Arctic torpedo scandal
In the newest military stories There were several big torpedo scandals:
• German - with torpedoes with contactless fuses of “gray wolves” Doenitz;
• American - with a set of problems in terms of reliability of torpedoes in combat conditions of US Navy submarines in World War II
These problems cost dearly both Kriegsmarine and the US Navy, so after the war, the US Navy was very tough on creating new torpedoes and conducting their tests. Under the conditions of the Cold War, which threatened to become “hot,” the US Naval Forces would not categorically want to obtain useless torpedoes (and other means of submarine warfare).
Unfortunately, we had a lot worse. The closure of objective information on the experience of using torpedoes in the Finnish, World War II and World War II led to the fact that we “did not notice” acute torpedo problems in their course and did not have an incentive for the similar US Navy to harshly raise questions to industry as a result and testing in "torpedo" R & D.
But now our torpedo scandal actually burst out. And it gives hope for the opening and the elimination of the serious problems of our sea underwater weapons.
Released to "MIC", "NVO", "Military Review" articles (and their “resonant coverage” in the online edition of "Tape") on the problems of combat readiness of the submarine forces of the North fleet (who had never carried out torpedo fire under ice with operating homing systems) caused a stormy reaction: in the media, society, the Ministry of Defense and government bodies (up to official requests: “sort it out and report”).
Earlier, official representatives of the Ministry of Defense stated that “everything is in order”, torpedo firing (“combat training exercises”) in the Arctic are “being conducted”.
Quote from the city of Volosatov, deputy head of the Information and Mass Communications Department of the Ministry of Defense ("MIC").
On the “readiness for 100% of all tasks” in the Arctic, the Commander of the Northern Fleet Admiral Evmenov repeatedly stated:
However, this problem (the complete absence of torpedo firing of the Russian Navy in ice conditions) actually exists, and statements by a number of people about the alleged lack of it are either related to the lack of objective information or their deliberate concealment.
However, if the IIMK Department (or other officials of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense) have something to say to this, then as they say, we will listen carefully. Since the announcement of Mr. Volosatov (January 29) about the availability of "official news on training combat training exercises in the Arctic" with the use of practical torpedo weapons by the Russian Navy, they did not find any such information and presented it. AND It will take a long time to “search” for it - up to the moment when such shooting will finally be carried out. Given the resonance of this issue both in society and in the military-political leadership, this is now only a matter of time.
There is a situation when publications in the media and public outcry on the acute problem of the country's defense have caused (there is no doubt that this will take place) the adoption of long overdue decisions - crucial for the country's defense.
Torpedoes No technical problems. Problems - in another
And here we can agree with the opinion of Rear Admiral, retired V.Ya. Dudko (voiced by him on this issue to FAN):
Yes, indeed, the proposals mentioned by Rear Admiral Dudko were prepared. There are some discrepancies among specialists according to their methodology, but this is normal, provided that the tests are carried out objectively (“consensus can only be at the cemetery”, and “the sea (the tests) will show who is“ more to the right ”).
Obviously, one of the key issues of our ice torpedo firing is the development of a qualitative test methodology, their objective conduct. And here it is not necessary to count on persons who have previously stained themselves with dubious methods of testing. "Will the fleet" Ichthyosaur "?
More examples? Please: one of our traditional "tricks" with torpedo tests supposedly in "jamming" conditions is setting up hydroacoustic countermeasures (by the way, very expensive) "aside", so that they "do not interfere with torpedoes induced". Or application in such, if one may say so, tests, obviously ancient and absolutely ineffective CPAP, as MG-34 and GUI-1.
Yes, strictly speaking, the very fact of the absence of torpedo firing (with the included “heads”) in the Arctic speaks for itself!
With the tests of our torpedoes for a long time everything is very, very bad.
Comment on the site "MIC" article S. Zhandarova 10.02.2015 g.
The point here is as follows.
The electric batteries of the copper-magnesium circuit, which are the main ones for the naval torpedoes, have never been tested for charging with cold water.
The values indicated in the technical specifications are not even “theoretical”, but are actually borrowed from silver-magnesium batteries (where the “cold-cocking” is ok). There are good reasons to believe that the “cold water” (the figures in the documents are given) simply will not cause the battery to start and start, i.e. the torpedo will be absolutely unfit. The reason for such a scandalous situation: the USSR defense complex, unable to provide supplies of silver-magnesium batteries for new generation torpedoes of 3 submarines due to a lack of silver, replaced it with copper at the beginning of 80's. "Questions" in this case arose, incl. and “cold water”, but those who asked them, turned out to be a powerful pressure. Opening the situation with copper-magnesium batteries for the military-industrial complex would collapse a series of torpedoes and raise tough questions for the Navy and the Ministry of Defense both on the ammunition load of submarines and on compliance with the positions held by those who allowed it all.
Considering the fact that today's "chief torpedo adviser" of the commander-in-chief of the Navy Korolev, Vice-Admiral Shevchenko (aka "part-time" and "Chief Arctic Admiral"), has long been the main opponent of the "Physicist" torpedo, promoting not just obsolete products with extremely low TTH (for example, "Kant"), and including not ensuring reliable use in the Arctic, it is necessary to talk about all this, openly and publicly. For the reports of Mr. Shevchenko in the “high offices”, to put it mildly, are not different in objectivity.
It is to them that “information” is distributed, for example, about the supposedly exceptional toxicity of the “Physics” unitary fuel.
According to the actual situation, they spoke exhaustively. leading specialists of JSC Morteplotekhnika V. F. Gurov and Yu. I. Sannikov:
The fact of the low toxicity of unitary fuel is confirmed by the memories of S. I. Berdichsky in the third volume of the book “Central Research Institute“ Gidropribor ”and its people” with a description of “terry” security breaches for handling unitary fuel. For example, he repeatedly, without being able to even wash himself, walked for several days, drenched in the "working off" of oil and fuel after the maintenance of a torpedo from the sea. However, there were no serious health consequences for S. I. Berdichesky.
