Soviet battleships between wars
This series of articles is devoted to the service of battleships of the “Sevastopol” type during the interwar period, that is, between the First and Second World Wars. The author will try to figure out how justified was the preservation of three, in general, already outdated battleships in the composition of the Red Army Naval Forces. To do this, it will be necessary to determine the range of tasks that these ships could solve, to remind dear readers the scope of modernization each of them underwent, and, of course, to reflect on the extent to which these upgrades were sufficient to perform the specified tasks.
As is known, 4 of the ship of the type “Sevastopol” was inherited from the Russian Empire of the USSR, of which 3 were in more or less satisfactory technical condition. The fourth battleship, Poltava, renamed 1926 in Frunze, was the victim of a strong fire in 1919. The ship did not die, but was heavily damaged: the fire almost destroyed three steam boilers, the central artillery post, both nasal logging (lower and upper), power station, etc. As you know, in the future there were many plans to restore it in one capacity or another, once even started repairing the ship, abandoning the case six months later, but the ship never returned to service. therefore history "Frunze" we will not consider.
As for “Sevastopol”, “Gangut” and “Petropavlovsk”, this was the case with them. As is known, the Russian Imperial Navy never ventured to use Sevastopol-type battleships for their intended purpose, so that in the First World War, ships of this type did not take part in hostilities. Another thing - the civil war.
After the Baltic Fleet's famous “Ice Campaign”, the battleships anchored throughout 1918, while the loss of their crew reached catastrophic values - sailors diverged along the fronts of the civil war, along river flotillas, and just ... diverged.
In 1918, Finnish troops laid siege to the fort Ino, located in 60 km from St. Petersburg. It was the newest fortification, which forms the mine-artillery position of the direct cover of the "city on the Neva", which was armed with the latest 305-mm guns. The Soviet leadership wanted to leave this fort under its control, but, eventually, obeyed the instructions of Germany, who ordered the Finns to surrender the fort - however, the remnants of the garrison blew it up before leaving.
There were still plans to keep Ino by force, it was supposed that the fleet could help, but only one battleship, Gangut, was completed for the fighting. However, he never came to Ino. Then "Gangut" and "Poltava" were transferred to the wall of the Admiralty plant, putting on conservation (where, in fact, "Poltava" and burned). Then, when the existing detachment of ships (DOT) was formed, “Petropavlovsk” was included in it from the very beginning, and later - “Sevastopol”. Petropavlovsk was even lucky enough to take part in a real naval battle that took place on 31 in May on 1919. On that day, the destroyer Azard was supposed to conduct reconnaissance of Koporsky Bay, but came across the superior forces of the British there and retreated to Petropavlovsk covering it. British destroyers, in quantities of 7 or 8 units. rushed in pursuit, and were fired upon by a battleship that consumed 16 * 305-mm and 94 * 120-mm shells, while the distance fell to 45 cables and even less. There were no direct hits - a long absence of combat training had an effect, but still a few fragments landed in British ships, and they were honored for the best retreat.
Subsequently, Petropavlovsk shelled the rebellious Krasnaya Gorka fort, using 568 * 305-mm projectiles. At the same time, the battleship itself did not receive any damage, but it got to Sevastopol, which, although it did not participate in this operation, was in the sector of firing of the fort's guns. Subsequently, Sevastopol shelled the White Guard troops during their second assault on Petrograd. Then their combat activity ceased until the very 1921, when the crews of both battleships fell into the form of counter-revolution, becoming not just participants, but instigators of the Kronstadt insurgency. In the course of the unfolding hostilities, both battleships were actively exchanged with the forts that remained loyal to the Soviet power, and also fired on the battle formations of the advancing Red Army men.
"Petropavlovsk" spent 394 * 305-mm and 940 * 120-mm shells, and "Sevastopol" - 375 and 875 shells of the same calibres, respectively. Both battleships were damaged by return fire: for example, 1 * 305-mm and 2 * 76-mm shells hit the Sevastopol, as well as an aerial bomb, and the shells caused a fire. The ship killed 14 people. and 36 was injured.
As mentioned above, “Petropavlovsk” was damaged only during the Kronstadt insurgency, and “Sevastopol” in addition to this - also from the “Red Hill”. Unfortunately, the author, unfortunately, does not have a complete list of damages, but they were relatively small and made it possible to return the battleships relatively quickly.
