The work on the rockets under the open ciphers of CMM and SB-32, started at KB-1 — the head organization for developing the C-25 anti-aircraft missile system — was transferred to 26 November 1953 of the USSR organized on the basis of its Khimki branch to the Special Design Bureau No. 2 of the USSR Ministry of Medium Machine Building . The primary task of OKB-2 was the development of a rocket for the new C-75 anti-aircraft missile system. 10 December 1953 was appointed PDGrushin as chief designer of the OKB-2, who tried to make the most of the scientific and technical groundwork on the transferred missiles to solve the tasks assigned to him. In particular, he instructed Dmitry Ludwigovich Tomashevich, who led the work on CMM (future PC-1-U) in KB-1 from the very beginning, to prepare a scientific and technical report on possible directions for further development and improvement of products of this class. The relevance of this work was explained by the fact that the CMM product was developed for the destruction of subsonic targets such as the Tu-4 and Il-28 bombers by subsonic MiG-17PFU and Yak-25K fighter-interceptor fighters, while at the same time, the United States and the USSR began full-scale work on supersonic hypersonic aircraft. .
After a few months, a detailed report “The optimal characteristics of air-to-air projectiles was ready. The main conclusion of the report was that the main characteristics of the CMM fully comply with the level of development of aviation and rocket technology achieved by that time. At a meeting held by the chief designer to review the report of D. L. Tomashevich, the views of the speakers on the prospects of the work carried out differed. Summing up, PD Grushin made a compromise decision: to continue work on the CMM in its current form with the implementation of the tactical and technical requirements for the rocket; at the same time, on the basis of the prospects for the development of jet aircraft, to start developing a new rocket based on a CMM with improved characteristics, ensuring its full use on supersonic fighters. Some time later, DL Tomashevich went to work at KB-1, while at the same time in 1954 — 1967 he taught at the Moscow Aviation Institute, where he trained more than one generation of aviation specialists in unmanned aerial vehicles. In MAI, he defended his doctoral thesis, became a professor, in 1969, one of his works was awarded the USSR State Prize.
After the meeting with PDGrushin, the design department of OKB-2 began to work on a promising air-to-air missile, which eventually received the industry designation K-5М, and retained the KMN-5 for the CMM. The chief designer of the rocket was appointed I.I.Popov. Initially, the work was carried out on an initiative basis: to carry out a full-scale development, it was necessary to determine and substantiate the main declared characteristics of the future rocket, select subcontractors, estimate the necessary expenses for the execution of works and link all this with the planned system of housekeeping in the USSR.
By the fall of 1954, the look of the promising K-5M rocket had taken shape. The main ideas laid by DL Tomashevich and tested during the flight tests of K-5, have been preserved. The principle of pointing “three points” along the equal signal line formed by a conical beam scanning of an onboard radar of an interceptor fighter and the aerodynamic scheme “duck” remained unchanged. At the same time, with a slight increase in starting mass and dimensions, taking into account the new conditions for the use of the upgraded missile, it was possible to improve the basic flight and tactical characteristics of the product. The effectiveness of the warhead (CU) increased, increasing its mass and amount of explosive, adjusting the contours of the combat equipment compartment; reduced the angle of the fragments; as a result, the damage radius increased by one and a half times. To increase maneuverability and maximum height, the area of the wing and the size of the rudders were increased; as a result, the maximum available overloads doubled to 18 units. The large launch range of the missile was ensured by the increased mass of solid fuel, the capacity of the pneumatic system cylinder and the onboard power supply source.
At the end of the 1954 of the year in the USSR, it became known that the AIM-4 “Falcon” air-to-air missile was adopted in the USA. This contributed to the fact that more attention was paid to similar work by the country's leadership, and on the eve of the New Year, the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers adopted a joint resolution on the development of several air-to-air missiles; K-5M and K-6 were created by cooperation of enterprises led by OKB-2, K-7 — OKB-134 (chief designer I.I.Toropov), K-8 — OKB-4 (chief designer M.R.Bisnovat) , K-9 — OKB-155 (chief designer A.I. Mikoyan) and KB-1 (responsible head A.Savin).