In the end, the author of this article, dealing with the topic of unitary fuel, found it necessary to check it on himself, which Shevchenko personally reported on as early as 2012. what Shevchenko did and does is not “bona fide error” (for objective information was provided to him more than once), but a very specific “interest”.
Well, according to the “PR” of Shevchenko as “an outstanding but underestimated naval commander” (including the search operation “Atrin”), it is appropriate to quote the commander of the multipurpose PL-A K-244 (participant of the “Atrin”), Captain 1 retired rank V. Alikov:
16 October 2018 G. in the newspaper "MIC" Shevchenko was publicly asked questions and suggestions to publicly explain his actions on a number of issues, including
Here a question may arise regarding the position of the author on the torpedo “Physicist” (especially since earlier in a number of documents he considered the execution of such shooting by a number of other torpedo samples). The point here is simple: a torpedo with a long range (no less than the effective range of the enemy's torpedoes), which has a good noise-tolerant digital homing and remote control system, is needed under the ice. So today we have one: "Physicist-1" (with all its advantages and disadvantages).
At the same time, there are problems with “Physics”, and serious (especially with respect to simply antique telecontrol (with a towed bobbin reel), corresponding to the western level of the 60-s of the last century). But their elimination is not just realistic, we simply have no right to other options, because the price of the issue is the combat capability of the submarine forces of the Navy and the combat stability of the NSNF (more on this in detail below).
According to official statements of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense, following the results of combat training for 2018, there was not a single prize from the commander in chief by the torpedo “Physicist-1”. Taking into account the fact that the “Physicist” has the highest performance characteristics of all domestic torpedoes, a logical conclusion follows that there are very serious problems with the development of this torpedo in the fleet.
There is nothing surprising in this, and the reasons for this have long been called.
I am sure that the first shooting under the ice will turn out to be largely a failure. And this is an objective fact. Do not worry: a tough and decisive elimination of the identified deficiencies, and again shooting. More disadvantages? Again, their removal and shooting. And the task will be solved, because, I repeat, there are no technical problems, everything is within our reach and can be solved. The question is exclusively in the tough formulation of the question (just as it was done earlier with the “Polyment-Redut” AAMS).
Our submarines must have reliable and effective torpedo weapons and be able to use them in all conditions of the situation (including under the ice)!
At the same time, it is highly advisable to modernize the torpedo “Physicist-1” (previously manufactured products) with the introduction of modern remote control and a number of other issues (set out in non-public documents).
Yes, a number of “respected” organizations of the military-industrial complex (first of all, SPBM Malakhit) will state this: “Excellent! Please give us the OCD of billions on 5 and the year 3-4 for “work” (actually “mastering” this funding).
And the officials of the Ministry of Defense in DOGOZ will say: “Well, we“ planned ”it. Starting work around 2023. ”
No, gentlemen! In mind and conscience, you had to do everything “yesterday”! Including in the framework of the ROC "Case". Today, taking into account the importance of these works, a decision on their conduct can and should be formalized according to the results of the first firing, and the work itself is not carried out within the framework of the new development project (there is simply no time for this, it had to be done “yesterday and immediately”), but in the order of 307 GOST (“product revision”), taking into account the existing (previously created) reserve, in particular, on the hose STU delivered to the beginning of the 2000-x to the customer (with the torpedo 211ТТ1), and the fiber-optic STU “Steering wheel” with characteristics at the level of the best foreign samples (2005 g.).
The author and a number of experts repeatedly raised the issue of using a number of results from the research work "Pipe" (AKIN, Frolov DP) in the "new" Physics. These are not “theories” but quite concrete practical breakthrough results obtained in the sea (the Atlantic Ocean) on real submarines. The implementation of these proposals in “Physics” provides not just a multiple increase in its efficiency, but a real possibility of winning “underwater duels” from the newest “Virginia”, even the old RPLN “Ryazan” (project 667BDR) (with the “new Physicists” and anti-torpedoes). I will emphasize: several leading developers on “Physics” came out of the “Frolov Group”, knew the results obtained by him, and repeatedly raised the question of their use in “Physics” and “Case”.
The fact that this question, despite repeated appeals in a “closed format”, has to be put publicly, eloquently shows “interest” (in quotes) in this on the part of Navy officials. During all this time, no one bothered to even raise the test materials and read!
The chief designer of "Physics" Mr. Grigoriev should not give interviews to various resources (and with obviously unreliable information), but be engaged in eliminating the shortcomings of his torpedo. At the moment, Mr. Grigoriev has no reason for self-praying in the media; there is nothing good in “Physics” - the merit of his predecessors.
The most widely used torpedo in the Navy, USET-80, does not have remote control, and its self-homing systems (two variants: Waterfall and Ceramics) are not just outdated. Everything is much worse. Primary for USET-80 since its “birth”, the powerful low-frequency SSN “Waterfall” has extremely low noise immunity and is practically inoperable in ice conditions.
In 1989, due to the extremely low noise immunity of “Waterfall” at shallow depths, USET-80 received a low-frequency medium-range CLE “Ceramics” (literally from the developer’s book: “reproduced on a national basis” with the USN torpedoes Mk46mod.1, 1961 g.) that, in fact, is a shameful page of domestic torpedo building.
Until now, the Ceramics SSN, despite its extremely low TTX, is the most common naval SSN torpedoes.
The use of USET-80 with "Ceramics" in ice conditions is possible with very significant restrictions, and at minimal ("pistol") distances, despite the fact that the positions of enemy torpedoes are almost an order of magnitude higher than ours (TTX torpedoes are simply incomparable). Figuratively speaking, the enemy has a sniper rifle against our pistol, and this is in terms of its significant lead in detection!
In such a situation, the clash of a Russian nuclear submarine with an American or British one will be described by the word "shooting", and this rule will have almost no exceptions.
