Marine Strategic Nuclear Forces: Weigh Pros and Cons


This material was conceived as a continuation of articles devoted to the Soviet atomic heavy aircraft carrier cruiser Ulyanovsk, links to which will be given below. The author intended to express his point of view on questions about the place and role of aircraft-carrying ships in the Russian Navy. However, under the influence of the remarkable series of materials of the respected A. Timokhin “Building the Fleet” that appeared on VO, the decision came to expand the scope of this work a little, including ships of other classes as well.


In the series of articles that are brought to your attention, the author will try to “design” for the Russian Federation a fleet of the future that can effectively solve its tasks in the coming decades. If possible, really taking into account the production and financial capabilities of our country, and, of course, comparing the results of the resulting calculations with existing plans and real projects under construction or planned for construction for the Russian Navy.

And start with


What kind of war should we be prepared for. Conflicts in which the Russian Federation may be involved are divided into 3 main categories:

1) Global Nuclear. This is a conflict in which the Russian Federation will have to resort to the full use of its strategic nuclear potential.

2) Limited nuclear. This is a conflict in which the use of nuclear weapons will be limited to tactical ammunition and, possibly, a small part of the strategic nuclear forces. This is possible, for example, in the event of a war with a power with little nuclear potential, which, nevertheless, would risk using it for us. Or in the event that the territory of the Russian Federation is subjected to a non-nuclear attack of such power that we obviously will not be able to repel it without using the "last argument of the kings". In this case, our defense concept allows the use of nuclear weapons first. It is clear that at first this application will be of a limited, precautionary nature. If, seeing our resolve, the aggressor will calm down, it means to be there. Otherwise, see paragraph 1.

3) Nuclear-free. Conflict in which the parties will fight exclusively conventional weapons. Here, options are also possible - from a clash with a first-class economic and military power, to a regional conflict such as forcing Georgia to peace, or a military operation in a foreign country "a la Syria."

Obviously, the Russian Navy must be prepared for any of these conflicts, including the worst - the global nuclear one. For this, as part of our fleetalong with general forces there are also strategic nuclear forces. Their tasks are extremely clear and understandable. In peacetime, the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces should serve as a guarantee of the inevitability of a retaliatory nuclear missile strike, well, and if Armageddon starts, they must strike it.

Everything seems to be clear, but ... still an seditious question arises. And do we really need naval strategic nuclear forces? Perhaps it makes sense instead to invest in the development of the land and air component of our nuclear triad? The thing is that there are more than enough arguments against the construction and operation of strategic missile submarine cruisers (SSBNs) today.

The domestic military budget does not seem to occupy the worst, although not too honorable, 6 place in the world. But at the same time, it is about 10,5 times inferior to the American, and more than 4 times to the Chinese. Compared to the total budget of the NATO countries, our military spending looks very miserable. This is not a reason to panic, but, obviously, we must properly manage every ruble allocated for the country's defense. However, if we try to evaluate the naval strategic nuclear forces in terms of “cost / effectiveness”, then the picture will be very hopeless.

Advantages of the SSBN, true and imaginary


What is the main advantage of the SSBN as an arms system over mine intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)? In stealth and mobility. What do these qualities give to the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces? Obviously, the impossibility of hitting the SSBNs with a preventive nuclear missile, or even with the “disarming strike” that the United States likes to talk about. This, of course, is great, but ...

But let’s be frank - about 300 of mine and mobile ballistic missiles, which the ground component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces have today, cannot be destroyed by any “disarming strike”. Today, our "sworn friends" do not have technologies that would guarantee the simultaneous destruction of almost 300 highly protected targets located mostly in the Russian outback, some of which, moreover, can move in space.

To date, the weapons that the United States could have allocated for such an attack have either too short a range to reach our ICBMs, or too much flight time, which is comparable to or even exceeds that of American nuclear ballistic missiles. That is, there will be no sudden strike - even assuming that the United States secretly launched the release of new modifications of the Tomahawks with an increased flight range, it will not even be an hour, but a clock, to fly to the locations of our ICBMs, despite the massive use of such missiles shortly after their launch. Such an attempt to "disarm" simply does not make sense - by the time these missiles arrive at their targets, Armageddon will be completed.

Thus, the only at least somewhat relevant option to destroy the Russian strategic missile forces before they are used is a nuclear missile strike at the ICBM locations of the Russian Federation. In this case, the Americans can hope that in those tens of minutes while the rockets fly, our leadership will not have time to figure out what's what and will not be able to issue a retaliation order.

Here are just the chances of success of such a scenario are very small. Firstly, because they have been very carefully preparing for such a development of events since the times of the USSR and continue to prepare now, so we should not “oversleep” the mass launch of US ballistic missiles. Secondly ... for a long time there was a belief that our powers that be, with their overseas villas and billions in bank accounts, simply would not dare to press a button. Today we can already guarantee that we will make up our minds: the Americans and Europeans, using the example of Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi, have clearly shown how they will deal with rulers of other countries that they do not like. That is, they perfectly explained to the Russian "powers that be" that they would not succeed in escaping and living out their lives in the Bahamas under any circumstances. And if a full-fledged nuclear missile strike is launched in our country, or if a non-nuclear invasion of obviously superior forces occurs, then our "top" will in any case be doomed. She understands this, so that our “owners of factories, newspapers, ships” will not have any fluctuations in terms of retaliation.

Marine Strategic Nuclear Forces: Weigh Pros and Cons

But even if the warning system about a nuclear attack does not work as expected, or if the country's leadership hesitates, there is still the "Perimeter", in other words: "Dead Hand". If impassive sensors detect the nuclear flame in which our Motherland burns, then automation will direct the flight of relay missiles, and they will ascend above the dying country, broadcasting permission-order for the use of nuclear weapons to everyone who can still hear it.

And many will hear. Even the allocation of 2-3 warheads to one missile silo or installation, generally speaking, does not guarantee the complete destruction of our strategic missile forces. Of course, with the massive use of US ballistic missiles, there will be a certain number of technical failures, and there will be separate technical failures. Some part of the warheads will go astray and fall farther away than their creators expected. Some of the nuclear warheads will be able to disable air defense systems.

What about mobile launchers? You need to understand that with the current level of technology, ballistic missiles are capable of hitting only stationary targets. Even if the Americans knew exactly the location of all our mobile launchers before they launched their ICBMs, this would not guarantee them success. During the flight of the Yarsa and Topoli missiles, it is quite possible to get out of attack - the flight time can be up to 40 minutes, while it will not be a mistake to assume that already at a distance of 12-15 km from the explosive point of the ammunition of the megaton class a mobile installation , the rocket and the calculation will remain operational.


That is, it is almost impossible to destroy our mobile ICBM systems even knowing their exact location in advance. But how would the Americans know him? Already in anything, but in disguise in the Russian Federation they know a lot - the traditions of “Invincible and legendary” are excellent in this respect. The only way to somehow find out the location of mobile Yars and Topol are spy satellites, but you need to understand that their capabilities are very limited. They are easy enough to mislead even the most ordinary mock-ups, not to mention the fact that such mock-ups can easily be equipped with devices that simulate the signature (thermal, etc.) of real launchers.

After all, even if out of more than one and a half hundred mine ballistic missiles only 5 R-36 survive, which received the affectionate nickname "Satan" in the west, and from more than a hundred mobile installations - a little less than half, that is, up to fifty "Yars", then only this will provide an opportunity to strike force in 200 nuclear warheads. The United States will not drive it into Neolithic, but inflicting unacceptable damage will guarantee for certain: American losses will amount to tens of millions. And all this is completely without taking into account two other components of our nuclear triad: air and sea.

But there is another extremely important aspect. The above-described attempt at a "counter-force" strike designed to destroy Russia's nuclear potential will give a chance for survival not even to millions, but to tens of millions of our fellow citizens. Indeed, using at least 2-3 “special warheads” to destroy each of approximately 300 ballistic missiles we have, it is necessary to isolate 600-900 warheads from 1 550 permitted by START III. Such a "disarming" strike will pull the mass of American nuclear weapons from our cities and other infrastructure and energy facilities of our country, and thereby save many lives of our citizens.

Suppose for a second that the country's leadership decides to eliminate the marine component of our nuclear triad. For the SSBN today there is about 150 ballistic missiles, and maybe more. And, theoretically arguing, instead of these missiles we could well deploy another 150 Yars mine or mobile based. In this case, the number of our ICBMs in the Strategic Missile Forces would have grown to about 450, and for a counter-force strike, the Americans would need up to the 1 350 nuclear warheads, which is obviously irrational, since there is very little left to defeat all other targets of the Russian Federation. So, when eliminating the naval component of the strategic nuclear forces in favor of the land, we finally make no sense to the concept of counter-force strike.

Why is it so important for us to make sense of it? For obvious reasons. The goal of any military aggression is a world in which the position of the aggressor would be better than it was before the war. No one in their right mind and sober memory will want to start a war in order to worsen their future. The only way that gives at least a ghostly hope for a relatively successful outcome of a nuclear war for the United States is to neutralize the enemy’s nuclear potential. That is, you can count on some kind of gain only if the enemy is destroyed by nuclear weapons, but does not have time to use his own. Take away from the United States (or any other country) the hope of neutralizing the nuclear weapons of a potential adversary - and he will never go to nuclear aggression, because it will never bring him peace that would be better than pre-war.

As you can see, in the case of the elimination of the marine component of the nuclear triad with the corresponding strengthening of the Strategic Missile Forces, this problem can well be solved. Moreover - there is every reason to believe that the Strategic Missile Forces and the strategic aviation even in their current state they are capable of causing unacceptable damage to the aggressor, even if the Russian Federation “spills” a large-scale nuclear missile attack.

But if so ... Then why do we even need naval strategic nuclear forces? What can the SSBN do that, which the Strategic Missile Forces cannot do?


At least in theory, the stealth of the submarine is better than that of the Yars or Topol mobile installation. At the same time, the limitations of land transport are higher than those of sea transport, which means that ballistic missiles that the SSBNs can carry are more powerful than their land mobile counterparts. In addition, the SSBN at sea is in principle not affected by strategic nuclear warheads - unless it is in the base.

All of the above (again, in theory) provides us with the best preservation of ICBMs for a retaliatory nuclear missile strike in case we nevertheless “wake up” a nuclear counter-force attack. But, firstly, in practice, everything can turn out not so good, and secondly - is it so important if we keep enough warheads even without the SSBN so that the aggressor doesn’t feel small? Here, the criterion “more-less” is not important here; sufficiency is important here.

In other words, the potential gain in stealth of the SSBN is not for us a truly critical advantage. It’s clear that this is useful, because “the stock doesn’t pull”, but we can do without it.

About the cost of MSNS


Alas, the SSBNs appear to be an extremely wasteful component of strategic nuclear forces. To begin with, such ships need to be armed with specialized ICBMs, unification with land-based missiles here, if possible, is only possible for individual nodes. In other words, the development of sea-based ICBMs alone is already an additional cost. But they also need to be produced, losing the "economies of scale" from large batches of "land" ICBMs - again costs. A submarine driven by atomic energy and capable of using ICBMs? It is a complex structure, no less technologically advanced than, for example, a modern spaceship. Well, she has a corresponding value - in 2011, numbers were mentioned indicating that the cost of one Borea exceeded 700 million dollars. The author does not have data on the cost of mine or mobile launchers, but it will not be a mistake to assume that they will be much cheaper for 16 missiles.


But that is not all. The fact is that there is such a thing as KOH, that is, the coefficient of operational voltage or the coefficient of operational use of forces, measured in the interval from 0 to 1. Its essence is that if, for example, a certain submarine was on combat duty on the 3 of the month in 2018, that is, a quarter of the total calendar time, then its KON for 2018 was 0,25.

So, it is obvious that the KOH of the same mine installation is significantly higher than that of the SSBN. The mine with the Voivode inside is on alert almost constantly, at the same time, even with the most heavily used American SSBNs, KOH usually does not exceed 0,5-0,6. In the USSR, KOH ships of a similar purpose ranged from 0,15 to 0,24. Simply put, the SSBN is a much more complex structure than a conventional missile mine, and the boat needs much more time for various kinds of preventive repairs, etc. etc.

So it turns out that in Soviet times, to ensure that the, for example, 16 sea-based ICBMs were in constant readiness for use, each 4 to 7 SSBN with 16 mines each was required, and in the USA, 2 SSBNs with the same number of missiles. But the SSBN is not just a thing in itself, it requires appropriate infrastructure for itself and other things. But that is not all. The fact is that the SSBNs are not a self-sufficient means of nuclear war and require significant forces to cover their deployment.

A single SSBN today is hardly vulnerable except in the ocean, which is so large that it is much more difficult to search for several such ships in it than the notorious needle in a haystack. Despite the numerous and powerful naval fleets of the United States and NATO, if a domestic submarine missile carrier managed to enter the ocean, then it can only be found there by accident. The problem is that even in ordinary peacetime it will be very, very difficult for the Russian SSBN to reach the Russian SSBN without the help of numerous general forces.

Yes, in the ocean our SSBNs can become "invisible", but their locations are known by all accounts. Foreign atomarians can watch our ships already at the exit from the bases, and, in the future, accompany them in the immediate readiness to use weapons upon receipt of an appropriate order. How real is this threat? In the article “Homeless Arctic”, Rear Admiral S. Zhandarov pointed out:

“From February 11 to August 13, the New Hampshire submarine 2014 uncovered all the strategic containment activities of the Northern Fleet in the Barents Sea.”


In the period of aggravation of the international situation, things will be even worse - the number of multipurpose nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines of NATO near our coast will increase, near our waters aviation will search for submarines, etc. In other words, in order for the SSBNs to be able to do their work, solid outfits of forces must cover their way out. Even in peacetime, we will urgently need a naval reconnaissance and targeting system to identify enemy forces off our coast, and plan the time of departure and SSBN routes so as not to come into contact with them. And in the military?

For some reason, many people believe that nuclear Armageddon must definitely strike like a bolt from the blue. But this is completely optional. In the past, the military and politicians considered other scenarios: for example, when the war of the USSR and NATO begins as a non-nuclear one, it continues as a limited-nuclear one, and only then develops into a full-scale nuclear conflict. Alas, no one has canceled this option today.

Suppose for a second that this will happen. As it will be? It is likely that the beginning of the war will be preceded by a certain period of exacerbation of the international situation. Prior to this exacerbation, obviously, only a part of the Russian SSBNs will be on combat duty, but with its beginning, realizing that “it seems that this is a war”, the fleet and country leadership will try to send as many SSBNs to the sea as possible, Conflicts are located in bases and are not ready for an immediate exit. Some of them will take several days, and some will take a month or two, some SSBNs will not be able to go to sea at all, for example, being stuck in a major overhaul. The period of tension can last for months, during this time it is really possible to seriously strengthen the deployed group of SSBNs with new ships. At the same time, the SSBNs will try to go to sea as they are ready, until the very start of Armageddon, that is, until there is someone (and from where) to go.


But every day this will make it all the more difficult, because the enemy will concentrate his naval and air forces, trying to open our deployment, to find and take our SSBNs for escort. Accordingly, we need forces capable of driving away, crowding out, and if the conflict at the first stage proceeds in a non-nuclear form, then destroy the enemy’s anti-aircraft defense systems, which create a danger for the deployment of our SSBNs. For this, dozens of surface, submarine, and air ships are needed: nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines, corvettes and minesweepers, fighter planes and aircraft (helicopters), and other and other. For each fleet, in which there are SSBNs.

Not that the same silo or mobile ICBM systems do not need cover. Even as they need! But still, protecting them from the attacks of long-range cruise missiles and creating a missile defense circuit based on the same C-500 will cost much less than the contents of the SSBN cover forces described above.

“But why even go out somewhere if our SSBNs can shoot from the pier,” someone will say. So it is, a number of goals in the USA can be covered by “Clubs” and “Blue” directly from the pier. But in order to shoot ICBMs off the coast of the SSBN, generally speaking, it is obviously redundant - missile mines will be much cheaper.

And so it turns out that according to the “cost / effectiveness” criterion, naval strategic nuclear forces consisting of SSBNs lose the same strategic missile forces. By redirecting the resources that we are currently spending on the construction and maintenance of the SSBN in favor of mine-based and mobile-based ICBMs, we will achieve the same effect, and even free up a ton of money to finance other branches and types of armed forces of the Russian Federation.

But what about our "sworn friends"?


“Well,” then the esteemed reader will say: “But why didn’t other countries put their SSBNs on the joke, and did not give priority to the ground and air components of nuclear forces?” The answer to this question is very simple. As for the United States, firstly, the appearance of submarine missile carriers - ballistic missile carriers occurred at a time when land-based ICBMs were still very imperfect. Then SSBNs were more than justified. In the future, traditions worked out - the American Navy always remained in competition with other branches of the US armed forces, and of course, was not going to lose its significance by abandoning SSBNs. And besides, the US Navy dominated the ocean: no matter how strong the Soviet Navy, it always remained in second place. Thus, the Americans never had such problems with deploying SSBNs with ICBMs on board, which are facing us. And another important aspect - SSBNs can get closer to our territory, in this case, the flight time of its ICBMs can be significantly reduced in comparison with missiles launched from the United States.

As for France and England, their nuclear arsenals are relatively small, as, in fact, are the territories of these countries. In other words, it is possible to place ICBMs in the Russian Federation so that the flying time of enemy cruise missiles can be several hours, but the British and French are deprived of this opportunity. But the combination of a small number of warheads and the small size of the territory can really lead to the fact that the strategic potential of England or France will be destroyed by a preemptive strike. So for them, the use of SSBNs looks quite reasonable and reasonable.


SSBN "Triumphan"

And for us? Perhaps the construction and use of the SSBNs today is really a luxury that we should not allow ourselves? Should we abandon the preservation of the strategic nuclear forces as part of the nuclear triad and focus on silo-based and mobile-based ICBMs and strategic aviation?

The answer to this question is very clear. No no and one more time no!

The first reason, more technical


When creating this or that weapon system, we should in no case be limited to evaluating its usefulness exclusively from the point of view of today. Because “not only everyone can watch tomorrow” (Klitschko), but the consequences of such decisions must be predicted for many decades to come. So today, when the flight time of the US ICBMs will be no less than 40 minutes, and their subsonic cruise missiles will fly even longer to our missile silos, the silo-based and mobile-based ICBMs can really retain the potential for a retaliatory strike.

But the situation can change dramatically with the proliferation of high-precision medium-range ballistic missiles (BRRS) and non-ballistic hypersonic missiles deployed, for example, in the same China. Which, generally speaking, today is slowly preparing to declare itself not only as an economic, but also as a political superpower, and which is located much closer to us than the United States itself. And the flight time of Chinese missiles to our mines, if that happens, will be much less. President of the United States D. Trump has refused the INF Treaty, so one can expect the appearance of American “first strike” missiles in Europe. Or somewhere else. As for hypersonic weapons, only the Russian Federation is now announcing the early entry into service of such missiles. But another 30-40 years will pass - and this kind of ammunition will cease to be a novelty and will be widely used. Scientific and technological progress cannot be stopped.

And there are questions to the near space. He, unlike airspace, is nothing, and what happens if someone wants to deploy a squad of spacecraft in the advanced version of the X-37 in low Earth orbits?


The American spaceship has already shown its ability to "hang out" in orbit for many months and return to earth. The combination of such a spaceplane with hypersonic weapons will be almost the ideal means of the first strike, which can be suddenly delivered during the passage of the spacecraft in orbit over enemy territory. Well, yes, there were some kind of treaties on non-proliferation of the arms race in space, but who would they stop? The INF Treaty was here too ...

That is, today the Strategic Missile Forces fully guarantee nuclear retaliation "to anyone who encroaches." But years so through 40 everything can radically change. And, abandoning the SSBN now, we run the risk of getting into a situation where by the time we completely lose any experience in the construction and operation of submarine missile carriers, the creation and maintenance of sea-based ICBMs, they will be the only way to preserve our strategic nuclear potential from " disarming "strike.

Here, of course, we can recall alternative means of delivery of nuclear weapons to the territory of a potential aggressor. That's right - the light did not converge on ballistic missiles, because you can create non-ballistic hypersonic missiles, or cruise missiles with a nuclear engine, or something else like that. But there are nuances. Under no circumstances will we put our strategic nuclear forces into orbit (unrealistic for technical and a number of other reasons), and any types of missiles placed on land can become the object of a disarming strike, it does not matter whether they are ballistic or not. So in a situation where any point of our immense Homeland may be under the gun of hypersonic weapons (and, God forbid, placed in outer space), only the SSBN can provide some real guarantees of the safety of the strategic nuclear forces.


The second reason, it’s also the main


This is a human factor. An attentive reader has probably noticed one feature of this article. The author took the liberty of asserting that with the existing technologies, the SSBNs are not the optimal means of conducting nuclear war on a “cost / effectiveness” scale. But the author did not mention a word that the main task of our strategic nuclear forces is not to lead, but to prevent a nuclear war.

The thing is that there is only one reason why Armageddon can erupt. This is a human error. There are no and cannot be winners in a nuclear war, but if suddenly someone mistakenly decides that it is still possible to win it ...

Professional military personnel (with the exception of some psychopathological cases) will always sensibly assess the consequences of a nuclear conflict. But they do not decide on the outbreak of war - this is the prerogative of politicians. And among them very different people come across.

Let us recall, for example, Saakashvili, who authorized the attack on Ossetia in 2008. He seriously believed that his small, but NATO-trained troops, if something happened, would easily deal with “these rusty Russians tanks". The reality of the war “08.08.08” turned out to be infinitely far from the ideas of the Georgian president, but would this really return the dead Russian and Ossetian citizens? But in fact, their deaths were the result of Saakashvili’s grossest error in assessing the combat potential of the Georgian and Russian armed forces.

Yes, of course, we can say that Saakashvili was an extremely odious politician, but ... Alas, the capitalist world does not need thinking people, but consumers: but the decline in the quality of education, “public IQ”, if you like, cannot but reflect on those in power. And we are no longer surprised when there is a threat from the high stands of the White House to send the 6 fleet to the shores of Belarus (for foreign readers - a landlocked country). Frankly, the author is not easy to imagine a similar blunder in the performance of the administration of the same R. Reagan. And it would be okay, it was a random reservation, but Jen Psaki won the sincere love of our fellow citizens, amusing us with such maxims almost weekly. What about Donald Trump? His statement that the United States is not obligated to help the Kurds, “because the Kurds did not help the United States in World War II, including the landing in Normandy,” is essentially absurd, but even if we assume that it was such a joke, then it admittedly completely inappropriate. And we hear more and more such frankly stupid remarks from American and European politicians ...

But mistakes are made even by the most intelligent people. Hitler and Napoleon should be reproached in many ways, but they were not fools for sure. Nevertheless, the first tragically underestimated the economic and military potential of the USSR and the will of the Soviet people, and the second did not think at all that the threat of the capture of Moscow might not force Alexander to end the war ... It seems to be not such difficult questions to understand, but not the “great Fuhrer ”, nor the truly great emperor of the French could handle them. And if even the smartest are mistaken, then what about the current American and European establishment?

And the premise of error in assessing the consequences of Armageddon exists today.

In the USA and in the West, the basis of nuclear forces is precisely the SSBN submarines, an analogue of our SSBNs. The explanation is very simple - invulnerability to a preemptive strike. Given NATO’s dominance at sea, this is certainly correct. And such reasoning has long become a common place understood by American and European taxpayers. It, in fact, has become a dogma. But such thoughts can lead to a simple mistake of perception: “We have SSBNs and our strategic nuclear forces are invulnerable. (It's right). But the Russians abandoned their SSBNs, which means their nuclear arsenal is vulnerable (but this is already a mistake!). ”

On the other hand, the Americans are constantly looking for ways to neutralize our strategic nuclear forces - hence all these theories of the "disarming" strike and so on. Means for such a strike are high-tech and expensive and are a tidbit for the defense industry. So it is not surprising that the lobby, “pushing” the adoption of such systems, with its advertising will create an advertising image of super-rockets that can effortlessly destroy the Russian nuclear potential ... And something terrible can happen - someone will believe in it.

So, the presence of a Russian SSBN triad will never allow such an error to happen. “We have invulnerable SSBNs, Russians have invulnerable SSBNs, well, let everything remain as it is.”

In other words, the SSBN is certainly not the most economical means of waging a global nuclear missile war. But at the same time, naval strategic nuclear forces are the most important tool for its prevention. So, the Russian Navy cannot abandon the SSBN - we will proceed from this axiom in our plans for the construction of the Russian Navy.

To be continued ...
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  1. xomaNN 13 November 2019 18: 15 New
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    +14
    To me, as a "naval", albeit a reserve officer, SSBNs seem to be a more formidable weapon than to the author. The truth, of course, is in the middle. The concept of "! Nuclear triad" is not an empty phrase! Each side of this shamrock has pros and cons. And only synergia allows you to create a truly effective "Homeland Shield" am
  2. Sapsan136 13 November 2019 18: 16 New
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    Ground mines are known to the enemy, who has their coordinates, so they are vulnerable ... Wheeled platform mobility is not great, and the RF has no BZHRK today ... So comparing APS with land-based stationary mines is simply stupid ... A nuclear submarine is more mobile, which means they are more likely to survive
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 13 November 2019 19: 29 New
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      +7
      Quote: Sapsan136
      Mobility of wheeled platforms is not great

      It is quite sufficient, given that the Americans simply have nowhere to know where they are now.
      Quote: Sapsan136
      So comparing APS with land-based stationary mines is simply stupid ...

      Thanks. But there is nothing stupid here at all - we are comparing different means of achieving one goal.
      1. Sapsan136 13 November 2019 20: 18 New
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        Do not underestimate the intelligence of the United States and Bandera and Basmachi who have come to the Russian Federation, who will gladly six and will be the United States against the Russian Federation ... Mobility of wheeled complexes is usually about 50 km, this is not a lot ... It is stupid to compare wheeled installations with nuclear submarines, with the BZHRK it would still be possible, but not with wheels ... for heaven and earth in mobility
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 13 November 2019 20: 42 New
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          Quote: Sapsan136
          The mobility of wheel complexes is usually about 50 km, this is not a lot ..

          It is not just thick, it is super thick. Can you imagine how many warheads of the megaton class you need to sow a circle with a radius of 50 km in order to guarantee the killing of mobile launchers?
          Quote: Sapsan136
          It’s silly to compare wheeled units with nuclear submarines

          Well stupid, so stupid :)))
          1. Sapsan136 13 November 2019 22: 32 New
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            On the contrary ... I imagine how several Bandera, Basmachi, or NATO special forces will illuminate your wheeled launchers for their Tomahawks .... In Iraq, the Yankees commanding the airborne tactical missile launchers of Iraq confidently illuminated their aircraft
            1. Alex_59 14 November 2019 09: 11 New
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              Quote: Sapsan136
              I imagine how several Bandera, Basmachi or NATO special forces will illuminate your wheeled launchers for their Tomahawks ...

              Nothing prevents you from playing such a basmach right now. Try to come to the position area and find in the taiga PGRK in the field position. Good luck to you. I, as a person living in the habitats of all this technology, guarantee - you will not even come close to the desired object.
              1. arkadiyssk 14 November 2019 18: 52 New
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                What taiga? If that is the story of the Ivanovo region and the Moscow region "mushroom pickers". This is only 200 km from the capital. But yes, the spy will not mow under the mushroom picker. And the Strategic Missile Forces are not fools, they are sitting under the Moscow umbrella of the ABM in the form of A-135.
                1. Alex_59 15 November 2019 07: 08 New
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                  +1
                  Quote: arkadiyssk
                  What taiga?

                  Ural.
                  Quote: arkadiyssk
                  and the Strategic Missile Forces are not fools, they are sitting under the Moscow umbrella PRO in the form of A-135.
                  All Strategic Missile Forces are sitting in the suburbs? Hmm ...
            2. Alexey LK 14 November 2019 17: 16 New
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              And what, the Iraqi Scuds did not take off?
              1. Fan-fan 15 November 2019 18: 15 New
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                Some did not take off, and precisely because of the actions of sabotage groups. Look on the net, there is information about this, I read.
                1. Alexey LK 16 November 2019 03: 58 New
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                  Quote: Fan-Fan
                  Some didn’t take off

                  "Some" is just an indication that this is not serious.
          2. Vladimir_2U 14 November 2019 05: 46 New
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            Of course it’s stupid, does the submarine have wheels? Not! The same one! )))
        2. Alex_59 14 November 2019 09: 17 New
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          Quote: Sapsan136
          The mobility of wheel complexes is usually about 50 km, this is not a lot ...

