Awkward questions: air supremacy over Ukraine and its consequences

The Russian special operation in Ukraine began on February 24, 2022, and already on February 28, information appeared from the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation (MO RF) about the seizure of air supremacy over the territory of Ukraine. Is it really? Let's try to figure it out.

Dominance is different

Air supremacy is the decisive superiority of the air force (Air Force) of one of the belligerents in the airspace. Air supremacy is divided into strategic, operational and tactical.



Strategic air supremacy is dominance on the entire front of the armed forces. Operational air supremacy is dominance on the scale of one or more fronts for the period of an offensive operation. Tactical air supremacy is dominance within the battlefield in the interests of ground troops operating in a chosen direction.

With regard to military operations in Ukraine, we can say that the RF Armed Forces are guaranteed to have tactical air supremacy over any arbitrarily chosen battlefield. We can also say that the RF Armed Forces have operational air supremacy - the Russian aviation unconditionally dominates the entire front line.

But is it possible to say that the RF Armed Forces have strategic air supremacy? If we consider strategic dominance as domination over all sectors of the offensive of the RF Armed Forces, then, probably, yes. But in this case, the differences from operational air supremacy are small - in general, these concepts are quite blurred, which is why such combinations as “operational-strategic”, “operational-tactical” dominance appear.

On the other hand, it is believed that in the combat operations of our time there may be no front lines at all, which is typical for aerospace operations. In the case of Ukraine, the RF Armed Forces are for the most part engaged in classic combat operations - the intensity of air strikes is relatively low compared to the use of ground forces in general and cannon and rocket artillery in particular. At the same time, strikes to the depth of the territory of Ukraine are carried out mainly not by aviation, but by sea, land and air-based cruise missiles, which are most often launched outside the territory of Ukraine.

At the same time, the effectiveness of combat operations as a whole strongly depends on the possibility of intensive strikes throughout the entire depth of the enemy's territory. Moreover, the required intensity cannot be provided only by high-precision weapons long range - you should guarantee the continuous presence in the sky above the enemy of your aircraft.

Based on this, in the context of combat operations over Ukraine, strategic air supremacy should be viewed as the ability of the Russian Air Force to operate freely over the entire territory of Ukraine.

It can be definitely said that the US Air Force had strategic air supremacy over the entire territory of Iraq and Yugoslavia in their respective military conflicts. Does the Russian Air Force have strategic air supremacy over Ukraine, allowing Russian aircraft to freely strike throughout the entire depth of its territory?

The answer is likely to be no, and there are a number of reasons for this.

Specifics of the Ukrainian conflict

What is the main difference between the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the Western invasion of Iraq and Yugoslavia?

The main difference is that Russia did not take an active part in those wars. It is believed that we surrendered Iraq altogether, among other things, by transferring the frequency grids of radar stations (RLS), previously supplied to Iraq by anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM).

During the conflict in Yugoslavia, Russia's position was already negative in relation to the actions of the US and NATO, but in reality there was little we could do, and Serbia received practically no support. It would be interesting to see how the United States would have reacted to the supply of S-300 air defense systems, operational-tactical missile systems (OTRK), anti-ship missiles (ASM) and other weapons at that time.

But now Russia is advancing in Ukraine, and the US and NATO countries are actively trying to prevent this, and the further they go, the more their impudence grows, and it’s time to really do something about it - all accomplices of the Ukronazis must be punished. One of the most important elements of support is the provision of intelligence information to Ukraine from the means of satellite and aviation intelligence of Western countries, and not the supply of military equipment, while they are still relatively small, though it's only a matter of time. In particular, the sky over neighboring countries is patrolled by early warning aircraft (AWACS), which our armed forces lack so much. There is no doubt that ground-based radars are also operating around the clock, capable of detecting high-flying targets at a distance of hundreds of kilometers.