In view of the above, the only (and effective!) Answer can only be the “Physicist”. The statements of some “specialists” about “high-speed underwater missiles” (SPR) as “effective weapons in the Arctic” are engaged and have no serious grounds. The main thing is that the effective distances of the enemy with torpedoes far exceed the theoretically achievable maximum distances of the “new squalls”. Those. the enemy can shoot us with impunity from a safe distance (where it cannot be reached even by the “new“ squall ”). The first and last time, when this sensitive issue was discussed publicly, was at the round table on torpedoes on the forum "Army-2015». There were no objections to the arguments of the author in terms of the ratio of shooting distances (torpedoes have much more than the SPR) for the chief designer of the SPR who was present.
The problem of "data entry"
In the same place, on “Army-2015”, the representatives of the Navy expressed an extremely controversial thesis: “let the old ships live with the old torpedoes”. I emphasize that this was announced a year and a half after the sharp exacerbation of the military-political situation in 2014!
In general, the very division of ships into "old" and "new" is nonsense. A ship is a combat unit, while it is in service, it must be combat-ready and undergo timely upgrades. There is no sound logic behind this statement.
The real reason is “the problem of entering data into new torpedoes on old carriers”, more precisely, simply “wild” financial requests from the CIAS developer - Morinformsystem-Agat concern and SPBM Malachite (as the head organization for torpedo complexes) to pay for these works . It comes to amounts in three-digit terms (in millions of rubles). And this is only a "refinement" and "registration". The cost of the new CICS is billions. It is absolutely abnormal when in the procurement for the modernization of the “Irkutsk” APCR, the cost of a new CICS is almost equal to the cost of a new hydroacoustic complex.
At the same time, “our CUIs” are not Western ASBUs, which are actually “smart superstructures” over sonar facilities, and the processing of tactical information and the use of weapons is carried out by them not only at the “geometrical level” (as in our CES), but also “ signal ". Against this background, all Russian PIUS PLs are simply “rudimentary”, and their extremely high cost is apparently due to the fact that “someone really wants fat budget financing.” And for the sake of these "willing", we were "strangled" by all the developments of small-sized devices for data entry into weapons and the "mini-BIUS". For the situation itself when a small-sized device for extremely small money makes the main part of the work of a huge and extremely expensive CICS (calculation of firing data and their input) raises questions. And this is not some kind of "initiative". For example, the data entry module, in one of the designed PDFs, is identical with the data entry module of the CICS on the St. Petersburg submarine (providing, among other things, torpedo telecontrol). And such examples can be continued.
The author of this article in the fleet was working out (together with interested representatives of central bodies and organizations) the questions of “tapping” new modules and the PDF in the standard firing systems on the serial Navy ship. All this was absolutely real, did not require significant funds, but in the end it ended in nothing. To the leadership of some defense companies, this turned out to be “extremely unnecessary” (for huge new CEMPs mean corresponding revenues for them), and they managed to “convey” this opinion to the command of the Navy.
For comparison: having received two Tang type submarines (the same age as our 80 project) at the start of the 611, the Turkish Navy independently upgraded them, ensuring the use of new torpedoes (including the Mk48), by installing a “mini -BIUS »VATOS. In 1999, the same submarines received a more modern version - VATOS Mk2
Those. what the Turks did quickly and easily for themselves in the 80-x, the Russian Navy could not do. The command of the Navy did not have the courage to go against certain individuals in the military-industrial complex.
How can you not remember the general designer of non-nuclear submarines Kormilitsina Yu.N. About "distant 70-x - 80-x.":
Good question: Will there be an admiral in the fleet who is able to toughly put problematic issues before the military-industrial complex?
Given recent statements by Admiral Yevmenov about the “readiness” to accept already this year the problematic head orders of Yasen-M and Borey-A (without actually conducting all the necessary tests), this question seems to be extremely difficult for the Navy ...
Do I need to put such sharp "special questions" in the public media?
There is another aspect here: is it necessary to raise such sharp “special questions” in the public media? It depends on the situation, but in the one that we have today with the Russian Navy, when many critical problematic issues are “choking” and “lacquered”, when sometimes “antiques” are supplied to the armament under the guise of “new and promising VVST samples” (and without carrying out full-fledged tests), nothing remains. Our problems are not in “technology”, but “organizations”, - the reluctance to objectively assess the situation and make difficult, but necessary decisions.
Patriotism is not “lacquering” and hiding the “unpleasant truth”, but the ability to objectively see problems and conditions, to toughly pose and solve, incl. "Hard" questions of the country's defense.
A vivid example of this situation is the repeatedly mentioned article by Rear Admiral Lutsky about the problems of the anti-torpedo defense of our newest submarines!
The question was repeatedly raised at all levels ... However, the extremely expensive and inefficient "antiques", which Lutsky wrote about in the Sea Collection of 2010, are still being purchased by the Navy (it is in fresh tenders on the public procurement website)!
Torpedoes as a critical element of the NSNS combat stability
The question arises: maybe it’s all a trifle, airplanes are flying, boats from the pole are firing rockets, and then some strange torpedoes? ..
In one of the responses to publications on the "ice problems of our torpedoes", in a conversation with a Nation News correspondent, TASS military commentator V. Litovkin stated:
Or another example: an interview (on the same issue) to Izvestia, the head of the Bureau of Military-Political Analysis A. Mikhailov:
Moreover, in August 2013, having arrived with a report on torpedo weapons of the Navy to the Main Command of the Navy, the author was confronted with the “point of view” of the high-ranking officer of the Navy, who supervised the work of the special services of the Navy and shipbuilding:
Torpedoes (and naval underwater weapons) are not “something not very important,” this is the most critical and disastrous direction of the VVST of the Russian Federation, incl. essential for defense and strategic deterrence. The latter’s foundation is not the “range of flight and the number of SLBM warheads”, but the inevitability of a retaliatory strike, which is based on the combat strength of the NSNF (the most important part of which is naval underwater weapons and torpedoes).
