 22 March 2019 04: 12
                    0
                    To want to live in the Far East, you need to either be born there or live 10-15 years

                    That is the point. Others also argue and do not want to go there even for a significantly higher salary.

                    And in Central Asia there are not many specialists for co-construction factories and in general who want to work hard. At first they work, and then they try to evade.

                    Therefore, the habitat of the Far East should be postponed for a long time, and now to build factories in densely populated regions, this will give a quick effect.

                    As for the size of the salary, I already wrote to you that if for the same work on the same ship in St. Petersburg a person receives, for example, 30 thousand rubles, then why should he get more for it in the Far East, because the enterprise will receive the same amount for the same ship!
      6. Sckepsis
        Sckepsis 25 March 2019 17: 46
        -1

        yes under the Father of nations

        To the earth would you to your father of nations ...
        1. bayard
          bayard 25 March 2019 18: 03
          0
          Do not choke on bile. We’ll all be there, no one will get out.
    2. Petrol cutter
      Petrol cutter 20 March 2019 17: 16
      +3
      Grandfather is old (insanity to be honest, not a nickname) ...
      Comment about nothing! And for some reason he is the first ... What exactly do you propose to do? How to proceed?! Here’s how you say it, we’ll do it. But you will be solely responsible for the decision.
    3. Normal ok
      Normal ok 23 March 2019 11: 33
      0
      Quote: Dead Day
      money for the fleet is not enough say ...

      Today, there was an article at the VO about how the US Air Force sabotages the topics of light attack aircraft due to the intra-departmental sawing of cash flows. In the process, the situation with Russian corvettes is absolutely similar.
  2. Mar.Tirah
    Mar.Tirah 20 March 2019 06: 22
    33
    Nothing changes in the Danish kingdom. Everyone adapted to Putin’s reigning methods, stupidly reporting on the implementation of the May decrees, still stupidly plundering, and things are still there. Serdyukovschina did not grow from scratch, it needed soil, here it is fragrant. One pulled out others came in his place. How can you not remember Stalin?
    1. Ross xnumx
      Ross xnumx 20 March 2019 06: 45
      16
      To the author - for a civil position - good and you for the exact comment - good
      Nothing more to add ...
  3. GKS 2111
    GKS 2111 20 March 2019 06: 37
    +6
    "In general, the situation in our Navy is changing little."
    Running on the spot reminds ..
    1. Ross xnumx
      Ross xnumx 20 March 2019 06: 50
      +4
      Quote: GKS 2111
      Running on the spot reminds ..

      Step forward, two steps back:
      The party is not only advanced, but also an organized detachment of the working class. She will be able to fulfill the role of leader only under the condition of high organization and discipline, unity of will and actions of her members.
      The party is the highest form of class organization of the proletariat. It is called upon to lead all the mass organizations of the working class (professional, cooperative, youth, women's, etc.), uniting their efforts in the struggle against the exploiting classes. The party is the embodiment of the connection between the vanguard of the working class and the millions of proletariat masses and all working people.

      What is the party United Russia? request
    2. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 10: 08
      -1
      kicking in place
    3. Vadim237
      Vadim237 20 March 2019 21: 40
      -2
      It's just that the Navy is in fourth place, after the Strategic Missile Forces, the naval detachments and the VKS.
  4. Rurikovich
    Rurikovich 20 March 2019 06: 44
    27
    You are struggling, Comrade Timokhin, with windmills in the person of the whole state and not see you success, because the state is no longer that ... No. Power is no longer with workers and peasants, natural resources also do not belong to them wink request .
    It's funny, but the current picture is fully illustrated by the yacht "Dilbar" of the oligarch Usmanov for 600 million (roughly), moored at the embankment of Barcelona

    And you are corvettes ... repeat
    A curtain!
    Article zhirnay plus !! hi
    1. Aristarkh Lyudvigovich
      Aristarkh Lyudvigovich 20 March 2019 07: 44
      13
      Andrei hi Moreover, the length of the superyacht Dilbar is 156 meters, and the length of the newest frigate of project 22350 "Admiral Gorshkov" is only 135 meters. Let's be glad for Usmanov, he has something to transport his girls with reduced social responsibility. Let's hope that in a difficult moment for the country, Usmanov will not deny the Russian Navy the possibility of placing a container with calibers on one of the yacht's helipads. It was not in vain that he received the Order of Merit for the Fatherland from the hands of the guarantor.
    2. mark1
      mark1 20 March 2019 08: 51
      0
      Well here! Here! Ready base for super project 20387! The fleet needs 15 pieces definitely!
    3. Vadim237
      Vadim237 20 March 2019 21: 42
      -7
      And where does the yacht for 600 million, Usmanov himself, and what does he have to do with the defense order?
      1. Rurikovich
        Rurikovich 23 March 2019 00: 28
        +1
        Quote: Vadim237
        And where does the yacht for 600 million, Usmanov himself, and what does he have to do with the defense order?

        And it’s just that once the Greek millionaire paid for the purchase of an entire cruiser to his country, which is now permanently parked in Piraeus, as a reminder of the true patriotism of the millionaire in relation to his country.
        You can say this against the background of dozens of yachts of Russian oligarchs wink Then do not be surprised that we have normal such ships near Milyanerau being built quickly, and those that the country has really needed for decades due to lack of funding smile
        Personally, I have more respect for Averov than for Usmanov. He was a true patriot hi
        1. Nemchinov Vl
          Nemchinov Vl 24 March 2019 23: 18
          0
          Quote: Rurikovich
          And it’s just that once the Greek millionaire paid for the purchase of an entire cruiser to his country, which is now permanently parked in Piraeus, as a reminder of the true patriotism of the millionaire in relation to his country.

          Yeah, a great example! With an excess of talk about what miserable funding is allocated for the implementation of the shipbuilding program for the Navy. Incidentally, I am tormented by vague doubts that there is any kind of shipbuilding program in general, in the light of unsystematic shyness from side to side.
          Let's return to the example - where is the president to find funds to finance the needs of the Navy. Can he collect the first 60 (out of the TOP 200 wealthiest citizens of the Russian Federation according to Forbes) and offer them to finance the construction of one unit of the frigate pr. 22350 (each one), so to speak, show his true patriotism ?! Although the first 15 from this list, and the construction of the destroyer is quite "too tough to finance."
          1. Rurikovich
            Rurikovich 25 March 2019 06: 37
            0
            Quote: Vl Nemchinov
            Let us return to the example - where is the president to find funds to finance the needs of the Navy.

            Ask the Chinese wink There are a lot of millionaires there, but for some reason they don’t buy giant yachts and do not shine on the pages of the yellow press, but participate in the life of the state to the fullest, because what they earn is more than enough for life. yes This is our love overseas with football clubs and Courchevels request hi
  5. Earthshaker
    Earthshaker 20 March 2019 07: 33
    10
    My deep bow to the author. Thank you for inconvenience with topical issues.
    1. Aristarkh Lyudvigovich
      Aristarkh Lyudvigovich 20 March 2019 07: 52
      +9
      I agree with you. Timokhin is a fan of the fleet, the position of the author deserves respect. The 22386 project corvette actually began to be built in November of the 2018 year, although it was laid in October of the 2016 year. During these years, the construction of the corvette was practically not carried out. At the same time, due to funding cuts, the construction of two more corvettes of the 22380 project at PJSC Amur Shipbuilding Plant was canceled. Instead of 6 units, only 4 will be built. Although the project worked out.
      https://topwar.ru/154241-ssz-severnaja-verf-korvet-proekta-20386-derzkij-postroen-na-12.html#comment-id-9105237
      1. Stirbjorn
        Stirbjorn 20 March 2019 08: 48
        +7
        Quote: Aristarkh Ludwigovich
        The corvette of project 22386 actually began to be built in November 2018, although it was laid in October 2016. During these years, the construction of the corvette was practically not carried out.

        More recently, similar news was launched in 2018, project 14400 training helicopter ship. It turned out that there is still no complete documentation for it wassat That is, they laid six months ago something that they really did not know themselves, well, they stopped work, of course - a blatant sloppiness!
        Due to problems with documentation, the Ship Repair and Shipbuilding Corporation is not yet building a project 14400 vessel.
        Work on the construction of a marine special vessel of project 14400 (training "helicopter carrier") for the Russian Navy has been suspended, Mil.Press FlotProm reports, citing sources at the enterprise and at the Krylov State Scientific Center. The ship is being built by the Gorodets Ship Repair and Shipbuilding Corporation (SSK).
        According to one of the sources, work was suspended due to the lack of a complete set of design documentation. At present, the specialists of the Baltsudoproekt Central Design Bureau continue to complete the missing parts of the documentation. It is assumed that this work can be completed by mid-2019.
        It is also known that in parallel with the formation of the hull, model tests were carried out, since the project underwent changes in the propulsion complex, when the water cannon was replaced with screws.
        1. timokhin-aa
          timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 10: 09
          +1
          Elegant, did not know.
  6. alma
    alma 20 March 2019 08: 10
    10
    The FSB, the Military Prosecutor’s Office need to deal with all those involved in pr. 20386. Guilty - punishment, regardless of ranks and positions.
    PS Respect to the author. Keep kicking this "gadyushnik"
    1. Oleg Kolsky 051
      Oleg Kolsky 051 20 March 2019 09: 23
      +7
      Haha Ek, you are bent.
      A raven will not peck out a raven's eyes. The little dirty trick who imagines himself the Tsar of All Russia is trying to sit as one goose on two moving chairs and in his friends all those who have long worked for 9 grams in the back of the head and confiscation! All his "successes and breakthroughs" are 20 years of undisguised robbery of the Fatherland by his entourage and others to death, and in the case of naughty ones, "we are not there" into the bushes!
      But with this approach, he has every chance to dance a jig on the American hangar, like Satddam, who was surrendered by his own entourage. And his head will buy their bills from sanctions.
      Russia for us is the Fatherland! And for this codla there is a place to steal and hide. There is no extradition from where.
      1. venik
        venik 20 March 2019 17: 26
        -5
        Quote: Oleg Kolsky 051
        The petty dirty trickster who imagined himself to be the Tsar of All Russia is trying to sit with one guz on two dispersing chairs and in friendship with him everyone who has already worked for 9 grams in the back of his head and forfeiture!

        ======
        Question: HOW to distinguish a person who loves his homeland, and is ready to criticize the authorities, from "hohlopithek" - "jumper" ???
        The answer is simple (like a corner of the house!) - BY COMMENTS !!!
        ("I recognize a sweetheart by his walk, and" ukronatsika "- by" comments "!!!). fool
    2. Vadim237
      Vadim237 20 March 2019 21: 45
      -4
      Why? Push for export.
  7. sashok1951.21
    sashok1951.21 20 March 2019 08: 18
    -17 qualifying.
    Guys, a good breeze. Get ready and in Glavkomat. Build a fleet. Or are you already working in a taxi?
    1. Mar.Tirah
      Mar.Tirah 20 March 2019 08: 40
      13
      Quote: sashok1951.21
      Build a fleet.