AWACS aircraft from NATO countries pose a significant threat to Russian military aviation. Image by wikipedia.org

This allows the calculations of Ukrainian air defense systems not to use detection radars that immediately unmask their positions on an ongoing basis, but to use data from Western countries to pre-enter information into the air defense system, turn on the radar for a short period of time to attack, followed by a change in positions. Such tactics can lead to significant losses of our aviation, which is why it is forced to "huddle to the ground."

Perhaps it is precisely because of this that the Russian Air Force does not use combat aircraft to the extent that they could, but this does not mean that this decision is correct.

Consequences of restrictions

The lack of strategic air supremacy seems to impose significant restrictions on the actions of Russian aviation. This allows the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) to provide a fairly effective logistics support for the front line, transport ammunition, manpower, weapons and military equipment, evacuate and repair damaged equipment. Even the problem with fuel supplies seems to have resolved - Ukrainian Tanks so they didn't get stuck. There are no communication problems, the cities are illuminated, the Internet and television work. The railway is functioning properly - well, they destroyed a couple of bridges, a couple of traction substations - most of this has already been repaired. And spending "Caliber" and "Iskander" on each transformer box - you will not save up any resources.

But it is vitally important to split Ukraine into its component parts, and this can be done with the help of aviation, even without gaining strategic air supremacy, operating at low altitudes - this issue was previously considered in the article "Decomposition of Ukraine as a way to radically reduce the capabilities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine to resist the Russian special operation".

And Petrushka-Zelensky is still alive, moreover, other European clowns regularly ride in his circus, and after all, the destruction of the top military-political leadership of Ukraine is one of the most important factors that, along with “decomposition”, can affect Ukraine’s readiness to resist , and from a psychological point of view, this is simply necessary - the enemies of Russia must be destroyed physically, so that the rest who want to become them develop the correct "conditioned reflexes". This issue was also discussed earlier in the material "Confrontation with the West on the territory of Ukraine: to press without stopping".

Ideally, Russian bombers should hover over the territory of Ukraine 24 hours a day, dropping dozens of tons of bombs at the slightest movement of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

There are a few more nuances.

Firstly, the need to "press close to the ground" leads to the fact that combat aircraft become vulnerable to man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS), which are physically impossible to completely destroy. Of course, their attacks are far from always effective, but it can be assumed that as the conflict drags on, the total losses of aviation from MANPADS will be compared with those that the Russian Air Force could suffer when gaining strategic air supremacy.

Secondly, the prolongation of the conflict leads to the fact that much more victims will be suffered by ground troops, as well as civilians dying on the territory of the DPR and in the cities of Eastern Ukraine.

Based on this, we can assume that it is expedient and necessary to organize a massive air operation to completely gain strategic air supremacy over the entire territory of Ukraine.

But how to do it with minimal losses?

Strategic air supremacy

Here we largely go into the realm of assumptions, since we do not know the real effectiveness of certain Russian weapons systems, but we will try to rely on open data. To gain strategic air supremacy, it is necessary to organize an intensified hunt for Ukrainian air defense systems, destroying them, if not all, then 99%, and this can presumably be done according to the scheme - provocation, detection, destruction.

First of all, it is necessary to neutralize or at least reduce the efficiency of the enemy AWACS aircraft and ground-based radars. Of course, the highly publicized Russian electronic warfare (EW) systems immediately come to mind, but how effective are they?

If our armed forces save their electronic warfare resources for the “last and decisive” without using all their capabilities, then this vicious practice must be abandoned - what will be unknown tomorrow, and the negative scenarios for the development of this “tomorrow” will be determined precisely by Russian actions in Ukraine. We will win - no one will turn up, and electronic warfare equipment will not be needed, the West will quiet down for a while. Let's start losing - nuclear weapons will be the last and only argument.



So it is necessary to "crush" AWACS aircraft, strategic reconnaissance unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and ground-based radars by all means. Perhaps - constantly, maybe - in waves, directly during the hunt for Ukrainian air defense systems, this already depends on the effectiveness of Russian electronic warfare systems.