          In this area, which is 50 km in radius, you just won’t get there, and if you get there you will be looking for the desired object for more than one day. And when you find it, it’s not a fact that it will not be a false object. And at the same time, all the time you will be discreetly on the "whoever needs" sight. There are ears and eyes in the forest. In those forests of eyes and ears are especially many. It is in peacetime. In the military - you just get shot at the entrance to the forest.
          1. 2 Level Advisor 15 November 2019 17: 00 New
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            Well, do not overdo it, Alex. the division’s positional area is not so protected, I just served in the PGRK in the Urals .. in any case, there are no traps and posts on every kilometer in the forest, and in principle 250 sq. km. it’s hard to guard the dense forest .. therefore, when the division enters the field position, a lot of security measures take place along the route of the movement .. but the fact that the training positions are usually just 2-3 is true, but no one knows combat positions, they will come out of them during the war. .
    2. YOUR 14 November 2019 03: 57 New
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      The article is written correctly. Ground nuclear forces are located so that the flight time will be at least half an hour for ballistic missiles. So there will be no unrequited blow. And this is the main reason for their silence.
      1. Cyrus 16 November 2019 10: 14 New
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        And about the fact that the US SSBNs are on duty in the Mediterranean, that in the Black, Baltic, Norwegian, Japanese, Swedish ports graze Berks with 92 cells for vigorous tomahawks, we bashfully forget? The fact that the enemy’s nuclear submarines graze in our “bastions” is also silent, at the same time we will forget about the patrol areas of the British nuclear submarines, right?
        And if there is no threatened period, and so on Sunday went to bed, and woke up on Monday from the sounds of sirens, then a hundred then we will say, who to complain?
        1. YOUR 16 November 2019 10: 55 New
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          We have both the one and the third.
    3. Rostislav Prokopenko 14 November 2019 11: 05 New
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      But geography ... the Baltic Fleet is surrounded by NATO, especially the Black Sea Fleet, the Pacific Fleet is next to the Japanese (read the Americans), and the North is not easy to reach the operational space.
      So the whole article is correct. And the last two paragraphs are also correct. So far, you have to spend money on the SSBN.
      1. Cyrus 16 November 2019 09: 12 New
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        No, it’s not right; recently, for some reason, it is customary to catastrophically underestimate the enemy, and this is one way to nowhere.
  3. Atlant-1164 13 November 2019 18: 17 New
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    To be honest .. I expected that it would be interesting-cognitive article. but the topic "Marine strategic nuclear forces: weighed the pros and cons" is not disclosed
    - the author is no offense. just expecting a "delicious" reading.
    Like for your work.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 13 November 2019 19: 30 New
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      Quote: Atlant-1164
      To be honest .. I expected that it would be interesting-cognitive article. but the topic "Marine strategic nuclear forces: weighed the pros and cons" is not disclosed

      And what exactly is not disclosed? :)))
      1. Polinom 15 November 2019 17: 17 New
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        Andrey, excuse me. Timokhin sharply increased the quality of articles (except the last). You have acc. decreased. . It is possible on points, but I will not. Just need to rewrite up to 70% of the article.
        I began to read, the Operator thought wrote.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 November 2019 18: 53 New
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          You need, you rewrite :) And without a “punctual” analysis, criticism does not make sense
          1. Polinom 19 November 2019 14: 39 New
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            So I’m out of luck)))
    2. Avior 13 November 2019 21: 00 New
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      Actually, this is only the first part of the article, it is written below that the continuation follows.
      Knowing the style of the author, there is no doubt that the topic will be revealed and even chewed.
      I remember that I myself somehow argued on a bottle of tequila, how many more articles will be in the cycle about the cruiser Varyag- and argued, they exceeded two dozen.
      Be patient, the author has so far analyzed in detail only the need for the marine component of the strategic nuclear forces.
      And I don’t understand how he missed a chance to consider the possibility of placing strategic nuclear forces on the NK smile
      And there was such a chance! smile
      1. mik193 14 November 2019 10: 51 New
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        As for the deployment of strategic nuclear forces on the NK, type in the search engine the “Scorpio project”, I think you will be interested. I can’t reset the article ...
      2. Nemchinov Vl 17 November 2019 15: 39 New
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        Quote: Avior
        I remember I argued with myself on a bottle of tequila, how many more articles will be in the cruiser series
        beautiful, a win-win option .. you like for the dispute strategy !!!
        1. illi 17 November 2019 16: 28 New
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          Exactly a win-win and no-win option. However, if you drink the hunt, then it is the same. Although no, here we need a shorter strategy, until Friday))
        2. Avior 18 November 2019 00: 10 New
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          One of the best debate I have won. smile
  4. Amateur 13 November 2019 18: 22 New
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    The author took the liberty of asserting that with the existing technologies, the SSBNs are not the optimal means of conducting nuclear war on a “cost / effectiveness” scale.

    Any nuclear war will lead to a simple arithmetic operation: "everyone will multiply by zero."
  5. Vladimir1155 13 November 2019 18: 22 New
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    in general, dear Andrei from Chelyabinsk correctly noticed everything, we need more submarines, and we need to strengthen the base of nuclear submarines, SF and Kamchatka, taking all 1155 without exception, frigate corvettes, cruisers, set up more minesweepers and coastal aviation, and abandon meaningless UDCs, battleship destroyers and Kuzyu sell to China or India
    1. Nemchinov Vl 17 November 2019 15: 43 New
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      Quote: vladimir1155
      and Kuzyu to sell to China or India
      and so they sold almost all of their homeland ... Leave at least Kuzyu - he is dear to me, at least as a monument :)
      1. Vladimir1155 17 November 2019 16: 30 New
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        Quote: Nemchinov Vl
        expensive, at least as a monument :)
        too expensive a pleasure for a monument
        1. Nemchinov Vl 17 November 2019 16: 41 New
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          Quote: vladimir1155
          too expensive a pleasure for a monument
          well so-so argument, because if -
          Quote: vladimir1155
          ... and Kuzyu to sell to China ...
          then arm a potential potential rival / opponent (as you please) for myself at times more expensive ... !!
          1. Vladimir1155 17 November 2019 22: 06 New
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            "The final cost was agreed upon during a visit to Moscow by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to Moscow in early December 2009. As a result, India agreed to pay Russia $ 2,34 billion for the conversion of Admiral Gorshkov TAKR into the Vikramaditya aircraft carrier." and Kuzya will be more expensive, $ 3 billion. But I love Borea ....
            SSBN project 955 "Borey"
            Autonomy of swimming 90 days
            Crew 107 people, including 55 officers
            The cost of $ 433 million, 23 billion rubles


            operating costs 800 people for 7 nuclear submarines, or 3000 suicide bombers on a single-rocket drowned mine with a clumsy vessel that does not even have a dock for repair .....

            total ..... 7 (seven Boreevs) ...... !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! That would not be senseless vanity, but the real pride of the country, capable of hitting any aggressor no matter who he is or where he is
            1. Nemchinov Vl 17 November 2019 22: 41 New
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              Quote: vladimir1155
              total ..... 7 (seven Boreans) ...... !! That would not be senseless vanity, but the real pride of the country, capable of hitting any aggressor no matter who he is or where he is
              You are not a maniac for an hour, Vladimir ?!
              1. Nemchinov Vl 17 November 2019 22: 52 New
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                Well, God be with him, with the administrator ..
              2. Vladimir1155 18 November 2019 00: 02 New
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                is this your only argument in the dispute? ..... well, well ... weak and you lack logic .....
                1. Nemchinov Vl 18 November 2019 00: 52 New
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                  Quote: vladimir1155
                  Is this your only argument in the dispute ?.
                  Yes, I did not argue with you that you ?! I just asked you a question -
                  Quote: Nemchinov Vl
                  You are not a maniac for an hour, Vladimir ?!
                  and this is because the arguments in the series - "The whole world is in dust !!", it's hard for me to equate to -
                  Quote: vladimir1155
                  your only argument in the argument
                  ... exactly how - ARGUMENT !! Well then, I'm a savage, do not pay much attention ...
  6. NordOst16 13 November 2019 18: 34 New
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    It is very interesting how the author sees the future development of our fleet and would like him to take into account not only the ship's composition, but also the aviation component.
    Personally, I believe that the Russian Federation will not be able to build an ocean fleet until it solves the problem of low economic growth and the relatively small (compared with the United States and China) amount of available funds that the state can allocate not only to the budget of the Moscow Region, but also to education and science. And not only because, as it seems to me, the state of the army is one of the indicators of the technological and economic development of the state.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 13 November 2019 20: 42 New
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      Quote: NordOst16
      It is very interesting how the author sees the future development of our fleet and would like him to take into account not only the ship's composition, but also the aviation component.

      And where without her? :)
      1. NordOst16 13 November 2019 21: 13 New
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        As you wrote at the beginning, a series of articles on Building a Fleet impressed me very much. As before, a series of articles about the situation of the Russian fleet at the moment (a very sad truth).
        It always seemed to me that the fleet should play a big role in the life of the Russian state and without it we would be a regional power.
        As for the SSBNs, I believe that their basing in bastions is the result of the problems of bringing the submarine into the open ocean and ensuring its stability. Here, it seems to me, one of the few ways out is to create base bases abroad and deploy forces there to cover them, but this requires the maintenance of a large number of forces abroad, but, on the other hand, allows you to project force there.

        Well, it also seems to me that several AUGs are necessary for the Russian Federation, but this is impossible due to the small amount of funds and the lack of technical and scientific capabilities (((
  7. dgonni 13 November 2019 18: 35 New
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    Nda! No comments: *
  8. ser56 13 November 2019 18: 46 New
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    "So, the Russian Navy cannot abandon the SSBN - we will proceed from this axiom in our plans for the construction of the Russian Navy."
    Alas, the author started the article well (I myself wrote a close commentary - this is not an implication for the author, just a statement hi ), but ended up weird ... bully There are suspicions why, I will not voice it ... wink
    I liked the author’s calculations about the required strength of forces for the destruction of our mine and mobile missiles, it’s a pity that the author didn’t notice new trends - reducing the power of U.S. nuclear warheads to CT units - such a NSC will not just hit the mine, especially if there are false targets, suppress GPS and actively interfere in all ranges (electronic warfare, aerosols). hi The author also ignored the question of railway complexes that can be based in Siberian ranges - on the same BAM ... crying
    I will add arguments regarding the need for an SSBN:
    1) The SSBN can be suddenly and secretly destroyed by an adversary who can disguise this as an accident - several nuclear submarines and diesel-electric submarines have already died.
    Based on the fact that in reality we can have no more than 1 carriers on the BS at the theater (SF and Pacific Fleet), then this is 50% request
    2) Construction of the SSBN distracts the finances of the state and industrial forces from the construction of strike nuclear submarines - instead of 10 * 955 / 955A and 7-8 * 885 projects, it was quite possible to have 18 last .... and this is already a serious force at sea .... request
    3) The construction of the SSBN distracts the forces of the fleet, including The submarine, on the defense of positional areas, in other words, the fleet has a defensive focus - with the abandonment of the SSBN, the capabilities of the Russian Navy to war far from its coast sharply increase.
    Now about the author’s arguments for the SSBN:
    1) Loss of compensation is an extremely controversial argument - we will continue the construction of nuclear submarines, and wait for 40 for years until someone comes up with something, after which they will urgently need an SSBN that looks quite comical ... request And if in 40 years they come up with, for example, mobile neutrino reactor sensors? hi
    2) A strike from space is quite real - but protection against it differs only slightly from protection from a strike by hypersonic NFCs, so the argument is not very, the problem is already being solved at C-500 and more ... request
    3) Impact of the INF Treaty - see paragraph 2. I would add that protecting the mines at the last frontier (1-2 km, which is quite enough for their survival) is noticeably simpler - no need to look for nuclear warheads - it flies itself ... The threat of China is far-fetched - not their mentality ...
    4) Protection from fools in power - alas, this problem has no solution - see Gorby! Let's just say - the fear of our missiles must be brought up with partners constantly! bully In my opinion, it’s wise to partially return to the powerful missiles the superstrong NWF (27МТ) and publish, for example, in a series of programs on RT, the zones of their impact on the territory of partners ... Let them think ...
    But in general - to the author a renegade for a good article! drinks
    1. Avior 13 November 2019 21: 05 New
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      . I didn’t notice any new trends - a decrease in the power of US NSC to units of CT - such NPS will not just hit the mine, especially if there are false targets, suppress GPS and active interference in all ranges (electronic warfare, aerosols).

      The Americans received low-power warheads on SLBMs in some small quantities for limited point-strike strikes, in fact in exchange for tactical nuclear weapons.
      This will not affect the vast number of SLBM warheads.
      And you won’t take away any EW or an aerosol SLBM warhead from the target, it’s also ballistic
    2. illi 13 November 2019 21: 27 New
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      I agree with you. The author’s arguments FOR look taut. Well, like, white people have it like that and we need it that way. Some kind of Kargokult.
      And we need to see what works better in our realities. The same BZHRK on a modern base would be much more efficient and cheaper. And a couple of the same orbital planes (purely for research purposes) would have made Americans think much more seriously than having an SSBN.
      Well, competencies are controversial in the nuclear fleet, we will remain competent, there are still multi-purpose submarines and icebreakers. And the fact that it is possible to forget how to build the SSBN so what? We forgot how to build armadillos, but we need it. But you can redirect the saved money to new technologies, orbital planes to the same planes, and since the time of the snowstorm we completely abandoned this topic.
      1. Alexey RA 14 November 2019 19: 04 New
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        Quote: illi
        The same BZHRK on a modern base would be much more efficient and cheaper.

        The BZHRK has a problem - they are tied to the network of Russian Railways, and their movement is regulated by the automated control system of Russian Railways.
        This is the same as forcing the SSBN to patrol with the AIS turned on and only on certain routes.
        1. illi 14 November 2019 19: 30 New
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          Well, with appropriate secrecy in the patrimony of the Russian Railways, this is not a problem at all. In any case, the enemy on our territory has no means to track them. How does this happen with the SSBN
          1. Alexey RA 14 November 2019 20: 00 New
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            Quote: illi
            Well, with appropriate secrecy in the patrimony of the Russian Railways, this is not a problem at all. In any case, the enemy on our territory has no means to track them.

            All that is needed is access to the ACS at the road level.
            1. ser56 15 November 2019 12: 18 New
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              Quote: Alexey RA
              All that is needed is access to the ACS at the road level.

              how do you find out the legendary trains? hi
            2. Fan-fan 15 November 2019 18: 23 New
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              Is it possible to find out from this ACS at what point and at what time the BZHRK will be? I’ll answer myself - you can’t. Therefore, BZHRK needed.
            3. illi 17 November 2019 16: 18 New
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              Well, if in the ACS it will be written in capital letters that there is a BZHRK. That of course everything was gone. But I think it's not a problem to make them in ACS indistinguishable from goods
    3. Alexey LK 14 November 2019 17: 37 New
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      Quote: ser56
      2) Construction of the SSBN distracts the finances of the state and industrial forces from the construction of strike nuclear submarines - instead of 10 * 955 / 955A and 7-8 * 885 projects, it was quite possible to have 18 last .... and this is already a serious force at sea ....

      And what, the 885 is much cheaper than the 955? And how does the proposed solve the problems of basing and access to the ocean? Strength at sea ... - against naval targets - yes, of course, but what does the strategy have to do with it? How can improved capabilities to destroy naval targets help prevent a nuclear war? After all, even 36 Ash-trees would not be enough for a guaranteed proactive destruction of enemy SSBNs, not to mention the fact that there is almost no sense in preventive destruction ...
      1. ser56 15 November 2019 12: 21 New
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        Quote: Alexey LK
        And what, the 885 is much cheaper than the 955?

        1) noticeably - they are without rockets
        2) they would be INSTEAD ...
        Quote: Alexey LK
        And how does the proposed solve the problems of basing and access to the ocean?

        bets will be different - it’s one thing to defend strategic nuclear submarines, another thing is ordinary, tactical ... request
        hence a different outfit of forces ...
        Quote: Alexey LK
        Yes, of course, but what does the strategy have to do with it?

        strike on enemy communications, fetter action of his fleet hi
        Quote: Alexey LK
        After all, even 36 Ash-trees would not be enough for a guaranteed proactive destruction of enemy SSBNs,

        Do you want to attack the USA? What for?
        1. Alexey LK 16 November 2019 03: 16 New
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          Quote: ser56
          strike on enemy communications, fetter action of his fleet

          It will be later if someone survives. I mean the first hour of the war.
          Quote: ser56
          Do you want to attack the USA? What for?

          No, I do not want to attack, but it was a retaliatory strike. Wouldn't the strategic boats of the attacking enemy be the priority targets for such a strike? There was a proposal - instead of the 955 th 885 th, i.e. if ICBMs from under the water cannot respond in the oncoming strike (because they will not be in the proposed version), then we would have to answer with what we have - isn’t that so? Of course, their missiles could already have been shot in their first strike - but we certainly would not know that ...
          1. ser56 19 November 2019 14: 19 New
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            Quote: Alexey LK
            I mean the first hour of the war.

            it is important not to allow war, but for this to have different forces ... request
            Quote: Alexey LK
            Wouldn't the strategic boats of the attacking enemy be the priority targets for such a strike?

            it means you have to drive your boat behind from a strategist, and his shock protects him ... they have more of them, obviously pointless .... request Understand that you can’t play by their rules ....
            Quote: Alexey LK
            we can answer in the opposite shot

            on the BS there will be no more than 2 SSBNs ... request Not the fact that we’ll cover them from the hunters ...
      2. Cyrus 16 November 2019 10: 18 New
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        Likely that the fleet will ensure the deployment of SSBNs in those areas from where the flight time will be less than or equal to the time it takes to make a decision about the strike this time. It is also likely that it will supplant or greatly complicate similar operations of the enemy fleet.
  9. looker-on 13 November 2019 18: 59 New
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    Andrey, you don’t want to enter politics? I would vote for you (not sarcasm)
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 13 November 2019 20: 48 New
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      Quote: looker-on
      Andrey, you do not want to enter politics?

      No, I don’t have so much money :)))) and, frankly, with my programs I’ll be removed on a formal basis in any election, even in the city council :)))))
  10. mark1 13 November 2019 19: 06 New
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    Thus, the only at least somewhat relevant option to destroy the Russian strategic missile forces before they are used is a nuclear missile strike at the ICBM locations of the Russian Federation. In this case, the Americans can hope that in those tens of minutes while the rockets fly, our leadership will not have time to figure out what's what and will not be able to issue a retaliation order.

    What dozens of minutes? What does subsonic KR have to do with it? And the refusal of the DRMSD is this what? The Baltic countries and Nezalezhnaya are excellent sites. What about hypersound? he is gone now. but he will be tomorrow. We also do not have a buffer in the form of ATS. And why are B-2 and B-21 created? Is the author lingering in the past? And what is this non-nuclear war
    with a first-class economic and military power
    ?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 13 November 2019 19: 26 New
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      Quote: mark1
      What dozens of minutes? What does subsonic KR have to do with it? And the refusal of the DRMSD is this what? The Baltic countries and Nezalezhnaya are excellent sites. What about hypersound? he is gone now. but he will be tomorrow.

      Not overpowered the article, and rushed to scribble an angry comment? Read to the end :)))) Specifically, this paragraph
      But the situation can change dramatically with the proliferation of high-precision medium-range ballistic missiles (BRRS) and non-ballistic hypersonic missiles deployed, for example, in the same China. Which, generally speaking, today is slowly preparing to declare itself not only as an economic, but also as a political superpower, and which is located much closer to us than the United States itself. And the flight time of Chinese missiles to our mines, if that happens, will be much less. President of the United States D. Trump has refused the INF Treaty, so one can expect the appearance of American “first strike” missiles in Europe. Or somewhere else. As for hypersonic weapons, only the Russian Federation is now announcing the early entry into service of such missiles. But another 30-40 years will pass - and this kind of ammunition will cease to be a novelty and will be widely used.
      1. mark1 13 November 2019 19: 44 New
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        I confess I didn’t read it a bit ... It’s very intricately written, and as I understand it, the conclusions in the article have not yet been made. But 30-40 years is a lot - 5 years ie now. And yet, Andrei, you yourself perfectly understand the need for a triad (the approach and space-based part of the strategic nuclear forces). And the classification of probable conflicts is not indisputable.
    2. Avior 13 November 2019 21: 06 New
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      You have not read to the end, it seems.
  11. Dart2027 13 November 2019 19: 29 New
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    Secondly ... for a long time there was a belief that our powers that be, with their overseas villas and billions in bank accounts, simply would not dare to press a button. Today we can already guarantee that we will make up our minds: the Americans and Europeans, using the example of Slobodan Milosevic, Saddam Hussein, Muammar Gaddafi, have clearly shown how they will deal with rulers of other countries that they do not like. That is, they perfectly explained to the Russian "powers that be" that they would not succeed in escaping and living out their lives in the Bahamas under any circumstances. And if a full-scale nuclear missile strike is launched in our country, or if a non-nuclear invasion of obviously superior forces occurs, then our "top" will in any case be doomed. She understands this, so that our “owners of factories, newspapers, ships” will not have any fluctuations in terms of retaliation.
    For once, an author was found who looks sensibly at life, and even the reasoning that "Putin annexed Crimea because he was ordered from the United States" will not even make people laugh.
  12. Knell wardenheart 13 November 2019 20: 06 New
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    1) Our country is overly obsessed with the clichéd thinking of the Cold War like “Superpower”, “Containment”, “Guaranteed destruction”, “assessment of the American strategy,” etc.
    You need to understand that Uncle Sam is a big cunning and dodger - and where we see a wall impenetrable by a Bosko - Uncle Sam sees not an “impenetrable wall” but a certain object that can be circumvented, dug up, loosened, and not just punched. This must be understood - and all of our calculations about the comparison of potentials and guaranteed containment can turn out to be a grandmother's nonsense if they quickly and suddenly place an orbital missile defense.
    And as I don’t pretend - and they not only CAN DO it, it is also the surest way for them to level our nuclear hemorrhoids and unlikely actions. They have the experience of sewing white thread out of many years of "international" treaties. The experience of chewing their allies is. They also have experience in gradual developments in a certain (related) field, the technologies necessary to implement an effective final solution (yes, at least their recent feint with ears with medium-short-range missiles).
    Given our increasing international technological isolation - in the case of such a scenario - we may suddenly find ourselves in a much less advantageous strategic configuration - when the whole canvas will push us to aggressive and first actions - or as an alternative to this - to an arms race, for which we are clearly not in shape.
    If we assume that it is our gradual pushing into such a configuration that is the ultimate interest of the US actions, then much becomes clear.
    At one time, like this, "to the noise" of the rout of the next demon — they entered Europe in the First World War. They turned the same game into World War II. They turned similar motives for aggressive and cultural discredit from the USSR in the final segment of the Cold War.
    Can crank it up again? They can.
    2) With regard to maintaining the nuclear triad - and all of these Poseidons, etc. - we are trying to get the United States to increase defense spending through the creation of diverse sources of threats, various kinds of point patterns, etc. We proceed from the fact that the "filling" of their watered. every time the system sees an “absolute threat” it raises a fierce howl and floods it all with dollars. Here our plan is understandable and even logical - at one time they themselves also “brought” us with their SDI. However, the strategic configuration, the tight economic gap and the technological one poses a real threat to us that at one moment the American hysteria will stop and they will sit down and figure out how they can do (sometimes). And at this moment, our configuration may look more like a bogeyman than a means for Doomsday.
    3) I agree with the author on the need to preserve the underwater components of support nat. security. However, do we have a real (non-mythical) idea of ​​how (and because of what) NATO will attack us, how this very nuclear end of the world will happen (for the sake of which we have over_doched weapons that are no longer suitable for anything) - here I have big doubts.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 13 November 2019 20: 44 New
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      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      if they quickly and suddenly place an orbital missile defense.

      It's technically impossible for years to come so 60-70 minimum, but rather longer
      1. illi 13 November 2019 21: 48 New
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        Why would it suddenly be impossible. IMHO it is possible now. Just a mega-expensive. Here, as they say, you need to take money from someone. At the same fleet, cut down the Fords and Berks.
      2. Knell wardenheart 13 November 2019 21: 58 New
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        If we argue in the plane of the problem, we come to the conclusion that America’s defensive response to our hypersound is the development of interceptors with twice the speed (and at the same time smaller size), a more advanced detection-targeting technique. The good range of such interceptors — multiplies their cost / size, which, coupled with the size necessary for covering the territory — translates into utterly fierce spending on the Americans ’“ classic ”response to our missile threat. With a reduction in the size of interceptors - they have to spend more on the information component, carriers - in the end, this still translates into extremely substantial costs to counter our threat "on land and sea." This is the arithmetic of the "classical" solution - in my opinion. The arithmetic is “non-classical” - when separately developed technologies for cheap and reliable output of massive loads into orbit (reusable heavy / superheavy rockets, mass launch technologies of small satellites - these technologies are now American leaders or go for it). The technology of creating high-precision missiles with a kinetic type of interception (compactness, reliance on accuracy, different guidance heads) - in these technologies, Americans also lead / go to this. Conceptual study of missile defense systems - Americans, like us, have a solid theoretical and engineering backlog in this area. Finally - our reliance to a large extent on missiles with homing missiles, with participation in nuclear-weapon limitation treaties - this gives Americans hypothetical information about the approximate number of our carriers - and in orbit would allow them to control not the “presence of a platform” (which can be inflated or disguised ) or a fraudulent warhead - and the immediate "root of the threat", and therefore not to waste resources on detection and defeat.
        Just as the development of modern nuclear weapons occurs through calculations and studies of individual elements, the use of computing power (in which the United States is one of the leaders) allows us to develop a viable concept in real tests of only its individual nodes (what could be the modifications of rockets, satellite details, the same mini the shuttle that flew in orbit for a couple of years). At the right time, for a fairly short time — we run the risk of encountering the same “unexpected person” that our Vanguard or Poseidon was for our overseas friends.

        I admit that all this is a technologically difficult task, but I hope you understand that at some point a similar solution may become the most economical, unexpected and effective for the United States. And I have no doubt about the ability to implement this, with their budget ..
        1. Knell wardenheart 13 November 2019 22: 12 New
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          Most of our nuclear strategy is betting on fast "thick" missiles, and the thesis that their launch will be difficult to detect / react to it until the separation and the start of maneuvering the "filling". This thesis has grown so much that chopping it under the root in one way or another - the enemy would achieve an overwhelming advantage - what would we cover? Our strategic aviation component? In our country, let’s say frankly, the most perfect of three.
        2. Nemchinov Vl 17 November 2019 16: 13 New
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          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          when separately developed technologies for cheap and reliable output of massive loads into orbit (reusable heavy / superheavy rockets, technologies for mass launch of small satellites -
          such as with SOI, yes ?! But at the Scientific Research Institute of the Russian Academy of Sciences, even under the USSR, scientists managed to figure out that this US BLUF, relatively easily and cheaply by the "controllers" satellites, under the guise of "research" (located nearby, in orbit, and armed, even with an ordinary machine gun), is utilized literally in minutes (in one of the books of M. Kalashnikov, you will find in more detail) !!! Only Gorbachev did not listen to the arguments (and calculations) of scientists of the RAS ...
          For this reason -
          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          I admit that all this is a technologically difficult task, but I hope you understand that at some point a similar decision may become the most economical, unexpected and effective for the USA.

          - Well, this is unlikely ... especially from words, - economical, unexpected and effective
      3. Cyrus 16 November 2019 13: 59 New
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        And you, as I understand it, in the course of all the novelties of the Pentagon and the fillings of all their satellites?)
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 16 November 2019 19: 17 New
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          Quote: Cyrus
          And you, as I understand it, in the course of all the novelties of the Pentagon and the fillings of all their satellites?)

          This is not necessary, it is enough to be a little at odds with common sense and have a minimal understanding of the topic of space weapons. All:)))
          In general, it’s enough to remember that the United States didn’t extend the network of reconnaissance satellites alone, capable of delivering missile defense to a target anywhere in the world within an hour (you will need much more efficient systems for SDI) - it's too expensive. On the deployment of combat satellites in geostationary orbits, there can be no talk in principle - the same USA has nothing to do with this. Starting at launch vehicles with acceptable payloads
    2. Alexey LK 14 November 2019 17: 50 New
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      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      and they sit down, count how they can do (sometimes)

      They always think - and yes, they know how. That is why they are now clutching their heads.
      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
      1) Our country is too fixated on the clichéd thinking of the Cold War

      Judging by your words, someone else is fixated on this.
      1. Knell wardenheart 14 November 2019 19: 32 New
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        Thinking of HV does not mean thinking of “opposition”. Confrontation has always been one empire, another. The Cold War gave us a specific habit of symmetrical confrontation - albeit not in letter, but in spirit. This means that for certain ostentatious measures, we are highly likely to choose the most straightforward counter-measures, and expect our opponent to think in the same plane. We proceed from the idea that we are still a superpower, capable and having some unshakable right to speak on equal terms with the United States - and in the context of this view (of doubtful fidelity then), often our measures and expectations (measures from the enemy ) are more likely to be a political confrontation, everyone moving away (on our side) from the realities of war - where TREASURE and SUDDENNESS often rule a ball over power.
        The Americans, too, are fixated on the ХВ in their own way, but they have left the political view of military planning - for them we are just an enemy and they are looking for ways to neutralize our threat (not necessarily now, but at the right time for them), but not supporting what something like a mythical balance of power or ability parity, or extracting political dividends in some complex global game (as we like to imagine).
        1. Alexey LK 14 November 2019 21: 06 New
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          Quote: Knell Wardenheart
          some complex global game (as we like to imagine).

          Those. do you think there is no complicated global game? It seems to me that you understand the situation somewhat superficially. In the world there are specific power groups in different states, and using the resources of these states available to them, they pursue their specific interests, often passing them off as the interests of the population of these states. These groups send each other specific signals, which are accompanied by information foam, sometimes structured into a scientific form. You are trying to analyze this foam, taking it for a real "game".
          1. Knell wardenheart 15 November 2019 00: 34 New
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            I apologize in advance for many letters, I believe that the devil is in the details.
            There is one large and well-thought-out party that the Anglo-Saxons have been leading for centuries. Their interest was initially in the seizure of vast spaces and control of sea lanes, as they realized this, ownership without tightening control was a rather unstable thing, and they began to form a block of states that benefited from the Anglo-Saxon plan (as well as control and order) - by benefit I mean not only direct benefit, but also benefit through maintaining stability and the relative inviolability of the rules of the game. All states that received a cap from the Anglo-Saxons in a certain epic battle or a series of such ones came to participate in this development of the Anglo-Saxon plan, to one degree or another. We see that in the 19 century, France was consistently attracted to this plan, after the 2 World War Germany, as well as a number of European states, were attracted to this plan. In a certain sense, Japan also became part of the same plan, also after BB2, although they certainly do not really like it. And although some elements of this stage of the Big Plan are now in a state of growing regional disagreement (due to the fact that with the light hand of the United States a huge number of insignificant countries have been dragged into the system banally pumping the boat, projecting and even having the audacity to openly form a “faction” inside the plan) - the system does not yet back up in any form.
            The ultimate goal of this system I see the logical desire of its participants to become the dominant bloc of countries on the planet, through control of the most economically-industrialized areas and communications, cooperation (as much as possible), maintenance of such a system of values ​​(through culture, production, lifestyle, creation good, etc.), which will undoubtedly spread its INFLUENCE throughout the globe, which will allow them to have access to the vast majority of the resources / people of interest who have value and predominantly for this block o peacefully (by soft power). So that you don’t cling to this phrase, I’ll explain that on the way to this goal they will inevitably take certain forceful actions, however forceful control of something (occupation) is not their method.
            This is how I see the big plan of the Anglo-Saxons, in this form they implement it - regardless of the presence / absence of the USSR or China or anyone else.