Here, a question immediately arises as to the expediency for Russia of having a naval component of the SNF (NSNF). All means of the “triad” have their own disadvantages and advantages, and the reliability of deterrence is ensured by overcoming the shortcomings of some of the means of the advantages of others. The main problem of the ground and air units of the SNF is their vulnerability to the “disarming” nuclear strike. To parry this, we need to always have at least one, but guaranteed not tracked SSBN (which, of course, requires a certain grouping in the Navy).
But what's the point of having submarines that do not have the ability to protect themselves in the event of an enemy attack? What is the point in unarmed "submarine cruisers"? What will they do with the enemy?
It is necessary to clearly understand: in the medium term, no one will “fight with the battle” along the Northern Sea Route, land assault troops on the Novosibirsk Islands (respectively, working out such activities as deploying coastal SCRC there and shooting them, cause, to put it mildly, bewilderment).
The threats of Russia in Artik today emanate either from beneath the ice and water (US Navy and US Navy U.S. planes), or from the air (US Air Force).
And in the first case, reliable and effective torpedoes in ammunition - this is actually the opportunity to "own" their part of the Arctic, to reliably solve their tasks there (including the NSNF). Despite all the “vigorous” reports, this possibility is not present now, and “legal rights”, as historical experience shows, mean little against the “right of the strong”.
And the situation here is simple: either we will gain power to the underwater confrontation, or they will crush us. And the notorious insecurity of the fighting stability of the NSNS provokes the adversary to "solve problems" by force.
And the last, for my "opponents". According to the "professional attitude to work." There are two hard criteria: objectivity and the ability to select the most important from the secondary. And the attitude to the extremely important issue on the scale of all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (readiness for effective and successful use of torpedo weapons in the Arctic by the forces of the Navy) shows who is who, visually. This is not only the “duel score” of the submarines, it is the combat stability of not only the NSNF, but also all the SNFs.
And no matter how “trivial” the interested persons try to present the combat effectiveness of Russian torpedoes in the main theaters of military operations, in fact this trifle puts the effectiveness of our entire SNF into question.
Now.
• German - with torpedoes with contactless fuses of “gray wolves” Doenitz;
• American - with a set of problems in terms of reliability of torpedoes in combat conditions of US Navy submarines in World War II
These problems cost dearly both Kriegsmarine and the US Navy, so after the war, the US Navy was very tough on creating new torpedoes and conducting their tests. Under the conditions of the Cold War, which threatened to become “hot,” the US Naval Forces would not categorically want to obtain useless torpedoes (and other means of submarine warfare).
Unfortunately, we had a lot worse. The closure of objective information on the experience of using torpedoes in the Finnish, World War II and World War II led to the fact that we “did not notice” acute torpedo problems in their course and did not have an incentive for the similar US Navy to harshly raise questions to industry as a result and testing in "torpedo" R & D.
Torpedo attack PLA US Navy. Will there be something to answer and protect our submariners?
But now our torpedo scandal actually burst out. And it gives hope for the opening and the elimination of the serious problems of our sea underwater weapons.
Released to "MIC", "NVO", "Military Review" articles (and their “resonant coverage” in the online edition of "Tape") on the problems of combat readiness of the submarine forces of the North fleet (who had never carried out torpedo fire under ice with operating homing systems) caused a stormy reaction: in the media, society, the Ministry of Defense and government bodies (up to official requests: “sort it out and report”).
Earlier, official representatives of the Ministry of Defense stated that “everything is in order”, torpedo firing (“combat training exercises”) in the Arctic are “being conducted”.
Even more surprising is the statement that the Navy does not work out combat training exercises in the Arctic. Klimov probably does not bother with conventional monitoring news information on this subject.
Quote from the city of Volosatov, deputy head of the Information and Mass Communications Department of the Ministry of Defense ("MIC").
On the “readiness for 100% of all tasks” in the Arctic, the Commander of the Northern Fleet Admiral Evmenov repeatedly stated:
Our submarines are permanently present under the ice of the Arctic. For obvious reasons, we will not go into the details of this work, but I can say that ... the Northern Fleet has enormous experience in icebreaking and operating underwater and surface ships in arctic conditions
... The main evaluation criterion is the readiness of the ships and their crews to perform tasks in their main destination at sea. The fact that today the North Sea submariners are ready to perform all the tasks assigned to 100% I have no doubt ...
We also closely monitor the activities of our subarctic neighbors in this region. We draw conclusions and on the basis of them we improve our training.
... The main evaluation criterion is the readiness of the ships and their crews to perform tasks in their main destination at sea. The fact that today the North Sea submariners are ready to perform all the tasks assigned to 100% I have no doubt ...
We also closely monitor the activities of our subarctic neighbors in this region. We draw conclusions and on the basis of them we improve our training.
Admiral Evmenov at the 8 International Forum "Arctic". Photo redstar.ru
However, this problem (the complete absence of torpedo firing of the Russian Navy in ice conditions) actually exists, and statements by a number of people about the alleged lack of it are either related to the lack of objective information or their deliberate concealment.
However, if the IIMK Department (or other officials of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense) have something to say to this, then as they say, we will listen carefully. Since the announcement of Mr. Volosatov (January 29) about the availability of "official news on training combat training exercises in the Arctic" with the use of practical torpedo weapons by the Russian Navy, they did not find any such information and presented it. AND It will take a long time to “search” for it - up to the moment when such shooting will finally be carried out. Given the resonance of this issue both in society and in the military-political leadership, this is now only a matter of time.
There is a situation when publications in the media and public outcry on the acute problem of the country's defense have caused (there is no doubt that this will take place) the adoption of long overdue decisions - crucial for the country's defense.
Torpedoes No technical problems. Problems - in another
And here we can agree with the opinion of Rear Admiral, retired V.Ya. Dudko (voiced by him on this issue to FAN):
... until now, the shooting necessary for this was not really carried out, although the Americans do it all the time. But such proposals are prepared and, if necessary, can be implemented.
