Military Review

Reconnaissance about German tanks and motorized infantry in June 1941

45

The following abbreviations are used in the article: IN - military district, gsd (gsbr) - mountain rifle division (brigade), GSh - General base, SOBOVO - Western Special VO, Spacecraft - Red Army, Cova - Kiev Special VO, md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), u - motorized body, pd (pbr, pp) - infantry division (brigade, regiment), Pribovo - Baltic special VO, Goals Difference - intelligence materials, Ro - intelligence department of VO, RU - Reconnaissance GSh KA, TGr - tank Group, td (mn) - tank division (regiment).


In the previous part it was shown that the RM about the German mobile troops did not correspond to reality. At the end of May, intelligence "for sure" knew about 21 armored and motorized divisions concentrated on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland. In fact, in these territories at that time there were about four td. The distorted picture of the distribution of enemy mobile groupings near our border was obliged to influence the actions and decisions of the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union on the eve of the war. In the previous article was placed link, on which you can see the German maps of the ground forces of the Wehrmacht (files №№799-844).

The opinion of a person who considers himself an expert


Let's first consider the opinion of the "expert" to clarify some questions.

Note that [the author] always writes "posted on the border", although if asked, he doesn't even know the depth of the border zone in the USSR. Now ask the author a question: 400 km is to be counted on the border with the USSR, or are these parts located deep in the rear:
At the same time, ask him how long it will take a tank division to move to the border if it is at a depth of 200-400 km from our border.
To refute it, it is enough to carefully read the memoirs of F.I.

Earlier in the article, it was said three times about which territories were considered by RU under the term "At our border"... I will consider this issue again in detail.

Our intelligence in 1940 considered East Prussia and the former Poland as the territories on which the group intended for the attack on the USSR was concentrated.

For example, the summary of the 5th Directorate of the Red Army (future RU) from 20.6.40 is called: "On the grouping of German units in East Prussia, the former Poland and Austria".

The summary of RU # 8 says the same: "The grouping of German troops in East Prussia and on the territory of former Poland on 15.11.40".

In the report of RU No. 1 in February 1941, other terms are used: "Northern part of the General Government" и "Southern part of the General Government".

In the report of RU No. 4 in April 1941, a similar term is used: "Strengthening the grouping of German troops on the border with the USSR (in East Prussia and the General Government)".

RU calmly uses the term "on the border" meaning territory East Prussia and the General Government.

However, the use of the term "General Government" in RM is incorrect, because the presence of German troops in an area larger than the territory of the General Government is being considered. The figure shows that the General Government does not include some of the territories of former Poland, which came to be called South Prussia, West Prussia and Reichsgau Warteland. There was also a decrease in the territory of the General Government in the southern part.


This discrepancy was eliminated in the RU report dated 5.5.41. In the report dated May 15, the territories on which the German group against the USSR is concentrated were finally determined:

German Armed Forces on our border distributed: in East Prussia ...; on the Warsaw direction against the West Military District ...; in the Lublin-Krakow region against KOVO ...; in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn ...; in Slovakia ...; in the Carpathian Ukraine ...; in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja ...

The document reuses the term "On our border"when talking about large areas. The author also uses this term in the article. The distance from our border to the western borders of the above territories in some areas exceeds the value of 400 km indicated by the "expert". We are faced with a human misunderstanding of the text of post-war memoirs.


In principle, one cannot refer to the memoirs of the former head of the RU General Golikov, since even at the beginning of the 60s he was sure that the pre-war RM were reliable. This also applies to the report of RU from 31.5.41, which in some part was repeated in report No. 5 of 15 June.

Reconnaissance about German tanks and motorized infantry in June 1941

In the early 60s, General Golikov was sure that the information about the presence of 286-296 divisions in the German armed forces, incl. 20-25 md, 8-10 paratroopers and airborne troops, 15 mountain and 16 SS divisions, was correct.

In fact, on 22.6.41, the German armed forces had up to 209,2 divisions, incl. up to 15,2 md (including 4,5 md SS), one parachute and airborne division each, 6 gsd, one SS police division.

The former head of the RU believed that the Republic of Moldova about the presence of 1 md and so on at our western border on June 27 was reliable. In fact, there were only 4 td near the border. Intelligence made a mistake 6,8 times, but the former head of the RU, even after the war, is unaware of this. General Golikov wrote that the overwhelming majority of the numbers of the German divisions concentrated on the border were known. Earlier in the article, based on documentary data, it was shown that the established numbers of most of the divisions were German disinformation.

How long will it take for a tank division to cover a distance of 200-400 km?


The “expert” himself does not know the answer to this question. He can only use information from the 70-80s about the mobility of the TD of the Soviet Army. It should be noted that the German command tried not to redeploy tanks to such a distance on their own. The wheeled vehicles of these divisions moved along the roads, and the tracked vehicles (for the most part) were transported by rail. One of the few 3rd TD moved under its own power from the border of the former Poland. It took the division about 4 days to arrive at the concentration area.


7.6.41 The division continues its march along the specified route Schwiebus-Tirshtiegel to the Pinne area ...
8.6.41 ... The division continues through Posen-Wreshen to the new quartering area ...
9.6.41 The division continues its march from the old to the new quartering area through Konin-Kolo-Krosniewice-Kutno-Lowicz ...
10.6.41 The division rests for one day and in the evening at 18.00 march from the convoy exit point through Warsaw to the Minsk-Mazovetsky, Kalushin area ...
11.6.41 According to the directive of the "442nd headquarters" on the movement of troops, the last units of the division on 11.6.41 at 6:00 should pass Warsaw ...
12.06.41 The division reaches its new location, moving through Siedlce, Luków ...


The movement of German tanks over long distances in peacetime was fraught with their failure. For example, the tanks of the 16th TD were transported by rail. Below in the diary (probably) we are talking about the march of tanks from the railway station to the concentration areas.

21.6.41 ... the 16th TD reports that during the march, about 200 track rollers failed, which must be replaced before the start of the operation. An inquiry to the head of the rear department of the General Staff of the Ground Forces revealed that there were no tracked rollers either in the warehouse of tank spare parts or in the arsenal of the ground forces in Magdeburg. all the supplies went to replenish the formations that participated in the Balkan campaign ...
22.6.41... The 16th TD is alarming, some of its Pz-III tanks are out of order due to defects in tracked rollers ...

In wartime, it was easier: rollers could be removed from damaged vehicles.


Why did the Germans overestimate the number of mobile units?


Readers ask the question: "Why did the German command need to overestimate the number of divisions of mobile troops at the border?" This question is logically followed by another: "Was the overestimation of the number of mobile connections at the border obliged to alert the leadership of the spacecraft and the USSR?"

The facts were presented: it happened. There are no answers to the above questions in the works of historians either. Therefore, the author will present only his opinion. So why did they do this?

In the previous part, all the places of dislocation of movable joints and parts that were mentioned in the RM were considered "Dislocation of German units and formations by groupings in the border strip with the USSR on 1.6.41 ..." This document was included in the report of the RU from 31.5.41. What follows from the previously presented material?

1) The presence of fictitious motorized and tank regiments near the locations of large headquarters could be required to mask these headquarters.

For example, from 17.2.41 in the city of Allenstein, the headquarters of the 4th TGr was deployed, and from the spring of 1941 the headquarters of the 41st MK appeared there. At the headquarters of the TGr and MK, many officers wear the uniform of tank troops. This is not necessarily a black tank uniform. It can also be a gray-green uniform with the colors of the tank troops.


The headquarters of the 4th TGr and the headquarters of the MK in Allenstein were not found by our intelligence. But a mythical TP was discovered there, and the intelligence double-checked and confirmed this information. How could reconnaissance find TP where there were no tanks?

