Military Review

1941. German mobile troops in the General Government

14

The following abbreviations are used in the article: А - army AK - army corps, IN - military district, GSh - General base, SOBOVO - Western Special VO, Spacecraft - Red Army, Cova - Kiev Special VO, u - a mechanized corps in a spacecraft or a motorized corps in the Wehrmacht, md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), Pribovo - Baltic special VO, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, Ro - intelligence department of VO, RU - Reconnaissance GSh KA, sd - rifle division, TGr - tank Group, td (tbr, mn, tb) - tank division (brigade, regiment, battalion), Ur - fortified area SWF - Southwestern Front.


In the previous part it was shown that our scouts were unable to provide timely information on the directions of strikes, on the concentration areas and on the exit directly to the state border of the 3rd and 4th TGR formations. Therefore, the impact of these groups was unexpected for the leadership of the PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KA. In the final part, we will consider the RM on the concentration of mobile enemy troops in the General Government.

Southern part of the General Government


In the report of RU from 31.5.41, there is verified information about the presence in the Lublin-Krakow region (against KOVO) of five md and six td. According to the document "Dislocation of German units ...", cited in the RM RU from 15.6.41, the intelligence was "aware" of the locations in the southern part of the General Government of the five headquarters of the MD, fourteen MP, four TD, the headquarters of the TD, six TP and three TB. In total, the author would estimate this grouping at 12 compounds, incl. up to 7 tank.

In fact, at that time there was not a single motorized or tank unit in the Lublin-Krakow region. Ранее the question of which divisions the reconnaissance mistakenly took for tank and motorized divisions was considered.

Currently, there are no published RMs with the locations of enemy divisions against KOVO in June 1941. The site "Memory of the People" contains several maps of the headquarters of KOVO and SWF, on which the locations of the German formations are marked. The dotted lines probably mark the areas of deployment of divisions, the RM about which required clarification as of June 19 ... 21.


According to the map dated June 23, on the eve of the war against KOVO, there are five MD, two TD, three TP and two TB. Also established are the places in which it is possible to find two more motorized and two tank divisions.

The difference between the cards developed on June 20 and the card created on the 23rd is as follows:
- there is no TD in Tarnów;
- there are MD and TP in Rzeszow;
- marked td north of Tomashuv;
- no MD in the Sennuva area. Probably, this MD arrived in Sennów from Rzeszow after 20 June.

Thus, the total number of mobile troops against KOVO, marked on different maps, is up to 14 motorized and tank divisions. This number includes connections that are circled in dotted lines on the map.

The table below shows the location of German mobile formations and units in accordance with the report of the RU on May 31 and in accordance with the situation, which is plotted on the maps of the headquarters of the KOVO or SWF.


The table shows that 50% of the formations (in Zamoć, near the cities of Tarnów, Sandomierz, Kholm and Grubieszow), noted in the RU summary of May 31, did not change their places of deployment before the start of the war. If we consider the possible locations of the four motorized and tank divisions, we can say that over 80% of the German formations of mobile troops remained in the places where they were "discovered" by reconnaissance at the end of May 1941.

Thus, intelligence before the start of the war tracked or tried to locate about 80% of non-existent mobile units ...

The figure below shows fragments of maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces with the locations of the divisions on the evening of June 16 or 19.


The figure shows that on the evening of June 16 in the Lublin-Krakow region there are the 25th MD (wheeled and tracked units), tracked units of the SS Viking division, 9th, 11th, 13th and 16th TD ... Outside the General Government, the wheeled units of the Viking SS Division, 11th, 13th and 16th etc., move along roads. The wheeled part of the 11th TD probably depicts mobile connections between the cities of Tarnów and Rzeszów.

By the evening of June 19, the tracked unit of the 14th TD arrived in the Kholm-Grubeshov area. Also on the territory of the General Government, wheel parts of the 14th and 16th TD appeared. The nonexistent td, which was stationed between the cities of Lublin - Holm and later between Holm - Krasnystav, was probably supposed to cover the advance to the border of the 1st TGr formations. The deployment areas of the arriving tracked units of the 9th, 11th and 16th TD were not found by our reconnaissance.

The figure below shows the deployment of German troops by June 22. The map additionally contains intelligence data on the locations of mobile troops. There are practically no coincidences, except for the presence of TD in the area of ​​the city of Holm.


From the evening of June 16 to the evening of June 19, a number of front-line divisions moved directly to the border and the tracked part of the 14th TD appeared near the border (behind the front-line). Also, the tracked part of the 25th MD was dispersed somewhat. By June 22, the 11th division reached the border.

Thus, on June 19-21, there was no mass withdrawal of the mobile divisions of the 1st TGr directly to the border.

On June 20, report No. 3 was prepared in the RO of the KOVO headquarters:

1. The movement of German troops to our borders is confirmed by various sources, the bulk of the arriving troops is concentrated on the Tomashev-Sandomierz direction...
3. Data on the numbering of armies require verification and clarification, but the presence of two army headquarters in the Lublin and Tomashev-Sandomierz directions is quite possible.
4. The replacement of previously located units in the Krakow direction deserves attention, especially since the newly arrived units belong to less resistant parts of the German army.
5. Large movement of all types of troops and transport south of Tomashuv pursues some kind of demonstrative purpose or is associated with ongoing exercises...