However, the most negative financial situation in which the Soviet Republic was in had the most negative impact on their return. In 1921, the composition of the RKKF was approved, and in the Baltic it was planned to leave only 1 dreadnought out, 16 destroyers, 9 submarines and 2 gunners, 1 mine patrol, 5 mine boats, 5 miners, miners-minors-minors-minors, 26 miners, and miners In this case, the head of the Naval Forces of the Red Army, E.S. Pantserzhansky in his address to seamen from 14 in May 1922 explained that the only reason was the strongest reduction in military spending caused by "extremely serious financial difficulties." In 1921-22 it came to the fact that even such a stripped-down fleet could not be provided with fuel for going out to sea, nor with shells for shooting practice, and the personnel of the RKKF were reduced to 15 thousand people.
Strange as it may seem, but in the best condition Petropavlovsk, which was the most intensively used during the Civil War years, became Marat after the Kronstadt insurgency. It was he who joined the Baltic Sea Naval Forces (SMBM) in 1921, taking the “vacancy” of the only battleship of the Baltic Sea, and from 1922, he participated in all maneuvers and exits of the fleet.
Only in June, the 1924 of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council and the Supreme Council of the National Economy submitted to the Council of People's Commissars a memorandum in which they proposed to proceed to the first, in effect, shipbuilding program of the USSR. In particular, the Baltic was supposed to complete the 2 light cruiser (Svetlana and Butakov), the 2 destroyer, the submarine, and return the 2 battleship to service.
It must be said that “Sevastopol”, which became the “Paris Commune”, was registered in the training squad since 1922, and even took part in training maneuvers in 1923. But this participation consisted only in the fact that the battleship, standing on the roads of Kronstadt, provided radio communication for the SMBM headquarters with ships at sea. As a full-fledged combat unit, the Paris Commune returned to the fleet only in 1925. But the October Revolution - the Gangut, which stood the entire civil war against the wall and had no combat damage, undertook to put it in the last place: entered into service only in 1926.
I must say that during this period the tasks of the battleships in the RKKF were not yet clearly formulated for the simple reason that tasks for the RKKF as a whole have not yet been defined. The discussion of the naval concept of the USSR began in 1922, with the discussion “Which RSFSR needs a fleet?”, But at that time no final conclusions were made. The theorists of the “old school”, adherents of a strong linear fleet, on the one hand, did not want to deviate from the classical theory of sea ownership, but on the other hand, they understood that the creation of a powerful linear fleet in the current conditions is utopian. Therefore, the discussions did not yield much result, and soon turned to unconditionally important, but still secondary issues of the interaction of diverse forces, that is, surface ships, aviation and submarines. Moreover, the most important postulate about the need for a balanced fleet at that time was almost not disputed by anyone, although supporters of the mosquito fleet were already back then.
Of course, the sailors had already proposed the tasks that the fleet would have to provide in the near future. For example, Deputy Chief and Commissioner of the Naval Forces of the RKKF Galkin and Acting Chief of the Staff of the RKKF Vasiliev in the “Report of the Command of the Naval Forces to the Chairman of the RVS of the USSR M.V. Frunze on the status and development prospects of the RKKFlot ”proposed for the Baltic Fleet:
1. In the event of a war with the Big Entente, the defense of Leningrad and the support of operations against Finland and Estonia, which required full possession of the Gulf of Finland before the meridian of Fr. Seskar and “controversial possession” - before the Helsingfors meridian;
2. In the event of a war with the Little Entente, full possession of the Baltic Sea, with all the tasks and advantages arising from this.
However, all this remained at the level of proposals and opinions: in the 20-ies there were no answers yet as to why the country needed a fleet and there was no concept of naval construction. The need to preserve the battleships in the fleet were much simpler and mundane considerations. That the country still needed the navy, everyone understood, and the Sevastopol-type battleships were not only the strongest of the ships at our disposal, but also were in quite acceptable technical condition, and were put into operation relatively recently. Thus, they represented a sea force that it would be strange to ignore. And even such an opponent of the linear fleet as Tukhachevsky considered it necessary to preserve them in the fleet. In 1928, he wrote: “Considering the existing battleships, they should be preserved, as an emergency reserve, as an additional tool for the duration of the war.”
Thus, in 1926, the three Baltic battleships returned to service and no one disputed their need for the fleet. However, in the next, 1927, the question arose about their large-scale modernization. The fact is that, although the same Galkin and Vasiliev believed that our battleships "... of the Marat type, despite the 10-year-old since the construction, still represent units of modern order," but many of their flaws including “with regard to booking, weakness of anti-airborne artillery and protection against underwater explosions” was well recognized.