Sources may have learned about TP from rumors, or they may have seen many servicemen in tank uniforms. In any case, these rumors could only have been based on German disinformation to cover up the location of the headquarters.

Fictitious units of mobile troops could cover large headquarters, which had many vehicles. For example, the headquarters of the non-existent 6th MD could cover the headquarters of the 6th field army, tk. they were in the same locality.

Two md in the city of Zamoć, in addition to a disinformation role, could additionally cover the headquarters of the 48th mk stationed in the city. The headquarters of the 48th MK was stationed in Zamoć until the evening of June 19, inclusive, and was also not discovered until the start of the war. By the beginning of the war, he relocated closer to the border.

According to the RO of the KOVO headquarters, both MDs were in Zamoć until June 21 inclusive. It is possible that the German command was afraid of the attention of our intelligence to the mythical MD in this city and therefore there were no actual formations in it.

2) It should be noted that the reconnaissance "definitely" knew about the multitude of motorized divisions and regiments, which at that time were not near the border. How much MD was discovered by intelligence?

On 31.5.41, reconnaissance discovered nine MDs, of which the "exact" numbers of seven are known: 6th, 8th, 17th, 37th, 58th, 175th and 215th. Information about the presence of the eighth MD (161st) needed to be clarified. All of these eight MD numbers did not exist in the German armed forces. Therefore, this is an example of the disinformation of the German command. Why did the Germans show non-existent MD?

On 6.9.40, the headquarters of the United Wehrmacht Command sent to the Abwehr a manual on measures to disinformation the Soviet military command, in which there is an interesting text:

To what extent are individual authentic data, for example, about the numbering of regiments, the number of garrisons, etc. can be transferred to the Abwehr for use in counterintelligence purposes, the Main Command of the Ground Forces decides ...

The main command of the ground forces determined for the Abwehr what information about the numbers of the regiments and, possibly, about the divisions should be disclosed to our intelligence.

Since the fall of 1940, the German MDs became essentially weakened PDs on cars (without one regiment and one artillery battalion). The division had up to 37 armored cars and had no tanks. Such a connection can be quickly transferred to the place of breaking through the defense and cannot be used to break through the enemy's defense, because they did not have the tanks and structures to support them. These divisions without TD also could not be used in breakthroughs to great depths. This is probably why the German command was not afraid to show mythical motorized divisionssince they should not have caused concern among the command of the spacecraft.

The problem turned out to be that the Germans did not know that our intelligence could not find out about the transformation of the MD into "Weakened pd on cars"... According to our intelligence, the German MD consisted of three regiments, had 70 armored cars, 96 tanks, 24 assault guns of 75 or 105 mm caliber, 72 guns on a tank chassis of 37 and 47 mm caliber.

On 22.6.41 in one of the documents of the RU all eight familiar MD numbers appear. Almost all of them remained in the same areas in which they were "discovered" by intelligence on May 31.


3) The situation with the TD is completely different. Intelligence is aware of the presence of such divisions, but their numbers are unknown or distorted. In the report of the RU on May 31, the headquarters of the 8th TD is located immediately in Warsaw (against ZAPOVO) and in Lancut (against KOVO). At this time, the 8th TD was stationed in the vicinity of the city of Prague. On the evening of June 22, RU believed that the 8th TD was concentrated against KOVO. In fact, the 8th TD fought as part of the 4th TGr against the troops of the PribOVO.

According to the report of the Republic of Uzbekistan dated May 31, there were twelve etc. against the troops of PribOVO, ZAPOVO and KOVO (up to Slovakia).

Against the PribOVO, which will be hit by two TGRs, reconnaissance did not find a single full-fledged TD. In East Prussia, there are only four tank regiments and 6 tank battalions. The indicated tank units are conventionally combined into two TDs, which do not have motorized infantry brigades, artillery regiments and support units. Our general staff officers were obliged to understand that these are not full-fledged etc. At the same time, in East Prussia, from the fall of 1940 to 22.6.41, two TDs (1st and 6th) were stationed, which for 9 months were not detected by our intelligence. This characterizes the work of our intelligence as poorly supported by knowledgeable agents.

The headquarters of the TD, the headquarters of the tank brigade, six tank battalions and 4 tank battalions were found against the WTO. The indicated tank units were counted for four TD. Of these, only two can be considered complete: one near Warsaw (170 km to our border) and one in the Dombrovo region (105 km). And no hints about the concentration in the future of shock groups on the Suvalka ledge or in the Brest region. The only TD, in fact, concentrated against the WTO in the area of ​​the city of Poznan, was not found by intelligence.

The instruction of the United Wehrmacht Command to the Abwehr leadership also concerned the southern direction and tank forces:

To create the impression that the main direction in our movements has been shifted to the southern regions of the General Government, to the protectorate and Austria and that the concentration of troops in the north is relatively low...

To exaggerate the state and level of armament of formations, especially of tank divisions ...

In accordance with these instructions, the German command could conduct an imitation of the presence of TD in the southern part of the General Government, far from the real directions of the TGR strikes. Five full-fledged TDs were discovered by our intelligence in the cities of Novy Sacz, Tarnow, Lezajsk, Lancut and between the cities of Lublin and Holm.


It can be seen from the figure that four TD are located opposite the top of the ledge, where in fact there were no enemy mobile strike groups. It turns out that the information about the presence of four TD in this area was beneficial to the German command, tk. suited their purposes. Therefore, the presence of this information in the RM could only be misinformation ...

Another td is located in the Lublin area - Holm. Probably, she was supposed to cover the deployment of formations of the 1st TGr (14th TD, 25th MD and MD SS "Adolf Hitler"). The same role could be played by two non-existent MD in Zamosc to cover the deployment of the headquarters and units of the 1st TGr, 1st and 13th TD.

4) After the "discovery" of the mythical motorized and tank divisions, our intelligence was obliged to organize observation of the locations of these formations or some of them. Observing the places of dislocation of these dummies, it was impossible to detect the fact that real joints were moving towards the boundary.

How many German divisions were transported to the border in June 1941?


According to the author, one of the reasons for the concealment of the RM for June 1941 is that the intelligence was unable to accurately determine the number of German formations that were redeployed to our border.

On 27.5.41 at the western border (from the Baltic to the Black Sea) there were up to 86 German divisions. By the morning of June 22, 123,3 divisions were located in the same territory. Thus, from May 28 until the start of the war, the territory of East Prussia and the former Poland was transported 37,3 divisions, of which 30,8 were motorized and tank.

In accordance with by a summary of RU from 31.5.41 (actually on May 27 or later) at our border there were 120-122 German divisions, including fourteen TD and thirteen MD.

Let's determine the number of transported German connections in the RM in June. Will help with this RU summary dated 22.6.41... In the summary of RU No. 1 at 20-00 on 22.6.41 it is said about the number of German divisions brought to the front (or to the border):

1. As a result of the hostilities on 22.6, the data available on 20.6 on the following enemy grouping, located directly on the border with the USSR, were actually confirmed ...

2. The general increase in the density of the direct concentration of German troops in front of the front is emphasized ...



From the above fragment of the document, it can be seen that, according to intelligence data for June 20 and 21, 13 divisions additionally arrived on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland. Another 9-11 divisions were redeployed to Slovakia, the Carpathian Ukraine and Romania. The RU summary also states:

[As of June 22nd. - Approx. Auth.] the total number of enemy groupings is determined by:
a) on the northwestern front - 29 divisions ...;
b) 31 divisions on the western front in the Warsaw region ...;
c) on the southwestern front (up to Slovakia) - 48 divisions ...
In addition, in Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine, the number of German troops is 13-15 divisions. In Romania - 33-35 divisions ...

Below are data on the number of German divisions according to intelligence data at different times.