            As for our perception of this plan, it is usually great different from what I described above. We call things, participants, trends incorrectly, our reaction to their plan is unsystematic, we don’t have a clear alternative to this plan, our allies are situational, we have a habit of squandering resources and throwing things started and situational allies to suffer image losses and come to him through adventurous, ill-conceived undertakings. Of course, in our historiography all this is substantiated differently, in some places deftly and pathos. However, the essence is this - the above plan - this is the only real large planetary game. And we absolutely do not know how to play it. We cling to wretched countries, watermarked papers, some kind of bases full of weapons and banana-fed dictators - there, here, wherever we can, we haw whom we can, like the bum who got 10 000 and he goes to buy food in Pyaterochka "
            At times, we can (even rejecting a sober perception of the plan) make good moves. But we do them by chance - which shows well how easily we lose / miss the benefits received.
            Other countries also lead their parties, for the most part these are regional players who want to gain weight. For the most part, their perception of the picture as a whole and the scale of ambition is even weaker than ours. The exception is China. This country has long managed to be a "laborer" inside the plan, not being part of it - which allowed them to understand the rules of the game quite well, learn how to use its tools and many of the benefits of the participants. However, there is no alternative to the China Plan. And he cannot become (and remain) a part of the plan.

            In my opinion, now this configuration is painfully similar to the European configuration before the First World War.
            1. Alexey LK 15 November 2019 03: 54 New
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              Quote: Knell Wardenheart
              the essence is - the above plan is the only real big planetary game

              So a plan, or a game? ... I apologize, but your concept is unconvincing. And then - who are the Anglo-Saxons? Is that WB + USA? Are they in one plan? And inside each of them - what, there are also no alternative players, all in one plan? That's the whole point, that you are trying to rely on the external side of events, trying to reconcile what we all see on TV and the Internet, as if behind the scenes of the media space everything is the same, only in more detail. But in my opinion the essence is precisely that in reality everything is completely different from what the external observer, the average man sees, everything is not just exactly the opposite, but in general, as it were, in other concepts, in other concepts, in a different worldview. In my opinion, there are no Anglo-Saxons, except for a certain ethno-historical group, largely conditional. And those who remotely resemble those whom you call the Anglo-Saxons, simply at some point in time relied on the British aristocracy, on the elite of the British Empire.
              1. Knell wardenheart 15 November 2019 12: 59 New
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                1) Plan - the direction in which design is carried out and efforts are made to implement it. A game is a plane in which a plan is realized, meets with the reality and various activities of other players (including those not taken into account by the plan). Do you understand? Plan - the implementation of the Plan - these are two big differences.
                2) WB + USA as well as the whole western Europe - LONG and with giblets are participants in the plan, which I designated as "Anglo-Saxon". It is such by origin and most significant contribution.
                3) At the tactical level, the World Bank and the United States may have disagreements - on the strategic level, they rarely arise and are mainly associated with “raising prices” for the first and also with some difference in the mentality of NOT elites (with which the World Bank historically has more difficulties). Britain still considers itself an empire and therefore often its actions, like ours, are forced to rely on populism (which is not good).
                4) At the moment, only this global plan is being implemented on the planet) I mean involvement, degree of elaboration, duration of implementation, success in time. There are a number of regional powers "in words" who want more and alternatives, but in reality - who want to gain their weight in the region and thereby become part of the plan (on the rights of such peripheral elements as Australia and Japan, for example). Exceptions - we and China - we because a number of breakdowns and the inability to strategically soberly plan did not break our rhino tenacity, China because it has already outgrown what participation in the plan could give him (he longs for more but his own planning is still in question)
                5) I do not rely on "these are your Internet" but on history and geography. You are touched by the term "Anglo-Saxons" - this is a pretty conditional term to mean, I agree. This implies a community of people speaking English and gravitating to Anglo-American law, political and social traditions. Even if this wording seems rather "muddy" - it is important that these people very well find a common language at the junction of culture-language-patterns of thinking .
                The British Empire launched a plan that I am talking about - implementing effective colonization and the creation of outposts in all parts of the world. It did not matter then whether the plan was in “form” or not — it often happens that a number of successful actions are added to the plan without having it at the core. The attitude of the inhabitants of these outposts towards the British Empire is unimportant - they were under its dense cultural, trade and political cap, and even the United States, breaking out of this network because of resource-ambition-power, remained part of the plan - through cultural ties and the territorial-economic framework developed by Britain . Gibraltar, Suez, the Panama Canal, South African ports, control of India and its ports, Australian ports - Chinese bases, etc. - all this trading intra-planetary architecture was consistently created and controlled by the Anglo-Saxons. Through a similar network - states not friendly to the plan - incurred losses, friendly ones - brought profits. As the WB weakened, a number of these pillars moved from direct political control to the "as given" position. At some stage, the architecture of building the plan flowed to the United States, which added speed and an increase in numerical indicators to it - however, it removed monumentality and added adventure. I would especially like to note that between the key participants of the plan (excluding Germany) there have been no wars for about 150 years, and possibly longer, which indirectly confirms my hypothesis.
                6) Separate disagreements between the countries within the plan are normal, as well as a lack of understanding by a number of key members of the "development and deepening" of the idea. When you feel good, satisfying and safe - someone wants more, and someone is happy with all of this. Take the same "Terminator 2" - someone is a cult film, the completeness of the story. And someone wants a continuation of the banquet, not conceptual but logical completeness.
                1. Alexey LK 16 November 2019 03: 49 New
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                  Quote: Knell Wardenheart
                  because a number of breakdowns and the inability to strategically soberly plan did not break our rhino tenacity

                  In general, it’s understandable - we lapotniks are unable to strategically soberly plan - rhinos, we panimish ...
                  1. Knell wardenheart 16 November 2019 11: 57 New
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                    Well, I proceed from the story. Bummer - this is when material and human resources are spent - and material gain contrasts sharply with costs.

                    We had a plan of aspirations to the East - resources were invested in it - we rushed to Alaska, took control of huge territories there and ... ingloriously sold them for very modest money.

                    There was a plan of aspirations to the West - the Russian flag over Constantinople, etc. This would give us a chic position in Europe and on the seas. It didn’t work either, but our “brothers”, whom we saved and sponsored more than once, turned out to be mostly not a cake.

                    We climbed into the meat grinder of the First World War - having, among other things, strategic plans. But these were defective plans - they did not take into account issues of internal stability during the war (and after 1905 it would be worth considering) - as a result - a bummer, loss, hemorrhoids.

                    Then there was the plan of the World Revolution - which was bent on Poland and cost so much money and lives.

                    The plan for the "peaceful coexistence of the two systems" also failed - the world was very arbitrary, our allies were mostly odious dictators and rogues (and the smaller part could hardly catch up with how they now need to live) and wild resources were spent on third world countries, living standards in which we reached exactly the values ​​when they had an appetite for capitalism. And everything was bent - extremely not epic.

                    Finally, there were plans to build the CIS, plans to integrate into the Western community in the form of a new Russia with a free market, competent privatization ---> EVERYTHING IS FULL.

                    After that - please tell me how you can relate to our ability to plan differently. Years go by, epochs change, authorities - but the "skill" is still the same. We are clearly doing something wrong!
                    1. ccsr 16 November 2019 16: 52 New
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                      Quote: Knell Wardenheart
                      We are clearly doing something wrong!

                      Yes, for too long we have relied on the greatness of the divine (under the tsar) and international (under the Bolsheviks) principles in our work, and the modern world has only used this, which is why we were twice in the twentieth century in a difficult situation and almost on the verge of collapse statehood. So it's time to move to healthy pragmatism and not have the illusion that beauty will save the world - our nuclear weapons are the guarantee of our world, and we must always remember this. And the rest of the nations must be treated the same way - to destroy those who will prevent us from living, or to help others, but not at no cost. There is no "brotherhood and equality" in the world, and we should think only about our descendants, and not smear the snot, that somewhere someone who lives there poorly.
                      1. Knell wardenheart 16 November 2019 17: 18 New
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                        And here I absolutely agree with you)
                      2. ccsr 16 November 2019 17: 39 New
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                        Quote: Knell Wardenheart
                        And here I absolutely agree with you)

                        I think all sane citizens of Russia will agree with this - we have experimented for too long on ourselves, for the sake of those who are not even worthy of our attention. Alas, all this did not do us any good; moreover, they hate us for it.
                  2. Alexey LK 17 November 2019 07: 11 New
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                    I am impressed by your interest in history and geopolitics, I share your interest in the topic, but still repeat - in my opinion, you superficially judge events and results, you should "dig deeper" (this is even more interesting, believe me!).
                    History didn’t play at our gates alone, and we cannot consider a country with the largest territory (for many decades) and resources that won several difficult wars, survived more than one catastrophe, solved many strategic tasks and continues to be one of the main world players despite what a failure in history or geopolitics! To defeat Hitler in such a situation and after such losses, when, I think, any other country would have already crumbled - this, damn it, is not an accident! The plan of the World Revolution - but it was ours, and not a stranger? “Loss” of developing allies? I look at it this way: we helped break out of colonial slavery almost half the world (not only for thanks, of course), and believe me, with all the nuances, with all the volatility of the foreign policy environment - they understand this well and will always remember! It’s just that they have generally begun civilization there, it’s much harder for them than us. But this is our moral asset for decades to come! I’m sure we can play it right.
                    Yes, there were losses and mistakes, of course. But this is in order to draw conclusions and more skillfully and responsibly "play" in the future, and not to self-abase and whine!
                    Good luck!
                    Victory will be ours!
                  3. Ajevgenij 25 March 2020 23: 50 New
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                    Knell You have detailed and interesting comments. And even if you are completely mistaken, you still give food for thought.
                    1. Knell wardenheart 26 March 2020 23: 04 New
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                      Thank. I do not claim that I am an expert in all matters, but in our time, total epic lies and disinfection wherever possible, certain analytics and critical thinking, it seems to me, are not superfluous.
          2. ccsr 15 November 2019 12: 11 New
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            Quote: Knell Wardenheart
            In my opinion, now this configuration is painfully similar to the European configuration before the First World War.

            One small addition - now, with a "fright", we can destroy all NATO and Washington together in a few tens of minutes, and in this situation no configuration plays a role at all. The presence of strategic nuclear forces makes us exceptional, together with the Americans, of course, with respect to the fate of any opponent, therefore, it makes no sense to assess the current situation from the point of view of historical analogies - the power of weapons is everything, not politics. This is especially evident in the last years of our confrontation, and the cancellation of various treaties by the Americans.
            1. Knell wardenheart 15 November 2019 13: 45 New
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              No matter how diminishing the capabilities of our missiles - I note that I hear this argument more often, more and more often our security and sloppiness is covered by this mantra about "all in ruin."
              How will it be -ono only Baba Wang and the Lord God know, but you can think a bit about how it was already and how it can "go."

              As it was already

              The countries of healthy ships were tuned up - large, powerful, and the guns shine. And then these vessels stand on the bases - because everyone is full of theorists and economists - it is banal scary, suddenly "the card will lie wrong".
              For several decades, chemical weapons have been riveted, the most vigorous and tough, and there are depots — and the bombs are lying — and it seems like everything in ruin (or almost all) would be a desire — but no. Lies to himself calmly - scary to use. And while they were doing it, progress did not stand still, gas masks were riveted, shelters were set up ..
              It happened that in theory five-turret tanks designed various "Mauses" - because in theory they were powerful and lethal. And such a trifle as anti-tank mines - in the "theory" few considered seriously. And then the practice came - and it turned out that a fit and terrible vepon - in the conditions of the battlefield it turns out .. well, if at all gets to there.

              How can it "go"

              If they develop orbital platforms with kinetic (or other) interceptors (now it is technically possible and the question is only about the cost of launching) - the issue of guidance will not be a problem - starting monsters "shine" properly and you don’t particularly maneuver on takeoff, so ..

              If they are able in a short time (weeks) to launch an array of such platforms into space (or even immediately before the war)

              If you make significant progress in detecting / tracking our nuclear submarines - detecting and verifying the position of mobile missile systems.

              If there is a ripe political split in the elites, an undercover agreement will occur before the hostilities. I want to note that in our country the army is traditionally subject to any policy.

              If our (deeply theoretical) developments in the field of homing, ballistics, foreign missile defense bypass systems, evaluating the operability of our false targets, assessing accuracy, operability in combat conditions, etc. - of our missiles and their warheads - IF all this is true. I remind you that for decades, the filling for rockets has been created purely theoretically (without testing), many systems of the rockets themselves are also tested purely theoretically (for reasons of secrecy). And although I respect Russian physics and our supercomputers - on the example of the creation of the "Mace", you can see that theoretical design is not entirely reliable .. We sometimes see the launches of point products and their tests. In peacetime - with the proper level of control - it will fly.
              In wartime, in conditions of mass launch and on-site control - of products that are heterogeneous in time of production - here I have a big question mark (question% malfunction)

              If the moment of our reaction (or the first strike) (to a massive non-nuclear attack) is well calculated / predicted - and the adversary is as ready as possible for such a turn of events (given the fact that we often consider nuclear weapons as the main means of action in such situations)

              Finally - not all components of the nuclear triad are equal in number and time of arrival at the target - it is likely that what we imagine as a massive response will be long enough for the enemy to react to each of the episodes in turn.

              Before you giggle into a fist and remember your favorite kvass tales, think carefully about each of these points.
              1. ccsr 15 November 2019 19: 59 New
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                Quote: Knell Wardenheart
                No matter how diminishing the capabilities of our missiles - I note that I hear this argument more often, more and more often our security and sloppiness is covered by this mantra about "all in ruin."

                This is the harsh reality of our survival - you apparently did not understand by what laws the world community is developing.
                Quote: Knell Wardenheart
                If they are able in a short time (weeks) to launch an array of such platforms into space (or even immediately before the war)

                At this stage, this is a technically insoluble problem - hello to you from Reagan. While the enemy is about to launch something into space, the war may end.
                Quote: Knell Wardenheart
                Before you giggle into a fist and remember your favorite kvass tales, think carefully about each of these points.

                I might have thought about your words, only they reflect some kind of virtual reality that has nothing to do with the real modern war. Remember a simple figure - the Americans consider unacceptable damage to themselves in a hundred nuclear charges that hit their territory at certain points. Even now, we can ensure the simultaneous launch of several hundred warheads. Even if you take into account all the failures and all affected warheads, more than a hundred will still reach the goal. It is from this that we must proceed first of all now, and what will happen next, time will tell.
            2. Polinom 15 November 2019 17: 25 New
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              Nothing will happen. It just does not allow the environment to give a command to start and someone will get a snuffbox on their bald head.
              1. ccsr 15 November 2019 20: 19 New
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                Quote: Polinom
                Nothing will happen. It just does not allow the environment to give a command to start and someone will get a snuffbox on their bald head.

                This option is possible, that's why we need to think about choosing those who will lead us. But I think that we will find a man who, at a critical moment, "enters the torch cellar with a torch."
                1. Knell wardenheart 16 November 2019 12: 18 New
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                  It is simpler and calmer to take a sober approach to planning in matters of threats. And it’s better to work out plans, making them less abstract and hoping that the fear of Doomsday will stop the nation, one of the life’s motives is the struggle against authorities and “fate” in our understanding.
                  At one time, the French relied on the Maginot Line and the number of their tanks - this gave them confidence that there would be no war (through reasoning about the absurdity of the war in such situations) - however ...
                  History teaches us that you cannot put too many eggs in one basket.
                  1. ccsr 16 November 2019 16: 41 New
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                    Quote: Knell Wardenheart
                    History teaches us that you cannot put too many eggs in one basket.

                    I agree. But do not forget that the arms race is too expensive a pleasure, and therefore it is necessary to determine the minimum set by which we can destroy any enemy and only leave it on the balance of the armed forces. Otherwise, we will repeat the fate of the USSR, which hardly any of the citizens of Russia wants, except for the inveterate villains.
                2. Polinom 19 November 2019 14: 44 New
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                  Three people are needed and those people who will be in touch with the "communicator". In general, both sides will learn about the passage of the ACTUAL signal within a minute, STILL BEFORE STARTING !!! At least that was until the early 2000s.
              2. Alexey LK 16 November 2019 03: 45 New
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                Quote: Polinom
                Just does not allow the environment to give a command to run

                Why do you think that the use of strategic nuclear weapons involves consultation with some environment? And then - to the "Perimeter" system, I believe, deeply do not care where anyone has families, villas and capital.
                1. Polinom 19 November 2019 14: 54 New
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                  I wrote above.
                  A senior naval officer wears a “communicator” from top officials, plus telecom operators.
                  1. ccsr 19 November 2019 20: 07 New
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                    Quote: Polinom
                    Navy senior officer wears a "communicator"

                    This officer has only the uniform of the Navy, and he has nothing to do with the Navy, well, if only by his youth he was somewhere connected by the naval VUS.
                    1. Polinom 23 November 2019 20: 56 New
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                      May I laugh? What kind of diploma does he have? Suitcase? The Fleet Officer ALWAYS remains a Fleet Officer, even in retirement. This is a caste, and what kind of duties does it later is not even the second question.
                    2. ccsr 24 November 2019 10: 27 New
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                      Quote: Polinom
                      May I laugh? What kind of diploma does he have?

                      Well, if an officer from the Navy graduated from the Academy of the Soviet Army, did he still have a naval VUS or durga? So the initial VUS still does not mean anything - many change it during the service.
                      Quote: Polinom
                      Fleet officer ALWAYS remains a fleet officer, even retired.

                      It was about the form, and she was chosen from the fact that black does not stand out among civilian suits. These officers generally have nothing to do with the fleet, because they most likely have a radio engineering military academy and they are from the ground forces. Although I do not exclude the possibility that one of them served in the Navy.
                      Quote: Polinom
                      This is a caste

                      Did you define yourself like that? Do not tell, because even among the naval there is a division into "pure" and "not clean."
                    3. Polinom 28 November 2019 12: 21 New
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                      This is true. The elite are submariners, naval aviation and submarines. Especially katerniki.
                      Navy uniforms were worn by many, but cool-sailing. Stripes and cabbage. The flyers do the same. The badge of class, that is, the flight crew.
                      Many graduated from the academy and GRU residents also wore a marine uniform. And the teachers in our school wore a marine, although the rest of the Air Force, green. And figs you make him change.
                      VUSovka probably changed. Like me. It was a navigator, but got to the headquarters of the fleet, it became different. But the origins are still flying and the epaulet with a blue clearance, I didn’t change it to yellow. As I dressed from lieutenants, I wore it to lieutenant colonel. laughing
                    4. ccsr 28 November 2019 17: 41 New
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                      Quote: Polinom
                      As he dressed from lieutenants, he was worn before the lieutenant colonel.

                      My father was in 1939. He graduated from the Molotovskoye VMATU and served all his life in naval aviation, right up to the Khrushchev reduction in 1961, so I’m in the subject.
        2. Zusul 20 November 2019 22: 45 New
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          Well, yes, the environment will scratch such a turnip and decide: damn, well, die with Putin and all of Moscow, but at least we won’t let our killers be destroyed
  13. The comment was deleted.
  • Cyrus 16 November 2019 14: 00 New
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    They personally told you this in secret, what are they clutching at, are you on their sidelines?)
  • Vadmir 13 November 2019 20: 34 New
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    Great article, thanks to the author! While reading the first part I wanted to make an objection, but the second part put everything in its place.
    The only comment on this:
    3) Nuclear-free. A conflict in which the parties will fight exclusively with conventional weapons. Here, options are also possible - from a clash with a first-class economic and military power, to a regional conflict such as forcing Georgia to peace, or a military operation in a foreign country "a la Syria."

    The big non-nuclear war with NATO or China and the local conflict in a small country are very different and deserve to be taken to different points.
    Moreover, the fleet for these two types of conflicts must be built differently.
    Moreover, in the context of the fleet, it makes sense to talk about local conflicts remote from the borders of Russia, since it is in such conflicts that the role of the fleet is maximum.
    I do not really believe in the possibility of a large non-nuclear war, but local wars are inevitable and not the fact that Russia will be able to avoid participating in them, with all the desire to do so.
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 13 November 2019 20: 46 New
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      Quote: Vadmir
      The big non-nuclear war with NATO or China and the local conflict in a small country are very different and deserve to be taken to different points.

      On the one hand, yes, but ... Later there will be an explanation of why I nevertheless combined them into one.
    2. ccsr 15 November 2019 12: 22 New
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      Quote: Vadmir
      Great non-nuclear war with NATO

      This will not happen. Why did you decide that we will be able to conduct it, and where is the guarantee from escalation on the very first day? How are you going to fight non-nuclear weapons with a population of one and a half billion?
      Quote: Vadmir
      and local conflict in a small country are very different and deserve to be brought to different points.

      We can pull it, but the question always arises, why do we need it. Right now in Syria, as many people think, we are resolving the issue of combating terrorists who supposedly could infiltrate or return to our territory, and this justifies our presence there, despite the death of our people. But few people believe that terrorists cannot be trained elsewhere, especially if the Saudis generously sponsor it. And then what should we do if they come to us not from Syria? In general, before you enter somewhere, you need to know in advance how we will get out of there, or how it will work out with Syria, like Assad defeated everyone, and our troops do not think to return. What this leads to, I remember from the example of Afghanistan, and I would not want to repeat the sad scenario of the past.
      1. Vadmir 15 November 2019 14: 26 New
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        This will not happen. Why did you decide that we will be able to conduct it, and where is the guarantee from escalation on the very first day? How are you going to fight non-nuclear weapons with a population of one and a half billion?
        There is a question of leadership’s determination to use nuclear weapons in the event of war. Wars do not always begin by mutual agreement. Therefore, the lack of desire to fight with NATO does not mean that there will be no war. In history, it was when wars started because of a trifle or a small border conflict grew into a war.
        As for the possibility of a war with “one and a half billion”, theoretically there is such a possibility, firstly Russia has a high mobilization potential, secondly, the West has an allergy to the coffins of its soldiers, if you can drag out the war, relying on the ruins of large cities, you won’t win but surrender can be avoided if losses become unacceptable to the West.
        The second option is a preemptive strike at a time when troops are already concentrated near our borders but the war has not yet begun. An attack on airfields, depots with ammunition and fuel and lubricants, on the barracks, on air defense and missile defense systems, on the radar, can significantly change the balance of power. Modern technology is so expensive and long to produce.
        All this in theory, of course, I myself do not really believe in a non-nuclear war with NATO or China, and I believe even less in a nuclear war - everyone wants to live.
        1. ccsr 15 November 2019 20: 09 New
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          Quote: Vadmir
          There is a question of leadership’s determination to use nuclear weapons in the event of war.

          I think our supreme man is with steel eggs, so there is enough determination. I want to believe it.
          Quote: Vadmir
          As for the possibility of war with the "one and a half billion", then theoretically there is such a possibility,

          There is no opportunity, do not console yourself with an illusion - there is only one option. We cannot even feed their captives if they appear ...
          Quote: Vadmir
          The second option is a preemptive strike at a time when troops are already concentrated near our borders but the war has not yet begun.

          This is not entirely true - a preemptive strike is delivered immediately as soon as we realized that the enemy’s troops had begun preparations for war, otherwise we would not have time to defeat them even at the points of permanent deployment.
          Quote: Vadmir
          I myself don’t really believe in a non-nuclear war with NATO or China,

          I will not make a big discovery, but in the eighties we did not expect another real option, although for the sake of politicians we planned something there for two wars, with one nuclear and one non-nuclear, or a combination of both. In general, they themselves gave rise to a myth that is still being circulated by lay people.
          1. Vadmir 16 November 2019 01: 20 New
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            This is not entirely true - a preemptive strike is delivered immediately as soon as we realized that the enemy’s troops had begun preparations for war, otherwise we would not have time to defeat them even at the points of permanent deployment.
            The points of permanent deployment of NATO troops, and indeed China, are often thousands of kilometers from our borders. They can be defeated by conventional weapons only when they are concentrated along our borders, when planes flew from the United States to Poland, the Baltic states, and Romania. Only in this way can they be destroyed by a powerful sudden preventive missile-bomb strike.
            1. ccsr 16 November 2019 10: 55 New
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              Quote: Vadmir
              Only in this way can they be destroyed by a powerful sudden preventive missile-bomb strike.

              As for the bombing, I doubt it, because there will be no surprise if there will be a massive take-off of our strategic aviation. And therefore only a missile strike gives us an advantage, especially if it is fired from submarines.
          2. Vadmir 16 November 2019 01: 37 New
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            I will not make a big discovery, but in the eighties we did not expect another real option, although for the sake of politicians we planned something there for two wars, with one nuclear and one non-nuclear, or a combination of both.
            In the eighties, the stake was placed on a swift tank breakthrough deep into Germany and it was believed that NATO did not dare to bomb its own territory with nuclear bombs. Would we decide whether or not we don’t know now.
            The modern military doctrine of Russia says that Russia can use nuclear weapons first if there is a threat to its existence. But at what point will it arise? Maybe when the first enemy soldier crosses our border? Or when will we lose the Kuril Islands? Or when the Crimea and Kaliningrad fall? Or maybe the enemy will approach Moscow? Or when the enemy comes to the Urals? Or maybe when there will be a direct threat to the positional areas of our ICBMs?
            No one knows the answer to this question, except the Supreme. Or maybe he doesn’t know. Do you really think that clicking a button is so easy?
            Another thing is when thousands of nuclear missiles fly at us, nowhere to go nowhere to press.
            1. ccsr 16 November 2019 16: 37 New
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              Quote: Vadmir
              In the eighties, the stake was placed on a swift tank breakthrough deep into Germany and it was believed that NATO did not dare to bomb its own territory with nuclear bombs.

              I don’t know who told you this, but I’ll just remind you that on the territory of the European theater of military operations, NATO had more than a thousand aircraft carrying nuclear weapons. What the hell are tanks - there is hardly anything left of the entire group if the Americans launched a nuclear strike with their strategic nuclear forces on the German Democratic Republic. And they were spitting on all Europeans - that was the real scenario.
              Quote: Vadmir
              The modern military doctrine of Russia says that Russia can use nuclear weapons first if there is a threat to its existence. But at what point will it arise?

              At a time when military intelligence owes that preparations for nuclear war have begun.
              Quote: Vadmir
              Maybe when the first enemy soldier crosses our border? Or when will we lose the Kuril Islands? Or when the Crimea and Kaliningrad fall? Or maybe the enemy will approach Moscow? Or when the enemy comes to the Urals? Or maybe when there will be a direct threat to the positional areas of our ICBMs?

              This is all frivolous - there are intelligence signs that conclude that they are preparing to attack with the use of nuclear weapons. From this, a decision will be made.
              Quote: Vadmir
              Do you really think that clicking a button is so easy?

              I think that the person standing at the head of the country should always be ready to do this. Otherwise, why do we need another verbiage, "Gorbachev".
              Quote: Vadmir
              Another thing is when thousands of nuclear missiles fly at us, nowhere to go nowhere to press.

              And I think that we must destroy the enemy before he inflicts an irreparable blow on us.
              1. Polinom 19 November 2019 16: 17 New
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                http://samlib.ru/editors/s/semenow_aleksandr_sergeewich333/war.shtml
                The war in the process "process" and the smart navigator
                ..... "The joint exercises of the Warsaw Pact countries" Soyuz-83 "worked out plans for a war with the West. After mass processing of areas of NATO troops by nuclear weapons, strike groups of five fronts were supposed to break into the West German defense. In two weeks, it was supposed to crush the FRG and reach to the French border. If NATO does not capitulate, the second phase of the operation will begin - the defeat of France. One front will continue the advance towards the English Channel, the second will turn south and go to the Spanish border. The duration of the second phase is a month.
                On November 24, 1983, on behalf of Andropov, it was reported that Temp-S operational-tactical missile launchers would be deployed on the territory of the German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovakia, and Soviet submarines and ships with nuclear weapons would be advanced to the shores of America.
                One of the formations of the Northern Fleet strategic missile submarine cruisers received a special mission. Submarines of project 667A with ballistic missiles carried combat duty closer to the territory of the United States, in the Bermuda Triangle. The missiles launched from these boats were supposed to fly to the United States as fast as the Pershing and Tomahawks to Soviet cities.
                The creation of a new mobile rocket complex "Speed" began, which they were planning to install closer to the borders of the Western powers. The task is to destroy the starting positions of American missiles in Europe before they take off.
                The head of the missile forces and artillery of the Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Vladimir Mikhalkin, was ordered to deploy two missile brigades in the GDR and one in Czechoslovakia. At zero hours Moscow time on June 25, 1984, he reported from the in-depth command post of one of the starting batteries to the new chief of the General Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, that "the ground forces missiles have begun combat duty to protect the borders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and countries of the socialist community."
                1. ccsr 19 November 2019 20: 03 New
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                  Quote: Polinom
                  After the mass processing of the areas of the deployment of NATO forces by nuclear weapons, the strike groups of five fronts were to break into the West German defense.

                  I don’t know who wrote this, but two fronts unfolded on the German border, which were formed from the GSVG and TsGV, and the Stavka was in Poland, so this statement is not true.
                  Quote: Polinom
                  If NATO does not capitulate, the second phase of the operation will begin - the defeat of France. One front will continue the advance towards the English Channel, the second will turn south and go to the border of Spain. The duration of the second stage is a month.