From the summary it follows that the scouts on June 20 were able to detect the exit of German troops to the border in the Tomashuv area. Reconnaissance was able to determine only one place of concentration of the shock group "The bulk of the arriving troops is concentrated in the Tomaszow-Sandomierz direction", but could not determine its quantitative composition. Two other strike groups (north of Sandomierz and in the Lublin-Kholm region) were not found by reconnaissance.

On June 20, intelligence of the NKGB also reported on the possible conduct of exercises in the General Government:

It was officially announced that one of these days large maneuvers of the German army will be carried out, in connection with which the population is urged to observe calm ...

At dawn on June 22, the German command struck unexpected strikes, not concentrating all the mobile units of the 1st TGr directly at the state border.

Memories of veterans of operational departments of KOVO


Head of Operations Department KOVO THEIR. Bagramyan wrote:

Against the 5th A on the first day of the offensive ... [enemy - Approx. Auth.] Introduced into the battle 10 PD and 4 TD ...
Every hour became more obviousthat we are not dealing with a border incident, but with the beginning of a carefully prepared war ...
[Frontline scouts. - Approx. Auth.] noted that in the area of ​​Lyuboml, one front line is advancing, in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsky - one front line and one TD, and the south, up to the border with the 6th A, - two more German front lines. It turned out that only 5 enemy divisions were advancing in the entire zone of the army. Considering that we had four rifle divisions not far from the border, the situation, naturally, did not seem so threatening.
The directive we received proceeded from this. After all, neither the People's Commissar, nor the Chief of the General Staff it was not yet knownthat from Sokal the German u and what is the same corps seeks to break through from Ustylug to Lutsk ...

From the memoirs it follows that the reconnaissance did not find the place of concentration of at least two German mk of the 1st TGr ...

The head of the operational department of the headquarters of the 5th A also writes about the incomplete information received from intelligence on the eve of the war. A.V. Vladimirsky:

To conceal the goals and scale of the concentration of such a mass of troops near our western border, the German fascist command carried out a whole system of carefully thought-out measures for operational-strategic camouflage and disinformation of the Soviet military command.
These included the extended movement of railway trains from the west to the border and careful camouflage of troops in the areas of concentration; imitation of the headquarters of the armies in those points from which they have already departed, and the assignment of code names to the newly arrived headquarters of armies and formations ...
On the concentration of large German fascist forces on the border with KOVO, the bulk of which was concentrated in the Tomaszow-Sandomierz direction, i.e. in front of the 5th A front, it was also noted in the RM of the KOVO headquarters, however, the conclusions about the goals of this concentration were incorrect. So, in the intelligence report No. 3 of the KOVO headquarters dated 20.6.41, it was indicated that "a large movement of all types of troops and transports ... pursues some kind of demonstrative purpose or is associated with conducting exercises" ...
Composition, numbering and location of enemy formations by our intelligence were opened accurately and not completely... So, before the 5th A, the presence of only 15 enemy divisions was noted, including only two etc. In reality, there were 21 divisions, including five etc. Concentration of the 1st TGr in front of the 5th Army, as well as the headquarters of Army Group South and the 6th Army in front of KOVO not noted at all...
During June 22, the army commander and headquarters did not yet have information about the situation, which would require a change in the grouping of forces and the introduction of corrections in the tasks of the troops determined by the cover plan. Therefore, the efforts of the command and staffs of all levels were directed on this day to the rapid advance of troops to the state border and the concentration of reserves in the areas designated for them ...

In the memoirs of General A. V. Vladimirsky, we can only talk about mythical etc., "discovered" by intelligence at the end of May near Tomaszów and between Kholm - Krasnystaw. General A. V. Vladimirsky directly points out that the presence of a large strike force in the form of the 1st TGr on the eve of the war before the 5th A reconnaissance was discovered.

Summaries of the first day of the war


On June 21 and 22, the leadership of the spacecraft and the border western VOs had to evaluate the German groupings based on the pre-war RM, in which they are represented scattered across the territory of East Prussia and the General Government. The places of concentration of large enemy strike groups were not determined at the border. Therefore, initially nothing dangerous was contained in the reports from the VO arriving at the General Staff. This was facilitated by the loss of communication with some formations and formations, as well as confusion and house in the command and control of troops.

Operator's bulletin No.1 GSh at 10-00 on 22.6.41:

Southwest front... At 4-35 after artillery fire ... enemy ground troops crossed the border developing a strike in the direction of Vladimir-Volynsk, Lyuboml and Kristinopol ... The enemy occupied, according to unverified data, Parkhach and Vysotsko in the Radymno area. Up to the regiment of enemy cavalry with tanks operating in the direction of Rava-Russk, penetrated into the UR ...

The front commanders put in place a cover plan and by active actions of mobile troops are trying to destroy the enemy units that have crossed the border ...

Operation No.2 GSh at 22-00 22.6.41:

German regular troops during June 22 fought with the border units of the USSR, having little success in some areas. In the second half of the day, with the approach of the forward units of the field forces of the spacecraft, the attacks of the German troops on the predominant stretch of our border were repulsed with losses for the enemy ...
Southwest front... During the day, units of the army fought with superior enemy forces advancing in the Lutsk and Lvov directions. Enemy attempts to cross to the eastern bank of the river. Rod had no success.
124th SD - occupying the former area on the right flank, withdrew to Stoyanow with the left flank. On the rest of the front, the situation is unchanged ...

