Modernization of Soviet battleships: anti-mine caliber and torpedoes
Continue history interwar upgrades of battleships of the “Sevastopol” type: let's talk about the mid-caliber artillery and the mine armament of these warships.
At the beginning of the service was presented 16 * 120-mm guns arr. 1907 with a barrel length of 50 calibers. The history of their appearance in the Russian imperial navy this: initially it was a 120 mm / 50 Vickers gun arr. 1905, which the British installed on the armored cruiser Rurik II ordered for them for our fleet. Our admirals liked the gun, so that subsequently their production was established at the Obukhov plant: here they were considered the “model of 1907”.
These guns, mounted on battleships of the “Sevastopol” type, were equipped ... here there is some ambiguity, because 2 of projectile type existed for the specified guns, both were of the 1911 sample. high-explosive, oddly enough, had a slightly larger mass (28,97 kg), but a smaller content of explosives - only 3,73 kg. Both projectiles had an initial speed of 29 m / s. The firing range at the maximum angle of elevation 3,16-mm / 792,5 guns arr. 120 g., Comprising 50 grad., Reached 1907 cable, the rate of fire - about 20 rds. min The relatively modest value of the rate of fire is associated with separate loading, which, moreover, was also a cap type, which, perhaps, should be recognized as the only significant drawback of this artillery system. Separate loading was quite justified, but, in an amicable way, it should be made separate-sleeve. On the other hand, this deficiency was largely leveled by the location of the guns in armored casemates, and the use of liners would add weight to the ship’s artillery weapons.
Ammunition originally made 250 shots on the barrel, but was later increased to 300 vyst.
Fire control 120-mm / 50 guns was carried out using the fire control system "Geisler and K" arr. 1910 d. As far as the author could understand, the centralized fire control system, consisting of Erickson, Pollan and Heusler devices, could well be involved in the "work" of the 120-mm guns if the main caliber was not used. But in that case, when Poln's PUS and so on. 305-mm guns were involved in firing, for the 120-mm guns only “Geisler and K” remained, the capabilities of which were described in detail in the previous article. But there were no separate rangefinders to ensure the fire of 120-mm / 50 guns. For everything about all the battleships "Sevastopol" had only two range finders with 6-meter base, located on the fore and aft superstructures, and which were also to ensure the work of the main caliber of these ships.
Mine caliber artillery was positioned so that in any sector (120-130 degrees) it would be possible to fire at least four barrels. The need to maximally clear the upper deck led to the fact that the casemates were located along the sides, the height of which above sea level and so did not strike the imagination, as a result of which the tools were flooded with water. However, this deficiency was in one degree or another peculiar to all dreadnoughts of the first generations, and otherwise on the 1914 of the PMK "Sevastopol" fully responded to its purpose.
As for the material part of the guns themselves, no changes have occurred here - until the very end of the service of the 120-mm / 50 guns were not subjected to modernization. But their number was reduced on the Marat to 14, and on the October Revolution - even to 10 units, so that the original 16 guns remained only on the Paris Commune. Such a reduction was caused, first of all, by the need to store ammunition for anti-aircraft artillery somewhere, and the cellars of 120-mm projectiles for this purpose were perfectly suited. As a result, the “Marat” lost two fodder 120-mm guns, and “the October Revolution, in addition to this, four more such guns in the central part of the ship. If you look at Sevastopol-type battleships from the side, their anti-mine artillery turned out to be a group of 4 guns assembled in 2, so on the October Revolution there were two central groups and they lost one barrel (located towards the stern of the battleship).
As for the ammunition, the Soviet battleships were armed with lighter, 26,3 kg projectile arr. 1928 g. Their advantage was an increased initial speed, reaching 825 m / s, and possibly better aerodynamic quality, thanks to which the firing range was increased from 76 to almost 92 cables. However, the price for this was a significant reduction in the explosive content of the projectile — from the 3,16-3,73 to just up to 1,87 kg.
Somewhat more modernization awaited the fire control system. Sometimes the author of this article had to come across the opinion that the mine caliber of all three Soviet battleships received a new Casemate test model, either 1928 or 1929. On the other hand, A. Vasilyev, in his monographs, reports that Casemate was installed only on the "October Revolution", while AV Platonov in general for all three battleships indicates the Geisler system, but for some reason different years of release.