The table shows that until June 19 (inclusive), 5-7 divisions arrived on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland, incl. two motorized and two tank. It turns out that the reconnaissance did not detect a redeployment to the border over 22 md, etc. Our intelligence made a mistake in the number of redeployed divisions by 5 times, and by the number of motorized and tank divisions by 6,5 times.

Until June 19, the average speed of delivery of German divisions to the border was 0,26 ... 0,37 divisions per day. Let me remind you that the speed of concentration of German divisions from May 15 to May 31, according to reconnaissance data, was a similar value - 0,3 divisions / day. At such a rate of delivery of German troops to the border, talking about the expectation of war by the leadership of the spacecraft and the USSR on June 22 is actually frivolous ... It is also frivolous to talk about the presence of a certain directive of the General Staff of June 18 ...

On 22.6.41, RU began to urgently increase the number of German divisions near the border. It is very likely that this increase is fictitious. Why? See for yourself. Against the troops of the PribOVO and ZAPOVO there are two SS. Accurate data on the presence of these divisions did not pass through any intelligence reports, including the RM RO of the PribOVO and ZAPOVO headquarters for June 21.


But, since the tanks from the Suwalki salient are advancing, according to data from two VOs, the RU specialists turned the unverified information in the summary into verified information about the presence of two SS TDs.

They also came up with or fell for the bait of German disinformation in RU, increasing the enemy's grouping against KOVO by 11 PD. Of these, five are again positioned against the top of the ledge, where these troops could not be. There were 48 divisions in the southern part of the former Poland, but in fact there were 37 of them at that time. It is clear that 11 divisions were simply assigned.


At the same time, the number of MD and so on, concentrated against KOVO, did not change from May 31 to June 22. The same thing happens in the Warsaw direction. The grouping of mobile troops increased by only one mythical SS armored division on the Suwalki ledge ...

According to intelligence, after May 31 and June 19, the German group against the PribOVO increased by five divisions, incl. 2 ppm and 2 td.

According to the maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, on the evening of June 19, there was:

- in East Prussia (against PribOVO) - 38 divisions, incl. up to 5,5 td and 4,5 ppm;
- in the Warsaw direction (against the ZAPOVO) - 41,3 divisions, incl. 6 td and 5,3 ppm;
- in the southern part of former Poland (against KOVO) - 35 divisions, incl. 5,5 td and 1,5 ppm.

Later, some of the divisions were somewhat redistributed across the border area.

The greatest contribution of German disinformation can be seen in the RM on the situation on the southern flank of our border. On the territory of Slovakia, Carpathian Ukraine and Romania, 20-21 German divisions arrived on June 9 and 11.

It should be noted that in accordance with the RI summary: “... in the center of Romania (Bucharest and west of it) - [available. - Approx. auth.] 11 divisions ", which include 2 TD and 2 MD. The distance from Bucharest to the Soviet-Romanian border is about 200 km. In East Prussia and the former Poland, a German group intended for an attack on the USSR is considered at a distance of up to 500 ... 600 km from the Soviet-German border. Logically, the German grouping in the central part of Romania should be considered as possible troops that can be used for the war with the USSR. The grouping of troops was located in the central part of Romania, not so far from our border.

Intelligence No. 3 RU at 22-00 24.6. 1941:

The total enemy grouping in front of our Southern Front is 15 German divisions, of which 6 are infantry, 7 motorized, 2 tank ... In the Bucharest, Ploiesti area [180 km to the border. - Approx. auth.], Pitesti [268 km. - Approx. ed.], front-line reserves of 15 German divisions are assumed ...

On June 22, according to intelligence, in the south (in Slovakia, Carpathian Ukraine and Romania) there is a huge German grouping in the amount of 46-50 divisions, incl. 15 ppm and so on.


In fact, in Romania on June 22, there are only 7 German infantry divisions, while in Slovakia and Carpathian Ukraine there are no German divisions. Below are the fragments of the maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, which confirm the above.



The Barbarossa plan said:

Within the framework of this general task, the armies, as well as the TGR, in accordance with the detailed instructions of the headquarters of Army Group South, carry out the following tasks:

11 Army to cover the territory of Romania, vital for the conduct of a real war by Germany, from the invasion of Russian troops. To ensure the success of Army Group South's offensive, the army must demonstrating the deployment of large forces, pinning down the opposing enemy, and later, as the offensive develops in other directions, in cooperation with aviation prevent the organized withdrawal of Russians across the river. Dnieper, pursuing their retreating troops on their heels ...

Let me also remind you of the OKW instruction to the Abwehr: "To create the impression that the main direction in our movements has been shifted to the southern regions of the General Government, to the protectorate and Austria ..."

Thus, our intelligence unwittingly provided the command of the spacecraft and the leadership of the USSR with German misinformation about the presence of a huge grouping of German troops alone, concentrated against the KOVO and ODVO.

For example, the number of groups concentrated against the troops of the KOVO and ODVO, as of May 31, was 72-73 German divisions, incl. 26 md and so on. At the same time, according to reconnaissance data, in the direction of the main strikes against the PribOVO and ZAPOVO there was a weaker grouping in the amount of 59-60 divisions, incl. 10 ppm, etc.

The SC command had the impression that the main attacks would be made in the southern direction: from the southern part of the General Government and from Romania to the flank of the KOVO and along the OdVO. After all, it was there that up to 55% of the German divisions and up to 72% of MD, etc. were concentrated. In addition, there were Hungarian and Romanian divisions, which, according to intelligence, included tank and motorized units of up to 3,5 divisions. It turns out that in the southern direction there could be up to 8-9 German motorized corps out of 10-12 available in Germany.

Misinformation about the presence of a huge number of German divisions in the southern direction came on the eve of the war. Valentine (16.6.41): “In Slovakia, outside the city of Presov in the direction of the city of Uzhok, 50 German divisions ".

On June 17, the RO of the ODVO headquarters prepared a scheme according to which there were up to 16 German divisions against the troops of the district, of which information about one TD needed to be clarified. However, in the reports of the RU on May 31 and June 22, it is said about the presence of two etc. in this area as verified information. We saw the same when examining two SS armored divisions on the Suwalki ledge. Part of the German divisions were stationed against the KOVO and therefore is not shown in the diagram.


The deployment of enemy troops near the border on June 21 can be seen on fragments of the map of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front. A logical question arises: how much effort did the German command take to show our intelligence such a huge mythical grouping at our border?


Below is a fairly impressive grouping of Hungarian troops of up to 6 divisions. This number includes tank and motorized units with a total number of up to 2,5 divisions. When calculating the number of divisions, it is assumed that one division is equal to two brigades.


On June 22, according to RU, in the southern grouping (the southern part of the General Government, Slovakia, Carpathian Ukraine and Romania) there were up to 94-98 German divisions, of which up to 26 were motorized and tank formations. As part of the enemy force grouping against the PribOVO and ZAPOVO there were 60 divisions, of which 14-15 were motorized and tank divisions.

Thus, according to intelligence, there were 40-43% of enemy troops concentrated at our border against the troops of the PribOVO and ZAPOVO, and up to 35-37% of the MD, etc. We see that the German command has fulfilled its task of misinforming the command of the spacecraft and the government of the Soviet Union ...

What conclusion can be drawn about the transport of German troops that RU discovered?

After the release of the RU summary from 31.5.41 and until June 19 inclusive, according to intelligence data, 5-7 German divisions arrived in the territory of East Prussia and former Poland, including two MD and two others.

In the report of the RU on June 22, they found an increase in German troops at the border by 22-24 divisions. However, the information about the appearance of 22-24 divisions does not correspond to reality: it is a lie or the result of German disinformation. RU added the indicated 22-24 mythical divisions in the following areas:
- on the Suvalkinsky ledge - two SS armored divisions;
- 2 divisions in Slovakia and 2-4 divisions in Carpathian Ukraine;
- 5 divisions arrived in Romania;
- 11 infantry divisions arrived in the southern part of former Poland and brought the number of German divisions in the area to 48.