                  To be honest, few of those who served in the headquarters of the group believed in this whim - we did not even really know what kind of force would strike the NATO forces in the CE theater of operations with the Strategic Missile Forces formations deployed on the territory of the USSR in the event of a nuclear war. What kind of advancement in contaminated and destroyed Europe should we plan if we couldn’t know what force the US strategic forces would exert on the GHA, excluding NATO tactical aviation with nuclear weapons. Although everything was beautifully painted and reported during the exercises, it is unlikely that anyone would understand, except for those who were involved in evaluating our opponent. But no one wanted to be Cassandra, that’s why some moments were silent.
                  Quote: Polinom
                  The head of the missile forces and artillery of the Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Vladimir Mikhalkin, was ordered to deploy two missile brigades in the GDR and one in Czechoslovakia.

                  All this is a trifle, in comparison with the forces of the Strategic Missile Forces, and by 1989 they were no longer in the group, because with the Americans agreed to withdraw their Pershing. So do not exaggerate the role of these brigades, although it was precisely because of them that the decision-making threshold for the use of nuclear weapons was lowered to the level of commanders-in-chief of groups. This scared the Europeans in the first place.
                  1. Polinom 23 November 2019 20: 59 New
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                    Sorry, you are all mixed up. The fact of preparation "Process" has taken place. I confirm, as its performer, even at the lower level of the headquarters of the aviation regiment at that time.
                    Europeans were so frightened that the USSR ordered a long life. laughing
                    1. ccsr 24 November 2019 10: 38 New
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                      Quote: Polinom
                      The fact of preparation "Process" has taken place.

                      In order for our allies under the Warsaw Treaty to sleep peacefully and scare NATO members and come up with this whim. The real exit from these brigades, with all our might of the Strategic Missile Forces, is simply insignificant - I tell you this without any confusion.
                      Quote: Polinom
                      Europeans were so frightened that the USSR ordered a long life.

                      By and large, we were not much afraid of Europeans, because the real threat came only from the Americans. By the way, the NATO leadership was not allowed to control US nuclear weapons - from here draw a conclusion who we were afraid of in the first place. These brigades had nothing to do with the collapse of the USSR — the costs of their maintenance were penny in comparison with what we spent on five land armies and one air army in the German Democratic Republic. This was exactly what made our economy cripple - it was a big stupid thing to contain such a mass of troops that the Americans could destroy right after the start of a nuclear war.
                      1. Polinom 28 November 2019 12: 22 New
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                        Maybe you are right. I wrote about what I encountered, I don’t really like to google.
      2. Vadmir 15 November 2019 14: 39 New
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        We can pull it, but the question always arises, why do we need it. Right now in Syria, as many people think, we are resolving the issue of combating terrorists
        Local wars are being waged for influence, this is how the allies, markets for military equipment, military bases in the modern world are acquired.
        To close within your borders, not to interfere in anything, not to help anyone - this is a recipe for how to find yourself in proud loneliness among enemies.
        The USA loves to organize coups in countries hostile to them, to create terrorist organizations, to produce rebels and "freedom fighters." This can happen not only somewhere far away, but also at our borders. I hope the example of Ukraine is enough? And if this happens in the union of Belarus to us? And if another ISIS appears in Tajikistan, Uzbekistan? In Kazakhstan, where are many Russians? Command me not to interfere?
        Local wars are inevitable, unfortunately, and they need to be prepared.
        1. Polinom 15 November 2019 17: 29 New
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          this is a recipe for how to find yourself in proud loneliness among enemies. laughing
          In my opinion already. Even I, a senior officer of the USSR who served the entire period at the Pacific Fleet, is ready to defend the territorial integrity of my country. Well it must be able to make the enemy of Ukraine. Keep up the good work, Belarus is next in line.
          1. Vadmir 15 November 2019 17: 49 New
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            Well it must be able to make the enemy of Ukraine.
            And this is a matter of leadership determination. In 2014, there was an opportunity to restore order in Ukraine; a minority supported the coup there. Yanukovych could request military assistance and would receive it legally. True, in this case, Crimea would still be Ukrainian. But Ukraine would not be our enemy, as would its population.
            1. Polinom 19 November 2019 16: 21 New
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              You are completely unaware of what was happening here in December 2013. And it’s too late to explain. You can’t take someone else’s, you can’t kill neighbors, you can’t break the contract. Nobody can do anything good. You have to pay for everything.
              EVERYONE has become worse and this is just the beginning.
        2. ccsr 15 November 2019 20: 15 New
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          Quote: Vadmir
          To close within your borders, not to interfere in anything, not to help anyone - this is a recipe for how to find yourself in proud loneliness among enemies.

          We are self-sufficient and strong, and our main task, given our small number, is to preserve our territory and our wealth for posterity inviolable. If we spend our resources on other tasks, our civilization will disappear. And this should be clear to all members of society in order to understand where we should move.
          Quote: Vadmir
          Command me not to interfere?

          No, I’ll offer them to return to their historical Motherland, and then we will destroy those territories that turned out to be hostile to Russian people.
          Quote: Vadmir
          Local wars are inevitable, unfortunately, and they need to be prepared.

          That's because they are inevitable, and we are few, we must exclude our direct participation in them.
          1. Vadmir 16 November 2019 01: 11 New
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            No, I’ll offer them to return to their historical homeland,
            Do you mean people or territories with the population? If the territory is someone without a fight will allow this, and this is war.
            and then destroy those territories that were hostile to the Russian people.
            Than? Nuclear weapons? Or is it still normal? If ordinary, then this is a local war that you want to exclude?
            We are self-sufficient and strong, and our main task, given our small number, is to preserve our territory and our wealth for posterity inviolable.
            If you do not demonstrate your strength, they may consider us weak and try to take away our wealth and territory.
            That's because they are inevitable, and we are few, we must exclude our direct participation in them.
            The whole history of mankind is the history of wars. It cannot be ruled out that it depends not only on us. They can put us in a hopeless situation and have been put more than once in history.
            1. ccsr 16 November 2019 10: 51 New
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              Quote: Vadmir
              Do you mean people or territories with the population? If the territory is someone without a fight will allow this, and this is war.

              What other battle, if an ultimatum is set to wipe the capital off the face of the earth, if they do not fulfill our requirements? Why do you think the genzavals surrendered so quickly, even with US support?
              Quote: Vadmir
              Than? Nuclear weapons? Or is it still normal?

              Conventional, heavy duty and at key control points.
              Quote: Vadmir
              If you don’t show your strength,

              Are you going to demonstrate something to the Americans? They already understand everything, like everyone else in the world.
              Quote: Vadmir
              They can put us in a hopeless situation and have been put more than once in history.

              In this case, I am of Putin’s opinion - we will be in paradise, and our opponents will be burned in hell.
      3. Cyrus 16 November 2019 14: 10 New
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        In Syria, we solve gas issues and geopolitical issues, unfortunately these issues very little coincide with citizens' wishes.
  • SVD68 13 November 2019 20: 41 New
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    The second reason seems convincing.
    But! Only on condition that at any given time several boats are on combat duty without a tail.
  • Avior 13 November 2019 21: 08 New
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    My opinion, the author did not consider the difference. 3.1 full-scale or rather large-scale non-nuclear war and 3.2 limited non-nuclear conflict or short targeted operation.
    1. Vadmir 14 November 2019 09: 57 New
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      Almost agree, but not 3.1 and 3.2, but 3 and 4. Subparagraphs can define close sub-options, and not so much different conflicts.
      For example: 3.1 War with NATO, including the USA, 3.2 War with Europe with passivity of the USA, 3.3 War only with the USA, 3.4 War with China, 3.5 War with Japan.
      4.1 Border conflict with a major power, without escalating into a big war, 4.2 Local conflict in a neighboring country, 4.3 Local conflict in a remote country with access to the sea, 4.4 The same but without access to the sea (in the context of our topic, you can not consider it).
      In my opinion, the author quite rightly put the definition of the type of conflict at the very beginning. With this, it is worth starting the development of the concept of building a fleet.
      1. Determining the type of conflict.
      2. Identification of the enemy and analysis of his capabilities.
      3. Setting tasks for the fleet.
      4. The allocation of forces and means necessary to accomplish the task. With the definition of specific types of ships suitable for the task.
      5. Distribution of subtasks to individual ships and their compounds.
      And so go through all types and subtypes of conflicts, all potential opponents. Then it will become clear what tasks the fleet can fulfill, which ones not. What types of ships and in what quantity are needed to perform each of the tasks. And that means to determine what and how much to build. And in what order.
      In my opinion, tasks should be solved sequentially from simple to complex, from the most relevant to the least relevant, from more probable to less probable, from more urgent to less urgent. Excluding from this sequence the SSBNs and the forces necessary for their activities, since this is in any case the priority task number 1.
      1. Avior 14 November 2019 10: 04 New
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        4.4 The same but without access to the sea (in the context of our topic can not be considered).

        can be considered.
        if within reach of aviation from the sea.
        and 4.5 — a point operation without any prolonged warfare — for example, rescuing hostages or capturing or eliminating terrorists — such as the American strike on Ben Laden or the French saving their hostages in Somalia on the coast.
        1. Vadmir 14 November 2019 10: 15 New
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          I agree with your revision.
  • evgen1221 13 November 2019 21: 24 New
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    Such a variant of the SSBN is also possible — in the form of an underwater drones for one or two missiles, a one-way diesel engine to the launch zone, a shallow depth of immersion (storm to sail). In theory, it should be cheaper than a full-fledged cruiser, which means you can do something like that without cancels the maintenance of full crew boats. In the threatened period, crews are nominated which speaks of the determination to apply, if it worked out well, okay. They didn’t need to - they would shoot back than they would and would surely die, or they would come to cd on cd, but in this situation the very fact of ten or more drones coming out with a guaranteed scribe the board will already make you think. Do they still need torpedoes somewhere to dial in order to sink them, and no one canceled the PLARK and PLO, and how much will the maintenance and construction of full-fledged boats cost the West to neutralize our unmanned aerial vehicles? It’s cheaper to buy our entire population, I think it will be peaceful to disperse.
    1. Alexey LK 14 November 2019 17: 54 New
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      The dofiga drones-SSBNs can be answered even more "dofiga" drones-hunters.
      1. evgen1221 14 November 2019 21: 20 New
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        And how much will a dozen inconspicuous arborists and overdigger hunters cost them? I think the profit is ours.
        1. Alexey LK 15 November 2019 03: 57 New
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          Quote: evgen1221
          And how much will a dozen inconspicuous arborists and overdigger hunters cost them? I think the profit is ours.

          It all depends on the design and applied technologies, but the essence of the comment was that drones would be put up for confrontation with drones, and not expensive traditional inhabited submarines.
          1. evgen1221 15 November 2019 16: 56 New
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            Well, the author writes about the high cost of the SSBN, I proposed for consideration a cheaper option for us and an expensive West. You want to make drones do the UAVs to catch UAVs, and they will go to sea only at one moment, and before that you can despair about patrolling the ocean carriers, and they are in the bulk of the house in shelters, and the enemy will chase the black cat = Everyone has fun, and profit for us. You can send a drone even without a weapon in peacetime, one figs will be washed to catch.)))
        2. Cyrus 16 November 2019 14: 12 New
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          not sure what is behind us
  • exo
    exo 13 November 2019 21: 26 New
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    The imbalance (and in fact: poverty) of the Russian fleet can put an end to all the advantages of the SSBN. So far, no changes have been observed.
    1. ser56 15 November 2019 12: 26 New
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      Quote: exo
      can put an end to all the advantages of the SSBN

      namely, and if you remove the SSBN, then the fleet will sharply release forces for active operations ... hi
      A curious consequence of the presence of an SSBN for our fleet is the blocking of the best forces of the Russian Navy for their protection ... request
  • Operator 13 November 2019 21: 32 New
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    Today is the 13 number, therefore Kolomoisky will predict Russian tanks near Warsaw, then the author of the article in question will express a rational judgment on the SSBN laughing

    The article has at least one logical flaw - the US preventive counter-force nuclear strike against mines and mobile missile systems of the Strategic Missile Forces, with no options, will end in zero result, since the Russian system of warning of a massive missile attack is designed to record such an event in 5-10 minutes after its start . Those. at the disposal of the Russian leadership will be about 30 minutes for a decision, a massive launch of missiles and separation of their warheads from the last stages of the launch vehicles.

    If American medium-range ballistic missiles are deployed in Europe with a flight time of Moscow in the amount of 10 minutes, all of their launch positions will be in the radar coverage area of ​​the operating Container ZRLS, which will record their launch within a few seconds after its start (via an ionized exhaust tail gases). This time is quite enough for transmitting the Strategic Missile Forces command via fiber-optic (mine installations) and radio-transmitting (mobile installations) communication channels, as well as for starting and completing the active section of the ground-based ICBM trajectory.

    In other words, the American counterforce strike will not work. Especially in the probable situation of a special (pre-war) period with the evacuation of the top military-political leadership of the Russian Federation from the areas of reach of the American infantry infantry regiment and the transfer of the Strategic Missile Forces into minute readiness mode.

    Then why goat button accordion - that is, the SSBN?

    Another thing is that the Russian Navy has the right to maintain its place in the Russian nuclear triad - on a new technical basis, of course. This is what the Poseidon program for the construction of uninhabited underwater vehicles is aimed at in an amount sufficient to destroy all potential opponents of the Russian Federation combined even without the involvement of the Strategic Rocket Forces and strategic aviation.

    For example, in the 700-km coastal zones of the USA, Europe and China, 80 percent of the industry and mobility of these countries is concentrated according to the fact that during the explosion of one special Poseidon warhead, the zone of continuous destruction of buildings and structures is 72 km, the zone of fires and burns of the first degree - 150 km, fallout zone - 700х300 km.

    The Poseidon submarine fleet is the best guarantee from World War III.
    1. Knell wardenheart 13 November 2019 22: 07 New
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      As for me, the best guarantee would be a dull sabotage network on the territory of the enemy and about a hundred portable nuclear devices, which "in which case" lead to housing estates / business centers of large cities. This is not very pathos and beautiful - but effective in the case of Day X.
      1. Operator 13 November 2019 22: 20 New
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        10 years ago, the United States completed the deployment of a wide network of border and domestic neutron radiation sensors that detect 6-kilogram plutonium charge, transporting a two-meter layer of polyethylene, water, boron, etc.
        1. Knell wardenheart 13 November 2019 22: 49 New
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          As you know, such charges would not be delivered by Russian Post. for this there are small low-noise submarines, which are much less noticeable than our missile carriers. Modern security measures are expensive, and they are mainly concentrated in points with good throughput. Considering periodically falling into the media stories about radioactive traces on trains or smuggling of fissile materials, I have more doubts about the capabilities of such a detection system, rather, its coverage and density.
          I see a very effective measure of delivering such charges to the coastal areas of a potential enemy (in the case of Day X approaching) - given how skillfully submarines of drug cartels go - I do not think that there would be a problem at this stage. Further from the coast
          on less important roads, such a cargo would reach approximate locations (from where access to the main target during the day would not be a problem, given the development of the US transportation network).
          In the case of bypassing the "security zones", which are definitely all kinds of ports / central highways at the entrances to large industrial cities - I think that all this would be an excellent means of both a first strike and a guaranteed incapacitation of a potential aggressor.
          Of course, such a plan, like any others, has a lot of difficulties and, including the human factor. However, it can be largely decentralized, scaled.
          In conclusion, I would like to note that with all the accuracy of modern detectors - they do not have such an impressive range, the problem is that fissile materials are now common in industry / medicine.
          1. Operator 13 November 2019 23: 36 New
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            Quote: Knell Wardenheart
            there are small low-noise submarines

            NPA "Poseidon" with a displacement of 40 tons is one to two orders of magnitude smaller than any submarine and equally as low-noise in motion at the same speed.

            "Poseidon" can lie for several years at the bottom at a depth of up to 1500 meters near the coast of a potential adversary, and then return to the base for scheduled maintenance. "Poseidon" has a swim time of up to an hour when lying at a distance of 180 km from the coastal target.

            Then why do we also need more small-sized anti-aircraft weapons with mininuclear charges?
            1. ccsr 16 November 2019 16: 59 New
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              Quote: Operator
              "Poseidon" has a swim time of up to an hour when lying at a distance of 180 km from the coastal target.

              You are confusing experimental developments with combat systems on duty. That is why it is necessary to discuss what we now have and can, and not what will happen once, and it is still not a fact that it will appear in service. Yes, and we must not forget that the enemy does not bast too, so it may turn out that it will be even easier to fight with new means than with traditional ones - science does not stand still, and it is not known what the enemy will present to us ....
              1. Operator 16 November 2019 20: 39 New
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                Think systematically and the picture will add up.

                The solution lies not in the plane of the carriers of nuclear charges, but in the plane of the nuclear materials themselves. In 1945, from 6 kg of plutonium they were able to squeeze out 20 Ktn of nuclear explosion power (97% of plutonium did not manage to react and was the main factor of radioactive contamination), after 10 years they received 25 Mtn, after 6 years - 58 Mtn with the possibility of increasing to 100 Mt.

                It was with the aim of realizing the power of the YAZ that Sakharov put forward the idea of ​​a carrier in the form of a torpedo with a nuclear ramjet engine, and not vice versa. The idea of ​​Sakharov was not accepted, not because of humanitarian considerations, but because of the physical insolvency of the JRPD.

                Now, when progress in the field of thermonuclear charges made it possible to obtain 100 Mtn in dimensions 1,5x5 m and weight 10 tons, the development of carriers already tested in practice for this charge - Sarmat ICBMs (an improved analogue of Voevoda ICBMs) and NPA Poseidon "(an improved analogue of the Lira submarine). Those. absolutely not set the task of development for the sake of development.

                As for the means of counteracting a massive nuclear missile (and now also a torpedo-nuclear), their analogues and even ideas for their creation do not exist.

                A short automatic control unit of the latest ICBM models allows the BB to be separated even before reaching an 130 km altitude (the boundary of a missile interception using infrared guidance), in space the BBs are protected by an inflatable stealth shell cooled by liquid nitrogen, and when they enter the atmosphere - by heavy false targets and anti-aircraft maneuver.

                The 40-ton NPA when driving generates 100 times less noise than the strike submarine (when moving at a comparable speed), and has 30 times less sonar signature. With full electric movement at the creeping speed, it is similar to a submarine with a VNEU, which the direction finders do not hear at point blank range.

                Of course, theoretically we can talk about the currently unknown physical principles of detecting and intercepting modern ICBMs and NLA, but first these principles must be discovered, then technically implemented, and then compared with the increased capabilities of attack means (for example, annihilation). Therefore, it is advisable to talk about the future in the future.
                1. ccsr 17 November 2019 17: 52 New
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                  Quote: Operator
                  Think systematically and the picture will add up.
                  The solution lies not in the plane of the carriers of nuclear charges, but in the plane of the nuclear materials themselves.

                  It is the number of carriers of nuclear charges that determines how much we can cope with the enemy’s missile defense system, given the fact that Americans have long taken up Aegis:
                  Potentially, a cruiser with Aegis MBIUS can launch up to 122 of these interceptor missiles, and a destroyer from 90 to 96 missiles (depending on the type of ship).

                  https://topwar.ru/16292-idzhis-pryamaya-ugroza-rossii.html
                  Quote: Operator
                  The idea of ​​Sakharov was not accepted, not because of humanitarian considerations, but because of the physical insolvency of the JRPD.

                  There were several other reasons - the death of crews and the difficulty of servicing such charges in a long hike. And the main continental part of the United States was not affected - this must also be remembered.
                  Quote: Operator
                  As for the means of counteracting a massive nuclear missile (and now also a torpedo-nuclear), their analogues and even ideas for their creation do not exist.

                  We do not know reliably at what level their developments are, and therefore your statements are not supported by anything. Hat-hoping always turned into a tragedy for us ...
                  Quote: Operator
                  A short AUT of the latest ICBM models allows for the separation of warheads even before reaching an altitude of 130 km

                  As far as I understand, the defeat will be carried out at lower altitudes. Moreover, judging by the missile defense positions in Poland and Romania, the Americans long before this dream to hit our heads, i.e. before breeding. However, I can be wrong, I will not insist.
                  Quote: Operator
                  Of course, theoretically we can talk about the currently unknown physical principles of detecting and intercepting modern ICBMs and NLAs,

                  There is such a simple principle - at an altitude of 20-40 kilometers, to undermine your nuclear weapons in order to create an "umbrella" for flying warheads - naturally, while protecting only a limited number of areas. The same principle is used now to protect tanks from ATGM, but this is a simplified version.
                  1. Operator 17 November 2019 21: 03 New
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                    The last modification of the US Aegis missile system, deployed on surface ships, is theoretically capable of intercepting Russian ICBMs based in the European part of Russia, but on one condition - unless there is an outstripping on time trajectory of leading Ikander-M missiles after which all ground and ship radars will be disabled for 10-15 minutes from high-altitude nuclear explosions.

                    Sakharov’s torpedo with YaPRD and T-15 torpedo with electric battery, electric motor and propeller are different underwater vehicles.

                    But we know at what level American developments in the field of missile defense are - at the bluff level of SOI 30 years ago.

                    Both the Americans and we have long removed nuclear weapons from missile defense because of their much greater harm (EMP) than their usefulness.
                    1. ccsr 18 November 2019 12: 38 New
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                      Quote: Operator
                      if there is no leading-in time undermining on their trajectory of the leading Ikander-M missiles,

                      What if it doesn’t happen, because the system is not part of the Strategic Missile Forces?
                      Quote: Operator
                      Sakharov’s torpedo with YaPRD and T-15 torpedo with electric battery, electric motor and propeller are different underwater vehicles.

                      I meant, first of all, the consequences of an underwater nuclear explosion on coastal territories.
                      Quote: Operator
                      But we know at what level American developments in the field of missile defense are - at the bluff level of SOI 30 years ago.

                      I would like to believe in it, but for the money that they unfasten in the military-industrial complex, much can be created at the most advanced level. Not to let us go ...
                      Quote: Operator
                      Both the Americans and we have long removed nuclear weapons from missile defense because of their much greater harm (EMP) than their usefulness.

                      Most likely they were removed because of too great difficulties in maintenance in ground-based air defense systems, which have neither a base nor specialists. And then the agreements made it possible to implement this. And now, when the Americans do not want to come to an agreement with us at all, it may be necessary to reconsider some earlier decisions.
                      1. Operator 18 November 2019 13: 35 New
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                        We have Strategic Missile Forces a priority, so it’s not difficult to use a dozen Iskander-Ms in their interests.

                        Consequences of the 100-Mtn explosion of a three-stage ID for the coastal zone to a depth of 700 km

                        In addition to money, ideas are needed, but with them there is a deficit in missile defense.

                        The special warhead is fully equipped at the factory and does not require any scheduled maintenance in operation, except to install / remove it from the carrier.
                      2. ccsr 18 November 2019 20: 15 New
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                        Quote: Operator
                        We have Strategic Missile Forces a priority, so it’s not difficult to use a dozen Iskander-Ms in their interests.

                        Understand correctly that this is a different kind of army, and it’s also inappropriate for them to hang up the Iskanders - everyone should do his own thing.
                        Quote: Operator
                        The special warhead is fully equipped at the factory and does not require any scheduled maintenance in operation, except to install / remove it from the carrier.

                        But it should be tested, and then I didn’t hear something, so that nuclear charges would not need maintenance after several months of being in a fighting position.
                        No wonder in Soviet times there were:
                        The military repair and technical bases (RTBs) related to the Strategic Missile Forces, Air Force, Navy and engineering forces were engaged in operational storage, preparation for combat use and the issuance of combat use units. Mobile bases (PRTB) related to the air and missile defense and air defense systems were engaged in the preparation of nuclear munitions (bombs, engineering mines, artillery shells, etc.) for combat use in the field.
                        The last, final, link was directly to the combat use units that contained or were ready for immediate execution of works on keeping nuclear munitions in the highest degrees of readiness, including those docked to carriers.

                        It is unlikely that now something has changed significantly.
                        Quote: Operator
                        Consequences of the 100-Mtn explosion of a three-stage ID for the coastal zone to a depth of 700 km

                        And if the wind in the other direction will be?
                        I read this article on VO, but all this is not yet realistic:
                        https://topwar.ru/155757-razvitie-konstrukcij-jadernyh-zarjadov.html
      2. The comment was deleted.
      3. Alexey LK 14 November 2019 18: 14 New
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        Quote: Operator
        In the USA, Europe and Russia, 10 years ago, the deployment of a wide network of border and domestic neutron radiation sensors was completed

        Yes? You can give the link, please?
        1. Operator 14 November 2019 18: 51 New
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          Google "Detectors for Detecting Illegal Transport of Nuclear Materials" by country.

          Modern integrated neutron and gamma radiation sensors reduced to the size of a case
          http://www.pribori.com/products/pdf/Detective-EX.pdf
          1. Alexey LK 14 November 2019 20: 51 New
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            Quote: Operator
            Google "Detectors for Detecting Illegal Transport of Nuclear Materials" by country.

            Thank you!
  • illi 13 November 2019 22: 31 New
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    The article has at least one logical flaw - the US preventive counter-force nuclear strike against mines and mobile missile systems of the Strategic Missile Forces, with no options, will end in zero result, since the Russian system of warning of a massive missile attack is designed to record such an event in 5-10 minutes after its start . Those. at the disposal of the Russian leadership will be about 30 minutes for a decision, a massive launch of missiles and separation of their warheads from the last stages of the launch vehicles.

    Well, that's all ideally. And in reality everything will be something like this. https://kiri2ll.livejournal.com/1333562.html That is, until the last until the missiles fall on the target there will be doubts, but if it doesn’t fail. The man is so arranged that in serious decisions he doubts and wages up to the last. And this is its advantage, otherwise we would have long ago burnt in the atomic fire from the link above.
    1. Operator 13 November 2019 23: 27 New
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      Neither you, nor the leadership of a potential adversary can know this.
  • Vadmir 14 November 2019 01: 17 New
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    Those. at the disposal of the Russian leadership will be about 30 minutes for a decision, a massive launch of missiles and separation of their warheads from the last stages of the launch vehicles.
    But there are options for a decapitation blow.
    Transit corridors of civil aviation pass near Moscow. You can remake one of the aircraft to deliver missiles with a flying time of seconds.
    There are other options.
    This time is quite enough for transmitting the Strategic Missile Forces command via fiber-optic (mine installations) and radio-transmitting (mobile installations) communication channels, as well as for starting and completing the active section of the ground-based ICBM trajectory.
    But will there be enough minutes for 10 to analyze the situation, transfer data to the management and make a decision? I have doubts.
    Then why goat button accordion - that is, the SSBN?
    Even a single boat at sea and without a tail makes any strike scenario impossible, but the boat commander should be entitled to strike a retaliation without the permission of the leadership, as there may be a situation when there is no one to give the order.
    The Poseidon submarine fleet is the best guarantee from World War III.
    Now Timokhin will come and say that Poseidons are easily intercepted by modern means of PLO, an underwater explosion is not effective and in general Poseidon is a waste of money.
    1. Operator 14 November 2019 07: 57 New
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      One plane / one missile / one nuclear charge will not be rolled out - after the decapitation of the top leadership, the protocol for assuming the new leadership’s position also takes effect on the country — a massive nuclear missile strike is delivered to the aggressor, which is clearly the last thing the aggressor country would like.

      10 minutes in the presence of a ready-made protocol of actions is quite sufficient time.
      1. Vadmir 14 November 2019 09: 08 New
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        after decapitation of the top management, the protocol on taking office of the new leadership takes effect
        For example, on May 9 the entire line of successors is together on a small patch where they can be destroyed even without a nuclear strike. The military leadership is there too.
        in the country - the aggressor receives a massive nuclear missile strike
        And if there is no evidence of involvement? If not a rocket, but a compact bomb brought in the trunk of a diplomatic car, or not a nuclear explosion at all, but a volume explosion bomb? And if there is a suspicion of a terrorist attack? There may be many options. As a result, temporary chaos in power and against this background, a global blow.
        10 minutes in the presence of a ready-made protocol of actions is quite sufficient time.
        Ten minutes for a decision may be enough, but there will not be ten minutes when a radar strike hits - until the radar detects a strike, while the operators analyze the information received, and transmit by command - how much will the management have to make a decision? You can not reset the human factor - man is not a robot, he always has doubts, distrust, unwillingness to believe in the inevitability of the death of millions and himself. Emotions can be dealt with, but would you have dealt with in a few minutes, if not seconds?
  • Cyrus 16 November 2019 14: 14 New
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    Another disease whose diagnosis is Poseidon))
  • Doctor 13 November 2019 21: 45 New
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    The article theoretically convincingly substantiates the uselessness of the SSBN as a component of the nuclear triad.
    However, there is practical evidence for this theory. At present, the quantitative and qualitative composition of our nuclear submarines, the organization of the database, and the degree of their protection against enemy submarines are at such a low level that they can be ignored as part of the country's nuclear forces. However, they do not attack us, there are not even prerequisites. So enough mine and mobile complexes. Proven by US and NATO.
    1. illi 13 November 2019 22: 45 New
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      However, they do not attack us, there are not even prerequisites. So enough mine and mobile complexes. Proven by US and NATO.

      Now Timokhin will come and prove to you that just the other day the United States will attack us with all its atomic power. They have literally now the last preparations are ending. And they will attack us because the Chinese do not like. That's it.
    2. Cyrus 16 November 2019 14: 16 New
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      And who told you that there will be prerequisites, this is firstly, secondly, if you do not see them, that does not mean that they are not there.
      1. Doctor 16 November 2019 18: 49 New
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        And who told you that there will be prerequisites, this is firstly, secondly, if you do not see them, that does not mean that they are not there.

        In the 90's, our army, like the whole country, was at the bottom. We even fought in a regional civil war (Chechnya) with all our strengths. There was no more convenient moment to kill us since the days of the Second World War. However, the West for some reason did not.
        Because the United States, as this is not surprisingly voiced by some, is not an aggressor country.
  • Old26 13 November 2019 22: 18 New
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    Quote: Sapsan136
    Ground mines are known to an adversary who has their coordinates, which means they are vulnerable ...