The 124th rifle division was stationed in one of the directions of the 1st TGr attacks ...

Below in the summary of the SWF are data on the enemy's mobile troops on the evening of June 22.

Operation No.1 headquarters of the South-Western Front by 20-00 22.6.41:

The troops of the South-Western Front are fighting on the front of Wlodawa, Lipkany and by 18-00 22.6 they occupy the position:
1. 5A with units of cover leads stubborn battles and continues to concentrate troops towards the front. In the Gorodlo area, up to 200 enemy tanks at 16-00 in readiness to force the river. Boog ...
2. 6A with cover units is conducting stubborn battles at the front ... 41 Rifle Division, having up to two enemy PPs in front of itself with tanks counterattacked the advancing units [enemy - Approx. Auth.] ...
A concentration of motorized infantry with tanks was established in the area of ​​Oleshice and Bubrka ...
15th MK - on alarm went to the Brody, Byala Kamen, Zolochiv, Podkamen area in readiness at 18-30 to start moving in the direction of Radzekhuv with the task of destroying the enemy tank units that had broken through in the Radzekhuv area.
8th MK - reassigned from the 26th army to the 6th army - by the morning of 23.6 it is withdrawn to the Kurovitsa, Vinniki, Borynichy area, in readiness for a counterattack of enemy motorized units found in the Sokal area ...

By the evening of June 22, at the headquarters of the South-Western Front, they had an idea of ​​the presence of enemy tanks in all directions in which the 1st TGr was conducting combat operations. However, the headquarters still did not know about the number of mobile units in the directions of attacks. At the same time, incorrect information about "Concentration of motorized infantry with tanks in the area of ​​Oleshice and Bubrka"... These RMs were likely echoes of pre-war misinformation about the presence of a large number of tank and motorized units in the area.


At the headquarters of 5th A, even in the afternoon of June 23, they had a poor idea of ​​the number of enemy troops in front of their front.


At the headquarters, they believe that only one enemy tactical unit is operating in front of the entire front of the army. There are up to 200 tanks in the Gorodno area - this is about one vehicle. According to the border guards, there are up to 1000 tanks in the Dubenko area (indicated above on the map fragment), but this is unverified information. In fact, there are enemy TDs far beyond the front line, but there are much fewer tanks there. Yes, and the German command was not going to introduce tanks in this sector of the front ...

Intelligence Directorate Summary


According to the data of the report No. 1 of the RU from June 22, it can be determined that from May 31 to June 19 (inclusive) the German group in the Lublin-Krakow region increased by only 1-2 pd. The arrival of real motorized and tank formations in RM was not reflected. The reconnaissance could observe the lines of echelons and columns, but could not tie them to the concentrating motorized and tank divisions. Also, she was unable to determine the location of the concentration of these divisions.

On June 22, RU decided that on June 20 and 21, 11 infantry divisions arrived at the KOVO border, which did not correspond to reality. From May 31 to June 22, reconnaissance tracked against KOVO the same number of mobile units: 5 motorized and 6 tank.

In the report of the RU on June 22, the groupings of the enemy forces were identified, which operated against the SWF.

1941. German mobile troops in the General Government

Below is a fragment of the map with the plotted data from the pre-war RM and with the areas of deployment of mobile units according to the data of the report No. 1 of the RU.


Information about the presence of one tank and three motorized divisions in the Hrubieszow - Sokal - Tomaszow - Szczebrzeszyn area is close to reality. However, all three MDs were discovered at the end of May 1941 and were nonexistent compounds. These are two md in the city of Zamoć and one in the Hrubieszow area. Therefore, the intelligence could never detect the exit of parts of these mythical formations directly to the state border ...

Thus, our intelligence was unable to detect the redeployment from Germany and from the Western direction of the mobile formations of the 1st TGr, to determine the places of concentration of these formations and the place of strikes by mobile groups.

The German command managed to create a deceptive picture of the concentration of a fictitious powerful strike group at the top of the Lvov ledge. Up to 2,5 mobile Hungarian compounds were also found there. An even more powerful fictitious strike group of up to 10 md, etc., was listed on the territory of Romania.

On the Voennoye Obozreniye website and in many studies, the movement of the micro spacecraft at the beginning of the war on the Lvov ledge is considered in accordance with the cover plans. However, these cover plans were developed at the General Staff and at the KOVO headquarters in late May - early June 1941. These plans were required to take into account the presence of non-existent strike groups at the top of the Lvov salient and in Romania.

Mobile troops against ZAPOVO


In the previous part, the RM was presented on the concentration of troops of the 3rd TGr on the Suvalka ledge. Therefore, in this section, we will consider only the issue of concentration of compounds of the 2nd TGr. The table below compares the RM from the report of the RU from 31.5.41 and the information available at the headquarters of the Western Military District about the enemy's mobile troops on the eve of the war.


The table shows that as of June 21:
1) 51% of motorized and tank regiments did not change their places of deployment, in which they were discovered at the end of May. It is assumed that TP consists of three TB;
2) out of 49% of the missing regiments, three regiments (21%) never existed in the Wehrmacht. It is possible that the servicemen who portrayed these dummies simply returned to their units;
3) none of the large headquarters of the mobile troops (the headquarters of the 58th MD, TD and TBR) changed their location from the end of May to 21 June;
4) in Demblin (117 km to the border), the Tbr appeared.