Thus, all our intelligence services were unable to detect the redeployment of a significant number of German divisions in June 1941, most of which were motorized and tank divisions ...

And according to the memoirs of the military leaders of all ranks who survived in the war, I.V. Stalin is to blame for everything, who allegedly expected the main blow to Ukraine, contrary to the opinion of the brilliant military leaders ... They say that the intelligence provided all the necessary reliable RM ... Let each reader judge for himself.

Even after the start of the war, the command of the spacecraft was forced to fear the huge mythical enemy grouping in the south.

Intelligence report No. 4 RU at 22-00 on 25.6.41:

On the offensive front from the Baltic Sea to Romania, the enemy brought into action 88-90 divisions, of which 72-73 are directly in battles ...

This number does not include the southern flank (Slovakia and Hungary), where general grouping of 46 divisions (German) I haven't shown myself yet ...

A significant mythical German grouping in Romania remained until the first days of July. It has only slightly decreased in volume. Until the beginning of July, our command even expected the landing of large landings in the Crimea or in the rear of the Southern Front. The figure below does not show the grouping of German troops in the central part of Romania, in the Slovaks and in Hungary.


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Articles from this series:
May 1941. Where are the German tanks and motorized infantry?
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  1. AsmyppoL
    16 August 2020 05: 51
    +8
    In the previous part, you could familiarize yourself with the German maps of the General Staff of the Ground Forces.
    Several questions were asked in PM about the symbols on the maps. I answer the questions posed
    1. Maki Avellevich
      Maki Avellevich 16 August 2020 06: 32
      29
      Eugene, thanks for the extensive work done on the article. read diagonally (morning),
      in the evening I will read the second diagonal.

      in fact, was it possible that there was also a place for, say, self-delusion / sabotage in the general staff in the intelligence business? in addition to the "fog of war"
      1. Grandfather
        Grandfather 16 August 2020 06: 46
        33
        an article for especially stubborn historians is unlikely to be mastered by an ordinary reader.
        1. Asad
          Asad 16 August 2020 06: 58
          28
          Plus to the author for work! I completely agree about the stubborn historians!
        2. antivirus
          antivirus 16 August 2020 20: 57
          -11 qualifying.
          I hope that such "discoveries" will help to clarify the truth in the future.

          the author does not have it yet.
          and there will be no ........ playing with live bait cannot be reflected on the maps given here - only in MI6 and the SVR, German intelligence and Hungarian + Romanian general headquarters-Intelligence command (who called what and what were they responsible for? in PM interaction with German intelligence structures)
          on the "threat to the south" - we were glad to be deceived in the present-day outskirts of all the sweat and blood of 20 years of building socialism, heavy industry, etc. (without Magnitka and Kuzbass).
          I read freely, it is quite tolerant for assimilation, but there is little use from the articles - where someone deceived whom, did not allow to be misled.
          shows the actual result of the game of our (against whom?) and the Germans (with the allies) against the USSR
          HOW THEY PLAYED ------ AT THE EXPENSE OF SOMETHING ---- CHEATED ------- BREAKED OUT "TO CLEAN WATER" - the author (already wrote) does not and will not

          the warehouse of the warehouse is building an outdoor - does not show (and cannot) throwing along the border to confuse the Red Army, but confused - GL - UNEXPECTED AND THE POWER OF IMPACT ON THE RIGHT DIRECTIONS ACHIEVED.

          right now, kokhly everyone knows about "Shoigu gathered on the ukrov border" so much and then hit. "
          Will the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation outwit them? hit where ukriytsy know? or where they do not wait and we need? -
          - "For a fool, 7 West is not a hook," but for a clever deception "7 miles is a hook"?

          not there and not looking for a genius -Eugene. under the lantern.
    2. ccsr
      ccsr 16 August 2020 16: 39
      -33 qualifying.
      [quote = AsmyppoL]In the previous part, you could familiarize yourself with the German maps of the General Staff of the Ground Forces. [/ Quote]
      In the previous material, it was proved that the last map given by the author No. 844 refers to May 27 and concerns the reserve forces of the Wehrmacht, which is why all the author's incantations that it can be judged by it about the data of our intelligence in June 1941 is a false lie - it cannot be determined by it grouping of Germans on June 22.
      [Quote]
      Earlier in the article, it was said three times about which territories were considered by RU under the term “near our border”. I will consider this issue again in detail.
      Our intelligence in 1940 considered East Prussia and the former Poland as the territories on which the group intended for the attack on the USSR was concentrated.
      For example, the summary of the 5th Directorate of the Red Army (future RU) from 20.6.40 is called: "On the grouping of German units in East Prussia, former Poland and Austria."
      The report of RU No. 8 says the same: "The grouping of German troops in East Prussia and on the territory of former Poland on 15.11.40."
      [/ Quote]
      The author blabs the essence of the issue, because in this case the words "near our border" are generalizing, and not detailing the location of the Wehrmacht troops in each district, because this is a document for different levels of commanders, and detailed detailing is inappropriate here, which is why these words are used ... Moreover, the author does not understand that at the time of the compilation of intelligence reports, individual formations and units that make up the formations could generally be far from the border at the time of compilation of the report, which is why he is surprised that
      [Quote]
      The distance from our border to the western borders of the above territories in some areas exceeds the value of 400 km indicated by the "expert". We are faced with human misunderstanding of the text of post-war memoirs. [/ Quote]
      Here, the author's complete illiteracy in the matter of the movement of German troops on the eve of the war is evident, and moreover, he does not understand how radio intelligence worked to open the radio networks of enemy formations and formations, which is why he speculates on the data of individual agents, not realizing that they were not believed in our intelligence agencies, as for example in the figure of 50 divisions:
      [Quote]Misinformation about the presence of a huge number of German divisions in the southern direction came on the eve of the war. Valentin (16.6.41): "In Slovakia, outside the city of Presovo in the direction of the city of Uzhok, 50 German divisions are concentrated.". [/ Quote]
      The author did not provide evidence that this figure was reflected in the materials of the intelligence department, which means that he deliberately slandered the work of our intelligence officers. By the way, the author does not give a link to the text of this report, and I do not exclude that he came up with it again, and in which he was repeatedly caught.
      [Quote]In principle, one cannot refer to the memoirs of the former head of the RU General Golikov, since even at the beginning of the 60s he was sure that the pre-war RM were reliable. This also applies to the report of RU from 31.5.41, which in some part was repeated in report No. 5 of 15 June.. [/ Quote]
      This is a heinous lie, in which the author is trying to discredit Golikov, because the information from RU was confirmed not only during the war, but also after it, when the captured documents came to us, and during their application it was found that the error was within 2- 3 divisions, and no more, which in itself is unique even for the present time.