I must say that the modernization of the battleships of the “Sevastopol” type also caused a very lively discussion. The main emphasis - areas of modernization, were placed at the "Special Meeting", held on March 10 1927 g, chaired by the Chief of the Naval Forces of the Red Army R.A. Muklevich. The discussion was based on the report of a prominent naval specialist V.P. Rimsky-Korsakov, who noted many of the shortcomings of the Sevastopol-type battleships, and ways to increase their combat capability. In general, the meeting came to the following conclusions.
1. The armor protection of the battleships is completely inadequate, and needs strengthening: this deficiency cannot be completely eliminated, but the optimal solution would be to bring the thickness of one of the armored decks to 75 mm. The weakness of the 76 mm roofs and the 75-152 mm barbets of the main-caliber towers were also noted.
2. The firing range was considered insufficient, according to V.P. Rimsky-Korsakov should have been brought to the 175 cable. In this case, the firing range of "Sevastopol" on the 2,5 miles would have surpassed that of the best British ships of the type "Queen Elizabeth" - at that time, experts believed that it reaches the 150 cable. In fact, it was a somewhat premature judgment, because initially the towers of battleships of this type provided an elevation angle of 20 degrees, which allowed only firing on 121 cables. Subsequently, the elevation angle was increased to 30 degrees, which allowed the British battleships to shoot 158 cables, but this happened already in 1934-36. V.P. Rimsky-Korsakov offered 2 possible ways to increase the firing range: creating a lightweight (about 370 kg) projectile equipped with a special ballistic tip, or much more serious work on upgrading the towers, bringing the elevation angles to 45 degrees. The latter, in theory, was to provide the range of "classic" 470,9 kg shells in 162 cable, and lightweight - up to 240 cable.
3. The increase in the range of the main caliber guns and the increase in the distance of the battle should have been provided with corresponding improvements in the fire control system. New, more powerful rangefinders should be installed on the battleships, and they should be placed higher than it was done in the original project, besides, the battleships should have been provided with the most up-to-date shooting control devices that could be obtained. It was also deemed necessary to equip the battleships with at least two hydraulic seaplanes.
4. In addition to the firing range, the main caliber also needed to increase the rate of fire, at least one and a half, and better - twice.
5. Mine caliber: 120-mm guns, placed in casemates relatively low above sea level, and having a range of up to 75 cable were considered obsolete. V.P. Rimsky-Korsakov advocated replacing them with 100-mm guns placed in two-gun towers.
6. It also required a high-quality anti-aircraft artillery. However, V.P. Rimsky-Korsakov understood very well that reinforcement of anti-mine and anti-aircraft artillery was only advisory, since the fleet and industry simply did not have suitable artillery systems.
7. The seaworthiness of the battleships was also considered insufficient - in order to resolve this issue, it was recommended to increase the height of the freeboard in the bow of the ship in one way or another.
8. Coal as the main fuel of the battleships was considered by all the participants of the meeting to be a complete anachronism - the transfer of the battleships to oil was considered by the meeting participants as a decided matter.
9. But there was no unambiguous decision on the anti-torpedo protection of the battleships. The fact is that the refusal of coal, and the protection that coal pits provided, reduced the already frankly weak PTZ of Sevastopol type battleships. The installation could have been saved by the installation of a boule, but then it would have to be put up with a decrease in speed. And on this discussion participants were not ready to decide: the fact is that speed was considered one of the most important tactical advantages of the battleship. Understanding that Sevastopoli, due to the combination of combat qualities, seriously loses to modern foreign 21-node battleships, the sailors viewed speed as an opportunity to quickly get out of battle if circumstances did not turn out in favor of the RKKF, and for obvious reasons, than likely.
10. In addition to all the above, the battleships needed such “trifles” as new radio stations, chemical protection, a floodlight device, and much more.
In other words, the meeting participants came to the conclusion that the battleships of the “Sevastopol” type in order to maintain their combat capability required a very, very global modernization, the cost of which, on first reading, was approximately defined as 40 million rubles. on one battleship. It is obvious that the allocation of funds in this amount was extremely dubious, almost impossible, and therefore R.A. Muklevich ordered, along with the "global", to work out the "budget" option of upgrading battleships. In this case, the transition to oil heating was considered mandatory in any case, and the speed, (obviously - in the case of the installation of boules) should not have decreased less than 22 knots.
