East Prussia. German mobile troops on the eve of the war

The following abbreviations are used in the article: AK - army corps, ap - artillery regiment, IN - military district, GSh - General base, SOBOVO - Western Special VO, Spacecraft - Red Army, Cova - Kiev Special VO, md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), u - motorized housing pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), Pribovo - Baltic special VO, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, Ro - intelligence department of VO, RU - Reconnaissance GSh KA, sk (sd) - rifle corps (division), TGr - tank Group, td (mn, tb) - tank division (regiment, battalion).

In the previous part it was said that instead of real enemy force groupings in East Prussia and in the northern part of the General Government, intelligence had "discovered" a huge grouping in southern Poland, Slovakia, Carpathian Ukraine and Romania. According to intelligence, by the evening of June 22, this group included up to 94-98 German divisions, of which 26 were motorized and tank divisions.

At the end of May, reconnaissance “for sure” knew about twenty one armored and motorized divisions, which were concentrated on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland. In fact, at this time in East Prussia there were two TDs and another TD arrived on the territory of former Poland in the area of ​​the city of Poznan.

Ранее The places of deployment of units that belonged to mobile troops were considered. There are no coincidences between the actual disposition of the enemy and RM. Of all the places of deployment of tank units, which are listed in the reconnaissance report dated May 31.5.41, 21, only one TP 1 (city of Letzen) was near the actual location of the 21st TP. However, Letzen was not part of the territory of the concentration area of ​​this division. The 20st TP in the 21th TD was at this time in Germany (Ohrdruf). The scouts could learn about TP from conversations of local residents or if they saw servicemen in tank uniforms with signs of the XNUMXst regiment.

The 20th TD could start redeploying to the territory of East Prussia only after June 16. In the evening of June 19, until half of the 20th TD is located near Letzen, but the city itself does not fall into the division's concentration area again. Therefore, it can be argued that all the found locations of the 21st Panzer and Motorized Divisions are mistakes of our intelligence or the result of German disinformation.

It was shown that, according to intelligence data, 19-5 German divisions were redeployed to the border by June 7 (inclusively). According to RU data for June 20 and 21, the number of divisions that appeared at the border was 22-24. However, these new 22-24 divisions simply did not exist in the areas where reconnaissance found them ... It turns out that in June 1941, reconnaissance could not record the redeployment of more than 30 German divisions, the overwhelming number of which were tank and motorized divisions.

The transportation of 5-7 German divisions until June 19, discovered by intelligence, is even an estimate from above. Of the indicated number of divisions, 4-5 (of which two MD and two TD) arrived on the territory of East Prussia. According to the author, this number is overestimated. In accordance with the report of RU from 31.5.41, there were 23-24 divisions in East Prussia, incl. 18-19 pd, 3 ppm and 5 tp (only 2 td).

According to the document "Dislocation of German units ..." from 31.5.41, in East Prussia there were 15 headquarters of the infantry division, 3 headquarters of the md, 63 pp, 12 mn, 22 ap, 5 tp, 6 tb and 11 infantry battalions. In addition to these troops, according to unverified data, the 161st MD was located in the city of Shilute, which, according to the RM on June 17 and 21, was in the same city. The enemy grouping in East Prussia on May 31 can be estimated at 28-28,5 divisions (21 infantry divisions, 4 md, up to 3-3,5 td), and according to reconnaissance data, as of June 19, there were 28 divisions there. If such an estimate is permissible, then the reconnaissance recorded from the end of May to June 19 the movement of only 2-3 pd (one in ZAPOVO and 1-2 in KOVO).

Intelligence data on mobile enemy troops in East Prussia

Maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces with the situation for the evening 16 June и 19 June 1941 were posted on the English site and later appeared on Russian sites. The deployment of German troops on the evening of June 16, theoretically, could reach the RO of the PribOVO headquarters by the end of June 17. Below, on a fragment of the map, RMs are plotted, which are given in the summary of RO PribOVO on the 17th.

It can be seen that the actual locations of the enemy tank and motorized units do not coincide with the reconnaissance data. The 21st TP is also listed not far from the concentration area of ​​the 7th TP.

Let me remind you that in the event of a redeployment of units of a division, its area on the maps is marked with a dotted line. All areas of concentration of formations shown on the map are outlined with a solid line, i.e. they do not move anywhere as of the evening of June 16. Therefore, even June 17-18, RMs are unreliable. Let's compare the RMs, which were received on May 31 and on the eve of the war.

The RM mentions numerous TB. On the eve of the war, there were only three separate TB units near our western border: the 100th (as part of the 47th MC of the 2nd TGr), the 101st (in the 39th MC of the 3rd TGr) and the 102nd as part of the 1st th TGr. Therefore, only one TB could be in East Prussia.

From the data presented in the table, it can be seen that the enemy grouping consists of 3 MD headquarters and up to 18 regiments. On the eve of the war, all 3 MD headquarters did not change their location. Up to 28% of the regiments were redeployed or disappeared (two TP, two MP and two TB).

Thus, more than 70% of the mythical group, "discovered" by intelligence at the end of May, remained in the same places before the start of the war. If our reconnaissance watched these formations, then it could not notice the beginning of their exit to the border due to the fact that these blanks should not have moved anywhere ...

Dislocation of German troops in East Prussia

The figure below shows fragments of maps with the deployment of mobile troops on June 16 and 19.

On June 16, on the territory of East Prussia there are: 1st, 6th, 7th, 12th, half of the 19th TD, SS division "Dead's Head", 3rd, 14th, 18th, 20th and 36th MD. On June 19th, the 8th and half of the 20th TD were added to them.

By the evening of June 19, the formations of the 4th TGr moved towards the Soviet-German border. The 8th TD began its concentration at the border behind the infantry formations. Divisions of the 3rd TGr from June 16 to June 19 do not move towards the border. I just finished the concentration of the 19th TD and the 20th TD began to relocate.

It seems that the German command paid special attention to the surprise of the strike from the Suwalki salient, since until the 20th, no movable joints were brought to the ledge. The figure below shows the deployment of enemy troops on June 22.

District information on German mobile forces on the eve of the war

Did the reconnaissance discover that the enemy mobile forces were moving to their initial positions to the border?

On June 21, PribOVO prepared a document “Information from PribOVO headquarters on the grouping of forces and means of German troops in East Prussia by 18 o'clock on 21.6.41 ".

The document lacks any information about the imminent start of the war at dawn on June 22. 10 hours before the war, the RO does not have information about the places of concentration and the directions of the attacks of the microns of the 3rd and 4th TGr. The district leadership and intelligence are not even aware of the presence of these corps and groups on the territory of East Prussia. In the document, all "discovered" tank units are smeared along the entire border: "6,9 tanks per 1 kilometer of the front"... The management of the PribOVO at 19-50 got acquainted with this document, which could not cause any particular concern in them. The figure below shows the presence of divisions and regiments by sector in accordance with the above document.

It can be seen from the figure that 10 hours before the start of the war, in the prepared document of the RO of the headquarters of the PribOVO, there are no tank divisions on the Suvalka ledge. Even in the reserves (in the Letzen group) there is only one such. This is probably the same 21st TP.

A stronger grouping of mobile troops is located in the vicinity of Tilsit: td, tp and over two md. However, a little later, a report of RO is being prepared, according to which in Tilsit they continue to be up to one MD and part of the 20th TD. Parts of the 20th TD are located over a fairly large area. For example, one of the TB division is located in the city of Shilute.

In two hours in RO PribOVO is preparing new document, which again contains nothing disturbing:

Conclusions:
1. The concentration of German troops continues to the state border.
2. The general grouping of troops continues to remain in the former regions..
3. It is required to install:
- the reliability of the deployment in Konigsberg of the headquarters of the 3rd Army Corps, the headquarters of the 1st Army (our data for a long time noted the headquarters of the 18th Army; data on its departure were not received);
- do the parts that are not indicated in this summary, previously noted by us, still remain (our intelligence report No. 15 [report of RO PribOVO dated 18.6.41. - Author's note]) ...

Nothing alarming is contained in the document of the RO of the headquarters of the ZAPOVO dated 21.6.41 (as of June 20):

Conclusion:
1. Earlier received data on intensive transfers of German troops to the borders of the USSR, mainly to the regions of Suwalki and Sedlec, are confirmed.
2. The data on the redeployment of the Eastern Group headquarters to Otwock and about 18 and 38 etc require additional verification.
3. In recent days in the army there have been numerous cases of desertion and non-observance of orders, but the army as a whole is a powerful bulwark of German fascism. Selected units of the army believe that they will win new wars as well ...

The "depressing situation" in the German army has previously received intelligence reports that are very similar to another line of German disinformation.

... On May 16, in Konstantinów (6 km north of Warsaw), 5 officers, 7 sub-officers and 39 soldiers were shot for desertion. There is massive desertion throughout the army ...
... Many soldiers of the border garrisons say: "As soon as the Bolsheviks shout hurray, then we are a bayonet in the ground and a tsurik nahause" ...

Advancement of the 3rd Panzer Group

On June 20, the troops of the 3rd TGr begin to advance to the Suvalka salient. The advance of these troops was not detected by reconnaissance on June 20 and 21. This is evidenced by the records of the chief of staff of the 3rd Army of the ZapOVO A.K. Kondratieva:

New divisions are being pulled up from our rear to the state border. 85th Rifle Division comes to us with Major General Bandovsky. The 17th RD is moving, which I met on the 16.6 on the march; 37th Rifle Division started from Vitebsk and Lepel and the headquarters of 21st Rifle Division - from Vitibsk.
What does this all mean ???
Yes, apparently the clouds are gathering, serious days are approaching!
21.6.41 ... Why, however, there are no instructions on the command line? ..
Recently, during my report to Pavlov, I asked him what to do with the families of the command personnel in case of any complications.
Oh, what a question I was! .. “Do you know that I have 6 tank corps at the ready ?! I forbid not only talking, but also thinking about evacuation! "
“I'm listening,” I replied, but the thought remains in my head: are we too arrogant ?!

In the notes of General A.K. Kondratyev does not say a word about his concerns about the approach to the border of the 3rd TGr compounds. Most likely, he doesn't even know about them. After the war, General A.K. Kondratyev answered the questions of Colonel-General A.P. Pokrovsky: "... No orders to bring the army troops into combat readiness, as I recall, were not received ..."... It can be seen that the answer coincides with his notes, which were made before the start of the war.

On the evening of June 20, the sounds of engines were detected when enemy troops were advancing to the Suvalkinsky ledge. At 2-40 on June 21, an encrypted message is sent to the General Staff:

Hand over immediately.
First. On June 20, in the direction of Augustow, there was a violation of the state border by German aircraft: in 17-41 6 aircraft deepened by 2 km, in 17-43 9 aircraft by 1 1/2 km, in 17-45 10 aircraft were at the border, at the same time 3 aircraft deepened our territory by 2 km. According to the border detachment, the planes had suspended bombs.
Second. To the report of the commander of the 3rd Army, the barbed wire along the border near the Avgustov, Sejny road, which had been in the afternoon, were removed by evening. In this area of ​​the forest, it is as if the noise of ground motors is heard. The border guards have reinforced the outfit. 345th Rifle Regiment (Augustow) ordered to be ready. Klimovsky

Our border guards and army men heard the hum of engines behind the forest on enemy territory, but the message went to the General Staff with the word "As if"... Probably, they did this so as not to irritate the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff once again ...

I. G. Starinov in his memoirs, describes a conversation with his friend Lieutenant General N.A. Klich (chief of artillery ZAPOVO) held on June 20: "...Pavlov every day reports to Moscow about the seriousness of the situation, but we are told not to panic and that Stalin knows everything ... "

In the evening of June 22, in the RO of the headquarters of the West last peace report.

The grouping of the German army on 21.6.41 is determined:
1. East Prussian direction. Within the borders on the right - Suwalki, Heilsberg; left - Shuchin, Naidenburg: the headquarters of the 9th Army Allenstein, four headquarters of the army corps - Elk (Lykk), Letzen, Ortelsburg, Allenstein; nine front-line headquarters - Sejny, Bryzgel, Suwalki, Oletsko (Troyburg, Margrabovo), Elk (Lykk), Aris and in the depths - Allenstein, Lyubava (Lebau), Lidzbark; up to two infantry divisions, two MD (data from PribOVO), 10 artillery regiments (up to two heavy artillery regiments); presumably two SS divisions, an anti-aircraft artillery regiment, up to four cavalry regiments ...

The report contains the already familiar non-existent 17th and 37th MD in Suwalki, as well as two SS divisions. It has previously been shown that information about the SS divisions was obtained from rumors at the end of May 1941. Until the first days of the war, PribOVO and ZAPOVO did not attach much importance to this information. Continuation of the summary of RO ZAPOVO:

5. The bulk of the troops is located within a 30-kilometer strip from the border. In the Suwalki area, Aris continues to pull up troops and rear services to the border. The artillery is in firing positions. In the Olshanka area (south of Suwalki), heavy and anti-aircraft artillery was installed. Heavy and medium tanks are also concentrated there.

Conclusion:
1) According to the available data, which are verified, the main part of the German army in the zone against the ZAPOVO took its starting position.
2) In all directions, there is a pull-up of parts and means of reinforcing the border.
3) All means of reconnaissance check the disposition of troops at the border and in depth ...

The ZAPOVO scouts, the only of the three districts (PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO), decided to write about the withdrawal of German troops to their initial positions near the border. Only they were forced to insert the text of listing 3 into the conclusions. The encryption went to RU on June 15-20 on 22 June.

The specified encryption could not fix something, even if it arrived on time. The RU information did not raise any concerns. The impression was that everything was under control ... The problem was that intelligence was watching non-existent units and divisions ... Therefore, Moscow did not pay special attention to the fears of the commander of the Western Military District, General of the Army Pavlov ...

Historian Sergei Leonidovich Chekunov wrote:

A study of the set of documents clearly shows that Pavlov clearly followed all the orders of the General Staff... No gag. Only the execution of orders ...

Documents of the first day of the war about tanks in East Prussia

The figures below show the reporting maps (prepared after the start of the war) of the headquarters of the North-Western and Western fronts with the position of the sides on June 21, 1941.

It can be seen that there are no strike groups of the 3rd and 4th TGr near the PribOVO border. This has been presented in other documents cited above as well.

On the map of the Western Front there is also no strike group of the 3rd TGr on the Suvalka ledge. Two TD CCs are accompanied by a signature "Supposedly"since at the front headquarters they do not yet know that in RU these words have already been removed from their summary regarding these divisions.

The fact that Moscow did not know about the concentration of the troops of the 3rd and 4th TGr near the border is confirmed by the documents prepared by the General Staff and RU on June 22, 1941.

According to information from the districts received by the General Staff on the morning of June 22, the enemy is leading an offensive against the North-Western Front. "From the area of ​​Zillkallen, Suwalki, Goldap with 3-4 infantry divisions and 500 tanks"... Since in this area, according to intelligence, there is one TP, then someone "knowledgeable" corrected the number «500» on «200»... 200 tanks is, according to intelligence, about one tank regiment. From the side of Tilsit there are 3-4 infantry divisions and an unclear group of tanks, i.e. mobile groupings as part of tank and motorized divisions are not entered into combat operations ...

An unknown group of enemy forces is fighting against the 3rd Army of the Western Front.

At 22-00 on June 22, the information is being clarified: 2-3 TD are active against the North-Western Front and another TD is against the 3rd Army of the Western Front.

The information in the report of RU at 20-00 on June 22 is also based on incorrect RM received before the start of the war.