      [/ Quote]In the early 60s, General Golikov was sure that the information about the presence of 286-296 divisions in the German armed forces, incl. 20-25 md, 8-10 paratroopers and airborne troops, 15 mountain and 16 SS divisions, was correct.
      In fact, on 22.6.41, the German armed forces had up to 209,2 divisions, incl. up to 15,2 md (including 4,5 md SS), one parachute and airborne division each, 6 gsd, one SS police division.
      . [/ Quote]
      Firstly, not in the early sixties, but in intelligence report No. 5, the ALL military power of Germany was determined, including with reserve divisions and other formations, and secondly, Golikov absolutely correctly considered that 1- 120 divisions, against England in all theaters of theater about 122-122 divisions and the reserve is 126-44 divisions. It is not difficult to calculate that Golikov did not make any mistake in assessing Germany's military capabilities. The author of the article has not provided any documentary refutations to these figures, and therefore he can be considered a dreamer who can lie that the intelligence report was deciphered for an hour and a half, although it was deciphered in 48 minutes according to the cipher's marks.
      To my question: "How long will it take for a tank division to cover a distance of 200-400 km?" the author could not directly answer, and began to weave something about the Soviet Army, although all specialists know that any Wehrmacht unit stationed in France could arrive at the Eastern Front in two days - such were the capabilities of the German railways and the training of troops. But he's just not in the subject, that's why he dragged his fantasies:
      [Quote]The “expert” himself does not know the answer to this question. He can only use information from the 70-80s about the mobility of the TD of the Soviet Army. It should be noted that the German command tried not to redeploy tanks to such a distance on their own. The wheeled vehicles of these divisions moved along the roads, and the tracked vehicles (for the most part) were transported by rail. One of the few 3rd TD moved under its own power from the border of the former Poland. It took the division about 4 days to arrive at the concentration area.[/ Quote]
      It was not the division that "needed" it, but the command determined for them the route and time of arrival to the place of the new deployment, so that only amateurs can judge the speed of movement of tank units by this example. In fact, they could arrive much faster if they had such a task ...
      [Quote]But a mythical TP was discovered there, and the intelligence double-checked and confirmed this information. How could reconnaissance find TP where there were no tanks?[/ Quote]
      Another amateurish conclusion, indicating that the author has no idea that a tank regiment can move by battalion, and moreover, the command of the regiment and all its services have already arrived at a new location, reported, entered the radio network of the compound, and the echelon with equipment has not yet approached for various reasons.
      [Quote]about the disinformation measures of the Soviet military command, which has an interesting text
      On 6.9.40, the headquarters of the United Wehrmacht Command sent the leadership of t
      :. [/ quote]
      Again, an enchanting conclusion, because on 6.9.1940 September XNUMX there was no plan of war with the USSR, we had a non-aggression pact, but there was a war with England, and therefore it was much more important for the Germans at that moment to misinform the Angilians than to us.
  2. AsmyppoL
    16 August 2020 07: 10
    26
    Quote: Maki Avellevich
    Eugene, ... in fact, was it possible that there was also a place for, say, self-delusion / sabotage in the General Staff in the case of intelligence? in addition to the "fog of war"

    Thank you, Maki Avellievich, for your words! To your question, I can only express my personal opinion, tk. I have not seen any documents confirming this or that point of view ...

    Sabotage - definitely - no. All versions of betrayal in an NPO or in the Intelligence Directorate are an attempt to understand the situation by poorly educated writers ...

    German intelligence officers, of course, existed and could influence the incoming intelligence information ... But they were not in high-level headquarters. Indirectly, this is confirmed by the fact that the German command did not have full information either on the Red Army as a whole or on any of the directions. Information about the spacecraft was severely curtailed.

    Self-delusion - you have noticed correctly. Self-confidence and self-delusion of the highest command personnel.
    When on the maps there are marks of enemy troops up to sapper, infantry, anti-tank battalions and artillery battalions. When even the locations of some individual artillery batteries, tank companies, armored trains, etc. are known. In fact, it turned out to be completely different ...

    I think that the intelligence repression also influenced the incorrect intelligence data. Many people have changed in the Intelligence Directorate. In 1940, Golikov came. The intelligence department was replenished with new people. The illegal agents have also changed in part. Since the summer of 1940, there has been a clear desire for accurate knowledge of the names of German units and formations. At the same time, accurate knowledge is at the level of 70% and above ...
    It already looks like the execution of the plan and its overfulfillment ...

    The massive use of German disinformation made it possible, without any difficulty, to obtain "accurate" data on the names of units and formations, as well as on their locations. There was no need to strain ...
    The sporadic information about the passage of the tank division to Brest and the arrival of the German corps commander was not confirmed by rumors among the population and signs on the shoulder straps. Therefore, such intelligence materials were dismissed as unreliable. A system for collecting information was built such that single accurate messages were refuted by multiple disinformation messages.

    The next part will consider how the information from May 31, 1941 differed from the intelligence data on June 17-22. In the last part I will try to show, based on scanty and fragmentary data, that the leadership of the spacecraft and the Soviet Union was not afraid of an unexpected German attack until June 21-22.
    1. stalkerwalker
      stalkerwalker 16 August 2020 13: 39
      -12 qualifying.
      When a discussion about the state of affairs on the Soviet-German border begins on the eve of 22.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX, I am immediately confused by the amount of material being uploaded to the reader. For a decade now, the topic of the readiness of the Red Army (as well as the USSR as a whole) for a war with Germany has been discussed. And personally, I see no reason to procrastinate this topic for the tenth time with references to the incorrect definition of the RKKA General Staff of the deployment of Wehrmacht units on the eve of the war, since immediately conclusions are drawn that are not always consistent with reality: about the qualifications of workers of the Republic of Uzbekistan, about the literacy of the highest commanding staff of NGOs, about personal the skills, knowledge and competence of the generals of the Red Army, and, finally, about the role of Stalin's personality in this matter ...
      What is the point of looking for essentially petty mistakes and shortcomings if the initially unmobilized and undeveloped Red Army had no chance of success in the Battle of the Border?
      The leadership of the Wehrmacht will not be called dilettantes. The withdrawal of units and subunits to their original positions took place in a planned way, at the last moment. The camouflage and "information cover" were carefully observed. A large-scale aerial reconnaissance was carried out, the technical component of which the spacecraft could not even dream of.
      What could the commander of the Western Military District Pavlov have done, having learned on June 19-20 that two tank groups were lining up in two monstrous columns against his newly formed Western Front? Got into a panic? Or would he manage to withdraw from Brest those divisions that were trapped?
      As an example - the actions of both sides on the eve of the battle on the Oryol-Kursk Bulge. Both sides closely followed the enemy for a couple of months and prepared for Operation Citadel. Almost in full view of each other. The concentration of German troops in the areas of the main attack corresponds approximately to the one that was on June 22, 41st. The fact that Hausser's tankers were at Prokhorovka by 11 July is not surprising.
      So why, with a tenacity worthy of application, spread the porridge on the table?
      1. ccsr
        ccsr 16 August 2020 17: 23
        -35 qualifying.
        Quote: stalkerwalker
        So why, with a tenacity worthy of application, spread the porridge on the table?

        And this should be asked the author of the article, who for a long time has been trying to denigrate the actions of our intelligence agencies on the eve of the war, and at the same time not disdaining outright lies, such as the fact that it took at least three days to transmit operational information to the radio station. And such false "discoveries" this pseudo-researcher has a wagon and a small cart, it is enough just to carefully study his "work" to understand that this is a custom "historian".
    2. ccsr
      ccsr 16 August 2020 16: 49
      -35 qualifying.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      When on the maps there are marks of enemy troops up to sapper, infantry, anti-tank battalions and artillery battalions.

      This is a lie, because the author has not cited so far any references to the original German maps, which were developed in June, so that one can believe that our intelligence was mistaken in the accuracy of the assessment of enemy forces on 22 June.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      Since the fall of 1940, the German MDs became essentially weakened PDs on cars (without one regiment and one artillery battalion). The division had up to 37 armored cars and had no tanks. Such a connection can be quickly transferred to the place of breaking through the defense and cannot be used to break through the enemy's defense, because they did not have the tanks and structures to support them. These divisions without TD also could not be used in breakthroughs to great depths. This is probably why the German command was not afraid to show the mythical motorized divisions, tk. they were not supposed to cause concern among the command of the spacecraft.