To be continued ...
As is known, 4 of the ship of the type “Sevastopol” was inherited from the Russian Empire of the USSR, of which 3 were in more or less satisfactory technical condition. The fourth battleship, Poltava, renamed 1926 in Frunze, was the victim of a strong fire in 1919. The ship did not die, but was heavily damaged: the fire almost destroyed three steam boilers, the central artillery post, both nasal logging (lower and upper), power station, etc. As you know, in the future there were many plans to restore it in one capacity or another, once even started repairing the ship, abandoning the case six months later, but the ship never returned to service. therefore history "Frunze" we will not consider.
As for “Sevastopol”, “Gangut” and “Petropavlovsk”, this was the case with them. As is known, the Russian Imperial Navy never ventured to use Sevastopol-type battleships for their intended purpose, so that in the First World War, ships of this type did not take part in hostilities. Another thing - the civil war.
In the years of civil
After the Baltic Fleet's famous “Ice Campaign”, the battleships anchored throughout 1918, while the loss of their crew reached catastrophic values - sailors diverged along the fronts of the civil war, along river flotillas, and just ... diverged.
In 1918, Finnish troops laid siege to the fort Ino, located in 60 km from St. Petersburg. It was the newest fortification, which forms the mine-artillery position of the direct cover of the "city on the Neva", which was armed with the latest 305-mm guns. The Soviet leadership wanted to leave this fort under its control, but, eventually, obeyed the instructions of Germany, who ordered the Finns to surrender the fort - however, the remnants of the garrison blew it up before leaving.
There were still plans to keep Ino by force, it was supposed that the fleet could help, but only one battleship, Gangut, was completed for the fighting. However, he never came to Ino. Then "Gangut" and "Poltava" were transferred to the wall of the Admiralty plant, putting on conservation (where, in fact, "Poltava" and burned). Then, when the existing detachment of ships (DOT) was formed, “Petropavlovsk” was included in it from the very beginning, and later - “Sevastopol”. Petropavlovsk was even lucky enough to take part in a real naval battle that took place on 31 in May on 1919. On that day, the destroyer Azard was supposed to conduct reconnaissance of Koporsky Bay, but came across the superior forces of the British there and retreated to Petropavlovsk covering it. British destroyers, in quantities of 7 or 8 units. rushed in pursuit, and were fired upon by a battleship that consumed 16 * 305-mm and 94 * 120-mm shells, while the distance fell to 45 cables and even less. There were no direct hits - a long absence of combat training had an effect, but still a few fragments landed in British ships, and they were honored for the best retreat.
Subsequently, Petropavlovsk shelled the rebellious Krasnaya Gorka fort, using 568 * 305-mm projectiles. At the same time, the battleship itself did not receive any damage, but it got to Sevastopol, which, although it did not participate in this operation, was in the sector of firing of the fort's guns. Subsequently, Sevastopol shelled the White Guard troops during their second assault on Petrograd. Then their combat activity ceased until the very 1921, when the crews of both battleships fell into the form of counter-revolution, becoming not just participants, but instigators of the Kronstadt insurgency. In the course of the unfolding hostilities, both battleships were actively exchanged with the forts that remained loyal to the Soviet power, and also fired on the battle formations of the advancing Red Army men.
Damage to the battleship "Petropavlovsk", received by him during the suppression of the Kronstadt insurgency.
"Petropavlovsk" spent 394 * 305-mm and 940 * 120-mm shells, and "Sevastopol" - 375 and 875 shells of the same calibres, respectively. Both battleships were damaged by return fire: for example, 1 * 305-mm and 2 * 76-mm shells hit the Sevastopol, as well as an aerial bomb, and the shells caused a fire. The ship killed 14 people. and 36 was injured.
Return to service
As mentioned above, “Petropavlovsk” was damaged only during the Kronstadt insurgency, and “Sevastopol” in addition to this - also from the “Red Hill”. Unfortunately, the author, unfortunately, does not have a complete list of damages, but they were relatively small and made it possible to return the battleships relatively quickly.