Thus, the intelligence data received before the start of the war did not make it possible to reveal the directions of the attacks of the 3rd and 4th TGr of the enemy, as well as their concentration and advance to the border on the eve of the war.

Strikes by two TGrs from East Prussia were unexpected both for the leadership of PribOVO and ZAPOVO, and for the leadership of the spacecraft in Moscow. The misunderstanding of the situation at the border on June 22 by the leaders of the spacecraft should have led to their erroneous actions in planning further operations. Erroneous actions in planning operations, in turn, led to the fact that they had to convince the Politburo and Comrade Stalin of the correctness of their decisions. Subsequently, the military declared Comrade Stalin to be the culprit of the tragic events of June 22.

The ending should ...

Comments

[Mavrikiy]

The misunderstanding of the situation at the border on June 22 by the leaders of the spacecraft should have led to their erroneous actions in planning further operations.

Is there an understanding of the situation at the border by the leaders today? And then they transfer a battalion, but a battalion. Maybe the sprats are already in the corps.

[Mwg]

Today it is not relevant, today the TPS will quickly cover the tank-hazardous direction, and if it is really bad, they will use tactical nuclear weapons

[Mwg]

Fraud, distortion and concealment of information at the General Staff level. Conspiracy against Stalin and for "democratic values". Then, of course, Stalin himself became to blame for everything, and the executed traitors were declared "victims of Stalinism"

[Olgovich]

1.

Thus, the intelligence data received before the start of the war did not make it possible to reveal the directions of the attacks of the 3rd and 4th TGr of the enemy, as well as their concentration and advance to the border on the eve of the war.

And then this is:

in the document of the RO of the headquarters of the ZAPOVO dated 21.6.41 (as of June 20):

Conclusion:
1. Previously received data are confirmed on the intensive transfer of German troops to the borders of the USSR, mainly to the regions of Suwalki and Sedlec.

and this :

The bulk of the troops are located within a 30-kilometer strip from the border. Suwalki district, Aris the pulling up of troops and rear services to the border continues. The artillery is in firing positions. In the Olshanka area (south of Suwalki) heavy and anti-aircraft artillery was installed. Heavy and medium tanks are also concentrated there..

?

2. What did the RM need to figure out that the Suwalki ledge would be hewn at the base in the first place and take countermeasures?

3. Intelligence and leadership KNEW that:

“Since the fall of 1940, the grouping of the German army has invariably shifted to the east. Now in the east - East Prussia, Poland, Romania - up to 118-120 divisions "General Tupikov

and even stated this in the TASS Statement.

Here are adequate measures, did not take: neither mobilization, nor bringing to combat readiness.

And this is on the war post:

On the report form, the resolution of I.V. Stalin: “This information is a British provocation. Find out who is the author of this provocation and punish him. " The military intelligence resident did not have to be punished - on June 22, as he reported, Germany attacked the Soviet Union

.

[cost]

On the report form, the resolution of I.V. Stalin: “This information is a British provocation. Find out who is the author of this provocation, and punish him "

IMHO, this seems to be the main reason that the proper measures were never taken.
I am extremely surprised that you received a minus for such a competent comment.

[Catfish]

Hi Dmitry!

I am extremely surprised that you received a minus for such a competent comment

There is nothing to be surprised at, there is an audience that automatically puts minuses without reading. and even more so without thinking about what is written. The site is full of these gavril, but still less than reasonable people.

[antivirus]

A study of the set of documents clearly shows that Pavlov clearly followed all the orders of the General Staff. No gag. Only the execution of orders ...

The main thing is that they did not succumb to provocations.
everything was known (WITHOUT NUMBERS IN \ H AND A CLEAR QUANTITY ON EVERY ROAD).
But it was impossible to openly prepare for war: to STAND IN THE FRONT, COLLECT ALL YOUR DEPARTMENT OF UNITS FROM THE CAMPS, RECEIVE B / P, GIVE AN ORDER TO NOZZLES AND AGED SOLDIERS - SHOOT INTO DEFENSE AND NOT TO BE SPIRED OF ANYTHING - then the troops have to turn back. all to take out from the border strip, in the mt sov bodies and border guards, and families of the military. was there any confidence that a 150 mm howitzer would not accidentally shoot -5-10-20 km into East Prussia? - THIS IS A REASON FOR WAR, etc.
chose not to provoke.

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

And then what :
in the document of the RO of the headquarters of the ZAPOVO dated 21.6.41 (as of June 20):
Conclusion:
1. Earlier received data on intensive transfers of German troops to the borders of the USSR, mainly to the regions of Suwalki and Sedlec, are confirmed.
and this :
The bulk of the troops are located within a 30-kilometer strip from the border. In the Suwalki area, Aris continues to pull up troops and rear services to the border. The artillery is in firing positions. In the Olshanka area (south of Suwalki), heavy and anti-aircraft artillery was installed. Heavy and medium tanks are also concentrated there.
?
2. What did the RM need to figure out that the Suwalki ledge would be hewn at the base in the first place and take countermeasures?
3. Intelligence and leadership KNEW that:
“Since the fall of 1940, the grouping of the German army has invariably shifted to the east. Now in the east - East Prussia, Poland, Romania - up to 118-120 divisions "General Tupikov
and even stated this in the TASS Statement.

You absolutely correctly noticed the absurd conclusions that the author gives in the article, and which contradict the documents cited by him. I will not yet seriously analyze all the nonsense that he outlined in the next article, but I will dwell on this in more detail, because they clearly show the author's complete illiteracy in military matters, including intelligence:

The strikes of two TGRs from East Prussia were unexpected both for the leadership of PribOVO and ZAPOVO, and for the leadership of the spacecraft in Moscow. The misunderstanding of the situation at the border on June 22 by the leaders of the spacecraft should have led to their erroneous actions in planning further operations. Erroneous actions in planning operations, in turn, led to the fact that they had to convince the Politburo and Comrade Stalin of the correctness of their decisions. Subsequently, the military declared Comrade Stalin to be the culprit of the tragic events of June 22.

What kind of "surprise" can we talk about if already in February 1941 three main options for the development of a future war were identified, and what was reported to the country's leadership:

Regarding the author's statement

Misunderstanding of the situation at the border on June 22 by the leaders of the spacecraft should have led to their erroneous actions to plan further operations

, then this once again proved that he had no idea what a plan for covering the district was, and that the General Staff could not plan any "operations" after the start of the war, if only because the scale of the invasion, the position of the troops and the incurred losses, seriously planning some operations can only amateurs, like the author of the article.
Statement that

Erroneous actions in planning operations, in turn, led to the fact that they had to convince the Politburo and Comrade Stalin of the correctness of their decisions.

are not only deceitful, but also contradict historical realities - the General Staff did not plan any "operations" either before the war or after June 22, because control of troops was partially lost, and therefore in the first days all front actions proceeded from the operational situation, and not how a consequence of thoughtful planning at the General Staff level. And in conclusion, the author's false statement that

Subsequently, the military declared Comrade Stalin to be the culprit of the tragic events of June 22.

shows that the author is fulfilling an order to discredit our history, because the military did not accuse Stalin of anything at all, and Khrushchev began the persecution, and only a small part of the military offended by the leader joined it, and the majority, including Rokossovsky, on the contrary highly appreciated Stalin's actions during the war. By the way, the author of the articles is lying when he claims that

Historian Sergei Leonidovich Chekunov wrote:
A study of the set of documents clearly shows that Pavlov clearly followed all the orders of the General Staff. No gag. Only the execution of orders ...

because Pavlov just made gross mistakes, not having time to raise the district on alert on June 22 due to fear of falling out of favor, unlike Zakharov. And this despite the fact that the ZAPOVO had a density of troops per kilometer of the border higher than in all other border districts, and even with a smaller territory compared to the KOVO. So Pavlov suffered a well-deserved punishment, and this is obvious, but it is not clear why the non-historian Chekunov is trying to smear him - apparently just to discredit the name of Stalin.

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: Olgovich

1.

Thus, the intelligence data received before the start of the war did not make it possible to reveal the directions of the attacks of the 3rd and 4th TGr of the enemy, as well as their concentration and advance to the border on the eve of the war.

And then this is:

in the document of the RO of the headquarters of the ZAPOVO dated 21.6.41 (as of June 20):

Conclusion:
1. Previously received data are confirmed on the intensive transfer of German troops to the borders of the USSR, mainly to the regions of Suwalki and Sedlec.

and this :

The bulk of the troops are located within a 30-kilometer strip from the border. Suwalki district, Aris the pulling up of troops and rear services to the border continues. The artillery is in firing positions. In the Olshanka area (south of Suwalki) heavy and anti-aircraft artillery was installed. Heavy and medium tanks are also concentrated there..

?

2. What did the RM need to figure out that the Suwalki ledge would be hewn at the base in the first place and take countermeasures?

3. Intelligence and leadership KNEW that:

“Since the fall of 1940, the grouping of the German army has invariably shifted to the east. Now in the east - East Prussia, Poland, Romania - up to 118-120 divisions "General Tupikov

and even stated this in the TASS Statement.

Here are adequate measures, did not take: neither mobilization, nor bringing to combat readiness.

And this is on the war post:

On the report form, the resolution of I.V. Stalin: “This information is a British provocation. Find out who is the author of this provocation and punish him. " The military intelligence resident did not have to be punished - on June 22, as he reported, Germany attacked the Soviet Union

.

The answer is very simple, dear Olgovich. You quoted the intelligence report of the Regional Office of the ZapOVO headquarters, which entered the RC General Staff of the KA only in the afternoon of June 22, when the war was going on. Until that time, RU had no confirmed information about the advance of the troops of the 3rd TGr to the Suvalka ledge. On the basis of the information available in RU before the start of the war, the People's Commissar of Defense and the Chief of the General Staff made decisions.

Information about the advancement of German troops to the Suvalkinsky ledge was not received from the RO of the PribOVO headquarters in whose area of ​​responsibility the lion's share of the territory west of this ledge was. There, the intelligence did not detect the withdrawal of German troops, or (most likely) the Germans blocked the routes of entry of the Republic of Moldova into our border districts ...

Let me remind you that on June 21, an encrypted message went to Moscow from the headquarters of the ZAPOVO with the words "as if": "... In this area of ​​the forest, the noise of ground motors seems to be heard ..." In Moscow, they could only decide that we were talking about unverified information, which until 20-00 on June 21 had not been confirmed by any of the intelligence services ...

Let me also recall the words of Starinov: "... Pavlov every day reports to Moscow about the seriousness of the situation ..."and the historian S. L. Chekunov: "A study of the set of documents clearly shows that Pavlov clearly followed all orders of the General Staff. No gag. Only the execution of orders ... " You can't break the butt of an ax with a twig ... Pavlov was pulled back and he simply decided to follow Moscow's instructions ...

You are not quite right about the words of General Tupikov. Note the conclusions of his document: "1... In the German plans of the ongoing war, the USSR appears as another enemy.
2. The timing of the onset of the collision is perhaps shorter and, certainly within the current year.
It is another matter that these plans and dates may come across something similar to Matsuoka's trip “to Moscow through Berlin and Rome,” as it is called here in diplomatic circles. But this is no longer at the good will of the Germans, but in spite of it.

3. Next upcoming events Germans seem to me like this:
a) Saddle Turkey by the Pact of Three or something similar.
b) The accession to the pact of three Sweden, and therefore of Finland, since the latter has long been ready to join it.
c) Strengthening the transfer of troops to our theater.
d) Are the Germans planning extensive operations in the Middle East and Africa with the use of such a number of troops that would weaken their European grouping, hard to say, although such goals as Suez, Mossul, and the defeat of the British in Abyssinia are officially proclaimed."

Everyone knew that the war was inevitable, but it was not known exactly when it would begin ... It took the Red Army about a day to get out of the border points of deployment (I'm not talking about points in the depths of the territory). It was believed that the German group was under the dense cap of our intelligence and the beginning of their exit to the border would be discovered ...

Well, the term that the Germans brought troops to our border is not an argument ... NATO is pushing troops to our borders in the Baltic States and Poland, but you do not expect it to start tomorrow, do you?

[Olgovich]

Quote: AsmyppoL

The answer is very simple, dear Olgovich. You quoted the intelligence report of the RO of the headquarters of the ZAPOVO, which entered the RO GSh KA only in the afternoon of June 22, when the war was going on

You wrote:

В end of May intelligence "for sure" knew about twenty one armored and motorized divisions, which were concentrated on the territory of East Prussia and the former Poland.

Those. already at the end of MAY, the leadership KNEW about the TD and MD of the Germans in the east of Prussia and Poland, even if they were not there, but they became reality by June 22.

Those. should have been ready with MAY, no?

You haven't answered a simple question:

What did the RM need to figure out that the Suwalki ledge would be hewn at the base in the first place and to take countermeasures?

that the strategic defense is being built on the basis of the RM on the throwing of divisions: if today the TD is here, then build an SD against it here, and if you left there, then drop everything and build already there?

And then in 3rd, 10th place?

And if there is no data, then .... is it not necessary to build a defense on tank-hazardous and vulnerable (the base of the ledge) places?

Quote: AsmyppoL

You are not quite right about the words of General Tupikov.

they are instructed to have a huge number of divisions on our border and to hope that they will not strike is utter folly.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Everyone knew that the war was inevitable, but when it would start exactly was unknown ..

Yeah, "unknown":

On the report form, the resolution of I.V. Stalin: “This information is a British provocation. Find out who is the author of this provocation, and punish him "

And yes, WHAT difference does -21,22,25 start? MUST, with SUCH German grouping, be ready and June 21,22,23,24,25

Quote: AsmyppoL

border points of deployment (I'm not talking about points in the depths of the territory). It was believedthat the German group is under a dense cap of our intelligence and the beginning of their exit to the border will be discovered ...

Can you prove that this is exactly what you thought? ,Those. did they blindly believe and and only on their basis did they act?

The Germans, by the way, also made a mistake with the location of our mechanical units (Gualder has it), which did not prevent them from inflicting a defeat.

Quote: AsmyppoL

Well, and the term that the Germans brought troops to our border is not an argument ...

For whom it was "not an argument" - received the worst military disaster in history.

And yes: -Germany declared war only for the DECLARATION of mobilization by Russia in 1914.

Here on the border there is a fully mobilized fighting army, and .... silence.

Quote: AsmyppoL

NATO is putting forward troops to our borders in the Baltic States and in Poland, but you do not expect it to start tomorrow, do you?

You compare carrots to horseradish and yes: the advancement of the Wehrmacht ALWAYS meant an imminent military attack.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Olgovich

Here on the border there is a fully mobilized fighting army, and .... silence.

and do not give in to provocations ...
in theory, from the beginning of June, the troops were supposed to occupy the 2nd defense lines of the URs, prepare barriers ...

[Olgovich]

Quote: DrEng527

and do not give in to provocations ..

In-in: as if world wars begin because of .... provocations. : belay.
Only a fool could think that avoiding provocations could postpone the WORLD War for at least one day ...

Quote: DrEng527

in theory, from the beginning of June, the troops were supposed to occupy the 2nd defense lines of the URs, prepare barriers ...

Obviously so.

And at least mine the STRATEGIC bridges that were ALL captured without a fight on the first day of (mostly) the war.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Olgovich

Only a fool could think that avoiding provocations could postpone the WORLD War for at least one day ...

Well, why are you so about Father and Teacher, the best friend of athletes ...

[chenia]

Quote: Olgovich

For whom it was "not an argument" - received the worst military disaster in history.