    Vulnerable. But, the power of modern warheads is much lower than it was 30-40 years ago. The power of SLBMs is now from 100 ct to 475 ct. And according to the calculations of the Americans, two blocks are needed to guarantee the defeat of the main number of mines. Theoretically, it is possible to achieve the defeat of a mine with a CVT of the order of 100 meters, but the chances are that in the silos by that time (time of destruction) the rocket will be extremely small.

    Quote: Sapsan136
    The mobility of wheeled platforms is not great, and the RF does not have a BZHRK today ...

    Mobility is about the same. In extremely small sections of the BZHRK movement, the speed is greater than the PGRK. In other cases, it is comparable. The mobility of the PGRK is sufficient so that in 20-30 minutes it is possible to go a distance of 15-20 km. In this case, the affected area of ​​the same 100 ki or 475 ct of ammunition will be insufficient to cause irreparable damage to the mobile launcher

    Quote: Sapsan136
    So comparing APS with land-based stationary mines is simply stupid ... A submarine is more mobile, which means they have a better chance of surviving

    Comparing is really stupid. the main task of any launcher is SHOOT OUTand not survive after a hit. In silos, the time required for the launch is approximately one and a half minutes. The boat will need more time for this and it is possible that at this time (launch preparation) it can be destroyed by enemy submarine hunters

    Quote: Sapsan136
    Do not underestimate the intelligence of the United States and the Bandera and Basmachi who have come to the Russian Federation, who will gladly gear and will gear the USA against the Russian Federation.

    AND? Well, let the U.S. intelligence detect (let us imagine this purely theoretically) the PGRK exit to the field position area. What will this give the Americans? Knowing the fact that the launchers are "in the field"? After all, such exits are quite regular. In addition, PGRK can safely carry out launches while in the Krona facilities.

    As for the ground grouping (Bandera and Basmachi), they will need a lot to control several exits and the regiment's deployment area. In addition, the appearance of such a large number of people and their long-term presence in the area of ​​the RPD will be quickly revealed. As part of each regiment of the PGRK there are security units that not only control the RPD, but also the surrounding area. Upon exit from the RPM, the security units will carry out their work along the route and will begin even before the launchers leave the structures and from the regiment ...

    Now for the US satellite constellation.
    Among the guidance documents there are materials related to the satellite environment. Not a single regiment commander will launch launchers for satellite lenses. The performance characteristics of satellites are sometimes such that it is possible to detect something resembling a launcher, but the time required for identification will be significant. And even if the satellite “detects” the launch, during the time required for transmission of the image over the air, the time required to decrypt the image and to transmit information to the weapon will far exceed the time required to launch the rocket from this launch.

    Quote: Sapsan136
    The mobility of wheeled complexes is usually around 50 km, it’s not a lot ... It’s stupid to compare wheeled units with nuclear submarines, it would still be possible with the BZHRK, but not with the wheels ... for heaven and earth are mobile

    I will repeat my thesis and thesis of Andrew. A speed of 50 km / h is enough to take the launcher out of the impact zone. The enemy will be able to hit such a launcher only if he begins to lay the warheads in a “square-nested” way, so that the zones of destruction by the warheads overlap. And for this you need oh how many blocks.
    In general, it’s really stupid to compare PGRK, silos and nuclear submarines with SLBMs. Each has its undoubted advantages and, of course, cons

    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    It is not just thick, it is super thick. Can you imagine how many warheads of the megaton class you need to sow a circle with a radius of 50 km in order to guarantee the killing of mobile launchers?

    Especially when you consider, Andrei, that our "sworn friends" from the USA are not in service with the megaton-class warheads
  • Wildcat 13 November 2019 22: 20 New
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    Good article, interesting questions!
    But ... "the presence in the Russian triad of the SSBN will never allow such an error to happen." We have invulnerable SSBNs, the Russians have the invulnerable SSBNs, well, let everything remain as it is. " - only not in conditions when "Foreign atomarians can watch our ships already at the exit from the bases, and, in the future, accompany them in the immediate readiness to use weapons upon receipt of an appropriate order." In this case, the 1 SSBNs will receive the 1-2 nuclear submarines that the SSBNs will drown. But on 16 mines, you need 16 (or 32?) BCH, and PGRK still needs to be found (and not only in the position area, probably).
    Rather, we can conclude from the article that our SSBNs for our “partners” are a good opportunity to remove a retaliatory strike.
  • AAK
    AAK 13 November 2019 23: 46 New
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    Information for consideration, however ... The disappointing conclusions for SSBNs suggest themselves:
    1. The actual ratio at the moment of combat-ready submarines of all types (except for boats with armored vehicles) on the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet in relation to the number of SSBNs is unlikely to exceed 1,5 to 1, the situation is not better for NK, i.e. the forces of these two fleets will be able to ensure during the threatened period that no more than half or even a third of SSBNs (4-6 units for both fleets, 64-96 ICBMs or 400-700 BGs) can be delivered relatively safely to the open ocean. How many of the withdrawn boats will "survive" until the launch of the BR in the conditions of active counteraction of five to all five of the largest number of enemy submarines? Hardly more than half. It’s not difficult to calculate the number of possible enemy targets in this situation ... The next controversial point is that when the Russian strategic nuclear forces retaliate, another problem arises, and where will we shoot at the empty mines, from where the ICBMs have already flown out (list of targets in " red packets "is limited and, as a rule, based on their military priority), or by city and infrastructure ... For shooters, it’s still small, but there is a moral difference ...
    2. The deployment of an enemy’s BRBD in Europe is not so much for the preventive destruction of strategic nuclear forces as (because of the short flight time, on average 8-10 minutes) for the destruction of political and military command centers and basic infrastructure in the European part of the Russian Federation, where large cities, important and conceived of dangerous for people industrial enterprises, transport hubs, nuclear power plants, etc. The RPM of the PGRK and the silos of ICBMs in the European part of the Russian Federation are much further from the places where the enemy’s infantry ballistic missile could be launched than Kaliningrad, Crimea, St. Petersburg and Moscow ...
    3. Some colleagues at the military academy, considering the situation with the “Bandera Basmachi” gearing on NATO, who crawl in the grass and between the birch trees, will place missile systems on their tablets, completely forget the sad experience of the late 80's - the beginning of 90's. In the threatened period, all sorts of mold is activated, primarily criminal-nationalist. In Siberia and the Far East (where more than half of the strategic nuclear forces of the Russian Federation) there are almost as many Chinese as there are Russians with Buryats, Tyva, Yakuts, Evenks and Chukchi combined. Further, worse, and given the growing almost exponentially facts of "love" of all sorts of small nationalities to Russians, elementary facts of hostage-taking from military families with the threat of hostage-killing, even when rockets are put into combat readiness or when the submarines leave the pier, are not ruled out ... And the elder of the launch will think what to do, turn the "key to the start", or save his wife and children so that they don’t have time to cut off their heads ...
    In general, it’s a little shitty, in spite of the drawn bright prospects ....
    1. Vadmir 14 November 2019 01: 30 New
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      and where we’ll shoot, at the empty mines, from where the ICBMs have already taken off (the list of targets in the “red packets” is limited and, as a rule, proceeds from their military priority), or by cities and infrastructure ... For shooters, it’s still a small but moral difference there is...
      There is a moral difference on the first hit. With a reciprocal and reciprocal counter, it can no longer be. And in this case, it is necessary to hit just the population in order to inflict unacceptable damage, and the adversaries should know about it, and have no doubt whether there will be a retaliatory strike.
      1. g1washntwn 15 November 2019 11: 20 New
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        Quote: Vadmir
        There is a moral difference on the first hit. With a reciprocal and reciprocal counter, it can no longer be.

        IMHO, the way it is. It is unlikely that the coordinates of the silo ICBMs are laid in the Perimeter. Even if the enemy does not launch their ground-based ICBMs in order to preserve the arguments after the preemptive strike, the task of causing unacceptable damage is only for goals that comprise strategic and economic potential. This is energy, industry, transport, science and research, etc. From megaton class in relation to megacities have long been abandoned. No matter how blasphemous this may sound, the task is to drop the standard of living of the enemy “below the baseboard”, and then the population will mow down the consequences, not the direct impact (by the way, this also applies to non-military methods to the full extent).
    2. Polinom 15 November 2019 17: 33 New
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      The SSBN will not be released. At least from Vilyuchinsk, even with all the might of the USSR, one out of six was withdrawn. And then with P-0,86. And now it’s am
      1. ccsr 15 November 2019 20: 33 New
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        Quote: Polinom
        At least from Vilyuchinsk, even with all the might of the USSR, one out of six was withdrawn. And then with P-0,86. And now it’s

        Precisely because we no longer have the power that was in the USSR, we must increase our underwater component of the strategic nuclear forces as much as possible, because it is they who can hold the staff for the scrotum, if only because the direction of the strike is unpredictable. So, instead of hikes and the creation of large surface ships, the fleet should significantly increase the number of submarines on alert. We have no other alternative - and this is understood by those who know what the Americans are afraid of. It is expensive and expensive, but there is no other way.
        1. Polinom 19 November 2019 15: 06 New
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          At least a dozen Boreevs will be stationed in Vilyuchinsk; now not a single one will be secretly released. And when deployed in a threatened period (or at the beginning of the database) - they will drown everyone.
          We had 8 OVR brigades from 114 MPCs and six minesweepers at 6th SSBN. BEM brigade (173rd) three 1135 and two 57. PSKR brigade of 3 1135 P. Varshavianok brigade in Bechevinka, 671 RTM division, Be-12 squadron, and Mi-14 squadron with Ka-25. AGAM, and the CEO in Berezovoy. Plus, on order, the Tu-142 regiment in Sov Gavan .... And then they pulled ONE out of the war. If you did not have time to deploy, but those that came out were not to be saved. I did this at the time (1980-1990)
          Count the security forces for one SSBN then and now.
          1. ccsr 19 November 2019 19: 39 New
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            Quote: Polinom
            At least a dozen Boreevs will be stationed in Vilyuchinsk; now not a single one will be secretly released. And when deployed in a threatened period (or at the beginning of the database) - they will drown everyone.

            For some reason, I understood that we are specifically increasing the number of SSBNs so that as many of them as possible are on duty in three oceans, and not be in bases. Naturally, some of the boats will be under modernization or repair, some will be kept in reserve, but at least 30% of the total number should be on duty, i.e. on a hike.
            If all this is not so, then I don’t understand the modern naval commanders at all - what are they counting on if they are seriously dug up by the minister or the General Staff, who will order an analytical or search research and prove that the naval ones are bluffing about their capabilities. Maybe I don’t understand something, but it seemed to me that the naval ones knew what to do so that at least 4-6 SSBNs out of the total could launch missiles, and this is already enough to cause unacceptable damage to the United States.
            1. Polinom 23 November 2019 21: 04 New
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              I do not know. There is an opinion, and not only mine.
              Support and not lose the industry.
              Or quite simply cut.
              However, after the Olympics, bridges, missiles, Poseidons, you will not surprise anyone.
              4-6 SSBN of the total number.
              They are the same number. One if he can shoot back, good.
              Kamchatka, as I suspect, will not be able to shoot at all. There has been talk about this for a long time.
              1. ccsr 24 November 2019 10: 45 New
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                Quote: Polinom
                I do not know. There is an opinion, and not only mine.
                Support and not lose the industry.

                This must be done in any case - the future will still be with the submarine fleet.
                Quote: Polinom
                4-6 SSBN of the total number.
                They are the same number.

                I will not argue, because I don’t know how things really are, but I know from the media that there is an armament program that provides for the construction of an SSBN. Such a rearmament of the fleet is done in more than one armament program, so I think everything is going according to plan.
                Quote: Polinom
                Kamchatka, as I suspect, will not be able to shoot at all.

                The main thing is that the Americans do not know about this. And there you look and Kamchatka will fix everything, if everything is really the way you write.
                1. Polinom 28 November 2019 12: 27 New
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                  Yes they all know. They are sitting in a pool at home, playing catch-up. Instead of firing rockets and military services. It has been discussed more than once.

                  1. ccsr 28 November 2019 17: 49 New
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                    Quote: Polinom
                    Yes they all know. They are sitting in a pool at home, playing catch-up. Instead of firing rockets and military services. It has been discussed more than once.

                    I think that gradually everything will normalize, and they will be forced to do what they were originally intended to do. There is no exaggeration here - you just have to always remember that a surface ship has much more unmasking features than an underwater missile carrier, which means that strategic missile weapons will need to be deployed only in submarines. This will be the main direction of the development of the Navy's strategic nuclear forces in the 21st century, and I am sure of that.
  • G. Georgiev 14 November 2019 00: 27 New
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    Russia is big, but it must be protected by many deployed A-235, C-500, Tirada-2C systems, as well as protection from 5000 tomahawks from all sides through REB systems (Tomahawk, 100 got to intact in Syria from 30, sorry.) that Kraukha-4, did not help much ... Surface ships are not needed !!!! Submarines only.
    1. Vadmir 14 November 2019 01: 34 New
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      Russia is big, but it must be protected by many deployed A-235, C-500, Tirada-2C systems, as well as protection from 5000 tomahawks from all sides through REB systems
      High wrote: Russia is big. What you proposed will not be mastered by any economy.
      Surface ships are not needed !!!! Submarines only.
      In order for boats to safely enter the sea, many surface ships and anti-submarine aircraft with helicopters are needed.
  • G. Georgiev 14 November 2019 03: 42 New
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    This is not an economic forum, but a military one. In Russia, there are many unnecessary industries, which take a lot of money. For example, medium-sized missile ships.
  • G. Georgiev 14 November 2019 03: 48 New
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    Your nuclear submarines, they are for nuclear war, but who will protect you and with what system. A-235, C-500 and Tirada -2C are important. Quantity required.
    1. Vadmir 14 November 2019 04: 12 New
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      who will protect you and with what system
      The sword protects no worse than a shield, preventing the desire to attack. In this case, the sword, unlike the shield, you can not only defend.
  • Vladimir_2U 14 November 2019 05: 50 New
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    A good article, by the way, plus the SSBN, it is necessary to add the beginning of the construction of covered piers, secrecy in this case increases significantly.
  • Avior 14 November 2019 10: 15 New
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    Perhaps this aspect is not disclosed.
    The START treaty expires, and the States stipulate its extension by 2 with points that include China's participation in it and the inclusion of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons in it.
    China is against, and the US is far behind Russia in tactical weapons, both in terms of charges and carriers, so Russia is against.
    But this can change in a fairly short time.
    Even if the agreement is extended on the same terms as it is now, this does not exclude the appearance of medium-range missiles, including ballistic or quasi-ballistic ones, in mobile installations in the variant with nuclear tactical warheads, which are still in service restrictions. And thus, taking into account the territorial location, the Americans will have the opportunity to attack mines and mobile installations without using strategic weapons, virtually unlimited in terms of the number of means of attack.
    And strategic ones will remain for strikes on industrial and other goals.
    And if the contract is not renewed, there will be no restrictions on strategic charges and their carriers.
    In both cases, the role of SLBMs increases dramatically.
  • Alex_59 14 November 2019 10: 23 New
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    The author does not have data on the cost of mine or mobile launchers, but it will not be a mistake to assume that they will be much cheaper for 16 missiles.
    In the 00-ies Topol ICBMs cost about 45-50 million dollars - estimated. Accordingly, the "Mace" should cost about the same (it has a little less "meat", the electronics are similar, but there is an RCM). Consequently, the ammunition "Borea" 16x50 = 800 million dollars approximately.
    For comparison, the launch of the Proton launch vehicle with the Breeze RB without taking into account the payload cost in those years amounted to about 70-75 million dollars.
  • mik193 14 November 2019 10: 46 New
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    I'll try to add a little. Another difference between ground-based launchers is the well-known launch site, which can facilitate their interception. The place of launch of missiles from the rpk SN, naturally, subject to proper secrecy, is not known to the enemy. And the duty of the rpk SN in the base is a necessary measure. In the 90's, ships were usually on duty, temporarily unable to go to sea and with a shortage of crew.
  • G. Georgiev 14 November 2019 11: 37 New
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    I don’t understand why they say everywhere that Russia is superior to the USA in tactical weapons, because the picture for the 2018 year: Tomahawk BGM-109 = 2200 pcs. + AGM-86 = 1800 pcs. + AGM-158 JASSM-ER = 700 and in Russia only 500 X-55, with a deviation of 50-70 meters from the target. The new X-101, X-555 air are recent production.
    1. Vadmir 14 November 2019 12: 00 New
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      Tactical nuclear weapons also include aerial bombs, artillery shells and mines from 152mm caliber, operational tactical ballistic missiles (for example, Iskander), as well as the air-based cruise missiles you mentioned that are not mentioned sea-based KR (Caliber and Grenade), land-based KR (also launched by Iskander). Etc.
  • Protos 14 November 2019 11: 40 New
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    Quote: Sapsan136
    On the contrary ... I imagine how several Bandera, Basmachi, or NATO special forces will illuminate your wheeled launchers for their Tomahawks .... In Iraq, the Yankees commanding the airborne tactical missile launchers of Iraq confidently illuminated their aircraft

    And it didn’t help them!
    For the whole company, they could not destroy not one Skud launcher, only a couple of LCs and one MOT car!
    And this is in the DESERT !!! hi
  • Old26 14 November 2019 12: 39 New
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    Quote: Avior
    The START treaty expires, and the States stipulate its extension by 2 with points that include China's participation in it and the inclusion of non-strategic (tactical) nuclear weapons in it.
    China is against, and the US is far behind Russia in tactical weapons, both in terms of charges and carriers, so Russia is against.
    But this can change in a fairly short time ..

    I think that the Americans will nevertheless prolong the treaty. A test ball about two points - a game for the public. They are well aware that contracts of this type are not concluded in a year or two. Even the development of bilateral takes 5-7 years. Here, none of the parties to such a tripartite agreement will not sign it. Too many factors to consider

    Quote: Avior
    Even if the agreement is extended on the same terms as it is now, this does not exclude the appearance of medium-range missiles, including ballistic or quasi-ballistic ones, in mobile installations in the variant with nuclear tactical warheads, which are still in service restrictions. And thus, taking into account the territorial location, the Americans will have the opportunity to attack mines and mobile installations without using strategic weapons, virtually unlimited in terms of the number of means of attack.

    Purely theoretically, over the course of 2-3 years, Americans can create, and within about 5 years, deploy medium-range ballistic missiles, including and in Europe.
    The question now they have is on a slightly different plane. Their plans for resuscitation of their own weapons and nuclear complex in order to start the production of new IW-type warheads to replace the old W are bursting at all seams. And if according to the original plan they planned to produce the first new warheads in the 2028 go, then this date has shifted to the 2030 years, and now we are talking about the 2033-2035 years. And most likely the last figure is close to realities.
    Seych their OYAK is only capable of doing two things.
    1. Dispose of old
    2. Conduct a life extension program for warheads in service.

    These possibilities are approximately 3 hundreds of utilizable and as many modernizable charges. The stocks of ready-made nuclear warheads that they are capable of delivering right now to their new missiles (cruise missiles for the Air Force and Navy) are extremely small. And it is unlikely that the Air Force and Navy will voluntarily give them up to equip new ballistic missiles

    The possibility of hitting mines and mobile complexes theoretically exists (everything will depend on the range of such missiles in the USA and where they are deployed. And there, as they say, “fift-fifti.” The long range and location of such missiles outside the zone of destruction by our current complexes will give time to retaliatory strike mine complexes. Striking on mobile - "money down the drain. Too many warheads will be needed to hit at least one launcher.

    Quote: G. Georgiev
    Russia is big, but it must be protected by many deployed A-235, C-500, Tirada-2C systems, as well as protection from 5000 tomahawks from all sides through REB systems (Tomahawk, 100 got to intact in Syria from 30, sorry.) that Kraukha-4, did not help much ... Surface ships are not needed !!!! Submarines only.

    to unravel a lot of A-235 - voluntarily ruin your country. Any missile defense system cannot be designed to intercept all targets. EMNIP system A-135M was able to intercept 18 paired targets in the presence of 100 anti-missile
    C-500 is still "It is not clear what." What functions it will perform and how many such complexes will be deployed is still unknown. As for all of these electronic warfare systems, you should not consider them a panacea. In 1, not all guidance systems will be able to influence them, and in 2 the inclusion of such systems at full power and their own electronic means will create tangible problems.

    you need everything. Armed forces, including and the fleet must be balanced. Declare that surface ships are not needed, but only submarines are needed - sorry not from a great mind. If the enemy has such surface ships, they can multiply our submarines by zero ...

    Quote: mik193
    I'll try to add a little. Another difference between ground-based launchers is the well-known launch site, which can facilitate their interception. The place of launch of missiles from the rpk SN, naturally, subject to proper secrecy, is not known to the enemy. And the duty of the rpk SN in the base is a necessary measure. In the 90's, ships were usually on duty, temporarily unable to go to sea and with a shortage of crew.

    Chit theoretically yes, the coordinates of the launch site can theoretically facilitate the interception. But ... Each missile has in its PZ not a single target, but several. The number and location of US missile defense systems is known. The probability of being intercepted by one missile defense is the same. And then mathematics comes into play. For 100% guaranteed interception of the target, with a probability of intercepting an anti-ballistic missile of the order of 0,8-0,85, you will need up to 3-4 anti-ballistic missiles on the target. At least they will have to plan such an amount of interceptors (of course, interception can be carried out with a single missile defense). So what is next...
    For example, our Voyevoda rocket carries 10 combat units and a number of heavy false targets (even 10). That is, for a guaranteed defeat of all warheads and heavy false targets, a minimum of 20 anti-missiles and a maximum of 60-80 are required.
    Our “sworn friends” now have such missiles in the order of 44 in two position areas (40 in Alaska and 4 in California). Even without false targets and with the 1 anti-missile-1 BG scenario, the entire US missile defense can only hit a couple of Russian Voivode.
    The duty of the boats in the base is of course a necessary measure, but if necessary, they can shoot back from the pier.

    Quote: G. Georgiev
    I don’t understand why they say everywhere that Russia is superior to the USA in tactical weapons, because the picture for the 2018 year: Tomahawk BGM-109 = 2200 pcs. + AGM-86 = 1800 pcs. + AGM-158 JASSM-ER = 700 and in Russia only 500 X-55, with a deviation of 50-70 meters from the target. The new X-101, X-555 air are recent production.

    Of course superior. We are talking about tactful nuclear charges, but you mechanically voice the numbers without thinking that
    1. Tomahawks may be 5000, but not one of them is equipped with nuclear warheads. Nuclear modification was utilized back in the last decade and the number of nuclear "tomahawks" was less than 400
    2. From the ALCM of the AGM-86 type with nuclear weapons less than 500. the rest are redone for conventional or cluster warheads.
    3. Not a single AGM-158 rocket was tested with a nuclear warhead and the Americans simply had a week of nuclear warheads on it

    In Russia, the X-55 is already, if not completely withdrawn from service, then intensively withdrawn. If they remain, then the X-55СМ with accuracy characteristics is significantly higher than that of the X-55
    X-555 was never a nuclear cruise missile. This is a conventional X-55 version with a conventional warhead ... And it is not new at the same time. X-101 are put into service in terms of replacing the same X-55 and how many are unknown. One hundred, two or five
    1. Vadmir 14 November 2019 13: 14 New
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      X-101 are put into service in terms of replacing the same X-55 and how many are unknown.
      Well, to be completely accurate, then X-101 is also not nuclear - nuclear is its modification of X-102.
  • Old26 14 November 2019 13: 44 New
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    Quote: Vadmir
    X-101 are put into service in terms of replacing the same X-55 and how many are unknown.
    Well, to be completely accurate, then X-101 is also not nuclear - nuclear is its modification of X-102.

    Yes, of course you are right. X-102
  • VohaAhov 14 November 2019 14: 45 New
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    Andrey, welcome! Welcome back! The topic that you raised is very important and interesting. Probably, in the following articles of this series it is worth telling about the quantitative and qualitative composition of the MSLF, both Russian and foreign. Fortunately, there are few countries with such weapons — only five. You can tell what damage can be done to the enemy by one full salvo of 16 SLBMs (and this is minus 2-3 US states). It is probably worth telling what the optimal composition of the NSLF of Russia will be. In my opinion, the APPCR should be 12 units, 6 on each of the fleets (Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet). In the fleet, boats should be reduced to 3 units in a division, one of which is in combat service, and the other two are ready or under repair. Based on this, there should be 4 (four) boats at the same time on combat patrol. It is desirable that the boats are of the same type and have the same type of SLBMs.
    1. Vadmir 14 November 2019 14: 58 New
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      of which one is in combat service, and the other two are in readiness or for repair.
      We have such deadlines for repairs, I am afraid that there will not be enough 6 boats to have 2 at sea.
    2. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 14 November 2019 16: 27 New
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      Quote: VohaAhov
      Andrey, welcome! Welcome back!

      Thank you, Vladimir, and good day to you! :)
      Quote: VohaAhov
      Probably, in the next articles of this series it is worth talking about the quantitative and qualitative composition of the “MSNS” both Russian and foreign

      Yet this is somehow another time :))) I was not going to pay too much attention to the SSBNs and quickly switch to general forces, but how do you get over to them if their priority task is to ensure the strategic nuclear forces? :) laughing
      1. Nemchinov Vl 17 November 2019 18: 56 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        The fact is that SSBNs are not a self-sufficient means [/ nuclear war and require significant forces to cover their deployment.
        I have a question for you precisely on this aspect: - How exactly do you, Andrey, see that the Navy has concentrated its orders for the Navy "in favor" of the Yasen-M project (pr. 885M, as ICLM), which It turned out in the course of testing - far from perfect, but already "treasury is too expensive". I must say right away that this is not so much a rebuke as an analysis of personal observations. It is clear that each new product is not without its “childhood diseases” (and with the fleet as an example, this is most easily seen). But why the Navy began to run into the Ash ?! After all, if it’s just according to the criteria: Cost / effectiveness / speed of construction (to close the gap / deficit of the ICAPL, in the places where the SSBN is deployed), which was formed after the collapse of the USSR, and cutting the mass of new, "not served their own" boats, pr. 671 RTMK. It seems to me that it would be much more logical to increase the ICAPL deficit, with boats of just the project type - 671 RTMK / Barakuda / Lira .. i.e. something averaged, with the maximum possible minimization by VI (naturally at the modern technological level, and in acoustics and so on. systems) Well, I think that you understood me correctly, that we are talking about boats much smaller than Yasen-M or even Pike-B, size and displacement, and therefore their cost, and accordingly, the speed of construction ?! At a minimum, before filling up 3-4 brigades (two each in the Northern Fleet and Pacific Fleet), to provide for military reconnaissance in the areas of deployment of the SSBNs, as well as parts of them, for small groups to "freely hunt", for similar cruisers of the "likely enemy" (control and tracking them)?! I think that in the TOR for such a project, the requirement was to be laid down to minimize the VI to 4-5 (well, a maximum of 6500 tons), the underwater speed of 32 or more knots, the reduction in the number of crews (thanks to automation, and where it’s not damage, struggle for survivability), and the cost of construction per unit up to 1/5 of the Ash-M project, well, at least four cheaper ?! Those. Your opinion is interesting on this aspect in the construction of the Russian Navy. Yes, thanks for the article. I read you and Timokhin, especially interesting !!
        1. bk0010 17 November 2019 21: 21 New
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          Quote: Nemchinov Vl
          But, why did the Navy begin to run into the Ash tree ?!
          Because it is the best that we have. That which can fight not only with a moose, but also with a virgin, and not be targets for them. I recall that a similar jump also cost the United States a lot: one wolf cost eighteen moose, but only he could act in our bastion of that time.
          1. Nemchinov Vl 17 November 2019 21: 50 New
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            Quote: bk0010
            Because it is the best that we have. That which can fight not only with a moose, but also with a virgin, and not be targets for them.
            well, don’t have to so ... have a fever, or what ?! There, a little lower, in correspondence with A. Timokhin, I seem to be a real case (as it is said from history, cited). and “Ash-M”, as tests show, is still so - hypothetically ... And in the price of construction, it’s not that it’s “hit the ruble”, but it’s whipping right away, it can be said to strip !! Here you are, personally, seeing gaps in the provision of artillery reconnaissance, say Pacific Fleet, and the catastrophic shortage of ICAPLs for cover in the deployment sites of the SSBNs, you will continue to be happy for Yasen-M (given their high cost and the slow construction speed associated with this), or prefer to look for a reasonable an alternative (suppose a project of something between RTMK / Barracuda / Lira, with a cost of 1/4 of the cost of Ash-M, naturally at the modern technological level in both acoustics and stealth, etc.), what would fill this gap faster ?! So that, -
            Quote: bk0010
            this is the best we have
            yes -
            Quote: bk0010
            That which can fight not only with elk,
            with a small letter (well, something like that) ... What would fight with “Elk” (aka “Los Angeles”) was enough “Pike-B” ?! It does not seem ?! The main thing here is the number of real, combat units embodied already in the metal, and in fact !! Do not agree ?! And I just because the analogue of the project 971 ("Pike-B") today, it would make sense to make it more compact (on the VI, and the crew) and cheaper (in construction). Otherwise, there is a huge risk of being embroiled in an arms race and losing it mediocre in pursuit of some ambitious Wunderwaffe. At one time, it was the quantitative composition of the submarines (first of all, multi-purpose hunters, capable of shooting the “Grenade” as well) of the USSR Navy, and the parity practically achieved in this (if not even quantitative superiority), forced USA as they say and "spare no money" for their disposal, when signing contracts "about the world" with Gorbachev ... Therefore, for God's sake, moderate ardor patrioticand do not bully the world with a family of not yet held Ashes ....
            1. bk0010 18 November 2019 00: 26 New
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              Quote: Nemchinov Vl
              Here you are, personally, seeing gaps in the provision of artillery reconnaissance, say Pacific Fleet, and the catastrophic shortage of ICAPLs for cover in the deployment sites of the SSBNs, you will continue to be happy for Yasen-M (given their high cost and the slow construction speed associated with this), or prefer to look for a reasonable an alternative (suppose a project of something between RTMK / Barracuda / Lira, with a cost of 1/4 of the cost of Ash-M, naturally at the modern technological level in both acoustics and stealth, etc.), what would fill this gap faster ?!
              Build diesel, they are quiet, at least there will be a chance. Targets for a quarter of the price of Ashen will not solve the problem. Lira, by the way, was not cheap at all, you should give her as an example in vain.
              Quote: Nemchinov Vl
              What would fight with “Elk” (aka “Los Angeles”) was enough and “Pike-B” ?!
              Virginia is already 17, and will be 30. As long as there are 3 Sea Wolves. What will you do on Shchuk-B if they sail (namely they will sail to us)? Pike-B is quiet, but old, to compete with this pack it must be upgraded. And I see no reason for the price of this upgrade to be very different from the price of Ashen. The only way to save money is to make a purely torpedo version of Ashen, but I’m afraid that he will not give a radical reduction in price.
              1. Nemchinov Vl 18 November 2019 01: 21 New
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                Quote: bk0010
                Lira, by the way, was not cheap at all, you should give her as an example in vain.
                God, I didn’t cite Lira as an example, but where ?! Well, even in my quote you highlighted, well, please well read carefully !!! (we are talking about minimizing the size / read on the VI /, and the number of crews due to automation similar to the "Lear", but not where it would harm the struggle for survivability, or expensive titanium). Well, do not distort, do not push !!
                Quote: bk0010
                Targets for a quarter of the price of Ashen will not solve the problem.
                why targets ?! I'm talking about cost savings, and sizes smaller than even Pike-B (without any VPU in the hull of the boat for the Onyx / Caliber, this is "a significant part of the rise in price of Yasen Ave"), and at ICAPL, they are so directly necessary ?! Are you sure ?! Furthermore, you seem willing to admit that -
                Quote: bk0010
                Pike-B is quiet but old
                and it was about a more minimized ICAPL project, at the modern technological level, right?
                Quote: bk0010
                Build diesel, they are quiet, at least there will be a chance.
                Well, at the deployment sites and for the OVR, I agree. And there I see the most promising project P-750 with VNEU ... But the nuclear submarine project that I would like to see - something in between RTMK / Barracuda / Lira, could serve not only in the deployment areas, but also a “free hunt” to go to the far shores, so to speak .. And due to the lower cost, and therefore the greater filling of the fleet ICAPL huntersmuch faster and cheaper than Ash would balance just those -
                Quote: bk0010
                Virginia is already 17, and will be 30. As long as there are 3 Sea Wolves.
                and say that -
                Quote: bk0010
                Pike-B is quiet, but old, to compete with this pack it must be upgraded. And I see no reason for the price of this upgrade to be very different from the price of Ashen.
                So the cost of "Pike-B" is about 0,5 to 0,7 of the cost of "Ash", and I just stand for an even cheaper project (due to minimization). That is, if instead of one "Ashen" for the same, if not less construction time, the fleet will receive four (well, even three) new ICAPL hunter ?! Is it like you ?! Does this idea annoy you ?! And this at equal cost !! Is this what infuriates you ?!
                1. bk0010 18 November 2019 20: 22 New
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                  Quote: Nemchinov Vl
                  That is, if instead of one “Ash” for the same, if not even shorter construction time, the fleet will receive four (well, even three) new MCAPL hunters ?!
                  I took your text as a proposal to build Pike-B instead of Ash. That is, you propose to make a new nuclear submarine, which could compete with the 4th generation of the US nuclear submarines, but would be cheap? I don’t think it was real. This requires a new technological leap.
                  Quote: Nemchinov Vl
                  ... ICAPL, are they so directly necessary ?!
                  We have boats (modern) is not enough. And I don’t think that launchers are prohibitively expensive - take a look at Borey: he has launchers for strategic missiles, but he is cheaper than Ashen.
          2. Polinom 19 November 2019 15: 08 New
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            You are wrong and mistaken, regarding the comparison of Los, Virginia and Ash. COMPLEX and PLO SYSTEM, not a single boat.
    3. SVD68 14 November 2019 20: 56 New
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      There is no reason to believe that the KOH of the Russian SSBNs will be greater than 0,24. Because you need them 16.
      1. Nemchinov Vl 17 November 2019 20: 16 New
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        Quote: SVD68
        There is no reason to believe that the KOH of the Russian SSBNs will be greater than 0,24. Because you need them 16.
        I’ll be curious ... and KOH Russian ICAPL =?!, and, accordingly, - how many of them are needed (and most importantly what) let me ask ?!
  • Alexey LK 14 November 2019 18: 37 New
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    1. From the point of view of nuclear war, the SSBN, although cynical, important (even if relatively light) targets will divert some of the nuclear warheads, which means there will be less for civilian targets. Not to mention that they themselves have time to do something.
    2. From the point of view of economic confrontation, the presence of an SSBN forces the United States, NATO countries and Japan to have numerous basic patrol aircraft, the contents of which cost no less than a dozen strategic boats.
    3.
    In addition, the SSBN at sea is in principle not affected by strategic nuclear warheads - unless it is in the base.

