May 1941. Where are the German tanks and motorized infantry?

The following abbreviations are used in the article: GraA - army group GSh - General base, Spacecraft - Red Army, cd - cavalry division, md (mp) - motorized division (regiment), pd (pp) - infantry division (regiment), Goals Difference - intelligence materials, Ro - intelligence department of the military district, RU - Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Spacecraft TGr - tank Group, td (mn) - tank division (regiment).

In the previous part it was shown that in the majority of RMs that were included in the document "Dislocation of German units and formations by groupings in the border strip with the USSR on 1.6.41 (according to intelligence data and data from RO PribOVO, RO headquarters ZAPOVO, RO headquarters KOVO", it was said about the deployment of troops as of May 27. Therefore, the materials from this document can be compared with the data shown on the map of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces from 27.5.41. Read the document "Dislocation of German units ..." can in this article.

Since May 1941, in the Republic of Uzbekistan it was believed that the German grouping concentrated against the USSR was deployed on the territory of East Prussia, former Poland, Romania (in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja), the Carpathian Ukraine (Hungary) and Slovakia.

The German command did not hide the presence of large infantry groupings at the border, reinforced with artillery, cavalry and tank units. Probably, with this approach, it tried to hide from our command the preparation for the blitzkrieg, which was to take place in less than a month.

In the new part, we will begin our consideration of RMs concerning German armored and motorized divisions. Let me remind you that on 25.4.41 our intelligence knew about the presence of nine tank and seven motorized divisions at the border. In fact, at this time in East Prussia, since the fall of 1940, there were the 1st and 6th etc. At the end of April 1941, the 4th TD began to arrive in the Poznan region. There were no other panzer or motorized German divisions near our border.

Earlier, the author promised to provide links to German maps that he used in his materials. Most of the documents used are on the site "Russian-German project for the digitization of German documents in the archives of the Russian Federation"... Maps are in the section Inventory 12451 - General Command of the Ground Forces (OKH) in cases from No. 799 to No. 844. Especially for Comrade I inform you that in the listed cases there are also German maps with a plotted intelligence situation. I wish all the readers who like to understand the maps of the Second World War success in this difficult field !!

RM on the presence of German tank and motorized divisions near our border

According with a summary of RU from 31.5.41 at the border was:

In East Prussia - ... 3 motorized, 2 tank [divisions. - Approx. auth.];
... in the Warsaw direction against the Western Military District - ... 4 tank, one motorized [division. - Approx. auth.];
... in the Lublin-Krakow region against KOVO - ... 6 tank, 5 motorized [divisions. - Approx. auth.];
... in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja - ... 4 motorized ... and two tank divisions ...

In total, the reconnaissance found fourteen tank and thirteen motorized divisions near the border.

On June 15, in the report No. 5 (for the West) of the RU, the information about the mobile troops, which was given in the report of May 31, was repeated.

The figure shows a fragment cards of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht ground forces from 27.5.41 g.

The combination of the figures below should be carried out by the "1st cd" icon in the orange rectangle.

It can be seen from the figures that there are old acquaintances on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland: 1st, 4th and 6th etc. On the territory of the former Poland is located about 1/3 of the divisional area of ​​concentration of the 13th TD and about half of the area of ​​deployment of the motorized regiment "Great Germany". In total, no more than 4 divisions of mobile troops are located on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland. It should be noted that parts of the 13th TD and the Great Germany motorized regiment were not found by our intelligence.

Dislocation of German tank and motorized divisions

Since it can be stated that the work of all our intelligence services to establish German mobile troops by the end of May turned out to be unsatisfactory, a legitimate question arises: where were the German mobile troops actually located?

Connections that are being redeployed are easily identified on maps by their designations.

The picture below shows the locations of seventeen Wehrmacht armored divisions as of 27.5.41/5/15. Three divisions (16th, XNUMXth and XNUMXth) have information that they were outside East Prussia and the former Poland.

From the figure it can be concluded that as of May 27, none of the tank divisions moved to the East. Thus, in addition to the 1st, 4th, 6th TD, parts of the 13th TD, other tank formations on the territory of East Prussia and former Poland did not have.

The figure below shows the locations of eleven motorized divisions and one motorized regiment as of 27.5.41. Three divisions have information that they were located outside East Prussia and the former Poland.

The presented fragments of the maps testify to the error of our reconnaissance in determining the number of tank and motorized divisions concentrated at our borders at the end of May 1941.

In the document "Dislocation of German units ..." indicates the exact locations of thirteen tank battalions. At this time, the Wehrmacht had six tank battalions.

Of the six battalions, two were in Scandinavia, one was only formed on the island of Crete. We accept that the remaining three battalions are at our border. Even so, intelligence was wrong 4,3 times ...

What units and formations were issued for tank and motorized divisions?

The figures below will show the detected mobile German troops, which are plotted on the map of the operational department of the General Staff of the Wehrmacht Ground Forces from 27.5.41/XNUMX/XNUMX.

In the upper part of the picture in Tarnobrzeg, intelligence found the headquarters of the 6th md, which did not exist. In fact, the headquarters of the 6th Army is stationed in this city, which has not been discovered by our intelligence. To confuse the headquarters of the motorized division with the headquarters of the army is a reconnaissance mistake. army headquarters cannot be used for deep penetrations.

To the right, a motorized and tank regiment was found in Tomashov. This is again a mistake, since the city has the headquarters of the 297th Infantry Division and its units. The infantry division does not include motorized infantry and tank units.

Up to a tank division was found in Lezhaisk. Apart from units of the 71st Infantry Division, there are no more enemy units in this area. Let me remind you that the uniform of the tankers is significantly different from the uniform of the military personnel of other troops, the military color (waffenfarbe) of the tankers is pink. The only explanation: someone portrayed this tank division or spread rumors about it ...

The headquarters of the 8th td and 11th tp are located in the town of Lancut. The data requires verification, since the second tank division with the same number, according to RO ZAPOVO, will be in Warsaw and will be there until the start of the war. It can be seen that the headquarters of the 49th Mountain Corps is stationed in Lancut and parts of the 68th Infantry Division may be located. But they have no tanks? .. If the intelligence knew about the colors of the army (waffenfarbe), they could confuse the shades of green: mountain riflemen or motorized infantry ...

There are up to two tank regiments in the city of Rzeszow. The headquarters of the 17th Army is located in Rzeszow, which is confused with tank regiments ...

In Tarnov, according to intelligence, there is more than a tank division. In April, the headquarters of the 71st Infantry Division was deployed in this city, and in May, the headquarters of the 296th Infantry Division. West of Tarnov (Okasima) is the forward headquarters of the GRA "Yug". There is no tank division here and there never was ...

In Krakow there is the 38th MP, which did not exist. In fact, in Krakow at this time there are the corps headquarters of the reduced composition H.Kdo XXXIV and the headquarters of the rear protection troops GRA "Yug" and the commander of the rear RHG103. A unit with the number 38 was not found in the composition of these headquarters. The regiment with the verified number "38" could only be portrayed by someone ...

A tank division was found in Novy Sонcz. In fact, the headquarters of the 101st Light Infantry Division is located in this city. In 1939, the light infantry divisions included tank and cavalry or motorized infantry units. Later, the structure of such divisions changed significantly and it became even weaker than an infantry division. It turns out that information about the change in the structure of light infantry divisions for a year and a half did not reach our intelligence. Just as information about the new structures of the motorized and tank divisions of the Wehrmacht did not reach. This testifies to the limited possibilities of our intelligence in obtaining intelligence information!

Consider the following figure. The headquarters of a tank brigade was found in Dombrow, where it will remain until 21 June. There was no longer such a connection in the German armed forces. A motorized regiment was found in the city of Radzyn. In this area, except for the 1st Cavalry Division, there are no other divisions and, therefore, there are no other units. It is most likely that intelligence could mistake one of the units of the cavalry division for a motorized regiment, but what kind of unit it is is difficult to imagine ...

In Pulaw, reconnaissance found the headquarters of the 215th MD and two motorized regiments. Nearby, in the city of Irene, there is another motorized regiment. The 215th MD never existed. The problem is that there are no motorized units in this area. The headquarters of the 215st Infantry Division was adopted as the headquarters of the 31th MD. As part of the 31st Infantry Division there are no units with the number 215. Therefore, we can say that the entire 215th Infantry Division depicted groups of servicemen from the 31st Infantry Division.