Apparently, this was the case. On the battleship "Marat" PUS mine caliber remained unchanged, that is all the same "Geisler and K" arr. 1911
At the October Revolution, these PUS were modernized, and the improved version of the Geisler and K was called the Casemate, although it may have been a separate system. As for the Paris Commune, on it the process of improving the mine action caliber went along the path of improving the Geisler and K, including with the addition of new equipment, such as, for example, devices for synchronous data transmission of the central tip of the TsN-29. And, probably, it would not be a mistake to assume that the Paris Commune received the best anti-mine caliber PUS, and they were the worst on the Marat. Unfortunately, the author did not find at least some detailed information about what additional features the upgraded PUS had.
Approximately the same thing happened with range finders. A big advantage over the pre-revolutionary LMS was the appearance on the battleships of quite numerous additional rangefinders for controlling the fire of the main, anti-mine and anti-aircraft caliber. About КДП, serving the main caliber, it was told in the previous article. As for the mine ...
On the battleship "Marat" was established six open-range rangefinders with a three-meter base DM-3 and two more DM-1,5 - with a half meter base.
The "October Revolution" received ... Alas, this is not a weak confusion here. According to A.V. Platonov on the battleship was installed two open-range rangefinders with a four-meter base DM-4, five DM-3 and two DM-1,5. But A. Vasilyev believes that the battleship received not two, but as many as four, and not just an open four-meter rangefinder, but full-fledged command-range stations KDP2-4. And here, apparently, there are inaccuracies of both respected authors.
The fact is that KDP-4, but not 4, as A. Vasiliev wrote, but only 2 are clearly visible in the photographs and drawings of the October Revolution.
Thus, it should be assumed error A.V. Platonov, who correctly indicated the number (2), but incorrectly - the type of instrument, because in fact it was the KDP-4 that was installed on the battleship, and not the open DM-4. At the same time, A. Vasiliev, having correctly indicated the KDP-4, made a mistake in their number.
Well, the Parisian Commune battleship, which, in addition to the two DM-3 and five DM-1,5, which were openly located, had as many as four KDP-4 command-range points, was predictably in the best position. However, some mysteries remain here.
The fact is that in the USSR there were several KDP-4. The simplest of them, the KDP-4 (B-12), had one 4-meter rangefinder DM-4, a stereo-tube CT-3, a center-view siren of the EP, and also two telescopic tubes of post directors. The walls and roof of the KDP were protected by 5 mm by armor plates, the weight of the KDP was 6,5 tons, and the 5 was serviced by a man, not counting the fire manager.
But, besides the above described KDP-4 (B-12), there were more advanced modifications, such as KDP2-4 (B-12-4), and further. They had not one, but two rangefinders with a base 4 m, as well as a slightly different composition of other equipment: the CT-3 stereo tube was missing on them, the center view sighting was different (VNC-2, although it is possible that the VIC-4) , the walls and the roof had a thickness of only 2 mm, but the number of staff increased to 8 people. Apparently, due to the thinner walls, the mass of the KDP remained the same, that is, 6,5 t. So, unfortunately, it is not entirely clear what type of KDP was installed on the Paris Commune: some sources give KDP-4, but for example , A. Vasilyev asserts that after all KDP2-4, but at the same time he does not bring B-12-4, but B-12!
In the opinion of the author of this article, the situation was as follows. Two KDP-4 (B-12) with one range finder and stereo tube CT-3 were installed at the "October Revolution". And on the Paris Commune, four KDP2-4 (B-12-4), or even a later version, were installed. Of course, this is just an opinion, supported by the study of photographs and schemes of ships, and there is the likelihood of error.
Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the presence of as many as four command-range posts, equipped with two (and even one!) Four-meter rangefinder each, gave the Paris Commune a great advantage over Marat and a significant advantage over The October Revolution. After all, the KDP-4, of course, could be used to ensure the firing of the main caliber, both in the event of a failure of the KDP-6, and together with them.
Further, the author should describe the anti-aircraft armament of Soviet battleships, but this is a fairly large topic worthy of a separate article. Therefore, we leave it for a separate material and proceed to the torpedo arms Marat, the October Revolution and the Paris Commune.
In addition to artillery, “Sevastopol” type battleships also received “self-propelled mines”: four torpedo tubes with ammunition in 12 torpedoes were deployed in the bow of the ships. Of course, their presence on dreadnoughts was an anachronism and was a waste of payload - however, in the period before the First World War, according to all tactical views, they were considered necessary. Torpedo tubes were installed on all the battleships and battlecruisers of Great Britain and Germany, so their presence on ships built into 1909 was, so to say, “inevitable evil”, the same as the ram on the battleships of the Russian-Japanese era .