Yes, the reason for failure. completely different. Start deploying our troops in May. the result was the same. The horror is that our generals. did everything (hoping that Germany was not ready for war in 1941 - and it really is) so that the enemy would be met by a completely untrained army, especially in armored vehicles.
BP failure is the main reason for failure. And Zhukov, one of the authors of the disaster, hid behind the "surprise" invented by Khrushchev.

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

BP failure is the main reason for failure.

Hardly anyone will deny that the BP was disrupted in the border districts, but for some reason you did not mention what it was connected with. But the construction of new URs was precisely the main reason for the disruption of the BP, when one battalion of regiments was constantly allocated for these works. How would you personally act in 1940 in the place of the country's leadership, after new territories appeared in our country and they had to be defended?

Quote: chenia

And Zhukov, one of the authors of the disaster, hid behind the "surprise" invented by Khrushchev.

In fact, Zhukov was only half a year before the outbreak of the war and was only the deputy people's commissar of defense - this must be taken into account. So if you really want to kick Zhukov (and you can always find a reason), then first decide on the role of Tymoshenko in that tragedy and those who nominated Zhukov to this important position without taking into account his experience of serving in positions of this level.
As for the "surprise", it was not at all, as the author of the article AsmyppoL (Eugene) invented it, and I will confine myself only to the statement of Mark Solonin, who can hardly be suspected of love for Stalin or for the history of the USSR and who is assessed by "Intelligence report No. 1/660724 RU General Staff of the Red Army at 20-00 22.6. 1941 " for "treachery" and "surprise":

Considering that this report was compiled on the evening of the first day of the war, it is worth noting what is not in it. And in it there are no words "suddenly" and "treacherously" in any case; there are no comments at all on the event that took place at dawn on June 22, all the more so - there are not the slightest attempts to justify themselves in anything. One gets the impression that neither the author of the report, nor the person to whom it was addressed, were surprised by anything and were not ...

[cavl]

As for the "surprise", it was not at all, as the author of the article AsmyppoL (Eugene) invented it, and I will confine myself only to the statement of Mark Solonin, who can hardly be suspected of love for Stalin or for the history of the USSR and who is assessed by "Intelligence report No. 1/660724 RU General Staff of the Red Army at 20-00 22.6. 1941 " for "treachery" and "surprise":
Considering that this summary was compiled on the evening of the first day of the war, it is worth noting what is not in it. And in it there are no words "suddenly" and "treacherously" in any case; there are no comments at all on the event that took place at dawn on June 22, all the more so - there is not the slightest attempt to justify anything. One gets the impression that neither the author of the report, nor the person to whom it was addressed, were surprised by anything and were not ...

How could a phrase about the surprise of an attack appear in the intelligence report of the Republic of Uzbekistan, if this means the unsatisfactory work of the intelligence department and automatically a label of an enemy of the people for Golikov ...
You are completely out of the habit of thinking ...

[ccsr]

Quote: cavl

How could a phrase about the surprise of an attack appear in the intelligence report of the Republic of Uzbekistan, if this means the unsatisfactory work of the intelligence department and automatically a label of an enemy of the people for Golikov ...
You are completely out of the habit of thinking ...

You seem to be generally inadequate - I don’t think that, it was Mark Solonin who made a conclusion based on reading the intelligence report. As for me personally, such as you and the author of the articles, I previously reported that provocateurs or crooks could talk about "surprise" on June 22, because the Directive w / n, which precisely determined that the attack would take place on June 22-23 , was drawn up at least 8-10 hours before the attack. The fact that the war will begin in the next few hours, Golikov reported before 21:21 on June 16 - this is a historical fact that cannot be refuted. Moreover, I am sure that the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense already by 17-21 o'clock on June 21 knew that the combat signal "Dortmund" had passed through the German radio networks, which means that the war would begin in a few hours. So what even tactical "surprise" can we talk about if the leadership of the country and the People's Commissariat of Defense knew on June 22 that the war would begin on June 22? Or will you, together with AsmyppoL (Eugene), continue to lie that the attack on June 21 was sudden for us, because intelligence allegedly did not provide data on where which German regiment was on June XNUMX? You are still those "strategists", believe you, do not respect yourself ...

[cavl]

The one who makes such arguments is inadequate.
There can be no words in the intelligence report about a surprise attack.

[D.N.Joni]

Dortmud's signal from army groups was transmitted by teletype, telegraph and telephone. The same as the previous signal.
Hitler's address was delivered from Army Group offices by messengers.
Your understanding of signal transmission across all radio networks is not correct

[ccsr]

Quote: DNJoni

Dortmud's signal from army groups was transmitted by teletype, telegraph and telephone.

And on German warships too? Moreover, some of the German troops were generally located where there were no wire means - for example, in the wilderness near our border, where they arrived on the eve of the war. Moreover, you are simply not in the subject, because it is known:

Information was also received by radio interception. The signal "Dortmund" came to the Germans by radio and was intercepted by the British and us. Churchill's memoirs mention that he wanted to address the British nation on the evening of June 21, but postponed it until the evening of June 22, "when the situation becomes clear," as he wrote in his memoirs.

Quote: DNJoni

Your understanding of signal transmission across all radio networks is not correct

I didn’t speak about ALL networks - no need to fantasize, because only headquarters of a certain level are included in the alert networks.

[D.N.Joni]

I understand that there will be no facts to support your statement.
As I understand it, you don't even know that the signal from Dortmund did not go through corps and divisions, for example, Army Group South. There this signal reached the directorates of the field armies and the first tank group, and then other signals went.

The Dortmud signal passed only to the divisions in Army Group Center, which was in radio silence until the evening of 21 June.
From the headquarters of the armies and tank groups, the signal went only through wire communication lines.
In Army Group North, the signal also went through wired communication lines, and from noon, officers had to replace the telephone operators! In this army group, the signal changed to Dortmund Y, which meant the start of hostilities at 3-05.
I just don't know how this signal was sent from OKH to army groups.

The signal to German ships could be transmitted by radio from the bases, but what it meant was impossible to understand. It was even impossible to understand to whom exactly this signal was sent. It could be a signal to change the code for a group of ships or submarines. Signal for merchant ships to stop loading or unloading and leave the port. There could be a signal to change the communication scheme to a spare. It could have been anything.

It just infuriates me when an incompetent person tries to classify himself as a military professional without knowing basic things.

[ccsr]

Quote: DNJoni

I understand that there will be no facts to support your statement.

What other facts does the layman need, even if Churchill pointed out the radio interception of the Dortmund signal? Do you have any idea who conducted radio intelligence in our border districts and how radio intelligence officers classify the types of signals when they are intercepted?

Quote: DNJoni

As I understand it, you don't even know that the signal from Dortmund did not go through corps and divisions, for example, Army Group South.

Since you have a naive idea about the passage of warning signals, I will simply inform you that each level of the armed forces has its own warning signals, which is why only those structures that are supposed to know about this signal are included in the network in order to avoid information leaks. Moreover, they are obliged to report the receipt of the signal to the higher authority. How do you imagine this from the point of view of back validation?

Quote: DNJoni

The Dortmud signal passed only to the divisions in Army Group Center, which was in radio silence until the evening of 21 June.

No radio silence regime was introduced on the eve of the war, so that the radio intelligence of the Red Army would not report on the change in the daily exchange of radio nodes, so there is no need to fantasize as the author of the article does.

Quote: DNJoni

I just don't know how this signal was sent from OKH to army groups.

They had their own central radio centers, just as our central radio centers of the NKO and the General Staff existed. These networks were opened by our intelligence even before the Germans attacked Poland and were constantly monitored. You are simply not in the subject, because you do not know how combat control signals differ from short messages, which is why you do not understand how the radio intelligence units immediately realized that an important signal passed.

Quote: DNJoni

The signal to German ships could be transmitted by radio from the bases, but what it meant was impossible to understand.

And the meaning of the signal does not need to be understood - it is enough to evaluate the training or combat one, and in which radio networks it passed, as well as how quickly they reacted to it.

Quote: DNJoni

It just infuriates me when an incompetent person tries to classify himself as a military professional without knowing basic things.

Take a sedative - you are just a layman in matters of radio intelligence, and in vain pose as a specialist, judging by this statement:

... It was even impossible to understand to whom exactly this signal was sent.

Firstly, all military nodes have call signs, are included either in radio directions or in radio networks, and all this is revealed long before the start of hostilities. At least radio intelligence data on German military HF radio stations were known back in the mid-thirties, that is, long before the attack on the USSR.
Secondly, all combat signals require a receipt for the receipt of the message - however, for you this is a Chinese letter, because you do not know the rules of radio exchange. But you keep pretending to be a specialist, even though you look like a real clown.

[RuSFr]

Milchakov never has facts. He knows.
And this is already megalomania.
He has a fix idea that stupid Germans broadcast this signal on the radio. But there are no facts of this

[D.N.Joni]

So I know that he is puffed up, but he has no facts. Our expert takes with his throat and rudeness ...
Here are excerpts from the document of the 57th Motorized Corps: "The 457th Corps Communications Battalion connects the corps command post north of Seina with the command posts of the 18th Motorized Division and the 12th Panzer Division by wire and, in addition, communicates to point 118 in the northern direction to Kalety and to the border at the road Berzhniki, Seiriyai. Further, the command post of the 18th motorized division will be connected with the 161st infantry division (8th army corps) in Kalety. During the offensive, the battalion will first be with both divisions, with their forward units ...
The radio silence after the start of the attack is canceled. "
It can be seen that the wire lines will almost reach the border.

[D.N.Joni]

And here is one of the excerpts from the documents that the Dormund signal did not pass through the communication lines of the 1st Panzer Group and even indicated exactly how the replaced signal was transmitted: "The Chief of the Operations Department of the Tank Group sends an order by phone:" Hero's saga, Wotan, Neckar 15 ". This means that the beginning of hostilities against Bolshevism is scheduled for June 22, 03:15 am After that, the corresponding orders were given to the divisions.
The corps is ready to start hostilities at the call of the Fuhrer. "

And there are many such documents. Only the expert does not know this

[D.N.Joni]

And with the British Prime Minister, everything is much easier. The British did not intercept this signal. Since the fall of 1940, the OKH was instructed to use radio communications to a minimum. The laid wire communication lines were used. The British read the encrypted correspondence of the Germans and learned about the signal from there. Somewhere else on June 17-18, there was information about what signal, which means ... On June 20, a signal passed (you need to look there for it starts with the letter Z) that the attack will start at 3-30 on June 22.
And the signal from Dortmund only confirmed this again. But its main significance was that after receiving it it was allowed to transmit orders by radio. It was believed that the Russians could no longer do anything. But in army groups the North and Center continued the radio silence.
This is not in Wikipedia and, of course, the expert does not know this.

[ccsr]

Quote: DNJoni

So I know that he is puffed up, but he has no facts. Our expert takes with his throat and rudeness ...
Here are excerpts from the document of the 57th Motorized Corps: "The 457th Corps Communications Battalion connects the corps command post north of Seina with the command posts of the 18th Motorized Division and the 12th Panzer Division by wire and, in addition, communicates to point 118 in the northern direction to Kalety and to the border at the road Berzhniki, Seiriyai. Further, the command post of the 18th motorized division will be connected with the 161st infantry division (8th army corps) in Kalety. During the offensive, the battalion will first be with both divisions, with their forward units ...
The radio silence after the start of the attack is canceled. "
It can be seen that the wire lines will almost reach the border.

This dilettante will have to explain on fingers how the warning networks work at different levels of the military. Firstly, when the document is dated, the author is shyly silent, because wire communication means are laid when the units arrive at the place of deployment many days before the start of hostilities. Secondly, the corps battalion, simultaneously with the laying of wire lines, has permanently switched on duty radios, which are tuned to the notification frequency. Thirdly, the radio silence mode is introduced only for certain parts, but in this mode the duty receivers work around the clock, because the operation of a separate group of transmitters is prohibited, but not the transmitters of central radio centers. However, you are illiterate in this, and you hardly understand what is at stake.

And here is one of the excerpts from the documents that the Dormund signal did not pass through the communication lines of the 1st Panzer Group and even indicated exactly how the replaced signal was transmitted: "The Chief of the Operations Department of the Tank Group sends an order by phone:" Hero saga, Wotan, Neckar 15 ".

Open any plan for covering the state border and you will see for yourself that the signals from Moscow to enter it differ from the signals that the district sends to subordinate units to enter army units. The same was true for the Germans, which is why having received the Dortmund signal at the level of the COMMANDER of the tank group, a completely different signal is sent to the lower structures, because a limited number of people had information about the Dortmund signal. By the way, your illiteracy manifested itself even in what you call a combat signal an order - the order for its implementation is in those to whom the signal is transmitted, and everything that needs to be done is reflected in it.

And there are many such documents. Only the expert does not know this

What's the point that you know about them, if you can't even understand what they are talking about.

And with the British Prime Minister, everything is much easier. The British did not intercept this signal. Since the fall of 1940, the OKH was instructed to use radio communications to a minimum.

This was primarily due to the fact that the operational situation changed, and Hitler began to prepare for a war against the USSR, which is why the load on the radio networks decreased. As for Churchill's assertions, which you consider to be a lie, then you tell the British that he lied in his memoirs, and I believe him, because I see no reason for him to distort the facts. Besides, how to do without radio communication with ships at sea, with airplanes in flight, with embassies and agent networks, you, as an "expert", will probably be able to explain to us.

Somewhere else on June 17-18 there was information about what signal, which means ... On June 20, a signal passed (you need to look there for it starts with the letter Z) that the attack will begin at 3-30 on June 22.

Don't lie - Halder's directive of June 10, rather than June 20, clearly indicates the warning signals and the date of the attack:

4. June 22, 3 hours 30 minutes: the beginning of the offensive of the ground forces and the flight of aviation across the border. If meteorological conditions delay the departure of the aircraft, the ground forces will launch an offensive on their own. Commissioned by: Halder
Translated from German from: DMA Potsdam, H 02.02 / 10/43, BI.689.

So you can sell your lies about the letter Z to amateurs - Halder did not write any of this in the directive.

It was believed that the Russians could no longer do anything.

During such a time, it is really impossible to do anything and there is only hope for a plan to cover the districts. Unfortunately, the full introduction of plans to cover the districts was not carried out, because Halder, unlike you, knew very well that such a decision was made at the level of the USSR Government, and not at the level of the People's Commissar of Defense. That is why he was sure that we will not be in time anyway, but you will never understand this anyway, because you have too primitive ideas of how everything was carried out at that time.

[ccsr]

Quote: RuSFr

He has a fix idea that stupid Germans broadcast this signal on the radio.

This is how warning signals are transmitted by radio - this is apparently news for our anonymous German, although it is known that:

Information was also received by radio interception. The signal "Dortmund" came to the Germans by radio and was intercepted by the British and us. Churchill's memoirs mention that he wanted to speak to the British nation on the evening of June 21, but postponed it until the evening of June 22, "when the situation becomes clear," as he wrote in his memoirs. Churchill does not write that the British had equipment for decrypting German radio transmissions captured in 1939, so throughout the war the British were aware of German plans, plus the recruited chief of the Abwehr (intelligence) Admiral Canaris and R. Hess, who "joined" him. We intercepted the signal and the start of operation of the radio stations, and at once in all levels of the German army and in larger volumes than before. This also gave Stalin reason to think that some kind of events were beginning on the border.
After the war, V.P. Pronin (in 1941 - the head of the Moscow City Council) said that in the evening he and the 1st Secretary of the Moscow City Conservatory, A.S. Shcherbakov, were summoned to see I.V. Stalin. According to Pronin, Stalin ordered this Saturday to detain the secretaries of district committees in their places and forbid them to leave the city. "German attack is possible", He warned.