However, the most negative financial situation in which the Soviet Republic was in had the most negative impact on their return. In 1921, the composition of the RKKF was approved, and in the Baltic it was planned to leave only 1 dreadnought out, 16 destroyers, 9 submarines and 2 gunners, 1 mine patrol, 5 mine boats, 5 miners, miners-minors-minors-minors, 26 miners, and miners In this case, the head of the Naval Forces of the Red Army, E.S. Pantserzhansky in his address to seamen from 14 in May 1922 explained that the only reason was the strongest reduction in military spending caused by "extremely serious financial difficulties." In 1921-22 it came to the fact that even such a stripped-down fleet could not be provided with fuel for going out to sea, nor with shells for shooting practice, and the personnel of the RKKF were reduced to 15 thousand people.
Strange as it may seem, but in the best condition Petropavlovsk, which was the most intensively used during the Civil War years, became Marat after the Kronstadt insurgency. It was he who joined the Baltic Sea Naval Forces (SMBM) in 1921, taking the “vacancy” of the only battleship of the Baltic Sea, and from 1922, he participated in all maneuvers and exits of the fleet.
Only in June, the 1924 of the USSR Revolutionary Military Council and the Supreme Council of the National Economy submitted to the Council of People's Commissars a memorandum in which they proposed to proceed to the first, in effect, shipbuilding program of the USSR. In particular, the Baltic was supposed to complete the 2 light cruiser (Svetlana and Butakov), the 2 destroyer, the submarine, and return the 2 battleship to service.
It must be said that “Sevastopol”, which became the “Paris Commune”, was registered in the training squad since 1922, and even took part in training maneuvers in 1923. But this participation consisted only in the fact that the battleship, standing on the roads of Kronstadt, provided radio communication for the SMBM headquarters with ships at sea. As a full-fledged combat unit, the Paris Commune returned to the fleet only in 1925. But the October Revolution - the Gangut, which stood the entire civil war against the wall and had no combat damage, undertook to put it in the last place: entered into service only in 1926.
Marat and Paris Commune, 1925
I must say that during this period the tasks of the battleships in the RKKF were not yet clearly formulated for the simple reason that tasks for the RKKF as a whole have not yet been defined. The discussion of the naval concept of the USSR began in 1922, with the discussion “Which RSFSR needs a fleet?”, But at that time no final conclusions were made. The theorists of the “old school”, adherents of a strong linear fleet, on the one hand, did not want to deviate from the classical theory of sea ownership, but on the other hand, they understood that the creation of a powerful linear fleet in the current conditions is utopian. Therefore, the discussions did not yield much result, and soon turned to unconditionally important, but still secondary issues of the interaction of diverse forces, that is, surface ships, aviation and submarines. Moreover, the most important postulate about the need for a balanced fleet at that time was almost not disputed by anyone, although supporters of the mosquito fleet were already back then.
Of course, the sailors had already proposed the tasks that the fleet would have to provide in the near future. For example, Deputy Chief and Commissioner of the Naval Forces of the RKKF Galkin and Acting Chief of the Staff of the RKKF Vasiliev in the “Report of the Command of the Naval Forces to the Chairman of the RVS of the USSR M.V. Frunze on the status and development prospects of the RKKFlot ”proposed for the Baltic Fleet:
1. In the event of a war with the Big Entente, the defense of Leningrad and the support of operations against Finland and Estonia, which required full possession of the Gulf of Finland before the meridian of Fr. Seskar and “controversial possession” - before the Helsingfors meridian;
2. In the event of a war with the Little Entente, full possession of the Baltic Sea, with all the tasks and advantages arising from this.
However, all this remained at the level of proposals and opinions: in the 20-ies there were no answers yet as to why the country needed a fleet and there was no concept of naval construction. The need to preserve the battleships in the fleet were much simpler and mundane considerations. That the country still needed the navy, everyone understood, and the Sevastopol-type battleships were not only the strongest of the ships at our disposal, but also were in quite acceptable technical condition, and were put into operation relatively recently. Thus, they represented a sea force that it would be strange to ignore. And even such an opponent of the linear fleet as Tukhachevsky considered it necessary to preserve them in the fleet. In 1928, he wrote: “Considering the existing battleships, they should be preserved, as an emergency reserve, as an additional tool for the duration of the war.”
Battleship "Marat"
Thus, in 1926, the three Baltic battleships returned to service and no one disputed their need for the fleet. However, in the next, 1927, the question arose about their large-scale modernization. The fact is that, although the same Galkin and Vasiliev believed that our battleships "... of the Marat type, despite the 10-year-old since the construction, still represent units of modern order," but many of their flaws including “with regard to booking, weakness of anti-airborne artillery and protection against underwater explosions” was well recognized.