However, it should be noted that the Russian Empire was somewhat lagging behind in the torpedo against the leading naval powers. While the latter switched to 533-mm caliber and more, the Russian navy was forced to be content with only 450-mm torpedoes. And so, during the First World War, the same British fleet was armed with an 533-mm torpedo carrying 234 kg of trinitrotoluene to a distance of just over 4 km (4 110 m) on 45 bonds, and the best domestic 450-mm torpedo arr. 1912 could hit the target 100 kg TNT at speed 43 knots at a distance of no more than 2 km. The English torpedo had a long-range mode - it could go 9 830 m at speed 31 knots. Domestic ammunition had two such modes - 5 000 m on 30 knots. or 6 000 m to 28 knots. In other words, it is possible to say that the small caliber of the domestic torpedo weapon led to the fact that in power and range it lost approximately 533-mm "compatriots" approximately twice.
Thus, it can be said that during the period between the two world wars, torpedoes of battleships of the Sevastopol type finally lost even their theoretical combat significance (they never had any practical). At the same time, as mentioned above, the leadership of the Red Forces Naval Forces clearly understood the need to strengthen the combat potential of battleships of this type. Obviously, this kind of modernization had to lead to significant overloads and the loss of speed, which was associated with them, and the latter was considered the most important tactical advantage of Sevastopol. And, it would seem, the removal of completely useless torpedo armament suggests itself - this also reduces overload, and the release of the interior, but at least under the same cellar for anti-aircraft ammunition. In addition, the need for a sharp increase in anti-aircraft weapons required an increase in crew size and additional space for their calculations. It is obvious that the "write-off" of the torpedoes of the battleships would allow freeing up at least a little space in the cockpits and cabins.
However, oddly enough, nothing of the kind was done. Of the three battleships, only the "Paris Commune" lost torpedo armament during upgrades - and even then, there is a persistent feeling that this was not done for the reasons mentioned above, but only because of the installation of the so-called "blisters" (boules), to shoot through which torpedoes would be too difficult. As for the "Marat" and the "October Revolution", the torpedo armament on them was not only fully preserved, but also improved by installing modern at that time torpedo firing controls "MAK". And all this was done for a reason, because the torpedoes of the battleships constantly improved their combat skills. So, in the period from 1927 to 1939, that is, 12 torpedo launches were made from the Marat battleship in 87 years, while 7 torpedoes were lost.
How were the Soviet admirals going to lead battleships like "Sevastopol" into dashing torpedo attacks, and against whom? For the time being these questions remain for the author the most complete riddle.
To be continued ...
Mine caliber: what was
At the beginning of the service was presented 16 * 120-mm guns arr. 1907 with a barrel length of 50 calibers. The history of their appearance in the Russian imperial navy this: initially it was a 120 mm / 50 Vickers gun arr. 1905, which the British installed on the armored cruiser Rurik II ordered for them for our fleet. Our admirals liked the gun, so that subsequently their production was established at the Obukhov plant: here they were considered the “model of 1907”.
These guns, mounted on battleships of the “Sevastopol” type, were equipped ... here there is some ambiguity, because 2 of projectile type existed for the specified guns, both were of the 1911 sample. high-explosive, oddly enough, had a slightly larger mass (28,97 kg), but a smaller content of explosives - only 3,73 kg. Both projectiles had an initial speed of 29 m / s. The firing range at the maximum angle of elevation 3,16-mm / 792,5 guns arr. 120 g., Comprising 50 grad., Reached 1907 cable, the rate of fire - about 20 rds. min The relatively modest value of the rate of fire is associated with separate loading, which, moreover, was also a cap type, which, perhaps, should be recognized as the only significant drawback of this artillery system. Separate loading was quite justified, but, in an amicable way, it should be made separate-sleeve. On the other hand, this deficiency was largely leveled by the location of the guns in armored casemates, and the use of liners would add weight to the ship’s artillery weapons.
Ammunition originally made 250 shots on the barrel, but was later increased to 300 vyst.
Fire control 120-mm / 50 guns was carried out using the fire control system "Geisler and K" arr. 1910 d. As far as the author could understand, the centralized fire control system, consisting of Erickson, Pollan and Heusler devices, could well be involved in the "work" of the 120-mm guns if the main caliber was not used. But in that case, when Poln's PUS and so on. 305-mm guns were involved in firing, for the 120-mm guns only “Geisler and K” remained, the capabilities of which were described in detail in the previous article. But there were no separate rangefinders to ensure the fire of 120-mm / 50 guns. For everything about all the battleships "Sevastopol" had only two range finders with 6-meter base, located on the fore and aft superstructures, and which were also to ensure the work of the main caliber of these ships.
