The Navy: Choosing a Balance Between Preparations for Hostilities and Peacetime Tasks
Discussing the combat readiness of the Navy, the ability of the state to provide the fleet with everything necessary and the correctness of the chosen development strategy fleet, we usually mean the need to be prepared for hostilities. If the exit from the base, then through mines and with the preliminary elimination of enemy submarines in an ambush at the exit, if the landing, then a bloody assault on the enemy’s coast, plowing tens of square kilometers of land with artillery fire from the sea, burned the skeletons of landing ships in shallow water and “rafting” from human bodies along the line of the surf - those who were unlucky to slip through the sweeping shore. Hence the desire and requirement to have minesweepers and modern mine action weapons, hence the need for shock aviation ashore to "deal" with enemy ship strike groups, and much more.
But behind this militaristic approach it is worth remembering that in the future a big war with our traditional enemies is far less likely than the continuation of the “near-war” confrontation with them, overflowing with stresses, provocations, demonstration of force, threats, false attacks, covert operations ... and losses, yes but not comparable with combat. Non-war, or new cold war, is much more likely than the potentially unpredictable "hot."
In the 70s, the naval shock groups of the USSR Navy more than once looked at the Americans "through the scope". The latter did not hesitate to demonstrate strength, arranging hooligan flights over the masts of our ships, brazenly could congratulate an officer with a new position even before the information about this came to the ship through regular communication channels (and ruin his career). Sometimes it was very hot: with shooting across the course, attempts to go to the ram, but there was no war. Ours, by the way, are also not particularly shy.
In 80, when the Reagan Crusader team made a firm decision to crush the USSR and developed powerful pressure, including on the Soviet Navy, it became even hotter (Reagan Navy Minister John Lehman gave a brief but powerful assessment in one of his interviews).
But the real war did not happen either, the USSR surrendered without it.
The logic of operations in war and non-war is diametrically different. For example, the recent passage of an American destroyer through Peter the Great Bay in a real war would have resulted in its sinking, most likely by an air strike from the shore. But in the logic of non-war, this was an attempt by the Americans to put pressure on us. To put pressure on them, showing that they didn’t give a damn about how we view this or that section of the World Ocean and what rights we have on it. Showing that it is their "spit", they are ready to back up with force, if necessary.
Specifically, there and then, it turned out they, frankly, not very. But even in this case, our Ministry of Defense had to make a special statement with explanations about the event, and the BOD also had to be sent to monitor the destroyer.
Lose the situation "in the other direction." The upgraded cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" as the embodied readiness to deliver a missile strike and a pair of BOD to ensure near-zone air defense and air defense systems will also be noted near the shores of the United States.
Would such a demonstration have military significance? No, in a real war they would not have reached there. And the political? What else. Even a banal voyage of a reconnaissance ship near American territorial waters usually causes a wave of publications in the American press - but in the press, so to speak, of the "third echelon". But this is with the passages of unarmed scouts. A cruiser potentially capable of attacking dozens of targets on the coast, repulsing a strong air attack and then, after that, sinking more than one surface ship is a completely different phenomenon. Yes, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, he will be doomed, but firstly, the enemy will pay a very considerable price for this, secondly, he is able to inflict huge damage in this case, and thirdly, such a waving of the barrel in front of his nose is certainly will not leave Americans indifferent. Someone else's cruising connection at your tervods is a symbol. Now it is more interesting for Russia not to provoke the United States with such antics, trying to play a civilized peace-loving country slandered by propaganda (which, by the way, is true). But everything can change.
Examples are (in English). Frankly, taking into account the intensity of the passions that was accompanied by that summit, the presence of the missile cruiser was quite appropriate.
For example, the number of ships in the PLA Navy will turn into the quality of the PLA Navy itself and they will “mate” with the Americans like our fleet during the Cold War. Then it will be possible for the Americans to make very thick hints in response to their every provocation - as soon as they send their AUGs to “restrain” the same Chinese AUGs, our ships may well appear near the Hawaiian islands, or a couple of ten miles to the south, showing the Americans that their calculations the correlation of forces with the enemy may be suddenly and at an extremely inappropriate moment for them - and not in the best direction for them. And that it is time to recognize our right to live on this planet, moreover, in the way we ourselves want, and not according to commands from Washington. Or prepare for surprises.