Modernization plans
I must say that the modernization of the battleships of the “Sevastopol” type also caused a very lively discussion. The main emphasis - areas of modernization, were placed at the "Special Meeting", held on March 10 1927 g, chaired by the Chief of the Naval Forces of the Red Army R.A. Muklevich. The discussion was based on the report of a prominent naval specialist V.P. Rimsky-Korsakov, who noted many of the shortcomings of the Sevastopol-type battleships, and ways to increase their combat capability. In general, the meeting came to the following conclusions.
1. The armor protection of the battleships is completely inadequate, and needs strengthening: this deficiency cannot be completely eliminated, but the optimal solution would be to bring the thickness of one of the armored decks to 75 mm. The weakness of the 76 mm roofs and the 75-152 mm barbets of the main-caliber towers were also noted.
2. The firing range was considered insufficient, according to V.P. Rimsky-Korsakov should have been brought to the 175 cable. In this case, the firing range of "Sevastopol" on the 2,5 miles would have surpassed that of the best British ships of the type "Queen Elizabeth" - at that time, experts believed that it reaches the 150 cable. In fact, it was a somewhat premature judgment, because initially the towers of battleships of this type provided an elevation angle of 20 degrees, which allowed only firing on 121 cables. Subsequently, the elevation angle was increased to 30 degrees, which allowed the British battleships to shoot 158 cables, but this happened already in 1934-36. V.P. Rimsky-Korsakov offered 2 possible ways to increase the firing range: creating a lightweight (about 370 kg) projectile equipped with a special ballistic tip, or much more serious work on upgrading the towers, bringing the elevation angles to 45 degrees. The latter, in theory, was to provide the range of "classic" 470,9 kg shells in 162 cable, and lightweight - up to 240 cable.
3. The increase in the range of the main caliber guns and the increase in the distance of the battle should have been provided with corresponding improvements in the fire control system. New, more powerful rangefinders should be installed on the battleships, and they should be placed higher than it was done in the original project, besides, the battleships should have been provided with the most up-to-date shooting control devices that could be obtained. It was also deemed necessary to equip the battleships with at least two hydraulic seaplanes.
4. In addition to the firing range, the main caliber also needed to increase the rate of fire, at least one and a half, and better - twice.
5. Mine caliber: 120-mm guns, placed in casemates relatively low above sea level, and having a range of up to 75 cable were considered obsolete. V.P. Rimsky-Korsakov advocated replacing them with 100-mm guns placed in two-gun towers.
6. It also required a high-quality anti-aircraft artillery. However, V.P. Rimsky-Korsakov understood very well that reinforcement of anti-mine and anti-aircraft artillery was only advisory, since the fleet and industry simply did not have suitable artillery systems.
7. The seaworthiness of the battleships was also considered insufficient - in order to resolve this issue, it was recommended to increase the height of the freeboard in the bow of the ship in one way or another.
8. Coal as the main fuel of the battleships was considered by all the participants of the meeting to be a complete anachronism - the transfer of the battleships to oil was considered by the meeting participants as a decided matter.
9. But there was no unambiguous decision on the anti-torpedo protection of the battleships. The fact is that the refusal of coal, and the protection that coal pits provided, reduced the already frankly weak PTZ of Sevastopol type battleships. The installation could have been saved by the installation of a boule, but then it would have to be put up with a decrease in speed. And on this discussion participants were not ready to decide: the fact is that speed was considered one of the most important tactical advantages of the battleship. Understanding that Sevastopoli, due to the combination of combat qualities, seriously loses to modern foreign 21-node battleships, the sailors viewed speed as an opportunity to quickly get out of battle if circumstances did not turn out in favor of the RKKF, and for obvious reasons, than likely.
10. In addition to all the above, the battleships needed such “trifles” as new radio stations, chemical protection, a floodlight device, and much more.
In other words, the meeting participants came to the conclusion that the battleships of the “Sevastopol” type in order to maintain their combat capability required a very, very global modernization, the cost of which, on first reading, was approximately defined as 40 million rubles. on one battleship. It is obvious that the allocation of funds in this amount was extremely dubious, almost impossible, and therefore R.A. Muklevich ordered, along with the "global", to work out the "budget" option of upgrading battleships. In this case, the transition to oil heating was considered mandatory in any case, and the speed, (obviously - in the case of the installation of boules) should not have decreased less than 22 knots.
To be continued ...
Information