2nd MP in the city of Lublin. It couldn't be there. It is most likely that one of the vehicle supply columns of the 3rd or 55th Army Corps or a subdivision of these headquarters is confused with this regiment.

According to intelligence, a tank division is located between Lublin and Chelm. There is, of course, no tank division here, but there are units of the 56th and 62nd infantry divisions, as well as the 213rd security division.

In Zamoć, reconnaissance found two headquarters of motorized divisions and six regiments from their composition with exact numbers. In fact, the headquarters of the 48th Army Corps and the 57th Infantry Division are stationed in Zamoć. As part of the 57th Infantry Division, there are no parts with the indicated numbers. Since six "exact" numbers of non-existent motorized regiments are known at once, this can only be a deliberate misinformation of the German command.

The headquarters of the 175th md, 52nd and 53rd md are located in the town of Grubieshove. The 298th Infantry Division is stationed in this area, which does not include units numbered 175, 52 or 53. The exact name of a non-existent motorized division and two motorized regiments, which cannot be here, is again German disinformation.

New drawing. In Allenstein, according to intelligence, there is a tank regiment. Most likely, he was confused with the headquarters of the 4th TGR. The 4th TGr was in this area from February to mid-June 1941 and was not detected by our intelligence.

In Naidenburg, the 48th MP was discovered. There are many parts here, but not a single motorized one. It is difficult to say what was taken for this regiment ... One can only say that the 48th regiment is not among the motorized regiments of the MD and among the rifle regiments, etc.

In Ostrolenka, the 91st battalion was found. A unit with this number is not among the units of the 221st Infantry and 221st Security Divisions.

In Ostrow the 615th battalion was found. A part with this number is also missing in the 268th pd.

The headquarters of the 58th MD was found in Kossovo, and a motorized regiment in Zembrov. There are no such units in this area.

Motorized regiments with numbers 91 and 615, as well as the 58th MD did not exist in the Wehrmacht.

In Janow Podlaski, the 46th tank regiment was discovered, and in Biala Podlaski the 49th tank and motorized regiments. The Wehrmacht has neither the 46th nor the 49th TP. Apart from units of the 131st Infantry Division and the 1st CD, there are no other mobile troops in this area.

Many tank units were found in the Warsaw area: the 8th tank division, the 1st, 8th and 192nd tank regiments, a tank regiment with an unknown number and the 28th battalion regiment. In total, up to two tank divisions are recruited, which are not here. Up to two panzer divisions in the area will be tracked by our reconnaissance before the start of the war. Unfortunately, intelligence would never have been able to timely detect the movement of these non-existent troops to the border and warn their command ...

At the same time, you can see that the 6th TD, which is located in the same area, has not been discovered by any of our intelligence services since the fall of 1940. Therefore, we can say that the measures of counteraction to our intelligence on the part of the German special services were very effective.

The last drawing. In Shilute, the 61st road is confused with the 161st road. The error will not be disclosed because in the RU document of 22.6.41, the 161st MD will appear against the troops of the North-Western Front. There was no motorized division with this number in the German armed forces.

In the area of ​​Tilsit and its environs, according to intelligence, many mobile troops are deployed: units of the 20th TD, 44th, 202nd, 204th, 206th, 227th, 291st, 350th and 510th mp. Although the summary indicates regarding the 202nd, 204th and 227th regiments that the data require verification, but in the report of RO PribOVO dated June 18, almost all of these regiments will be located in the same areas. Only the number of one regiment will change - from the 510th to the 210th MP. There were no regiments with the indicated numbers among the motorized and rifle regiments of the Wehrmacht. We are again faced with very large-scale disinformation ...

There can be no 6th MP and 25th MP in Instreburg, 28th MP and 25th MP in Konigsberg, 17th and 34th MD, 412th, 420th and 422nd MPs on Suwalkinsky ledge.

In addition, the 17th and 34th MD, the 412th, 420th and 422nd MT did not exist in the German armed forces. The 28th TP was disbanded on 1.3.41.

A tank regiment in the Letzen area could be confused with the advance group of the headquarters of the 3rd TGr.

Number 21 TP could be confused with parts of the 1st etc.

Thus, we can conclude that, at best, our intelligence was able to accurately detect only one tank regiment in the area of ​​the town of Letzen. All other RM on the presence of 27 tank and motorized divisions, unfortunately, turned out to be false and disinformation of the German command ...

In the next parts we will try to understand the question of how whether something has changed in the authentic RM in June 1941.

To be continued ...

Comments

[Olgovich]

Thus, apart from the 1st, 4th, 6th TD, there were no other tank formations in the territory of East Prussia and former Poland, units of the 13th TD.

In total, reconnaissance found fourteen tank and thirteen motorized divisions near the border.

Those. at the end of May, intelligence exaggerated the number of German offensive formations SEVEN times. But this is evidence of a follow-up attack (which happened just 3 weeks later)! Paradoxically, it turns out that she is a warning of an attack and - in advance.

And what is the reaction of the leadership to this (immediate mobilization, bringing troops to combat readiness, statements of diplomats, warnings to the aggressor, etc.)?

All the other RMs about the presence of 27 tank and motorized divisions, unfortunately, turned out to be false and disinformation of the German command...

Logically, the German command would have been more profitable with absolutely reverse information - about the absence of German offensive formations on the border. Why would they report their presence, if, logically, this will lead to retaliatory measures and, in fact, reveal the true immediate goals of the Wehrmacht?

[Swan]

Quote: Olgovich

And what is the reaction of the leadership to this (immediate mobilization, bringing the troops into combat readiness, statements of diplomats, warnings to the aggressor, etc.)

The leadership tried to defuse the situation and smooth over the acute moments on the diplomatic front.

[Varyag_0711]

Lebed (Victor)
The leadership tried to defuse the situation and smooth over the acute moments on the diplomatic front.

It is useless to explain this to the Russophobe and the Soviet-hater Olgovich, he accepts only liberal myths about how Stalin hid in his country house and did nothing.
He doesn't need truth from the word at all.

[Whispering in the night]

Quote: Varyag_0711

It is useless to explain this to the Russophobe and the Soviet-hater Olgovich, he accepts only liberal myths about how Stalin hid in his country house and did nothing.
He doesn't need truth from the word at all.

But you really "need", no doubt. That is why, apparently, they did not write a single line on the topic, immediately switching to the personalities of their opponents.

[Varyag_0711]

Whispering in the night (Nikolai)
But you really "need", no doubt.

What truth do you want? And do you need it at all? Now, knowing how it all ended, sitting on a soft sofa, it is easy to talk about the mistakes made at the beginning of the war. Only the one who does nothing is not mistaken. Stalin did and did a lot, and, like any person, he naturally made mistakes.
Yes, the mistakes of the leadership were costly, but everyone was wrong, from Stalin to the last junior lieutenant. The mistakes of the commander of the western front, Pavlov, were worth something.

That is why, apparently, they did not write a single line on the topic, immediately switching to the personalities of their opponents.

There is neither personality nor opponent in Olegovich. An ordinary Russophobe, a liar and a traitor.

[Whispering in the night]

Quote: Varyag_0711

What truth do you want? And do you need it at all? Now, knowing how it all ended, sitting on a soft sofa, it is easy to talk about the mistakes made at the beginning of the war. Only the one who does nothing is not mistaken. Stalin did and did a lot, and, like any person, he naturally made mistakes.
Yes, the mistakes of the leadership were costly, but everyone was wrong, from Stalin to the last junior lieutenant. The mistakes of the commander of the western front, Pavlov, were worth something.

The difference is that Pavlov was accused of all mortal sins for his mistakes, made a scapegoat and shot along with the entire headquarters, and for his mistakes only orders and titles were hung for Stalin throughout the war and after the war. Although, as you know, the main responsibility for this or that global failure should be borne by the main leader, and not the intermediate link.

There is neither personality nor opponent in Olegovich. An ordinary Russophobe, a liar and a traitor.