Quote: RuSFr

But there are no facts of this

Read carefully, dilettante, how our scouts worked on direction finding and radio interception on the eve of the war - this is the testimony of the GRU colonel General Staff I.Z. Zakharov:

[D.N.Joni]

Again, apart from your inventions, I saw nothing.
So I understand that there will be no facts.
Hence everything you said is a lie

[AsmyppoL]

Very interesting!
In PM you can drop something or links at least

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

But the construction of new SDs was just the main reason for the failure of the BP,

The overly inflated formation of new associations, in particular the 30 MK (sanctioned by Timoshenko and Zhukov, while Meretskov objected uncertainly) is the main reason for the failure of the BP (especially in BTV).
I am a professional soldier in the past (I went through several deployments), and at the same time I can not even imagine the scale of this event. And what could the l / s and commanders do in such conditions? Only by tracing parks and building infrastructure, receiving equipment, and creating training fields and shooting ranges, I am silent about classrooms (and this is primitive). And the barracks fund? And what about the dos? But that's not all, the constant change of command personnel (I did not have time to meet, as your company commanders had already left for a higher one (being only recently platoon commanders), and came from the cavalry. And soon you yourself trump. - .. "I introduce myself on occasion. .. "in a new position, in a new part.

Well, what will happen?

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

The overly inflated formation of new associations, in particular the 30 MK (sanctioned by Timoshenko and Zhukov, while Meretskov objected uncertainly) is the main reason for the failure of the BP (especially in BTV).

In fact, the decision to create 30 MK was made back in 1940, before Zhukov was appointed to the post of NGSH, and this program was calculated until 1946, and in peacetime.

Quote: chenia

I am a professional soldier in the past (I went through several deployments), and at the same time I can not even imagine the scale of this event.

You just don’t know the details of this program, therefore you don’t imagine its scale, but it was designed for many years. After all, the point is not only in obtaining equipment, but also in the fact that personnel were needed for these MCs, and even conducting studies at the level of buildings, and all this takes time.

Quote: chenia

And what could the l / s and commanders do in such conditions? Only by tracing parks and building infrastructure, using technology, and creating training fields and shooting ranges, I am silent about classrooms (and this is primitive). And the barracks fund? And what about the dos?

You are saying everything correctly, just do not take into account that all this was planned to be done during the peaceful six to seven years at least. And no one wants to remember this, so absurd accusations arise, although I myself perfectly understand that the industry would hardly be able to satisfy all the needs of the army during this period. With regard to study, then for six years with a three-year training of tank officers, at least three graduations of officers can be done during this period if new schools are created in 1941, not counting the old ones.

[chenia]

Quote: ccsr

In fact, the decision to create 30 MK was made back in 1940, before Zhukov was appointed to the post of NGSH and this program was designed until 1946,

You are right, I will not argue. BUT was approved in March 1941, and began to implement at an insane pace. And such a number obviously shows caste egoism.

Quote: ccsr

but also that we needed personnel for these MK

The formation of 30 MK reached the level of subdivisions (in some vehicles it was minuscule, l / s at a minimum, and there are already KB and company commanders. They were (partially) pulled out with a promotion from the MK of the first stage.

Quote: ccsr

all this was planned to be done during peaceful six to seven years at least

I also agree. BUT! Since the summer of 1940 (the decision on the formation of the MK as part of the UA - an analogue of the TG among the Germans), a full-fledged MK exercise was not conducted. And this event would reveal the shortcomings of management, all the mistakes of the OShS. imperfections in technology.
And if you know that we ultimately, rather quickly (having paid in blood during the war), came to the organizational structure of the TK-3 TBR. in each of the two-battalion TP (later MK was reduced to TA. It can be assumed that TD (1940) is equal to (approximately) TK (1942). and TBr -TP (but only three (two) battalion TP with 3 tanks in platoons).
And if they switched (and they did it) to this structure already in 1941, they would have a controlled MK with
476-480 main tanks. and with combat support units up to 600 tanks, not a thousand.

[ccsr]

Quote: chenia

You are right, I will not argue. BUT was approved in March 1941, and began to implement at an insane pace.

In order to approve this decision in March, it at least had to be coordinated in the fall of 1940 with all the people's commissars, and only after that the Resolution was adopted. This is primarily due to the budgetary money and material resources that had to be allocated in 1941 to start this huge program of reorganization of the ground forces.

Quote: chenia

And such a number obviously shows caste egoism.

Understand correctly that there was a theory of motorized warfare, to which Zhukov had nothing to do with it, and it was born under Tukhachevsky, who stubbornly implanted it. So it was not a spontaneous decision, but a consequence of the misconceptions of some of our military leaders about future tank battles, which already affected the beginning of the war, when the number of our tanks did not play a big role for a number of reasons.

Quote: chenia

I also agree. BUT! Since the summer of 1940 (the decision on the formation of the MK as part of the UA - an analogue of the TG among the Germans), a full-fledged MK exercise was not conducted. And this event would reveal the shortcomings of management, all the mistakes of the OShS. imperfections in technology.

Quite right, the training of the MK actions should be carried out during the exercises of the corps and the army in order to understand what problems in command and control and interaction with other branches of the armed forces will arise - here I completely agree with you. By the way, the author of the article AsmyppoL (Eugene) is talking nonsense, stating that

The decision to form 30 mechanized corps was made after the war games in January 1941. Then there was a survey of the opinion of the command staff of the military districts on the number of mechanized corps for each district.

Firstly, the industrial commissars do not give a damn about all the military exercises, because they have an annual plan and an annual budget, and if they do not plan finances in 1940 for the creation of equipment for new mechanized corps, then all plans and exercises of the People's Commissariat of Defense will go to the trash can ... This means that the January exercises are not dancing here. Secondly, at the command post exercises of the General Staff, the issue of working out the actions of the MK and interaction with other types of troops cannot be carried out at all - this is carried out at the district and army levels during the planned exercises with the participation of troops. Thirdly, no "polls" of the military play a role in such a situation, because the creation of 30 MKs lies in the competence of the USSR Council of People's Commissars and its chairman, and not some commanders of the district level.
So, according to this statement of the pseudo-researcher AsmyppoL (Eugene), you can understand what level of local "specialists" who have wild ideas about the joint work of the military-industrial complex and the People's Commissariat of Defense in matters of creating mechanized formations in 1941. By the way, almost all of his arguments about military intelligence on the eve of the war are amateurish fantasies and sometimes outright lies, on which he was caught here more than once.

Quote: chenia

And if they switched (and they did it) to this structure already in 1941, they would have a controlled MK with
476-480 main tanks. and with combat support units up to 600 tanks, not a thousand.

Quite right, the number of tanks in the mechanized corps was not reasonable and this was a consequence of the "gigantism of plans" of our commanders of that time, who too believed that such a mass of equipment would be easy to control and provide. That is why in the initial period of the war we suffered non-combat losses of armored vehicles at the level of 50% in some units and formations, but this was not the result of Zhukov's fault, but the result of theoretical delusions of the early thirties, when the same Tukhachevsky dreamed of having 100 thousand tanks, absolutely not understanding how the country can implement all this.

[AsmyppoL]

As usual, a person who is trying to ascribe to himself the title of "expert" is completely unaware of events about the formation of 30 mechanized corps (mk) ...

Let me briefly recall the prehistory of this event.
Mv Zakharov wrote: “... At the end of May 1940, at a regular meeting with the 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff, IV Smorodinov, the conversation turned to the development of a new organizational structure for MK.
I.V. Smorodinov told me: “Matvey Vasilyevich, last night Boris Mikhailovich and I were at Stalin's. The latter asked: “Why are there no mechanized and tank corps in our army? After all, the experience of the war of the German fascist army in Poland and in the West shows their value in battle. We need to immediately consider this issue and form several corps, in which there would be 1000-1200 tanks. " Stalin - I.V. Smorodinov looked at me meaningfully, - in the near future he is waiting for our proposals ... "

On 9.6.40, the People's Commissar of Defense approved a plan for the formation of new microns for specially developed states. The plan was to deploy eight mk and 2 separate tank divisions. At the end of 1940, KOVO was formed only one mechanized corps.

M.I. Kazakov wrote about an interesting event that happened after the January games: “... The end of the games seemed somewhat unusual to me: the analysis was carried out not by the People's Commissar of Defense and not by the General Staff, but by the participants themselves - G.K. Zhukov and D.G. Pavlov. Immediately after the analysis, the commanders of the military districts began to prepare for departure, and our brother of the chiefs of staff was still detained in the General Staff. But on January 13, 1941, the situation suddenly changed dramatically. By 12 o'clock everyone was invited to the Kremlin.

A meeting of the Main Military Council was held in the Kremlin on the results of our training camp. The People's Commissariat of Defense reported here to the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party and the Soviet government ...

And it turned out quite awkward when K.A. Meretskov began to report on the ratio of the forces of the parties during the drawing of the offensive operation in the western direction on the maps. It turned out that the "eastern" side ("red"), having only 60-65 divisions, successfully overcame the resistance of the "western", defended by 55 divisions.

Stalin immediately asked the question: how could this be achieved with such an insignificant superiority in forces?
Army General Meretskov replied in this spirit:
- Lacking overall superiority in forces, the commander of the Western Front was able to take part of the troops from passive sectors and use them in the strike group. As a result, local superiority in forces was created, which ensured the success of the offensive operation.

Then Stalin took the floor and resolutely objected to the speaker: in our age of mechanized and motorized armies, local superiority in forces will not ensure the success of the advancing side; the defending enemy, having the same means for maneuver, in a short time can carry out a regrouping of his troops, strengthen their composition in the threatened area and thus nullify the local superiority in forces created by the advancing ... "

A very reasonable opinion of the head of the country, which is not imposed by the number of mechanized corps ...

[AsmyppoL]

Continuing memories M.I. Kazakova: “... Kulik's speech was repeatedly interrupted by the leaders of the party and government. Finally, he was asked a direct question: how much does he think our Armed Forces need to have mechanized (tank) corps? In terms of his operational training, Kulik was far from understanding this and tried to cheat.
- It depends on how many tanks the industry can give, - he answered evasively ...

After a new slippery and vague answer from Kulik, a sharp remark was made against Tymoshenko. Stalin said: "Comrade Timoshenko, as long as there is such a confusion in the army about motorization and mechanization, you will not have any motorization and mechanization of the army".

Semyon Konstantinovich objected with dignity that among the leadership of the army there is a complete understanding of the essence of mechanization and motorization, only Kulik is confused in these issues, does not understand them.

“Well, let’s listen to what the commanders of the districts have to say,” Stalin responded to this and in turn asked them about the required number of mechanized (tank) corps for the corresponding theater of military operations.

The commanders responded in the order of deployment of the districts, starting from the right flank. All of them were already oriented that, by the decision of the government, by the end of 1940, the formation of nine microns was completed, and from February 1941 they would begin to form several Yet the same connections, and, of course, managed to think over their needs for them.

Kirponos (LVO) requested 1-2 buildings, Kuznetsov (PribOVO) - 2-3 buildings, Pavlov (BOVO) - 3-4 buildings, Zhukov (KOVO) - 4-5 buildings, Cherevichenko (OdVO) - 1-2 buildings, Efremov (ZakVO) - 1-2 buildings, Apanasenko (SAVO) - 1 building ... [In total, without the Trans-Baikal District and the Far Eastern Front 13-19 microns - Approx. Auth.]

These answers ... it was evident that the members of the Politburo received them with satisfaction. An explanation immediately followed why the process of equipping troops with tanks was proceeding so slowly. We were told that for several years the Central Committee of the party and the government literally "imposed" on the leadership of the NPO the idea of ​​the need to create large mechanized and tank formations, but the People's Commissariat showed amazing timidity in this regard ... "

On January 13, Stalin was not given the exact number of mechanized corps that the spacecraft required.
The next day, the Decree of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was prepared, in which General of the Army G.K. was appointed head of the General Staff and Deputy People's Commissar of Defense. Zhukov.

On 12.2.41, a Note was prepared outlining the mobilization deployment of the spacecraft, in which it was said about the deployment during the mobilization of 30 MK directorates, 30 motorized and 60 tank divisions. On February 14, NGOs and General Staff prepare a draft Resolution of the Council of People's Commissars.

On February 22, a note is being prepared on the manning of the tanks formed by MK. The Memo speaks of the 1st stage microcapacities (19 combat and 7 reduced strength) and the 2nd stage (4 reduced strength). Thus, the final amount of 30 microns was determined under the direct supervision of the new chief of the General Staff.

Only on March 8, 1941, a Resolution was issued confirming the formation of 30 microns.
Thus, the leadership of the KA in the person of the young reformer - the chief of the General Staff and the People's Commissar of Defense (who did not climb out with the decision on the mass formation of the MK) for almost a year) justified before the Government and Stalin and pushed through the Resolution on the formation of thirty mechanized corps, scattering resources and personnel ...

[Operator]

Marshal Kulik was the only one adequate in the top military-political leadership of the USSR Armed Forces - he took into account not only the wishes of politicians and the military (+100500 tanks, 30 mechanized corps in six months, etc.), but also the capabilities of Soviet industry, in particular the exorbitant cost of new types of weapons , for example: the cost of a buggy and inaccurate SVT was an order of magnitude higher than the cost of a reliable and accurate Mosin rifle, the cost of a milled PPD was an order of magnitude higher than the cost of a stamped PCA, the release of new artillery guns was premature due to the lack of armor-piercing shells for them, etc. etc.

Stalin and his supporters Voroshilov, Timoshenko, Meretskov and Zhukov (not to mention the inexperienced Pavlov, Krivonos and other lower-level figures) had the standard dizziness from partial successes, which did not allow them to soberly assess the production and personnel capabilities of the USSR as of 1941 ...

On this we got burned, and not on some kind of "surprise" of the attack of the Third Reich.

[ccsr]

Quote: Operator

Marshal Kulik was the only one adequate in the top military-political leadership of the USSR Armed Forces - he took into account not only the wishes of politicians and the military (+100500 tanks, 30 mechanized corps in six months, etc.), but also the capabilities of Soviet industry, in particular the exorbitant cost of new types of weapons ,

It is absolutely true that it was precisely this that our commanders of the pre-war period (and in the post-war period too) suffered, who had no real idea of ​​what industry was and its capabilities to meet the demands of the military. If Tukhachevsky, being the Deputy People's Commissar, first dreamed of 100 thousand tanks, and then lowered the bar to 50 thousand, then one can imagine what was in the minds of those who had no idea about the country's economic opportunities, but climbed with their stupid initiatives to Stalin.

Quote: Operator

On this we got burned, and not on some kind of "surprise" of the attack of the Third Reich.

I completely agree - it was precisely the lack of infrastructure for tank forces, when there was not enough fuel, ammunition, spare parts, communications, repair specialists and led to the fact that the equipment was simply thrown on the march, and it did not even have time to enter the battle.
So the deceitful AsmyppoL (Eugene), fulfilling the order, will never prove that precisely because of the intelligence, which allegedly could not reveal the enemy's grouping - and this is a lie - we suffered such losses in the initial period of the war. However, I think he will repeat his lies more than once here, as was the case with the promotion of the 16th Army, when for four articles he lied that Moscow was planning a war against Iran in 1941, which is why 16A moved along the southern route.

[DrEng527]

Quote: ccsr

- precisely the lack of infrastructure for tank forces,

could it have been created for the 30MK? Note that the Germans cost 4000 tanks ...