      Yes, we built this fleet in the USSR and the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Hungary, Poland, I'm not talking about Ukraine, it was ours. Because I saw a massive influx of brand new ships of all ranks and appointments in 79-83 personally. Therefore, we see now how it is "built" and compared. We would advise how to build, but who will listen to us? You will never see this, but you generously distributed the disadvantages to everyone, without even understanding the essence of the problems. Molodets, continue on.
  8. Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 20 March 2019 08: 51
    -5
    I respect Alexander Timokhin for his concern for the Navy! I agree that an intermediate corvette is not really needed, there are the Gorshkovs for the ocean and there is Karakurt for the coastal zone and especially marine water areas with the possibility of relocation by morning waterways. Klimov and Tmokhin united! And most importantly, they began to see clearly about the uselessness of large surface ships, and generally not very necessary surface ships. For all the tasks of the Navy in peacetime, 5-7 frigates, seafarers simply Gorshkovs, are enough, and in wartime only minesweepers and Karakurt are needed. For only submarines will be able to leave the coastal aviation zone.
    1. Beregovic_1
      Beregovic_1 20 March 2019 16: 14
      +5
      That is why all over the world frigates swelled from 3 to 5-7 kilotons, and destroyers from 5 to 10-14. If you are saying that Russia does not need large surface ships .... Change your nickname to Vladimir1124. laughing
      1. Vladimir1155
        Vladimir1155 22 March 2019 12: 12
        +1
        1155 is actually a frigate, it’s just a big, good ship for its time, now the armament has become more compact so that the replacement of the 1155 grins is normal, but did the destroyers see you all over the world? they are present only in single countries on the fingers can be counted
        1. Beregovic_1
          Beregovic_1 22 March 2019 14: 40
          0
          I apologize for becoming personal, it is your business how to call yourself. But ... Destroyers are very expensive ships, so not everyone can afford them. At the same time, large ships are a reliable and stable platform for weapons, without limitation of use, for landing and taking off of aircraft, for crew habitability (talking less). In addition, on a large ship above the mast, antenna posts are located higher, which means the radar sees farther, which means the reaction time to the threat is longer. A large ship is a powerful and heavy GAK, for example "Polynom". We do not have the United States as allies, which will defend our interests with a huge fleet of destroyers. Therefore, Europeans (except for Great Britain) do not spend money on large ships, although their frigates are huge.
          Now the weapons have become more compact so that the replacement of the 1155 grins is normal
          "AFSS Gorshkov", by the way, is criticized for lack of seaworthiness.
  9. stalki
    stalki 20 March 2019 09: 00
    +3
    To the author + for his constructive approach. Honestly, I am not strong in this matter, but the author can be said to chew and put in his mouth. I would like to wish you good luck with bringing information to society and the country's leaders.

    P.S. I do not know if this advice will be useful, but I wanted to offer the author this information to clothe it in a video form and put it on YouTube, VK, and other million resources. It can be more powerful than a "major publication".
  10. monster
    monster 20 March 2019 09: 27
    +1
    This is a diversion.
  11. Aleksandr21
    Aleksandr21 20 March 2019 09: 53
    +7
    Article disappeared from the section Armament - "Requires verification" censorship does not allow? :)

    PS The author has great respect for raising such a complex topic and an attempt to at least change something on this issue.
    1. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 10: 10
      0
      It's okay
      1. Aleksandr21
        Aleksandr21 20 March 2019 10: 14
        +1
        Reassured, I thought they no longer miss the article ..... unfortunately we can expect everything.
      2. Oleg Kolsky 051
        Oleg Kolsky 051 20 March 2019 10: 25
        +1
        Thank!! And not just thanks, but THANKS for your boulders in this swamp! Maybe people like you will shift the situation from shallow to relatively clean water.
  12. lopuhan2006
    lopuhan2006 20 March 2019 10: 02
    +7
    UNDER EVERY WORD OF THE AUTHOR I WILL PUT MY SIGNATURE AND WORSHIP !!!! WHAT'S GOING ON IN THE Navy IS CALLED THE TAMPER AND THEFT! EVERYONE WHO SELLED THIS PROJECT, I WILL REPEAT EVERYONE !!! UNDER COURT !!!!
  13. Alex_59
    Alex_59 20 March 2019 10: 02
    +6
    Strongly agree with the author. Everything written to me personally was clear from the very first mention of the 20386 project, but the author was able to really shock the high ranks and is trying to stir up this hornet's nest. For this he respects and respect, I simply would not have found desire, time and energy for this.
    1. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 10: 10
      +6
      Yes, I have not shocked anyone. So, I threw a pebble out the window from the street.
  14. The comment was deleted.
    1. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 11: 34
      +6
      Colonel of the Navy, gygy laughing

      Do you understand what the article is about though?
    2. Aristarkh Lyudvigovich
      Aristarkh Lyudvigovich 20 March 2019 12: 24
      +4
      Quote: Е2 - Е4
      The article is all gone. We don’t have fools in the MO this time, today it’s such that the large ships of 1 and 2 rank are no longer needed; these are targets for our ZIRCONS, DAGGERS, POSEIDONS and many other weapons that we don’t know anything about, but which are armed.

      You don't know much at all, so sleep well. It is strange how you got into this section of the site. Typically, trolls like you do not go further than the news.
      1. Vadim237
        Vadim237 20 March 2019 21: 50
        -9
        In fact, this is so: the larger the ship, the more expensive it is, the more crew it needs, the more expensive its service, the slower it is, and finding and hitting it taking into account rapidly developing radars, anti-ship missiles and torpedoes is not difficult.
        1. timokhin-aa
          timokhin-aa 22 March 2019 21: 41
          +1
          and to detect and hit it in view of the rapidly developing radar, anti-ship missiles and torpedoes - is not difficult.


          Typical children's view of the world.
    3. Vladimir1155
      Vladimir1155 22 March 2019 12: 14
      0
      support cons don't be afraid
      Quote: Е2 - Е4
      The question is, why are these huge ships ???
      minus those who are afraid of pitching
  15. Tektor
    Tektor 20 March 2019 11: 11
    0
    Where does this information come from ?:
    2. Weak weapons. Despite a significant increase in displacement (from projects 20380 and 20385), the “innovative” project 20386 lost the Caliber complex (nominally located on project 20385). The use of "Caliber" is possible only with the "planned" "container-modular" launcher, installed instead of a helicopter (!) And with a reduction in ammunition by half from project 20385.
    ??
    Everything is exactly the opposite! In fact, the corvette 20386 in its performance characteristics is close to the frigate, including in terms of armament, rocket and radio engineering. And it is the standard of the corvette. Only such ships need to build a fleet! And we’ll survive the next draft.
    1. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 11: 35
      +6
      Not on TTX Daring is close to the frigate, but at the price and displacement.

      And on weapons and weapons - well, compare yourself, the data is open and publicly available.
      1. Tektor
        Tektor 20 March 2019 17: 53
        +2
        Cheeky

        The armament of the “Daring” corvette significantly exceeds the potential of its foreign “colleagues”. For example, the USS Montgomery.
        https://comp-pro.ru/flot/korabli/proekt-20386.html
        The first corvette of project 20386 will be equipped with the following weapons:

        Universal automatic artillery mount A190 of 100 mm caliber, which will be installed in a new flattened tower;
        On board the ship will be installed two missile systems "Uranus" or "Uran-U", which are intended to destroy enemy ships at a distance of 130 to 260 km. It is possible that it will be a caliber missile systemwhose missiles are capable of hitting surface ships at a distance of up to 375 km. In order to reduce the visibility of these complexes, they are hidden in the stowed position of the ship behind special shields that are located in the central part of the ship's superstructure;
        In the bow of the corvette are located launchers of air defense systems "Redut". They serve to destroy air targets, both at medium and short distances;
        In the middle of the hull, special launchers of the package-NK complex. This complex is designed for anti-torpedo and anti-submarine protection of the corvette;
        Automatic six-barreled artillery installations will be located aft on both sides of the sides, designed to repel attacks by pirates, saboteurs, as well as the shooting of floating mines.
        Although the exact composition of the armament of the “Daring” corvette is unknown, the designers have repeatedly stated that the warship will be sold principle of modular acquisition. In a special compartment designed for modules, there will be containers with a variety of weapons and equipment.
        In addition, a KA-27 ship helicopter and several Horizont helicopter-type unmanned aerial vehicles will be placed on board the Dersky corvette.

        Radio equipment of the daring corvette

        At the moment, it is planned to install radio-technical weapons on the “Daring” corvette that are identical to those placed on the corvettes of project 20385. Since these systems can be improved over several years, it is possible that more advanced radio equipment will be installed on the new corvette. Now, the proposed set of radio weapons is as follows:

        Combat information management system "Sigma";
        Radar "Furke-2";
        Radar target designation;
        Two RSL navigation type;
        Navigation aids;
        Communication complex "Ruberoid";
        EW tools;
        OGAS "Anapa-M";
        Station "Minotaur-M".
        To protect against standard means of detecting the enemy and his anti-ship missiles, the Smely complex of fired jamming is used. The operation of this complex reduces the chances of hitting a ship by 70%.
        1. timokhin-aa
          timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 19: 02
          +3
          At the moment, it is planned to install radio engineering armament for the coronet “Daring”, which is identical to that located on the corvettes of the 20385 project.


          Well, see?

          And at 20385 the canvas of the RLK is higher. GAK is cooler at infinity times. No need to choose between cruise missiles and a helicopter, you can have one and the other at the same time. There is a PLUR. The price is lower in 1,5 times (at least). Continue?
          1. D16
            D16 20 March 2019 21: 42
            +1
            And will the Bold one always fight the enemy’s AUG in splendid isolation, or as part of a squadron? I suspect that the price is high due to the fundamentally new EU. NPO “VINT” COMPLETED THE DEVELOPMENT OF A PERSPECTIVE MOTOR COMPLEX FOR NAVY SHIPS
            https://www.star.ru/Novosti/NPO-Vint-zavershilo-razrabotku-perspektivnogo-dvijitelnogo-kompleksa-dlya-korabley-VMF
            So there and without calibers there was something to spend money on. And why did you decide that Zaslon does not have a radio correction channel for missiles?
          2. Vadim237
            Vadim237 20 March 2019 21: 52
            -1
            A hangar for a helicopter can be made under the landing deck.
            1. timokhin-aa
              timokhin-aa 21 March 2019 14: 16
              +1
              There are boats, and replaceable modules. Helicopter from the lift there is not a ride.
        2. Povelitel_buri
          Povelitel_buri 21 March 2019 00: 14
          +1
          And what do you want to show with this ridiculous 3D model?
          1. Tektor
            Tektor 22 March 2019 14: 09
            0
            And the fact that there, in the middle part, where there are two quadruple vertical launchers, there is still room for the placement of PU Zircons ...
            1. timokhin-aa
              timokhin-aa 22 March 2019 21: 42
              +1
              In the real world there is a helicopter hoist.
            2. Povelitel_buri
              Povelitel_buri 24 March 2019 23: 22
              0
              Are you kidding like that? For you, every free square meter must be filled with some UKSK? Look at the modernization of Nakhimov and the placement of these very UKSK. In theory, they can be smeared there over an area of ​​more than 200 cells. But "for some reason" this did not happen and only 80 were posted. Nothing confuses you?
  16. rudolff
    rudolff 20 March 2019 11: 15
    16
    "However, what is happening in our Navy resembles an orgy with a complete lack of adequate military and technical justification (and its substitution with advertising tricks of 'innovation' and 'modularity')." An absolutely accurate description of the current state of the Navy. We stamp highly specialized RTOs, having huge holes in the ASW, air defense of the near sea zone. They have muddied a series of patrol ships, the purpose of which no one can really articulate. At best, the demonstration of the flag and the fight against piracy somewhere out there. We have a disaster in the mine-sweeping fleet, but we began to glue these pieces of glass with dubious performance characteristics, which will never become widespread. It was the corvettes that were to become the backbone of the fleet, the workhorses of the BMZ. Yes, something didn't work out. Yes, weapons problems. Yes, Kolomna diesel engines are often only characterized by obscenities. But this is how you need to refine, lick the project to perfection, and not wave pictures of another wunderwafe. I don't want to talk about "modularity" at all. Someone did not play enough Lego in childhood.
    Similarly, some kind of bacchanalia is not visible. Itself had something to do with the fleet, but I do not understand point-blank what is happening in it now. It seems that they are deliberately and maliciously destroying it.
    1. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 11: 36
      +6
      It seems that he is deliberately and maliciously destroyed.