Yes, indeed, the proposals mentioned by Rear Admiral Dudko were prepared. There are some discrepancies among specialists according to their methodology, but this is normal, provided that the tests are carried out objectively (“consensus can only be at the cemetery”, and “the sea (the tests) will show who is“ more to the right ”).
Obviously, one of the key issues of our ice torpedo firing is the development of a qualitative test methodology, their objective conduct. And here it is not necessary to count on persons who have previously stained themselves with dubious methods of testing. "Will the fleet" Ichthyosaur "?
... a few years ago, the author of the article was asked about the "victorious reports" about the "testing" of the upgraded USET-80 equipment with a "stop target" - a small displacement torpedo with a "large" detection distance. However, a careful analysis of the "reports" showed that the "tests" were carried out in lake conditions of very small waves, in the conditions of a "cold" near-surface layer (with the formation of an acoustic "channel" with a significant positive sound propagation anomaly). Taking into account such "aquarium" test conditions (not related to the sea), the question already arises: why was the result so small?
Homeland should know their "heroes". The developer of programs and techniques of such “advanced” tests is the head of the torpedo department of the Central Research Institute of the Navy S.P. Voloshin. The same person is the developer of the TTZ at the Lomonos design and development works, which is closed due to the obviously impossible deadlines and requirements and the lack of a scientific and technical reserve for their implementation.
Homeland should know their "heroes". The developer of programs and techniques of such “advanced” tests is the head of the torpedo department of the Central Research Institute of the Navy S.P. Voloshin. The same person is the developer of the TTZ at the Lomonos design and development works, which is closed due to the obviously impossible deadlines and requirements and the lack of a scientific and technical reserve for their implementation.
More examples? Please: one of our traditional "tricks" with torpedo tests supposedly in "jamming" conditions is setting up hydroacoustic countermeasures (by the way, very expensive) "aside", so that they "do not interfere with torpedoes induced". Or application in such, if one may say so, tests, obviously ancient and absolutely ineffective CPAP, as MG-34 and GUI-1.
Yes, strictly speaking, the very fact of the absence of torpedo firing (with the included “heads”) in the Arctic speaks for itself!
With the tests of our torpedoes for a long time everything is very, very bad.
Comment on the site "MIC" article S. Zhandarova 10.02.2015 g.
... with all the "touching care" of Zhandarov about FOSS, he, being the representative of Concern IPO "Gidropribor" in Moscow, "forgot" to note the fact that weapons testing in the Arctic is not only not carried out, but the product was personally lobbied by him, "Limited combat capability" in the Arctic, without the necessary tests.
The point here is as follows.
The electric batteries of the copper-magnesium circuit, which are the main ones for the naval torpedoes, have never been tested for charging with cold water.
The values indicated in the technical specifications are not even “theoretical”, but are actually borrowed from silver-magnesium batteries (where the “cold-cocking” is ok). There are good reasons to believe that the “cold water” (the figures in the documents are given) simply will not cause the battery to start and start, i.e. the torpedo will be absolutely unfit. The reason for such a scandalous situation: the USSR defense complex, unable to provide supplies of silver-magnesium batteries for new generation torpedoes of 3 submarines due to a lack of silver, replaced it with copper at the beginning of 80's. "Questions" in this case arose, incl. and “cold water”, but those who asked them, turned out to be a powerful pressure. Opening the situation with copper-magnesium batteries for the military-industrial complex would collapse a series of torpedoes and raise tough questions for the Navy and the Ministry of Defense both on the ammunition load of submarines and on compliance with the positions held by those who allowed it all.
Considering the fact that today's "chief torpedo adviser" of the commander-in-chief of the Navy Korolev, Vice-Admiral Shevchenko (aka "part-time" and "Chief Arctic Admiral"), has long been the main opponent of the "Physicist" torpedo, promoting not just obsolete products with extremely low TTH (for example, "Kant"), and including not ensuring reliable use in the Arctic, it is necessary to talk about all this, openly and publicly. For the reports of Mr. Shevchenko in the “high offices”, to put it mildly, are not different in objectivity.
Retired Vice Admiral A.I.
It is to them that “information” is distributed, for example, about the supposedly exceptional toxicity of the “Physics” unitary fuel.
According to the actual situation, they spoke exhaustively. leading specialists of JSC Morteplotekhnika V. F. Gurov and Yu. I. Sannikov:
The opinion that exists in some Navy circles about the high toxicity of the fuel is extremely exaggerated. During the operation of torpedoes, naval personnel may face the problem of fuel toxicity only in an emergency situation during depressurization of the fuel tank. It should be noted that during 40 years of fuel handling in the Scientific Research Institute of Marine Engineering, there was not a single case of occupational disease or poisoning, despite repeated direct contact with the fuel. US torpedo weapons using Otto-Fuel II fuel are used in dozens of countries around the world on all continents.
Practical torpedoes Mk48 and children in the torpedo compartment of the submarine. Unlike our torpedoes, in Mk48 the fuel is not encapsulated, and the torpedoes themselves in the photo have traces of intense exploitation (shooting)
The fact of the low toxicity of unitary fuel is confirmed by the memories of S. I. Berdichsky in the third volume of the book “Central Research Institute“ Gidropribor ”and its people” with a description of “terry” security breaches for handling unitary fuel. For example, he repeatedly, without being able to even wash himself, walked for several days, drenched in the "working off" of oil and fuel after the maintenance of a torpedo from the sea. However, there were no serious health consequences for S. I. Berdichesky.
In the end, the author of this article, dealing with the topic of unitary fuel, found it necessary to check it on himself, which Shevchenko personally reported on as early as 2012. what Shevchenko did and does is not “bona fide error” (for objective information was provided to him more than once), but a very specific “interest”.
Well, according to the “PR” of Shevchenko as “an outstanding but underestimated naval commander” (including the search operation “Atrin”), it is appropriate to quote the commander of the multipurpose PL-A K-244 (participant of the “Atrin”), Captain 1 retired rank V. Alikov:
The mistakes of the leadership of the PPO "Atrina" in the preparation and in the process of the march predetermined the loss of the stealth of the boats.