[DrEng527]

Quote: Operator

glitchy and inaccurate SVT

if not a secret - where does this data come from?

Quote: Operator

cost price

evaluating weapons only by cost is not correct, it is necessary to take into account the effectiveness of weapons when performing a task otherwise the very weapon is a pitchfork ...

[Operator]

The gas engine of the SVT multiplied its firing accuracy, and the unworked design of the reloading mechanism caused massive failures in the field (this drawback was overcome only in the AK after 9 years).

PPD and PPSh are functional classmates with the same combat effectiveness, but the cost of the first one is an order of magnitude higher than that of the second

[zyablik.olga]

Quote: Operator

PPD and PPSh are functional classmates with the same combat effectiveness, but the cost of the first one is an order of magnitude higher than that of the second

"An order of magnitude" is 10 times. Do you responsibly assert that PPD cost 10 times more than PCA?

[DrEng527]

Quote: Operator

The gas engine of the SVT significantly reduced its firing accuracy,

You are substituting concepts! Inaccurate and reduced accuracy are different - snipers successfully fought with SVT, the same Pavlyuchenko - but you can make 2 aimed shots, unlike a mosinka!

[Operator]

Is three times less accuracy a decrease or a multiple decrease?

Why would a sniper take a second shot at the target - he is a sniper by definition, and the target is not a sucker.

[kloss]

Why has the SVD been in service for decades? It's just not bad at a distance of 600 meters.
Your comment is a comment from a sucker

[DrEng527]

Quote: kloss

It's just not bad at a distance of 600 meters.

and then in real combat conditions and not get ...

[DrEng527]

Quote: Operator

Why would a sniper take a second shot at the target - he is a sniper by definition, and the target is not a sucker.

there is a gust of wind ... or the enemy jerked ...

[chenia]

Quote: AsmyppoL

and from February 1941, several more of the same formations will begin to form, and, of course, they managed to think over their needs for them.

I did not know such subtleties, but I always felt that Zhukov had a hand in this. Although he was surprised in his memoirs, there were so many MCs.

I was more interested in why they began to replicate the untested structure in such a way.
In my time in the 70s and 80s, a lot of experiments were carried out and volumes of dissertations were written to justify the appearance of a new divisions.
And then the DShBr (although this is already part of it - they were carried away by the air echelon), they did not know (for almost a decade and a half) where to stick in (until they were shoved into the Airborne Forces in the late 80s).
And here...!?

[AsmyppoL]

“I didn’t know such subtleties, but I always felt that Zhukov had a hand in this. Although he was surprised in his memoirs - there were so many MCs.”

I specifically looked before that - for some reason these memories passed by historians who wrote many books about our tanks ...

You are absolutely right. when I.V. Stalin is credited with the military, then, as a rule, the military themselves are to blame. Perhaps these are other persons - but they are military ...

For example, even before 1941, intelligence brought information that the German tank division had two tank regiments and the division had 500 tanks. Our reconnaissance did not find out that the German tank division began to have one tank regiment until the beginning of the war. Less than a month before the start of the war, it is said about the presence of 580 tanks in the German tank division. This is all said by military intelligence officers. The military of the General Staff and the People's Commissariat of Defense, the GABTU, etc., do not object to this. Thus, according to intelligence, two German tank divisions will have 1000 tanks or more. And two TDs can be part of the German tank corps ...

What is strange is that Stalin tells the military about a tank corps with 1000 tanks. A person sees from intelligence materials that the Germans are acting skillfully and successfully. He does not understand why - he is not a military man ... Perhaps it is the number of tanks ... The bad thing is that none of the military tries to explain to Stalin why this should not be done.

M.V. Zakharov: “... I had to remind I.V. Smorodinov that we have developed staffs for the mechanized corps. This should have been reported to Stalin and asked for his permission, based on the calculations and the plan for the receipt of tanks from the industry, to re-form the mechanized corps in relation to the previously existing staff structure, in which it may be advisable to make only some changes.

I.V. Smorodinov replied that he could not discuss this issue, since he had received instructions from Stalin - to have a mechanized corps in the composition of two tank and one motorized divisions, and in tank regiments to have at least two hundred tanks.

To develop the organizational and staff structure of the mechanized corps, I proposed to involve the head of the Armored Directorate of the corps commander D.G. Pavlova. Let him now prove that the commander of a tank regiment will be able to control a unit that will include two hundred tanks. Indeed, in 1939, working on a commission chaired by G.I. Kulik, he supported the opinion that the tank corps of the former organization were cumbersome and not viable.

To the remark of I.V. Smorodinova: "We will give the regiment commander a diamond ..." - I noticed that it was not a diamond, but the difficulties of managing such a cumbersome regiment. On this our conversation ended ... "

[Doliva63]

And then the DShBr (although this is already part of it - they were carried away by the air echelon), they did not know (for almost a decade and a half) where to stick in (until they were shoved into the Airborne Forces in the late 80s).
Probably still in the 90s. And there was no need to "stick" anywhere, they were quite in their place.

[chenia]

Quote: Doliva63

Probably still in the 90s

I agree, I don't remember much already.

[ccsr]

Quote: Doliva63

Probably still in the 90s. And there was no need to "stick" anywhere, they were quite in their place.

Quite right - the GSVG had its own airborne brigade, which was subordinate to the headquarters of the group, and there were more than 2,5 thousand paratroopers trained to conduct hostilities not only in the rear, but also against NATO ground units on the battlefield. In addition to the brigade, there were five separate army battalions, i.e. in total, about 5 thousand paratroopers were recruited, and they were in their place, at least in the plans of the group headquarters. This was until the beginning of the withdrawal of troops from Germany.

[Doliva63]

Quote: ccsr

This was until the beginning of the withdrawal of troops from Germany.

I would say - before the collapse of the Union. In the 89th they began to withdraw, in the 91st the Union began to crumble.

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

As usual, a person who is trying to ascribe to himself the title of "expert" is completely unaware of events about the formation of 30 mechanized corps (mk) ...

No, I know how it all happened, but the dreamer AsmyppoL simply does not understand what he is writing, which is why it is easy to catch him on lies and home-grown conclusions.
First, in 1940, it was decided to create 8 (and then another) mechanized corps based on tank brigades, i.e. they were created not from "scratch" but on the basis of the existing armored vehicles and personnel who were trained. Those. there is an organizational and staff measure that does not require the industry to change plans for the release of equipment.
Secondly, the text of the memoirs is not yet a document, and the fact that Stalin is credited with the number of 1000-1200 tanks is not confirmed by any documents. Most likely, on the contrary, the idea was imposed on Stalin that exactly such a number of tanks should be in mechanized corps, because later, when the military leaders during the war realized what they had done with the number of tanks in the MK, they, to put it mildly, tried to shift the arrows to the leader of the peoples, denying their mistakes. How could Stalin determine the required number of tanks in the MK if he really had no idea what was going on in the troops and only Finnish opened his eyes.
Thirdly, all speculations by AsmyppoL (Eugene) about 30 MK are built on its lack of gamot, because initially they were planned to be created only during MOBILIZATION activities, and this was indicated in the Memorandum of the People's Commissariat of Defense:

On 12.2.41, a Note was prepared outlining the mobilization deployment of the spacecraft, in which it was said about the deployment during the mobilization of 30 MK directorates, 30 motorized and 60 tank divisions.

The People's Commissariat of Defense understood perfectly well that they did not even have personnel for such a number of formations and associations, which is why it was the mobilization period that was stipulated when they called in people from the reserve.
Further, the author of the article is lying again, attributing to Zhukov something to which he could not relate:

On February 22, a note is being prepared on the manning of the tanks formed by MK. The Memo speaks of the 1st stage microcapacities (19 combat and 7 reduced strength) and the 2nd stage (4 reduced strength). Thus, the final amount of 30 microns was determined under the direct supervision of the new chief of the General Staff.

The vile lie of AsmyppoL is that Zhukov did not have the right to determine the number of MKs, and this could only be done by the People's Commissar of Defense, especially since the People's Commissar was subordinate to Fedorenko, who was responsible for the armored service of the Red Army and he could really determine the needs for this equipment and in buildings, not Zhukov. This is followed by the lies of the anonymous AsmyppoL (Eugene):

Only on March 8, 1941, a Resolution was issued confirming the formation of 30 microns.
Thus, the leadership of the KA, represented by the young reformer - the head of the General Staff and the People's Commissar of Defense (who had not climbed out with the decision on the mass formation of the MK) for almost a year) justified before the Government and Stalin and pushed through the Resolution on the formation of thirty mechanized corps, scattering resources and personnel ..

At first, he lied that it was Stalin who imposed the creation of thirty mechanized corps of 1000 tanks each, and now he changed his shoes in the air and already ascribes to Zhukov that it was he and Timoshchenko who were the initiators and it was they who passed the Resolution. As they say, they caught a liar by the hand, because he brought his memoirs:

I.V. Smorodinov told me: “Matvey Vasilyevich, last night Boris Mikhailovich and I were at Stalin's. The latter asked: “Why are there no mechanized and tank corps in our army? After all, the experience of the war of the German fascist army in Poland and in the West shows their value in battle. We need to immediately consider this issue and form several corps, in which there would be 1000-1200 tanks. "

But the point is not even this, but the fact that 30 MCs were not supposed to appear in a year or two, but it was a long-term program designed for 6-7 years of peacetime, but amateurs do not understand this.

[chenia]

Quote: AsmyppoL

A very reasonable opinion of the head of the country, which is not imposed by the number of mechanized corps ...

And I have always argued that 30 MK is not Stalin's initiative.
There was an obvious caste interest.

[AsmyppoL]

You're right. Just like the formation of 10 anti-tank artillery brigades with 107-mm and 85-mm guns. The military insisted, began their formation, but some of them were not provided with vehicles. They added 76-mm divisional guns as anti-tank guns, but again they did not bother with the production of shells for them ... But, on June 21, the Chief of the General Staff said menacingly that the plan for large-caliber shells was not being fulfilled ... And the 37-mm and 85-mm shells anti-aircraft guns, armor-piercing shells for 76-mm tank and divisional guns somehow did not bother him ...

What was G.K. Zhukov, in addition to the General Staff, as deputy people's commissar? For the connection! Nothing has been done on the note of the commander of the spacecraft communications ... For the air defense! On the 1-2 day, the air defense guns of the 37-mm and 85-mm guns were left without shells. Then they were given out one by one, because production rates were low. For fuel! And D.M. was to blame for the fact that the ZAPOVO fuel turned out to be far beyond its borders. Pavlov. He struck a blow to Lublin and flew away to organize it on the Southwestern Front. As a result, the most combat-ready mechanized corps were ineptly burned ...

[ccsr]

Quote: AsmyppoL

You're right. Just like the formation of 10 anti-tank artillery brigades with 107-mm and 85-mm guns. The military insisted, began their formation, but some of them were not provided with vehicles.

Another manipulation - the formation of artillery brigades, like mechanized corps, is a long process, the pace of which determines not only the capabilities of the industry, but also the availability of trained gunners in the country. The fact that this formation was in demand during the war is evidenced by the fact that in 1944 they returned to the brigade structure again, and 9 new brigades, even divisional artillery, were created.

Quote: AsmyppoL

What was G.K. Zhukov, in addition to the General Staff, as deputy people's commissar? For the connection! Nothing has been done on the note of the communications chief of the spacecraft ...

A disgusting lie, because only in March Zhukov was appointed responsible for communications and he could not do anything in three months, if only because at that time he was engaged in the processing of operational planning documents, even at the district level.

Quote: AsmyppoL

For air defense! On the 1-2 day, the air defense guns of the 37-mm and 85-mm guns were left without shells. Then they were given out one by one, because production rates were low.

Another heinous lie, because in March Zhukov became responsible for air defense, and a plan for orders for equipment and weapons was formed in 1940, i.e. Zhukov did not stand in any way to this.

Quote: AsmyppoL

For fuel! And D.M. was to blame for the fact that the ZAPOVO fuel turned out to be far beyond its borders. Pavlov.

Another heinous lie - the Fuel Supply Directorate of the Red Army was responsible for the spacecraft fuel.

The head of the department, and then of the department, until the moment of his arrest in December 1937, was Colonel N.N. Movchin, who until 1935 had a category k-12.
The department was in charge of providing the Red Army with all types of fuels and lubricants, antiknock agents, containers, special equipment, and refueling facilities. Subordinated to the Main Directorate of Armaments and Technical Supply of the Red Army, from July 1937 - the NKO of the USSR, from October 1939 - to the newly created Directorate of Military-Technical Supply of the Red Army, and after the latter was disbanded by order of the NCO No. 0132 of June 26, 1940 - directly the NCO of the USSR.
After the start of the Great Patriotic War, by order of the NKO of the USSR No. 0257 of August 1, 1941, the fuel supply department was subordinated to the Chief of the Rear Services of the Red Army.

What could Zhukov have changed in the three months before the war, if the accumulation of rear reserves lasts for years?

Quote: AsmyppoL

He struck a blow to Lublin and flew away to organize it on the Southwestern Front.

Again, a heinous lie - in no cover plan there is an instruction to develop a plan for an offensive against Lublin, but there is an instruction to be ready, under favorable conditions, to launch an offensive against Lublin. And these are completely different tasks, and Zhukov has nothing to do with it.

Quote: AsmyppoL

As a result, the most combat-ready mechanized corps were ineptly burned ...

Another amateurish conclusion, because Zhukov can be accused of some miscalculations, but the fact that the mechanized corps suffered losses is primarily connected not with his activities at the post of NGSH, but with the miscalculations of the top military leadership of the NCO, who, to the detriment of the quality of armored vehicles and the infrastructure of tank forces, got carried away its quantity, and this was a fatal mistake of pre-war planning. The origins of these errors lie in the activities of Tukhachevsky, who did not understand well how all this would be managed and supplied, because in fact he was more of a neo-Trotskyist than a competent commander. It is for these mistakes that we paid with the blood of our soldiers.

[Torpom]

The fuel control service was also subordinate to the chief of the General Staff. What prevented him, if he knew about the beginning of the war, to send a couple of echelons to Zapovo.? The head of the Hanko base, General Kabanov, was promised to issue a bill for the delay of the ship to take out the families of servicemen. But Zhukov did nothing to provide the tanks with fuel. Tanks were simply thrown without fuel. Also with anti-aircraft guns. For more than three months, he did nothing to prevent anti-aircraft guns from being left without shells. He did not take any initiative. But even on the eve of the war, he discusses the issue of the production of gliders, which did not pass according to the plans of the industry. In June, it seems on the 16th, a decree on the production of equipment and weapons for the URs is being carried out, which was also not planned. This question was important to him at the time, and the increase in the release of anti-aircraft shells of new calibers was not important. And he was directly responsible for this service, so he signed a permit with Tymoshenko for the arrest of the chief of the air defense.

One of the main reasons for the defeat of our border grouping is communications, command and control of the headquarters of unions and air defense. And it is strange that one person was responsible for all this, who turns out to be not to blame.
It also turned out that it was he who was to blame for the fact that there were many tank corps, which were practically poorly manned.
And why do you write a lot and do not present the facts?
You wrote that the program for the formation of mechanized corps was adopted in 1940 and was calculated until 1946. Where are the facts of this? Or did you come up with it?
Where are the facts that the dormunt signal was intercepted by our rumors? Or is it your invention again?
Where is at least one fact that this signal was sent to the corps and divisions by radio?
Or you can only write what cannot be blown. In other words, you come up with

[ccsr]

Quote: ToRpom

The fuel control service was also subordinate to the chief of the General Staff. What prevented him, if he knew about the beginning of the war, to send a couple of echelons to Zapovo.?