This is a lie and slander. You can treat Olgovich as you like, but it is precisely his position and ideals, good or bad, correct or not - another question, there are so many people, so many opinions, but this is precisely the position that he consistently and reasonably defends. And, by the way, I don’t remember that he, like you, hung dirty labels on your opponents.

[Varyag_0711]

Whispering in the night (Nikolai)
The difference is that Pavlov was accused of all mortal sins for his mistakes, made a scapegoat and shot along with the entire headquarters,

Pavlov was shot completely for the cause, or rather for criminal inaction.

and for his mistakes only orders and titles were hung on Stalin throughout the war and after the war.

Please list the orders and titles of Stalin received by him precisely for mistakes? You can not? And you will not be able, because it is not to turn bags to make noise.
Stalin received all his orders (of which there are only 11 pieces) quite deservedly. And he never trumped them, but wore only one Order of the Hero of Socialist Labor and thus emphasized that he valued his labor merits more than the military.

Although, as you know, the main responsibility for this or that global failure should be borne by the main leader, and not the intermediate link.

What do you say? And was Stalin personally supposed to command the front, army, division, regiment, battalion, company?

This is a lie and slander. You can treat Olgovich as you like, but he has this position

Aha, the position of a traitor, dreaming of returning the property taken from his ancestors. It was people like him who went along with the Germans to return what was taken from them by the Bolsheviks. How did they end up not reminding you?

[Whispering in the night]

Quote: Varyag_0711

Pavlov was shot completely for the cause, or rather for criminal inaction.

If Pavlov was shot for deed (inaction), then Stalin should have been shot all the more. Right on June 23 in the courtyard of the Butyrka prison, it would be logical, consistent and simply fair!

Please list the orders and titles of Stalin received by him precisely for mistakes? You can not? And you will not be able, because it is not to turn bags to make noise.

Do not exaggerate or reverse my words. If Pavlov had not been shot, then he, too, could well have become a renowned commander of the level of Zhukov, Rokossovsky, and he would have hanged no less orders.

What do you say? And was Stalin personally supposed to command the front, army, division, regiment, battalion, company?

For the failures of the company commander, one should ask the company commander, and for the failure of June 22, 1941, one must ask, first of all, the head of state, and only then with the commanders of districts, corps, divisions, etc.

Aha, the position of a traitor, dreaming of returning the property taken from his ancestors. It was people like him who went along with the Germans to return what was taken from them by the Bolsheviks. How did they end up not reminding you?

Yes, stop lying, together with the Germans there were crumbs of former Russian citizens compared to those crowds of Soviet citizens (including communists) who joined the ranks of the Germans during the war.

[Varyag_0711]

Whispering in the night (Nikolai)
If Pavlov was shot for deed (inaction), then Stalin should have been shot all the more.

Well yes, iron logic ... By your logic, then Nikolashka the bloody would have given the order to shoot himself immediately after the Russian-Japanese disaster ...

P.S. The rest of the nonsense is even too lazy to comment on.

[Whispering in the night]

Quote: Varyag_0711

By your logic, then Nikolashka the bloody would have given the order to shoot himself immediately after the Russian-Japanese disaster ...

But no, Nicholas II did not shoot his generals for mistakes and miscalculations, you know. Therefore, this logic does not fit him at all, but one hundred percent fits your Stalin!

P.S. The rest of the nonsense is even too lazy to comment on.

Usually, people who have run out of arguments answer this way.

[Varyag_0711]

Whispering in the night (Nikolai)
But no, Nicholas II did not shoot his generals for mistakes and miscalculations, you know.

And in vain! And what is the result of Nikolashka the Bloody? Stessel, Kuropatkin, Fok, Nebogatov, Alekseev and other perpetrators should have been not only shot, but generally quartered in public.
What's the bottom line? Nikolashka fucked up the empire, and Stalin created the greatest state, which was capable of breaking the back of anyone.
So stick your "arguments" where the legs lose their proud name ...

[Whispering in the night]

Quote: Varyag_0711

And in vain! And what is the result of Nikolashka the Bloody? Stessel, Kuropatkin, Fok, Nebogatov, Alekseev and other perpetrators should have been not only shot, but generally quartered in public.
What's the bottom line? Nikolashka fucked up the empire, and Stalin created the greatest state, which was capable of breaking the back of anyone.
So stick your "arguments" where the legs lose their proud name ...

You should not call Nicholas II "bloody", compared to your Stalin, he is generally white and fluffy.
And with regards to who "fucked up" something, the final result of the so-called "greatest state" created by your Stalin is well known and does not differ in any way from the results of the reign of Nicholas II.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Whispering in the night

who "fucked up" what, the final result of the so-called "greatest state" created by your Stalin is well known and he is no different from the results of the reign of Nicholas II.

no need to compare the incomparable: Russia in February 1917 is a country with the fastest growing population in the world, a competitive growing economy, with RUSSIAN Odessa, Nikolaev and without coupons for cowards and meat

[Varyag_0711]

Olgovich (Andrey)
there is no need to compare the incomparable: Russia in February 1917 is a country with the fastest growing population in the world, a competitive growing economy

Well, maybe in your sore brain.
And in reality, Russia of 1917 is a country of chaos, anarchy and total plunder.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Varyag_0711

Well, maybe in your sore brain.
And in reality, Russia of 1917 is a country of chaos, anarchy and total plunder.

1. 1991extinction Russians, coupons for panties, and meat, non-Russian Odessa, Nikolaev and more Five million km2 (YOU made them like that in 1917-1940).

2. 1917 is the opposite.

These FACTS have come, haven't they?

[zenion]

You know that whispers are always snakes, they are always hissing.

[Cyril G ...]

Quote: Whispering in the night

I didn’t shoot my generals for mistakes and miscalculations, you know.

And in vain by the way. That would have shot Stessel for surrender, by the way, not justified by Port-Arthur. You look, the Russian fortresses in the west would not have surrendered at the beginning of 1914, except for Osovets, of course. Well, there are still a number of characters no less worthy to stand in front of the formation of the firing platoon.

[Nikolai Korovin]

After the Japanese captured the city of Vysokaya and installed a long-range battery on it, the squadron was first shot in the harbor of Port Arthur, and then the bombardment of the city began, in fact, turned into a continuous infirmary, and the unpunished extermination of the remnants of the garrison (out of the original 40 thousand in service on the moment of surrender there were 14 thousand). The facts are as follows. But they, of course, are not a justification for surrendering the fortress, because the fortress of the Russian Empire cannot be surrendered to the enemy, just as a warship of the Russian Empire has no right to lower a flag in front of the enemy.

One can, of course, regret that Stessel was only put in the fortress, but not shot, but, unfortunately, the remnants of the Port Arthur garrison in any case no longer had the opportunity to inflict any significant damage on the Japanese, and could only die in positions. It was a very difficult dilemma for him. And the Japanese at the walls of Port Arthur lost 60 thousand people.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Whispering in the night

, the main responsibility for this or that global failure must be carried by the chief executive, not an intermediate.

exactly!

The author proved that intelligence, erroneously citing a large number of tanks in the reports. divisions of Germany, in fact, for anotherand three weeks before the attack WARNED that the aggression is about to begin. For the armada of tanks only testified about this (that the armada had not yet moved, they did not know ..

What's the answer? No mobilization. nor bringing to combat readiness. decisions about which only top management could make.

But there was the wildest Tass statement of June 13, unprepared for the destruction of strategic bridges (ALL are captured intact) and the CATASTROPHE of June 41

And if you still remember the gross miscalculation of the leader on the basis of his complete misunderstanding of recent history. then the question of guilt is generally obvious:
September 1939: statement by the head of the country:

“The war is between two groups of capitalist countries. We are not averse to having them fight well and weaken each other... It is not bad if the position of the richest capitalist countries was shaken by the hands of Germany. Ditler, himself not realizing this and not wanting to, shatters and undermines the capitalist system <…> <…> We can maneuver, push one side against the other, so that we’re better torn. The next moment is push the other side»

.
Such a "! Puppeteer" -pusher, yeah

And reality in the cruellest way poked into the fact that the lessons of recent History should be taught, and not considered themselves smarter than them: not weakened, but ONCE strengthened Germany turned out to be against us, who were alone and weighed down by only interest.

