Russia and China. Who builds submarines faster and does it matter?
Recently, the Chinese agency Sina released an article, the brief meaning of which is as follows: Russia is building its X-VUMX Varshavyanka submarines the fastest in the world. A developed country spends on a non-nuclear submarine from four to seven years, while Russia is managed with a single Varshavyanka for about two and a half years.
At the end of the article, the Chinese edition asks a question: can China surpass Russia? The timing of the construction of Chinese submarines in China, it is customary to secret, but not so long ago, China won the right to put a version of its submarine project 041 to Thailand, and now it’s not possible to hide the submarine construction deadlines.
Let's show the Chinese edition: they are approximately equal to the world average for boats of this class and range from 3-x to 4-x years. And so it will be with the Thai submarines.
"Varshavyanka" are built really faster.
But not everything is so simple.
Sina, really messed up something: the 636 project boats were not built in the USSR, these boats are the development of the export version of the 877 project and saw life after the collapse of the USSR. But they built them really fast. However, the name "Varshavyanka" was born more in relation to the 877-m boats and the Chinese could be confused.
The 636 project was in some sense a breakthrough. First, domestic shipbuilders were able to achieve really very fast terms for the construction of these boats. Secondly, it was done without damage to the performance characteristics - the boats turned out to be really good. For its time, of course.
We will not repeat propaganda clichés about “black holes in the ocean”, the nickname that the 636 project inherited from its predecessor — the boats of the 877 project. It’s not good to be a “black hole”, it’s bad because the enemy has only a little more difficulty in finding a zone with a low noise background than a high one — the boat should not stand out against the background of a natural acoustic background. But we recognize that, at the same time, the secrecy of this submarine was very good and, in fact, even now allows, in some cases, to reach the torpedo launch distance on the western submarine, though not for long.
"Varshavyanka" turned out to be easy to operate, with good habitability, with a good for their time, hydro-acoustic complex and a serious modernization potential.
This was all the more important because the project was originally intended for export. Therefore, they began to build them for the Chinese. And indeed, the export potential of the boat was excellent.
To date, ten such submarines of various modifications are in the ranks of the Chinese Navy, four in the Algerian Navy, six in the Vietnamese Navy. Successful Varshavyanka repeated the export success of their “founder” - the 877 project.
Six more submarines of project 6363 built for the Black Sea fleet The Russian Navy, and the same is being built for the Pacific Fleet.
And here it is worth asking a simple question - if the boat is exported, then why is it being built for the Russian Navy?
And they are building it because the project that was intended for our fleet is 677 "Lada", which is called "did not go."
While for foreign customers built boats project 636, for the Russian Navy created a completely different ship. The 677 project (code “Lada”) was supposed to be a real breakthrough into the future, “by class” surpassing the previous diesel boats in everything.
Single body design. Unlike Varshavyanok, Lada was conceived without traditional two-part architecture, they have one building. This made it possible to significantly reduce the severity of such a problem as the visibility of the submarines in the conditions of the use of low-frequency acoustic "lighting" by the enemy.
Waves of great length, created by various sources, having reached a double-hull boat, force its light external structures to oscillate and reflect the wave back into the water column, and such a reflected wave, like the original one, propagates very far. In such conditions, low noise gives nothing - the boat may not make any sounds at all, but will be detected tens of kilometers away. A single-body rigid structure is capable of absorbing much more wave energy, not reflecting it back, and its visibility with this type of search is much lower.
Smaller sizes. Boat dimensions are reduced, which also reduces visibility. Firstly, the smaller the boat, the less impact it has on the water column that is “moved apart” when moving - and this also gives rise to a “secondary” infrasound, because the movement of water masses cannot but be accompanied by the appearance of waves. And they learned to detect, and, because of the great length, they also spread very far. “Lada” wins here.
The second most important quality of a smaller boat is the less pronounced manifestation of surface wave and electric (orientation of ions in sea water under the influence of the mass of the boat) disturbances caused by a boat moving under water. This has already been written (here и here). Currently, the detection of a submarine by surface wave and electric manifestations using radar anti-aircraft aircraft is in the US and Japanese Navy the main type of search. The Americans even abandoned the technical ability to set up a “field” of sonar buoys - they simply don’t need it, they simply “see” when they pass the place where the submarine is located. The fact that the US Navy’s unitary enterprise went to medium altitudes is also known. There is no way to completely eliminate such detection, however, it is known that the smaller the submarine, the less surface perturbations it causes. A trifle, but in some circumstances it will be crucial, so a reduced submerged displacement at Lada is an important step forward.