      I have the same feeling.
    2. Aristarkh Lyudvigovich
      Aristarkh Lyudvigovich 20 March 2019 12: 57
      11
      Quote: rudolff
      It seems that he is deliberately and maliciously destroyed.

      To begin with, you need to have a self-sufficient strong economy and professionals in government. I sometimes think that Hitler and Napoleon foolishly tried to take Russia by force. It turns out that it is much more effective to plant a puppet government that will work for its master, but at the same time keep the duped population tightly in check. No matter what, songs about external enemies, getting up from your knees, spiritual braces, the fifth column, endless parades, fireworks and salutes in honor of past victories, etc. The main thing is that the country does not develop, but remains in place in the role of an oil well, or a mine ... That is what we have a place to observe ... Pension, gasoline and all other "lawlessness". Robberies of ordinary citizens in 1991, 1998 and 2014. At the same time, the passivity of the people is prohibitive, as in the song: "... But we do not care, but we do not care ..." Today we really do not have a modern fleet, and even less defense capability. A little more show-off, even more aplomb, much more scrap metal and a very small number of ships keeping their last strength afloat.
      1. rudolff
        rudolff 20 March 2019 13: 41
        +3
        That's right.
        1. Dante Alighieri
          Dante Alighieri 20 March 2019 20: 45
          +6
          Yes, with them, everything is clear. Another thing saddens me that they really have a fairly wide layer of support in society. Of course, as a rule, the human qualities of such individuals leave much to be desired, but they are - this is an indisputable fact. It is these "Judas" who, content with crumbs from the table of the masters of life, provide them with electoral support (albeit not the notorious 74% - I know how the electoral system works and even have a corresponding diploma, and therefore I absolutely do not believe in these verses, because I saw with my own eyes how make results, but they have 40-50 percent of support, of which 20% is an asset, the rest is a latent liability that does not even go to the polls, but in principle everything suits him). And even here, on VO - a still free resource, they breastfeed those who build their well-being at the expense of the future of their own children, not realizing that they are being deprived of it thereby.
  17. Spiridonovich2
    Spiridonovich2 20 March 2019 15: 53
    +3
    The main thing is that the money has been cut, there are no offended, no guilty ones either. Who is involved in construction? Managers. What are they trained for? Skilled to cut budget money. Armata tanks, airplanes, cosmodromes are all stages of the "long journey" for sawing money. True, then there is not enough for pensioners, but these are trifles, the costs of grandiose ideas.
  18. Decimam
    Decimam 20 March 2019 16: 02
    +5
    The answer to the author of the article from the Navy Group of Companies occupies formally a whole page, but in fact it is very short.
    1. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 19: 04
      0
      This is expected. Just then something could not be done, starting from the article.
  19. mik193
    mik193 20 March 2019 16: 55
    +6
    You can, I will quarrel, then blame me everything you can ... Corvette and frigate, according to modern classification, these are air defense and anti-aircraft defense ships. Accordingly, you need to put these complexes on them, and not stupidly shove various "Calibers" on them. Our industry (both shipbuilding and ship repair) needs to be torn down hard in all holes, since since the times of the USSR they have got used to shoving various unfinished shit into the fleet (including those allegedly repaired for the New Year) and receive bonuses. Of course, I am a former submariner, I'm not a specialist in the surface fleet, but if you build a corvette now, in my opinion, it should be a development of the Project 1124 MPK. This stuffing of unfinished complexes is a modern nightmare.
    1. Dante Alighieri
      Dante Alighieri 20 March 2019 20: 54
      +1
      I will support you with a small correction: a modern corvette should then, based on the tasks you specified (anti-aircraft defense and anti-aircraft defense), be rather a reduced size (technical progress after all) a copy of Project 11540 "Hawk", which is somewhat under-armed for a patrol / frigate, but in the quality of the corvette would look ideal, and most importantly - the weapons included in its composition are well mastered by the industry and, compared to more sophisticated versions, are relatively cheap (at the same time, it can hardly be called outdated or ineffective, especially given the water areas where the corvette is supposed to serve).
      1. Nemchinov Vl
        Nemchinov Vl 24 March 2019 13: 29
        0
        Dante - ".... to be rather a reduced size (technical progress, after all) a copy of the project 11540" Hawk ", which is somewhat under-armed for a patrol / frigate, but would look perfect as a corvette, and most importantly - the weapons included in it the composition is well mastered by the industry and, in comparison with more sophisticated options, is relatively cheap ... "
        Do not lie to yourself or to others, there are no GTUs (neither cruise nor afterburner, similar to 11540, they have not mastered the industry of the Russian Federation. It's just that since 2014, I did not consider it necessary to develop the creation of its own gas turbine engine building of a wide (in terms of power indicators) line. two types of NPO Saturn turbines, 27000 hp and 14000 hp, will solve all the problems for the construction of the Navy, but they will not solve it! And one enterprise cannot cope with this!
        1. Dante Alighieri
          Dante Alighieri 24 March 2019 17: 45
          0
          Where did I say something about the gas turbine? I spoke exclusively about weapons: RK Uranus and ZRAK Kortik + RPK NK Waterfall.
          Instead of GTU are Kolomna diesel engines, but rather poor, but they are. Of course, there is an option for such a boat: an 1 afterburning gas turbine and an 2 diesel would be better, but we have what we have.
          Conceptual objections to the fact that the modern domestic corvette should be an analogue of the Hawk there?
          1. Nemchinov Vl
            Nemchinov Vl 24 March 2019 21: 43
            0
            Quote: Dante
            Conceptual objections to the fact that the modern domestic corvette should be an analogue of the Hawk there?

            There has been a modern OVR corvette for a long time, and this is not an analog of the Hawk. This is pr. 11661-K (E), normally balanced to perform precisely these functions in the BMZ in terms of the composition of its weapons (and price, which is important). And there is no need to invent a bicycle here. Instead, the Navy and the USC lobbied for the construction of more expensive and less adequate to fulfill the same tasks, etc. 20380 (5). Why ?! So someone needs this.
            The hawk project is quite outdated, and it is now impossible to serially produce it (due to the turbines that make up it), and there is no need for it anymore. In terms of habitability and functionality of weapons, there is a more successful frigate 22350, and its power plant, in principle, can be considered modified, and ready for mass and serial construction (where the only "weak link" is the speed of creation and assembly of gearboxes on the "Star Reducer", but this with proper control by the USC and the Navy, it can be solved). With all this, new bookmarks of these frigates, under the pretext of a new project 22350M ?! So somebody needs it too !! Despite the acute shortage of rank 1-2 NK, new ships are not built even if all components of Project 22350 have been worked out !!
    2. Corn
      Corn 20 March 2019 21: 55
      -3
      these are air defense and anti-aircraft defense ships. Accordingly, you need to put these complexes on them, and not stupidly shove various "Calibers" on them.
      Comrade Timokhin has been written about this more than once or twice, but with insistence worthy of a better application, he continues to insist on the need to shove the unwelcome to the detriment of the main purpose of the ship of this class.
      All the boiling can be reduced to the fact that the author is not satisfied with the seizure of shock function from surface ships, and he does not care deeply that this is a global trend.
      1. timokhin-aa
        timokhin-aa 21 March 2019 14: 17
        +1
        So in Daring and anti-submarine function seized. And air defense compared to 20385 deteriorated. With this, what to do?
  20. arturpraetor
    arturpraetor 20 March 2019 16: 57
    +4
    After all this, if 2025 is rolled out by the year 20387, it will not be funny at all. But I'm more than sure that certain movements in this direction are already being done ...

    You know, ship modelers have the opinion that the process is more important than the result (i.e. the process of assembling models). It seems that the "top" sit exactly that the noble modelers. But people's job responsibilities are a bit different, and the result is needed the day before yesterday, and they all enjoy the process ...
    1. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 19: 04
      +2
      After all this, if 2025 Ave is rolled out by 20387, it will not be funny at all.


      They can try, for 2038X are already drawing with might and main.
    2. frog
      frog 20 March 2019 20: 59
      +2
      So if a jigsaw is used in the process, how can it not be important, is this a process? But with the result, everything is more complicated. There is nothing to cut there, so, to hell with it with the result. Yes, and with the fleet, too, since the funds have been spent, the villas are bought, the children are attached .... And what does the fleet have to do with it? And not only the fleet, by the way ....
  21. tchoni
    tchoni 20 March 2019 17: 55
    +2
    Of course, they will spoil me here, now, but nevertheless, I do not agree with the author. At least because the authors shout a lot and never justify their point of view. Why do I think so ...? Yes, here's why:
    1. Why is the new project 20386 has extremely weak weapons with a significant increase in its displacement and cost?

    Why did the author decide so? Anti-ship weapons remained at the level of 20380 - the same 8 anti-ship missiles. There was an opportunity to cram as many calibers ... (is there a question, but we will come back to this a little later) ... there was a helicopter ... and not instead of but in a compartment with calibers .. (from where the authors took it that there was a helicopter excludes the presence of calibers, I do not know, for I did not find such information on the Internet)
    or here:
    The main thing - we need in the near zone a mass carrier of the most effective GAS today, the Minotaur (with a long towed antenna).