The redeployment of real motorized and tank units was again undetected by our reconnaissance forces.

On the evening of June 16, the 3rd, 4th, 17th, 18th TD, 10th, 29th MD and the SS Reich division were concentrated against the troops of the Western Military District.


At the railway station in the city of Lublin, the 10th TD was unloaded, which began to move to its divisional concentration area located south-west of the station. West of Lublin, the tracked part of the 10th MD, which arrived by rail, was concentrated. The wheel part of the 10th md moves towards it along the roads.

By the evening of June 19, the mobile units of the divisions remained in the same places of deployment as on the evening of June 16. From the map fragments it can be seen that units of the 3rd, 4th, 17th and 18th TD were concentrated at the border, but there were no tanks at the border at that time. This is evidenced, for example, by records in war log of the 3rd TD:

13.06.41 Units report on arrival in a new concentration area ... Units in forest camps persistently complain of torment from mosquitoes, demanding urgent help. Only mosquito nets are an effective tool.
14.06.41 ... A careful camouflage is prescribed to the east of the prohibition line.
15.6.41 ... Since the division on June 16 at 0-00 takes over control of the border section, the 3rd and 394th Regiment will receive a special order to replace [the border guards].
16.6.41... The order on the protection of the border gives directives on the attitude towards the population of the border regions, whose freedom of movement is sharply limited in the near future ...
19.06.41 ... By order of the division commander, changes are taking place in the advancement plan, since on the night from B-3 to B-2 [from 19.6 to 20.6 - Approx. Auth.], In addition to the previously assigned units, the 3rd motorcycle battalion, the 1st reconnaissance battalion, the 543rd and 521st anti-tank battalions also entered their initial positions; on the night from B-2 to B-1 [from 20.6 to 21.6 - Approx. Auth.] The 3st and 6nd battalions of the same regiment were behind the 1rd battalion of the 2th TP. Thus, on the night from B-1 to B [from 21.6 to 22.6 - Approx. Auth.], Only the headquarters of the 5th tank brigade and the headquarters of the 6th tank regiment with the remaining divisions of the regiment leave the Radzyn area in the area of ​​the initial positions ...

The reconnaissance battalion had 25 armored vehicles and no tanks. The motorcycle battalion had only cars and motorcycles. The first tanks of the 3rd TD began to move directly to the state border only on the night of June 20-21. Nothing could alert the intelligence and command of the border military units until June 21 ...

The figure below shows a report map of the headquarters of the Western Military District with the situation at 21.6.41. The map additionally contains the full names of some parts and compounds.


It can be seen from the figure that the headquarters of the Western Military District are confident that the German mobile troops are dispersed along the entire border. In the area of ​​deployment of the 2nd TGR, of the mobile troops, there is only a brigade, two tp, mn and two cavalry brigades. Of the many thousands of vehicles of tank formations and formations of the 2nd TGr, only 300 vehicles are known ... It can be seen that most of the divisions and regiments of the grouping in the Brest region are located quite far from the border line.

Information from the KOVO map (SWF), a fragment of which is presented below, also testifies to the insignificant grouping of mobile troops in the Brest region.


The information available at the KOVO headquarters about the enemy troops north of Wlodawa coincides with the data of the ZAPOVO headquarters and does not correspond to reality ...

Below on the map with the deployment of German formations by June 22, the author plotted the data of the last peaceful reports of the RO of the headquarters of ZAPOVO.


It can be seen from the figure that on the evening of June 21, ZapOVO scouts are sure that more than half of the German mobile troops are scattered along the entire border, and two such units are even located in the Minsk Mazovetsky - Warsaw area. A fairly solid grouping was "found" near Brest: up to two TD, up to two MD and up to three cavalry divisions. This grouping includes troops in the area of ​​the town of Sedlec (two infantry divisions and two cavalry regiments) and a brigade in the area of ​​the town of Demblin.

Thus, neither the headquarters of the ZapOVO, nor the RU, nor the General Staff know about the presence of the 2nd TGr in the Brest region. This is evidenced by the fact that neither in the operational reports of the General Staff for the 22nd day and in the morning of June 23, nor in the report of the RU for June 22, there is not a word about this direction ... This direction in the General Staff does not cause concern. there are no large strike groups in this area ...

Operator's bulletin No. 1 GSh at 10-00 on 22.6.41:

The Western Front... With ground forces, the enemy is developing an attack from the Suwalki area in the direction of Golynka, Dobrov and from the Sokolow area along the railway to Volkovysk. The advancing enemy forces are being specified ...
In the direction of Sokolow, Volkovysk, intense battles are going on in the Cheremkha region. By his actions in these two directions, the enemy obviously strives to cover the north-western grouping of the front ...

Operator's bulletin No. 2 GSh at 22-00 on 22.6.41:

The Western Front... During the day, restraining the enemy's offensive in the Grodno, Bialystok and Brest directions, at the same time pulling up reserves from the depths to launch a counteroffensive ...
A 10... Having repulsed the enemy offensive on Bialystok, he is fighting on the front Lomza, Tsekhanovets. The enemy retreats from Lomжа to Ostroleka.
In the area of ​​Radun, Nacha in the period 16-42 - 17-54 parachute troops were dropped in the amount of 1000-1500 people.
13 microns - at 18-00 launched a counterattack in the direction of Botska, against enemy tanks that had broken through to Belsk.
6 microns are concentrated in the Bialystok area. The position of the rest of the army is being specified.
A 4... During the day, the army's troops fought stubborn battles with superior enemy forces on the Melnik, Brest-Litovsk line ...