All this is not the only advanced features of the project 677. New Automated Combat Control System, new electronics, less noisy torpedo tubes, a fundamentally new permanent magnet chassis motor - if without details, this technology can also be used to reduce the physical fields of the boat and its visibility.
And, of course, an air-independent power plant. VNEU was to give the boat a completely new operational capabilities. If the standard “Varshavyanka” or “Halibut”, when leaving the danger zone with a jerk, at the limit, loses the charge of the batteries in less than a few (we can do without details here) hours, the VNEU allows not to emerge to charge the batteries for many days. The boat is similar in its properties to atomic, with the exception of underwater speed.
Lada was supposed to be one of the most modern non-nuclear submarines.
Unfortunately for the project, in our country there were 90s.
The main submarine of the X-NUMX B-677 “St. Petersburg” project was laid at the Admiralty shipyards (in the same place where Varshavyanka was built at a record pace) in 585 year. To date, the ship can not be considered a full-fledged combat unit and is in trial operation since 1997. In fact, it can be said that it has not yet been completed, and, apparently, it will not be now.
It is known that after a huge number of unsuccessful attempts to bring the "St. Petersburg" to combat status, the 677 project was radically reworked. Perhaps, as in the case of "Ash" and "Boreas" starting from the next boat, "Kronstadt", we just see another submarine - in the end, the "Borea-A" and "Ash-M" even have completely different hulls, compared with the head ships, why not the first serial submarine of the 677 project to be recycled as well ...
There were a lot of problems with the boat. Most of the information is closed, but it is known that something went wrong with the new electromotive scheme, many of the newest systems just do not work as they should, and most importantly, the VNEU did not work. She just could not do, until now. Recent news that there will be no it at all in these boats, and instead of it there will be lithium-ion batteries from this series.
A little earlier, under Admiral Vysotsky, it almost cost the project of life, however, and now there are voices demanding to stop investing money in Lada.
This is definitely wrong. Modern technology has reached such a level of complexity that without passing this generation, without fulfilling all the technical difficulties, without having erased the “childhood diseases” in the structure, without having built at least a small series, it will be impossible to start working on the next generation. The refusal of finishing the Lada, if it had actually happened, would have meant for Russia to depart from the club of advanced submarine builders. Fortunately, this did not happen, but problems with the VNEU suggest that it is too early to relax.
With a lot of stress and torment, with errors and failures, but this project is moving forward. Hopefully, over time, all questions on the 677 project will be resolved and the boat will be “brought to mind” - we simply have no other option, and the matter is not even in the VNEU and not in the non-nuclear submarines themselves. Or rather - not so much in them.
Electromotion in a form similar to the one in which it is being attempted to be implemented on the Lada would be vital for our future nuclear submarines ...
You can not retreat.
And with the timing of the construction of the 677 project to the Chinese and it would be worthwhile to compare themselves and others - “St. Petersburg” was laid in 1997, launched in 2004, commissioned in 2010. Thirteen years from laying to raising the flag of St. Andrew, and the boat is not ready and may never be. B-586 "Kronstadt" - laid in 2005-m, launched after thirteen years and two months - the complete rework of the project affected. The boat is still in construction, tentatively will be commissioned next year. B-587 - “Great Luke” - they began to build in 2006, they had to re-install (!) In 2015. They promise to finish in 2021.
It should be understood that these three unfortunate ships will most likely not become full-fledged combat units. Perhaps only the "Great Luke", but not a fact.
But the following ... at the Army-2019 forum, the Ministry of Defense signed a contract for the construction of a pair of boats of the 677 project. Apparently, this will be the first fully combat-ready Lada. But the question of the VNEU is not resolved and whether it will be in new boats is unclear. How quickly the boats will be built is also unclear.
It was these dramatic events that caused the export of the 6363 project boats to the Navy. The decision turned out to be salutary - by that time the only “Alrosa” of the 877В project with vague prospects due to its technical condition remained on the Black Sea Fleet. Similarly, there is a shortage of new submarines in the Pacific. It is necessary to understand - “Varshavyanka” is by no means equal to the Japanese “Littering”. But such submarines are better than none. When choosing between nothing and an outdated submarine, it is worth choosing an outdated submarine. This is true all the more so since each of the Varshavyanok that has got into the Navy is the carrier of Caliber cruise missiles.