Mine caliber artillery was positioned so that in any sector (120-130 degrees) it would be possible to fire at least four barrels. The need to maximally clear the upper deck led to the fact that the casemates were located along the sides, the height of which above sea level and so did not strike the imagination, as a result of which the tools were flooded with water. However, this deficiency was in one degree or another peculiar to all dreadnoughts of the first generations, and otherwise on the 1914 of the PMK "Sevastopol" fully responded to its purpose.
Mine caliber: what has become
As for the material part of the guns themselves, no changes have occurred here - until the very end of the service of the 120-mm / 50 guns were not subjected to modernization. But their number was reduced on the Marat to 14, and on the October Revolution - even to 10 units, so that the original 16 guns remained only on the Paris Commune. Such a reduction was caused, first of all, by the need to store ammunition for anti-aircraft artillery somewhere, and the cellars of 120-mm projectiles for this purpose were perfectly suited. As a result, the “Marat” lost two fodder 120-mm guns, and “the October Revolution, in addition to this, four more such guns in the central part of the ship. If you look at Sevastopol-type battleships from the side, their anti-mine artillery turned out to be a group of 4 guns assembled in 2, so on the October Revolution there were two central groups and they lost one barrel (located towards the stern of the battleship).
As for the ammunition, the Soviet battleships were armed with lighter, 26,3 kg projectile arr. 1928 g. Their advantage was an increased initial speed, reaching 825 m / s, and possibly better aerodynamic quality, thanks to which the firing range was increased from 76 to almost 92 cables. However, the price for this was a significant reduction in the explosive content of the projectile — from the 3,16-3,73 to just up to 1,87 kg.
Somewhat more modernization awaited the fire control system. Sometimes the author of this article had to come across the opinion that the mine caliber of all three Soviet battleships received a new Casemate test model, either 1928 or 1929. On the other hand, A. Vasilyev, in his monographs, reports that Casemate was installed only on the "October Revolution", while AV Platonov in general for all three battleships indicates the Geisler system, but for some reason different years of release.
Apparently, this was the case. On the battleship "Marat" PUS mine caliber remained unchanged, that is all the same "Geisler and K" arr. 1911
PMK battleship "Marat"
At the October Revolution, these PUS were modernized, and the improved version of the Geisler and K was called the Casemate, although it may have been a separate system. As for the Paris Commune, on it the process of improving the mine action caliber went along the path of improving the Geisler and K, including with the addition of new equipment, such as, for example, devices for synchronous data transmission of the central tip of the TsN-29. And, probably, it would not be a mistake to assume that the Paris Commune received the best anti-mine caliber PUS, and they were the worst on the Marat. Unfortunately, the author did not find at least some detailed information about what additional features the upgraded PUS had.
Approximately the same thing happened with range finders. A big advantage over the pre-revolutionary LMS was the appearance on the battleships of quite numerous additional rangefinders for controlling the fire of the main, anti-mine and anti-aircraft caliber. About КДП, serving the main caliber, it was told in the previous article. As for the mine ...
On the battleship "Marat" was established six open-range rangefinders with a three-meter base DM-3 and two more DM-1,5 - with a half meter base.
A nice photo of DM-3 - though not on the battleship, but on the destroyer of the 7 project.
The "October Revolution" received ... Alas, this is not a weak confusion here. According to A.V. Platonov on the battleship was installed two open-range rangefinders with a four-meter base DM-4, five DM-3 and two DM-1,5. But A. Vasilyev believes that the battleship received not two, but as many as four, and not just an open four-meter rangefinder, but full-fledged command-range stations KDP2-4. And here, apparently, there are inaccuracies of both respected authors.
The fact is that KDP-4, but not 4, as A. Vasiliev wrote, but only 2 are clearly visible in the photographs and drawings of the October Revolution.
Thus, it should be assumed error A.V. Platonov, who correctly indicated the number (2), but incorrectly - the type of instrument, because in fact it was the KDP-4 that was installed on the battleship, and not the open DM-4. At the same time, A. Vasiliev, having correctly indicated the KDP-4, made a mistake in their number.
Well, the Parisian Commune battleship, which, in addition to the two DM-3 and five DM-1,5, which were openly located, had as many as four KDP-4 command-range points, was predictably in the best position. However, some mysteries remain here.
The fact is that in the USSR there were several KDP-4. The simplest of them, the KDP-4 (B-12), had one 4-meter rangefinder DM-4, a stereo-tube CT-3, a center-view siren of the EP, and also two telescopic tubes of post directors. The walls and roof of the KDP were protected by 5 mm by armor plates, the weight of the KDP was 6,5 tons, and the 5 was serviced by a man, not counting the fire manager.