    What did the author mean? Why not hit if discovered?
    1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 14 November 2019 19: 49 New
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      Quote: Alexey LK
      What did the author mean? Why not hit if discovered?

      An SSBN at sea cannot be destroyed by either a ballistic missile or a missile launcher with a nuclear bomber or a nuclear bomb from a bomber
      1. Alexey LK 14 November 2019 21: 23 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        nor KR with YABCH

        How about an aircraft torpedo? Or a depth bomb from a patrol plane? Or is it, as it were, not strategic, but tactical nuclear weapons? So the difference?
      2. Polinom 15 November 2019 17: 35 New
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        Wrong.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 November 2019 18: 56 New
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          No, I’m not mistaken :)
          1. Polinom 19 November 2019 15: 13 New
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            So with VUSovka - "070200 Planning Operations and Combat Operations of the Fleet" I played the fool, it is a pity I didn’t know you before, otherwise I would have invited him for a consultation.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 19 November 2019 16: 16 New
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              Apparently yes, they dumped :) And in more detail let me know exactly where, I can only after at least some concretization of your statements
      3. Nemchinov Vl 17 November 2019 20: 22 New
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        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        An SSBN at sea cannot be destroyed by either a ballistic missile or a missile launcher with a nuclear bomber or a nuclear bomb from a bomber
        and it was torpedoed by the enemy ICAPL (well, like Los Angeles), which is carrying out tracking (hunting, if you like), maybe ?! ... As an example, the “Kursk” happened (well, it’s more likely that they were blundered by a fright), but still, maybe or not ?! that is, you are absolutely sure that -
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        SSBN at sea cannot be destroyed
        , or the question of how, and in what situation ?!
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 18 November 2019 06: 06 New
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          Of course it can. If the deployment is opened and the SSBN is monitored. But the SNF has nothing to do with it.
    2. timokhin-aa 14 November 2019 20: 06 New
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      What did the author mean? Why not hit if discovered?


      Well, you’re sitting at the checkpoint in Washington state. A report arrives to you that a reconnaissance satellite of such and such 11 minutes ago has detected a “Kelvin wedge” from an underwater object in the Sea of ​​Okhotsk.

      The course is so-and-so, the speed at a given wave is not exactly determined by 4-9 nodes approximately.

      And how do you destroy it? How do you determine what it is:

      1. Russian submarine
      2. SSBN and not a "hunter".
      3. Guaranteed not its own submarine on the "free hunt".

      And yes, even if determined, then how to get it?
      1. Alexey LK 14 November 2019 21: 20 New
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        Quote: timokhin-aa
        How do you determine what it is

        When I wrote “discover,” of course I also meant “identify.” How can we be sure that in places like the Sea of ​​Okhotsk a network of autonomous underwater detection stations is not already deployed, hunter drones do not patrol, etc.? What in our communication systems, in headquarters, do not sit different bookmarks, spyware, etc.?
        Quote: timokhin-aa
        And yes, even if determined, then how to get it?

        Pre-installed mine torpedoes, for example. Or underwater standby drones ...
        I do not claim that this is exactly how it is, but I do not exclude this. Yes, the whole ocean cannot be covered by such zones of destruction, but the whole is not necessary - the areas where the SSBN "graze" are, in general terms, long known - I think so.
        1. timokhin-aa 15 November 2019 08: 33 New
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          Putting something at the bottom of the Sea of ​​Okhotsk is a loss of surprise, no one will go for it.
      2. Polinom 15 November 2019 17: 42 New
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        Not from scratch. With Permanent BG tracking according to the plan of military services, space and acoustics. Intervals are specified - how much is acceptable to lose contact. In Elevated follow up will become continuous. Even in the USSR, with the 1-1,2 ratio, Americans managed to keep track of pauses for up to three hours. Time was measured with the passage of the signal to the use of nuclear weapons. (Cycle from 40 min to 2.20.). Now, well, five years ago, they sought less than an hour. SSBN destroyed even after they receive a signal to fire. Well, if only to drive a session on 30, and this is a double-edged sword. It will be worse, and there is no one to drive. They’ll lay right in Rybachy at the piers.
        1. ccsr 15 November 2019 20: 44 New
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          Quote: Polinom
          Even in the USSR, with the 1-1,2 ratio, Americans managed to keep track of pauses for up to three hours. Time was measured with the passage of the signal to the use of nuclear weapons. (Cycle from 40 min to 2.20.). Now, well, five years ago, they sought less than an hour. SSBN destroyed even after they receive a signal to fire. Well, if only to drive a session on 30, and this is a double-edged sword. It will be worse, and there is no one to drive. They’ll lay right in Rybachy at the piers.

          Well, not everything is so pessimistic, if only because our adversary will need time to prepare himself for a nuclear strike. And this means that strategic intelligence will open this preparation, and we will have at least several tens of minutes (or even hours) in reserve. During this time, they will have time to give a command located on the sub-float and wait for a one-way communication session.
          I understand the seriousness of real-time control of submarines and those located at depth, and I believe that in Soviet times it was not finally resolved. But now we’ll just be forced to improve the communication system with the SSBN and I think it’s technically solvable.
          1. Polinom 19 November 2019 15: 16 New
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            Well, maybe they’ll decide ...
        2. Nemchinov Vl 17 November 2019 20: 47 New
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          Quote: Polinom
          They’ll lay right in Rybachy at the piers.
          well no, as he used to say the great commentator, N. Ozerov, - "we don’t need such hockey!".
          Quote: Polinom
          SSBN destroyed even after they receive a signal to fire.
          God forbid, as they say !! Well, I mean what can "the global spending of the MO budget, is it worth revising and redistributing ?!" with the speed of construction of the Boreev and Ash-tree-M, would it make sense to drop (until freezing for a while) until the fleet receives the necessary number of effective ICAPLs ?! Well, something is akin to the "most reliable RTMK" (that is, less and cheaper to build than Yasen-M /at least until the cure of "his childhood diseases" identified during the tests/, or even "Pike-B")?! Or does it seem so to me alone ?!
          1. Polinom 19 November 2019 15: 18 New
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            They created a complex, SYSTEM. Boats are one of the links, important, but not key. This is how to fight in "counter" one computer with a dozen computers and a dozen operators connected by a network.
  • timokhin-aa 14 November 2019 20: 03 New
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    But let’s be frank - about 300 of mine and mobile ballistic missiles, which the ground component of the Russian strategic nuclear forces have today, cannot be destroyed by any “disarming strike”. Today, our "sworn friends" do not have technologies that would guarantee the simultaneous destruction of almost 300 highly protected targets located mostly in the Russian outback, some of which, moreover, can move in space.


    Here it is necessary to add the word "Bye". The problem that confronts the enemy is the following - it is necessary to destroy all targets before they fire in response. This does not mean "at the same time."

    I will quote myself so as not to hammer on the buttons once again:

    the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces can be destroyed by non-diversion methods - if the control system is shaken well by sabotage methods, for example by destroying command personnel at a Victory Day parade, for example. Three bags per 27 kg. Such


    You need to win only flight time. And now we believe - for clarification of the status of the first person and the search for an authorized to issue an order to strike - 5 minutes.
    Passing the order - well, I won’t write how much it is, although I know, let’s say so - the lay volley is faster if it hits the territory of the Russian Federation. His accuracy is lower ... but they will not send one missile at a target.

    We look further:

    Moment “Ch” - SADM detonation, launch of SLBMs from the Norwegian Sea, launch of SLBMs with the W76-1 warhead (improved accuracy) according to the strategic nuclear forces (all), launch of ICBMs, take-off of the B-2 with bombs from Fairford.

    At the moment of H - the loss of all the first persons and two radar SPRN to create blind sectors. Suppose a missile attack is announced in H + 2 minutes.
    But in H + 6-7 minutes CP and communication centers are covered by a lay volley. The launch team cannot technically go anywhere during this time.

    H + 20-30 min depending on the target - all silos and all places of deployment of PGRK cover SLBMs and ICBMs, the remaining missiles cover those places where, according to intelligence, deployed PGRK.

    Further the course of events is simple.

    We still have a certain number of mobile carriers. Sooner or later, with the help of the "Perimeter" or other similar system, they will start.

    Amer's task:

    Find the maximum of these carriers and destroy them. In the case of PGRK, both the remaining reserve ICBMs and the bombers, who will be relatively easy to operate after a nuclear strike on the Russian Federation. ICBMs will be used for those detected by the PGRK satellite, B-2 will search and destroy them themselves.

    As a result, the remaining salvo should not be so large as to inflict unacceptable damage on the attacker. They survive a dozen nuclear explosions on their territory.

    This is how, with some probability, the world without MSNS looks like. I understand that the probability is low, but it is far from zero.

    By the way, we would be able to do this with them too, if not for their SNLF. And it’s easy. They do not have PGRK, our task is much simpler.

    It is clear that at any stage of such an operation there are huge risks, the same bag can be detected by some detector, which in bulk in Moscow, especially in the center, but in any case, all this turns out to be technically possible.

    What gives the SNF — not like ours, but normal ones — they give the power of a retaliation strike. In one case, a dozen PGRK = 30 BBs worked out, in another, a surviving SSBN was added to it, with 160 BBs, moreover, aimed at CITIES, and not at silos and airfields.

    And this factor is quite sobering.

    All that is needed is to make this SSBN survive and live up to the moment when a launch command flew in from some long-wave station. All.

    And two SSBNs are 32 cities with 10 BB for each.

    And this is precisely what we need to think about, and not how to cut the MSNF.

    Because if the adversary is not confident in his ability to endure MNWF (and even now he is completely unsure of it, hunters sometimes lose SSBNs, we don’t have to consider us fingers made, but their gods of depths), then nothing will happen.

    Because, with normal BS support, he will have to raise such forces to search for and intercept the SSBNs so that he can immediately announce a combat alert across all strategic missile forces, disperse the ASNF, raise bombers with nuclear weapons on air alert, and withdraw the rest of the SSBNs by alarm at sea and etc.

    That's all.


    Regarding the destruction of the strategic nuclear forces by the first strike, we do not have bombers on combat duty with bombs, we write them off accordingly.
    Silos are known to all, with topographic accuracy in centimeters.
    For a pair of ICBMs or 3-4 SLBMs on a silos and that’s all.

    PGRK - two thirds in places of post. Deployment. Covered immediately.
    There remains a third of those on duty. Some will be covered by satellite reconnaissance and will run ICBMs on them.
    Some will succeed in finding B-2 which no one will interfere with after a massive nuclear strike against the Russian Federation.

    To deal with those that B-2 cannot find today, the Americans are polishing computer algorithms for analyzing satellite photos specifically to identify masked PGRK. And they will learn to do it.

    So the idea that you can’t cover all three hundred goals is wrong.
    Cover.
    1. Wildcat 14 November 2019 22: 05 New
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      Some will succeed in finding B-2 which no one will interfere with after a massive nuclear strike against the Russian Federation.
      To deal with those that B-2 cannot find today, the Americans are polishing computer algorithms for analyzing satellite photos specifically to identify masked PGRK. And they will learn to do it.
      So the idea that you can’t cover all three hundred goals is wrong.
      Cover.

      It is doubtful that only 20 B2 would be planned for this matter. The rest: F22, F35, B1, B52 (and others) - will things be more important? Destroy surviving strategic nuclear forces - the main task in such a story, IMHO.
      1. timokhin-aa 15 November 2019 08: 34 New
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        Not enough range
        1. Wildcat 15 November 2019 11: 10 New
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          IMHO, in terms of the "range of flight" B1, B2, B52 for the situation under consideration, if they differ, then slightly. Given the possibility of refueling and the use of non-permanent basing airfields (like Reflex Action in the last century), the range issue for other planes seems to be solved? The use of aviation for the search / destruction of strategic nuclear forces (namely, PGRK / BRZhK), if I remember correctly, was one of the goals of the stealth programs F117 / B2. This task is "facilitated" by the fact that the air defense of the Russian Federation is "different" from the air defense of the USSR.
          Our differences with you, it seems to me, relate only to the fact that you consider the counter-force strike SO NOT possible
          So the idea that 300 goals are not covered is absolutely true
          UNTIL.
          . My opinion is that among the military plans of our "partners" such a plan should be mandatory, and possible. So many years of preparation, and then "perestroika, razruadka i perezagruzka" ruined everything? No, of course, just the number of goals has decreased.
          And, apparently, your military and political leadership shares your confidence in the impossibility of a counter-force or beheading strike, otherwise there would have been no legendary photo of the SSBF in one bay and there would have been no Bocharov Ruchey. Hence the good question "about pressing a button," to which Andrei from Chelyabinsk answers positively (which is not a fact). At the same time, the examples of dead leaders that should help “push the button” are not really examples: none of the deceased had the opportunity to start a nuclear war in those places where a significant part of, say, close people live.
          Another question is that there is no need for a counter-force or decapitation strike. The Russian Federation, in comparison with the USSR, has been a very positive subject of international relations throughout its history in recent years (our domestic policy, glory to our strategic nuclear forces, remains our business). There is no confrontation between the 60's and 80's of the last century (which, apparently, explains the calmness of our leadership). The Russian Federation pays all its debts, writes off debts to its debtors. Successfully exports raw materials (everything that can be exported), the money for which is successfully returned under any pretext back. Freedom of entry and exit from the country. There is no ideological confrontation (other than TV). Competition in commodity markets or "food sanctions" - well, who are we seriously harming? Yes, there are some points - Georgia, Ukraine, Syria, all kinds of elections - but who is not without sin? Moreover, this gives an occasion to “move” us in some interesting moments (the same sanctions in the oil and gas industry). It does not touch anyone's "vital interests". The Russian Federation reacts normally to military conflict moments: Su24, Il18, Deir ez Zor, "tomahawks fly out of the zone of responsibility of our air defense," - everything is calm.
          1. timokhin-aa 15 November 2019 12: 27 New
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            1. As for the range, I’m talking about F. The bombers can throw a blow, but the B-52 does not look like a PGRK hunter, and the B-1 is not used to carry nuclear weapons, maybe temporarily.

            2. If you take out the Russian Federation, then China and Iran are clearly kneeling. It is well worth it, especially since in recent years the Amer elites have been obsessed with some strange contempt for us. They are not afraid of us, but despise. This can give rise to dangerous illusions in the heads of their solved.
      2. Polinom 15 November 2019 17: 51 New
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        It was such a thing five or six years ago.
        “AN / AAQ-37 DAS is a distributed-aperture optoelectronic system (six IR / TV cameras on the surface of the aircraft). It provides passive location in all directions. With this system, the F-35 has already detected ballistic missile launches from record 1200 km distance. In a recent test, the AN / AAQ-37 DAS worked in conjunction with the F-81 AN / APG-35 radar to test a range of electronic equipment that demonstrated the capabilities that no modern aircraft have. "

    2. bk0010 14 November 2019 22: 45 New
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      Output. 1) To exclude the entire "civilian scum" of any rank from the decision-making system for launch. To expand the circle of decision-makers up to the commanders of the Strategic Missile Forces divisions or even operational duty officers. Will the risk increase? Do not care, let Obama worry about it. 2) To restore and increase the constellation of SPRN satellites, let the operational situation be continuously transmitted through the SR. In the controlled area to bring the North and Norwegian Sea. To clarify the situation will be enough.
      1. timokhin-aa 15 November 2019 08: 34 New
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        Reducing the level of control over the launch permit is very fraught.
    3. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 November 2019 07: 25 New
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      A pair of ICBMs or 3-4 SLBMs on a silos, of course, will destroy the launcher, but the Americans simply do not have enough ammunition to destroy them all. Well, they don’t have so many rockets :) This time.
      That two-thirds of mobile launchers are at the base, maybe so, although this is far from a fact, but who said that they will remain there? We may not have time to make a decision on a retaliatory strike, but we’ll have time to announce the combat alarm for sure, and after the battle they will leave their places of deployment. And the same applies to strategic missile carriers - some of them, on alarm, will have time to fly into the air. About B-2 - they will not be in time, the order for the use of nuclear weapons will come much earlier.
      They can grind satellite images as much as they like, this will help very little. The limitations that satellite intelligence has today cannot be overcome even with the US military budget, and even an order of magnitude more advanced satellites can still be misleading.
      So the idea that 300 goals are not covered is absolutely true
      1. timokhin-aa 15 November 2019 08: 40 New
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        A pair of ICBMs or 3-4 SLBMs on a silos, of course, will destroy the launcher, but the Americans simply do not have enough ammunition to destroy them all. Well, they don’t have so many rockets :) This time.


        Well, you are aware of:

        1. US Reluctance to Extend START.
        2. BRDS work

        That two-thirds of mobile launchers are at the base, maybe so, although this is far from a fact, but who said that they will remain there?


        Well, estimate the alarm output time. Just stupidly run to cars, start the engine, roll out onto the road with a column, etc. All this against the background of 15-20 minutes of flight time and the fact that the alarm was announced, for example, in H + 3 minutes.

        A pair of ICBMs or 3-4 SLBMs on a silos, of course, will destroy the launcher, but the Americans simply do not have enough ammunition to destroy them all. Well, they don’t have so many rockets :) This time.


        Maybe yes, maybe not, but their work is going on now.

        So the idea that 300 goals are not covered is absolutely true


        UNTIL.
        1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 November 2019 09: 13 New
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          If the Americans leave START, we will leave, and then the number of missiles with us will increase significantly too. The BRDS is a big danger, I agree, and if the United States convinces the Europeans to massively place the role of the SSBN, it will grow sharply, which I wrote in the article. But until this has happened, the flight time is about 30-40 minutes, and when they are placed, so probably we will also stop 2 / 3 mobile launchers in the place of basing (I doubt that they stand now, but okay)
          1. timokhin-aa 15 November 2019 12: 29 New
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            If the Americans leave START, we will leave, and then the number of missiles with us will increase significantly too.


            And who will replay whom in this game?

            But until that happens


            when it happens it will be too late. Tests promise like next year.
            1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 November 2019 13: 52 New
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              No matter how funny, but it is unknown. Everything that the US military-industrial complex touches becomes gold, and the project to revive the production of nuclear warheads with a multiple build-up of ICBMs .... In general, I am very unsure of the ability of the United States to be ahead of us by strategic nuclear forces.
              Please tell me what it means "late"? All the necessary infrastructure for the distributed deployment of mobile launchers will require a year or two from the force, and this is an order of magnitude less than the time required for the deployment of infantry rocket launchers in Europe.
              1. Polinom 15 November 2019 17: 52 New
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                And what does Rogozin touch, what becomes?
                1. Andrei from Chelyabinsk 15 November 2019 18: 48 New
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                  No one will let Rogozin go to ICBMs
        2. Vadmir 15 November 2019 13: 57 New
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          1. US Reluctance to Extend START.
          2. BRDS work
          A withdrawal from strategic offensive arms means an increase in the number of missiles on both sides, and therefore a risk of receiving unacceptable damage. Each new missile reduces the risk of nuclear war. Moreover, the abolition of strategic offensive arms also means the absence of control commissions that regularly come from the USA with inspections. The secretive construction of fifty new mines with the Sarmatians whose location is unknown is almost completely eliminates the risk of nuclear war. I remind you that the Americans were very unpleasantly surprised when they were invited for the first time, opening a fair amount of start-up mines about which they did not even suspect.
          The abandonment of strategic offensive arms gives the green light to the Barguzin project, the construction of new Yars and, possibly, Boundaries, more compact, mobile and maneuverable complexes. This means the emergence of new places of their deployment, new patrol routes, a large number of simultaneously patrolling complexes that will not be destroyed by the first strike.
          The abandonment of the INF Treaty will lead to the development of medium-range ballistic missiles, which means that the whole of Europe will be under attack, and from Chukotka these missiles will reach the United States.
          And it is not so important that the enemy has more opportunities to build up their strategic nuclear forces, even if they have two or three more missiles, this does not negate the fact that in case of war dozens of American cities will be destroyed along with the population. Any war makes sense; such a war makes no sense.
          ICBMs will be used for those detected by the PGRK satellite, B-2 will search and destroy them themselves.
          PGRK on the move cannot hit the ICBMs, it will not be at the point of impact in 30-40 minutes when the missile reaches it. The B-2 has subsonic speed, until it reaches all the PGRK missiles will be launched, no one will wait hours for their arrival.
          Well, returning to the maritime theme, while at least one SSBN will be at sea without a tail, nuclear war is impossible, because 16 of destroyed American cities is not the price that the United States is willing to pay. And no matter how many times they have more missiles.
    4. SID
      SID 5 February 2020 11: 59 New
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      I will quote myself so as not to hammer on the buttons once again:

      ... the ground component of the strategic nuclear forces can be destroyed by non -version methods - if ...


      Very informative.
      Do not consider it unnecessary work, highlight the next question ...
      - How solvable is the problem for the USA to prevent a retaliatory strike by the SSBN forces standing on the DB in the bases at the berths? What is the effectiveness of launching SLBMs from berths, what is the stability of the SSBN on the database in the bases at the berths to hit the enemy?
      - The same is true with mobile soil ... Poplars are also able to shoot from the post-deployment site.
      hi
      1. timokhin-aa 5 February 2020 13: 03 New
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        - How solvable is the task for the United States to prevent a retaliatory strike by the SSBN forces standing on the DB in the bases at the berths?


        Solvable and easy

        How effective is the launch of SLBMs from berths


        Same as anywhere

        What is the stability of the SSBN on the database in the bases at the berths to hit the enemy?


        Near-zero

        - The same is true with mobile soil ... Poplars are also able to shoot from the post-deployment site.


        When passing the start command. And if she will not be?
        1. SID
          SID 5 February 2020 15: 48 New
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          Quote: timokhin-aa
          - How solvable is the task for the United States to prevent a retaliatory strike by the SSBN forces standing on the DB in the bases at the berths?


          Solvable and easy

          How effective is the launch of SLBMs from berths


          Same as anywhere

          What is the stability of the SSBN on the database in the bases at the berths to hit the enemy?


          Near-zero

          - The same is true with mobile soil ... Poplars are also able to shoot from the post-deployment site.


          When passing the start command. And if she will not be?


          Very capacious ...
        2. SID
          SID 5 February 2020 16: 12 New
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          I would venture to clarify ...
          Subject to the passage of the command:
          - Is it possible that air defense and anti-aircraft defense, guards of the SSBN bases are not able to provide launches, to prevent deployment of destroyers with missile defense in the area of ​​interception of SLBMs? If in the sea of ​​the SSBN it doesn’t have time to open the "bombs", as the hunter destroys it, then in the base, what could prevent the launch?
          - The application algorithms for PGRC are different from their OS and from MSNS all the more. I suspect that there are applications and without a centralized team.
          1. timokhin-aa 6 February 2020 12: 57 New
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            - Is it possible that air defense and anti-aircraft defense, guards of the SSBN bases are not able to provide launches, to prevent deployment of destroyers with missile defense in the area of ​​interception of SLBMs? If in the sea of ​​the SSBN it doesn’t have time to open the "bombs", as the hunter destroys it, then in the base, what could prevent the launch?


            Preventive nuclear strike on the base, for example.
            Or non-nuclear.
  • ccsr 15 November 2019 12: 01 New
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    Author:
    Andrei from Chelyabinsk
    What is the main advantage of the SSBN as an arms system over mine intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)? In stealth and mobility.

    It’s a completely wrong approach, because the main advantage of the SSBN is the possibility of a long time off the coast of the United States, thanks to which we dramatically gain in time of approach to the main targets on their territory. The Strategic Missile Forces are inferior in terms of this parameter to the SSBN, and despite the fact that the submarine fleet is very expensive, we will expand this component of the Navy, because the essence of the future doctrine of nuclear war will be how to quickly defeat the main enemy. That is why they will not reckon with the costs - the future is still the increase in the percentage component of the submarine fleet in the strategic nuclear forces.
    Today, our "sworn friends" do not have technologies that would guarantee the simultaneous destruction of almost 300 highly protected targets,

    Quite right, it is NOW this is not, but there is no guarantee that they will be able to solve this problem taking into account the relatively long flight of the Strategic Missile Forces warheads to the United States. In order not to scratch our turnips later, right now we must invest in the submarine fleet, and this will pay off in the 21 century. Everyone understands that this is costly, but this is not the case when we can save. It is better to save on all other armed forces, but not on strategic nuclear forces.

    But at the same time, naval strategic nuclear forces are the most important tool for its prevention. So, the Russian Navy cannot abandon the SSBN - we will proceed from this axiom in our plans for the construction of the Russian Navy.

    Here I agree with 100%, and not only that, I believe that the pace of development of this area in the current century should outpace the pace of development of other areas of our strategic nuclear forces, otherwise we may lose the confrontation.
    1. timokhin-aa 15 November 2019 12: 32 New
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      The low-frequency hydrophones in the Bahamas sometimes hear our boats over 5000-6000 km. There will be no location off the coast of the United States; this is an unsolvable task.
      1. ccsr 15 November 2019 13: 15 New
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        Quote: timokhin-aa
        The low-frequency hydrophones in the Bahamas sometimes hear our boats over 5000-6000 km.