Operator's bulletin No. 3 GSh at 8-00 on 23.6.41: «The Western Front... Front troops continue to engage in stubborn battles with the enemy force up to 30-32 infantry division, four TD and two MD, advancing on the Grodno and Belsk directions ... "

Operator's bulletin No. 4 GSh at 18-00 on 23.6.41: «The Western Front... 4 Army. At 5-30 TD the enemy launched an offensive on Zhabinka and 3 Infantry Divisions with tanks - from Brest to Kobrin ... "


Intelligence report of RU No. 1 at 20-00 on 22.6.41:

The Western Front: Groupings are confirmed:
a) in the area of ​​Mlawa, Ciehanów, Ostrolenka, Myshinets on the operational direction Bialystok, consisting of about 5 road units;
b) a grouping of troops in the region of Brest, Sedlets, Domachevo on the operational direction Brest - Kobrin, consisting of at least three infantry and one tank division.
c) a grouping to the east and north-east of Warsaw in the Malkin, Vyszków, Wengrów area, consisting of 6 infantry and one motorized division ...



The number of "confirmed" divisions in the report of the Republic of Uzbekistan still does not correspond to reality ... The number of mobile formations concentrated against the Western Front in the Republic of Uzbekistan on the evening of June 22 is estimated at one MD, four TD and one cavalry division. The same number of divisions was "discovered" by reconnaissance by May 31, 1941. It can be seen that the impact of the MK 2nd TGr was unexpected both for the command of the ZAPOVO and spacecraft, and for reconnaissance.

conclusions


In accordance with the materials and documents given in the article on mobile troops, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. RM on the deployment of German troops at the Soviet-German border since the spring of 1940, significantly overestimated the number of enemy formations. Of the one TD, two tank brigades and five tank battalions discovered by reconnaissance at 8.8.40, in the territory of East Prussia and former Poland, in fact, there was not a single formation or unit that could be attributed to tank forces.

At the same time, the numbers of nonexistent one TD and four TP were known to intelligence and rechecked with the help of other sources of information. Such a situation could be only in one case: when these data were based on deliberate misinformation of the German command.

2. Until the end of May 1941, the RM on the deployment at the border of the German mobile troops significantly differed from their actual presence. For example, in the RM, given in the report of the RU dated May 31 (similar data are also presented in the report No. 5 RU of June 15), it was said about the presence in the territories:
- East Prussia and the former Poland - twelve tank and fifteen motorized divisions;
- Romania - four tank and six motorized divisions.

In fact, there was not a single German armored or motorized division in Romania at that time. On the territory of East Prussia and the former Poland at that time, in fact, there were only three TD and in total no more than one division in the Katowice area, which could have been parts of the 13th TD and MP "Great Germany".

When checking the RM with the data presented on the maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, it can be determined that not a single location of TD, MD, TP and MP, according to reconnaissance data, coincided with the actual areas of deployment of tank formations. Those. reconnaissance observed, rechecked and tracked non-existent units and divisions ...

3. By 22.6.41 from 50 to 80% of non-existent tank and motorized formations and units on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland were in the same places where they were "discovered" by reconnaissance at the end of May 1941.

By June 22, Romania still did not have a single German tank or motorized division out of ten, which our intelligence "discovered" and tracked until June 25 and even later.

At the same time, the concentration of the mobile formations of the four TGRs, the directions of their attacks and the exit of these troops directly to the state border were not detected by our intelligence services. This is evidenced by the maps of the headquarters of the PribOVO, ZAPOVO, KOVO prepared after the start of the war, the operational reports of the General Staff of the first days of the war and the report of the RU from 22.6.41. Therefore, for the command of the border military units, for the leadership of the spacecraft and the general staff, the strikes of the enemy's TGR were unexpected.

4. In the instruction of the High Command of the Wehrmacht, the Abwehr said: «Make an impression, that the main direction in our movements has been shifted to the southern regions of the General Government, to the protectorate and Austria ... "

In the Barborossa plan, the 11th Army headquarters, which commanded German troops in Romania, was assigned the following task: “To ensure the success of the offensive of Army Group South, the army must, demonstrating the deployment of large forces, pin down the opposing enemy, and in the future, as the offensive develops in other directions, in cooperation with aviation prevent the organized withdrawal of the Russians beyond the river. Dnieper...".

By June 22, in the southern part of the General Government, in Slovakia, in the Carpathian Ukraine and on the territory of Romania, up to 94-98 German divisions, of which up to 26 were motorized and tank divisions, were able to “detect” the disinformation measures carried out within the framework of the above instructions.

According to intelligence, up to 35-37% of mobile units were located against the PribOVO and ZAPOVO (in the so-called secondary direction), which were dispersed along our border.

The real picture was more ominous. A grouping of mobile forces was concentrated against these military units, which accounted for over 70% of all tank and motorized divisions that the German command allocated for the war with the Soviet Union.

5. On June 21 and 22, the People's Commissariat of Defense and the General Staff practically do not understand what is happening in the adjacent border area. Lacking reliable RM, not understanding what was happening on the border and assuming that the German groupings were not completely concentrated near the border, the SC command in the afternoon of June 22 insisted on a meeting with Stalin on striking the border military units.

