There was money for the fleet. They even spent
In the course of the dialogues concerning how well-thought the shipbuilding policy of the Russian Navy was, the question of money inevitably arises. Whoever is an opponent who does not want to recognize the disastrous nature of the entire Russian naval construction of the past sixteen or seventeen years, is a corrupt official involved in this impasse, is not quite a smart officer, has gone too far in defending the honor of the uniform, but the argument "About the money" will be launched necessarily.
“Where would the money come from for what you are offering here?” We believed, and it turned out that the collapse could not be avoided, the allocated money would not be enough to maintain the combat readiness of the Navy. " Arguments of such a plan always come up.
It is worth once and for all to debunk them, if only because they are untenable, not only in fact, but even logically.
Yes, money for military shipbuilding was allocated in insufficient quantities. Yes, even the money that was allocated came with constant delays. Yes, it was impossible to keep the available number of ships in the ranks. That's right.
But the matter is different - with all of the above money for the fleet, albeit insufficient, were allocated and even mastered. They were not just given - they were even spent. The question is how. And from the answer to this question all claims follow.
Let's deal with this in more detail.
How much did the fleet spend on surface ships and what did it end up with?
First, let's list the projects of warships that went into the series (auxiliary, rear vessels, etc., we don’t take - we’ll dwell on warships, and some, to simplify understanding of the issue).
So, over the past decade and a half, the Navy has laid and received the following warships:
- frigates of the project 11356, 3 units - we will further exclude them from consideration. Building these ships for fleet It turned out to be a necessary measure, and with all the minuses of this decision, it allowed to have at least some forces in the Black Sea Fleet. If not for this, then in fact the Black Sea Fleet would have two running patrol boats, useless unarmed rubbish of Project 22160 and non-navigable missile gunboats of Project 21631. Of course, it was worth paying more attention to the anti-submarine capabilities of these frigates - now they are inferior to their "grandparents" - class frigates "Talwar" for India, and very much inferior. But such ships are better than none;
- the frigates of the project 22350, 1 are handed over, 3 is in construction, they can lay more - without comment, a project that saves the country, with all its flaws. And having a high combat value;
- 20380 project corvettes - 6 units delivered, 4 in construction. A very controversial project, the head ship was unsuccessful, further alterations began, however, the last corvette can already be considered brought to mind. Almost everything works and almost as it should, but something is just perfect. The project needs a certain modernization, after which it will become a quite good fighting ship. So far, the hypothetical modernized 20380 is the only ship that Russia can pawn and build relatively massively, and with stable funding and re-laying ships where they have already been built, it is possible to increase the speed of construction;
- Corvette project 20385, 1 on trial, 1 in construction. Much more powerful ship than 20380, albeit more expensive. In shock armament surpasses the frigate 11356. On antisubmarine - at large distances, too, exceeds, about the SJC and there is nothing to say. A somewhat controversial project, and too expensive, but potentially (if everything works as it should) having a high combat value;
- “perekorvet-nedofregat” project 20386, 1 in construction. Already inflicted the country's defenses serious harm may not be built ever. At least in its current form (according to rumors "from above", the project is now seriously being reworked to make it feasible). About him, in principle, everything is already said in two previous articles: time и two;
- MRK project 21631 "Buyan-M", 7 units handed over, 5 in construction. Strange project. On the one hand, the idea of “hiding” the carriers of Caliber cruise missiles on inland waterways and in the coastal maritime zone is quite “working”. On the other hand, it was worthwhile to think about the fact that the diversity of the tasks of the Navy cannot be reduced to launching missiles against stationary targets and the “work” of the 100-mm cannon. The ships have neither air defense, nor PLO in a meaningful form, any, even the most seedy and ancient submarine can sink them in such quantity in which she will have torpedoes on board, meeting with a helicopter armed with anti-ship missiles for this ship is also deadly, about the results combat with a modern surface ship or a full-fledged attack from the air should be kept silent. Seaworthiness of the ship, in the popular language, no. Plus imported components, sanctions. The conceptual problem is that the USA’s exit from the INF Treaty deprives it of any meaning whatsoever. Soon cruise missiles can be put on car chassis;