Quote: Whispering in the night

this is exactly the position

I am ridiculous about these Varangians -... "Russophiles" CUT OFF FIVE million km2 from Russia, turning RUSSIANS Nikolaev and Verny into .... Mykolaiv and A-aty, and led the Russian people to extinction. ignore them. and yes, if this is "Russophilia, then what is ... Russophobia?"

Moreover, ON THE TOPIC of the articles, there is usually NOTHING to tell them, except for insults, agitation and empty chatter.

[oldbuddy]

"For the armada of tanks only testified about this"?

Come on, intelligence reported that about the same amount was concentrated against the USSR as against England.

"Reconnaissance report No. 5 (in the West) of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army
15.06.1941:
...
as of June 1, 1941

The total strength of the German army as of June 1, 1941 is determined in 286-296 divisions, including: motorized - 20-25, tank - 22, mountain infantry - 15, parachute - 4-5, airborne - 4-5, divisions “SS” - 18.
.....
The total number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldavia and Dobrudja) as of June 1 reaches one hundred twenty to one hundred twenty two divisions, including fourteen tank and thirteen motorized divisions.

...
One hundred twenty two to one hundred twenty six divisions are concentrated against England (on all fronts), of which: in Norway - 17 (of which six are located in the northern part of Norway), in Africa - 8, in Italy - 9, in Greece (with the island Crete) - 10, in Yugoslavia (Belgrade, Sarajevo, Niš) - 2, on the northwestern coast of France, Belgium, Holland and Denmark - 57-60, inside the occupied part of France - 9-10, on the border with Spain - 10. "

In other words:
against the USSR - 120-122 divisions
against England - 122 - 126 divisions
Reserve - 44-48 divisions

According to this intelligence, there is no clear picture of concentration against the USSR

[Olgovich]

Quote: oldbuddy

in other words:
against the USSR - 120-122 divisions
against England - 122 - 126 divisions

And nothing that, according to the Special Communication of the Intelligence Directorate "On the transfer of German troops in the border zone of the USSR", from 16 April 1941 g- The total number of German divisions of all types in East Prussia and the General Government was only 78. (without German troops in Moldova) "

And in May there are already 125, ie per month number increased by FIFTY divisions?

Quote: oldbuddy

According to this intelligence, there is no clear picture of concentration against the USSR

See above the RD-about the transfer for the month.

And yes: the North Sea, the English Channel and the Mediterranean Sea = .... Yu. Bug only in some ...

[oldbuddy]

On 25, 04-1941 divisions (excluding cavalry units), so what?

The numbers only matter when compared with other numbers.
Intelligence reported that the ratio of forces allocated against the USSR was approximately equal or even slightly less than against England.

In the absence of diplomatic tension or any demands from Germany, these divisions could be seen simply as insurance against surprises during Operation Sea Lion.

[Olgovich]

Quote: oldbuddy

The numbers only matter when compared with other numbers.

The growth of hostile divisionsand 60% behind month on our border is ..... "nothing", yeah

Quote: oldbuddy

In the absence of diplomatic tension or any German demands, these divisions could be viewed simply as insurance against surprises during the operation "Sea lion"

The Turaks reasoned like that, yes ... And they believed even this stupidity.

But everything was different ...

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Olgovich

The growth of hostile divisions by 60% per month on our border is ..... "nothing", yes

Taking into account intelligence reports on the equal concentration of the Wehrmacht against Britain, the increase in the number of divisions on the border with the USSR is the preparation of the Reich for the "Sea Lion": building a defense in case of sudden movements of the USSR.
EMNIMS, information was leaked to our intelligence that 120-140 divisions would be assigned to this barrier.

[oldbuddy]

Growth of hostile divisions by 60% per month
:)
It looks like you didn't take the arithmetic course in high school.

[Olgovich]

Quote: oldbuddy

Growth of hostile divisions by 60% per month
:)
It looks like you didn't take the arithmetic course in high school.

1. Arithmetic takes place in the PRIMARY school, ignoramus.

3. 50/78*100=64%

Got it, no?

[oldbuddy]

You're also a liar.
Where did you get 50 (FIFTY) divisions in a month?

Let me poke your nose.

Early April
"Special message of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army on strengthening the grouping of German troops on the border with the USSR
04.04.1941
With them, the total number of German divisions of all types in the border zone with the USSR reaches 83-84 divisions, not counting the troops concentrated in the Czech Republic, Moravia and in the center of Romania "


End of april
"Special message of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army on the distribution of German armed forces in theaters and fronts of military operations as of 25.04.41.

26.04.1941
The total number of German troops on our western border with Germany and Romania (including Moldova) is 95-100 divisions (excluding cavalry units) "

Total for the month of April:

100 - 84 = 16 divisions (19%)

Early May

95-100 divisions (excluding cavalry units) - see message dated 26

The end of May
Special communication of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Red Army on the grouping of German troops on June 1, 1941

31.05.1941
against the USSR - 120-122 divisions;

Total for the month of May:
122 - 100 = 22 divisions (22%)


Now we look at your,, tantrums:

"And in May there are already 125 of them, that is, in a month the number has grown by FIFTY divisions"
"Growth of hostile divisions by 60% per month on our border"
:)

Congratulations, Mr. Sovramshi

[Olgovich]

Quote: oldbuddy

You're also a liar.

Learn to speak YOU.

Poke your wife , Yes.

Quote: oldbuddy

now we look at yours,
e "

For a tanker and ignorant of ARITHMETICS, once again:

Special message of the Intelligence Directorate "On the transfer of German troops in the border zone of the USSR" from April 16, 1941 - The total number of German divisions of all types in East Prussia and the General Government was only 78.

At the end of May -122 divisions.

122-78 44 =

44 / 78 * 100 = 56%

Got it, no?
To school, yeah ..

Tired of and ...

[oldbuddy]

With difficulty suppressing disgust for liars, I will answer the last time:

Silly liar, read it again:
"there were only 78 in East Prussia and the General Government"

Only. "In East Prussia and the General Government."

This is clear, ?

Read an earlier message from 04.04.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX:

“To this composition of the German troops it is necessary to add German troops in Moldavia and Northern Dobrudja in a total of about 9 infantry and one motorized divisions.

With them, the total number of German divisions of all types in the border zone with the USSR reaches 83-84 divisions, not counting the troops concentrated in the Czech Republic, Moravia and in the center of Romania "

And, stupid liar, read where these 122 divisions are located on 31.05.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX:

"The distribution along the lines of the German forces against the USSR is as follows:

a) in East Prussia - 23-24 divisions, including 18-19 infantry, 3 motorized, 2 tank and 7 cavalry regiments;

b) in the Warsaw direction against the ZapOVO - 30 divisions, including 24 infantry, 4 tank, one motorized, one cavalry and 8 cavalry regiments;

c) in the Lublin-Krakow region against KOVO - 35-36 divisions, including 24-25 infantry, 6 tank, 5 motorized and 5 cavalry. regiments;

d) in Slovakia (area Zborov, Presov, Vranov) - 5 mountain divisions;

e) in Carpathian Ukraine - 4 divisions;

f) in Moldova and Northern Dobrudja - 17 divisions, including 10 infantry, 4 motorized, one mountain and two tank divisions;

g) in the area of ​​Danzig, Poznan, Thorn - 6 infantry divisions and one cavalry regiment. The reserves of the main command are concentrated:

a) in the center of the country - 16-17 divisions;

b) in the area of ​​Breslau, Moravska-Ostrava, Katowice - 6-8 divisions;

c) in the center of Romania (Bucharest and west of it) - 11 divisions;

d) in Bulgaria - 11 divisions. "


You must be despised even by your mother, right, liar?

[Olgovich]

Quote: oldbuddy

With difficulty suppressing disgust for liars, I will answer the last time:

But I do not suppress her to the foulness:

Quote: oldbuddy

stupid

Quote: oldbuddy

even your mother

Shame ....

You-to freedom,Yes!

Ps and to school for arithmetic!




-

[oldbuddy]

You're just a dumb liar. And nothing else

[Olgovich]

Quote: oldbuddy

You just dumb.

What an abomination, ugh ..