To understand - in the Pacific Fleet there is still no carrier of such weapons not. And this is four years after his first combat use! Submarines will have to increase the "total salvo" of the Pacific Fleet. And purely for submarine warfare, with its torpedoes and mining, they are needed.
But the manner in which Varshavyanka enter the Navy raises questions.
If for export boats come with a flexible long towed antenna (GPBA), then "our boats" do not have it - the design is simplified. And this is a very important equipment for the timely detection of enemy boats. Unlike the same Indian pr. 877, ours are still equipped with an insufficient number of antediluvian hydroacoustic countermeasures, which is guaranteed to disrupt the attempt to evade the enemy's torpedo attack. BIUS and boat electronics are extremely far from what we ourselves can do. All this reduces the combat potential of the new submarines, and without any objective reasons whatsoever. About the fact that the Navy obstruction and torpedoesand delays with antitrustit has also been written more than once, and there are no objective reasons either, especially with the anti-torpedoes for which Russia is the world leader. They are not in significant quantities in the armament of the sub-float just because someone so decided. As a result, the decision to build the Varshavyanok series for Russia, which was salutary for the military composition of the Navy, was half-hearted. And, it is worth repeating, not because we cannot. Because we do not want.
On the newly built submarines could well be onboard sonar antennas.
As a result, completely new submarines are already in need of extensive modernization. However, the Navy is no stranger to pretend that everything is normal.
Most recently, in the "Independent Military Review" article M. Klimov "Varshavyanka requires an upgrade", devoted to some aspects of the modernization of the submarine projects 6363 and 877in service with the Navy.
I would like to add to this the fact that part of the modernization work can be done, starting from the backlog of export boats, for example, the same GPBA. Another important step would be to equip the “Varshavyanki” under construction and the 6363 and 877 projects already built and operated by the fleet with lithium-ion batteries. VNEU in the already built boat is very difficult and unnecessarily expensive to build in (and for a long time). But the replacement of batteries seems to be much more simple action, which also significantly increases the duration of the stay of the boat under water.
Will it be done? We'll see. There are no reasons for pessimism in this case, but also for optimism. But the fact that the problem of having full-fledged torpedo remote control and the introduction of a sufficient amount of 324-mm anti-torpedo will finally be solved will no longer be believed at all. But it is necessary to repeat all the same.
The main production of Chinese naval submarines now in production is the 041 project, which in the West is called the “039 type” or “Yuan-class”. It is these submarines that will be delivered to Thailand, which was mentioned above, and to Pakistan (in the latter case, by joint construction). It is known that, like our "Varshavyanka", 041 project has a two-case architecture.
It is also known that the Chinese are already ahead of us in the implementation of full-fledged remote control of torpedoes - and we did it to them (according to Chinese torpedoes - article "Torpedoes of the Great Neighbor" by M. Klimov). We don’t have it for ourselves, but for export. Also of interest are reports on the presence of Chinese boats VNEU. According to the available western expert estimates, the Chinese VNEU do not show the required performance characteristics and need serious revision, which is being actively pursued. We will not speculate on the subject of these assessments - whatever this VNEU would turn out to be, but the Chinese have it. However, other sources report that the VNEU dismantled due to low TTX. One way or another, we don’t have them at all.
Also known are the works of the Chinese on copying weapons control systems and other systems of Western-style submarines, mainly Thales.
All of the above suggests that our Varshavyanki will most likely lose 041 to the project in battle. And this, we repeat, there are no objective reasons - only organizational, multiplied by the evil will of individuals and the thirst for profit of others.
What conclusions can be drawn from this? We have a lot of work. By bringing to the "series" boat project 677. By creating a VNEU for them. To debug serial production to a level that allows you to build these boats at least four years. According to the extensive modernization of "Warsaw" and "Paltus". On the introduction of anti-torpedoes and torpedo control upgrades.
We sincerely hope that all this will be done. Even if the speed of construction of submarines at the same time slightly grows - to the world average values, for example.
After all, really effective submarine forces are far more important for us than the praise of a Chinese newspaper for the rapid construction of already outdated submarines.