- The 22800 “Karakurt” RTO project, 1 delivered, 1 under test, 9 in construction, 7 contracted, but not yet laid. The result of the realization that the 21631 RTO project is, firstly, a fiasco in terms of its GEM and TTH, and secondly, also an expensive fiasco (later on prices). Theoretically, Karakurt is much more successful than Buyan-M. He is seaworthy and has more diverse offensive weapon. The ship, starting with the third hull, should receive a PANZYR-M. Not to say that he was a super-weapon, but in general it is much better than a bunch of "Duet" and "Bending" on 21631. Hard cons of the ship - there is no way to defend against submarines, no. However, in the future it will be possible to invent a lightweight version of the package-NK complex and equip them with Karakurt. It will not be easy from an organizational point of view, but technically possible. In addition, a launching platform can be made from it within the framework of the network-centric approach, when its ships will be fired by other ships that do not have such missiles, but have more advanced radar systems for detecting targets. As well as 21631, the ship is a conceptual deadlock - after the USA’s exit from the INF Treaty its role as the “Kalibron bearer” becomes doubtful. But at least it can be used as a “classic” IRA. And here we have a second problem. The Navy has signed a contract for these ships, without having checked the possibility of the supplier of power plant, PJSC "Zvezda", to produce diesel engines at the right time and in the right amount. The truth came out anyway, but when it was too late. How now to steer out of the situation - it is not clear, the Zvezda will not give the diesel in the right amount, and either for a long time or never. Now the creative thought of the Navy ricochets from one rescue plan to another, from the deployment of diesel production at the Kingisepp Machine Works, which is not ready for this, until the project is reworked for the CCD, which will make the cost of its life cycle “golden”. Due to the dubious role of the IRAs as a carrier of Calibrov, the costs of the project clearly do not outweigh the benefits;
- the so-called patrol ships of the project 22160, 1 handed over, 1 on the test, 4 built. Everything was said about them, nothing to add. Absolutely useless project, it would be better if it was not. The product of mental convulsions of Admiral Chirkov and some of his then muddy relationship with industry. The only result of the presence of these ships in the ranks is that they delay personnel in peacetime, and in wartime they will kill this personnel instantly and to no avail. The appearance of this miracle has no other effects.
Let's stop on this. Until.
Every time someone says that there was no money for the fleet, you can remember this list - it was completely worth it and it costs money, which really has already been spent on it, and will be spent again.
Now we estimate the approximate cost of this shipbuilding program. This will be somewhat difficult, as it has been implemented over a long period of time, with serious inflation. The same 20380 at the beginning was worth less than 7 billion rubles, and in 2014 prices of the year already 17.
But we don’t have to count everything exactly, we need to understand approximately (with an error in 15 or 20 percent it would be quite normal), what could be obtained with this money if you could dispose of it wisely and not in the same way . Therefore, we will roughly and roughly bring prices to some general level, for example, to the level of 2014 of the year. And let's estimate the order of expenses, understanding that these prices in 2004 were completely different, and will be completely different in 2020, but since they could and could be bought “as much as a ship”, the method turns out to be quite legitimate, though not accurate.
So.
The cost of ships in our conditional prices. At the same time (IMPORTANT MOMENT) we do not touch those ships that were needed and useful without options, that is, 11356 and 22350. We believe that the money spent on them properly and do not take into account in the future, it will be clear below why.
20380. Built - 102 billion rubles, under construction - 68. It must be said that 1007 and 1008 orders are likely to be significantly more expensive even in the quoted prices, as they have a 20385 radar complex, but the order of numbers is important for us, and we can simply ignore this fact, noting that our prices are real - understated.
20385. The author did not come across estimates of the value of these ships. Accepting the sum of 20 billions with a reference above with an acceptable error, we can be completely satisfied with this figure. Thus, we assign 20 billions for “Thundering”, and the same amount for the “Agile” under construction.
20386. With this ship is ambiguity. It is not yet, and in the end, no one knows how much it will cost. There is the construction cost of this ship sounded by Severnaya Verf PJSC in the initial project - 29,6 billion rubles in 2016 prices of the year. However, this ship is part of the ongoing development work, and R & D funding goes through the development company, that is, in our case, the Almaz Central Securities and Design Bureau. This means that 29,6 does not smell billions there, and the cost of the project is much higher as a result. How many? We do not know. Evil tongues argue that the “Bold” is catching up on the cost of 22350. This is probably an exaggeration, but the fact that the cost of this ship is truly huge for a corvette, no doubt. Since we need the order of numbers, we simply leave 29 billion. We assume that they have already been spent.