Testing of joint actions of submarines in tactical groups was carried out "in a general" manner, regardless of the composition of the groups that were assigned to conduct search operations, and not with the commanders of those tactical groups. Such working off was of a formal nature, since it did not ensure the formation of mutual understanding of specific people, and even ruled out the possibility of remembering the acoustic portraits of those boats with which they were to “catch” the enemy.
The submarines could not cooperate in the operation either among themselves or with other RPLS forces involved in participation in Atrin, because the preparation for engagement was not carried out.
... the situation in which the preparation for Atrin was going on characterizes the episode, ... by the commander of the divisional division Shevchenko, with cavalry and provocations, including those in public, the commander was brought to the point that he promised to shoot him.
Testing of joint actions of submarines in tactical groups was carried out "in a general" manner, regardless of the composition of the groups that were assigned to conduct search operations, and not with the commanders of those tactical groups. Such working off was of a formal nature, since it did not ensure the formation of mutual understanding of specific people, and even ruled out the possibility of remembering the acoustic portraits of those boats with which they were to “catch” the enemy.
The submarines could not cooperate in the operation either among themselves or with other RPLS forces involved in participation in Atrin, because the preparation for engagement was not carried out.
... the situation in which the preparation for Atrin was going on characterizes the episode, ... by the commander of the divisional division Shevchenko, with cavalry and provocations, including those in public, the commander was brought to the point that he promised to shoot him.
16 October 2018 G. in the newspaper "MIC" Shevchenko was publicly asked questions and suggestions to publicly explain his actions on a number of issues, including
4. Lobbying instead of “Physics” of another torpedo, with TTX is much worse than that of the Mk48 mod.1 (1971 year), that is, the advancement of the backwardness of the naval weapon of the Navy from the world level that is notorious in 30 – 40.
5. Exceptions to conduct the necessary tests of this torpedo with reasonable doubts about its combat capability in the Arctic ...
5. Exceptions to conduct the necessary tests of this torpedo with reasonable doubts about its combat capability in the Arctic ...
Here a question may arise regarding the position of the author on the torpedo “Physicist” (especially since earlier in a number of documents he considered the execution of such shooting by a number of other torpedo samples). The point here is simple: a torpedo with a long range (no less than the effective range of the enemy's torpedoes), which has a good noise-tolerant digital homing and remote control system, is needed under the ice. So today we have one: "Physicist-1" (with all its advantages and disadvantages).
At the same time, there are problems with “Physics”, and serious (especially with respect to simply antique telecontrol (with a towed bobbin reel), corresponding to the western level of the 60-s of the last century). But their elimination is not just realistic, we simply have no right to other options, because the price of the issue is the combat capability of the submarine forces of the Navy and the combat stability of the NSNF (more on this in detail below).
According to official statements of the Navy and the Ministry of Defense, following the results of combat training for 2018, there was not a single prize from the commander in chief by the torpedo “Physicist-1”. Taking into account the fact that the “Physicist” has the highest performance characteristics of all domestic torpedoes, a logical conclusion follows that there are very serious problems with the development of this torpedo in the fleet.
There is nothing surprising in this, and the reasons for this have long been called.
I am sure that the first shooting under the ice will turn out to be largely a failure. And this is an objective fact. Do not worry: a tough and decisive elimination of the identified deficiencies, and again shooting. More disadvantages? Again, their removal and shooting. And the task will be solved, because, I repeat, there are no technical problems, everything is within our reach and can be solved. The question is exclusively in the tough formulation of the question (just as it was done earlier with the “Polyment-Redut” AAMS).
Our submarines must have reliable and effective torpedo weapons and be able to use them in all conditions of the situation (including under the ice)!
At the same time, it is highly advisable to modernize the torpedo “Physicist-1” (previously manufactured products) with the introduction of modern remote control and a number of other issues (set out in non-public documents).
Yes, a number of “respected” organizations of the military-industrial complex (first of all, SPBM Malakhit) will state this: “Excellent! Please give us the OCD of billions on 5 and the year 3-4 for “work” (actually “mastering” this funding).
And the officials of the Ministry of Defense in DOGOZ will say: “Well, we“ planned ”it. Starting work around 2023. ”
No, gentlemen! In mind and conscience, you had to do everything “yesterday”! Including in the framework of the ROC "Case". Today, taking into account the importance of these works, a decision on their conduct can and should be formalized according to the results of the first firing, and the work itself is not carried out within the framework of the new development project (there is simply no time for this, it had to be done “yesterday and immediately”), but in the order of 307 GOST (“product revision”), taking into account the existing (previously created) reserve, in particular, on the hose STU delivered to the beginning of the 2000-x to the customer (with the torpedo 211ТТ1), and the fiber-optic STU “Steering wheel” with characteristics at the level of the best foreign samples (2005 g.).
Hose reel and torpedo telecontrol system 211ТТ1 and its application
Some of the material and documentary results of the ROC "Shturval"
Towed bathysphere equipment "Pipe". Atlantic, the end of 80's
The author and a number of experts repeatedly raised the issue of using a number of results from the research work "Pipe" (AKIN, Frolov DP) in the "new" Physics. These are not “theories” but quite concrete practical breakthrough results obtained in the sea (the Atlantic Ocean) on real submarines. The implementation of these proposals in “Physics” provides not just a multiple increase in its efficiency, but a real possibility of winning “underwater duels” from the newest “Virginia”, even the old RPLN “Ryazan” (project 667BDR) (with the “new Physicists” and anti-torpedoes). I will emphasize: several leading developers on “Physics” came out of the “Frolov Group”, knew the results obtained by him, and repeatedly raised the question of their use in “Physics” and “Case”.
The fact that this question, despite repeated appeals in a “closed format”, has to be put publicly, eloquently shows “interest” (in quotes) in this on the part of Navy officials. During all this time, no one bothered to even raise the test materials and read!