Spare me of communicating with you, yeah

[oldbuddy]

The standard reaction of an exposed liar

[Operator]

There is no need to pull the owl onto the globe - with the help of Kerncross and the NKGB PU, Stalin was well aware of the German bullshit in the "Sea Lion" unit.

[antivirus]

to know about the game "to fly" is one thing, but to do it right and confirm your intentions by actions in History is another.

without clear actions of 120 divisions against the USSR or VBrit (an island or Africa + BBV? - also a fork) - all reflections on some thick

[strannik1985]

Pavlova for his mistakes

He was unlucky to be the first, then for the defeat of the front he was demoted in positions / ranks.

Stalin for his mistakes only orders

Different levels of tasks and responsibilities, "to start doing something" on the scale of the USSR = mobilize the army and strike preemptively, in full accordance with Zhukov's "Considerations ...". In the summer of 1941, without precise intelligence, this is a very difficult decision.

[mat-vey]

Quote: strannik1985

Different levels of tasks and responsibilities, "to start doing something" on the scale of the USSR = mobilize the army and strike preemptively, in full accordance with Zhukov's "Considerations ...". In the summer of 1941, without precise intelligence, this is a very difficult decision.

Not just complicated - it could lead to colossal political consequences ... Something like "Soviet Monster" is preparing to show its bestial character.

[strannik1985]

Not just complicated

Objectively, taking into account our "couch sitting", it was the most correct, only Stalin did not know what we know.
In an ordinary situation, the main sign of preparation for an attack is mobilization, it is difficult to miss it, but here it was not.

[mat-vey]

Quote: strannik1985

the main sign of preparation for an attack is mobilization

Not quite grasped - whose mobilization do you mean?

[strannik1985]

Countries - the enemy, as in the WWI started. The problem is that Germany has been at war since 1939, its army was mobilized long ago.

[mat-vey]

And no, I understood you correctly then ... I don't remember where I stumbled across - there was an estimate of how much time the USSR needed to mobilize, it so happened that it would be in time by the end of June, it was necessary to start at the beginning of May ...

[strannik1985]

Most likely at Meltyukhov, it takes 30 days to fully transfer the districts to the fronts (with the formation of spare parts, communications, hospitals, etc.).

[mat-vey]

quite possible ..

[your1970]

so for this we held the May training camp - my grandfather was called to them

[misti1973]

Well, what do you think as a child? Firstly: the strong do not care what the weak says - he is playing the game, and not being played by other people's tricks :) Stalin believed that Germany would not win this war, and, therefore, Hitler would not dare to do it. Barbarossa's plan was it is considered a "slapstick" :), which is not surprising at all. I looked at it and I immediately got the impression that it was written in a hurry and wears a very superficial character. Secondly: if the USSR had attacked, no one would have said a word, but we would only be glad that Hitler was stabbed in the back! At that time, the Second World War was already two years, and they were all at war with Germany. All of Europe was captured by the Wehrmacht. Yes, they would shower us with flowers!

[mat-vey]

Quote: misti1973

. Yes, they would shower us with flowers!

Yes, you can still ...

[Aviator_]

He was not lucky to be the first

For some reason, in other districts, divisions were withdrawn from their places of permanent deployment, and only in the Brest Fortress was the division blocked by the Germans, who bypassed it and went further. So Pavlov got what he deserved. More than 7000 people (the initial number of the fortress garrison) fought heroically, but they could not stop or at least detain the Germans. That is, the task was not completed. Absolutely. Such a disastrous situation was only in the Belarusian military district.

[Kaz bek]

You are right, considering that everyone else just immediately lost to Hitler and became his satellites

[antivirus]

the Poles had a negative attitude towards the USSR and there were just few agents, only the Communists cleaned them out in Poland and Akrajova and the Germans.
the game was a success --- they cheated in all directions, BUT WERE "FLYING HEADS" FOR 1-2-3 MONTHS WITH THE ALKASH LADIES (decoy ducks) NOBODY WILL SAY ...
IN THE CARDS (ARTICLE) GAME ABVER and others are NOT REFLECTED.
empty articles - what was, do not describe the plans and their winding path to victory over the USSR.

the author with the psychology of a builder - the concrete was poured and it is impossible to move the foundation of the house 300 km.
everything could be overtaken from voivodeship to other voivodeship and returned back. according to my simple peasant psychology - deception is worth a victory and "flying headquarters" + "separate groups" of tanks and supply columns (from the article) were also confused - to gain time - where Pavlov (and other districts) should send their fur corps ...
it was easier "not to succumb to the provocation" - not succumbed.
the price is known.
see the archives of intelligence or the British headquarters are needed (the interest was primarily in aviation, and what else is needed for the landing?)

emptiness is the key to a well-spilled abstract on N-pages.
to condemn the IVS and the Politburo (and intelligence) for being "unprepared" - nonsense (words of one Kremlin long-liver)
back in the 70s, my father said about PKharbor: "The United States did not hide and now does not secret its military facilities." what German standards were that ours knew?
if 30 "officer-tanker" is dancing with the ladies and drunk "they blabbed everything out", how to check? no sympathy for the Union in the former Poland (only the communists in Majdanek?).
not a special officer wrote tsydulki. school teacher, at best. disappointed - spent a lot of time.

[misti1973]

And the Poles just adored the Germans after the 39th :)

[Siberian54]

If without a person, an article of the USSR-Japan treaty, with the aggression of any contracting party against the third, the treaty becomes null and void ... the USSR could not even twitch at its borders so as not to get a war on two fronts ... And the Wehrmacht command knew the situation and brazenly provoked, flights of scouts, shelling of border guards

[Jurkovs]

Quote: Olgovich

But this is also evidence of an imminent attack.

Perhaps in the plans of the Germans was the possibility of allowing the inspection from our side. For our complacency.

[Sugar Honeyovich]

Quote: Olgovich

What is the reaction of the leadership to this (immediate mobilization, bringing troops to combat readiness, statements by diplomats, warnings to the aggressor, etc.)?

At least:
In April – June of 1941, with the growing threat of war, additional urgent measures were taken to increase combat readiness, including:
the call in April – May of 793 of thousands of reservists to replenish the troops of the western military districts almost to wartime states;
the directive of the Chief of the General Staff of 14 April on urgent putting into combat readiness all long-term firing structures, fortified areas with the installation of weapons of field troops in them in the absence of personnel;
covert transfer from May 13 from the internal districts of the troops of the second strategic echelon to the western districts while bringing them into combat readiness - 7 armies of 66 divisions (16, 19, 20, 22, 24 and 28-I army, 41-X infantry, th and 21 th mechanized corps);
bringing the 63 divisions of the reserves of the western districts into combat readiness and putting them out by night marches, secretly, from June 12 into the army of covering these districts (NGO Directive from 12.06.41);
putting into combat readiness and covert withdrawal under the guise of exercises at the 52 concentration center of the divisions of the second echelon of the cover armies from places of permanent deployment (Order of the NPO from 16.06.41);
the withdrawal of divisions of the first echelon of cover armies to fortified areas by telegram from the chief of the General Staff from 10.06.41 and the instructions of the people's commissar of defense from 11.06.41 - from the beginning of June;
bringing all PribOVO and OdVO troops to readiness 18 – 21.06.41;
creation of command posts from April 1941 of the year and their occupation on June 18 – 21 by urgently formed front-line departments;
the creation of the army group of S. M. Budyonny on the Dnieper line 21.06.41;
early release by order of NGOs from 14 in May from all schools and the direction of graduates in the western border districts;
Order of the NCO No. 0367 from 27. 12.40 and its repetition of 19.06.41 on the dispersal and camouflage of aircraft, etc .;
Direction Deputy. People's Commissar of Defense of the General K.A. Meretskov I.V. Stalin in ZapOVO and PribOVO to check the combat readiness of the air forces of the districts 14.06.41/XNUMX/XNUMX
publication of the NGO Directive and Headquarters (No. 1) for putting the troops of the western military districts in combat readiness (signed by 21.06.41 in 22.00, since S.K. Timoshenko and G.K. Zhukov left Stalin in 22.20, having received the approval of this directive by sending it with N.F. Vatutin at the communications center of the General Staff).
In total, 225 of the 237 divisions of the Red Army intended for the war against Germany and its allies according to defense plans were put on alert before the German attack "(S.Yu. Rybas)

[Alexey RA]

Quote: Sahar Medovich

the call in April – May of 793 of thousands of reservists to replenish the troops of the western military districts almost to wartime states;

This is the total number of those called up for fees. Number assigned staff rifle divisions, called up for training, was 466 people.
The most interesting thing is that of these hundreds of thousands of attributed KOVO received 65,5 thousand, PribVO - 42 thousand, OdVO - 24 thousand, but ZOVO - only 24 thousand. At the same time, MVO received 60 thousand. Siberian Military District - 36 thousand, and Ural Military District - 30 thousand.
Well, the worst thing is that the mobilization of transport and traction was not carried out. As a result, the artillery and rear of the same twelve-thousandth divisions remained in peacetime states, which nullified all the advantages of replenishing them with personnel.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Sugar Honeyovich

Quote: Olgovich

What is the reaction of the leadership to this (immediate mobilization, bringing troops to combat readiness, statements by diplomats, warnings to the aggressor, etc.)?