Ideally, they should not completely deprive the enemy's reconnaissance means of detecting aircraft over the territory of Ukraine, but should not allow them to be recognized. Even if the side effect will be the impossibility of flights of civil aviation aircraft and the disruption of communications over the territory of European countries neighboring Ukraine. Even if a NATO AWACS aircraft or an American strategic UAV completely crashes to the ground from the effects of electronic warfare, it’s okay, they will survive, wipe themselves off and endure something else.

A provocation is a false target, which is a UAV or a manned aircraft with a set of equipment for remote control. These can be, for example, the Orion UAV or obsolete combat or transport aircraft capable of flying at an altitude of over 7 meters, of course, if our industry is able to equip them with remote take-off, piloting and landing systems (the latter is optional, in a number cases, such aircraft can be used at the end of the operation to strike at targets deep in enemy territory, like a projectile aircraft).



A false target should imitate a valuable target for the enemy - a strategic bomber or transport aircraft. To do this, its radar signature can be enlarged and distorted using corner reflectors and Luneberg lenses.

The task of the false target is to provoke the Ukrainian air defense systems to turn on the radar to strike according to the intelligence of the Western countries.

Detection is electronic reconnaissance aircraft (RTR) capable of effectively detecting enemy radars. We have few such aircraft, as mentioned in the articles "Russian special operation in Ukraine: to dispel the fog of war" и "Issues on the use of AWACS aircraft, reconnaissance and combat control during the NWO in Ukraine". The problem is that even the existing RTR aircraft themselves can become targets for Ukrainian air defense systems if their effectiveness is not high enough.

The US Navy actively uses the EA-18G Growler, which replaced its predecessors, the E / A-6B Prowler carrier-based aircraft, at the combat post. Their task is precisely the detection of enemy radars, the production of protective interference and the destruction of the detected radars by anti-radar missiles (PRR) aimed at the radiation source.



The aviation of the Navy and the Russian Air Force have no direct analogues of the E / A-6B Prowler and EA-18G Growler. The Su-24MR is a reconnaissance aircraft, it is already outdated, it does not know how to put interference. Only 24 units of Su-8MP jamming aircraft were manufactured, they were never brought to “mind”, and after the collapse of the USSR, they all ended up in Ukraine.

It remains to use multifunctional fighters and front-line bombers to hunt for Ukrainian air defense systems, but there is a dilemma here - the more modern a vehicle we send to hunt for Ukrainian air defense systems, the less likely it will be shot down, but the more painful the loss will be. If we send a more outdated machine, then the chances that it will turn into a target increase significantly.

Considering that the air-to-air confrontation in Ukraine has mostly ended, it is most likely advisable to use Su-35S multifunctional fighters, additionally equipped with RTR and EW systems, as well as Kh-31P / anti-radar missiles, to detect and destroy Ukrainian air defense systems. PD. It is likely that low-observable fifth-generation Su-57 fighters with X-58UShKE in-fuselage deployment can also be used, of course, if these vehicles and weapons for them have reached, respectively, operational readiness. By the way, it is likely that the United States will also abandon vehicles such as the E / A-6B Prowler and EA-18G Growler in favor of a bundle of a multifunctional fighter, RTR containers, electronic warfare and anti-radar missiles.





Such a bunch of false targets based on UAVs and obsolete remote-controlled manned aircraft, as well as Su-35S / Su-57 multifunctional fighters equipped with radar and electronic warfare equipment, as well as Kh-31P / Kh-31PD / Kh-58UShKE anti-radar missiles, will allow clearing the territory of Ukraine from long-range and medium-range air defense systems, and then moving on to the systematic massive application of strategic and tactical aviation missile and bomb strikes from high and medium altitudes that are beyond the reach of MANPADS.

It should be noted that earlier information appeared in the open press about the development by the KRET concern of specialized containers for the Su-34 front-line bomber, including containers for setting group protection electronic jamming, conducting electronic intelligence (UKR-RT), optical (UKR-OE) and radar reconnaissance (UKR-RL). If the deliveries of these containers are/are being made, then the leadership in the destruction of Ukrainian air defense systems may go to the Su-34.