The chief designer of "Physics" Mr. Grigoriev should not give interviews to various resources (and with obviously unreliable information), but be engaged in eliminating the shortcomings of his torpedo. At the moment, Mr. Grigoriev has no reason for self-praying in the media; there is nothing good in “Physics” - the merit of his predecessors.
The most widely used torpedo in the Navy, USET-80, does not have remote control, and its self-homing systems (two variants: Waterfall and Ceramics) are not just outdated. Everything is much worse. Primary for USET-80 since its “birth”, the powerful low-frequency SSN “Waterfall” has extremely low noise immunity and is practically inoperable in ice conditions.
In 1989, due to the extremely low noise immunity of “Waterfall” at shallow depths, USET-80 received a low-frequency medium-range CLE “Ceramics” (literally from the developer’s book: “reproduced on a national basis” with the USN torpedoes Mk46mod.1, 1961 g.) that, in fact, is a shameful page of domestic torpedo building.
USET-80 torpedoes with SSN "Waterfall" and "Ceramics" on racks in the torpedo compartment of the APRK 949A project. Photo: magazine MO "Orientir"
Until now, the Ceramics SSN, despite its extremely low TTX, is the most common naval SSN torpedoes.
The use of USET-80 with "Ceramics" in ice conditions is possible with very significant restrictions, and at minimal ("pistol") distances, despite the fact that the positions of enemy torpedoes are almost an order of magnitude higher than ours (TTX torpedoes are simply incomparable). Figuratively speaking, the enemy has a sniper rifle against our pistol, and this is in terms of its significant lead in detection!
In such a situation, the clash of a Russian nuclear submarine with an American or British one will be described by the word "shooting", and this rule will have almost no exceptions.
In view of the above, the only (and effective!) Answer can only be the “Physicist”. The statements of some “specialists” about “high-speed underwater missiles” (SPR) as “effective weapons in the Arctic” are engaged and have no serious grounds. The main thing is that the effective distances of the enemy with torpedoes far exceed the theoretically achievable maximum distances of the “new squalls”. Those. the enemy can shoot us with impunity from a safe distance (where it cannot be reached even by the “new“ squall ”). The first and last time, when this sensitive issue was discussed publicly, was at the round table on torpedoes on the forum "Army-2015». There were no objections to the arguments of the author in terms of the ratio of shooting distances (torpedoes have much more than the SPR) for the chief designer of the SPR who was present.
The problem of "data entry"
In the same place, on “Army-2015”, the representatives of the Navy expressed an extremely controversial thesis: “let the old ships live with the old torpedoes”. I emphasize that this was announced a year and a half after the sharp exacerbation of the military-political situation in 2014!
In general, the very division of ships into "old" and "new" is nonsense. A ship is a combat unit, while it is in service, it must be combat-ready and undergo timely upgrades. There is no sound logic behind this statement.
The real reason is “the problem of entering data into new torpedoes on old carriers”, more precisely, simply “wild” financial requests from the CIAS developer - Morinformsystem-Agat concern and SPBM Malachite (as the head organization for torpedo complexes) to pay for these works . It comes to amounts in three-digit terms (in millions of rubles). And this is only a "refinement" and "registration". The cost of the new CICS is billions. It is absolutely abnormal when in the procurement for the modernization of the “Irkutsk” APCR, the cost of a new CICS is almost equal to the cost of a new hydroacoustic complex.
At the same time, “our CUIs” are not Western ASBUs, which are actually “smart superstructures” over sonar facilities, and the processing of tactical information and the use of weapons is carried out by them not only at the “geometrical level” (as in our CES), but also “ signal ". Against this background, all Russian PIUS PLs are simply “rudimentary”, and their extremely high cost is apparently due to the fact that “someone really wants fat budget financing.” And for the sake of these "willing", we were "strangled" by all the developments of small-sized devices for data entry into weapons and the "mini-BIUS". For the situation itself when a small-sized device for extremely small money makes the main part of the work of a huge and extremely expensive CICS (calculation of firing data and their input) raises questions. And this is not some kind of "initiative". For example, the data entry module, in one of the designed PDFs, is identical with the data entry module of the CICS on the St. Petersburg submarine (providing, among other things, torpedo telecontrol). And such examples can be continued.
Backup data entry devices
The author of this article in the fleet was working out (together with interested representatives of central bodies and organizations) the questions of “tapping” new modules and the PDF in the standard firing systems on the serial Navy ship. All this was absolutely real, did not require significant funds, but in the end it ended in nothing. To the leadership of some defense companies, this turned out to be “extremely unnecessary” (for huge new CEMPs mean corresponding revenues for them), and they managed to “convey” this opinion to the command of the Navy.
For comparison: having received two Tang type submarines (the same age as our 80 project) at the start of the 611, the Turkish Navy independently upgraded them, ensuring the use of new torpedoes (including the Mk48), by installing a “mini -BIUS »VATOS. In 1999, the same submarines received a more modern version - VATOS Mk2
Mini-BIUS VATOS Mk2 (1999) Photo: http://turkishnavy.net
Those. what the Turks did quickly and easily for themselves in the 80-x, the Russian Navy could not do. The command of the Navy did not have the courage to go against certain individuals in the military-industrial complex.
How can you not remember the general designer of non-nuclear submarines Kormilitsina Yu.N. About "distant 70-x - 80-x.":
My reports to the board of the Ministry of Industry and Industry on the fact that the Knot Kiosk consists only of 2-3 racks, and the number of tasks to be solved corresponds to the systems of other developers that are enormous in size and power consumption, provoked vigorous resistance in those years to the Ministry and the headquarters of the shipbuilding industry. The fact is that the introduction of the Uzus “CUSS” led to a drastic reduction in the consumption of financial and labor resources ... the “self-sublimation” of the CICS, acoustic and navigation systems led to the creation of 3 and 4 mastodons, which were inferior in quality to the ships of a potential enemy, and unjustified costs.
Good question: Will there be an admiral in the fleet who is able to toughly put problematic issues before the military-industrial complex?