To illustrate how these operations look and what they lead to, let us analyze one of these operations, since this is simply a textbook example.
At the beginning of the Reagan era, Americans still suffered from a lack of a coherent concept of what they should do with the expanded Soviet Navy and by what methods. However, their new “Maritime strategy” was adopted and refined, providing for an “attack” on Soviet naval positions in the world, so that, many years later, John Lehman would say “drive Soviet naval bears back to their dens”.
In order to mark the beginning of a new era for the Soviet Union, the exercises Norpac FleetEx Ops'82, scheduled for the autumn of 1982, were chosen.
It makes no sense to completely describe in the article what happened there, it will be much more useful for those interested to familiarize themselves with the essay by Rear Admiral V.A. Karev "Unknown Soviet Pearl Harbor". V.A. Karev was a direct participant in our events. The people who served in Kamchatka in those years found a number of inaccuracies and inconsistencies in his memories, but not fundamental ones. The essay, among other things, well conveys the spirit of that era.
Here it is worth listing briefly the sequence of the American operation:
1. Open promotion of AUG Enterprise to Kamchatka.
2. Covert extension of the AUG Midway to Kamchatka. The Americans, who “figured out” how Soviet intelligence works, managed to “substitute” Midway for it at night, moreover, that our Pacific Americans took “Midway” as “Enterprise.”
3. Fires in the barracks at the Soviet radio interception points on Iturup island and in Provideniya. For those who are “not local”, it is necessary to clarify that the distance between them is thousands of kilometers. Almost simultaneous fires of the barracks at night in different, but critically important for the disruption of the deployment of American military units can not be a coincidence. So the assumption of Rear Admiral Karev about the attack of special forces SEAL is most likely true. It should be understood that both in Soviet times and after them, the entire defense system of the coast of Chukotka could be completely disorganized by literally read sabotage groups, and it was impossible, not possible, to stop their disembarkation, or to stop advancement from the coastline to the attacked objects. Apparently, it was the same on the Kuriles. Most likely, the Americans really did it, especially since then the raids of their naval special forces on the territory of the USSR became a sad reality.
4. Formation of an aircraft carrier connection (AUS) of AUG Enterprise and Midway AUG with a size and layer sufficient for defeating Soviet forces on the Kamchatka Peninsula, both Marine and air.
5. Beginning of air strikes in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky.
And only after that Soviet intelligence spotted the Americans.
Here is how Karev describes it:
This is how it looked. Moreover, as noted by Karev below, according to the scenario of the American exercises, the attack of the AUS on Kamchatka, to which the Americans were able to make secrets, was preceded by a training attack by cruise missiles from submarines, which the Navy did not suspect.
This is such a non-war. It was with such measures of psychological pressure that the USA broke the will of the Soviet political leadership. And eventually broke. Not just at sea, of course. Those interested in the question can find and read the book by Peter Schweitzer “Victory”, everything is well described there. At the same time, no real "big" war happened.
What was the intention of the American political leadership conducting such provocative exercises? In order for the USSR to understand: should the Americans strike first, and they will not be stopped. It was a banal forcing fear from the enemy. Of course, in a real war already underway, it would not have been possible to do this. But before it began, when preparing the strike, everything worked out perfectly - it really happened. Then there were a lot of such exercises, and not only in the Pacific, but in the mid-eighties, the USSR began to curtail its presence in the World Ocean. That was what the Americans wanted.
The conclusion from all this is this: the fleet, in principle, is capable of forcing the enemy to perform certain actions without war, but for this the threat created by him must be clear and realistic. It must be implementable. And then the enemy may flinch. Although it may become embittered, and then it will only get worse. But this is the task of politicians - to choose the right moment to demonstrate force.
Here are a couple of examples.
In the 70-ies of the Soviet Navy practiced, and successfully, its own set of measures to put pressure on the Americans. These measures consisted in deploying submarines with cruise missiles ready for striking from the American naval formations and tracking the American formations by surface ships. The ship provided target designation, the submarines "struck" a blow. The strike of the submarines could, and if possible should have been, accompanied by attacks from the Naval rocket-carrying aircraft. This tactic, for all its drawbacks, for the time being, was a very effective tool for non-strategic deterrence, and ensured that at the beginning of the war, the US Navy would suffer monstrous losses in ships and people - right away. In the red, it was this that gave rise to the American response in the eighties. But it could have been otherwise, and with proper management of the course of events, it should have been.