At least:
In April – June of 1941, with the growing threat of war, additional urgent measures were taken to increase combat readiness, including:
the call in April – May of 793 of thousands of reservists to replenish the troops of the western military districts almost to wartime states;
the directive of the Chief of the General Staff of 14 April on urgent putting into combat readiness all long-term firing structures, fortified areas with the installation of weapons of field troops in them in the absence of personnel;
latent transfer

The units were not brought into readiness, the advance was chaotic, slow, belated:

This is only for Day 1 June 22:

Halder:

The offensive of our troops, apparently, was for the enemy on the entire front a complete tactical surprise.

Border bridges across the Bug and other rivers were captured by our troops everywhere without a fight and in complete safety... The complete surprise of our offensive for the enemy {3} is evidenced by the fact that the units were taken by surprise in the barracks, the planes were at the airfields, covered with tarpaulins, and the forward units, suddenly attacked by our troops, asked the command about what to do

The general picture of the first day of the offensive is as follows: The offensive of the German troops took the enemy by surprise. The enemy's battle formations were tactically not adapted for defense.; His troops in the border zone were scattered over a vast territory and tied to their quartering areas. The protection of the border itself was generally weak.

Tactical surprise led to the fact that enemy resistance in the border zone turned out to be weak and disorganized, as a result of which we EVERYWHERE it was easy to seize bridges over water obstacles and break through the border strip of fortifications to the full depth

Our advancing divisions, wherever the enemy tried to resist, threw him back.

In this way, the way is open for mobile connections.

On the front of Army Group South, already in the middle of the day, Kleist's group {10} was able to launch an offensive with its northern and [28] central corps.

On the front of Army Group Center, the right flank of Panzer Group Guderian {11} (3rd and 4th Panzer Divisions) will enter the Brest-Minsk highway in the evening. The northern flank of the Panzer Group [Lemelsen (47th Motorized Corps)] broke through the enemy's defenses and entered the operational space.

North of Bialystok Panzer Group Gotha {12} has achieved the greatest success. With a swift throw, she overcame the wooded-lake area, went to the Neman River and captured intact the most important crossings across the Neman at Alytus and Merkene. The tank group scattered parts of eight enemy divisions thrown to meet it. Now only scattered enemy units are operating in front of the front of the Hoth Panzer Group. There is no organized resistance. In this sector, our troops apparently secured freedom of action for themselves.

On the front of Army Group North, Göpner's Panzer Group {13}, conducting successful battles, advanced to the Dubissa River and took possession of two undisturbed crossings.

"Brought" in combat readiness PVO: went to the Neman River and captured intact the most important crossings across the Neman at Alytus and Merkene. The tank group scattered parts of eight enemy divisions thrown to meet it. Now only scattered enemy units are operating in front of the front of the Hoth Panzer Group. [B] [/ b]

Immediately visible - "readiness" at the "highest" level

[Sugar Honeyovich]

In other words: not everything that should have been done was done ... as it became known THEN. But all the same it is impossible to say that nothing was done: "neither mobilization, nor bringing to combat readiness". Moreover, everything is not so simple here either.

[Olgovich]

Quote: Sahar Medovich

But all the same, it cannot be said that nothing was done: "neither mobilization, nor bringing to combat readiness"

Something was undoubtedly being done.
BUT - much less than required and POSSIBLE - even from the available forces and means.

[Cayz kfgby]

And what is the reaction of the leadership to this (immediate mobilization, bringing troops to combat readiness, statements of diplomats, warnings to the aggressor, etc.)?

And as soon as all this was done, the democratically elected head of Germany would declare to the entire democratic world that the hordes of barbarians from Muscovy-Tataria, under the command of Jewish commissars, want to enslave the friendly family of European and American countries, but he will protect Europe and the rest of the world, and at the same time liberate Estonians, Latvians, Ukrainians, Georgians ...
The Soviet leadership directly and indirectly asked the Fritzes what their divisions were doing at our borders?
The problem is not that

intelligence exaggerated the number of German offensive formations SEVEN times. But this is evidence of a follow-up attack (which happened just 3 weeks later)! Paradoxically, it turns out that she warned of the attack and - in advance

but that she incorrectly determined the locations and possible directions of attacks ... remember the strike near Grodno of the 6th MK, where they repelled the strike of "2-3 tank divisions" that were not there

[misti1973]

And what can be the reaction when you do not have time to complete the concentration of troops and receive information that the enemy is ready to strike a preemptive strike? In Barbarossa's plan, the number of Red Army troops in the border districts is estimated at 4,5 million soldiers and officers! What they were doing there in such a quantity is clear, but all troop movements from our side were very slow and obvious! There is no mechanization, no serious fortifications, and why build them if you are going to attack? And the fact that this was exactly what was planned is a fact, which just arises from the number of forces and their location. And the redeployment was not completed, and the quality of the troops of the second draft was very doubtful. Suffice it to recall the Brest Fortress. There were 9000 people, artillery , anti-aircraft artillery, etc. And the Germans blocked it on the second day. Half of them were from the Union republics untrained, often do not understand Russian fighters. So what do we see? Information was received and measures were taken, but insufficient due to the fact that such a development of events was practically ruled out altogether. And intelligence from the other side made a lot of mistakes. And despite all this, such a defeat! Well this is what level of mess and stupidity should be? Guderian recalled that they were simply overwhelmed that they had broken through so far with relatively little casualties!

[yehat2]

because absurdity is much more convenient

[EvilLion]

In fact, any normal person knows that the Germans dragged mechanized formations only before the invasion, and this is precisely the critical factor in the difficulty of determining the moment of the beginning of the war for the intelligence of the Red Army. Infantry divisions, albeit numerous, the Red Army was not quite rightly afraid, because during an attack they would not be able to advance quickly and the superiority of the Germans in deployment would not play a big role.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: EvilLion

In fact, any normal person knows that the Germans dragged mechanized formations only before the invasion, and this is precisely the critical factor in the difficulty of determining the moment of the beginning of the war for the intelligence of the Red Army.

EMNIMS, not only did the Germans begin to pull up the main part of the mechanical connections from 25.05.1941/XNUMX/XNUMX, but they also deployed them in areas that are a hundred kilometers or more from the border. The advancement of the TGR units to the original ones began only five days before the attack.

[polpot]

Thanks, as always interesting material

[Jurkovs]

One gets the impression that Germany was ready, with our due perseverance, to carry out short-term inspections of Poland for us. We would make sure that in those areas where our intelligence found tank divisions that they are not there. And they calmed down. After that, any of our fabrications would be rejected from the threshold and the transfer of troops would go under this smoke cover. It turns out that the preparation for our disinformation on the part of the German General Staff was more multilevel. than we previously thought.

[andrew42]

We can say that in June 1941 the Red Army suffered a serious defeat not so much from the Wehrmacht as from the Abwehr. The headquarters of the western districts were clearly crammed with German agents, and in such good positions. Plus the excellent organization of the work of the German sabotage groups directly from the first hours of the war - and this is impossible without the presence of well-informed moles in our headquarters at different levels.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: andrew42

We can say that in June 1941 the Red Army suffered a serious defeat not so much from the Wehrmacht as from the Abwehr. The headquarters of the western districts were clearly crammed with German agents, and in such good positions.