Given recent statements by Admiral Yevmenov about the “readiness” to accept already this year the problematic head orders of Yasen-M and Borey-A (without actually conducting all the necessary tests), this question seems to be extremely difficult for the Navy ...
Do I need to put such sharp "special questions" in the public media?
There is another aspect here: is it necessary to raise such sharp “special questions” in the public media? It depends on the situation, but in the one that we have today with the Russian Navy, when many critical problematic issues are “choking” and “lacquered”, when sometimes “antiques” are supplied to the armament under the guise of “new and promising VVST samples” (and without carrying out full-fledged tests), nothing remains. Our problems are not in “technology”, but “organizations”, - the reluctance to objectively assess the situation and make difficult, but necessary decisions.
Patriotism is not “lacquering” and hiding the “unpleasant truth”, but the ability to objectively see problems and conditions, to toughly pose and solve, incl. "Hard" questions of the country's defense.
A vivid example of this situation is the repeatedly mentioned article by Rear Admiral Lutsky about the problems of the anti-torpedo defense of our newest submarines!
... Subscriber projects "Ash" and "Borey" under construction are proposed to be equipped with PTZ systems, the development specifications of which were compiled in 80-s of the last century, the results of studies of the effectiveness of these tools against modern torpedoes testify to the exceptionally low probability of non-damaging submarine submarines.
The question was repeatedly raised at all levels ... However, the extremely expensive and inefficient "antiques", which Lutsky wrote about in the Sea Collection of 2010, are still being purchased by the Navy (it is in fresh tenders on the public procurement website)!
Torpedoes as a critical element of the NSNS combat stability
The question arises: maybe it’s all a trifle, airplanes are flying, boats from the pole are firing rockets, and then some strange torpedoes? ..
In one of the responses to publications on the "ice problems of our torpedoes", in a conversation with a Nation News correspondent, TASS military commentator V. Litovkin stated:
military forces need to be assessed together. For example, the Russian Navy has strategic missile forces ... no one can say that the Russian side is weaker than America ... we are inferior to the United States in some parameters, but at the same time they are retreating through air defense and missile defense systems. Russia is much stronger in the ground forces. You can pull out certain facts, but you need to be able to rise above the details and see the big picture, but she says that we are at least the second, if not the first military power of the world.
Or another example: an interview (on the same issue) to Izvestia, the head of the Bureau of Military-Political Analysis A. Mikhailov:
To argue about the combat effectiveness of the most powerful Russian fleet - the Northern - from the point of view of conducting training firing of a particular type of weapon, including the author’s publication of torpedoes “Physicist-1”, at least unprofessionally
... during 2018, the Northern Fleet conducted a series of exercises and firing involving missile cruisers, nuclear submarines, anti-submarine and other warships with firing cruise missiles, as well as sea aviation and air defense and coast guard units. The conducted exercises in practice confirm Russia's military control over the Arctic space.
... during 2018, the Northern Fleet conducted a series of exercises and firing involving missile cruisers, nuclear submarines, anti-submarine and other warships with firing cruise missiles, as well as sea aviation and air defense and coast guard units. The conducted exercises in practice confirm Russia's military control over the Arctic space.
Moreover, in August 2013, having arrived with a report on torpedo weapons of the Navy to the Main Command of the Navy, the author was confronted with the “point of view” of the high-ranking officer of the Navy, who supervised the work of the special services of the Navy and shipbuilding:
I do not care [another (obscene) expression was used] on your torpedoes, my “Bulava” does not fly !!!
Torpedoes (and naval underwater weapons) are not “something not very important,” this is the most critical and disastrous direction of the VVST of the Russian Federation, incl. essential for defense and strategic deterrence. The latter’s foundation is not the “range of flight and the number of SLBM warheads”, but the inevitability of a retaliatory strike, which is based on the combat strength of the NSNF (the most important part of which is naval underwater weapons and torpedoes).
Here, a question immediately arises as to the expediency for Russia of having a naval component of the SNF (NSNF). All means of the “triad” have their own disadvantages and advantages, and the reliability of deterrence is ensured by overcoming the shortcomings of some of the means of the advantages of others. The main problem of the ground and air units of the SNF is their vulnerability to the “disarming” nuclear strike. To parry this, we need to always have at least one, but guaranteed not tracked SSBN (which, of course, requires a certain grouping in the Navy).
But what's the point of having submarines that do not have the ability to protect themselves in the event of an enemy attack? What is the point in unarmed "submarine cruisers"? What will they do with the enemy?
It is necessary to clearly understand: in the medium term, no one will “fight with the battle” along the Northern Sea Route, land assault troops on the Novosibirsk Islands (respectively, working out such activities as deploying coastal SCRC there and shooting them, cause, to put it mildly, bewilderment).
The threats of Russia in Artik today emanate either from beneath the ice and water (US Navy and US Navy U.S. planes), or from the air (US Air Force).
And in the first case, reliable and effective torpedoes in ammunition - this is actually the opportunity to "own" their part of the Arctic, to reliably solve their tasks there (including the NSNF). Despite all the “vigorous” reports, this possibility is not present now, and “legal rights”, as historical experience shows, mean little against the “right of the strong”.
And the situation here is simple: either we will gain power to the underwater confrontation, or they will crush us. And the notorious insecurity of the fighting stability of the NSNS provokes the adversary to "solve problems" by force.
And the last, for my "opponents". According to the "professional attitude to work." There are two hard criteria: objectivity and the ability to select the most important from the secondary. And the attitude to the extremely important issue on the scale of all the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (readiness for effective and successful use of torpedo weapons in the Arctic by the forces of the Navy) shows who is who, visually. This is not only the “duel score” of the submarines, it is the combat stability of not only the NSNF, but also all the SNFs.
And no matter how “trivial” the interested persons try to present the combat effectiveness of Russian torpedoes in the main theaters of military operations, in fact this trifle puts the effectiveness of our entire SNF into question.
Now.
Information