21631. In September, the Ministry of Defense 2016 signed a contract with the Zelenodolsk plant for three such ships with a value of 27 billion rubles. This suggests that the cost of the ship in prices 2016 of the year - 9 billion rubles. Since we want to bring everything approximately to the prices of 2014 of the year, we reduce this price by the amount of inflation and get approximately 7,4 billion rubles per ship.
Thus, in our prices listed already built ships are 51,8 billion, and under construction - 37.
22800. Everything is unclear with them. It is known that they are cheaper than 21631, and significantly. Let us make the assumption that, in 2014 prices of the year, they would have cost 5 billion rubles per unit. Then there are two 10 billions built, 9 45 billions under construction and 7 contracted 35 billions.
22160. There is also no accurate data, there is a leak on the part of a person who has access to such information, which estimated the cost of each of the ships at about 6 billion rubles without indicating what year this figure refers to. Let us assume that to the one in which the bookmarks of these ships began, that is, to 2014. Then the already built ships cost 12 billions, and those under construction will cost another 24 billion rubles.
Total all mentioned shipbuilding program: ships already built - 237,6 billion rubles, under construction (both in high readiness and low) - 268,6 and not yet pledged, but already contracted "Karakurt" - 35. How much of the cost of ships under construction has already been spent? It is difficult to judge, well, let, for example, half.
Then we “overclock” all the received figures into two categories: already spent by the state - 371,9, the state is ready to spend - 169,45.
And all - 541,35.
Well, let 540 billion. If someone has the exact numbers, then he can repeat with them.
Now let's do a mental experiment.
Imagine a conditional combat unit - a conventional combat ship. Let it be something surpassing the price of 20380, let's say a billion by three and by the same “percentage” more efficient. For example, it is a large corvette in the dimensions of the 20380 and its GEM, with its gun, with the UBCS, with the Shtil air-defense missile system and only with serial radio electronic and radio weapons. Maybe with a hangar, and maybe not, it will not go so deeply into details. Everyone can imagine what he sees as the workhorse of the Navy as part of its concept of its application. Then, for 540 billion rubles, one could buy 27 of such conventional combat ships for 20 billions per unit, taking into account the budget utilization rates, 12 of them would have already been built, and 15 would be in different stages of readiness, or they would wait in line for bookmark.
And now the last question: what is stronger than 27 corvettes with normal weapons (100-mm gun, 16 SAM and 8 RCC, for example) or a bed unable to work together due to different seaworthiness and speed of freaks 22160 and 21631, supported by a small number of large corvettes, who are still weaker than our conventional ship? What is more useful - "Karakurt", or ships, with the same UBCS, and even can be with the same shell, but also able to fight with submarines?
The answers are obvious. Moreover, it is real, if there were no OCD heaps on all the above projects, which are also included in their cost, then it would be quite possible to scrape together three more “conditional” money and get ... five complete BMZ brigades, to 2021-2022 ! For the same money! And that would be if our ships cost 20 billions. And they could be on 15, depending on the design and the performance characteristics. Then six brigades.
All this is very approximate, of course, but even substituting for the scheme extremely precise and ideally reduced amounts to a single inflation, it would be impossible to get a different picture.
Moreover, all this is only the tip of the iceberg. A commonplace example is the Poseidon nuclear torpedo. According to the author, the project has already risen in an amount equivalent to two billion US dollars - and this despite the fact that not a single workable torpedo yet, and when (and if!) It appears, then there will be no sense from it, as already it has been said more than once, Including experts in marine underwater weapons with extensive experience serving in the Navy. But even if we discard these estimates of the cost of the project, we will not be able to discard something. The carrier of this weapon, the Khabarovsk submarine, which is under construction, will tentatively stand up for the country in 70-90 billion rubles. One boat, unable to use either cruise or ballistic missiles, almost unable to fight with torpedoes - is it too expensive in our situation? Only one boat is equal to four warships for 20 billions, and with ammunition will be equal to another brigade. And this money is also already spent.
And tankers at inflated prices? Whole broods of communications boats, and in fact - VIP yachts for admirals? And periodic statements by officials about the development of ekranoplans? How much does this development cost? And what about the ultra-expensive restructuring (the language doesn’t turn to call IT an upgrade) of the Admiral Nakhimov TAKR? Maybe it was easier to carry out upgrades, cheaper? And the main naval parade, which is even scary to imagine how much money is worth?