At the end of the article, the Chinese edition asks a question: can China surpass Russia? The timing of the construction of Chinese submarines in China, it is customary to secret, but not so long ago, China won the right to put a version of its submarine project 041 to Thailand, and now it’s not possible to hide the submarine construction deadlines.
Submarine project 677 cipher "Lada". They were supposed to be built for the Navy, not the “Varshavyanka”. But so far failed
Let's show the Chinese edition: they are approximately equal to the world average for boats of this class and range from 3-x to 4-x years. And so it will be with the Thai submarines.
"Varshavyanka" are built really faster.
But not everything is so simple.
Bulk export submarine
Sina, really messed up something: the 636 project boats were not built in the USSR, these boats are the development of the export version of the 877 project and saw life after the collapse of the USSR. But they built them really fast. However, the name "Varshavyanka" was born more in relation to the 877-m boats and the Chinese could be confused.
The 636 project was in some sense a breakthrough. First, domestic shipbuilders were able to achieve really very fast terms for the construction of these boats. Secondly, it was done without damage to the performance characteristics - the boats turned out to be really good. For its time, of course.
We will not repeat propaganda clichés about “black holes in the ocean”, the nickname that the 636 project inherited from its predecessor — the boats of the 877 project. It’s not good to be a “black hole”, it’s bad because the enemy has only a little more difficulty in finding a zone with a low noise background than a high one — the boat should not stand out against the background of a natural acoustic background. But we recognize that, at the same time, the secrecy of this submarine was very good and, in fact, even now allows, in some cases, to reach the torpedo launch distance on the western submarine, though not for long.
"Varshavyanka" turned out to be easy to operate, with good habitability, with a good for their time, hydro-acoustic complex and a serious modernization potential.
This was all the more important because the project was originally intended for export. Therefore, they began to build them for the Chinese. And indeed, the export potential of the boat was excellent.
To date, ten such submarines of various modifications are in the ranks of the Chinese Navy, four in the Algerian Navy, six in the Vietnamese Navy. Successful Varshavyanka repeated the export success of their “founder” - the 877 project.
Six more submarines of project 6363 built for the Black Sea fleet The Russian Navy, and the same is being built for the Pacific Fleet.
And here it is worth asking a simple question - if the boat is exported, then why is it being built for the Russian Navy?
And they are building it because the project that was intended for our fleet is 677 "Lada", which is called "did not go."
Not yet made a breakthrough
While for foreign customers built boats project 636, for the Russian Navy created a completely different ship. The 677 project (code “Lada”) was supposed to be a real breakthrough into the future, “by class” surpassing the previous diesel boats in everything.
Single body design. Unlike Varshavyanok, Lada was conceived without traditional two-part architecture, they have one building. This made it possible to significantly reduce the severity of such a problem as the visibility of the submarines in the conditions of the use of low-frequency acoustic "lighting" by the enemy.
Waves of great length, created by various sources, having reached a double-hull boat, force its light external structures to oscillate and reflect the wave back into the water column, and such a reflected wave, like the original one, propagates very far. In such conditions, low noise gives nothing - the boat may not make any sounds at all, but will be detected tens of kilometers away. A single-body rigid structure is capable of absorbing much more wave energy, not reflecting it back, and its visibility with this type of search is much lower.
Smaller sizes. Boat dimensions are reduced, which also reduces visibility. Firstly, the smaller the boat, the less impact it has on the water column that is “moved apart” when moving - and this also gives rise to a “secondary” infrasound, because the movement of water masses cannot but be accompanied by the appearance of waves. And they learned to detect, and, because of the great length, they also spread very far. “Lada” wins here.
The second most important quality of a smaller boat is the less pronounced manifestation of surface wave and electric (orientation of ions in sea water under the influence of the mass of the boat) disturbances caused by a boat moving under water. This has already been written (here и here). Currently, the detection of a submarine by surface wave and electric manifestations using radar anti-aircraft aircraft is in the US and Japanese Navy the main type of search. The Americans even abandoned the technical ability to set up a “field” of sonar buoys - they simply don’t need it, they simply “see” when they pass the place where the submarine is located. The fact that the US Navy’s unitary enterprise went to medium altitudes is also known. There is no way to completely eliminate such detection, however, it is known that the smaller the submarine, the less surface perturbations it causes. A trifle, but in some circumstances it will be crucial, so a reduced submerged displacement at Lada is an important step forward.