How can such measures work today? Well, for example, as soon as NATO began its Trident Juncture teachings, it was necessary not only to “deceive” them with GPS, as it was done, and to spy on them with Tu-142M, but also, for example, to form an ATC of Baltic Fleet ships and frigates of the Black Sea Fleet , and the airborne detachment of the Black Sea and Baltic BDK with the marines (and this is about ten ships, that is, about two battalions with equipment), after which, by the forces of this detachment, "shake" from Gibraltar. Together with the aircraft from Hmeimima. Subtly hinting, so to speak. With the subsequent delivery of a series of real strikes on the pro-British gangster groups somewhere in Syria, with their demonstrative destruction. Yes, it would not have special military significance, but it would have a political one - the Britons would be shown that they could be pressed not quite where they are ready for it. Not necessarily in Gibraltar, anywhere.
Such fleet operations are in fact no less important than preparation for an apocalyptic war with the United States and NATO. Although preparation should take place, otherwise such raids will be a clean and easily recognizable bluff, but the fact of the matter is that it is impossible to focus on one preparation for a “real” war, and even one scenario (we were attacked). What if the enemy does not attack? And investments in the fleet should pay off.
Article “Offensive or defense? There are enough resources for one thing. ” it was stated that in a limited budget, extensive development, such as the necessary forces of the Middle Sea zone (coastal attack aircraft, PLO corvettes, small rocket ships, minesweepers, etc.) will leave power for the Far Sea and Ocean zones not only without money for ships, but without people. Now it's time to complicate the situation even more and to voice another water one - creating a fleet capable of effectively putting pressure on the enemy using the methods described above, and creating a fleet capable of inflicting maximum losses on an enemy in a real war, these are similar tasks, but these are different tasks. They differ from each other, like a multi-shot pistol taken out of a holster in their hands, and a smaller pistol with a silencer, with a smaller ammunition package, hidden under clothes. It seems, but not the same.
For example, in order to "put pressure" on the enemy, we will approach a destroyer or better a URO cruiser with cruise missiles. It is well suited to strike a weak opponent, and to demonstrate strength, and to demonstrate a flag. But for conducting combat operations near its shores, a regiment of Su-30CM armed with anti-ship missiles of various types and pilots with special maritime training will be more useful. Different things.
In order to ensure the deployment of SSBN in the period of danger, we need only ships. In order to cover the bases of terrorists in Africa or cause hysteria in the Times - other ships. Sometimes the role will be combined. But often it will be the other way around. For example, minesweepers are vital during a war, but of little use during "force pressure" operations.
One of the tasks of the future naval construction will be to determine the balance between ships more suitable for putting pressure on an opponent and those that will be needed to kill its military in the course of a real, large, escalating spiral of war. Where there is no tracking weapons and counter-tracking, where the commanders do not test each other's nerves, but immediately drown the discovered ship of the "opponent" or at least try. Of course, the ships most needed for power pressure will be able to fight in a full-scale war, and ships built in strict accordance with the requirements of such a war can also be used in peacetime operations, but they will be very "non-optimal" when deciding "not their own "Tasks. Therefore, it will be necessary to reveal this balance and stick to it, because on the one hand, the best fight is the one that did not take place, and on the other, the state is the embodiment of readiness for war. Both of these statements are true, and it will be necessary to correspond to both, having decided in some way the existing contradiction in the requirements for the number and types of ships.
After all, ultimately the goal of the existence of the armed forces is the achievement of the political goals of the country by force. And force can not only be used, but also demonstrated, and this too should be able to do right, if only out of philanthropy.
There is simply no other choice.
But behind this militaristic approach it is worth remembering that in the future a big war with our traditional enemies is far less likely than the continuation of the “near-war” confrontation with them, overflowing with stresses, provocations, demonstration of force, threats, false attacks, covert operations ... and losses, yes but not comparable with combat. Non-war, or new cold war, is much more likely than the potentially unpredictable "hot."
In the 70s, the naval shock groups of the USSR Navy more than once looked at the Americans "through the scope". The latter did not hesitate to demonstrate strength, arranging hooligan flights over the masts of our ships, brazenly could congratulate an officer with a new position even before the information about this came to the ship through regular communication channels (and ruin his career). Sometimes it was very hot: with shooting across the course, attempts to go to the ram, but there was no war. Ours, by the way, are also not particularly shy.