Directive of the People's Commissar of the USSR No. 3 22.6.41:

“I order:
... d) The armies of the Southwestern Front, firmly holding the border with Hungary, concentric strikes in the general direction of Lublin with forces of 5 and 6A, at least five microns and all aviation of the front, surround and destroy the enemy grouping advancing on the front Vladimir-Volynsky, Krystynopol , by the end of 26.6 capture the Lublin region. Secure yourself from the Krakow direction ...
People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Tymoshenko
Malenkov, member of the Main Military Council
Chief of the General Staff of the Red Army, General of the Army Zhukov

This decision was based on pre-war unreliable RMs, which did not even closely reflect the actual situation at the border. The chief of the General Staff quickly left for the headquarters of the South-Western Front to organize counterattacks against the invading "small" enemy forces and for a further offensive on Lublin. When making this decision, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff could only be guided by the RM about the German troops, which are presented below in the figure.


It was very tempting to defeat the few invading German divisions and deliver a swift attack with mechanized corps at the main enemy forces that had not finished concentrating ...
Author:
Articles from this series:
East Prussia. German mobile troops on the eve of the war
Reconnaissance about German tanks and motorized infantry in June 1941
May 1941. Where are the German tanks and motorized infantry?
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  1. cavl
    cavl 25 September 2020 05: 25
    61
    Thanks to the author for the interesting article! I read it with great pleasure.
    I had no idea about many moments in history.
    I would like to meet something unexpected in the future
  2. Olgovich
    Olgovich 25 September 2020 07: 21
    -2
    Like this statement:
    Enough a solid grouping was "discovered" near Brest: up to two TD, up to two md and up to three cavalry divisions.

    the author correlates with this:
    Thus, the availability 2nd TGr in the Brest region Don't know nor at the headquarters of the WTO
    belay
    According to intelligence, against PribOVO and ZAPOVO (on the so-called minor direction) was up to 35-37% of mobile connections, which were dispersed along our border.

    The real picture was more ominous. A grouping of mobile forces was concentrated against these military units, which accounted for over 70% of all tank and motorized divisions that the German command allocated for the war with the Soviet Union.


    Was the catastrophe in KOVO (secondary in real life and with prepared forces to confront much larger German forces, according to the author) was much smaller? In theory, they should have been smashed and driven, since the Germans were much weaker than expected. Apparently, this is not the point ...

    RM interfered with the preparation of strategic bridges for destruction (captured intact ALL)?

    Disinformation is a well-known technique for thousands of years and strategic defense cannot be based on RMs, which obviously have a percentage of inaccuracies and misinformation.

    As far as I remember, the directions of the main strikes, lost in the headquarters exercises on the eve of the war, did not differ much from those actually inflicted ...
    1. AsmyppoL
      25 September 2020 11: 08
      46
      Corresponds very simply ...
      A tank brigade and two tank regiments were discovered by reconnaissance at the end of May, when these units were simply not near the border. On the map of the ZAPOVO headquarters with the situation as of 21.6.41 in the Brest direction, the same units are marked. They are deployed not near the border, but at a distance from it. In the same place where they were for almost a month or more. Those. not parts of the 2nd TGr, which began to move after May 30, 1941, were discovered, but some dummy ...

      Thus, the actual redeployment of the 2nd TGr divisions to the territory of former Poland and closer to the state border was not detected. The concentration areas of these divisions do not coincide with the areas of detection of the tank brigade and regiments.

      In the morning or afternoon of June 21, the intelligence department of the headquarters of the Western Military District is preparing a report on the situation for June 20, in which nothing particularly serious or dangerous is noted.

      In the next summary at 20-00 on June 21, there are alarming notes, but the grouping itself has not changed. They simply added a tank brigade in the Demblin area and a motorized division, parts of which were stationed from Kossov to Seldce. Opposite Brest, tank units are not recorded ...

      There is no contradiction. Intelligence noted all non-existent parts that were allegedly discovered in the month of May. The arriving tank brigade also cannot change something ... If it is a tank division, then where are its two motorized regiments and two artillery regiments (as you are sure of the reconnaissance): an artillery regiment and an anti-tank regiment.
      1. Olgovich
        Olgovich 25 September 2020 13: 01
        -8
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Those. not parts of the 2nd TGr, which began to move after May 30, 1941, were found, but some dummy ...

        What is the difference between 2 Tr and "dummies" (but which were considered REAL)?

        The name?
        Quote: AsmyppoL
        Thus, the actual redeployment of the 2nd TGr divisions to the territory of former Poland and closer to the state border was not detected. The concentration areas of these divisions do not coincide with the areas of detection of the tank brigade and regiments.