At least the lack of free containers for their storage, not to mention that the plan for the supply of fuel to the districts was APPROVED by the People's Commissar of Defense in 1940, when the Fuel Supply Directorate of the Red Army was personally subordinate to him. The chief of the General Staff does not have the right to cancel the orders of the People's Commissar - this can only be done by the People's Commissar himself, you do not seem to know the order in the army. So Zhukov could only petition for a change in the fuel supply plan and no more. But the commanders of the districts, who were OBLIGED to analyze the state of providing the district with fuels and lubricants, had to submit reports on the allocation of additional funds, and then if they had storage reserves. If you do not understand how the military mechanism works, then there is nothing to hang on Zhukov with any nonsense, because he is not able to determine the provision of fuel and lubricants by the districts, if only due to the fact that these are consumables and reports on their use are submitted to the General Staff once a year.

Quote: ToRpom

The head of the Hanko base, General Kabanov, was promised to issue a bill for the delay of the ship to take out the families of servicemen.

And what is so surprising here if the government determines the procedure for settlements between different departments in the country? The People's Commissariat of Defense also pays for the use of the cars and their simple defense commissariat - is this news to you?

Quote: ToRpom

But Zhukov did nothing to provide the tanks with fuel.

How he PERSONALLY had to do it - tell me in more detail.

Quote: ToRpom

For more than three months, he did nothing to prevent anti-aircraft guns from being left without shells. He did not take any initiative.

What the hell was the initiative if he was planning and preparing for war, and did not have time to analyze district level reports during that period?

Quote: ToRpom

It also turned out that it was he who was to blame for the fact that there were many tank corps, which were practically poorly manned.
And why do you write a lot and do not present the facts?

Because these facts are well known, and if you do not know them, then these are your problems:

A special section of this plan was the development of the Armed Forces of the USSR. The five-year plan for the construction of the Red Army was each time considered and adopted at the level of the Central Committee party and the Soviet government. M.V. Zakharov writes: “All the most important planning documents of the General Staff, after approval by the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Council of People's Commissars, were always signed by several responsible persons. I.V. Stalin strictly adhered to the established order, and such documents were not signed by him alone. And this time on the title page of the third five-year plan for the construction of the Red Army were signed in red “for” - I. Stalin, K. Voroshilov and others ”.

https://military.wikireading.ru/5382
In February 1941, a new five-year plan for the construction of a spacecraft was adopted.

Quote: ToRpom

You wrote that the program for the formation of mechanized corps was adopted in 1940 and was calculated until 1946. Where are the facts of this? Or did you come up with it?

Firstly, the program for the creation of 30 MK was approved in 1941 in the form of a MOBILIZATION plan - you will at least figure it out for a start.
Secondly, the annual plan for the production of tanks in 1940-1941. was:

In total, from January 1939 to June 22, 1941, the factories produced more than 7 thousand tanks of all types. By 1941, the industry could annually provide the army with up to 5,5 thousand tanks of all types. However, the release of new combat vehicles of new designs lagged behind the plan. So, in 1940, it was planned to produce 600 T-34 tanks, but only 115 were actually produced. After the February Conference of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks in 1941, things went faster, and in the first half of that year, 1500 tanks of new designs were manufactured. These tanks entered the troops, but were not properly mastered.

The capabilities of the industry made it possible to produce about 3000 tanks of new designs per year, which means that it will take about 30 years at least to equip all 10 MKs with new equipment, based on the states of the time, where the mechanized corps was supposed to have 1000-1200 tanks as conceived by our commanders. Do you understand anything in these calculations in order to accuse me of inventing this? I think that you just have no idea how it all works in the armed forces and the military-industrial complex, so you believe in various nonsense that some article authors write here.

Quote: ToRpom

Where are the facts that the dormunt signal was intercepted by our rumors? Or is it your invention again?

This is known to those who were trained in radio intelligence. I cited the memoirs of radio intelligence officers, where they directly indicate that long before the war they opened the enemy's networks and monitored the exchange of information. This is how it was carried out in naval radio stations, which did not differ from the land ones in terms of equipment and principles of work, which were described by the historian of the fleet Strelbitsky on the basis of documents:

Since Tykotin was removed from the then "border of friendship" with Germany by about a hundred kilometers, the BRP-5 continued to function even after the actual start of hostilities in the Great Patriotic War. This is evidenced by 18 relevant records at once, made in the "Journal of the KBF reconnaissance direction" for June 22 - 29, 1941. Getting in touch with the Detachment about once every two hours, in just 35 first hours of the Great Patriotic War, the BRP-5 sailors tracked about two dozen ships of Germany, Finland and Sweden in the sea (including 9 submarines, the flagship of the Finnish fleet - the coastal battleship defense "Ilmarinen" and at least 8 more surface warships of various classes), as well as 12 aircraft in the air and a number of aviation radio stations that worked from the ground. The most valuable thing is to recognize the radio interception at 11.02 on the first day of the war, when the German radio station on the island of Rügen reported in detail about two minefields exhibited by the Kriegsmarine ships in the Baltic Sea and about clear navigable channels along the German coast.
At 14.40 on June 23, the last message was sent from Tykotin to the Detachment that “from 15.30 to 19.34 Finnish aircraft will fly in the Abo-Aland archipelago and in the mouth of the Gulf of Finland”, and the BRP-5 was forever silent ... “BRP No. 5 ( Bialystok) cut off communication with the detachment at 15 o'clock on June 23, - we read in the official report on the detachment's combat activities.

Is that enough for you to understand how radio intelligence worked?

Quote: ToRpom

Or you can only write what cannot be blown. In other words, you come up with

If you are not in the subject, then you should not compensate for your illiteracy with reproaches that you do not know what I and other professionals who have an idea of ​​the issue under discussion know.

[DrEng527]

Quote: ccsr

the result of the "gigantism of designs" of our commanders of that time, who believed too much that such a mass of equipment would be easy to control and provide.

Or maybe it's easier to say - their illiteracy?

Quote: ccsr

but this was not a consequence of Zhukov's fault, but a consequence of theoretical delusions

watch the battle for the mountain on Kh-G and the counterstrike in Ukraine performed by the GKZh - the same mistakes - tanks without infantry and artillery rush into battle without reconnaissance ...

[antivirus]

then first decide on the role of Tymoshenko in that tragedy and those who nominated Zhukov to this important position without taking into account his experience of serving in positions of this level.

the VKPB is in charge, and not the military, the IVS gathers in the Central Committee apparatus from below (democrat centralism) and makes decisions: build socialism, plow roads, cleanse enemies of the people. to accept in the Komsomol and the Party, tractors and horse-drawn traction in military units (assigned) do not give everything on agricultural fields to collective farms, let them pull on themselves as we give them, so they will ride them. these are decisions from places for growth (in 2020 they call it that) of GDP and the welfare of the peoples of the USSR - the transition from a subsistence economy to an unknown bright future. under any RM, the party apparatus would be against the abandonment of the border area (fields-factories) ....... Owl the apparatus to take out the families of the military, AND ALL CITIZENS WHERE? take out too? count from the border of the USSR (on 15.05.41/22.06.41/30 OR XNUMX/XNUMX/XNUMX) to the front + XNUMX km to the rear - THIS IS HOW MUCH AND WHERE TO EVACUATE, FOR HOW MUCH?
and plans to start exporting Minsk and Vilnus-Riga?
And the plans to stop peaceful life and "all volunteers in the Red Army" is how much a minus to the 3 five-year plan?

[ccsr]

Quote: antivirus

under any RM, the party apparatus would be against abandoning the borderlands (fields-plants) ..

This is too one-sided interpretation of our military planning, because it is only necessary to open the plans for covering the districts and the numbers of mobilization measures from M-3 to M-10, and even to M-15 immediately appear there. So, in addition to the party apparatus, the military were also interested not to retreat with the aim of replenishing our troops - and this is much more important than the removal of military families.

Quote: antivirus

And the plans to stop peaceful life and "all volunteers in the Red Army" is how much a minus to the 3 five-year plan?

This just proves that it was unreasonable to mobilize in May 1941, if only because Hitler would immediately attack the USSR, and then it is still unknown how the battle of Moscow would have gone. Well, any delay in deadlines is always in favor of those who have not yet had time to prepare and are trying to catch up. Of course, such a mobilization caused economic damage to the country - you cannot argue with that, which is why Stalin tried by any means to postpone the start of the war, sometimes making not entirely justified steps in the last weeks until June 22.

[antivirus]

we must also take into account one point - the mentality of the peasants - and the IVS and the Politburo and all the Comintern members were like that - to harvest the harvest, to lend it to the fool at any cost
THE MAIN THING IS AGRICULTURAL CYCLE, everything else in the former hungry country --- then. Yes, and in the war, lunch is on schedule

[DrEng527]

Quote: ccsr

How would you personally act in 1940 in the place of the country's leadership, after new territories appeared in our country and they had to be defended?

URy is not the best element of the country's defense! I would have struck in the rear of the Germans in May 1940 ...

Quote: ccsr

and those who nominated Zhukov to this important position without taking into account his experience of serving in positions of this level.

is he alone? But you are right - the main problem is the Bolshevik power - the power of bandits and scum ...

[VS]

Quote: DrEng527

I would have struck in the rear of the Germans in May 1940 ...

p-k Khodarenok - an officer of the OU GSh - made an analysis of this plan for which w. and wanted to hit first - nonsense and not a plan)))

Quote: DrEng527

the main problem is the Bolshevik power - the power of bandits and scum ...

if THESE people were not at the head of the country, Stalin and his supporters, you would be in the fields with MANURE at best for the Germans .. How right now the same Ukrainians and Balts are becoming manure ..

[DrEng527]

Quote: V.S.

BRED golimy and not a plan)))

from your point of view, no more ...

Quote: V.S.

right now, in the fields with MANAVOZ it would be at best for the Germans

your problem is that you do not know how to think and live in the agitprop paradigm without Bolshevism in Russia there would be no fascism in Europe ... and in WW1 RIA fought with dignity and in foreign (for today) territories, mainly, and not near Moscow-Tsaritsin, like the Red Army ...

Quote: V.S.

As right now, the same Ukrainians and Balts are becoming manure ..

their very presence is a consequence of the policy of the Bolsheviks, as well as of other pseudo states - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, etc. ...

[VS]

Quote: DrEng527

BRED golimy and not a plan)))

from your point of view, no more.

analysis of the mediocrity of this plan at one time, back in 2001, was done by Colonel of the General Staff of the Russian Federation M.M. Khodarenok - "A Lesson Paid in Blood". (Independent Military Review. June 22, 2001) - read)))
"" if the main blow of the forces of the Southwestern Front is plotted on the map, then even an amateur will immediately become clear - this blow could not cut off Germany from any southern allies even with the most significant operational imagination. This means that this strike has no strategic goal. A blow is planned for the sake of a blow, into space.
If you display on the map a strike in the direction of Sedlec-Dęblin, you get a rather strange curved line, which does not explain much in the plans of the Soviet command. It is not clear from what considerations the provincial settlements of Sedlec and Demblin were chosen for the planned attacks (the latter is especially often mentioned in the "Considerations"). What's this? Warsaw, Königsberg, Breslau?
"")))

Quote: DrEng527

without Bolshevism in Russia there would be no fascism in Europe ...

that is, you do not know that WWII did not bring the expected results to the world powers in dividing the world and Russia in this division was nothing more than a territory for the division between England, the United States and others, and WWII was a foregone conclusion BEFORE Lenin won the Intervention in Russia and unleashed whites, with the support of the West, civil war (((i.e. you do not know WHO brought Hitler to power and why (((For you, the principle - you are to blame for what I want to eat) is more important than the fact that you are alive thanks to the Bolsheviks and Stalin ... I sympathize - they didn't give you a crunch of rolls ... (((

Quote: DrEng527

in WW1, RIA fought with dignity and in foreign (for today) territories, mainly, and not near Moscow-Tsaritsin, like the Red Army ...

I, too, being a young lieutenant, at the end of the 80s, thanks to the Gorby lights - preached for some time - until I grew wiser and learned that the Kaiser stupidly DID NOT have his Barbarossa on RI. And as the current KERENSKIE smashed into the dust of the Republic of Ingushetia, the Germans ended up near Petrograd - if you don't know ... (((

Quote: DrEng527

their very presence is a consequence of the policy of the Bolsheviks, as well as of other pseudo states - Belarus, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Armenia, etc. ...

so you don’t know THIS - WHY Lenin was FORCED to create the USSR on the ruins of Ingushetia after the civil war and the INTERVENTION of the west - when more than 100 thousand invaders stormed into Russia and they killed more than 100 thousand citizens of Soviet Russia already - and Stalin, who was an active enemy of the UNION, went on this? (((would you read the thread or something (((for example WHEN all these independent republics of Transcaucasia, Dill and other Baltic states) appeared ... with whom the Bolsheviks had to fight .. WHO is there sponsoring the Basmachi until the end of the 30s. ..

[DrEng527]

Quote: V.S.

this blow could not cut off Germany from any southern allies

I already wrote to you earlier - think for yourself, and do not read nonsense ... in May 40, Romania is not an ally of Germany and Bessarabia is still in its composition ...

Quote: V.S.

и рRussia in this division was nothing more than a territory for the division between England, the United States and other

1) are you a Russophobe? happens to fools
2) everything else is just nonsense of the propaganda officer ...

Quote: V.S.

and unleashed by the whites, with the support of the West, the civil war ((

the war was unleashed by the Bolsheviks when they staged the October coup, and then dispersed the US ...
Let me remind you that back in 16 he put forward the slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil one ...

Quote: V.S.

this STUPIDITY I, too, being a young lieutenant

discussing lofty matters with an illiterate shovel boot is humiliating

Quote: V.S.

WHY Lenin was FORCED to create the USSR on the ruins of RI

what nonsense ... re-read the article by VIL "about the national pride of the Great Russians" ...

[VS]

Quote: DrEng527

this blow could not cut off Germany from any southern allies

I already wrote to you earlier - think for yourself, and do not read nonsense ... in May 40, Romania is not an ally of Germany and Bessarabia is still in its composition ...

in general, we are talking about the plans of the General Staff of SPRING 41)) it is necessary to be more careful with criticism and cleverness)))

Quote: DrEng527

Russia in this division was nothing more than a territory for the division between England, the United States and other

1) are you a Russophobe? happens to fools
2) everything else is just nonsense of the propaganda officer ...

wow ((here we have a fan of lacy panties drew the same - they came running from dill or what?))) So Russophobe then wow here we really have)))

Quote: DrEng527

unleashed by the whites, with the support of the West, the civil war ((

the war was unleashed by the Bolsheviks when they staged the October coup, and then dispersed the US ...

and why did the Bolsheviks have to unleash a war if they took POWER IN OCTOBER BLOODY then?)) like from their cannibalism and mental deviations ??))

Quote: DrEng527

back in 16, he put forward the slogan of turning the imperialist war into a civil one ...

if you want to quote a classic - quote not your funny retelling, but EXACTLY)) Lenin argued that the imperialist war ALWAYS turn into a civil war - because the people will get tired of dying for the bourgeoisie and he will definitely turn bayonets - on the bourgeois))) And those - will surely unleash a civil war, because they will not will wish their own, such as honestly earned on the robbery of cattle for centuries - give the cattle)))

Quote: DrEng527

discussing lofty matters with an illiterate shovel boot is humiliating

)) do not carry nonsense and everything will be fine))

Quote: DrEng527

re-read the article by VIL "about the national pride of the Great Russians" ...