    Where did the authors get the idea that we need it in the near zone? Where did the authors get the idea that some kind of special PLO is needed in the near "200 mile" zone? Did they do the analysis? Are they going to hunt down American nuclear submarines in the Black and Baltic Seas? What can a simulated enemy submarine do in the near zone if the range of its strike weapons is more than 1000 miles? To drown fishermen and cabatage - do not tell my slippers. Russia is not a maritime country, unlike England. There is no marine umbilical cord here to cut.
    And there are many such moments.
    It seems to me personally that the fleet leadership still began to take into account the experience of the Syrian conflict, and not only ours. And he, it seems, says that just a corvette of the near sea zone is simply not needed, but a patrol ship is needed that can perform many different functions, from tracking the enemy to controlling shipping in a given area, from escort functions to air defense functions of a given district.
    Are the authors worried about the increase in displacement without an increase in the number of guns and rockets? So I will say that it would be nice for the Ators to be put on a business trip to the Tartus region for half a year, so that they would evaluate the habitability of that same 20380 in their own skin. One acquaintance had such an opportunity - he was not enthusiastic.
    Authors don't like modularity? so I will say that modularity is not only the ability to adapt the ship to the tasks, but also the ability to upgrade it fairly budget. And this is not unimportant.
    Returning to the insights of the naval command, I can say that the same Syrian experience (though not quite ours) showed that in order to inflict serious damage on the enemy in the conditions of no matter how effective air defense, a cruise missile strike must be truly massive. And you certainly can’t call a massive strike in 8-16 calibers (we are just returning to whether calibers are needed in the near zone). Yes, this may be enough to damage individual point targets (destroy the building of an underground factory. Or, there, a warehouse ...) but to cut a military base in such a way is very difficult, which the Americans showed us. So MO learns from the mistakes of others. So he ordered the modernization of the Project 22350 frigate, turning it into something arlieberk-like, destroyer-like and, hopefully, somewhat cheaper than the same Arlie-berk. And in addition to it and, in order to fill the existing vacuum, if you please, get 20386. In this light, the next reasonable step leading to the formation of a small but effective "high seas fleet" capable of projecting force (albeit limitedly) throughout globe, should be the development of the project and the laying of another aircraft carrier ship. I would like, of course, a full-fledged aircraft carrier, but I think that the UDC will do well in the first couples. Rumors about this are actively circulating in the press. Then think for yourself.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 20 March 2019 19: 32
      +8
      Where did the authors get the idea that we need it in the near zone? Where did the authors get the idea that some kind of special PLO is needed in the near "200 mile" zone?

      Yes, because in the far zone we no longer have PLO, but in the near zone - soon there will also be no. But in the near-field anti-aircraft defense, it is theoretically easier to provide: large BODs of the 1155 type are not needed there - enough OVR corvettes.
      Did they do the analysis? Are they going to catch American nuclear submarines in the black and Baltic seas? What should a conventional enemy submarine do in the near zone if its range of strike weapons is more than 1000 miles?

      What to do? Wait for our SSBN to leave the base. Or to mine the approaches to this very base with the same Captors or self-transporting mines.

      The main task of our fleet is to ensure the withdrawal of the SSBN positions (SLBMs are 40% of our strategic nuclear forces). Before solving this problem, all the other bends of naval thought are not only useless, but harmful - like taking away resources from the main task. And at the moment our Navy has not even solved the task of safely withdrawing SSBNs from its own bases. Modern minesweepers - one piece for the entire Navy. The OVR ships on paper seem to be enough on paper, but in fact they are IPCs that Gorbachev still remembers.
      Moreover, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy in solving the main task not only does not help, but on the contrary - interferes. A new OVR corvette was designed to replace the OVR Albatrosses. And suddenly in 2014 the project was closed by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Chirkov - who instead began to promote tub with a gun pr. 22160. Another five years, and the virgins will not need to look for our SSBNs at sea - they will be able to calmly wait for their departure right at Gadzhievo and Vilyuchinsk, in terravods, at the fairway. For there will simply be no one to detect and drive alien ICAPL.
      Quote: tchoni
      In this light, the next reasonable step leading to the formation of a small but effective "high seas fleet" capable of projecting force (albeit limitedly) across the globe should be the development of a project and the laying of another aircraft carrier. I would like, of course, a full-fledged aircraft carrier, but I think that the UDC will do well in the first couples.

      Gorgeous. Fleet of the open sea, with bases - passage yards. Come who you want, put what you want - no one will see, no one will hear. sad
      1. tchoni
        tchoni 20 March 2019 19: 51
        -1
        Quote: Alexey RA
        The main task of our fleet is to ensure the withdrawal of the SSBN positions (SLBMs are 40% of our strategic nuclear forces).

        Why do you think so? In peacetime, no one bothers to take the boat out of the base behind the minesweeper, and in war you will not leave it. Do not have time. And who prevents intercontinental missiles from shooting off the pier?
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Moreover, the Commanders-in-Chief of the Navy in solving the main task not only does not help, but on the contrary - interferes. A new OVR corvette was designed to replace the OVR Albatrosses. And suddenly, in 2014, the project was closed by order of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Chirkov - who instead began to promote a tub with a cannon, pr. 22160. Another five years, and the virgins will not need to look for our SSBNs in the sea - they will be able to calmly wait for their release right at Gadzhievo and Vilyuchinsk, in the terrvod, by the fairway. For there will be simply no one to detect and drive other people's SSNS.

        You shout a lot ... And not on business. Who prevents to fill the same waters in the area of ​​Vilyluchinsk with at least acoustic buoys? And in general, often recall anti-submarine aircraft ...
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 20 March 2019 21: 15
          10
          Quote: tchoni
          Why do you think so? In peacetime, no one bothers to take the boat out of the base behind the minesweeper

          Minesweeper alone. Four fleets. And in the best case, there will be six of them - for the same four fleets and all their bases.
          Quote: tchoni
          and you won’t get out of the military. Do not have time

          That is, we will suddenly begin a global nuclear war?
          Quote: tchoni
          And who prevents intercontinental missiles from shooting off the pier?

          But why then push a lot of money into the construction of new SSBNs, if they have to shoot from the pier? Isn’t it easier to give them ... no, not to pensioners and children, but to the Strategic Missile Forces?
          Quote: tchoni
          Who prevents to fill the same waters in the area of ​​Vilyluchinsk with at least acoustic buoys? And in general, often recall anti-submarine aircraft ...

          It is very difficult to forget about our anti-submarine aviation. As many as eight modernized aircraft for four fleets. The Poseidons are in awe at this pace. smile
          By the way, Chirkov, a pomnitsa, also justified the cessation of work on the OVR corvette by the fact that its tasks would be performed by PLO aviation. The result is obvious.
          1. Vadim237
            Vadim237 20 March 2019 22: 07
            -8
            There are only 25 minesweepers — on all four fleets and 32 anti-submarine ships.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 21 March 2019 11: 06
              +4
              Quote: Vadim237
              There are only 25 minesweepers - for all four fleets

              That's just with modern mines can work only 2 of them. The rest were stuck in the 60s of the last century.
              Quote: Vadim237
              and 32 anti-submarine ships.

              And how many of them are under 20 years old and have passed at least a small modernization?
          2. Vadim237
            Vadim237 20 March 2019 22: 17
            -8
            At the expense of the PLO of the Russian Navy - 54 Tu 142 and IL 38 aircraft, ours are more likely to go the other way - the creation of small underwater unmanned robots to search for and destroy enemy submarines, in their territorial waters and beyond.
            100 of these underwater drones and in the Arctic Ocean will no longer want to meddle.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 21 March 2019 11: 10
              +5
              Quote: Vadim237
              At the expense of the PLO of the Russian Navy - 54 Tu 142 and IL 38

              With the same success, Be-12 can also be recorded in PLO aircraft.
              There are only eight modern PLO aircraft at the Russian Navy. Moreover, modern in filling - the glider remained old.
              And all the rest of the aircraft’s aviation PLO remained at the level of the collapse of the USSR and even earlier.
              1. Vadim237
                Vadim237 21 March 2019 11: 49
                -5
                Nothing prevents to modernize all these minesweepers and PLO aircraft - and why did they take that the current minesweepers are not good, that in modern mines this is technically?
                1. Alexey RA
                  Alexey RA 21 March 2019 12: 24
                  +5
                  Quote: Vadim237
                  Nothing prevents to upgrade all these minesweepers and PLO aircraft

                  Since 2012, 8 IL-38s have been modernized. The average pace is 2 aircraft per year. Apparently, however, something is in the way.
                  Most IL-38s will be written off earlier in age than they will fall under modernization.
                  Quote: Vadim237
                  and why did the current minesweepers not suit, that in modern mines this is technically?

                  Technically? I will quote the famous alarmist smile :
                  The current level of the Navy's mine action forces corresponds to the 50-60s of the last century (since they even lost what was in the 70s, for example, towed searchers and cord charges). The minesweepers that are part of the Navy are virtually abandoned - unlike foreign mines, no modernization was carried out with the introduction of new anti-mine systems. It simply comes to the shameful episodes of joint exercises for the Navy and the Russian Federation (for example, the annual OpenSpirit in the Baltic):

                  Western minesweepers: “Subsequent reports from the training area resembled combat reports: on September 7, 11 Russian and German anchor mines were discovered and destroyed. 5 minutes from the Belgian minesweeper Primula, 3 mines on the account of the French minesweeper L'Aigle, one mine from the Latvian Talivaldis, the Polish Seagull and a team of divers. September 10 - 25 mines were discovered, of which 12 were on the account of Talivaldis. September 11 - found 46 minutes. On the account of Talivaldis - 18 min. On September 12, all ships discovered 57 minutes, 55 minutes were destroyed. Talivaldis found 20 minutes. "

                  Domestic minesweepers: “... Russian minesweepers on all OpenSpirit exercises demonstrate only work with towed trawls, cutting off training mines specially set up for them - they set up a 28-meter trawl and at a speed of 8-9 knots, pulling it along with them. At the same time, other participants in the exercises are engaged in the search for underwater objects using remote-controlled underwater vehicles RAR-104, using sonars and databases of underwater objects. "

                  A simple question - which of our vehicles are ready to deal with difficult to detect mines that explode even when approaching underwater vehicles? How many mine seekers do we have?
                  Alas, most of our mine-sweeping forces lagged not by one, but by two generations from modern requirements. And the Soviet TSh-IM - for a generation: their devices at the present time can be considered disposable (one NPA - one mine that worked on it).
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 20 March 2019 19: 39
      +4
      Quote: tchoni
      It seems to me personally that the fleet leadership still began to take into account the experience of the Syrian conflict, and not only ours. And he, it seems, says that just a corvette of the near sea zone is simply not needed, but a patrol ship is needed that can perform many different functions, from tracking the enemy to controlling shipping in a given area, from escort functions to air defense functions of a given district.

      Yeah ... that's just ordered in real life 22160 can not perform any of these tasks except for "flag demonstration". For PLO, it does not have a complete set of GAS or places for their installation (the standard GAS, although it is declared as anti-submarine, is in fact a low-power GAS to combat PDSS). And for air defense, it has no installation sites for launchers and air defense radar antennas.
      And the worst thing is that 22160 are already being accepted by the fleet, and there are not a single module declared for them in the iron yet.

      But it was 22160 that killed all the work on the OVR corvette.
      1. tchoni
        tchoni 20 March 2019 19: 54
        -3
        Quote: Alexey RA
        only ordered in real life 22160 can not perform any of these tasks except for "flag demonstration".

        Why are you hanging on to the poor bird? He has few cannons, the GAS is not the same .... Let it at least show the flag, drive the pirates ... And so ... How are you there. Moremanov, they say: "is tracking the enemy" (drowning - it's not so pity, all 30 people are not a hundred.)
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 20 March 2019 21: 18
          +8
          Quote: tchoni
          What are you clinging to the poor bird? He has few guns, the CEO is not the same .... Let him at least show the flag, drive the pirates ...