        On YOUR map, this is the region of Brest and you yourself write: "At Brest" - where is closer to the border?
      2. AsmyppoL
        18 October 2020 12: 59
        +4
        There must be something from above. I finished the article and came down with ARVI. Three weeks ARVI diagnosis. Two weeks of them, the temperature was from 38 to 39,7 ... The clinic of our federal nuclear center is packed with hundreds of ARVI patients. A day later, it turned out that I was in contact with a coronavirus patient. A day later, that I myself was sick and more than 40% of my lungs were affected ... The reserve department for such a situation turned out to be without doctors. In four days, they showed three shifts of a heavily infected patient with coronavirus. Trained with one 30 doctors in three shifts. Wildness. Some kind of systematic error has been made in the protection system. All 30 doctors were sent to sick leave two days later. We ended up in a department where doctors could hardly be gathered one by one from different departments. No tests. This is a new strain. And in the city, thousands of patients are sure that they have ARVI ... Listening to the lungs and fluorography say that everything is fine ...
        Terribly scary for the people who are outside the hospital. Huge respect for a few doctors who are afraid, do not want to work with us, but work, joke and support us, patients with corlnovirus ... Everything is different on TV ...
        1. cavl
          cavl 19 October 2020 02: 10
          +2
          Health to you, dear Eugene!
          Good, responsive doctors and patience on the way to get rid of the coronavirus!
          One of the readers
    2. ccsr
      ccsr 25 September 2020 13: 02
      -40 qualifying.
      Quote: Olgovich
      As far as I remember, the directions of the main strikes, lost in the headquarters exercises on the eve of the war, did not differ much from those actually inflicted ...

      Already in February, the options for the main attacks of the Wehrmacht were known, but the pseudo-researcher AsmyppoL (Eugene) does not want to take this into account:

      Moreover, he always slips DRAWINGS, not maps, and if you look closely at them, you will see traces of modern drawings and, naturally, these are false "documents".
      For example, he indicates that
      The figure below shows fragments of maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces with the locations of the divisions on the evening of June 16 or 19.
      If any competent person looks at it, he will see that the enemy is not indicated on it, i.e. this map cannot belong to officials of the operations department of the General Staff, if only because there are six or three days left before the war, and there is not even information about the enemy on the map. He further writes that
      The figure below shows the deployment of German troops by June 22.
      , but the funny thing is that Halder himself probably drew two black arrows with a felt-tip pen - in general, this dreamer draws on the cards everything that comes into his head, and at the same time thinks that those who understand the documents will believe him. So, only amateurs can believe in the nonsense that he says about intelligence actions on the eve of the war, because he constantly lies, and he was repeatedly caught in lies and fraud. As for the deployment of German troops on June 1, 1941, there is a map of the GRU General Staff, which indicates in detail what German forces were concentrated by that time and there are no additional drawings on it:
      1. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
        Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 25 September 2020 14: 04
        +7
        Quote: ccsr
        that is, a map of the GRU General Staff, which indicates in detail what German forces were concentrated by that time and there are no additional drawings on it:

        something doubtful that this is a map of the GRU General Staff. Staff officers sat and painted contour maps)
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 25 September 2020 19: 55
          -30 qualifying.
          Quote: Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
          something doubtful that this is a map of the GRU General Staff. Staff officers sat and painted contour maps)

          This is a bookstore redrawing maps (a version of tracing paper, if you know how to do it), which was included in the rare edition "History of Russian Military Intelligence" and where declassified materials of the GRU General Staff came to be in connection with the 200th anniversary of Russian military intelligence. The reliability of the materials contained in it is 100%, because the group of authors is too authoritative in the GRU General Staff, and would not engage in fraud. If you ever catch your eye, I recommend buying it right away - there were a total of 1000 copies released:

          By the way, the author of the article uses scans from this book, which I posted on this forum.
          1. Paragraph Epitafievich Y.
            Paragraph Epitafievich Y. 25 September 2020 20: 10
            +3
            Quote: ccsr
            If you ever catch your eye, I recommend to buy immediately


            I will try, thanks for the recommendation.
            1. cavl
              cavl 26 September 2020 00: 41
              25
              You were right about the card.
              The author has repeatedly cited links
              On the document "Dislocation of German units ...", which is given in the book of Kondrashov.
              The tables of the document indicate the locations of the headquarters of armies, corps, divisions. Dislocation of divisions, regiments, some battalions and special units.
              The given map is nothing more than an attachment to the specified document.
              On the map, the groupings of German troops are roughly and approximately outlined in accordance with the tables of the specified document.
              There is no other meaning and more accurate information in this.

              Since the author has placed all the links to the maps used in his materials, only the dull-witted Milchakov can say that there is a certain catch in the figures. Anyone can compare original maps with additional information provided on maps by the author.
              Additional information provided on the maps in the article, which is easily distinguished by the color used, makes it easy to understand how false the intelligence data turned out to be.
              But, for Milchakov, when it is impossible to dispute the facts, but really want to - the main thing is to cast at least some kind of shadow.
              Together with Kozinkin, they are ready to engage in any fraud ...
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 27 September 2020 16: 19
                -24 qualifying.
                Quote: cavl
                On the map, the groupings of German troops are roughly and approximately outlined in accordance with the tables of the specified document.
                There is no other meaning and more accurate information in this.

                Since a certain anonym cavl (Vladimir) is a complete dilettante in military affairs and apparently never served in the army, his illiteracy is manifested even in the assessment of the GRU GSh map. Firstly, for the category of military commanders who were familiar with these materials, they do not care at all about the "approximation of the grouping circle", because they are strategists in thinking and they are primarily interested in the entire military potential of the enemy, and not how exactly the formations and parts are located on the ground. Secondly, from the map it is quite clear that the main forces of the Germans are not spread over the entire territory of Poland, but only near our border, which is why if cavl (Vladimir) cannot draw the correct conclusions from this, then any military professional will immediately understand what it is a threat to our country.
                And thirdly, cavl (Vladimir), like the liar AsmyppoL, did not answer the simple question of how long it would take a German tank division located at a distance of, for example, 200, 400, 600 and 1000 km from the border with the USSR to move it, for example, to the deployment area directly at the border on June 22. I don’t know how our "theorists" will be able to calculate this, judging by their delusions and outright lies.
                Quote: cavl
                then only the dull-witted Milchakov can say that there is a catch in the drawings.