SO WHO tore RI into independent republics BEFORE Lenin ischo?)))

[DrEng527]

Quote: DrEng527

i would hit in May 1940 to the rear of the Germans ...

Quote: V.S.

in fact, we are talking about the plans of the General Staff SPRING 41st )) it is necessary to be more careful with criticism and cleverness)))

would you take this thesis to yourself

Quote: V.S.

So Russophobe then wow here we really have)))

Quote: V.S.

for the division of the world and Russia

you write the word Russia with a small letter, and am I to blame?

Quote: V.S.

we have a fan of lace panties

Yeah, I love it when my woman is in beautiful lingerie and I can buy it for her ...

Quote: V.S.

and why did the Bolsheviks have to unleash a war if they took POWER in OCTOBER

1) they took power in the country within six months - that's where the GV started ... read in the soviet history textbook - "triumphal march of the SV"
2) your logic is bad - having made a coup and dispersed the US, the Bolsheviks provoked a response - people in Russia were not satisfied with this power and contempt for the choice of the people who chose the US!
3) for example, something like that happened in 2014 - the power in Kiev was seized by the Natsiks, as a result, Crimea went to the Russian Federation, and the Civil War began in Donbass ...

Quote: V.S.

An imperialist war will ALWAYS turn into a civil war -

as it did not go over in France, as well as in England ... but in Russia it was unleashed by the Bolsheviks, they wanted it in Germany too, but the Germans hanged their Red Liebhnevts in time ...

Quote: V.S.

on the robbery of cattle for centuries - to give cattle)

if you consider yourself and your ancestors cattle - that's your right ... I will note - the Bolsheviks robbed everyone in Russia, from merchants to peasants - and people did not live better - they were dying of hunger ...

Quote: V.S.

)) do not carry nonsense and everything will be fine))

see above - you simply don't know how to read and understand what you read ...

Quote: V.S.

SO WHO tore RI into independent republics BEFORE Lenin ischo?)))

1) learn history ....
2) it was the Bolshevik coup that led to the sovereignization of the outskirts - Ukraine was the first to fall away, then VIL gave independence to Finland with Vyborg and went ... learn history

[VS]

Quote: DrEng527

your logic is bad - having made a coup and dispersed the US, the Bolsheviks provoked an otvetka — the people in Russia were not satisfied with this power and contempt for the people's choice, who elected the US!

yeah - well, people just dreamed of giving back to the bourgeoisie and the landowners))) WHAT'S ALL OVERALL, everyone dreamed of giving the land back to the landowners)))

Quote: DrEng527

for example, something like that happened in 2014 - the power in Kiev was seized by the Natsiks, as a result, Crimea went to the Russian Federation, and the GV began in Donbass ...

and then the Bolsheviks are to blame - WHO UNITED the war in Donbass? Or do you have that Natsik Bandera that Lenin's Bolsheviks are the same thing?))

Quote: DrEng527

An imperialist war will ALWAYS turn into a civil war -

somehow it didn’t go over in France, as well as in England ... but in Russia it was unleashed by the Bolsheviks, they wanted it in Germany too, but the Germans hanged their Red Liebhnevts in time ...

yeah ((((Power was taken BLINDLY, peace was given and the land seized by the peasants by black redistribution was legalized - and then it became boring for them and unleashed a civil war ((And it wasn't that INTERVENTS were invited just by your whites?

Quote: DrEng527

the Bolsheviks robbed everyone in Russia, from merchants to peasants - and people did not live better - they were dying of hunger ...

How will it become better and everything will live better at once if the bourgeois have called the interventionists to return their power and the massacre in the country has been launched?))) Do you even know how much the interventionists killed Soviet citizens?

Quote: DrEng527

SO WHO tore RI into independent republics BEFORE Lenin ischo?)))

1) learn history ....
2) it was the Bolshevik coup that led to the sovereignization of the outskirts - Ukraine was the first to fall away, then VIL gave independence to Finland with Vyborg and went ... learn history

you, for a laugh, look WHAT Glad the Ukrops celebrate today - WHEN they began to lead their independence from the Republic of Ingushetia))) BY October there ALREADY were independent Transcaucasian Ukrainians and other Asians with the Balts))) With their parliaments and the authorities))) So the Bolsheviks only resigned themselves to situation and legalized the collapse of the Republic of Ingushetia - and created the USSR - the UNIFIED state of people's power))) Thanks to which you and your like with lace panties on your head instead of brains - you can safely fart at her now - and did not become dung from the German burghers ...

[DrEng527]

Quote: V.S.

yeah - well, people just dreamed of bourgeois and landowners to substitute the backside)))

you have strange allusions ... but that's none of my business ...

Quote: V.S.

WHY OVERALL everyone dreamed of giving the land back to the landowners)))

the people of the NE did not give the land - it gave them the opportunity to use it for several years, and then gave it to collective farms - in fact, the 2nd serfdom ...

Quote: V.S.

and then the Bolsheviks are to blame - WHO UNITED the war in Donbass? Or do you have that Natsik Bandera that Lenin's Bolsheviks are the same thing?))

1) it was the Bolsheviks who gave Donbass to Ukraine
2) I don't see much difference - just different sorts of shit ...

Quote: V.S.

, the world was given and the land seized by the peasants by the black redistribution was legalized

1) instead of peace and victory - Brest Peace with the loss of territories and indemnity ...
2) it was tactics - see above, then enslavement of peasants on collective farms

Quote: V.S.

And nicho that the INTERVENTS were invited just by your whites?

for example, in the North, the Bolsheviks invited the invaders ... I note that the occupation of Ukraine and the Baltic states in the Brest Peace ...

Quote: V.S.

how will it become better and everyone will live at once l

Let me remind you that when the NEP was established, the country recovered in 3 years ...

Quote: V.S.

Do you even know HOW MUCH only the interventionists killed Soviet citizens?

and how many did the Reds shoot in the Red Terror and starve to death? where are the invaders ...

Quote: V.S.

October there ALREADY were independent Ukrainians, Transcaucasians and other Asians with the Balts

you don't know the history - there were no branches before the Bolshevik coup I'm too lazy to teach you further ... good luck!

Quote: V.S.

so that the Bolsheviks only resigned themselves to the situation and legalized the collapse of the Republic of Ingushetia - and created the USSR - the UNITED state of people's power)))

It was the Bolsheviks who destroyed RI - through their coup, the recognition of Poland, Finland, the Baltic States and the return of Kars ...

Quote: V.S.

with lace panties on the head instead of brains - m

hmm, with panties you have a fetish ..
I will refrain from talking about your intelligence and knowledge - you are a banal illiterate and ill-mannered boot! The discussion with you is meaningless and turns into a flood! I finish it here ...

[Catfish]

Totally agree with you. And the version of "surprise" was beneficial to absolutely everyone on our side of the front line.
For the Germans, "General Moroz" played this role.

[Olgovich]

Quote: chenia

... The horror is that our generals. did everything (hoping that Germany is not ready for war in 1941 - and it really is), so that the enemy would meet completely untrained army,

It's impossible to comment on raving

[chenia]

Quote: Olgovich

It's impossible to comment on raving

You are undersized to such delirium. It happens with gray hair, but plays in the sandbox.

[Olgovich]

Quote: chenia

You are undersized to such nonsense. It happens with gray hair, but plays in the sandbox.

This is the statement of an ignoramus

[ccsr]

Quote: Olgovich

It's impossible to comment on raving

On many historical issues, I have the opposite opinion to yours, but as for military issues, I pay tribute to you - you reason like a sane person who realistically evaluates the pre-war events. Moreover, you immediately saw the author's fraud, when he refutes himself, slipping documents, the meaning of which he does not understand and you pointed to them directly, after which the anonymous author AsmyppoL (Eugene) began to wriggle. That is why I completely agree with you about the "nonsense" - apparently it has become the norm for small-town authors who have decided to promote their illiterate views by means of a large number of articles containing lies.

[DrEng527]

Quote: chenia

BP failure is the main reason for failure.

extremely controversial! BP is one element, important, but not the main one in the defeat of 41g ... the same militias or workers' regiments near Tula / Leningrad had BP at a minuscule level, and fought well ...

[Aviator_]

I. G. Starinov in his memoirs describes a conversation with his friend Lieutenant General N.A. Call (chief of artillery ZapOVO) held on June 20: "... Pavlov every day reports to Moscow about the seriousness of the situation, and we are told not to stir up panic and that Stalin knows everything ..."

Well, this source is very biased, especially since he wrote this at a time when Stalin was considered the embodiment of universal evil. Again, beyond his narrow specialization (the creation of the DRG), he was extremely incompetent. In this regard, it is worth noting his negative attitude to the "rail war" in the summer of 1943, when, instead of this operation, he proposed massive raids on German junction stations to destroy steam locomotives and rolling stock. There was only a trifle - but were the partisan detachments capable of this?

[DrEng527]

Quote: Aviator_

Again, beyond his narrow specialization (the creation of the DRG), he was extremely incompetent

have you ever read his books?
his plans to sabotage communications - in fact, the development of the ideas of Kutuzov-D. Davydov, was rejected!
Very interesting - why?

Quote: Aviator_

In this regard, it is worth noting his negative attitude to the "rail war" in the summer of 1943, when, instead of this operation, he proposed massive raids on German junction stations to destroy steam locomotives and rolling stock.

he proposed to mine the railway lines - that would require less explosives! and the conducted rail war was an ordinary PR action - the Germans had enough rails to replace! But there was an ambush with steam locomotives ...

Quote: Aviator_

There was only a trifle - but were the partisan detachments capable of this?

3rd year of war ...

[Aviator_]

Naturally, I read, they are on my bookshelf. It is there that it is written about the destruction of rolling stock. But - a dear egg for Christ's day. By the way, what is the difference between the "mining of railway tracks" and the "rail war" is the same thing. And to disable locomotives and carriages, raids on well-guarded nodes were required. So, troll, you earned your pretty penny with my help. Read his memoirs about how he was going to disrupt the German offensive on Moscow with the help of some DRGs in the fall of 1941.

[DrEng527]

Quote: Aviator_

... By the way, what is the difference between "mining of railway tracks" and "rail war" is the same thing.

not! mines against trains - both a steam locomotive and wagons with cargo are destroyed! and mines with a multiplicity device and a timer!

Quote: Aviator_

So, troll, you earned your pretty penny with my help.

1) poking is not polite, it looks like your parents raised you badly ...
2) you have not learned to understand either books or messages - I sympathize ...

Quote: Aviator_

Read his memoirs about how in the fall of 1941 he was going with the help of some DRGs to disrupt the German offensive on Moscow.

I read and wrote to you above! Unlike you, he understood that the primers would get wet in the fall, and without the delivery of military supplies, it is impossible to fight! Mining railway roads would drastically weaken the capabilities of the Wehrmacht and could lead to the disruption of the offensive!

[VIP]

"are the mistakes of our intelligence or the disinformation of the German intelligence" in fact, Canaris both wanted and fooled our intelligence.
The GRU must be 3 and then with a stretch.
"Subsequently, the military declared Comrade Stalin to be the culprit" "or rather, they helped" the comrades from the Presidium of the Central Committee "thanks for not being declared" an enemy of the people. "

[AsmyppoL]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: chenia

The overly inflated formation of new associations, in particular the 30 MK (sanctioned by Timoshenko and Zhukov, while Meretskov objected uncertainly) is the main reason for the failure of the BP (especially in BTV).

In fact, the decision to create 30 MK was made back in 1940, before Zhukov was appointed to the post of NGSH, and this program was calculated until 1946, and in peacetime.

Quote: chenia

I am a professional soldier in the past (I went through several deployments), and at the same time I can not even imagine the scale of this event.

You just don’t know the details of this program, therefore you don’t imagine its scale, but it was designed for many years. After all, the point is not only in obtaining equipment, but also in the fact that personnel were needed for these MCs, and even conducting studies at the level of buildings, and all this takes time.

Quote: chenia

And what could the l / s and commanders do in such conditions? Only by tracing parks and building infrastructure, using technology, and creating training fields and shooting ranges, I am silent about classrooms (and this is primitive). And the barracks fund? And what about the dos?

You are saying everything correctly, just do not take into account that all this was planned to be done during the peaceful six to seven years at least. And no one wants to remember this, so absurd accusations arise, although I myself perfectly understand that the industry would hardly be able to satisfy all the needs of the army during this period. With regard to study, then for six years with a three-year training of tank officers, at least three graduations of officers can be done during this period if new schools are created in 1941, not counting the old ones.

The decision to form 30 mechanized corps was made after the war games in January 1941. Then there was a survey of the opinion of the command staff of the military districts on the number of mechanized corps for each district. Everything was finalized after G.K. Zhukov for the post of Chief of the General Staff. According to the plans, all the corps of the first stage were supposed to have armored vehicles in accordance with the standard structure. Replacement of new-type tanks with old-type tanks was allowed. The mechanized corps of the second stage were to be completed in 1942.

[Operator]

Quote: ccsr

AsmyppoL (Eugene), completing an order

And what will happen to Eugene when someone knocks on him from the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, unlike Stalin's fans operating anywhere in the world?

[rruvim]

Thank! But I still don't understand the role and movement of the 14th md Wehrmacht. She then pops up in maps, in almost all directions and fronts ...

[rruvim]

The 14th division began operations in the 41st against the USSR under the leadership of Major General Heinrich Wosch, and ended in Kaliningrad in 1945.

[ccsr]

Let's proceed to the next trial of false information coming to the forum from
AsmyppoL (Eugene), who writes:

Previously, the locations of the units that belonged to the mobile troops were considered. There are no coincidences between the actual location of the enemy's troops and the RM. Of all the places of deployment of tank units, which are listed in the reconnaissance report dated May 31.5.41, 21, only one TP 1 (city of Letzen) was near the actual location of the 21st TP. However, Letzen was not part of the territory of the concentration area of ​​this division. The 20st TP in the XNUMXth TD was at this time in Germany (Ohrdruf).

I have repeatedly asked the author how long it takes for a Wehrmacht tank division to move from Ohrdruf, or from distances of 200 and 400 km to the border with the USSR in June 1941, but because of his illiteracy he could not give an answer. We leave the question in force, but there will be no answer. since the author will evade as always. What follows is the statement:

The 20th TD could start redeploying to the territory of East Prussia only after June 16. In the evening of June 19, until half of the 20th TD is located near Letzen, but the city itself does not fall into the division's concentration area again. Therefore, it can be argued that all the found locations of the 21st Panzer and Motorized Divisions are mistakes of our intelligence or the result of German disinformation.

This is a lie, because the unit can move in stages, and it is not at all necessary that the combat units are in the first place. That is why the support units and rear reserves of the division could arrive at the designated area much earlier and begin deployment there, which could be recorded by our intelligence.

Maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces with the situation on the evening of June 16 and June 19, 1941 were posted on the English website and later appeared on Russian websites.

Well, finally, the author brought the first maps of mid-June, which he began to compare with the data of our intelligence on May 31. The first thing that catches your eye is that the maps do not contain the signatures of officials and it is completely incomprehensible who it belonged to - Halder or some major who was preparing a certificate for his head of the department head. But the fun begins next, because the author states:

The deployment of German troops on the evening of June 16, theoretically, could reach the RO of the PribOVO headquarters by the end of the day on June 17. Below, on a fragment of the map, RMs are plotted, which are given in the summary of RO PribOVO on the 17th.