The "raids" of the Soviet naval rocket-carrying aircraft on American AUGs were a bright sign of the Cold War. In the photo, our Tu-16 (some of the "K", apparently the scout) and the aircraft carrier "Ranger"
In 80, when the Reagan Crusader team made a firm decision to crush the USSR and developed powerful pressure, including on the Soviet Navy, it became even hotter (Reagan Navy Minister John Lehman gave a brief but powerful assessment in one of his interviews).
But the real war did not happen either, the USSR surrendered without it.
The logic of operations in war and non-war is diametrically different. For example, the recent passage of an American destroyer through Peter the Great Bay in a real war would have resulted in its sinking, most likely by an air strike from the shore. But in the logic of non-war, this was an attempt by the Americans to put pressure on us. To put pressure on them, showing that they didn’t give a damn about how we view this or that section of the World Ocean and what rights we have on it. Showing that it is their "spit", they are ready to back up with force, if necessary.
Specifically, there and then, it turned out they, frankly, not very. But even in this case, our Ministry of Defense had to make a special statement with explanations about the event, and the BOD also had to be sent to monitor the destroyer.
Lose the situation "in the other direction." The upgraded cruiser "Admiral Nakhimov" as the embodied readiness to deliver a missile strike and a pair of BOD to ensure near-zone air defense and air defense systems will also be noted near the shores of the United States.
Would such a demonstration have military significance? No, in a real war they would not have reached there. And the political? What else. Even a banal voyage of a reconnaissance ship near American territorial waters usually causes a wave of publications in the American press - but in the press, so to speak, of the "third echelon". But this is with the passages of unarmed scouts. A cruiser potentially capable of attacking dozens of targets on the coast, repulsing a strong air attack and then, after that, sinking more than one surface ship is a completely different phenomenon. Yes, in the event of the outbreak of hostilities, he will be doomed, but firstly, the enemy will pay a very considerable price for this, secondly, he is able to inflict huge damage in this case, and thirdly, such a waving of the barrel in front of his nose is certainly will not leave Americans indifferent. Someone else's cruising connection at your tervods is a symbol. Now it is more interesting for Russia not to provoke the United States with such antics, trying to play a civilized peace-loving country slandered by propaganda (which, by the way, is true). But everything can change.
Examples are (in English). Frankly, taking into account the intensity of the passions that was accompanied by that summit, the presence of the missile cruiser was quite appropriate.
For example, the number of ships in the PLA Navy will turn into the quality of the PLA Navy itself and they will “mate” with the Americans like our fleet during the Cold War. Then it will be possible for the Americans to make very thick hints in response to their every provocation - as soon as they send their AUGs to “restrain” the same Chinese AUGs, our ships may well appear near the Hawaiian islands, or a couple of ten miles to the south, showing the Americans that their calculations the correlation of forces with the enemy may be suddenly and at an extremely inappropriate moment for them - and not in the best direction for them. And that it is time to recognize our right to live on this planet, moreover, in the way we ourselves want, and not according to commands from Washington. Or prepare for surprises.
The destroyer "Dragon" of the Royal Navy of Great Britain accompanies our "Kuznetsov" in the English Channel. Such an escort has no military meaning, but it is necessary to demonstrate the strength - at least such. Sure to
To illustrate how these operations look and what they lead to, let us analyze one of these operations, since this is simply a textbook example.
At the beginning of the Reagan era, Americans still suffered from a lack of a coherent concept of what they should do with the expanded Soviet Navy and by what methods. However, their new “Maritime strategy” was adopted and refined, providing for an “attack” on Soviet naval positions in the world, so that, many years later, John Lehman would say “drive Soviet naval bears back to their dens”.
In order to mark the beginning of a new era for the Soviet Union, the exercises Norpac FleetEx Ops'82, scheduled for the autumn of 1982, were chosen.
It makes no sense to completely describe in the article what happened there, it will be much more useful for those interested to familiarize themselves with the essay by Rear Admiral V.A. Karev "Unknown Soviet Pearl Harbor". V.A. Karev was a direct participant in our events. The people who served in Kamchatka in those years found a number of inaccuracies and inconsistencies in his memories, but not fundamental ones. The essay, among other things, well conveys the spirit of that era.