        And what does this give the Americans if they don’t know when the combat signal was received, and the whole launch will take several minutes?
        By the way, VO already wrote about this in 2013:
        The SOSUS system was mothballed due to reduced efficiency and the actual absence of the enemy. And to solve the problems of anti-submarine defense in the United States, the question was raised about the creation of rapidly deployable multi-element regional underwater lighting systems (FOSS), designed to work in the planned areas of military operations. Before FOSS, the main requirement was put forward: to immediately detect any underwater object when entering the designated area of ​​responsibility. Thus ended the time of global submarine detection systems.



        Quote: timokhin-aa
        There will be no location off the coast of the United States; this is an unresolved task.

        They still seem to fit, and no one is attacking them. But the Americans will not be able to predict how they will act further until the last minute.
        1. timokhin-aa 16 November 2019 19: 17 New
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          And what does this give the Americans if they don’t know when the combat signal was received, and the whole launch will take several minutes?


          The hunter will plant a torpedo in the SSBN immediately upon occupying the launch depth and course. If you are optimistic, then when you open the cover of the first shaft.

          Well, it’s impossible to shoot from anywhere, it’s necessary to conduct some hydrographic studies of the launch area, and we closely monitor each other’s hydrographs.
          1. ccsr 17 November 2019 11: 14 New
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            Quote: timokhin-aa
            The hunter will plant a torpedo in the SSBN immediately upon occupying the launch depth and course.

            Are you sure that all our submarines are accompanied by "hunters" and they will not be destroyed before the launch of ballistic missiles?
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            If you are optimistic, then when you open the cover of the first shaft.

            If you do not have it, but take your position, then you need to disperse the navy at all, and cut the submarines into needles. But I think you are mistaken about the capabilities of our sailors, otherwise they would have been reduced long ago and would not have invested in the creation of new submarines.
            Quote: timokhin-aa
            Well, it’s impossible to shoot from anywhere, it’s necessary to conduct some hydrographic studies of the launch area,

            As far as I know, our naval officers do not eat bread for nothing, so if you say about all kinds of difficulties with this, then at least give a link to the opinion of professional submariners. I think that you greatly exaggerate the problem ...
            1. timokhin-aa 19 November 2019 13: 28 New
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              As far as I know, our naval officers do not eat bread for nothing, so if you say about all kinds of difficulties with this, then at least give a link to the opinion of professional submariners.


              Immediately beneath this thread, Polinom personally flew out to search for foreign submarines tracking the SSBN in the Pacific Ocean. In approximately 80% of departures, a foreign submarine was found “on the tail” of the SSBN.
              1. Polinom 19 November 2019 15: 23 New
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                "Do not waste kume, go down to the bottom" .... laughing
                Now do you understand Mina, who is obscene for such interlocutors? Can anyone come up with something new, like the Andrey Operator.
                People believe what they want to believe. And now I'm just having fun, sometimes.
              2. ccsr 19 November 2019 19: 27 New
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                Quote: timokhin-aa
                In approximately 80% of departures, a foreign submarine was found “on the tail” of the SSBN.

                And what, our submarine is not able to "come off" or can not destroy the "tail" when receiving a signal? And if naval aviation sees their submarines, then who is stopping them from coordinating the attack on the pursuers before launching the missiles? But the question is not even that, but whether, during the SSBN movement, measures were taken to stealth the campaign, which are carried out in the armed forces upon receipt of a combat signal, all units and formations. I think that in peacetime special secrecy is not specially done so as not to reveal all our preparations.
                But if everything is not so, and our boats are immediately destroyed, then the question arises - do the naval ones specially drive us into the bullshit about the capabilities of the SSBN? Answer directly to understand who is lying to us.
                1. timokhin-aa 21 November 2019 13: 44 New
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                  And what, our submarine is not able to "come off" or can not destroy the "tail" when receiving a signal?


                  She can't hear him. And closer to the United States, the factor of stationary hydrophones is added, with the diversity of the package / reception.

                  Understand that a lot of clever goals are working on the task of going to the US coast, but there is no solution yet, this is a very difficult issue, with individual boats it is not solved at all.
                  1. ccsr 21 November 2019 19: 56 New
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                    Quote: timokhin-aa
                    Understand the passage to the US coast

                    And what prevents the launch south of the equator from the Pacific or Atlantic Ocean, not to mention the Arctic?
                    I understand perfectly well that it cannot be considered an end in itself to get close to the US coast, but the question arises of how far from the territory their anti-submarine activities become relatively ineffective and at least a few of our SSBNs will fulfill their task. After all, there was justification for the creation of this type of weapon in the days of Gorshkov and it is not clear, didn’t you think about it then?
                    1. Polinom 23 November 2019 21: 11 New
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                      The first question is to shoot the “Bulava" from Kamchatka boats so that the carrier itself does not blow it apart.
                      The second question is to exit secretly.
                      The third question is to secretly go to the designated area.
                      The fourth question is to get a signal and be able to shoot back.
                      If each question is considered (roughly) at 25%, then the probability of launching missiles with an SSBN is zero.
                      But this is all completely uninteresting and they try not to talk or notice about it (as one academician said about "Non-traditional" -Why upset our submariners.) repeat
                      1. ccsr 24 November 2019 11: 03 New
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                        Quote: Polinom
                        If each question is considered (roughly) at 25%, then the probability of launching missiles with an SSBN is zero.

                        The mace was also allowed on several occasions, so a successful 27 out of 34 is still 79% (data from the Internet). Regarding questions 2,3 and 4, I doubt that the probability of their successful completion is 25%, so your calculation is very conditional, and hardly reflects real numbers. But even if we assume that under all adverse conditions, the probability of a successful launch of one submarine will be 0,3 i.e. 4 missiles per boat, it is obvious that already 5 boats will be enough to cause unacceptable damage to the enemy. Even if half of the warheads are shot down, then about a hundred will reach the goal - I guess based on the simplest calculations. For the sake of such results, it is necessary to maintain an submarine fleet - this is my personal opinion based on service in the armed forces.
                      2. timokhin-aa 25 November 2019 13: 17 New
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                        The mace was also allowed on several occasions, so a successful 27 out of 34 is still 79% (data from the Internet).


                        Now they began to secret the cancellation of starts for technical reasons. There, everything is somewhat worse in fact.
                      3. ccsr 25 November 2019 13: 29 New
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                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        Now they began to secret the cancellation of starts for technical reasons.

                        Maybe this is for the best - at least there will be no disasters due to the fact that they showed excessive vigilance in peacetime and postponed the start. In manned astronautics this is a common occurrence, although there are punctures there, up to the recent shooting of the capsule with the crew.
                        Quote: timokhin-aa
                        There, everything is somewhat worse in fact.

                        I will not argue, but in peacetime it is better to work out only what is guaranteed will not lead to disaster. In wartime, there will already be what will happen - that’s why I used the coefficient of 0,3 to calculate the successful launch of an ammunition of one submarine. Although I think that I went too far in the direction of understatement - I hope not everything is so bad in the Navy.
                  2. timokhin-aa 25 November 2019 13: 16 New
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                    The second question is to exit secretly.
                    The third question is to secretly go to the designated area.
                    The fourth question is to get a signal and be able to shoot back.
                    If each question is considered (roughly) at 25%, then the probability of launching missiles with an SSBN is zero.


                    Here ksati is not a fact))

                    Rather, everything is true for our current realities, but not "in principle." Cle that has changed since your dismissal. An additional factor complicating the actions of the United States appeared which did not exist before.
                  3. Polinom 28 November 2019 12: 35 New
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                    Has changed. In the number of support forces and in the capabilities of the enemy.
                    By the way, a couple of years ago the term “partially successful launch” was applied to the “Mace”. Almost like "a little bit pregnant."
                    He wrote, along with Nevsky, in Vilyuch. factory workers arrived and for half a year tried to prepare START rockets for launch. Then they let them go and just hung around the garrison, drank a little winked
                    There, almost everyone knows each other and new people are immediately noticeable. Then these left, others arrived, to the arrival of the new Borea. But the shooting was never carried out and the task was not closed. And without this, the boat is NONLINEAR. He does not go to the BS.
                    Maybe for 4 years that has changed. After the outbreak of the war, men are afraid of me writing to Ukraine.
                  4. timokhin-aa 28 November 2019 15: 16 New
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                    I'm not talking about that.

                    All this is decided not by very difficult disciplinary measures.

                    Now the Chinese factor has appeared - their SLBM launch zone closest to the USA is southeast of the Kuril ridge. For us, too, if you shoot, then from there.

                    And to break away from the amers through their assignment to the Chinese is one of the options that should be checked.

                    Anyway, you have to start playing cat and mouse with these guys again, especially at the Pacific Fleet, where a normal race can be arranged around the Kuril ridge by pulling at least two boats behind one SSBN, and then bringing out the second. Americans are now forced to break into two opponents, instead of one USSR, it is necessary to exploit this topic.

                    And the restoration of security forces is a matter of 5-7 years and money is not much needed.

                    By the way, a new submarine arrived at the Pacific Fleet on Monday, diesel. Not God knows what, but with Caliber. In general, there are some resources that need to be properly used.
  • Polinom 15 November 2019 17: 56 New
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    I think less. Now. And there is no need so much. They work with borders.
    I also met such numbers, but probably it was related to 667AU or 627.
    1. timokhin-aa 16 November 2019 19: 18 New
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      This is old data from 70's EMNIP.
      1. Polinom 19 November 2019 15: 25 New
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        Yes, I remember in the comments on Livejournal led.
  • bk0010 16 November 2019 10: 05 New
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    But is it possible to make them hear thousands of our boats?
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Nemchinov Vl 18 November 2019 19: 10 New
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    Quote: timokhin-aa
    Low Frequency Hydrophones in The Bahamas sometimes hear our boats for 5000-6000 km.
    ?! that is all the same sometimes ?! and range of 5000-6000 km?! Whereas - "...29 February 1996 year during the exercises of the NATO fleet after a successfully completed mission to detect submarines of a conditional enemy, an undetected Russian submarine contacted the ships asking for help. Soon, in the middle of the warrant of NATO ships, a submarine emerged that was recognized by the British sailors as project 971 "Pike-B" ... "- (from Wiki Project 671 RTMK) However, -" ... The British press covered this incident, and the newspaper The Times noted that it was a demonstration of the invisibility of Russian submarines. The British sailors then made a mistake: in front of them was the K-448 Tambov nuclear submarine [5] of Project 671RTMK, and not the Pike-B [6] ... "?!
  • Old26 15 November 2019 14: 12 New
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    Quote: timokhin-aa
    Regarding the destruction of the strategic nuclear forces by the first strike, we do not have bombers on combat duty with bombs, we write them off accordingly ..

    Initially incorrect assumption. Now, like the Americans, we don’t have PATROL nuclear bombers on board.
    Moreover, the war will not start just like that. There will be a certain preparatory period, which, in principle, is revealed by means of intelligence. And if this preliminary period exists, then it is completely wrong to think that strategists will not stand at airfields in readiness for take-off. The crew is in the cockpits (at the maximum level of readiness), and special items are already suspended. So write them off too soon.

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    Silos are known to all, with topographic accuracy in centimeters ..

    Topographic location with an accuracy of centimeters simply does not exist. It’s just that even during the inspection, the inspectors do not let the “fleet” to the mines in order to tie it with an accuracy of centimeters. But even if such a topographic location exists, then it is redundant. The ballistic missile CVO (ICBM, SLBM) with all the tricks of the Americans was not less than 90 meters.

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    For a pair of ICBMs or 3-4 SLBMs on a silos and that’s all.

    The use of an ICBM or 3-4 SLBM pair on a silo was never predicted. The number is calculated in a pair of BLOCKS per mine, not the number of missiles. Moreover, this pair of blocks should, according to American calculations, belong to two different missiles. There is a likelihood of silos, but very little. For defeat SIMULTANEOUSLY with two blocks is theoretically impossible because of the difference in time of launches of two different missiles. In addition, the second can be knocked off course by a nuclear explosion. Although for the 100% guarantee for the defeat of the mine, an underground explosion rather than an air explosion is needed ...

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    PGRK - two thirds in places of post. Deployment. Covered immediately ..

    This is now a third of the PGRK may be in the fields, and two in the structures. To find in the fields is unlikely at the current level of development of satellite reconnaissance equipment. Even if we assume that the order for use will come to the launcher at the moment of H + 10 minutes, then there is absolutely no need to withdraw PGRK from the PPD very urgently. Everything is much simpler. A few seconds and the roof of the Krona opens. Another minute or two to rise TPK and all. The product is gone ...

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    There remains a third of those on duty. Some will be covered by satellite reconnaissance and will run ICBMs on them.

    Let's start with the most cutting-edge American optoelectronic intelligence satellites of the KN-11 type, the 5 block. The maximum resolution will be 15 centimeters. With this permission, of course, the identification of the launcher will, of course, be carried out. But such a resolution will be only when using the satellite in the detailed shooting mode. In this case, the frame will be approximately 2x2 km. In order to know at least the approximate location of such a launcher should be shooting in overview mode. At the same time, the viewing width will be tens of kilometers, but the resolution will be such that it will be impossible to identify the launcher. A picture wakes up on which it is completely unclear what will happen. Either a launcher, or a pipe truck, or a tractor with a roundwood. The size of the cars will be approximately the same. So, after such a fixation of “it is not clear what”, a decryption is still required. And only then the second satellite (they always go in pairs) can be launched in the detailed shooting mode. And between the spans an hour or two will pass.
    Remote sensing satellites can solve this problem by other methods, but they have insufficient resolution for identification.
    Each unit of the Strategic Missile Forces, among regularly updated documents, has a document that evaluates the satellite environment. And of course, windows in the passage of satellites will be used for relocation. So the probability of covering a specific satellite launch launcher is quite small, especially when the other side will use camouflage measures.
    And one more important detail. We (many of us) saw dozens and hundreds of photographs in which the launchers stand at a distance of 2-3 ten meters from each other. These are most often launchers with the Pioneer BRDS. But the thing is that the Pioneer launchers are SELF-PROPELLED launchers. And these installations were connected to the cable combat control vehicle. The distance between the machines was determined by the length of the cable.
    Modern launchers are Autonomous launchers that are not interconnected by cables. And the distance between them can be calculated in kilometers and even tens of kilometers. And try to hit the launcher division with one charge, for example, not to mention the launcher shelf.
    To do this, you need to "nail" by APPROXIMATE the area where the launchers are located using the “square-nested method”. How many enemy blocks will it take ???

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    Some will succeed in finding B-2 which no one will interfere with after a massive nuclear strike against Russia ..

    And while the rockets will wait on the launchers, when will the B-2 cover them? Are you serious?

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    To deal with those that B-2 cannot find today, the Americans are polishing computer algorithms for analyzing satellite photos specifically to identify masked PGRK. And they will learn to do it ..

    Will learn. But not next year and not in the near future. Why - wrote above. This will help speed up the identification time, but will not make this process instant.

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    Well, you are aware of:

    1. US Reluctance to Extend START.
    2. BRDS work

    The issue of reluctance to extend strategic offensive arms is still open. Trump, of course, does not mind multiplying all the agreements by zero, so that after concluding them he himself can be considered a peacemaker. But in the US Congress and Senate, and in the Moscow Region there are smart people who do not PR in the media by the way of breaking contracts with Russia. At the same time, they are well aware that the state of the US weapons and nuclear complex is not such that they can increase their nuclear arsenal several times, despite the availability of weapons-grade plutonium. Fortunately for us and unfortunately for the USA. They will be able to do this in about 10-15 years. At the same time, the production of new warheads at the initial stage will be insignificant. The order of 50-80 new warheads per year. Although subsequently this amount will be increased. Now they can only upgrade those in service and recycle the old ones. Moreover, their number is of the order of 300-350 of each segment.

    Work on the ballistic missile defense is, of course, underway. It will take several years for them to appear in service. But not the fact that they have enough Yabz ...

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    Well, estimate the alarm output time. Just stupidly run to cars, start the engine, roll out onto the road with a column, etc. All this against the background of 15-20 minutes of flight time and the fact that the alarm was announced, for example, in H + 3 minutes.

    That is unnecessary. They will shoot through the roof
    1. timokhin-aa 16 November 2019 19: 46 New
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      There will be a certain preparatory period, which, in principle, is revealed by means of intelligence. And if this preliminary period exists, then it is completely wrong to think that strategists will not stand at airfields in readiness for take-off


      There will be a nuclear attack either without a threatened period, or it will not be at all.

      It’s just that even during the inspection, the inspectors do not let the “fleet” to the mines in order to tie it with an accuracy of centimeters.


      Even the shaft cover is sometimes opened.

      This is now a third of the PGRK may be in the fields, and two in the structures. To find in the fields is unlikely at the current level of development of satellite reconnaissance equipment. Even if we assume that the order for use will come to the launcher at the moment of H + 10 minutes, then there is absolutely no need to withdraw PGRK from the PPD very urgently. Everything is much simpler. A few seconds and the roof of the Krona opens. Another minute or two to rise TPK and all. The product is gone ...


      The first blow is inflicted on the control system and the DM. The goal is to delay the passage of the launch command by more than the flight time.

      So the PGRK will need to be brought down in order to survive the first strike and then when the launch command still arrives, launch.

      Will learn. But not next year and not in the near future. Why - wrote above.


      Through 10-15 years will learn. By that time, they had just the puzzle and develops according to the possibilities.
    2. ccsr 17 November 2019 18: 27 New
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      Quote: Old26
      That is unnecessary. They will shoot through the roof

      By the way, a similar method was provided by the Americans about forty years ago, when they could launch the Pershing-2 from the park in Europe by rolling them out of the boxes.
      Quote: Old26
      The resolution will be a maximum of 15 centimeters. With this permission, of course, the identification of the launcher will, of course, be carried out.

      Here, the truth must be taken into account that identification will be carried out comprehensively, and not only by means of optoelectronic intelligence. So the point is not even in the resolution, which really will be 0,3 - 0,5 m, but in how many satellite intelligence systems they will use for this. And here we should not hope that the Americans will not be able to correctly use their capabilities, which is why we will prepare for the worst. So, it is necessary to reduce the standards for bringing the combat control signal and bringing the installation into a combat position - this is the key to success in the retaliatory strike.
  • 2 Level Advisor 15 November 2019 17: 04 New
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    Quote: ser56
    Quote: Alexey LK
    And what, the 885 is much cheaper than the 955?

    1) noticeably - they are without rockets

    Wrong, 885 is 2 times more expensive than Borea
  • Old26 15 November 2019 23: 04 New
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    Quote: Vadmir
    A withdrawal from strategic offensive arms means an increase in the number of missiles on both sides, and therefore a risk of receiving unacceptable damage. Each new missile reduces the risk of nuclear war. Moreover, the abolition of strategic offensive arms also means the absence of control commissions that regularly come from the USA with inspections. The secretive construction of fifty new mines with the Sarmatians whose location is unknown is almost completely eliminates the risk of nuclear war ..

    Yes, there will be no on-site inspections, but the hidden construction of mines for Sarmat is not even a science fiction field. Dig a trunk with a depth of 3-4 a dozen meters and a diameter of almost 10, work to strengthen the walls of such a shaft with concrete and reinforcement - this will take several months. The Americans of these mines will not notice if we ask them to turn off their satellites. So they will know very precisely ... And why build new ones when there are enough mines from the Voivode ...

    Quote: Vadmir
    I remind you that the Americans were very unpleasantly surprised when they were invited for the first time, opening a fair amount of start-up mines about which they did not even suspect.

    And when did this significant event happen? In 1972, when did you conclude the first SALT agreement?

    I’ll tell you one story that comes from the beginning of 70's. This bike was told by a representative of the KVO political department, speaking to the families of division officers.
    The point is that both the USA and the USSR realized that it was necessary to agree. But how? Nobody wanted to start “giving out” their sources of information. Several useless meetings took place. But then the representative of the USSR Comrade Smirnov came to the podium. With a red folder and the coat of arms of the USSR on it. And he began to "peck" the Americans. Where, how much, what missiles they have installed. Exact coordinates, etc. Then he switched to the fleet, and then to aviation.
    The Americans were shocked and took three days to prepare. And three days later their representative came out, Mr. Smith, and began to say the same thing. Where, how many, what missiles we have installed, the locations of boats and strategic bombers. And in the end he congratulated the Soviet delegation on the fact that the nuclear submarine No.xxx was launched seven days ahead of schedule. In short, both sides realized that they know a lot.
    By the way, in the SALT agreement, a ban was signed on the construction of new mines and the creation of interference with control over such construction (that is, masking was prohibited)

    Quote: Vadmir
    The abandonment of strategic offensive arms gives the green light to the Barguzin project, the construction of new Yars and, possibly, Boundaries, more compact, mobile and maneuverable complexes. This means the emergence of new places of their deployment, new patrol routes, a large number of simultaneously patrolling complexes that will not be destroyed by the first strike.

    I am afraid that those who dream of re-creating the Barguzin BZHRK project will be dreaming of it for a very long time. When the complex is a priority, its creation is not delayed for at least 10 years. And most likely for good. Just in a certain period of time in the Moscow region the lobbying group that stood behind this complex prevailed. Now it seems they are in the pen.

    The construction of the Yars continued in the presence of the START treaty and will continue in the absence of it. There is a planned replacement of the old complex "Poplar", which is very small on the new "Yars" (not the essence of which - "Yars-M", "Yars-S" or "Yars-with-number").
    After the replacement of "Poplar" by "Yars" is complete, the turn of "Poplar-M" will come. And they must be replaced by almost 8 dozens.

    Perhaps the "frontier" will really be put into service, though now there is a problem with the chassis. We do not purchase the Minsk chassis, and the KAMAZ chassis is not yet fully ready. Although with a small modernization of the Rubezh, it can be used as a heavy-duty ballistic missile ...
    True, all this will not happen very soon. We have one solid fuel rocket plant. And launches ICBMs, SLBMs, and Iskanders too. The question will become either-or. Or we will reduce the speed of rearmament of the Strategic Missile Forces and the Navy and begin to rivet instead of these BRRS missiles, or compromise. And this means that the maximum will be put into service per year, God forbid, to the regiment

    Quote: Vadmir
    The abandonment of the INF Treaty will lead to the development of medium-range ballistic missiles, which means that the whole of Europe will be under attack, and from Chukotka these missiles will reach the United States.

    Yes, it will lead to the creation of new missiles. But this means that not only Europe will be under attack. but also the territory of Russia. The medal has always had two sides.
    And forget about Chukotka. 40 years ago, quite smart people from the main headquarters of the Strategic Missile Forces were able to prove not only the Ministry of Defense, but also the Politburo that this should not be done ...

    Quote: Vadmir
    And it is not so important that the enemy has more opportunities to build up their strategic nuclear forces, even if they have two or three more missiles, this does not negate the fact that in case of war dozens of American cities will be destroyed along with the population.

    It doesn’t matter that twice or three times Russian cities will be destroyed along with the population ??? You are so famously operating millions of lives that it becomes creepy. creepy from the fact that you consider only the losses of the other side. And how many Russian cities will turn into a scorched desert ...

    Quote: Vadmir
    ICBMs will be used according to the PGRK detected by the satellite, B-2 will search and destroy them themselves. The PGRK on the go cannot hit the ICBMs, it will not be at the point of impact through 30-40 minutes when the missile arrives there. The B-2 has subsonic speed, until it reaches all the PGRK missiles will be launched, no one will wait hours for their arrival ..

    For a change, PGRC still needs to be discovered and identified.
    And no one will wait for the arrival ...
    1. Vadmir 16 November 2019 00: 33 New
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      It doesn’t matter that twice or three times Russian cities will be destroyed along with the population ??? You are so famously operating millions of lives that it becomes creepy. creepy from the fact that you consider only the losses of the other side.
      If there is a risk of guaranteed destruction of dozens of American cities with tens of millions of people, then there will be no war, even if the United States has three times as many missiles - that's about it. A nuclear weapon is a paradoxical thing; the more it is, the less likely it is to be used.
  • Mityay65 16 November 2019 16: 58 New
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    Quote: Old26
    the hidden construction of mines for Sarmat is not even a science fiction field. Dig a trunk with a depth of 3-4 a dozen meters and a diameter of almost 10, work to strengthen the walls of such a shaft with concrete and reinforcement - this will take several months.

    You are saying something wrong, dear comrade. There are well-established methods for constructing silos in various soils using the “Metrostroy method” - a horizontal mine shaft with branches to silos. Outside, no construction work and other work, no hatches., Excavation, transportation of materials and ICBMs, maintenance warheads - all through the mine. From the satellite, there is noticeable activity at the cargo entrance into the shaft of the mine - a couple of tens of kilometers from the combat area. Especially good in the presence of rocky soil - concreting work is minimal.
    I saw all this in the old American magazines of the 80's. hi
    Of course, the fuss with liquid-fuel ICBMs while serving underground ICBMs complicates the process. But for solid fuels, it’s quite ...
    This completely excludes the possibility of detecting the coordinates of the silos from the satellite.
  • Old26 16 November 2019 18: 13 New
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    Quote: Mityai65
    You are saying something wrong, dear comrade. There are well-established methods for constructing silos in various soils using the “Metrostroy method” - a horizontal mine shaft with branches to silos. Outside, no construction work and other work, no hatches., Excavation, transportation of materials and ICBMs, maintenance warheads - all through the mine.

    Maybe also tell me where in this way mines were built and under which complexes? Ways may exist, that's just NEVER were not implemented during the construction of silos for ICBMs. First of all, because of its colossal cost and construction time. Exceptionally classic way. Photos of such buildings on the network, if not thousands, then hundreds for sure. By the way, this is consistent with the clause of the agreement on camouflage work on silos
    And I would like to see how you push a rocket into the mine from the tunnel with a diameter of 2,5-3 meters and a length of 20-30 meters. Or will you bend it? I'm not talking about how to dock the transitional compartments, APB, warheads, cover it all with a head fairing, and fill it all up. So I see how multi-axle MAZ squeeze into the tunnel, roll along it 20 km, fill it all with aggressive fuel components, and then as the cancer starts backing away, passing these 20 km of the tunnel. And in this "blind mine" is the dirt bridge that hides this mine from the satellite when are you going to blow up? After receiving the start command? And where will these tons of soil fall through then? To the rocket ...

    Quote: Mityai65
    From the satellite, there is noticeable activity at the cargo entrance into the shaft of the mine - a couple of tens of kilometers from the combat area. Especially good in the presence of rocky soil - concreting work is minimal.
    .

    And you do not consider the cost of driving horizontal development? The launcher itself is a complex engineering structure of a very decent cost. And then 20 km you will pass the tunnel. Moreover, given the fact that a regiment is most often an 6 silo, you will need to make tunnels with a total length of kilometers in 120. And if you consider that the average speed of such a tunnel sinking with a tunnel shield about 400-500 METERS PER MONTH, and in rocky soils can reach a maximum of 150-200 meters, you will have to punch one tunnel from about a little over 4 years in normal soils to 11 years in rocky. Good pace ...

    Quote: Mityai65
    I saw all this in the old American magazines of the 80's. hi.

    Such an idea existed. But when they calculated the time and money, they burst into tears ...

    Quote: Mityai65
    Of course, the fuss with liquid-fuel ICBMs while serving underground ICBMs complicates the process. But for solid fuels, it’s completely ... This completely excludes the possibility of detecting the coordinates of the silos from the satellite.

    It’s not even fantastic to propose building mine launchers in this way.
    1. Mityay65 17 November 2019 21: 42 New
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      Quote: Old26
      where in this way we had mines built and under which complexes?

      As far as I know, not a single regiment / division is actually deployed.
      But, when I heard that technical solutions were worked out, in t / h at natural facilities. We have roofing felts, or in the USA ... With a complete imitation of the location of the Republic of Belarus and service.
      Quote: Old26
      due to its colossal cost and construction time.

      Expensive, of course. But there are no other accommodation options in the silos. By the mid-80s, it was concluded that the deployment of BR in silos is pointless, due to vulnerability. And I also think so. The new classic silos are just stupid. Money down the drain.
      Quote: Old26
      this is consistent with the clause of the agreement on camouflage work on silos

      We must forget about START-3. After the cancellation of the INF Treaty, this contract is harmful to us.
      Quote: Old26
      how do you push a rocket with a diameter of 2,5-3 meters and a length of 20-30 meters into the mine from the tunnel.

      As I understand it, there are many options for the construction of tunnels. I will say this: design features of laying tunnels and engineering equipment. And, as an option that I especially like, assembling / docking / refueling directly in silos for liquid fuel missiles or just an assembly for solid fuel rockets. Naturally, silos should be expanded, equipped with engineering and have an adjacent loss for operations with steps / blocks of the Republic of Belarus.
      Quote: Old26
      fuel it all. So I see how multi-axle MAZ squeeze into the tunnel, roll along it for 20 km, fill it all with aggressive fuel components, and then as the cancer starts backing away, passing these 20 km of the tunnel.

      Most likely, it is still possible to refuel via the pipeline from the storehouse centrally or with the help of a special fueling station moved along the rails. Of course, the piping for the components of the fuel under nitrogen is sealed. Multi-axle MAZs will not be needed - the narrow gauge rail track. Of course, solid fuel RB is preferable. In general, I think that it is necessary to leave liquid-fuel monsters in the past. Like Yuri Solomonov, I consider their creation to be sabotage stop
      Quote: Old26
      And in this "blind mine" is the dirt bridge that hides this mine from the satellite when are you going to blow up?

      I suppose a directed explosion + a special intruder with a jack + a hydraulic monitor with high water pressure. Something like this. It is necessary to experiment. As a last resort, we will place a platoon of a construction battalion under the guise of shepherds / tractor drivers in a nearby barn soldier They will help to spread the soil with shovels ...
      Quote: Old26
      And you do not consider the cost of driving horizontal development?

      Of course, this is not cheap. There is simply no other way. Or finish the story with the silos just do. And they think, if the specialists of the former building Glavka of the MO are engaged in construction, then everything will be budgetary.
      Quote: Old26
      And then another 20 km you will pass the tunnel. Moreover, given the fact that a regiment is most often 6 silos, you will need to make tunnels with a total length of 120 kilometers.