      Another profanation of those events, because in the summer of 1940 the reduction of the Wehrmacht units began, which continued in the fall, but at the same time the organizational structure of the MD did not change, and in order to restore its combat power, it was only necessary to call in the first-stage assignees, which they began to do at the end of 1940.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      In the report of the RU on May 31, the headquarters of the 8th TD is located immediately in Warsaw (against ZAPOVO) and in Lancut (against KOVO). At this time, the 8th TD was stationed in the vicinity of the city of Prague. In the evening of June 22, RU believed that the 8th TD was concentrated against KOVO. In fact, the 8th TD fought as part of the 4th TGr against the troops of the PribOVO

      The author once again showed blatant illiteracy, because "Prague" is a district of Warsaw, and not the capital of the Czech Republic, and even Svejk knew about this:
      "Prague is a historical district of Warsaw, located on the right bank of the Vistula River. Since 1648, Prague has been an independent city, but on April 18, 1791, it became a suburb of Warsaw."
      So it was not intelligence that was mistaken about "Prague", but our home-grown researcher, who did not know the structure of the capital of Poland in those years, decided that readers would believe in his lie.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      How many German divisions were transported to the border in June 1941?

      The author of the article does not know this, because apart from intelligence report No. 5 he saw nothing at all.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      According to the author, one of the reasons for the concealment of the RM for June 1941 is that intelligence was unable to accurately determine the number of German formations that were redeployed to our border ...
      Our intelligence made a mistake in the number of redeployed divisions by 5 times, and by the number of motorized and tank divisions by 6,5 times.

      Even German sources refute this heinous lie:
      "It is natural to want to compare these data of our Intelligence Agency with what is written in the book of the Hitlerite Wehrmacht General Kurt Tippelskirch" History of the Second World War ": , 22 tank, 81 motorized, 1 police and security divisions. 17 infantry, 15 tank, 9 motorized divisions and 22 police division were on the approach as reserves of the main command "(2). Total: 2 divisions. a quote from the book of a collective of military historians "World War II 1-174": "The German fascist troops (taking into account the reserve of the main command, not counting the five German divisions stationed in Finland, as well as the Allied troops) were located in directions, borders which are indicated above (150). In the main direction, in the center of the front, there were 1939 divisions and two brigades, or about 1945%, in the southern sector of the front nta - 175 divisions, or up to 62%, and in the northern sector of the front - 43 divisions, or 54% "(36). Total: 31 German divisions (with five stationed in Finland). "
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      According to the maps of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces, on the evening of June 19, there was:
      This is a lie, because the author presented only the map dated May 27, and he has no other data. Moreover, all of his drawn June maps are fake, or, at worst, were invented by alternatives, because the author does not have the original documents and does not provide links to them.
      Quote: AsmyppoL
      The SC command had the impression that the main attacks would be made in the southern direction: from the southern part of the General Government and from Romania to the flank of the KOVO and along the OdVO. After all, it was there that up to 55% of German divisions and up to 72% of MD, etc. were concentrated.

      There is nothing surprising in this, because since 1939, cards have already been introduced in Germany and in 1941 the country simply did not have enough food. That is why it was precisely at the expense of the southern regions of the USSR that Hitler wanted to get food in order to solve the problem with the shortage of food in the Reich:

      The deployment of enemy troops near the border on June 21 can be seen on fragments of the map of the headquarters of the Southwestern Front. A logical question arises: how much effort did the German command take to show our intelligence such a huge mythical grouping near our border?

      Another manipulation of the author - he does not have such a map, and what he uses does not apply to the materials of the intelligence department.

      Thus, all our intelligence services were unable to detect the redeployment of a significant number of German divisions in June 1941, most of which were motorized and tank divisions ...

      This lie is refuted by both our and German sources, which gave the true number of German troops before the attack on the USSR, and these data practically do not differ. The author of the article uses a thimble technique, slipping intelligence data on May 31 as the final document of the deployment of German troops, although it is obvious that on June 22 the situation was completely different. I'm not talking about the usual lies when he states that

      The figure below does not show the grouping of German troops in the central part of Romania, in the Slovaks and in Hungary.
      but at the same time he does not say that this is a WORKING table of the chief of intelligence of the army, and not a document signed by the chief of the intelligence department of the front. So, out of a small lie, the author gave birth to a big lie that the German command misled our intelligence on the eve of the war. For example, the author states:
      At the beginning of the section there is a link to German maps. There is intelligence on maps of Foreign armies. You can see what they knew about our army at different times ...
      In the previous article, a link was placed where you can see the German maps of the Wehrmacht ground forces (files # 799-844).

      Since I looked at these maps, I claim that this is a lie, because the latest map concerns the Wehrmacht reserves as of May 27, 1941, and everything else has nothing to do with the June deployment of German troops, i.e. there is a forgery that the author uses to discredit the Soviet military intelligence.
      1. Operator
        Operator 16 August 2020 17: 15
        -30 qualifying.
        Just today, on another military portal, I read (at the same time I remembered) that the Luftwaffe in mid-May 1941 had several times reduced the number of sorties for bombing the British Isles in connection with the relocation of most of the German aviation to the border of the USSR.

        Well, the NKGB PU and the General Staff of the USSR Armed Forces overlooked this relocation, but the NKID, represented by the Soviet embassy in London (according to the author of the article), did not notice a sharp decrease in the number of air raids and destruction from bombing laughing
  3. svp67
    svp67 16 August 2020 07: 57
    33
    From all that has been said, only one conclusion suggests itself that the Abwehr and other counterintelligence structures of Nazi Germany OVERWEATED our intelligence as the military GRU General Staff and the NKVD, which ensured the success of their troops at the first stage of the operation ...
  4. ee2100
    ee2100 16 August 2020 11: 15
    26
    A very interesting article, it would be interesting to look at the German scattered information about the deployment of our troops in the pre-war period. And in general, what the German spies reported
    1. AsmyppoL
      16 August 2020 11: 32
      +3
      At the beginning of the section there is a link to German maps. There is intelligence on maps of Foreign armies.
      You can see what they knew about our army at different times
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. ee2100
        ee2100 16 August 2020 12: 45
        +5
        There is a fragment of a map with the Lviv area, but how much does the data of the Germans correspond to reality?
        How do you feel about Martirosyan's version of a conspiracy in the generals of the KA?
        1. AsmyppoL
          16 August 2020 13: 07
          +5
          There is a fragment of a map with the Lviv area, but how much does the data of the Germans correspond to reality?

          It's hard for me to say something about this, tk. I did not specifically deal with this issue. Only now I saw that German reconnaissance maps for June were missing ...
          How do you feel about Martirosyan's version of a conspiracy in the generals of the KA?