No money, right?
It is a lie that the problems of the Navy are connected with underfunding. There is underfunding, it is foolish to deny it, and it limits the ability to replenish the composition of the ship, and severely limits. But the main problem is not this, but the fact that the Navy naturally throws that money into the wind, which still reaches shipbuilding programs. Throws them away.
How was this possible? For a lot of reasons. The tyranny and voluntarism of the commanders (see V. Chirkov’s decision on 22160 and I. Zakharov’s approval of the 20386 project), capable of making decisions under the influence of the “urine in the head hit” factor. Corruption, allowing unscrupulous officers to "push through" deliberately populnyh projects for a fraction of the time. Illiteracy of the highest military-political leadership, not allowing to penetrate into all these issues and put the stupefied executors in place. The sabotage of foreign agents of influence, as they say, "rubbing" in this topic, and the inability of the FSB to identify and neutralize them all. The traditionally strong influence of the military-industrial complex on the military and the ability of industry commanders to push decisions that are beneficial to them (the endless use of budgets for OCD is just from there) and not the country and the fleet.
But all these problems are the product of one, the main. In our country, both in society and among government officials, there is a lack of understanding of what the navy is intended for. At best, we can state the instinctive conviction that for anything and fit, the Americans have fit. In order to understand what the fleet can give, and what does not, and there is no question. In the worst case, there will be a complete inability to understand at all the nature of the modern threats to the country and by what forces and means these threats should be parried, and how. But shipbuilding programs are a derivative of the tasks of the Navy, which in turn should be derived from the real threats and political goals of the country in the world.
This chain does not work for us, and as a result, instead of a deliberate and balanced strategy of naval construction, as a result of which we would have, if not very large, but balanced and without discounts, efficient naval forces, we observe wild disorder and wavering, throwing from project to project and the endless use of budgets by greedy commanders of the shipbuilding industry, as a result of which, instead of at least some fleet, the country has a gathering of ships that are unclear for any tasks that cannot even work together not representing mostly a threat to potential adversaries. And as a scarecrow at the top of the heap - pictures and cartoons with nuclear megaloped, apparently the most expensive pictures and cartoons in the world.
For the same money.
And all this, apparently, is not even going to end.
Leningrad Navy, Kronstadt. None of the same ship
“Where would the money come from for what you are offering here?” We believed, and it turned out that the collapse could not be avoided, the allocated money would not be enough to maintain the combat readiness of the Navy. " Arguments of such a plan always come up.
It is worth once and for all to debunk them, if only because they are untenable, not only in fact, but even logically.
Yes, money for military shipbuilding was allocated in insufficient quantities. Yes, even the money that was allocated came with constant delays. Yes, it was impossible to keep the available number of ships in the ranks. That's right.
But the matter is different - with all of the above money for the fleet, albeit insufficient, were allocated and even mastered. They were not just given - they were even spent. The question is how. And from the answer to this question all claims follow.
Let's deal with this in more detail.
How much did the fleet spend on surface ships and what did it end up with?
First, let's list the projects of warships that went into the series (auxiliary, rear vessels, etc., we don’t take - we’ll dwell on warships, and some, to simplify understanding of the issue).