                Of course, AsmyppoL's drawings have a lot of different add-ons and other stickers, but the most important thing is that he managed to bring only three German maps (one of our trophy), and one of them was dated May 26, and the other two were generally incomprehensible to whom it was they do not fully reflect the situation at the date of compilation, and moreover, there is no enemy at all. Anyone who is familiar with the maps and knows what is displayed on them will immediately understand that the author is brandishing that he has no real relation to June 22, 1941. But such amateurs as cavl (Vladimir) are quite enough of this in view of their illiteracy.
                Quote: cavl
                Additional information provided on the maps in the article, which is easily distinguished by the color used, makes it easy to understand how false the intelligence data turned out to be.

                This is a heinous lie, because the intelligence data was absolutely reliable, and this is confirmed by German sources:
                Thus, the total composition of the forces of Hitlerite Germany, deployed and intended to start operations against the Red Army, on June 1, 1941 was no less than 150-155 German divisions. Obviously, this count does not include the number of ground divisions and individual brigades of the then Hitler's allies - Romania, Hungary and Finland. We knew their numbers exactly, as it is rightly said in the aforementioned book "Soviet Army" on page 156, "a total of 190 divisions stood in full readiness against the Red Army ..." The accuracy of our data is the result of the exceptional conscientiousness of military intelligence officers on the ground and special checks of information received by employees of the Intelligence Agency.
                .....
                Naturally, the desire to compare these data of our Intelligence Agency with what is written in the book by General of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht Kurt Tippelskirch "History of World War II": 22 armored, 81 motorized, 1 police and security divisions. Another 17 infantry, 15 tank, 9 motorized divisions and 22 police division were on the way as reserves of the main command "(2). Total: 2 divisions. On the same issue, I will quote from the book of a collective of military historians "World War II 1939-1945": "The German fascist troops (taking into account the reserve of the main command, not counting the five German divisions stationed in Finland, as well as the Allied troops) were are located in the directions, the boundaries of which are indicated above (175). On the main axis, in the center of the front, there were 62 divisions and two brigades, or about 43%, in the southern sector of the front - 54 divisions, or up to 36%, and in the northern sector of the front - 31 divisions, or 21% ”(176). Total: 152 German divisions (with five stationed in Finland).
                Finally, the official evidence on this issue is what was said in the book "50 Years of the Armed Forces of the USSR": "For the attack on the Soviet Union, 153 divisions were assigned, including 33 tank and motorized ..." (177).

                So if different amateurs argue that if some kind of unit or headquarters has not been identified, this is a criterion for assessing intelligence, then you can only notice that these people are completely lacking not only strategic thinking, but also completely operational. Any commander of a district (front), by and large, does not care where on the eve of a war the headquarters of an enemy formation or army is located, because he is concerned about the number of combat ready formations and the enemy's ability to build them up, and everything else is secondary. But our dreamers, foaming at the mouth, will prove the opposite because of their illiteracy, because none of them even stood close to the headquarters of the army or corps, and I’m not even talking about the district or front.
  3. cavl
    cavl 26 September 2020 00: 43
    26
    Quote: Olgovich
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    Those. not parts of the 2nd TGr, which began to move after May 30, 1941, were found, but some dummy ...

    What is the difference between 2 Tr and "dummies" (but which were considered REAL)?

    The name?
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    Thus, the actual redeployment of the 2nd TGr divisions to the territory of former Poland and closer to the state border was not detected. The concentration areas of these divisions do not coincide with the areas of detection of the tank brigade and regiments.

    On YOUR map, this is the region of Brest and you yourself write: "At Brest" - where is closer to the border?


    The difference is huge. Try to prove that two tank brigades are equal to nine divisions of three motorized corps.

    Maybe you will calculate the distance from the border, at which the places of deployment of German brigades in Demblin and Dombrovo are marked.

    As far as I understand, "at Brest" is the same as "at the border" in the intelligence data, regarding the two tank divisions that are stationed near Warsaw.

    For the leadership of the Red Army, data on the exit to the initial areas 2-3 km from the border of the shock motorized tank groups should have been important.
    But this information through intelligence before the start of the war and even after its start did not reach nie.
    1. icant007
      icant007 8 October 2020 22: 09
      -11 qualifying.
      motorcycle groups

      smiled)))

      would say already mechanized or motorized would look smarter)

      About two tank brigades and nine divisions that you play with numbers and mislead people.
      Be honest, single out 3 or 4 armored divisions out of three corps, and the comparison will not seem so wild.
      And your irony in comparison with Brest and Warsaw. This is the distance of one daily passage of a tank column.
      There was no information about advancing directly to the border, as I already wrote, about the time delay between detection and transmission of intelligence information.
      And about intelligence in the first days of the war, you can not talk at all, let alone evaluate.
      Aviation is broken, communications are interrupted. The headquarters of the armies could not be contacted, let alone provide intelligence. God grant from the front line to report information.

      This is who you are treating with Eugene. Engage in banal manipulation, word and number games.

      They survived, civilians are teaching the military to evaluate the work of intelligence.