          Above, I talked about this version ...
          1. The comment was deleted.
          2. AsmyppoL
            16 August 2020 13: 17
            +7
            Link to the April OKW information, taking into account the update as of 16.6.41 for the PribOVO
            https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/pages/545529/map
            1. AsmyppoL
              16 August 2020 13: 32
              +5
              Leningrad district at 11.6.41
              https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/pages/545539/map
            2. ccsr
              ccsr 16 August 2020 17: 02
              -38 qualifying.
              Quote: AsmyppoL
              Link to the April OKW information, taking into account the update as of 16.6.41 for the PribOVO
              https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/pages/545529/map

              Leningrad district at 11.6.41
              https://wwii.germandocsinrussia.org/pages/545539/map

              Again, a rigging, because these maps do not show the situation of the German troops on June 22, which means they cannot be used to judge how wrong Golikov and the Intelligence Directorate were in assessing the enemy. As you can see, the author deliberately throws materials on the forum that do not confirm his fantasies, but at the same time he tries to pose as a major specialist in intelligence materials.
  5. VIP
    VIP 16 August 2020 12: 50
    13
    Quote: AsmyppoL
    At the beginning of the section there is a link to German maps. There is intelligence on maps of Foreign armies.
    You can see what they knew about our army at different times

    It would be interesting
  6. VIP
    VIP 16 August 2020 13: 16
    11
    "at the beginning of the 60s he was sure that the pre-war RM were reliable" he could not otherwise: if the RMs are reliable, then he is smart and did everything to prevent the war, and byaka Stalin flushed my warnings down the toilet.
    Then the Central Committee of the CPSU clearly said that Stalin was to blame for everything.
  7. VIP
    VIP 16 August 2020 14: 34
    -4
    [quote = ee2100] There is a fragment of the map with the Lviv area, but how much does the data of the Germans correspond to reality?
    How do you feel about Martirosyan's version of a conspiracy in the generals of the KA? [/ Quo
    In fact, Martirosyan's version is close to reality, but needs to be supplemented: there was a conspiracy not of generals, in Stalin's inner circle.
    Near every leader there is an envious person, and near Stalin there were such people near Vovan. EVERYWHERE there are. And to achieve the goal, they will do EVERYTHING
    1. ee2100
      ee2100 16 August 2020 15: 27
      +4
      In 2002, some documents of the KGB and intelligence services of WW2 were published (sorry I didn't leave the book). According to reports from Eden's entourage, it became known from an English source in Hitler's inner circle that there was a German informant in Stalin's inner circle. These are data from 1943-44.
      1. VIP
        VIP 17 August 2020 08: 04
        +3
        Schellenberg also wrote about this.
        1. ee2100
          ee2100 17 August 2020 10: 12
          +5
          Shelenberg has little faith - he is an interested party, although this is also an indirect confirmation. He should have known this source by his position, and if so, he could have surrendered it so as not to go to jail
      2. ccsr
        ccsr 17 August 2020 10: 54
        -11 qualifying.
        Quote: ee2100
        According to reports from Eden's entourage, it became known from an English source in Hitler's inner circle that there was a German informant in Stalin's inner circle. These are data from 1943-44.

        If this were true, then believe me, this source would have been declassified and made public long ago during the Cold War, and Rezun would have been given this case from the archive for use in his propaganda books. By the way, in Great Britain one of the most liberal laws on keeping state secrets and hiding other people's secrets did not make sense to them at all:
        As reported on February 25, 2010 by the Ministry of Justice, secret government documents will be declassified after 20 years, and not 30 years as before.

        http://rusrim.blogspot.com/2010/03/30-20.html
        So this is most likely a newspaper duck, although it is quite possible that German agents could work in the USSR People's Commissariats of that period, but hardly in significant positions to be surrounded by Stalin.
        1. ee2100
          ee2100 17 August 2020 11: 29
          +4
          Read carefully. I read this declassified intelligence materials, and this is not a "newspaper duck", and there is nothing to declassify - the source claims that Stalin's entourage has an informant and that's it.
          1. ccsr
            ccsr 17 August 2020 11: 40
            -17 qualifying.
            Quote: ee2100
            Read carefully. I read this declassified intelligence materials, and this is not a "newspaper duck", and there is nothing to declassify - the source claims that Stalin's entourage has an informant and that's it.

            So a source from Eden's entourage, and he could simply not have information, or he could have used German disinformation, about which the author of the article AsmyppoL (Eugene) eaten a baldness to everyone here, proving how cleverly the Germans deceived our intelligence by changing their buttonholes and shoulder straps, but at the same time they did not have not the slightest idea how our strategic agents and radio intelligence worked.
            1. ee2100
              ee2100 17 August 2020 12: 00
              +3
              A source from Eden's entourage is his secretary. He did not tell the secretary that there was an informant in Stalin's entourage. What the agent heard was what he conveyed. At the time, the Kemrizhd five were above suspicion. Hardly misinformation.
              1. ccsr
                ccsr 17 August 2020 12: 12
                -17 qualifying.
                Quote: ee2100
                What the agent heard was what he conveyed. At the time, the Kemrizhd five were above suspicion. Hardly misinformation.

                Read carefully what the author AsmyppoL (Eugene) cited here as an undercover message (although the source did not indicate, which means it may be the author's lie):
                Misinformation about the presence of a huge number of German divisions in the southern direction came on the eve of the war. Valentin (16.6.41): "In Slovakia, outside the city of Presovo in the direction of the city of Uzhok, 50 German divisions are concentrated."

                Any military professional understands that FIFTY divisions cannot be concentrated on such a sector, which means that this is either misinformation, or, most likely, an error that arose in the transfer of information, which is why it cannot be believed in it. The same could have arisen when processing the information received from the secretary, because if this were true, it would have long been used for propaganda purposes by various scribblers, including such as AsmyppoL (Eugene).
                1. ee2100
                  ee2100 17 August 2020 12: 26
                  0
                  He (Eugene) is not a supporter of the conspiracy of the generals and their betrayal in favor of Germany. He wrote about it. And if there was a traitor in Stalin's entourage, then this does not fit into the paradigm of Eugene. Or maybe he just did not read these documents. Martirosyan's version explains a lot. Evgeny's statement that German intelligence has outplayed ours explains something, but, as you understand, not everything
                  1. ccsr
                    ccsr 17 August 2020 18: 18
                    -14 qualifying.
                    Quote: ee2100
                    He (Eugene) is not a supporter of the conspiracy of the generals and their betrayal in favor of Germany. He wrote about it.

                    I don’t believe in this either, because there was no such conspiracy, otherwise Martirosyan would not have written about it, but there would have been materials of criminal cases that after the war Stalin would have presented to the people.
                    Quote: ee2100
                    And if there was a traitor in Stalin's entourage, then this does not fit into the paradigm of Eugene.

                    Evgeny generally bears nonsense on many issues, but the point is not in his ideas, but in the fact that if there was such an agent, then he would have to keep a large radio station for him, and this in Moscow after the start of the war was difficult to implement due to the harsh counterintelligence regime.
                    Quote: ee2100
                    Martirosyan's version explains a lot.

                    Martirosyan's version does not explain why Stalin did not give a go to exposing such agents during the war or after its end.
                    Quote: ee2100
                    Evgeny's statement that German intelligence has outplayed ours explains something,

                    In fact, the German intelligence service did not greatly outplay us, but outplayed us by the Wehrmacht, which was better prepared for war. Here Eugene gave German maps of the PribOVO and LenVO and if you study them carefully, you will see how primitive they are and do not reflect the detailed deployment of our troops in the border districts.
                2. cavl
                  cavl 29 August 2020 11: 06
                  14
                  "Any military professional understands" ...
                  Why are you, Mr. Milchikov, insulting General Golikov? Don't you consider him a military professional? Why are you denigrating a fighting general?

                  After all, on June 25 he was confident in 46 divisions ... This, of course, not 50 divisions, but a significant number ..
                  50 non-existent divisions - so the scouts from abroad reported ...

                  Reconnaissance report No. 4 RU at 22-00 on 25.6.41: "This number does not include the southern flank (Slovakia and Hungary), where the general grouping of 46 (German) divisions has not yet shown itself ..."
                  1. ccsr
                    ccsr 29 August 2020 11: 30
                    -15 qualifying.
                    Quote: cavl
                    "Any military professional understands" ...