          Oh yes ... a flag demonstration and the pursuit of pirates is the most vital thing for our Navy. All the other tasks have already been solved ... wink

          And I stuck to 22160 only because it was this pepelats who killed the ship that was badly needed for the fleet. Because of 22160, the "albatrosses" will not wait for the change and will quietly go on pins and needles, leaving a gaping void instead of the OVR.
          1. Vadim237
            Vadim237 21 March 2019 00: 39
            -6
            "All the other tasks have already been solved .." - Resolved, no naval wars are foreseen in the near future, and the development of rocketry will generally reduce to naught, the role of large ships, I do not see any prospects in PLO aircraft - a meeting with a fighter and an aircraft with Khan's expensive equipment - Sushka has a combat radius of 1500 kilometers and missiles with a range of P 77, P 27 110 kilometers, MiG 31 1450 kilometers, missiles P 37 300 kilometers, more promising for detecting and tracking enemy nuclear submarines in their waters, unmanned small submarines hunters and the creation of an acoustic system along the Arctic Ocean and from Kamchatka to Vladivostok, from an economic point of view, this will be much more efficient than construction
            anti-submarine ships and aircraft PLO.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 21 March 2019 11: 14
              +5
              Quote: Vadim237
              Resolved, no naval wars are foreseen in the near future

              This is not about naval wars. We are talking about the critical vulnerability of 40% of the country's strategic nuclear forces - moreover, the very component that in theory is considered the most "difficult to bear" and difficult to detect, and which guarantees the inevitability of a retaliatory strike.
              1. Vadim237
                Vadim237 21 March 2019 11: 53
                -5
                At least they can launch rockets at the pier - all NATO submarines sailing in the Arctic Ocean are found.
                1. Ivanchester
                  Ivanchester 21 March 2019 13: 38
                  +2
                  At least they can launch rockets and dock ...

                  ... unless the enemies strike first and do not take the SSBNs at piers to hell.
                  That is why it is so important for SSBNs to be able to go into the areas of the database without being accompanied by enemy MAPL.
                  And to ensure this capability, it is required to have in the Navy both corvettes, PLO planes, and multi-purpose boats. And by and large also surface ships and aircraft that can provide air defense to the specified forces.
                  1. tchoni
                    tchoni 22 March 2019 20: 37
                    0
                    Quote: Ivanchester
                    At least they can launch rockets and dock ...

                    ... unless the enemies strike first and do not take the SSBNs at piers to hell.
                    That is why it is so important for SSBNs to be able to go into the areas of the database without being accompanied by enemy MAPL.
                    And to ensure this capability, it is required to have in the Navy both corvettes, PLO planes, and multi-purpose boats. And by and large also surface ships and aircraft that can provide air defense to the specified forces.

                    Who is arguing? Just squeezing the big beautiful red Triden launch button and turning the base into a radioactive soup is much easier than stealthily mining the exits from this very base, risking a boat. And the war .... what difference does it begin with? from the submarine’s undermining when leaving the base or from the destruction of the base itself?
                    1. Ivanchester
                      Ivanchester 22 March 2019 22: 08
                      0
                      I didn’t quite understand your comment :( It’s really irrelevant how the war begins (if it starts). It’s important that if at the moment it starts we will have SSBNs on alert and their location will not be known to the enemy, then he will have a good reason to refrain from delivering a first disarming strike to our SNF, but if the boats remain in the bases, they will be locked up there first, and then (if necessary) destroyed, and not necessarily by ballistic missiles.
                2. timokhin-aa
                  timokhin-aa 22 March 2019 21: 44
                  0
                  Yes, where do you take all this dregs, eh?
          2. tchoni
            tchoni 22 March 2019 20: 40
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            And I stuck to 22160 only because it was this pepelats who killed the ship that was badly needed for the fleet. Because of the 22160 "albatrosses"

            Why do you think so? Why are albatrosses so needed? Why can't the same 22160 replace them? If it is modular and in principle can be adapted to any task.
      2. Nemchinov Vl
        Nemchinov Vl 24 March 2019 13: 53
        0
        Quote: Alexey RA
        But it was 22160 that killed all the work on the OVR corvette.

        Come on, drop it please. 22160 was created as a patroller, and not for the OVR, already initially. And do not stand like uv. A. Timokhin, compare it with 20380?! You do not compare coffee (compote and other drinks) with hot meat (second) dishes. Different goals and purposes.
        For the role of the OVR corvette, there has long been a project 11661-K (Z), which is many times more successful and cheaper than the 20380/5 positioned for this role. And at least two enterprises (the Zelenodolsk plant, and the sites leased by it at the Kerch "Zaliv") can quite successfully "churn out" them for their own Navy. For Vietnam, for example, they are doing quite well. Nothing stands in the way of building them for their own Navy, at the power plant - DDA12000 (worked out at 20380), with the Zarya state-owned joint stock company (the project provided for this initially, and only during the construction of Dagestan was truncated to the level of RTOs. Another question is that the leadership of the Navy and the USC, they are not ordered for their fleet, for the sake of the more expensive and "limitedly capable" pr. 20380, well, that means someone needs it .... https://vk.com/al_feed.php
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 25 March 2019 11: 18
          0
          Quote: Vl Nemchinov
          Come on, drop it please. 22160 was created as a patroller, and not for the OVR, already initially.

          We carefully read the statement of the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy:
          The High Command sees no prospect in the creation of ships previously designated as the OVR Corvette. One of the main tasks of the OVR is to ensure the protection and defense of naval forces in the areas of naval bases and in the territories adjacent to them. This task is now carried out by coastal surveillance equipment, stationary sonar stations and coastal missile and artillery troops, armed with anti-ship missiles of different ranges, as well as anti-submarine and attack aircraft.

          Having abandoned the corvette, the Navy turned to the idea of ​​creating patrol ships - less armed, but with greater autonomy and versatility, capable, among other things, of going on long campaigns. The development of the patrol ship project will be carried out by OJSC "Severnoye Design Bureau".
          © Chirkov

          That is, the patrol ship, pr. 22160 was designed specifically instead of (not in return, instead) of the closed topic "corvette OVR". At the same time, as you rightly noted, 22160 was not imprisoned under the OVR.
          In fact, the commander-in-chief decided to leave the OVR without ships, ordering instead patrols for the fleet, 80% of the declared tasks of which also belong to the competence not of the Navy, but of the FSB.
    3. DarkMatter
      DarkMatter 20 March 2019 20: 21
      +3
      Honestly laziness to answer deployed wassat
      But it seems that you are too poorly versed in the question, from which you ask your questions and write that you do not understand. Even some of them have answers in the article itself, but due to a misunderstanding, you could not find them there or understand that these are the answers.
      Moreover, you contradict yourself in your text. For example, you stated that it is not clear why the PLO is needed for the ship, and then designated covering the convoys or controlling the area as one of the main tasks.

      PS
      And in addition to it and, in order to fill the existing vacuum, you are kindly requested to receive 20386.

      We must not fill the vacuum, but build ships for the urgent tasks of the fleet. And then they fill the vacuum, build it, and then they come up with why it’s better to use ships, while billions have been spent on them. what
      1. tchoni
        tchoni 20 March 2019 21: 17
        -2
        And you are not lazy, for laziness is a mortal sin. Yes, I am not a moroman, but nevertheless, this does not interfere with logical thinking.
        What is clearly not enough for you, for I have not said anywhere that the ship does not need PLO. I, only, argued that going in cycles in the near-field PLO and building special ships for it, functioning ONLY in the near-field zone, is absurd. Especially in our position. And these are different things. For now we have a big hemorrhoids using ships not intended for such trips to control the space in the Tartus area. And made to work on the principle of a week at sea a month in the database. Do you know what buzz in such a suitcase of months so to live for half a year? .. pleasures of the sea
        1. rudolff
          rudolff 20 March 2019 23: 32
          +5
          "... special ships, functioning ONLY in the near zone - there is an absurdity." The near sea zone is from 200 to 500 miles. Based on Baltiysk and Kronstadt, this is virtually the entire Baltic. Based on Novorossiysk and Sevastopol, these are the Black and Azov seas completely. Based at the PMTO Tartus, this is all of the eastern Mediterranean. Isn't that enough?
          "... using ships not intended for such trips to control the space in the Tartus region." The ships can make any kind of voyage. The essence of the zone of destination, the ability of a ship to perform its tasks in a given operational zone, is two-thirds of the time of combat service (autonomous navigation).
          "... what a thrill to live in such a suitcase for six months like this?" I will not tell you a secret if I say that the crews of the NK, unlike the crews of the submarine, do not have coastal barracks / cockpits. They live on ships all the time of service, sometimes without the right to go ashore. And no matter how cramped it is, the autonomous submarine is even closer. The 613th went for six months, the 641st happened for a year. But not all crew members even had personal berths on them.
          You would first understand the essence of the matter, and then you already demonstrated your logic.
          1. tchoni
            tchoni 22 March 2019 20: 33
            0
            Quote: rudolff
            "... special ships, functioning ONLY in the near zone - there is an absurdity." The near sea zone is from 200 to 500 miles. Based on Baltiysk and Kronstadt, this is virtually the entire Baltic. Based on Novorossiysk and Sevastopol, these are the Black and Azov seas completely. Based at the PMTO Tartus, this is all of the eastern Mediterranean. Isn't that enough?
            "... using ships not intended for such trips to control the space in the Tartus region." The ships can make any kind of voyage. The essence of the zone of destination, the ability of a ship to perform its tasks in a given operational zone, is two-thirds of the time of combat service (autonomous navigation).
            "... what a thrill to live in such a suitcase for six months like this?" I will not tell you a secret if I say that the crews of the NK, unlike the crews of the submarine, do not have coastal barracks / cockpits. They live on ships all the time of service, sometimes without the right to go ashore. And no matter how cramped it is, the autonomous submarine is even closer. The 613th went for six months, the 641st happened for a year. But not all crew members even had personal berths on them.
            You would first understand the essence of the matter, and then you already demonstrated your logic.

            And two hundred years ago and for 25 years they served ... and nothing ... served. And they beat the soldiers with sticks ... sometimes they died after that ... and the same thing ...
            I gave you about a chnmodan for six months on the basis of the impressions of a real person who had previously served on a scout, and now forced to serve on a new "militant". So, according to him, six months near Tartus on an old reconnaissance plane and on a new corvette are very different six months. The comparison is not good for the corvette.
            1. rudolff
              rudolff 22 March 2019 20: 54
              0
              And do not tell me, but on which exactly new corvette did your friend deign to serve in Tartus for six months? Velmy is curious!
              1. tchoni
                tchoni 23 March 2019 10: 48
                0
                In my opinion on the "Admiral Makarov". And before that he served on the "Liman"
                1. rudolff
                  rudolff 23 March 2019 12: 50
                  +1
                  Well, do you compare such ships ... To begin with, Makarov is still a frigate, and not a corvette, and certainly not a suitcase. The living conditions are quite normal, even better than on previous Petrels. And for six months he did not go anywhere. Extreme service like 4 months. In quite greenhouse conditions, this is not the North after all. Your friend just spoiled on the Estuary. The estuary was originally built as an oceanographic ship, not like a warship and designed / built it in Poland. It looks unprepossessing, but by the living conditions it is almost a yacht. I was not on the Estuary, on a similar. Finishing living quarters with wood veneer, air conditioning ... And discipline ... peculiar. They may have heard about the Ship charter, but ...
                  1. tchoni
                    tchoni 23 March 2019 17: 07
                    0
                    Maybe he was spoiled. Who knows .... But there is a problem (in his own words) on the "militants" very reluctantly go to serve double bass. It is because of the conditions. They prefer to serve out the contract (if they got there by the will of the wise authorities) and dump them into the merchant fleet. Something like this.
    4. D16
      D16 20 March 2019 21: 06
      0
      What should a conventional enemy submarine do in the near zone if its range of strike weapons is more than 1000 miles?