At the same time, the decree provided for the arming of promising fighters with new missiles. The Mikoyan Design Bureau, which created the MiG-17PFU, has already studied the possible use of CMM products as part of the armament of the SM-7А supersonic interceptor fighter (60 product) based on the MiG-19. After the release of the resolution, the scope of work on the missile armament of fighter-interceptors in the Mikoyan Design Bureau expanded: K-6 was intended for the I-3 with the Almaz-3 radar and K-9 for the heavy E-152. The technical requirements for the second instance of the T-3 interceptor fighter, the OKO Sukhoi Design Bureau, provided for its armament with K-7 guided missiles. The product K-8 was supposed to arm the promising fighter AS Yakovlev Yak-123 (Yak-27).
Work on the K-5M rocket progressed very quickly, and already in March 1955, OKB-2 presented the draft design to the customer. In the spring of 1956, the development of autonomous rocket launches from a flying laboratory based on the MiG-19 — CM-2М (serial number 59210108) with two APU-4 starting devices began. At the first launch, a few seconds after the launch, the rocket lost control and, after writing several turns, went to the ground. During the initial study of fragments of a fallen rocket, it was not possible to identify the obvious causes of the accident. The cause of the incident found in a few days. The rear part of the fourth compartment, in which the aileron pneumatic drive was located, together with the fifth instrumental compartment formed an airtight cavity. Removal of the exhaust air of the pneumatic actuator from the cavity occurred through a bleed valve, which was closed before the launch of the rocket with an aluminum foil membrane. After the launch of the rocket, the pre-set valve provided a constant pressure differential between the cavity and the environment. When the board cavity was pressurized, the boards in the fifth compartment case were deformed, and a short circuit of one of them to the case occurred. After the suspicious fee was deployed, there were no more cases like this.
Another of the flaws in the missile control system that was discovered during flight tests was the autopilot failures that resulted in uncontrolled roll rotation. During the search for the causes of this phenomenon, it was possible to establish that it was caused by acoustic oscillations that occurred during the operation of the powder engine and led to a malfunction of the gyros.
To speed up the testing and development of the missile from the base carrier in 1956, at the Gorky Aviation Plant No. 21, according to the drawings of the A.Mikoyan Design Bureau, two MiG-19P aircraft were modified to the SM-7М variant, the RP-2-U radar sight and four pylons were installed on the aircraft. for installation of APU-4 starting devices. In GosNII-6 cars flew with tail numbers 03 and 04. Subsequently, after adopting this modification, the fighter-interceptor received the designation MiG-19PM.
In September 1956 of the year, the K-5M rocket was transferred to state joint tests (GSI), during which launches were carried out at altitudes up to 15,5 km, according to their results, the developers were offered to carry out appropriate modifications of the weapon system elements, and then to carry out control tests before the end of the year. At the GSE stage, the test crew was headed by the head of the GosNII-6 department, F.L. Antonovskiy, and I.V. Zabegailo was appointed as assistant engineer. The flights under the program were carried out by test pilots of GosNII-6 M.I. Bobrovitsky, L.N. Peterin, A.S. Devochkin, A.Ye. Chernyaev and from LII — Bychkovsky and A.I.Pronin. The team included leading autopilot engineer M. Karzachev, assistant autopilot engineer Yu.O. Nivert, lead engineer in combat unit (A / C) and aircraft suspension devices (AAP), I. Sultan, assistant chief engineer for A / C and AAP A. Tyroshkin, V.Maletsky was engaged in the preparation of the product on the pyrotechnic position.
If the first launches were carried out at medium altitudes and problems arose with the developers of the rocket, then during the first launch at a height of about ten kilometers they appeared with the developers of the fighter engine. After the launch of the missiles from the guides of the aircraft, both the TRDs stalled. At high altitude, due to the greater pressure drop at the nozzle section of the powder engine, the expansion of the jet after the flow increased significantly and the gases got into the fighter intake. The pilot had to save the prototype of the machine and start the engines in the air.