All this is not the only advanced features of the project 677. New Automated Combat Control System, new electronics, less noisy torpedo tubes, a fundamentally new permanent magnet chassis motor - if without details, this technology can also be used to reduce the physical fields of the boat and its visibility.
And, of course, an air-independent power plant. VNEU was to give the boat a completely new operational capabilities. If the standard “Varshavyanka” or “Halibut”, when leaving the danger zone with a jerk, at the limit, loses the charge of the batteries in less than a few (we can do without details here) hours, the VNEU allows not to emerge to charge the batteries for many days. The boat is similar in its properties to atomic, with the exception of underwater speed.
Lada was supposed to be one of the most modern non-nuclear submarines.
Unfortunately for the project, in our country there were 90s.
The main submarine of the X-NUMX B-677 “St. Petersburg” project was laid at the Admiralty shipyards (in the same place where Varshavyanka was built at a record pace) in 585 year. To date, the ship can not be considered a full-fledged combat unit and is in trial operation since 1997. In fact, it can be said that it has not yet been completed, and, apparently, it will not be now.
It is known that after a huge number of unsuccessful attempts to bring the "St. Petersburg" to combat status, the 677 project was radically reworked. Perhaps, as in the case of "Ash" and "Boreas" starting from the next boat, "Kronstadt", we just see another submarine - in the end, the "Borea-A" and "Ash-M" even have completely different hulls, compared with the head ships, why not the first serial submarine of the 677 project to be recycled as well ...
There were a lot of problems with the boat. Most of the information is closed, but it is known that something went wrong with the new electromotive scheme, many of the newest systems just do not work as they should, and most importantly, the VNEU did not work. She just could not do, until now. Recent news that there will be no it at all in these boats, and instead of it there will be lithium-ion batteries from this series.
A little earlier, under Admiral Vysotsky, it almost cost the project of life, however, and now there are voices demanding to stop investing money in Lada.
This is definitely wrong. Modern technology has reached such a level of complexity that without passing this generation, without fulfilling all the technical difficulties, without having erased the “childhood diseases” in the structure, without having built at least a small series, it will be impossible to start working on the next generation. The refusal of finishing the Lada, if it had actually happened, would have meant for Russia to depart from the club of advanced submarine builders. Fortunately, this did not happen, but problems with the VNEU suggest that it is too early to relax.
With a lot of stress and torment, with errors and failures, but this project is moving forward. Hopefully, over time, all questions on the 677 project will be resolved and the boat will be “brought to mind” - we simply have no other option, and the matter is not even in the VNEU and not in the non-nuclear submarines themselves. Or rather - not so much in them.
Electromotion in a form similar to the one in which it is being attempted to be implemented on the Lada would be vital for our future nuclear submarines ...
You can not retreat.
And with the timing of the construction of the 677 project to the Chinese and it would be worthwhile to compare themselves and others - “St. Petersburg” was laid in 1997, launched in 2004, commissioned in 2010. Thirteen years from laying to raising the flag of St. Andrew, and the boat is not ready and may never be. B-586 "Kronstadt" - laid in 2005-m, launched after thirteen years and two months - the complete rework of the project affected. The boat is still in construction, tentatively will be commissioned next year. B-587 - “Great Luke” - they began to build in 2006, they had to re-install (!) In 2015. They promise to finish in 2021.
It should be understood that these three unfortunate ships will most likely not become full-fledged combat units. Perhaps only the "Great Luke", but not a fact.
But the following ... at the Army-2019 forum, the Ministry of Defense signed a contract for the construction of a pair of boats of the 677 project. Apparently, this will be the first fully combat-ready Lada. But the question of the VNEU is not resolved and whether it will be in new boats is unclear. How quickly the boats will be built is also unclear.
"Warsaw Women" in salvation? Yes, but there are questions
It was these dramatic events that caused the export of the 6363 project boats to the Navy. The decision turned out to be salutary - by that time the only “Alrosa” of the 877В project with vague prospects due to its technical condition remained on the Black Sea Fleet. Similarly, there is a shortage of new submarines in the Pacific. It is necessary to understand - “Varshavyanka” is by no means equal to the Japanese “Littering”. But such submarines are better than none. When choosing between nothing and an outdated submarine, it is worth choosing an outdated submarine. This is true all the more so since each of the Varshavyanok that has got into the Navy is the carrier of Caliber cruise missiles.