      IMHO hunting for SSBNs in deployment areas. I agree with the rest. He will not walk quickly with the Zorya in the nasal bulb. That's why they put "Platinum" as on 11356. In general, 20386 looks more like a hound than a bloodhound laughing . In general, you will get a good watchtower with limited air defense-PLO, but the possibility of escorting KUG thanks to the gas turbine and increased displacement.
      1. timokhin-aa
        timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 22: 43
        +1
        So he is deaf with GAK something. And how to be? The range from which the submarine (any) can fire a torpedo along it somewhere in 4-6 times (depending on the type of torpedo) further than it finds the submarine.
        1. D16
          D16 21 March 2019 18: 30
          0
          He will lower his BUGAS and will guard the water area in a very quiet way. It is not yet known who will hear whom before. Especially if there will be a boat with a low-frequency pulse generator, or whatever it is called. And if he finds someone, he will tell you where you need to laughing or the helicopter will pick it up. Also, as part of the KUG, units are needed that can accompany nuclear-powered ships.
          1. timokhin-aa
            timokhin-aa 22 March 2019 21: 45
            0
            But this makes 2 cheaper in 20380. Why then overpay?
            1. D16
              D16 22 March 2019 22: 28
              0
              20380 on their puffs laughing not once those steamboats that can organize the anti-submarine curtain on the path of the KUG. This is a greyhound that does not need to see and hear too well. She needs to be in the right place at the right time and complete the task. When the need arises, the big boys will shoot back. Yes, and an extra helicopter in KUG is not at all superfluous.
              1. rudolff
                rudolff 22 March 2019 22: 42
                +1
                Corvette doesn’t have a place in KUG. Its destiny is the coastal (up to 200 miles) and the near sea (200 to 500 miles) zones. OVR. KUG begins with a frigate. And given the current state of the fleet, we will not have any CGM at all. If only an inter-naval formation.
                1. D16
                  D16 22 March 2019 23: 14
                  +1
                  1135 is there a place in KUG? And he has a displacement of 200 tons less, and the power plant is much easier. Nakhimov finish. They will build 22350M.
                  1. rudolff
                    rudolff 22 March 2019 23: 40
                    0
                    Petrel, this is a lightweight version of BOD 1134. The Union’s budget was not rubber either, but a massive project was needed. Nearly fifty petrels were built. And now we need precisely mass ships. Orlan alone will not do the weather. New Gorshkov is still unknown how long to wait.
                    1. D16
                      D16 23 March 2019 00: 04
                      0
                      Orlan alone will not do the weather.

                      20386 is also currently being built in a single copy.
                      [quoteBurevestnik, this is a light version of BOD 1134] [/ quote]

                      Shashechki you or go?
                      1. rudolff
                        rudolff 23 March 2019 10: 00
                        0
                        Go. Because the admiral's series was limited to three ships, because they can be called frigates with a big stretch. Purely from the hopelessness and long-term construction of Gorshkov.
                      2. D16
                        D16 23 March 2019 18: 02
                        +1
                        Choi, I did not quite understand the course of your thoughts.
                        Go.

                        That is, you agree that 1135 can accompany the IBM?
                        Then why can't a 22356 gas turbine with a large displacement?
                        Why they can not replace 11356, especially since the ship is much more advanced.
                        Quote: rudolff
                        Because the admiral's series was limited to three ships, because they can be called frigates with a big stretch.

                        Classification thing conditional. It is necessary that the ship performs tasks. Series 11356 originally comprised 6 ships. To create a power plant from scratch under three buildings is somewhat expensive, given that no one planned to build further obsolete 11356.
                        Quote: rudolff
                        Purely from hopelessness and long-term construction Gorshkova.

                        Excuse me, what kind of connection do you trace between the North Shipyard and Kaliningrad Amber?
                      3. rudolff
                        rudolff 23 March 2019 19: 48
                        +1
                        D16, I don’t understand your train of thought. Etc. 22356, this is a full-fledged frigate of the far sea zone. The Admiral series was muddied only for the simple reason that Gorshkov, for well-known reasons, got a stake. In general, re-read the article again, everything is chewed there.
                      4. D16
                        D16 23 March 2019 20: 06
                        +1
                        Quote: rudolff
                        Etc. 22356, this is a full-fledged frigate of the far sea zone.

                        Maybe 22350?
                        Quote: rudolff
                        Because the admiral's series was limited to three ships, because they can be called frigates with a big stretch. Purely from the hopelessness and long-term construction of Gorshkov.

                        The series was made up of six frigates, but was limited to three due to the lack of a power plant. And they built 11356 not only because of problems with Gorshkov. 22350 on the Black Sea is to say the least redundant.
                      5. rudolff
                        rudolff 23 March 2019 20: 10
                        -1
                        Are you just trolling? Your quote: "Then why can't a 22356 with a gas turbine and a large displacement?" I answered what I read in your comment.
                      6. D16
                        D16 23 March 2019 22: 06
                        0
                        Sorry. Horses mixed up in a bunch, people. I had in mind 20386. The export version of 22350 had nothing to do with it.
  • Fizik M
    23 March 2019 19: 20
    -2
    Quote: D16
    with limited air defense-PLO, but the possibility of accompanying the CUG due to GTU and increased displacement.

    what for the same money instead of the crap 20386 you can build a FULL Frigate pr.22350 does not reach you?
    1. D16
      D16 23 March 2019 19: 46
      +1
      Until the price of SERIAL 20386 and the price of serial 22350 of the SAME YEAR with OUR GEM are announced, all these gasping eggs are not worth it.
  • Povelitel_buri
    Povelitel_buri 21 March 2019 00: 08
    +2
    Now you can cram as many calibers

    calibers not so much, but half as much as 20385. And then to the place of the helicopter. Below is the variation in placement:


    and as you can see, the container goes exactly instead of a helicopter.

    Where did the authors get the idea that some kind of special PLO is needed in the near "200 mile" zone?

    The protection of bases from enemy submarines just enters the near zone. There are enough foreign non-nuclear submarines on the Black and Baltic Sea to at least block the exits from the base. And for the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet, the protection of the SSBN bases is the most important task. They may lie in wait not directly at the base itself, as you might think, but at the transition to the areas of the database, and timely detection of the enemy’s nuclear submarines will at least frustrate the task of tracking the routes of our strategists.

    Authors don't like modularity? so I will say that modularity is not only the ability to adapt the ship to the tasks, but also the ability to upgrade it fairly budget.

    The authors know this perfectly well without you, and moreover, they are actively campaigning only for such "modularity" when you can quickly replace an outdated module with an updated one, and they wrote about this in detail in the previous article, the link to which they give at the beginning.

    Returning to the insights of the command of the Navy, I can say that the same Syrian experience (though not really ours) showed that in order to inflict serious damage to the enemy under conditions of effective air defense, a cruise missile strike must be truly massive.

    This has become a revelation to you, but it’s an open secret. Precisely because the volley should be several tens of RCs, this can provide either a multitude of carriers with 8-16 CRs, or several burke-like NKs.

    So he ordered the modernization of the frigate project 22350

    The MO began to deal with this yet another foolishness long before the strike on Shairat.

    And yes, the corvette of pr.20386 does not in any way belong to the "high seas fleet"
  • Horse, people and soul
    Horse, people and soul 20 March 2019 18: 34
    0
    Oh, I smell, and someone will kiss a jellyfish in the ass!