So, over the past decade and a half, the Navy has laid and received the following warships:
- frigates of the project 11356, 3 units - we will further exclude them from consideration. Building these ships for fleet It turned out to be a necessary measure, and with all the minuses of this decision, it allowed to have at least some forces in the Black Sea Fleet. If not for this, then in fact the Black Sea Fleet would have two running patrol boats, useless unarmed rubbish of Project 22160 and non-navigable missile gunboats of Project 21631. Of course, it was worth paying more attention to the anti-submarine capabilities of these frigates - now they are inferior to their "grandparents" - class frigates "Talwar" for India, and very much inferior. But such ships are better than none;
- the frigates of the project 22350, 1 are handed over, 3 is in construction, they can lay more - without comment, a project that saves the country, with all its flaws. And having a high combat value;
- 20380 project corvettes - 6 units delivered, 4 in construction. A very controversial project, the head ship was unsuccessful, further alterations began, however, the last corvette can already be considered brought to mind. Almost everything works and almost as it should, but something is just perfect. The project needs a certain modernization, after which it will become a quite good fighting ship. So far, the hypothetical modernized 20380 is the only ship that Russia can pawn and build relatively massively, and with stable funding and re-laying ships where they have already been built, it is possible to increase the speed of construction;
- Corvette project 20385, 1 on trial, 1 in construction. Much more powerful ship than 20380, albeit more expensive. In shock armament surpasses the frigate 11356. On antisubmarine - at large distances, too, exceeds, about the SJC and there is nothing to say. A somewhat controversial project, and too expensive, but potentially (if everything works as it should) having a high combat value;
- “perekorvet-nedofregat” project 20386, 1 in construction. Already inflicted the country's defenses serious harm may not be built ever. At least in its current form (according to rumors "from above", the project is now seriously being reworked to make it feasible). About him, in principle, everything is already said in two previous articles: time и two;
- MRK project 21631 "Buyan-M", 7 units handed over, 5 in construction. Strange project. On the one hand, the idea of “hiding” the carriers of Caliber cruise missiles on inland waterways and in the coastal maritime zone is quite “working”. On the other hand, it was worthwhile to think about the fact that the diversity of the tasks of the Navy cannot be reduced to launching missiles against stationary targets and the “work” of the 100-mm cannon. The ships have neither air defense, nor PLO in a meaningful form, any, even the most seedy and ancient submarine can sink them in such quantity in which she will have torpedoes on board, meeting with a helicopter armed with anti-ship missiles for this ship is also deadly, about the results combat with a modern surface ship or a full-fledged attack from the air should be kept silent. Seaworthiness of the ship, in the popular language, no. Plus imported components, sanctions. The conceptual problem is that the USA’s exit from the INF Treaty deprives it of any meaning whatsoever. Soon cruise missiles can be put on car chassis;
- The 22800 “Karakurt” RTO project, 1 delivered, 1 under test, 9 in construction, 7 contracted, but not yet laid. The result of the realization that the 21631 RTO project is, firstly, a fiasco in terms of its GEM and TTH, and secondly, also an expensive fiasco (later on prices). Theoretically, Karakurt is much more successful than Buyan-M. He is seaworthy and has more diverse offensive weapon. The ship, starting with the third hull, should receive a PANZYR-M. Not to say that he was a super-weapon, but in general it is much better than a bunch of "Duet" and "Bending" on 21631. Hard cons of the ship - there is no way to defend against submarines, no. However, in the future it will be possible to invent a lightweight version of the package-NK complex and equip them with Karakurt. It will not be easy from an organizational point of view, but technically possible. In addition, a launching platform can be made from it within the framework of the network-centric approach, when its ships will be fired by other ships that do not have such missiles, but have more advanced radar systems for detecting targets. As well as 21631, the ship is a conceptual deadlock - after the USA’s exit from the INF Treaty its role as the “Kalibron bearer” becomes doubtful. But at least it can be used as a “classic” IRA. And here we have a second problem. The Navy has signed a contract for these ships, without having checked the possibility of the supplier of power plant, PJSC "Zvezda", to produce diesel engines at the right time and in the right amount. The truth came out anyway, but when it was too late. How now to steer out of the situation - it is not clear, the Zvezda will not give the diesel in the right amount, and either for a long time or never. Now the creative thought of the Navy ricochets from one rescue plan to another, from the deployment of diesel production at the Kingisepp Machine Works, which is not ready for this, until the project is reworked for the CCD, which will make the cost of its life cycle “golden”. Due to the dubious role of the IRAs as a carrier of Calibrov, the costs of the project clearly do not outweigh the benefits;
- the so-called patrol ships of the project 22160, 1 handed over, 1 on the test, 4 built. Everything was said about them, nothing to add. Absolutely useless project, it would be better if it was not. The product of mental convulsions of Admiral Chirkov and some of his then muddy relationship with industry. The only result of the presence of these ships in the ranks is that they delay personnel in peacetime, and in wartime they will kill this personnel instantly and to no avail. The appearance of this miracle has no other effects.
Let's stop on this. Until.
Every time someone says that there was no money for the fleet, you can remember this list - it was completely worth it and it costs money, which really has already been spent on it, and will be spent again.
Now we estimate the approximate cost of this shipbuilding program. This will be somewhat difficult, as it has been implemented over a long period of time, with serious inflation. The same 20380 at the beginning was worth less than 7 billion rubles, and in 2014 prices of the year already 17.