                    But you are not a professional, and you do not know how to understand military documents, that is why you did not understand what Golikov wrote in intelligence report No. 4. I'm not saying that you did not provide a scan of the intelligence report, but even based on the text of the word "southern flank" the Soviet-German front implies not only Slovakia and Hungary, but also Romania, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria, where common the total number of German troops could well correspond to this figure, albeit with the proviso that the grouping itself did not show. The word "did not show" just shows the professionals that Golikov does not have exact data on the composition of the group. So it’s not I who insult Golikov, but you, as an ordinary amateur, could not understand what he was writing about, so you made some ad-libbing about "ten barrels of prisoners."
                    1. cavl
                      cavl 29 August 2020 19: 18
                      13
                      Correctly Eugene made you laugh as a typical sofa expert.
                      You are constantly trying to classify as a professional military who understands military science that it looks ridiculous ...
                      First of all, intelligence reports are written in such a way that they are not subject to double interpretation.
                      Military documents of this type do not provide for double interpretation. These are, like instructions for using military equipment, instructions for a duty officer, etc.
                      You can't even understand the text of the article.

                      The summary reads: "On on the offensive front from the Baltic Sea to Romania, the enemy brought into action 88-90 divisions, of which 72-73 are directly in battles ... "

                      The summary clearly indicates to Romania. Further, it is also indicated unambiguously about the southern flank of the sector to Romania: "This number does not include the southern flank (Slovakia and Hungary), where the general grouping of 46 divisions (German) has not yet shown itself ..."

                      The parentheses unambiguously speak of the countries that are implied. There is no need to conjecture anything. Everything is spelled out very clearly, but the expert does not understand it from the sofa. Doesn't reach ...
                      If this is difficult for a non-professional military man to understand, then you just need to realize that the reports are read by members of the Politburo and they need extreme accuracy, and not some kind of speculation ...
    2. VIP
      VIP 17 August 2020 17: 33
      -9
      For those in doubt, I recommend reading Martirosyan, he cites interesting facts, Burlatsky (helped Khrushch in 1956) or Kremlev
  8. The comment was deleted.
  9. ee2100
    ee2100 17 August 2020 21: 58
    +2
    In fact, the German intelligence service did not greatly outplay us, but outplayed us by the Wehrmacht, which was better prepared for war. Here Eugene brought German maps of the PribOVO and LenVO and if you study them carefully, you will see how primitive they are and do not reflect the detailed deployment of our troops in the border districts. [/ Quote]
    Eugene writes actually writes about the other side. How our intelligence miscalculated. And the fact that you looked through the German maps of LenVO and PribOVO and found, then they do not reflect the actual deployment of our troops, it is logical to assume that other German maps also sinned by this, that is, they climbed into Lazar's mind. And this indirectly confirms that they knew some kind of "military secret."
    1. ccsr
      ccsr 18 August 2020 13: 15
      -14 qualifying.
      Quote: ee2100
      Eugene writes actually writes about the other side. How our intelligence miscalculated.

      He lies throughout all the articles about our intelligence, and he speaks such illiterate nonsense that any military professional understands that he is fulfilling an order. Not only is he an anonymous author, and carefully hiding his name and surname in fear of exposure, but his "sources" smack of foreign roots, and they, as you know, have long been trying to rewrite history in their favor. For example, he referred to a "source", which ended up as a garbage site where a book by a Czech or Slovak author was discussed, and which cannot be considered a historical work at all. Another garbage site with German roots was exposed by another author earlier - http://www.lexikon-der-wehrmacht.de/, where the owner writes:
      Support the Wehrmacht lexicon with a small donation to our association. With your donation, you are helping to cover the costs of this site and to expand it. Many thanks!
      Webmaster: Andreas Altenburger

      So the fakes that AsmyppoL (Eugene) spreads, upon close examination, turn out to be an ordinary lie, as was the case, for example, with a resident in Berlin or a lie about the timing of encryption transmissions.
      For example, AsmyppoL (Eugene) is lying that supposedly Golikov cannot be trusted, because in the sixties he wrote not what was actually known to intelligence. Without even entering into an argument with this amateur, I quote the words of Marshal A.A. Grechko. whom it is difficult to suspect of currying favor with someone:
      “It is also appropriate to raise the question of surprise at the beginning of the war. There is an opinion that the invasion of the German fascist invaders on June 22, 1941 was completely sudden. It seems to us that such an assessment is somewhat simplistic, one-sided. As we have already noted, Soviet intelligence officers were able to timely reveal the intentions of the enemy, the concentration and deployment of his armed forces near our borders, and the timing of the attack. It is another matter that the correct conclusions were not drawn from the available information in a timely manner and all measures were taken corresponding to the situation and the data obtained. But here the talk should, apparently, go not so much about surprise as about miscalculation.
      The attack of the Hitlerite armed forces on June 22, 1941 was a surprise for the troops of the western border districts and, of course, for the Soviet people, although the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Defense and the command of the districts had information about the preparation of this attack long before that. Speaking of "surprise for the troops," we emphasize the enormous responsibility that lies with the leadership for taking all measures to prevent this surprise or to weaken its effect in every possible way. "

      And what will the verbiage AsmyppoL (Eugene) say to this? And he will not say anything, because it is impossible to refute, tk. this was stated by the Minister of Defense and a front-line soldier with extensive experience in the army and past the war.
      In general, your business, but do not hope that after reading the articles of this verbiage you will know the truth - this is a big propaganda lie designed for amateurs.
      1. ee2100
        ee2100 18 August 2020 16: 26
        +8
        Everyone decides for himself the question of the tragic beginning of the Second World War for the USSR, based on the information that he has. Eugene raised this topic from an interesting side - it was interesting to me. It is clear that this is probably not his research, but all the more dumb, I will repeat myself, something explains this.
        If you think that his article is not worthy of publication - contact the moderator and, by the way, he has all the data on this person (they list him a fee).
        As for the memoirs, this is my personal opinion, this is the most unreliable source of information.
        1. ccsr
          ccsr 18 August 2020 19: 18
          -13 qualifying.
          Quote: ee2100
          If you think that his article is not worthy of publication - contact the moderator and, by the way, he has all the data on this person (they list him a fee).

          I have never approached any moderator and I am not going to do this - let everyone decide who can be trusted and who is maliciously lying here. But your note about royalties finally put all the dots on the "I" - it immediately became clear where this dilettante was so fertile, he just wanted to cut down a little dough, since he was paid for it. And I thought that he was really interested in the history of the war, but everything turned out to be much more primitive ...
          1. ee2100
            ee2100 18 August 2020 20: 09
            -6
            Almost everyone here writes for money
          2. Operator
            Operator 18 August 2020 21: 05
            -5
            They pay a little and not always (at least in my case). Of course, an individual approach is always possible laughing
  10. Operator
    Operator 18 August 2020 21: 24
    -16 qualifying.
    On the opinion of a person who considers himself an analyst: what distance the Wehrmacht tanks deployed in June 1941 in the General Government will cover faster - 400 km to the Soviet border or 1600 km to the Channel; the opinion of the "analyst" - before the Channel laughing
  11. Zementbomber
    Zementbomber 8 October 2020 02: 11
    0
    H. Eugene - to the question of "spies-conspiratorial" versions "(which I not supporter - but some interesting questions - like the "revisionists of the Holocaust" - their adherents sometimes still pose): what do you say about so far and even roughly not identified by "Andre" - who knew and transmitted to the Germans practically all the essential information both on the part of the Red Army and on the part of the NKVD Troops in the Moscow Defense Zone during the defensive phases of the Battle of Moscow ??
  12. Dilettante grandfather
    Dilettante grandfather 12 November 2020 16: 44
    +1
    The Germans needed misinformation not only to conceal their headquarters. If I have information from the RU about the concentration of the enemy in this or that sector, then I have to transfer my troops there. Is it logical? If I covered the border in an area where there are no opposing enemy forces, then I weakened other areas. After the start of the DB, the troops, which are waiting for a strike where it is not applied, will take time to redeploy to the area of ​​active hostilities. Soviet tank units marched on their own, which entailed the failure of some of the equipment, and if we also take into account the activity of the Luftwaffe, the redeployment led to guaranteed losses of Soviet troops.