    laughing
  • hostel
    hostel 20 March 2019 19: 12
    0
    Looks like our admirals are doing sabotage. The director of the FSB needs to write.
  • Likant
    Likant 20 March 2019 19: 20
    -4
    "Krasauchiki!" Such a divorce "abroad" "for the money" has never happened! Bravo! Tanks, ships, airplanes! .. Allocate a small amount for "blueprints", America throws billions in panic, Europe is not lagging behind! In America, they already understand that a LOT of money has been thrown into the army, but they cannot stop! Europe, despite the crisis, is also developing weapons, spending the already meager crisis budget! And then Russia rolls up the project and launches a new one, "even cooler"! Again the Race of the Outback! The US national debt is huge and continues to grow! ..
    But Putin understands that just one "alarm case" with a "Red button" is enough and all tanks, planes and ships will become a heap of radioactive scrap metal! "Submarine" - the planet Earth is one and you can't get away from it! :)
    1. Dante Alighieri
      Dante Alighieri 20 March 2019 21: 13
      +6
      In your magnificent pink plan, there is one "BUT": the enemy receives not only billions of dollars in spending, which, however, are insignificant for him, since being a world financial center, he can simply print a couple of thousand tons of green banknotes or oblige his satellites to finance his economy by buying their state. bonds, which are even easier to print - you can also save on paper, but also a series of offensive weapons embodied in metal and composites that can neutralize the nuclear weapons factor, while in great Russia headed by the permanent Pu, only fantastic wunderwaffe projects remain.
  • mik193
    mik193 20 March 2019 20: 38
    10
    Well, I’ll add it on my own. At the moment, the anti-mine (PMO) and anti-submarine (PLO) of all our naval bases are limping on both legs. What our military-industrial complex offers is complete, incomplete crap. To be ready for the confrontation, fairly inexpensive and mass-produced ships are needed primarily for the defense of our bases (OVR ships). Yes, our main striking force is still submarines for various purposes. The lack of turbines and other mechanisms - this was pissed off by our leaders, who had been doing absolutely nothing for 25 years. Enough of cheap show-offs and ironing - it's time to turn to reality. Maybe I'm wrong, but it's a cry from the heart.
  • Yuriy Malyshko
    Yuriy Malyshko 20 March 2019 21: 10
    +6
    Our surface fleet exists (and existed in Soviet times), as it were, separately from shipbuilding. What they slip in, we serve. There is an opinion (not only mine) that this is due to the fact that the position of the chief of shipbuilding of the Navy is not always occupied by former ship commanders, but by former mechanics such as V. Tryapichinkov. I don’t remember that the commanders of the BS-5 would ever become commanders of a warship, but for some reason they rule the construction of warships only. Leaving the military service, the Rag rappers move to high positions already in shipbuilding corporations themselves and they rule, and lobby from there; but operational-tactical thinking was both absent and absent - these questions do not worry them much.
    1. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 20 March 2019 22: 45
      0
      As for the BS-5, you have noticed this well, but here the problem is wider - we don’t have a clear understanding of who to take to these posts. Without technical literacy, too, nowhere.
  • cdrt
    cdrt 20 March 2019 21: 41
    0
    Since 20386, Russian naval commanders have once again confirmed that they are degenerate and that they should not be allocated any significant funds for surface ships. Degenerates and impotent.
    1. silver169
      silver169 22 March 2019 17: 14
      0
      What a country, such and naval commanders! lol
  • Devil13
    Devil13 20 March 2019 22: 26
    +1
    To the authors - thanks and keep it up. Guys, I believe that you will be able to reach out! And about wrecking ... the construction of 20380 is also wrecking, such a ship was made in 99 - 12441. And for the sake of fraudsters it was sawn into metal. Compared to 20380, 85, 86, it is N-times more powerful. with a similar displacement.
    Knock, write to the shipyard, to the Navy, Shoigu, Putin, everyone ... if you manage to kick these "design geniuses" and builders. that for 12 years the frigate is being built - it will be awesome help to the Navy.
    1. Vadim237
      Vadim237 21 March 2019 00: 02
      0
      The author has already been politely sent in "unsubscribe". There is no point in knocking further.
  • Viknt
    Viknt 21 March 2019 00: 03
    -1
    KhBZ, what they wanted, they got and, we note, is several times cheaper than the Americans with their Zumvolt. We just need to be glad that this pepelats is several times smaller than the Zumvolt in displacement. It is not entirely fair to focus on shortcomings; one could look for something good. The increase in the displacement of the corvette is a forced and logical measure, in the absence of ships in the far zone. Trying to follow "fashion" is also kind of not bad, it's bad when it turns into monkeying. Judging by the characteristics, it turns out not a combat ship, but an admiral's member ship, but our admirals are not expected in the ports of "partners". Probably only those who are not versed in the intricacies of Chubais's "market" liberal pricing can connect the price with combat characteristics. According to Chubais, the market is tied to displacement and similar "characteristics", and not to combat effectiveness. The attempted sinking of 386 by the President apparently failed. It is possible to propose to appeal to the Minister of Defense, but the appeal should be as brief as possible and in its form as clear and specific as possible. For example, to summarize in a single table the characteristics of corvettes 385, 386 and a frigate, with an indication of prices. Attach explanations to the table - conclusions in words, what the data in the table mean, as for. Nobody will think and understand there, everything should be chewed up and concrete, without husks. For the 386 project, it is possible to propose to modify the project to an acceptable level in terms of propulsion and armament. BUT! To do this, one must first come to at least some kind of unity, at least with each other. For example, to offer a certain minimum and maximum. It is better to write a letter collectively with characters known in the navy. The ship will be built for a long time and it will not do without finishing the project. Therefore, there are chances. Sentences should be obvious to the point of being primitive. It is necessary to refer to the already implemented best technical solutions and for 386 projects, 385 is probably better to forget. In our situation, universal or semi-universal ships are better, slightly differing in armament within the same project.
  • Vyacheslav
    Vyacheslav 21 March 2019 06: 07
    +1
    The author of the article is a little cunning, comparing the cost of ships of projects 22350, 20380 and 20386. So, he takes the prices of projects 22350 and 20386, relevant at the time of their laying and compares them with the price of corvette 20386 at the time of its laying. Naturally, the comparison is not in favor of the latter. The real cost of the frigate 22350, if laid down today, will be significantly higher than the cost of the corvette 20386, excluding the cost of R&D. In addition, all criticism of the 20386 project is built on open data about its saturation with electronics and weapons, which were disclosed at an international exhibition. But any person interested in the issues of rearmament of the army and navy knows very well that at exhibitions projects are presented in export configuration. We know about the domestic project 20386 corvette only from the mortgage board and the advertising brochure posted at the bookmark. And this is not God knows what sources of information. So it turns out that all the criticism is reduced to the author's assumptions about the saturation of the corvette, as well as the properties of some equipment and "wishes" of the author.
    The author reduces everything to the futility of the project due to the construction of frigates 22350 and the insufficient armament of the corvette. But this is the main contradiction. Corvette 20386 does not carry the tasks inherent in a frigate; accordingly, it does not need weapons similar to a frigate. The main question: why does the fleet generally need a 2038 line? I suppose the answer is obvious. Corvettes of this class are needed at the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet to enter the ocean and deploy our strategists. To do this, he needs: GAS - Bugas (I’m sure that the domestic corvette will come out with a minimum of Zarya -2 and the Monument), means of combating enemy submarines, that is, torpedoes and a helicopter (this is already standard equipment: helicopter and Package), the ability to scare away anti-submarine aircraft (16 Reduta missiles with a range of 40 km), the ability to scare off enemy NK (Uranus complex with a range of 260 km.). Obviously, all this time, the pair interaction of the 20380 corvettes was worked out to fulfill these goals. Interacting together, these BMZ corvettes created a safety corridor from underwater, surface and air threats to our missile carriers. The problem is limiting the range of stocks and seaworthiness. So, the DMZ corvette project appeared for the indicated purposes.
    That there are no advertised Caliber on the project, this only testifies in favor of a mature approach to understanding the functionality of a given combat unit. Enough to try to push the destroyer into the dimensions of the corvette (project 20385). Why are they needed there? And all these statements about modularity are simple - a tribute to fashion. 20385 he won’t be able to fight Arli Burki on his own, he won’t be able to shoot missiles with torpedo missiles (ASG range is not enough), he won’t be able to repel a mass attack of the Kyrgyz Republic (even with anti-aircraft missiles radio correction), he can’t go far from the coast. Question: what is it for, so expensive and with calibers for? 20386: stealthy, balanced armed, functionally justified corvette DMZ, which will relieve frigates of the obligation to engage in unusual affairs. But let's haul the ships - there are no calibers on them ...
    1. Avior
      Avior 21 March 2019 13: 25
      +2
      Corvettes of this class are needed at the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet to enter the ocean and deploy our strategists. To do this, he needs: GAS - Bugas (I’m sure that the domestic corvette will come out with a minimum of Zarya -2 and the Monument), means of combating enemy submarines, that is, torpedoes and a helicopter (this is already standard equipment: helicopter and Package), the ability to scare away anti-submarine aircraft (16 Reduta missiles with a range of 40 km), the ability to scare off enemy NK (Uranus complex with a range of 260 km.).

      What ocean will he lead to? and what kind of opponent?
      Will Arli Berkov with Nimits scare Uranus away? So he won’t even know about them, he will suddenly receive a couple of four SM-6s or LRASMs, or both, and then they will finish off in their free time ....
      As for anti-submarine aviation, it’s hard to understand, how can he scare Poseidon, or even ancient Orion, armed with Harpoons?
      The poster will hang - "Don't make me angry, I will kill!" whether? And why only anti-submarine aircraft? and the rest of the enemy where will go?
      unclear....
      How can such a ship be sent against such an enemy, and even into the oceans?
      it is contraindicated to stick his nose out of the protection of coastal aviation.
    2. Fizik M
      23 March 2019 19: 16
      +2
      Quote: Vyacheslav
      The author of the article is a little cunning

      Musya, a lot of YOUR flood is crossed out with one simple comparison
      there is a "serial weapon" with a price of 1 and a combat effectiveness of 1
      however, his series is stopped (now the decision has already been changed) and instead of it there is a "new promising innovative", with a price of 1-1,5 and a "combat effectiveness" of 0,2-0,6 of what was in the series

      if the normal language - then it tamper
  • Xazarin
    Xazarin 21 March 2019 08: 33
    0
    It is not for me to judge the feasibility of the project because it is not a specialist, but the position of the Author is respectable. Not only a word but a deed.
    1. Vadim237
      Vadim237 21 March 2019 11: 57
      0
      Only here is the matter - it turned out to be a waste of time.
  • Simferopol
    Simferopol 21 March 2019 10: 04
    -2
    Project 20386 does not have any serious military and technical justification. The Navy, which received it, “to put it mildly,” from the “back door”, has not and is not able to bring any serious and noteworthy arguments in its favor. Its serial construction is impractical.

    It depends on the situation. If oil prices return to the region of $ 140, the United States falls apart and the West lifts sanctions, and we begin to grow at a tremendous pace, then you can indulge in an expensive 386 corvette. But in conditions of financial constraint, of course, this expensive toy nafig is not needed. Not much more rational than Zamvolta, at which we all laugh
  • musorg
    musorg 21 March 2019 12: 14
    0
    However, these throwings will lead to large costs and loss of time, which is even more expensive!
  • zak167
    zak167 21 March 2019 12: 22
    -7
    Question to the authors. What do you need to do? I want to crap what Russia is trying to create? Yes, it doesn’t always work out, sometimes with errors. This is normal. Your interest is that everyone is whining, everyone is unhappy with something. Stop making all-knowing experts out of yourself. If you like American, write about them. And leave our Russian alone. Yes, and stop retyping the article. This topic already existed, only the author was different.
    1. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 21 March 2019 14: 23
      +2
      The author was the same, just this article has two of them.

      I don’t like the fact that for our money the country stays weaker militarily. And you, I see, fine.
    2. Fizik M
      23 March 2019 19: 13
      +1
      Quote: zak167
      I need you

      pseudo-patriot here you
      for there is a clear and understandable sabotage and undermining the combat capability of the Navy
      Quote: zak167
      Russia is trying to create

      follow the speech
      Russia has nothing to do with this scam, this is an fornication absolutely specific villains
  • Dimon19661
    Dimon19661 21 March 2019 12: 44
    -6
    Similar issues are resolved in closed-door offices, by people who are aware of the TRUE state of affairs, and not on the VO website. Brad is shorter, although the people normally hawl. And in general, it became very rare to go here (only via links in Zen), the site began to strongly resemble the REN TV channel.
    1. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 21 March 2019 14: 24
      +3
      I ran after you for half a day to tell you how indifferent you were to me laughing

      Or whatever it was ...
    2. Fizik M
      23 March 2019 19: 11
      0
      Quote: Dimon19661
      Similar issues are resolved in offices behind closed doors, by people who are in the know.

      sad joke in the fact that the sanity (towards greater adequacy) of decisions "there" was significantly influenced by the publication here
  • Sergei 777
    Sergei 777 21 March 2019 17: 40
    0
    Personally, one thing calms me down is that these chimeras will be built one well, at most two and that's it. I am more concerned about the priority of export orders over ours.
  • Zveruga
    Zveruga 21 March 2019 22: 03
    0
    But it is primarily needed for ships in the far zone.