But we don’t have to count everything exactly, we need to understand approximately (with an error in 15 or 20 percent it would be quite normal), what could be obtained with this money if you could dispose of it wisely and not in the same way . Therefore, we will roughly and roughly bring prices to some general level, for example, to the level of 2014 of the year. And let's estimate the order of expenses, understanding that these prices in 2004 were completely different, and will be completely different in 2020, but since they could and could be bought “as much as a ship”, the method turns out to be quite legitimate, though not accurate.
So.
The cost of ships in our conditional prices. At the same time (IMPORTANT MOMENT) we do not touch those ships that were needed and useful without options, that is, 11356 and 22350. We believe that the money spent on them properly and do not take into account in the future, it will be clear below why.
20380. Built - 102 billion rubles, under construction - 68. It must be said that 1007 and 1008 orders are likely to be significantly more expensive even in the quoted prices, as they have a 20385 radar complex, but the order of numbers is important for us, and we can simply ignore this fact, noting that our prices are real - understated.
20385. The author did not come across estimates of the value of these ships. Accepting the sum of 20 billions with a reference above with an acceptable error, we can be completely satisfied with this figure. Thus, we assign 20 billions for “Thundering”, and the same amount for the “Agile” under construction.
20386. With this ship is ambiguity. It is not yet, and in the end, no one knows how much it will cost. There is the construction cost of this ship sounded by Severnaya Verf PJSC in the initial project - 29,6 billion rubles in 2016 prices of the year. However, this ship is part of the ongoing development work, and R & D funding goes through the development company, that is, in our case, the Almaz Central Securities and Design Bureau. This means that 29,6 does not smell billions there, and the cost of the project is much higher as a result. How many? We do not know. Evil tongues argue that the “Bold” is catching up on the cost of 22350. This is probably an exaggeration, but the fact that the cost of this ship is truly huge for a corvette, no doubt. Since we need the order of numbers, we simply leave 29 billion. We assume that they have already been spent.
21631. In September, the Ministry of Defense 2016 signed a contract with the Zelenodolsk plant for three such ships with a value of 27 billion rubles. This suggests that the cost of the ship in prices 2016 of the year - 9 billion rubles. Since we want to bring everything approximately to the prices of 2014 of the year, we reduce this price by the amount of inflation and get approximately 7,4 billion rubles per ship.
Thus, in our prices listed already built ships are 51,8 billion, and under construction - 37.
22800. Everything is unclear with them. It is known that they are cheaper than 21631, and significantly. Let us make the assumption that, in 2014 prices of the year, they would have cost 5 billion rubles per unit. Then there are two 10 billions built, 9 45 billions under construction and 7 contracted 35 billions.
22160. There is also no accurate data, there is a leak on the part of a person who has access to such information, which estimated the cost of each of the ships at about 6 billion rubles without indicating what year this figure refers to. Let us assume that to the one in which the bookmarks of these ships began, that is, to 2014. Then the already built ships cost 12 billions, and those under construction will cost another 24 billion rubles.
Total all mentioned shipbuilding program: ships already built - 237,6 billion rubles, under construction (both in high readiness and low) - 268,6 and not yet pledged, but already contracted "Karakurt" - 35. How much of the cost of ships under construction has already been spent? It is difficult to judge, well, let, for example, half.
Then we “overclock” all the received figures into two categories: already spent by the state - 371,9, the state is ready to spend - 169,45.
And all - 541,35.
Well, let 540 billion. If someone has the exact numbers, then he can repeat with them.
Now let's do a mental experiment.
Imagine a conditional combat unit - a conventional combat ship. Let it be something surpassing the price of 20380, let's say a billion by three and by the same “percentage” more efficient. For example, it is a large corvette in the dimensions of the 20380 and its GEM, with its gun, with the UBCS, with the Shtil air-defense missile system and only with serial radio electronic and radio weapons. Maybe with a hangar, and maybe not, it will not go so deeply into details. Everyone can imagine what he sees as the workhorse of the Navy as part of its concept of its application. Then, for 540 billion rubles, one could buy 27 of such conventional combat ships for 20 billions per unit, taking into account the budget utilization rates, 12 of them would have already been built, and 15 would be in different stages of readiness, or they would wait in line for bookmark.