No agents did the Red Army more harm than she herself. The chronic illness of the Red Army at the end of the 30s is an extremely low level of education not only for the conscript contingent, but also for those who were supposed to train this contingent - the junior command staff. What can a young recruit teach a young man with only three grades of school behind him? And such, for example, in the BTV KOVO, there were a third. Result (15 TD 8 MK):

In the 2nd battalion of the 29th tank regiment, classes on the topic "A soldier in an offensive battle" were conducted by Art. Sergeant D. No one gave him practical instruction on this topic. The abstract is poorly prepared. D. himself does not know how to use a shovel. The Red Army soldiers do not know the technique of the trench fragments lying down, they have a poor shovel, they choose the places for shooting unsuccessfully. The running technique is poorly worked out, weapons for shooting are not made. Senior sergeant D. explained the combat mission clumsily. Example: “Squad take possession of the farm and defeat the enemy.

© Ulanov / Shein
An enemy spy or saboteur will die of strain, but will not be able to inflict such harm:

In parts of 97 SD rifles manufactured in 1940. , which were on hand for no more than 4 months, up to 29% are reduced to a state of rust in the barrel, machine guns "DP" manufactured in 1939 to 14% also have a deterioration of the barrel channels.

97 sd: The command personnel of the units do not know the optical sight of the Maxim machine gun, the optical sight of the sniper rifle and other types of new weapons. Some of the company’s commanders do not know how to remove a bayonet from a rifle arr 1891 / 30g.
The knowledge of the junior commanding staff is weak, but nevertheless, the weapons in the unit know better than the commanding staff.
The knowledge of ordinary cadets is low.
They do not know automatic weapons at all and are only able to carry rifles and pull the trigger. Extremely poor knowledge of the materiel of small arms and besides the gunners do not know the names of the parts of the machine gun "DP" and the revolver. The machine gunners do not know the name of the parts and rules for disassembling the rifle. To great shame, and chagrin, cadet regiment schools have lesser knowledge of small arms than the knowledge of the Red Army, and yet despite this they are issued by junior commanders.
There is no need to talk about the rules, cleaning weapons, and their inspection by younger commanders.
This situation should be, since the commander, having no knowledge of small arms, cannot transfer them to his subordinates and demand knowledge from them when he himself does not know him.

And this is the best division in the district.

The headquarters of the division was rated as the most advanced in the Red Army and was awarded the challenge prize of the General Staff. For the organization of combat and political training and the training of troops, the division commander, Major General I. Sherstyuk, was awarded the Order of the Red Banner.

[mat-vey]

Quote: Alexey RA

The chronic illness of the Red Army at the end of the 30s is the extremely low level of education not only of the conscript contingent, but also of those who were supposed to train this contingent - the junior command staff.

This is probably due to the fact that the Bolsheviks destroyed the most advanced education that was in the Russian Empire ..

[Alexey RA]

Quote: mat-vey

This is probably due to the fact that the Bolsheviks destroyed the most advanced education that was in the Russian Empire ..

Not otherwise.
Seriously, the problem of the inadequate quality of the recruiting contingent is quite solvable - if there is a competent junior command staff who can train the replenishment ... in all possible ways. So it was in the Armed Forces of the Empire, so it was in the Armed Forces of the post-war USSR. But in the Red Army at the end of the 30s, due to the explosive growth in the number of formations, this very junior command staff had to be trained in parallel with the preparation of replenishment. And from the same "raw material". The result is obvious.

[mat-vey]

Well, seriously, it was the same objective reason as the cold in winter ... there were not enough literate and trained people in production ...

[andrew42]

I cannot agree that the main reason for the defeat lies in the commanders of the middle and lower echelons. These guys are in charge of Tactics! Well, let's say the tactical developments of the Wehrmacht were significantly higher, the organization of interaction between the combat arms at the level from battalion to division is also higher, plus Communications, communications and again communications. But it was problematic to beat the Red Army with this baggage. This is evidenced by numerous facts of stubborn resistance of individual units and even individual units of the Red Army, even in cases of creating an overwhelming advantage in the Wehrmacht. And who, excuse me, is responsible for the Strategy? For supply? For checking the combat readiness of units? - The headquarters structures of the districts in the first place. The western districts turned out to be STRATEGICHEKI not ready for database maintenance. Strategically and organizationally. This is not the level of the brigade commander, division commander. at least, starting with the corps commander and higher, up to the General Staff. I don’t understand why in general compare the competence of the battalion commanders, when disorganization comes from the District Headquarters.

[Alexey RA]

Quote: andrew42

I cannot agree that the main reason for the defeat lies in the commanders of the middle and lower echelons. These guys are in charge of Tactics!

That's it! The commander and the headquarters of the army issue an order, drawn up taking into account the fact that his executors read at least the Charter. They cannot assume that, having received this order, the infantry division commander will send into the attack only the attached tanks without infantry. That another divisional commander, in response to the order to ban frontal attacks on fortified villages, will report another unsuccessful frontal assault. That the tank brigade commander would lead the brigade to attack through the ridge of the hill directly to the unsuppressed anti-tank defense, without interaction with the infantry and its artillery. That the infantry battalion commander would request fire from the division's artillery at a single machine gun, disrupting all the timing of the offensive. That an infantry general, having met the tanks sent to bypass the fortified village, would use obscenities to drive the tankers into a frontal attack on the anti-tank gunnery.
As a result basically executable order through the efforts of subordinate commanders, it turns into a bloody bacchanalia. And then the survivors in the memoirs will curse the last words of the bloody butcher-marshals, who drove them to the machine guns - not knowing that this was done in violation of the orders of the same marshals.

If you read the SDB, then the orders of the front-army level in terms of measures to correct shortcomings already in 1941 turned into a collection of quotes from regulations and instructions.

[ccsr]

Quote: andrew42

For checking the combat readiness of units? - The headquarters structures of the districts in the first place. The western districts turned out to be STRATEGICHEKI not ready for database maintenance. Strategically and organizationally.

Marshal Zakharov, too, was not ready to STRATEGICALLY organize a rebuff to the Germans in his district, and so that some of our units were on the adjacent territory during the battles with the enemy? Why did he raise his troops by his willful decision, while Pavlov's regiments rose under artillery fire?
Well, with what joy, on the eve of the WAR, Pavlov managed to be at the performance on June 21 in the evening, when any officer of the district headquarters knows that even on the eve of regular exercises, everyone is at the headquarters from early morning and until a command arrives that someone can be released by the end of the day, and even then not all.

[andrew42]

You can't argue with that. But the adversary's mess needs to a) know b) evaluate c) be able to use it. The latter is just the most difficult thing, and it cannot be done without wide agents.

[alimov76]

Quote: Whispering in the night

For the failures of the company commander, one should ask the company commander, and for the failure of June 22, 1941, one must ask, first of all, the head of state, and only then with the commanders of districts, corps, divisions, etc.

and why actually a failure? would you play better from such a low start at 17?

[mat-vey]

Quote: alimov76

and why actually a failure? would you play better from such a low start at 17?

All these critics and analysts could not only “play” better, they could not organize the production of famous galoshes not only for export, but as such.

[alimov76]

Quote: andrew42

We can say that in June 1941 the Red Army suffered a serious defeat not so much from the Wehrmacht as from the Abwehr. The headquarters of the western districts were clearly crammed with German agents, and in such good positions. Plus the excellent organization of the work of the German sabotage groups directly from the first hours of the war - and this is impossible without the presence of well-informed moles in our headquarters at different levels.

X ..... nya that's all, the struggle at the level of organizational structures, the Soviet society, which is 20 years old, against a variety of capitalism such as fascism, the result is known. The damage was such that 50 years later they rolled back to capitalism.

[serg v stock]

What happened happened. If you knew about the invasion, would you have time to prepare? It is unlikely, for training you need at least a month to teach an infantryman, three gunners, half a year of tankers. Pilots, if not nuggets, at least half a year. Serviceable equipment was required, but where there. The bike, invented relatively recently, was raised by an alarm by an automobile division of 70 units, a march of 150 km. less than half arrived. As for intelligence, it gives management an opportunity to reflect on the future, but it cannot provide an absolute guarantee of the correct decision.