I would like to ask this scholar who brazenly asserted that it takes more than three days to deliver intelligence information, how in this case, on the 16th, could this data be included in the RO report on the 17th? There is another manipulation and lies of the author of the articles, who is trying to discredit the actions of our intelligence in the pre-war period in the form of such statements:

Let me remind you that in the event of a redeployment of units of a division, its area on the maps is marked with a dotted line. All areas of concentration of formations shown on the map are outlined with a solid line, i.e. they do not move anywhere as of the evening of June 16.

If someone opens these maps, he will see that, firstly, they use several types of designations for the locations of parts and connections - double solid closed, double closed dotted, double dotted unclosed, single closed, single unclosed, single dotted unclosed, which indicates a different degree of deployment of certain formations and units. Secondly, it is impossible to believe the illiterate Eugene, if only because he will not be able to explain what the designations and numbers mean inside the deployment areas of the type - Tle, (m.), (M Tle), ½ 19 Pz, 1/3 87 and how they should have been assessed by our intelligence if the deployment process had begun but had not yet ended. Thirdly, there is no enemy on the map, and this already indicates that the compiler of the map was not admitted to high-level intelligence information, and had no idea about the deployment of the spacecraft, which suggests that this map does not belong to the highest military leader of the Wehrmacht. This indirectly confirms the absence on the map of allied units on the southern flank of the German troops - this is another sign that the map does not reflect the true deployment of our enemy units, which our intelligence revealed.
What follows is another deceitful conclusion of the author, which states:

On June 21, PribOVO prepared a document "Information of the PribOVO headquarters on the grouping of forces and means of German troops in East Prussia by 18 pm on 21.6.41" The document lacks any information about the imminent start of the war at dawn on June 22.

Any literate person understands that OPERATIONAL information is reflected in intelligence reports, and not in a table where numbers are simply put down, i.e. there is another distortion of facts on the part of the dreamer Eugene. And this is only a small part of the lies that AsmyppoL (Eugene) spreads and which can be determined with the naked eye - I think anyone can check it himself.

[kloss]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: RuSFr

He has a fix idea that stupid Germans broadcast this signal on the radio.

This is how warning signals are transmitted by radio - this is apparently news for our anonymous German, although it is known that:

Information was also received by radio interception. The signal "Dortmund" came to the Germans by radio and was intercepted by the British and us. Churchill's memoirs mention that he wanted to speak to the British nation on the evening of June 21, but postponed it until the evening of June 22, "when the situation becomes clear," as he wrote in his memoirs. Churchill does not write that the British had equipment for decrypting German radio transmissions captured in 1939, so throughout the war the British were aware of German plans, plus the recruited chief of the Abwehr (intelligence) Admiral Canaris and R. Hess, who "joined" him. We intercepted the signal and the start of operation of the radio stations, and at once in all levels of the German army and in larger volumes than before. This also gave Stalin reason to think that some kind of events were beginning on the border.
After the war, V.P. Pronin (in 1941 - the head of the Moscow City Council) said that in the evening he and the 1st Secretary of the Moscow City Conservatory, A.S. Shcherbakov, were summoned to see I.V. Stalin. According to Pronin, Stalin ordered this Saturday to detain the secretaries of district committees in their places and forbid them to leave the city. "German attack is possible", He warned.

Quote: RuSFr

But there are no facts of this

Read carefully, dilettante, how our scouts worked on direction finding and radio interception on the eve of the war - this is the testimony of the GRU colonel General Staff I.Z. Zakharov:

Why bring verbal garbage for the twentieth time, if there is no confirmation of the interception of the Dortmund signal?
Not knowing about the beginning of the war on June 22, almost all the personnel of Bushuev's point were captured at dawn on June 22. They write that 7 people were killed, the rest were captured. And this clown is lying in our eyes.

[ccsr]

Quote: kloss

Why bring verbal garbage for the twentieth time, if there is no confirmation of the interception of the Dortmund signal?

Especially for the illiterate, I inform you that they wrote about this in textbooks on radio intelligence sixty years ago, but you could not see them in your eyes.

Quote: kloss

Not knowing about the beginning of the war on June 22, almost all the personnel of Bushuev's point were captured at dawn on June 22.

Lies, because the entire point in the state had 30 servicemen, and only part of them died. At least Bushuev himself and several people with him survived, including Zakharov. But this is not the point, but the fact that, firstly, they conducted radio reconnaissance before the war in full force, and secondly, the division had four such radio posts, which also conducted radio reconnaissance of the enemy's networks before the war. So they carried out the pre-war autopsy of the group in full force, and your lie is inappropriate in this case.

Quote: kloss

And this clown is lying in our eyes.

This is such a clown, as you did not understand what is in the tutorial TEN months they trained conscripts and the training included at least 4-6 hours of daily training in radio interception or direction finding, depending on the specialization, but you just do not know what they teach there, so you lie without a twinge of conscience. That is why they could distinguish combat signals from short messages and radiograms, they understood the structure of subordination of German radio centers and knew the exchange rules, but for you it is still a Chinese letter. By the way, since you are a layman in radio intelligence, you have no idea who else in the districts conducted radio intelligence besides individual radio divisions and what objects they worked on.

[Operator]

Quote: zyablik.olga

Do you responsibly assert that PPD cost 10 times more than PCA?

Essno - and what surprises you: the receiver of the first was milled for a long time and tediously from a solid blank, the receiver of the second was quickly and easily stamped from a sheet.

PS By the way, PPS with a perfected stamping technology at cost was several times less labor-intensive than PPSh.

[zyablik.olga]

Quote: Operator

Essno - and what surprises you: the receiver of the first was milled for a long time and tediously from a solid blank, the receiver of the second was quickly and easily stamped from a sheet.

PPD-40 with a set of spare parts cost 840 rubles, and PPSh-41 at the earliest stage of its development in production was 500 rubles. Subsequently, the cost of production of the PPSh-41, depending on the place of manufacture, was 280-330 rubles. In the second half of the war, due to the simplification of a number of technological operations, the cost dropped to 142 rubles. That is, your statement about the cost is less "on order"is not wealthy, and you once again proved yourself as a person not responsible for your words.

[Torpom]

Quote: ccsr

Quote: DNJoni

So I know that he is puffed up, but he has no facts. Our expert takes with his throat and rudeness ...
Here are excerpts from the document of the 57th Motorized Corps: "The 457th Corps Communications Battalion connects the corps command post north of Seina with the command posts of the 18th Motorized Division and the 12th Panzer Division by wire and, in addition, communicates to point 118 in the northern direction to Kalety and to the border at the road Berzhniki, Seiriyai. Further, the command post of the 18th motorized division will be connected with the 161st infantry division (8th army corps) in Kalety. During the offensive, the battalion will first be with both divisions, with their forward units ...
The radio silence after the start of the attack is canceled. "
It can be seen that the wire lines will almost reach the border.

This dilettante will have to explain on fingers how the warning networks work at different levels of the military. Firstly, when the document is dated, the author is shyly silent, because wire communication means are laid when the units arrive at the place of deployment many days before the start of hostilities. Secondly, the corps battalion, simultaneously with the laying of wire lines, has permanently switched on duty radios, which are tuned to the notification frequency. Thirdly, the radio silence mode is introduced only for certain parts, but in this mode the duty receivers work around the clock, because the operation of a separate group of transmitters is prohibited, but not the transmitters of central radio centers. However, you are illiterate in this, and you hardly understand what is at stake.

And here is one of the excerpts from the documents that the Dormund signal did not pass through the communication lines of the 1st Panzer Group and even indicated exactly how the replaced signal was transmitted: "The Chief of the Operations Department of the Tank Group sends an order by phone:" Hero saga, Wotan, Neckar 15 ".

Open any plan for covering the state border and you will see for yourself that the signals from Moscow to enter it differ from the signals that the district sends to subordinate units to enter army units. The same was true for the Germans, which is why having received the Dortmund signal at the level of the COMMANDER of the tank group, a completely different signal is sent to the lower structures, because a limited number of people had information about the Dortmund signal. By the way, your illiteracy manifested itself even in what you call a combat signal an order - the order for its implementation is in those to whom the signal is transmitted, and everything that needs to be done is reflected in it.

And there are many such documents. Only the expert does not know this

What's the point that you know about them, if you can't even understand what they are talking about.

And with the British Prime Minister, everything is much easier. The British did not intercept this signal. Since the fall of 1940, the OKH was instructed to use radio communications to a minimum.

This was primarily due to the fact that the operational situation changed, and Hitler began to prepare for a war against the USSR, which is why the load on the radio networks decreased. As for Churchill's assertions, which you consider to be a lie, then you tell the British that he lied in his memoirs, and I believe him, because I see no reason for him to distort the facts. Besides, how to do without radio communication with ships at sea, with airplanes in flight, with embassies and agent networks, you, as an "expert", will probably be able to explain to us.

Somewhere else on June 17-18 there was information about what signal, which means ... On June 20, a signal passed (you need to look there for it starts with the letter Z) that the attack will begin at 3-30 on June 22.

Don't lie - Halder's directive of June 10, rather than June 20, clearly indicates the warning signals and the date of the attack:

4. June 22, 3 hours 30 minutes: the beginning of the offensive of the ground forces and the flight of aviation across the border. If meteorological conditions delay the departure of the aircraft, the ground forces will launch an offensive on their own. Commissioned by: Halder
Translated from German from: DMA Potsdam, H 02.02 / 10/43, BI.689.

So you can sell your lies about the letter Z to amateurs - Halder did not write any of this in the directive.

It was believed that the Russians could no longer do anything.

During such a time, it is really impossible to do anything and there is only hope for a plan to cover the districts. Unfortunately, the full introduction of plans to cover the districts was not carried out, because Halder, unlike you, knew very well that such a decision was made at the level of the USSR Government, and not at the level of the People's Commissar of Defense. That is why he was sure that we will not be in time anyway, but you will never understand this anyway, because you have too primitive ideas of how everything was carried out at that time.

So the most important thing in the presented German document is that the signal from the headquarters of the tank group was transmitted by telephone, and not by radio! How could our listeners intercept this signal? And not a radiotelephone?
How could our listeners intercept the signal received by the headquarters of the tank groups, if they did not know about the location of these headquarters near our border?

[ccsr]

Quote: ToRpom

So the most important thing in the presented German document is that the signal from the headquarters of the tank group was transmitted by telephone, and not by radio!

You are inattentively reading the texts, because it was about intercepting the Dortmund signal, and the author cited the transmission of another signal INSIDE the army itself, which was completely different:

"The Chief of the Operations Department of the Tank Group sends the order by telephone:" Heroic saga, Wotan, Neckar 15 ".

These are different levels of the troop warning system - I hope you understand that at least.

Quote: ToRpom

How could our listeners intercept the signal received by the headquarters of the tank groups, if they did not know about the location of these headquarters near our border?

I understand that you have no idea how direction finding differs from interception, how HF and CB radio waves propagate, but I popularly explain that all radio nodes have constant call signs and are included in radio networks or radio directions, and sometimes both at the same time. Therefore, knowing the operating frequencies of the highest-level warning systems, it is enough to simply monitor them and record everything that is transmitted over them (this is taught in educational units for many months), and for this, even the exact location is not necessary to know. And the officers of the operational department of the radio battalion, where information is received, are trained to analyze all incoming information and even by indirect signs of activation of the warning networks to understand what is happening in the enemy units. That is precisely why radio silence is so often used during the war, when it is understood that radio intelligence, even for the operation of networks, can make a fairly accurate analysis of upcoming events.

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

adequate measures, did not take: neither mobilization, nor bringing to combat readiness.

nonsense))) ALL NECESSARY measures were taken)))

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

that the strategic defense is being built on the basis of the RM on the throwing of divisions: if today the TD is here, then build an SD against it here, and if you left there, then drop everything and build already there?

And then in 3rd, 10th place?

And if there is no data, then .... is it not necessary to build a defense on tank-hazardous and vulnerable (the base of the ledge) places?

these are too difficult questions for a batan)))

[VS]

Quote: Olgovich

do not give in to provocations ..

In-in: as if world wars begin because of .... provocations. : belay.
Only a fool could think that avoiding provocations could postpone the WORLD War for at least one day ...

in those days the question of provocations was very important - the question was WHO would be recognized as an AGGRESSOR !! Or Germany or the USSR, and hence the question of future allies - who will the United States provide in world war)))

[VS]

Quote: chenia

The overly inflated formation of new associations, in particular the 30 MK (sanctioned by Timoshenko and Zhukov, while Meretskov objected uncertainly) is the main reason for the failure of the BP (especially in BTV).

Namely THIS and blamed Zhukov and Marshal Zakharov and the marshals at the 57th Plenum where Zhukov was filmed)))

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

As usual, a person who is trying to ascribe to himself the title of "expert" is completely unaware of events about the formation of 30 mechanized corps (mk) ...

Let me briefly recall the prehistory of this event.
M.V. Zakharov wrote: “... At the end of May 1940, at a regular meeting with the 1st Deputy Chief of the General Staff, IV Smorodinov, the conversation turned to the development of a new organizational structure for MK.
I.V. Smorodinov told me: “Matvey Vasilyevich, last night Boris Mikhailovich and I were at Stalin's. The latter asked: “Why are there no mechanized and tank corps in our army? After all, the experience of the war of the German fascist army in Poland and in the West shows their value in battle. We need to immediately consider this issue and form several corps, in which there would be 1000-1200 tanks. " Stalin - I.V. Smorodinov looked at me meaningfully, - in the near future he is waiting for our proposals ... "

On 9.6.40, the People's Commissar of Defense approved a plan for the formation of new microns for specially developed states. The plan provided for the deployment of eight microns and 2 separate tank divisions. At the end of 1940, another mechanized corps was formed as part of KOVO.

and why are you doing forgery? It says here that - by the fall of the 40th - they created ONLY 9 pieces !! A SPEECH is about the creation of 30 mechanized corps - in addition to the existing 9 in February-March 41st Zhukov thought of creating another 21 mechanized corps !!!

[VS]

Quote: AsmyppoL

You're right. Just like the formation of 10 anti-tank artillery brigades with 107-mm and 85-mm guns. The military insisted, began their formation, but some of them were not provided with vehicles. They added 76-mm divisional guns as anti-tank guns, but again they did not bother with the production of shells for them ... But, on June 21, the Chief of the General Staff said menacingly that the plan for large-caliber shells was not being fulfilled ... And the 37-mm and 85-mm shells anti-aircraft guns, armor-piercing shells for 76-mm tank and divisional guns somehow did not bother him ...

What was G.K. Zhukov, in addition to the General Staff, as deputy people's commissar? For the connection! Nothing has been done on the note of the commander of the spacecraft communications ... For the air defense! On the 1-2 day, the air defense guns of the 37-mm and 85-mm guns were left without shells. Then they were given out one by one, because production rates were low. For fuel! And D.M. was to blame for the fact that the ZAPOVO fuel turned out to be far beyond its borders. Pavlov. He struck a blow to Lublin and flew away to organize it on the Southwestern Front. As a result, the most combat-ready mechanized corps were ineptly burned ...

but intelligence is your fault anyway?))))

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

He struck a blow to Lublin and flew away to organize it on the Southwestern Front.

Again, a heinous lie - in no cover plan there is an instruction to develop a plan for an offensive against Lublin, but there is an instruction to be ready, under favorable conditions, to launch an offensive against Lublin. And these are completely different tasks, and Zhukov has nothing to do with it.

here you are wrong. ))) Zhukov struck by name - PROMOTED his idea - a blow to Lublin on the dir. 3))) And as Pokrovsky said later, Zhukov, who screwed up with this blow, then on Stalin and began to blame this adventure ..