Of course, even after the main cleansing phase, at least strategic bombers should be covered by multifunctional fighters with RTR, SEM, as well as anti-radar missiles.

Possible problems

Possible problems arise from questions that are unlikely to be answered in open sources:

- the effectiveness of Russian electronic warfare systems: if we cannot suppress or at least seriously complicate the work of Western countries' radar reconnaissance means, then the task of gaining strategic air supremacy over the territory of Ukraine is greatly complicated;

- the presence of UAVs capable of simulating false targets, the possibility of relatively quickly equipping manned aircraft with remote control equipment;

- the effectiveness of the RTR and EW systems built into the Su-34, Su-35S and Su-57, the availability and effectiveness of the RTR and EW hanging containers;

- the presence of a sufficient number and effectiveness of Kh-31P / Kh-31PD / Kh-58UShKE anti-radar missiles;

- the Russian Air Force is prepared to organize and conduct such a complex full-scale air offensive operation, simultaneously control dozens of combat vehicles - after all, it is necessary not only to destroy the enemy's air defense systems, but also not to hit your own, as well as not to hit your own aircraft with your own air defense systems.

All these factors can significantly complicate or even make it impossible to seize strategic air supremacy over the territory of Ukraine. And this will mean that aviation will "huddle to the ground" and suffer losses from MANPADS, the ground operation will be delayed, and the "partners" will begin to become impudent.

Conclusions

Ruthlessness and ruthlessness is the only thing we can oppose to the countries of the West. They must clearly understand that we will go much further than they can go.

They must realize that in the event of a Russia-NATO conflict, Eastern Europe will be the first to burn in a nuclear fire, followed by Western.

They should know that for any strike on our territory, especially with nuclear weapons, we will respond twice according to whoever delivers this strike. What about those economic sanctions that Western countries impose on us, we will respond asymmetrically and turn their economy into ruins.

We will arm their enemies in the same way that they arm Ukraine, for example, help Argentina take the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands from Britain, and take from them everything that can be taken without even crossing their borders, for example, expropriate all their intangible assets.

The longer the special operation drags on, the more negative consequences occur - the Armed Forces of Ukraine have already attacked Russian cities and villages, the shelling of the DPR has increased significantly, and attacks have been carried out on oil and gas infrastructure of the Russian Federation. Poland is becoming impudent and concentrating troops, even pathetic Lithuania has declared a blockade of Kaliningrad - and in fact this is a declaration of war. And we keep promising to strike at the "decision-making centers"...

Maybe stop promising? And then sometimes there is a feeling that we are playing some kind of "giveaway".

After gaining strategic air supremacy, no ground target will be safe. Of course, we are not talking about the bombing of cities, but as far as military and near-military targets are concerned, everything is different here.



The railway track was destroyed - a repair team was sent, 30 minutes after the start of work, a blow was struck on the team and the repair team. They sent a second one - another blow. The railroad has been stopped. Any information about the movement of military personnel, cargo, fuel - strike, strike, strike ... It will become almost impossible to form columns.

Any large accumulation of trucks is a blow. Bridges, narrow sections of highways, ports, power lines, communications centers, military registration and enlistment offices, headquarters of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and buildings of civil authorities calling for the destruction of Russia and Russians. Concrete-piercing bombs against underground structures, FAB-3000 against large targets - to fill up the Beskydy tunnel tightly so that the mouse does not crawl through.

There will be no military commissariats and communications - there will be no conscription. There will be no railways and bridges - there will be no fuel and shells. There will be no electricity - repair factories will rise. There will be no rear, and then the defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine will really “fall apart”, since there will be no hope for at least some kind of “overcoming”.

If the RF Armed Forces can seize strategic air supremacy over Ukraine, even if at the risk of certain losses, then it is vital to do so. If not, then this is an occasion to seriously think about the organization of training and the technical equipment of the Russian Air Force.