But, besides the above described KDP-4 (B-12), there were more advanced modifications, such as KDP2-4 (B-12-4), and further. They had not one, but two rangefinders with a base 4 m, as well as a slightly different composition of other equipment: the CT-3 stereo tube was missing on them, the center view sighting was different (VNC-2, although it is possible that the VIC-4) , the walls and the roof had a thickness of only 2 mm, but the number of staff increased to 8 people. Apparently, due to the thinner walls, the mass of the KDP remained the same, that is, 6,5 t. So, unfortunately, it is not entirely clear what type of KDP was installed on the Paris Commune: some sources give KDP-4, but for example , A. Vasilyev asserts that after all KDP2-4, but at the same time he does not bring B-12-4, but B-12!
In the opinion of the author of this article, the situation was as follows. Two KDP-4 (B-12) with one range finder and stereo tube CT-3 were installed at the "October Revolution". And on the Paris Commune, four KDP2-4 (B-12-4), or even a later version, were installed. Of course, this is just an opinion, supported by the study of photographs and schemes of ships, and there is the likelihood of error.
Be that as it may, there is no doubt that the presence of as many as four command-range posts, equipped with two (and even one!) Four-meter rangefinder each, gave the Paris Commune a great advantage over Marat and a significant advantage over The October Revolution. After all, the KDP-4, of course, could be used to ensure the firing of the main caliber, both in the event of a failure of the KDP-6, and together with them.
Further, the author should describe the anti-aircraft armament of Soviet battleships, but this is a fairly large topic worthy of a separate article. Therefore, we leave it for a separate material and proceed to the torpedo arms Marat, the October Revolution and the Paris Commune.
Torpedo armament
In addition to artillery, “Sevastopol” type battleships also received “self-propelled mines”: four torpedo tubes with ammunition in 12 torpedoes were deployed in the bow of the ships. Of course, their presence on dreadnoughts was an anachronism and was a waste of payload - however, in the period before the First World War, according to all tactical views, they were considered necessary. Torpedo tubes were installed on all the battleships and battlecruisers of Great Britain and Germany, so their presence on ships built into 1909 was, so to say, “inevitable evil”, the same as the ram on the battleships of the Russian-Japanese era .
However, it should be noted that the Russian Empire was somewhat lagging behind in the torpedo against the leading naval powers. While the latter switched to 533-mm caliber and more, the Russian navy was forced to be content with only 450-mm torpedoes. And so, during the First World War, the same British fleet was armed with an 533-mm torpedo carrying 234 kg of trinitrotoluene to a distance of just over 4 km (4 110 m) on 45 bonds, and the best domestic 450-mm torpedo arr. 1912 could hit the target 100 kg TNT at speed 43 knots at a distance of no more than 2 km. The English torpedo had a long-range mode - it could go 9 830 m at speed 31 knots. Domestic ammunition had two such modes - 5 000 m on 30 knots. or 6 000 m to 28 knots. In other words, it is possible to say that the small caliber of the domestic torpedo weapon led to the fact that in power and range it lost approximately 533-mm "compatriots" approximately twice.
Thus, it can be said that during the period between the two world wars, torpedoes of battleships of the Sevastopol type finally lost even their theoretical combat significance (they never had any practical). At the same time, as mentioned above, the leadership of the Red Forces Naval Forces clearly understood the need to strengthen the combat potential of battleships of this type. Obviously, this kind of modernization had to lead to significant overloads and the loss of speed, which was associated with them, and the latter was considered the most important tactical advantage of Sevastopol. And, it would seem, the removal of completely useless torpedo armament suggests itself - this also reduces overload, and the release of the interior, but at least under the same cellar for anti-aircraft ammunition. In addition, the need for a sharp increase in anti-aircraft weapons required an increase in crew size and additional space for their calculations. It is obvious that the "write-off" of the torpedoes of the battleships would allow freeing up at least a little space in the cockpits and cabins.
However, oddly enough, nothing of the kind was done. Of the three battleships, only the "Paris Commune" lost torpedo armament during upgrades - and even then, there is a persistent feeling that this was not done for the reasons mentioned above, but only because of the installation of the so-called "blisters" (boules), to shoot through which torpedoes would be too difficult. As for the "Marat" and the "October Revolution", the torpedo armament on them was not only fully preserved, but also improved by installing modern at that time torpedo firing controls "MAK". And all this was done for a reason, because the torpedoes of the battleships constantly improved their combat skills. So, in the period from 1927 to 1939, that is, 12 torpedo launches were made from the Marat battleship in 87 years, while 7 torpedoes were lost.
How were the Soviet admirals going to lead battleships like "Sevastopol" into dashing torpedo attacks, and against whom? For the time being these questions remain for the author the most complete riddle.
To be continued ...
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