[ccsr]

Author:
Eugene

Earlier, the author promised to provide links to German maps that he used in his materials. Most of the documents used are on the website of the Russian-German Project for the Digitization of German Documents in the Archives of the Russian Federation. The maps are in the Inventory section 12451 - General Command of the Ground Forces (OKH) in cases from 799 to 844. Specially for Comrade, I inform you that in the listed cases there are also German maps with a plotted reconnaissance situation. I wish all the readers who like to understand the maps of the Second World War success in this difficult field !!

I was not lazy and found the map referred to by the author of the articles - it goes under number 844, and all other maps belong to an earlier period, and have nothing to do with the June grouping of the Wehrmacht, because they mainly relate to 1940, i.e. .e. the author again uses thimble methods of fooling readers.
The map was taken from OUR archive, i.e. is a trophy, and apparently came to us after the end of the war. But the point is not even this, but the fact that due to the lack of data on the card itself (and on the back), it is impossible to determine who it belonged to, and for what purposes it was used, since it could have been prepared for exercises or as a reference material for a report in one of the headquarters services. But if we close our eyes to this, then it is not clear how this map can determine the positions of German troops in the last week before June 22. All attempts by the author to draw it to our intelligence report on May 31 look unconvincing, if only because the intelligence report cannot reflect all the data that is not documented at the time of its compilation, tk. this cannot be included in the text of the summary. And for some reason, the author always leads the right side of the map, but avoids its left side, where parts and connections are specially highlighted in red and brown, which, according to my assumptions, either started moving to our border, or are planning to be transferred in the near future. Unfortunately, the red text on the map cannot be translated without a professional military translator, and the author takes advantage of this.
In a word, the next injection of the author of the article did not add anything new to the fact that he had been promoting here before - he does not have a single JUNE document of the Wehrmacht confirming his fantasy that our intelligence in June did not know how many divisions would be used against the USSR and wrong appreciated the military plans of Germany. Another soap bubble burst, like all the previous ones, like about district intelligence schools and an hour and a half decryption of a report from Berlin.

[Alex1949]

Author! And with what forces Germany attacked the USSR, really with one regiment. I think that the author of the article should have just read Wikipedia on this issue. And better - "Memories and Reflections" by Zhukov.

[VS]

So when will our anonymous author reveal his name?)) What sensations did he create, and in the end everything will subside on a little-interesting and little-known site a bestseller a la rezun - will we wait for the GREAT book from our anonymous author?)) Who for some reason is lying that it was Martirosyan who invented about flying around the border by the divisional commander of the SAD Zakharov on June 18 in the ZAPOVO strip)))

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

I was not lazy and found the map referred to by the author of the articles - it goes under number 844, and all other maps belong to an earlier period, and have nothing to do with the June grouping of the Wehrmacht, because they mainly relate to 1940, i.e. .e. the author again uses thimble methods of fooling readers.

Therefore, Worth is a miracle and hides his name in every possible way))) For liars and falsifiers always try to hide their name))) The exception is Markusha Solonin and A. Isaev)) These lie in a brazen way - do not hesitate)) Ie. our anonymous author has not completely lost his conscience))) Or - just a primitive coward)) a la Rezun)))

You just wrote that Golikov was several times with Stalin without Timoshenko and Zhukov)) Alas - Golikov was with Stalin in 41 - BEFORE June 22 - ONLY ONE time))) With the same report of March 20))) And in The 40th was more often - three times)) Ie ALL infa from RU went to Stalin from January 41st to June 21st - through Zhukov constantly)))

[ccsr]

Quote: V.S.

You just wrote that Golikov was several times with Stalin without Timoshenko and Zhukov)) Alas - Golikov was with Stalin in 41 - BEFORE June 22 - ONLY ONE time))) With the same report of March 20))) And in The 40th was more often - three times)) Ie ALL infa from RU went to Stalin from January 41st to June 21st - through Zhukov constantly)))

Not everything is as simple as it might seem, because in addition to the OFFICIAL summons to Golikov's report, Stalin himself constantly called various senior officials of all the People's Commissariats, and on various issues, and the head of the Intelligence Agency is no exception. This is how it was sometimes with regard to information obtained by military intelligence:

In the early 1930s, the Intelligence Directorate of the Red Army (Intelligence Directorate) managed to find an approach to the imperial adviser V. Wenner, the head of the Reichswehr cryptography service, and through him - to the head of the German telephone tapping service, the imperial adviser Hans Kumpf. It was a phenomenal success for Soviet military intelligence. She had never done this before! This breakthrough happened largely thanks to the efforts of Artur Artuzov. Therefore, Stalin allowed him to report directly, bypassing his immediate superior, Yan Berzin. So Artuzov became the eyes and ears of Stalin in the Intelligence Agency. He regularly wore the leader tape tapes with telephone conversations of all the highest bosses of Germany, including Hitler himself! Joseph Vissarionovich had a good knowledge of German, although he never boasted about it. And he kept all the tapes with the conversations of his opponents, periodically listening to them. But just in case, he insured himself with the opinion of specialists. They were unanimous: the records are genuine!

https://topwar.ru/98226-telefon-i-stalin.html

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

as was sometimes the case with information obtained by military intelligence:

Golikov visited Stalin ONLY ONE time - from January 41 to June 22. Stalin did not wear any films ...

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

Stalin himself constantly called various top officials of all the people's commissariats, and on various issues, and the head of the Intelligence Agency is no exception.

Calling and clarifying some points that he read in the reports of the RU that the General Staff brought Stalin to Stalin was not a visit to Stalin.

[ccsr]

Quote: V.S.

Calling and clarifying some points that he read in the reports of the RU that the General Staff brought Stalin to Stalin was not a visit to Stalin.

You are simply not in the subject - on the "Kremlin" phones, more issues were often resolved than could be seen in official documents. And in general, before going to a report to the big leadership, they first discuss with his entourage what issues the boss wants to discuss (if an order was not given earlier), and this existed not only under Stalin, but also much later, because such things need to be prepared in advance ...

Quote: V.S.

Golikov was ONLY ONE time with Stalin

This does not mean anything at all, because Golikov presented daily intelligence reports and some encrypted messages for his superiors, and which then went to Stalin for a report. I do not see anything new or supernatural in this, which is why the fact that Golikov was officially summoned once proves nothing.

[VS]

Quote: ccsr

the fact that Golikov was officially summoned once proves nothing.

So I did not understand - what YOU wanted to say - what do you want to prove? YOU said - Golikov visited Stalin SEVERAL times, I corrected - HE WAS WITH Stalin ONLY ONE time - and accordingly all his reports went to Zhukov and not to Stalin at once and all the more did not obey Golikov to Stalin bypassing Zhukov ... Did Stalin call Golikov? SO IT DOES NOT MATTER. He read everything he needed in his reports that they got to him from Golikov and through Zhukov and directly because Zhukov directly pressed on Golikov demanding to lie that the main forces of the Germans should be expected to the south of the woodland - a plus to the fact that other intelligence agencies reported ..

[ccsr]

Quote: V.S.

YOU said - Golikov was with Stalin SEVERAL times, I corrected - HE WAS with Stalin ONLY ONE time

I did not say for how long, and you only dragged in 1941, although in the memoirs of Zhukov and Golikov they admit that he was at Stalin's report more than once.

Quote: V.S.

Did Stalin call Golikov? SO IT DOES NOT MATTER.

It doesn't matter to you, but for any military leader, even a call from a member of the Politburo can be considered as an oral instruction from the country's top leader.

Quote: V.S.

and through Zhukov and directly because Zhukov directly pressed on Golikov demanding to lie

Well, yes, Golikov was "stupid" enough to put his head under a bullet, knowing that his information could be double-checked through other special services. I do not believe in this, if only because Stalin had no complaints about Golikov at all - neither during the war, nor after its end.

[PVM]

All enti reasoning is nonsense and self-indulgence.
The world is ruled and ruled by the world "behind the scenes".
She plans everything 50 years ahead and Manages the launched processes.
WW2 is her project. And it was ruled at the level of the dictators Hitler and Stalin and their inner circle.
All other analytics are irrelevant.
The main result: the world "behind the scenes" got rich. And the peoples shed rivers of blood and suffered terribly.