The A.I. Mikoyan Design Bureau did not come across this phenomenon for the first time, and dealt with this problem at SRI-2 (now GosNII AS) and the Central Institute of Aviation Motors. RD-9B engines were equipped with a CS system that automatically reduces the fuel supply to the engine and converts it to slower speed when the combat button is pressed by the pilot. In 1957, plant number 21 built five MiG-19PM aircraft armed with guided K-5M missiles. In July — August, 1957 carried out factory flight fire tests of three of them on three of them. A similar system was later equipped with the AL-7-1 engine when the Su-9 interceptor fighter with missile weapons was tested.
State control tests of the armament system, consisting of the MiG-19PM fighter-interceptor and K-5M missiles, were carried out only in August-October of the 1957.
Rocket K-5M surprises testers not only in the air, but also on the ground. Once, when preparing for the departure of the MiG-19PM test pilot GosNII-6, Lieutenant Colonel Arkady Chernyaev, a spontaneous launch of two K-5M rockets occurred. Having flown meters 20, they hit the ground and collapsed. The combat units burrowed into the ground, and the working powderhunks continued to move the remains of the rocket along the airfield. Fortunately, no one was hurt. The incident was reported to the leadership of the institute, and soon the deputy head of GosNII-6 for research work, Colonel L.I. Los, appeared at the scene of the incident. He found one of the engineers of the institute for digging out the warhead. Elk ordered to immediately stop this dangerous occupation and called for sappers to undermine the warhead.
Actively involved in the testing of missiles K-5M not only employees of OKB-2, but also the companies that produced the prototypes of missiles. The heading 455 number for the production of K-5M was the plant in Kaliningrad near Moscow. By the middle of the 1950-x plant mastered the production of aircraft turrets. In April, 1954, the company, largely due to the experience and energy of the plant director No. 455, MP Arzhakov, mobilized domestic resources, began the development of fundamentally new technology and technological processes, headed the cooperation of allied workers, with no less difficulty mastering the production of components. At the beginning of 1956, the plant started mass production of K-5 missiles. In this case, the plant was significantly assisted by the specialists of Plant No. 134, OKB-2 and KB-1. And if the first K-5 software rockets were manufactured by the research institute NII-88, then from 1956, K-5, and then K-5M, manufactured control and test equipment and ground equipment, were manufactured by plant number 455.
By a joint resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers No. 1343-619ss from 28.11.57, the K-5M missile as part of the C-2-U weapons system was accepted for supply by the Air Force. By the end of the year, OKB-2 and KB-455, organized in June 1956 of the year on the basis of the serial design department of the plant No. 455, together with the subcontractors eliminated the shortcomings identified during the control tests of K-5М, and finalized the design documentation. After adopting the K-5M rocket, it received the designation PC-2-U, in open documents the designation was used — product I.
Developing the principles embodied in the K-5M rocket design, in March 2-ÖB-1956 released a preliminary design of a modified K-5С product with a starting mass twice as large as the original machine and designed for use from a heavy fighter-interceptor. To defeat a test aerial target, not four K-5М missiles were required, but two K-5C. However, due to the heavy workload of the OKB-2 on the main theme — anti-aircraft guided missiles, further work on air-to-air missiles in Khimki was turned off, and a scientific and technical reserve to improve the K-5M missile, including the variant with a thermal homing head, was handed KB-455. In the future, work on modifying the K-5M missile and creating unmanned aerial vehicles of a different purpose on its base were carried out at KB-455 under the guidance of NT Picot.
In December, 1957 Plant No. 455 released the first serial PC-2-U. For three years, the plant produced 12 400 rockets (1957 — 3000,1958 — 7000, 1959, —3730 products). A small number of PC-2-U in 1959 were produced by factories - carpet number 575 and Izhevsk number 622. Plant number 455 provided them with technical assistance in setting up mass production.
In 1958, KB-455, following the government’s decree and the order of the Chairman of the GKAT, issued in November 1957, started modifying K-5М for use with the improved MiG-19 - SM fighter-interceptor SM-12M. -9 — T-43, developed from the directives mentioned above. The main task of the upcoming work was still the achievement of maximum altitude with the interception of air targets by fighters with higher tactical performance.