And now the last question: what is stronger than 27 corvettes with normal weapons (100-mm gun, 16 SAM and 8 RCC, for example) or a bed unable to work together due to different seaworthiness and speed of freaks 22160 and 21631, supported by a small number of large corvettes, who are still weaker than our conventional ship? What is more useful - "Karakurt", or ships, with the same UBCS, and even can be with the same shell, but also able to fight with submarines?
The answers are obvious. Moreover, it is real, if there were no OCD heaps on all the above projects, which are also included in their cost, then it would be quite possible to scrape together three more “conditional” money and get ... five complete BMZ brigades, to 2021-2022 ! For the same money! And that would be if our ships cost 20 billions. And they could be on 15, depending on the design and the performance characteristics. Then six brigades.
All this is very approximate, of course, but even substituting for the scheme extremely precise and ideally reduced amounts to a single inflation, it would be impossible to get a different picture.
Moreover, all this is only the tip of the iceberg. A commonplace example is the Poseidon nuclear torpedo. According to the author, the project has already risen in an amount equivalent to two billion US dollars - and this despite the fact that not a single workable torpedo yet, and when (and if!) It appears, then there will be no sense from it, as already it has been said more than once, Including experts in marine underwater weapons with extensive experience serving in the Navy. But even if we discard these estimates of the cost of the project, we will not be able to discard something. The carrier of this weapon, the Khabarovsk submarine, which is under construction, will tentatively stand up for the country in 70-90 billion rubles. One boat, unable to use either cruise or ballistic missiles, almost unable to fight with torpedoes - is it too expensive in our situation? Only one boat is equal to four warships for 20 billions, and with ammunition will be equal to another brigade. And this money is also already spent.
And tankers at inflated prices? Whole broods of communications boats, and in fact - VIP yachts for admirals? And periodic statements by officials about the development of ekranoplans? How much does this development cost? And what about the ultra-expensive restructuring (the language doesn’t turn to call IT an upgrade) of the Admiral Nakhimov TAKR? Maybe it was easier to carry out upgrades, cheaper? And the main naval parade, which is even scary to imagine how much money is worth?
No money, right?
It is a lie that the problems of the Navy are connected with underfunding. There is underfunding, it is foolish to deny it, and it limits the ability to replenish the composition of the ship, and severely limits. But the main problem is not this, but the fact that the Navy naturally throws that money into the wind, which still reaches shipbuilding programs. Throws them away.
How was this possible? For a lot of reasons. The tyranny and voluntarism of the commanders (see V. Chirkov’s decision on 22160 and I. Zakharov’s approval of the 20386 project), capable of making decisions under the influence of the “urine in the head hit” factor. Corruption, allowing unscrupulous officers to "push through" deliberately populnyh projects for a fraction of the time. Illiteracy of the highest military-political leadership, not allowing to penetrate into all these issues and put the stupefied executors in place. The sabotage of foreign agents of influence, as they say, "rubbing" in this topic, and the inability of the FSB to identify and neutralize them all. The traditionally strong influence of the military-industrial complex on the military and the ability of industry commanders to push decisions that are beneficial to them (the endless use of budgets for OCD is just from there) and not the country and the fleet.
But all these problems are the product of one, the main. In our country, both in society and among government officials, there is a lack of understanding of what the navy is intended for. At best, we can state the instinctive conviction that for anything and fit, the Americans have fit. In order to understand what the fleet can give, and what does not, and there is no question. In the worst case, there will be a complete inability to understand at all the nature of the modern threats to the country and by what forces and means these threats should be parried, and how. But shipbuilding programs are a derivative of the tasks of the Navy, which in turn should be derived from the real threats and political goals of the country in the world.
This chain does not work for us, and as a result, instead of a deliberate and balanced strategy of naval construction, as a result of which we would have, if not very large, but balanced and without discounts, efficient naval forces, we observe wild disorder and wavering, throwing from project to project and the endless use of budgets by greedy commanders of the shipbuilding industry, as a result of which, instead of at least some fleet, the country has a gathering of ships that are unclear for any tasks that cannot even work together not representing mostly a threat to potential adversaries. And as a scarecrow at the top of the heap - pictures and cartoons with nuclear megaloped, apparently the most expensive pictures and cartoons in the world.
For the same money.
And all this, apparently, is not even going to end.
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