    Barking, he wrote it. The fact of the matter is that 20386 is a ship of the far sea zone! For this, they increased the displacement so that he had a greater range and better seaworthiness. This is the corvette of the future AUG, which without cover in the face of 22350M will not work. You are trying to compare it with the 20380-20385 near-sea area of ​​operations, and with the frigate 22350, which will no longer be produced in its old form and has a greater displacement, and hence worse maneuverability, acceleration dynamics, and greater visibility.
    1. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 22 March 2019 21: 49
      0
      The point is that 20386 is a ship of the far sea zone! To do this, he and increased the displacement, so that he had a greater range and better seaworthiness. This is the future corvette of AUG


      This is some kind of anecdote. Why is he in the "future AUG"?
      1. D16
        D16 23 March 2019 00: 17
        0
        Here he will overtake the AUG, dissolve the fishing rod on the route, he will hear someone and will not allow torpedoes to shoot. And they will immediately say that there is a benefit from the steamer wink .
  • Kolosenko oleg Viktorovich
    Kolosenko oleg Viktorovich 21 March 2019 22: 40
    0
    de facto for war we are not ready again for Russian maybe
  • xomaNN
    xomaNN 22 March 2019 12: 08
    0
    Even if 30% of what was written by the authors on the combat capabilities of the new BNKs is true, this is clearly an occasion for the Navy and USC to weigh the prospects three times
    Corvette Project 20386

    But it seems that there is only one person in Russia, you see, who belay can make a decision.
    But he is not a military commander, but trusts the conclusions of the leadership of the Navy and USC.
    So, ... "we'll see" ...
  • Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 22 March 2019 12: 17
    +1
    Quote: rudolff
    having huge holes in the PLO, air defense of the near sea zone. They embarrassed a series of patrol ships, whose purpose no one could really formulate. At best, a flag demonstration and the fight against piracy are out there. We have a catastrophe in the mine-sweeping fleet, but they began to glue these glasses with dubious performance characteristics, which will never become widespread.

    that’s all right, there aren’t enough minesweepers, they are scattered on a lot of projects, in the piece-wise execution, the IPCs have been completely forgotten
  • Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 22 March 2019 17: 49
    0
    Quote: Beregovyhok_1
    crew habitability (chatting less)

    habitability and seaworthiness are different things, sufficient and satisfactory habitability, and it is even available on karakurt. about the equipment, so specialization is needed, a long-known technique. You missed the disadvantage of a surface ship that negates all of its advantages, namely 1 visual and other visibility 2 quiet running (even slower than the tank) and as a result ..... attention! 100 percent vulnerability to missile weapons and enemy submarines ..... why equip the mast and crew if the ship is hit by a third missile? and all this has already happened, in the Russian-Japanese, in the first world war and the Second World War, but for the sake of "(chatters less)" many love NK, recklessly ready to die in the first battle (Tsushima!)? are claustrophobic? or are they planning, under the threat of mines (Russian-Japanese), aviation and submarines (World War II) to sit out in the port? but this is dishonest and not like a man, Stalin in 1941 enrolled all such clever men into the infantry ...
    1. timokhin-aa
      timokhin-aa 22 March 2019 21: 51
      0
      Blindness prevents the ship to use weapons, for your information. Therefore sizes are important. They do not affect visibility in our time.
      1. rudolff
        rudolff 22 March 2019 22: 17
        +1
        Not just interferes, but forbids. Seaworthiness in terms of navigation safety is, as a rule, a point or two higher than seaworthiness in terms of the use of weapons. I had a floating practice at the school on the MRK 1234.1. We left Liepaja and in the strait zone near Sweden got into a turbulence of 4-5 points. I can say for sure that already at 4 points the ship was absolutely incapable of combat. 5 points - seaworthiness "according to the passport".
        1. Fizik M
          23 March 2019 19: 09
          0
          Quote: rudolff
          I can say for sure that already in 4 points the ship was absolutely not combat-ready.

          this is not the case and depends on the position relative to the wave
          see Mikhailovsky "I am in command of the fleet" checking it at the boatmen, "bump-run maneuver" is just for this
          1. rudolff
            rudolff 23 March 2019 19: 33
            +1
            I don’t know about Mikhailovsky, but at that time our ship was not ready, either onboard or in keel. At the missile post, no one was able to keep watch at all, the bodies of the sailors could only be found in the gyropost, the navigator rested his forehead on the "rubber band" of the radar and vomited and did not see the second MRK at close range, I could not get the assistant commander out of his cabin by order of the commander himself ... Two out of three diesels were fired, then one was started. Broken part of the main radio mast. It was a complete well ... ah, not a hike. When we returned to Liepaja, we could not moor for an hour. Half of the base came running to look at this clowning. They unraveled the wooden beam of the quay wall, dented the side. Half of the cadets wrote their expulsion reports. True, they took it later, but they remembered that case for life. One of them later became one of the commanders of Severodvinsk.
  • Oden280
    Oden280 22 March 2019 20: 11
    0
    Quote: Alexey RA
    Hmmm .... I relied on MK with the work of Chernyshev on pr. 26:

    In several of the denominations they write differently, then 3, then 6.5. But the meaning is the same. The loading angle is fixed.
  • Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 22 March 2019 23: 22
    0
    Quote: timokhin-aa
    In our time, they do not affect visibility.

    By the way, it’s true, they are so noticeable that nothing is already affecting ... why are you bypassing the vulnerability? because then there’s no reason to talk about blabbering, just suicide bombers at least big though small .... Only submarines, coastal aviation, a small surface coastal fleet protected by the coast are needed. By the way, about 5 points in the Baltic .... The Baltic Sea is considered moderate in its unrest, both on the high seas and near the coast. In the middle of the sea, the waves are usually small, on average up to 3-4 meters. Near the coast, even less than 3 meters. Storm warnings in the Kaliningrad region according to the Ministry of Emergency Situations were announced:
    2013: June 25-26.06.2013, 6, December XNUMX (Hurricane Xavier).
    2014: December 13, from 0 to 3 a.m. west wind of 17-25 m / s.
    2015: January 2-3,11, 8, November 20 (wind up to 25-22 m / s), December 12 (in the morning, wind 17-22 m / s, in places up to 27-XNUMX m / s).
  • Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 22 March 2019 23: 28
    +1
    Quote: rudolff
    was at MRK 1234.1.

    Well, it’s not Karakurt anyway, and especially not Gorshkov
    1. rudolff
      rudolff 22 March 2019 23: 47
      0
      Comparison with Gorshkov is inappropriate, but with Karakurt completely. MRK, he is MRK.
  • Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 23 March 2019 08: 38
    0
    Quote: rudolff
    MRK, he is MRK.

    For the project 1234.1: 640 t (standard),.
    59,3 m length (longest)
    54 m (on design waterline)
    Draft 3,02 m (average design waterline)
    karakurt
    Displacement 800 t [2]
    Length 67 m [2]
    Draft 4 ......... nevertheless, it’s not the same even in size, but stability is also important, I don’t have numbers, but I can see that the stability of the karakurt is better by an order of magnitude, the light superstructure and the main armament are deeper located
    1. rudolff
      rudolff 23 March 2019 09: 50
      0
      And do you think they are incomparable? Then here is the opinion of the chief designer of the Almaz Central Marine Design Bureau, Dmitry Tsymlyakov, who is also the chief designer of this project:
      "Project 22800 replaced the Project 1241 Molniya RCA and Project 1234 Ovod MRK. The last Ovod MRK was built in the late 80s of the last century. Therefore, in terms of such parameters as the main dimensions, displacement, speed, these ships are comparable. They are similar in their main purpose. "
      Their contours differ due to the fact that the "Gadfly" used a planing hull, and the "Karakurt" - the contours of the transitional regime. The power plant of three M 507 diesel engines was borrowed from the Gadfly. And where is the weaponry located deeper at Karakurt? Six Gadfly Malachites in inclined launchers on the deck, eight Karakurt calibers in vertical launchers in the superstructure.
  • Arkon
    Arkon 23 March 2019 13: 35
    0
    "4." Feasibility "of the introduction of a hybrid power plant, taking into account the fact that the installed low-power electric motors are not able to provide even a search run of 16-18 knots?"
    "since the power of the electric motors on the 20386 project is small for an effective search run (about 18 knots), and the inevitable transition to turbines dramatically increases noise, operating costs and reduces the cruising range."

    Could the author comment on this information? What does "transition to turbines" mean? As far as I understand, the turbines are decoupled from the propellers and are the electricity suppliers. How can you "switch" to them? And how, then, is travel speed related to electric motors? Electric motors are always running there. At any speed. Or am I misunderstanding something?
    1. Fizik M
      23 March 2019 19: 01
      0
      Quote: Arkon
      What does "transition to turbines" mean?

      the logic of the power plant is simple - "kolomna" are EXISTING, MASTERED
      "the basis of the combat mode" for 20380 is 18 nodes with BUGAS, "kolomny" provides it
      taking into account the fact that BUGAS is ACTIVE-passive - the question of carrier noise is not a priority, but to lose 18 knots. SEARCH progress by going to 12-14 nodes (what happened on electric motors for 20386) is a significant loss of search performance

      those. we are talking about the complex optimization of the components of the ship in relation to the criterion "efficiency-cost of performing the target function

      according to 20386, I personally do not understand the limitation of the power plant's capacity, perhaps because "they received MW how many tons of load they gave for it"

      and the question "where does the 20386 get the electric motion" - the answer is very simple, it is not even a "trend" (because the trend is a HED of significantly higher power, providing large strokes), but ... "it worked well with them at 22100" (having a completely different range of speeds, than OVR corvettes)
      1. Arkon
        Arkon 23 March 2019 23: 05
        0
        Quote: Fizik M
        but lose 18 bonds. SEARCH move care on nodes 12-14 (what happened on electric motors for 20386) is a significant loss in search performance


        I don't really understand where the 12-14 knots figure comes from. And, I repeat: what does "on electric motors" mean? The hybrid installation assumes, as I understand it, the course ONLY on electric motors. That is, it also provides 30 nodes on electric motors.
        1. Fizik M
          April 21 2019 14: 58
          0
          Quote: Arkon
          Hybrid installation involves, as I understand it, the course is EXCLUSIVELY on electric motors. That is, it provides 30 nodes also on electric motors.

          Of course not
          and in speed - estimates of the power (insufficient) of electric motors
  • Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 23 March 2019 16: 54
    0
    Quote: rudolff
    that on the "Gadfly" a gliding hull was used, and on "Karakurt" - the contours of the transitional regime

    well, you’re probably not a sailor, the contours of the hull of the corps are just the reason for the heavy pitching, and the transitional contours are no longer a boat, but a ship, and the pitching is much less there,
    1. rudolff
      rudolff 23 March 2019 17: 40
      +1
      Do not distort. I wrote to you simply about the difference in the shape of the hull and I did not give this assessment. Not an order of magnitude. The difference in seaworthiness in the safety of navigation of Gadfly and Karakurt is one point.
  • Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 23 March 2019 16: 57
    0
    Quote: rudolff
    eight Gauges of Karakurt in vertical PU

    I think they rest on the keel, unless of course the designer did not manage to screw up with stability
  • Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 23 March 2019 17: 09
    +1
    Quote: Simferopol
    If oil prices return to the region of $ 140, the US will fall apart and the West will lift sanctions, and we will begin to grow at a tremendous pace

    prices for all commodities are set by the owners of the US Federal Reserve (Rothschilds Rockefellers) and concurrently by the owners of 95 percent of the global business, through OJSC Wangward, Sanctions and nothing at all, if the owners of the US Federal Reserve through the IMF manage the government of the Russian Federation ...... we don’t start to grow, because it is not profitable for those who manage us, it is beneficial for them to crush our entire business with taxes and turn into banana republics https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ThivKUtXeeg and reduce the population to 12 million (Margaret Techer)
  • Vladimir1155
    Vladimir1155 23 March 2019 17: 21
    0
    Quote: Alexey RA
    Gorgeous. Fleet of the open sea, with bases - passage yards. Come whoever you want, put what you want - no one will see, no one will hear

    support! there are almost no minesweepers, the naval bases are not covered, in the Far East, almost everything is about Vladivostok cafes, sailors, and Petropavlovsk were simply left to their fate ... and everything was accompanied by childhood dreams about aircraft carriers and cruisers with battleship destroyers, sailing the oceans with proudly fluttering flags and "the cowardly Yankees run away like hares", and most importantly the instigators will stand on the captain's bridge and all the girls on the shore will fall in love with them, having seen a steep mareman across the ocean, "we know they swam"