      I suppose there will be one trunk of a tunnel per 10 km division. And side branches of 10 km of tunnels to the shelves. For each silo a branch is not more than 500 m from the regimental tunnel. Something like this. It’s enough to cover the division.
      Quote: Old26
      And if you take into account that the average flow rate of such a tunnel with a tunnel shield is about 400-500 meters per month, and in rocky soils can reach a maximum of 150-200 meters, you will have to punch one tunnel from about a little more than 4 years in normal soils to 11 years in rocky.

      You have indicated the correct penetration rate bully Yes, 3-4 years and the division area is ready in normal soil, 6-8 years for rocky. Equipment of new areas can be carried out gradually, without a race of the 80s.
      Quote: Old26
      when they calculated time and money, they burst into tears ...

      Yes, expensive. But classic silos are simply pointless. Then you need to switch only to a mobile basis. I suggest that the Governor and Sarmatia carry on an hovercraft platform fellow
      Quote: Old26
      It’s not even fantastic to propose building mine launchers in this way.

      It seems that one division area can be placed in this way. See what and how. Maybe moles will bite the cable ... Nowadays, when there are quite productive tunneling shields, when there are specialized design organizations, the construction of tunnels is no longer a miracle, as in the 30s ...
      1. Vadmir 18 November 2019 23: 39 New
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        how do you push a rocket with a diameter of 2,5-3 meters and a length of 20-30 meters into the mine from the tunnel.

        As I understand it, there are many options for the construction of tunnels. I will say this: design features of laying tunnels and engineering equipment. And, as an option that I especially like, assembly / docking / refueling directly in silos
        And why such difficulties - the main thing is to build mines covertly, and a rocket to a mine in a TPK can be installed and openly using windows in the span of satellites, plus camouflage nets, or rather, the special fabric that the tanks now protect against detection in the infrared range. Well, a little smoke, a la natural fog.
    2. bk0010 18 November 2019 00: 31 New
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      10 mines connected by an underground tunnel was the second MX-based option. States also did not pull it.
      1. Mityay65 18 November 2019 12: 01 New
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        It was a project of the late 70s. Since then, much has changed in tunneling technology. And a lot of design issues have been resolved. In those days, the construction of classic silos made sense, now no.
      2. Vadmir 18 November 2019 23: 29 New
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        The SALT and START treaties made this venture senseless due to mutual inspections, and the cancellation of these treaties, on the contrary, could revive such projects.
  • Old26 16 November 2019 21: 23 New
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    Quote: timokhin-aa
    There will be a nuclear attack either without a threatened period, or it will not be at all.

    I'd love to have a second option. But if we distract from everything else, it is worth noting that 30-35 years ago, I would probably vote with both hands for your thesis "there will be no nuclear attack without a threatened period." The number of warheads in the USA and the USSR was estimated at more than 30 thousand on each side. And even half of these 30 thousands would make war either meaningless or without a threatened period. After all these explosions, there would be nothing to conquer, and hardly anyone would fight
    Now another thing. The number of warheads is of the order of 1,5 thousands on each side. And mind you. These BGs will need to be "smashed" not in one country (USA), but in such a way that "each sister would get earrings." That is, the number of BGs for each country would already be within a few tens to several hundred. This means that after an exchange of nuclear strikes attempts will be made including and capture of other territories. At least from the point of view of the state border pushed forward for the future.
    But ordinary armed forces just like that, without a preparatory period will not be able to go on the offensive. In addition to the troops, it will be necessary to concentrate stocks of ammunition, food, and fuel. That is, in any case, there will be a threatened period, and fortunately it will open. It is impossible to solve such logistics problems so that no one knows about it ...
    And there will be a threatened period - there will be in high or full readiness both airplanes at aerodromes and the Strategic Missile Forces calculations, and boat crews

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    Even the shaft cover is sometimes opened.

    And the head fairing is sometimes removed, trying to prevent the inspectors from coming close to the mine’s mouth. But even if the coordinates are known to the nearest centimeter, there is no point in this. QUO will still be in the region of 100 meters and higher ...

    Quote: timokhin-aa
    The first blow is inflicted on the control system and the DM. The goal is to delay the passage of the launch command by more than the flight time.

    So the PGRK will need to be brought down in order to survive the first strike and then when the launch command still arrives, launch.

    It is impossible to strike at control centers so that it is invisible. Moreover, such control centers will not be in the singular. But even if the normal command transmission channels are violated, there is an additional, alternative command to bring the application command to launch. Even if the personnel of these launchers will not be already alive. I hope you understand which system I'm talking about

    I repeat again. You a priori believe that the application team will come after a blow is inflicted on our mines and missile maintenance planes of the aviation, navy and PGRK. That is, consider only the option of "retaliation." Not “reciprocal-oncoming,” and not “at the appointed time,” but only as a result of the “Reciprocal” strike. such an option is most likely one of the ten possible and least applicable, as it gives advantages to the enemy.
    And PGRK during the threatened period and so will leave their PPD "in the field." More precisely, "into the woods." And look for them there
  • Old26 18 November 2019 15: 49 New
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    Quote: Mityai65
    Quote: Old26
    where in this way we had mines built and under which complexes?

    As far as I know, not a single regiment / division is actually deployed.
    But, when I heard that technical solutions were worked out, in t / h at natural facilities. We have roofing felts, or in the USA ... With a complete imitation of the location of the Republic of Belarus and service.

    Work in this direction was underway. It is difficult to say how theoretical or practical they were. But such a term as a “blind mine installation” basically existed. It was hard to say whether it was tested at natural facilities. It is unlikely that the development of such a scheme has reached such a level of elaboration. I described speeds approximately. Nothing beyond the impossible existed in this regard, but the longer the distance from the "entrance" to the horizontal mine to the mine itself, the longer the time. And 20 km from the “entrance” to the mine are years of sinking. No one needs such a speed of construction of silos. In fact, the development of basing methods was a lot. Americans were especially reveling when they were working out ways to base their Piskipper (MX) ICBMs. What they just did not come up with. In the end, they settled on a standard silo-based system

    I repeat. Purely technically, to break through the horizontal output, and then the vertical shaft, there were no problems. There were only two factors. Time and money.
    But further ... It is unlikely that the study reached the level of full-scale tests.
    To begin with, it is very difficult technically to deploy missiles in such a situation from horizontal to vertical. To do this, huge underground halls resembling mine workings in salt mines were needed. Yes, there the rocket could be raised upright. What next? Punching the arch of this mine to build a mine along which the rocket will go out? Technically and theoretically, it is possible, but without a guarantee that the rocket located "in the hall" will definitely enter the shaft of the mine. Indeed, in the existing silos, this system is worked out and the missile is centered using obturator rings. As in such a mine structure - to be honest I can not imagine. Or it’s necessary to “fence such a garden” that it will not pay off even taking into account the fact that the coordinates of the silos will not be known to the enemy. The second question, which was hardly worked out, is what to do with the soil of the lintel that separates the mine from the atmosphere. Ejection blast? There is no guarantee that all soil will be thrown away. A few tons of soil that collapsed again into the mine will damage the rocket fairing.
    The question of how, for example, to lift an 80-100 ton rocket already loaded from a horizontal position was also hardly worked out. In the silos, the rocket is placed in an unfilled form (liquid). And only then follow the processes of refueling, installing certain compartments, warheads and fairing. How it was decided here is also unknown. That is, theoretically, this was considered, it is unlikely that it came to practical study

    Quote: Mityai65
    Quote: Old26
    due to its colossal cost and construction time.

    Expensive, of course. But there are no other accommodation options in the silos. By the mid-80s, it was concluded that the deployment of BR in silos is pointless, due to vulnerability. And I also think so. The new classic silos are just stupid. Money down the drain ..

    I don’t know where you got the information that the placement is pointless due to their vulnerability - I don’t know. But the degree of protection of mines is different, and therefore the degree of vulnerability is different.
    Purely theoretically, the mine is affected in 100% of cases. Even non-nuclear means. But this is a bare theory. For this, a coincidence of so many factors is needed that defeat can only be discussed theoretically. Well, or when you need to "report" that the problem has been resolved ... In practice, everything is much more complicated. And the Americans, realizing that it’s impossible to hit a mine with one block, even take 2 BGs in calculations, realizing that no one will wait until the BGs explode near the mine

    Quote: Mityai65
    Quote: Old26
    this is consistent with the clause of the agreement on camouflage work on silos

    We must forget about START-3. After the cancellation of the INF Treaty, this contract is harmful to us.

    The clause of the ban on masking mines does not apply to the clauses of the START-3 treaty. This article is EMNIP contract OSV-2. But at the conclusion of the next contract, articles of previously existing ones are taken into account
    You should not forget about the START-3 treaty. It is still useful to us, because it limits our opponent, as well as us.
    In particular, thanks to this agreement, the missiles are not “fully loaded”. There is also a limit on the number of carriers. We have a large "shortfall" to the permitted levels and we can make up for this shortfall, while the Americans have practically exhausted all reserves in this regard. So it’s not harmful to us, but useful

    Quote: Mityai65
    Quote: Old26
    how do you push a rocket with a diameter of 2,5-3 meters and a length of 20-30 meters into the mine from the tunnel.

    As I understand it, there are many options for the construction of tunnels. I will say this: design features of laying tunnels and engineering equipment. And, as an option that I especially like, assembling / docking / refueling directly in silos for liquid fuel missiles or just an assembly for solid fuel rockets. Naturally, silos should be expanded, equipped with engineering and have an adjacent loss for operations with steps / blocks of the Republic of Belarus.

    The answer is a little higher
    1. Mityay65 19 November 2019 01: 00 New
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      Vladimir, you and I have one cardinal disagreement of opinions - I consider the silos to be outdated and meaningless, but you do not. Accordingly, I believe that it is necessary either to switch to "blind mine installations" (SSPU) or only to mobile deployment of the Republic of Belarus. According to the principle of evaluating the coordinates in terms of price - "quality of the combat mission", I assume that the solution will be for mobile-based RB.
      This question must be evaluated purely from the economic t / z.
      Quote: Old26
      To begin with, it is very difficult technically to deploy missiles in such a situation from horizontal to vertical. To do this, huge underground halls resembling mine workings in salt mines were needed. Yes, there the rocket could be raised upright.

      This can be solved if, next to the SSHPU, adjacent to it, a special loss will be arranged for moving the BR into the SSHPU in a vertical position from horizontal. A kind of reloading compartment. I suppose that the BR will have to be in a transport and combat container (TBK), which will be the internal barrel of the SSPU, and on which the shutters will lean on when firing. Those. the transport and combat container (TBK) is centered in the SSPU, and the BR is centered in the TBK. After installing in an upright position, the ball valve should be separated by a shutter from the lost ones, probably by turning around the axis. TAC is obtained by a unit of full factory readiness, only with RB not filled inside, tanks under dry nitrogen under pressure. It is possible that only the BB will be docked in the horizontal position to the RB immediately before moving the TAC to the vertical position and insert into the UWB.
      Quote: Old26
      In the silos, the rocket is placed in an unfilled form (liquid). And only then follow the processes of refueling, installing certain compartments, warheads and fairing.

      The TBK will be placed in the SHPU with an empty RB, but it will be fully equipped from all the blocks, including and warheads. Refueling later when the TBK is already upright through the TBK fittings.
      Quote: Old26
      I don’t know where you got the information that the placement is pointless due to their vulnerability - I don’t know. But the degree of protection of mines is different, and therefore the degree of vulnerability is different.
      Purely theoretically, the mine is affected in 100% of cases.

      I believe that the next generation of warheads will be with homing BGs, KVO no more than 10 m, with the ability to penetrate the Earth by 20 meters. This will make all silos, any previously reconnoitered targets, vulnerable from the first strike. This makes the first strike disarming for the enemy and very tempting.
      I absolutely do not believe in the possibility of a retaliatory strike. This is a complacency theory. No one will dare to put an end to the world until the warheads begin to break in Red Square. Only a retaliatory strike is possible, and the notorious Dead Hand will most likely produce it. And only the realization of this indisputable fact by the adversary will save us from armageddon.
      Quote: Old26
      You should not forget about the START-3 treaty. It is still useful to us, because it limits our opponent, as well as us.

      This is a debated issue. If these schizos have thought of breaking the DRMSD, then anything can be expected from them .. for example, the deployment of the RMDS in Poland.
  • Old26 18 November 2019 15: 50 New
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    [quote = Mityai65] [quote = Old26] to refuel it all. So I see how multi-axle MAZ squeeze into the tunnel, roll along it for 20 km, fill it all with aggressive fuel components, and then as the cancer starts backing away, passing these 20 km of the tunnel. [/ Quote]
    Most likely, it is still possible to refuel via the pipeline from the storehouse centrally or with the help of a special fueling station moved along the rails. Of course, the piping for the components of the fuel under nitrogen is sealed. Multi-axle MAZs will not be needed - the narrow gauge rail track. Of course, solid fuel RB is preferable. In general, I think that it is necessary to leave liquid-fuel monsters in the past. Like Yuri Solomonov, I consider their creation to be sabotage stop [/ Quote]
    Here are just a separate storage in the area of ​​such mines and is not enough for complete happiness.
    You can imagine the difficulties that arise with such a refueling system. Indeed, for the refueling of the Voyevoda rocket the same requires about 180 tons of SRT. Now you are proposing to use a separate storage and pipelines. Under what pressure will all this be pumped? The presence of refuelers on the launch pad allows in case of any contingency during refueling to immediately stop it. Yes, and it is unlikely that the pressure will be excessive when refueling at the start. But if, God forbid, an emergency occurs during refueling, it’s scary to think what will happen when these components are fed through a 20 km pipeline ...
    Rail track and narrow gauge. But nothing that the refueling process is limited, including in time. In a narrow gauge railway, initially supply tons of 60 tons of fuel - two specialized 30-ton tanks. Then take them out and drive four tanks with an oxidizing agent.

    With solid fuel, everything is easier, of course, than with liquid, there are no questions.

    Liquid is not wrecking. Alas, Yuri Semenovich recently has often become a PR, making sure that sorry for my French "obsyraet" products of other designers. Unfortunately, some parameters of solid rockets are smaller than those of liquid rockets. And it will not succeed in achieving parity. Solid fuels have an indisputable advantage in the form of a short automatic fuel transfer system, but the cast weight of solid fuels is several times smaller than that of liquid fuels. If you want to have powerful military equipment on missiles, this can only be achieved with liquid missiles. In fact, the Soviet and Russian systems of building strategic nuclear forces are optimal
    1. Heavy missiles with powerful military equipment
    2. Light monoblock / or with homing solid-propellant rocket mine and mobile-based
    3. Aviation equipped with long-range missiles
    4. SLBMs on nuclear missile boats.
    Everything else is IMHO from the evil one. All these "Petrels", "Poseidons" and the likes of the Wunderwaffe ...

    [quote = Mitya65] [quote = Old26] And in this "blind mine" is the dirt bridge that hides this mine from the satellite when are you going to blow up? [/ quote]
    I suppose a directed explosion + a special intruder with a jack + a hydraulic monitor with high water pressure. Something like this. It is necessary to experiment. As a last resort, we will place a platoon of a construction battalion under the guise of shepherds / tractor drivers in a nearby barn soldier They shovels will help spread the soil .... [/ quote]
    Targeted burst to eject? How many tons of explosives will it take to break through a 6-8 meter thick vault? A ton and a half? And the blast wave reflected from the walls of the hacked space, striking the rocket fairing? What is it like? In addition, even with an ideal explosion, a certain amount of soil will "return to the mine" anyway
    A water monitor - this is how it will be noticed from the satellite, as well as the crowd of construction battalions picking the ground in a strikingly limited space, so reminiscent of the neck of a mine. And why all these tricks for driving a 20-km horizontal mine? It turns out that the cost of your structure will skyrocket with all these underground workings, centralized fuel storage facilities (or narrow gauge railroad tanks with fuel tanks), a jack penetrator and a hydraulic monitor.
    There is an expression that is 100% suitable for the creation of such a structure - "the sheepskin is not worth the candle"

    [quote = Митяй65] [quote = Old26] And you don’t think at all about the cost of horizontal mining? [/ quote]
    Of course, this is not cheap. There is simply no other way. Or finish the story with the silos just do. And one wonders if the specialists of the former construction headquarters of the Moscow Region will take up construction work, then everything will be budgetary. [/ Quote]
    There is an exit. Build (or rather rebuild) old mines without disguising work. In any case, it is cheaper than "fencing the garden", which we are considering. Silos are needed at least in order to reduce the number of BBs that would not have been silos would have been used for other purposes.
    In addition, the whole process of working according to your option - it will be so noticeable that in just a week or two the Americans will know that something is being done there.
    Imagine. You will have to start by building a portal (entrance) to the horizontal mine. Judging by your requests, you will need a mechanized tunnel shield with a working diameter of 10 meters. The tunnel shield itself is a structure several tens of meters long and weighing hundreds of tons. The rate of penetration depending on the soil is from 400-500 meters per month for soft soils to 150-200 meters in rock formations. 20 km of rock probably will not. Not in the mountains, you will build these structures. This means that next to the portal you will need a "small candle factory", sorry, a small concrete plant in order to fix horizontal production with cast-in-place concrete. It will take tubing to strengthen the vertical silos, a huge number of fittings, rail facilities, diesel locomotives (or electric locomotives) for mining operations. Places where the selected breed will be dumped. In short. There are so many unmasking factors that only a blind person will not see this. And such a construction cannot be called budgetary ....

    [quote = Mityai65] [quote = Stary26] And then another 20 km you will pass the tunnel. Moreover, given the fact that a regiment is most often 6 silos, you will need to make tunnels with a total length of 120 kilometers. [/ Quote]
    I suppose there will be one trunk of a tunnel per 10 km division. And side branches of 10 km of tunnels to the shelves. For each silo a branch is not more than 500 m from the regimental tunnel. Something like this. It is enough to cover the division. [/ Quote]
    That is, all those developments on the creation of separate starts, when the silos were located at a distance of 10-20 km from each other and did not allow the enemy to cover everything with one charge - is this all on the side?
    Division - take 4 regiments (minimum). A division tunnel of 10 km, plus 4 regimental tunnels of 10 km each. Plus 6 branches in a regiment of 500 meters. Total 65 km of tunnels will lie on the circle, not counting the construction of another 29 mines
    If the division is solid-fuel missiles, then you will have to go under 4 km of tunnels with 80 regiments, not counting 45 silos.

    Well, the use of a nuclear BG penetrator on such a tunnel will lead to the fact that an underground nuclear explosion will pass through such workings, leaving nothing behind. Or are you still going through an nth number of kilometers (or hundreds of meters) and also puts anti-nuclear hermetic doors?

    [quote = Mityai65] [quote = Old26] And if you consider that the average tunnel speed of such a tunnel with a tunnel shield is about 400-500 meters per month, and in rocky soils it can reach a maximum of 150-200 meters, you will have to punch one tunnel from about a little more than 4 years in normal soils to 11 years in rocky soils. [/ quote]
    You have indicated the correct penetration rate bully Yes, 3-4 years and the division area is ready in normal soil, 6-8 years for rocky. Equipment of new areas can be carried out gradually, without a race of the 80s.
    And in the 80s, the race was gone. Almost all positional divisions of divisions were created in the late 60s and early 70s. All new missiles were often put in the tunable mines of previous missiles. Cheap enough compared to building new ones. And fast.

    [quote = Mityay65] [quote = Old26] when they counted the time and money - they wept ... [/ quote]
    Yes, expensive. But classic silos are simply pointless. Then you need to switch only to a mobile basis. I suggest that the Governor and Sarmatia carry on an hovercraft platform fellow [/ Quote]
    They are meaningless in your opinion. For me - it makes sense. To transfer everything to a mobile basis is a shy away in the other direction.
    To transport a 150 - 200-ton rocket on mobile platforms on the VP - what platform should be with which engines. But raising this rocket upright is a song ...

    [quote = Mityay65] [quote = Old26] It’s not even fantastic to propose building mine launchers in this way. [/ quote]
    It seems that one division area can be placed in this way. See what and how. Maybe moles will bite the cable ... Nowadays, when there are quite productive tunneling shields, when there are specialized design organizations, building tunnels is no longer a miracle, as in the 30s ... [/ quote]
    WHAT FOR? Why create insurmountable obstacles, then heroically overcome them, spend billions or trillions in order to create such an absolutely unnecessary “golden” deployment area ????
    1. Mityay65 19 November 2019 01: 39 New
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      Quote: Old26
      Here are just a separate storage in the area of ​​such mines and is not enough for complete happiness.
      You can imagine the difficulties that arise with such a refueling system. Indeed, for the refueling of the Voyevoda rocket the same requires about 180 tons of SRT. Now you are proposing to use a separate storage and pipelines. Under what pressure will all this be pumped? The presence of refuelers on the launch pad allows in case of any contingency during refueling to immediately stop it.

      I think it will be necessary to organize a separate fuel storage for each regiment, or a group of SSPUs located nearby. Pressure no more than 2 atm., Most likely somewhere around 1,5 atm. So the excess in the highway is 0,5 atm. Yes, and in any emergency situation, reverse should be possible, respectively, the system is not displacing, but pressure, using centrifugal pumps. I don’t think it’s very difficult.
      Quote: Old26
      Rail track and narrow gauge. But nothing that the refueling process is limited, including in time. In a narrow gauge railway, initially supply tons of 60 tons of fuel - two specialized 30-ton tanks. Then take them out and drive four tanks with an oxidizing agent.

      And this option is possible. I think it will be possible to try it with the help of a special automated gas station, which supplies the components with pumps and controls the process, and refuel through local pipelines with both components at the same time. Well, if necessary.
      Quote: Old26
      Alas, Yuri Semenovich recently has often become a PR, making sure that sorry for my French "obsyraet" products of other designers. Unfortunately, some parameters of solid rockets are smaller than those of liquid rockets. And it will not succeed in achieving parity. Solid fuels have an indisputable advantage in the form of a short automatic fuel transfer system, but the cast weight of solid fuels is several times smaller than that of liquid fuels.

      It seems to me that what Solomonov proposed is very interesting: a single solid propellant medium-class BR both for silos and for PGRK and BZHRK. Without liquid fuel RB. It turns out very cheap, reliable and safe. And the fact that he expressed this is a great hardware courage. The fact that he exposed himself to a blow is not to say that he was promoting.
      And the fact that designers "obsyraet" products of other designers "is very good for all of us! We must encourage this. Competition is the mother of progress.
      Of course, you will have to put 2 solid fuel on combat duty instead of one liquid fuel. And still it will be cheaper in terms of the cost of operation during the life cycle of the product.
      And, last but not least, in 2 middle-class solid fuel RBs, combat stability is much higher than in one liquid-fuel monster, even when placed in silos, not to mention PGRK and BZHRK.
      This is a question mat. modeling, as I understand it. Well, the calculations of the State Planning Commission .. oh yes! we have no Gosplan .. laughing
      Well, you have to get out like that ...
    2. Mityay65 19 November 2019 02: 38 New
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      Quote: Old26
      Targeted burst to eject? How many tons of explosives will it take to break through a 6-8 meter thick vault? A ton and a half? And the blast wave reflected from the walls of the hacked space, striking the rocket fairing? What is it like? In addition, even with an ideal explosion, a certain amount of soil will "return to the mine" anyway
      A water monitor - this is how it will be noticed from the satellite, as well as a crowd of construction battalions picking the ground in a strikingly limited space, so reminiscent of the neck of a mine.

      Combined soil piercing method. A directed explosion, but most likely not with one, but with several charges. A directed explosion will remove and scatter around the neck of the SSHPU only part of the soil the rest (2 -3 m) will have to be pierced with a printers on jacks + a hydraulic monitor. It will be very fast, 3 to 6 minutes. Penetratra will recline after breaking through the mine. Further, in the shaft above the SSPU, it will be extended on the TAC jacks to the ground level, and will fire a shot. Here experiments are needed. But I see great difficulties. And let the satellites watch. The bird has time to fly up.
      I joked about the platoon of the construction battalion lol
      Quote: Old26
      There is an exit. Build (or rather rebuild) old mines without disguising work. In any case, it is cheaper than "fencing the garden", which we are considering. Silos are needed at least in order to reduce the number of BBs that would not have been silos would have been used for other purposes.

      Yes, including the restructuring of old underground workings, as an option. Here you just need to understand that the topology of the tunnels of old mines can always be found by the adversary in some archives.
      Silos, of course, will most likely have to be left as false targets with mock RBs. Well, after all, they did it before, as I understand it?
      Quote: Old26
      In addition, the whole process of working according to your option - it will be so noticeable that in just a week or two the Americans will know that something is being done there.
      Imagine. You will have to start by building a portal (entrance) to the horizontal mine. Judging by your requests, you will need a mechanized tunnel shield with a working diameter of 10 meters. The tunnel shield itself is a structure several tens of meters long and weighing hundreds of tons.

      Мы do not hide the entrance to the portal and the work that is being done there. Only in general terms, so that it would not be possible to establish the scale of the excavation and preferably the diameter of the tunnels. As soon as construction begins, it will immediately be under surveillance. The main thing is that the adversary does not understand the topology of the tunnels and the coordinates of the UWB.
      Quote: Old26
      Not in the mountains, you will build these structures.

      Ural Mountains, Altai, Sayan Mountains, m. Sikhote-Alin .. why not? So rocket men are sitting in some kind of wild holes, and here it’s quite a resort area ... mountain air and world views ...
      Quote: Old26
      That is, all those developments on the creation of separate starts, when the silos were located at a distance of 10-20 km from each other and did not allow the enemy to cover everything with one charge - is this all on the side?

      I think that the minimum distance between the UWB should be somewhere around 2 - 2,5 km.
      Quote: Old26
      Well, the use of a nuclear BG penetrator on such a tunnel will lead to the fact that an underground nuclear explosion will pass through such workings, leaving nothing behind. Or are you still going through an nth number of kilometers (or hundreds of meters) and also puts anti-nuclear hermetic doors?

      Yes of course. Anti-nuclear doors will be needed. UWB must be reliably protected.
      Quote: Old26
      WHAT FOR? Why create insurmountable obstacles, then heroically overcome them, spend billions or trillions in order to create such a completely unnecessary “golden” deployment area ????

      I believe that so far there is no point. But he may appear in the next 5 to 7 years. Depending on the development of events. After all, could old McCain become president? And therefore, missile forces must begin to prepare in advance for the worst case scenario.
      How to protect such a hefty easily vulnerable fool as Sarmat in another way - I can not imagine. If you place it - then you need to cover normally.
      Our second disagreement with you - I do not believe in the reality of a retaliatory strike. As I understand it, you believe in its reality.
  • Old26 19 November 2019 20: 37 New
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    Quote: Mityai65
    It seems to me that what Solomonov proposed is very interesting: a single solid propellant medium-class BR both for silos and for PGRK and BZHRK. Without liquid fuel RB. It turns out very cheap, reliable and safe. And the fact that he expressed this is a great hardware courage. The fact that he exposed himself to a blow is not to say that he was promoting.

    This is what he is saying now. A few years ago, he spoke extremely negatively (and here I agree with him) regarding the BZHRK.
    A few earlier, he reacted extremely negatively about the "Sarmatian". And not so much about the product itself, but about who will produce it (GREC Makeeva).
    In principle, we don’t even know the Sarmat TTX. What Y. Borisov said about him is IMHO not true. I think that the starting at Sarmat will be slightly less, tons 160-170, and not 210. But this is my personal IMHO.
    Solomon could not create competition for the Sarmat, MIT simply never engaged in heavy missiles. Although in our country there are enterprises that can produce solid fuel stages weighing 75 tons. But no one wants to use such steps. And such a solid rocket could have a starting ton of 135-140. But alas. The GRC no longer has the competencies for the production of solid fuel rockets. The last solid fuel is a monster-type SLBM for boats of project 941 under 90 tons of launch
    And MIT has never done heavy. Pratov situation. But at the same time, Solomonov should not have been throwing mud at competitors from the GRC

    Quote: Mityai65
    And the fact that the designers "obsyrat" the products of other designers "is very good for us all! We must encourage this. Competition is the mother of progress ..

    If a competitor observes the products of other designers, this is very bad. Some ethical standards must still be respected. And the main thing is not that. If he made at least an analogue of “Sarmat”, but if you lose to the GRTs, then you could say that “He knew what he was talking about.” It’s not a competition when you haven’t done anything, but exclusively in the media you continue to sprinkle dirt on competitors' products.

    Quote: Mityai65
    Of course, you will have to put 2 solid fuel on combat duty instead of one liquid fuel. And still it will be cheaper in terms of the cost of operation during the life cycle of the product ..

    In principle, this is not necessary. Modern ICBMs with solid fuel engines have about 4-6 blocks. Against 10 on heavy. But it’s four times easier .... And you can unify the entire fleet of missiles, and not have, as in the 80s, armed with a dozen different products
  • aleev1957 23 November 2019 11: 55 New
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    Anyone who is devoted to such topics, if he is a theoretician, understands perfectly well that so far there is no mini-submarine in service that can literally get up to the depths of an airplane and a helicopter. I do not consider myself a genius; I am not a simple theoretician. The skeleton under the boat is made of aluminum welded in vacuum and hard rolling. It is like ribs in a person. I will not discuss further, let it remain my secret
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  • Polar Bear 23 December 2019 15: 23 New
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    After the United States did not decide on a war with North Korea, which has no nuclear potential in comparison with Russia, I think it makes no sense to seriously talk about a nuclear conflict. And even one or two Russian submarines on a BS with nuclear missiles for the United States is completely unacceptable. A camouflaged non-nuclear conflict with the United States is already underway in Syria. The Americans are fighting against the Russians there, using not only the Syrian opposition, but also directly. I strongly doubt that Lieutenant General Asapov was killed by the militants without the help of the Americans, and the presence in the ranks of the Syrian convoy of Russian soldiers from the PMCs did not stop the Americans from delivering air strikes and artillery .