To understand - in the Pacific Fleet there is still no carrier of such weapons not. And this is four years after his first combat use! Submarines will have to increase the "total salvo" of the Pacific Fleet. And purely for submarine warfare, with its torpedoes and mining, they are needed.
But the manner in which Varshavyanka enter the Navy raises questions.
Diesel submarines "Rostov-on-Don". The 6363 project was a salvation for the Navy, but the time of these boats is rapidly leaving
If for export boats come with a flexible long towed antenna (GPBA), then "our boats" do not have it - the design is simplified. And this is a very important equipment for the timely detection of enemy boats. Unlike the same Indian pr. 877, ours are still equipped with an insufficient number of antediluvian hydroacoustic countermeasures, which is guaranteed to disrupt the attempt to evade the enemy's torpedo attack. BIUS and boat electronics are extremely far from what we ourselves can do. All this reduces the combat potential of the new submarines, and without any objective reasons whatsoever. About the fact that the Navy obstruction and torpedoesand delays with antitrustit has also been written more than once, and there are no objective reasons either, especially with the anti-torpedoes for which Russia is the world leader. They are not in significant quantities in the armament of the sub-float just because someone so decided. As a result, the decision to build the Varshavyanok series for Russia, which was salutary for the military composition of the Navy, was half-hearted. And, it is worth repeating, not because we cannot. Because we do not want.
On the newly built submarines could well be onboard sonar antennas.
As a result, completely new submarines are already in need of extensive modernization. However, the Navy is no stranger to pretend that everything is normal.
Most recently, in the "Independent Military Review" article M. Klimov "Varshavyanka requires an upgrade", devoted to some aspects of the modernization of the submarine projects 6363 and 877in service with the Navy.
I would like to add to this the fact that part of the modernization work can be done, starting from the backlog of export boats, for example, the same GPBA. Another important step would be to equip the “Varshavyanki” under construction and the 6363 and 877 projects already built and operated by the fleet with lithium-ion batteries. VNEU in the already built boat is very difficult and unnecessarily expensive to build in (and for a long time). But the replacement of batteries seems to be much more simple action, which also significantly increases the duration of the stay of the boat under water.
Will it be done? We'll see. There are no reasons for pessimism in this case, but also for optimism. But the fact that the problem of having full-fledged torpedo remote control and the introduction of a sufficient amount of 324-mm anti-torpedo will finally be solved will no longer be believed at all. But it is necessary to repeat all the same.
And what about the Chinese?
The main production of Chinese naval submarines now in production is the 041 project, which in the West is called the “039 type” or “Yuan-class”. It is these submarines that will be delivered to Thailand, which was mentioned above, and to Pakistan (in the latter case, by joint construction). It is known that, like our "Varshavyanka", 041 project has a two-case architecture.
The project submarine 041.
It is also known that the Chinese are already ahead of us in the implementation of full-fledged remote control of torpedoes - and we did it to them (according to Chinese torpedoes - article "Torpedoes of the Great Neighbor" by M. Klimov). We don’t have it for ourselves, but for export. Also of interest are reports on the presence of Chinese boats VNEU. According to the available western expert estimates, the Chinese VNEU do not show the required performance characteristics and need serious revision, which is being actively pursued. We will not speculate on the subject of these assessments - whatever this VNEU would turn out to be, but the Chinese have it. However, other sources report that the VNEU dismantled due to low TTX. One way or another, we don’t have them at all.
Also known are the works of the Chinese on copying weapons control systems and other systems of Western-style submarines, mainly Thales.
All of the above suggests that our Varshavyanki will most likely lose 041 to the project in battle. And this, we repeat, there are no objective reasons - only organizational, multiplied by the evil will of individuals and the thirst for profit of others.
What conclusions can be drawn from this? We have a lot of work. By bringing to the "series" boat project 677. By creating a VNEU for them. To debug serial production to a level that allows you to build these boats at least four years. According to the extensive modernization of "Warsaw" and "Paltus". On the introduction of anti-torpedoes and torpedo control upgrades.
We sincerely hope that all this will be done. Even if the speed of construction of submarines at the same time slightly grows - to the world average values, for example.
After all, really effective submarine forces are far more important for us than the praise of a Chinese newspaper for the rapid construction of already outdated submarines.
Information