Here it is worth listing briefly the sequence of the American operation:
1. Open promotion of AUG Enterprise to Kamchatka.
2. Covert extension of the AUG Midway to Kamchatka. The Americans, who “figured out” how Soviet intelligence works, managed to “substitute” Midway for it at night, moreover, that our Pacific Americans took “Midway” as “Enterprise.”
3. Fires in the barracks at the Soviet radio interception points on Iturup island and in Provideniya. For those who are “not local”, it is necessary to clarify that the distance between them is thousands of kilometers. Almost simultaneous fires of the barracks at night in different, but critically important for the disruption of the deployment of American military units can not be a coincidence. So the assumption of Rear Admiral Karev about the attack of special forces SEAL is most likely true. It should be understood that both in Soviet times and after them, the entire defense system of the coast of Chukotka could be completely disorganized by literally read sabotage groups, and it was impossible, not possible, to stop their disembarkation, or to stop advancement from the coastline to the attacked objects. Apparently, it was the same on the Kuriles. Most likely, the Americans really did it, especially since then the raids of their naval special forces on the territory of the USSR became a sad reality.
4. Formation of an aircraft carrier connection (AUS) of AUG Enterprise and Midway AUG with a size and layer sufficient for defeating Soviet forces on the Kamchatka Peninsula, both Marine and air.
5. Beginning of air strikes in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky.
And only after that Soviet intelligence spotted the Americans.
Here is how Karev describes it:
Thus, we remained in the dark about where the Midway AUG is located. And only on the afternoon of Sunday, a report was received from our coastal radio squadron in Kamchatka that our posts commemorate the work of the ships at frequencies of the AUG Midway intra-firing link.
It was a shock. The radio finding results showed that the newly formed carrier-assault strike compound (Enterprise and Midway), consisting of more than 30 ships, maneuvers 300 miles southeast of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and conducts flights of deck aircraft at a distance of 150 km from our coast.
Urgent report to the headquarters of the Navy. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov SG make a decision immediately. Urgently send the Sentry Guard patrol ship, three 671 RTM multi-purpose nuclear submarines to track the AUS, organize continuous aerial reconnaissance, bring the entire naval carrier of the Pacific Fleet fully operational, establish close cooperation with the air defense system in the Far East, and bring it into full combat readiness all parts and ships of the intelligence of the Pacific Fleet.
In response to such aggressive actions by the Americans to prepare for the departure a naval division of the naval-carrying aviation in readiness, on Monday to designate an airborne missile attack on an aircraft carrier. At the same time, multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarines with cruise missiles were also preparing to strike.
13 Monday, September. The reconnaissance of the Pacific Fleet will have to locate the AUS and deploy a naval missile-bearing aviation division. But at that time, radio silence was introduced on the ships of the US aircraft carrier. All radar stations are turned off. We are carefully studying the data of optical space intelligence. There is no reliable data on the location of aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, the departure of the MRA from Kamchatka took place. In an empty place.
Only a day later, on Tuesday, 14 of September, we learn from the data of the air defense posts in the Kuril Islands that the carrier-based strike force is maneuvering east of the island of Paramushir (the Kuril Islands), conducting flights of carrier-based aircraft.
Then they managed to send the sentry ship “Storozheva” to the aircraft carriers (TCR “Watchdog” at one time gained notoriety at the Main Command of the Navy after the well-known events in the Baltic Sea connected with the hijacking of the ship in 1975 under the command of the Kremlin’s politician. the crew was disbanded, and the ship was transferred from the Baltic to Kamchatka). Now this ship has become a direct tracking ship for the AUS. Multipurpose submarines sent to monitor the American AUS did not quite cope with their tasks, as this is the most difficult task for the submarine commander. It is necessary to try to be undetected in the composition of the order of connection.
Ultimately, the US carrier strike force passed east of the Kuril Islands, revealing the capabilities of the Soviet air defense to protect its borders. The apotheosis of this transition was the violation of the airspace of the USSR in the area of the Small Kuril chain (the islands of Tanfiliev, Anchuchin, Yuri, Polonsky, Green, Shikotan) by aircraft of carrier-based aircraft. It turned out that our "all-weather" fighter aircraft, represented by outdated MIG-19 and MIG-21 fighters, is not able to withstand the American decked-off phantom and attack aircraft "Intruderam." The weather did not allow them to use. After this next spit in our direction, the carrier connection (Enterprise, Midway) through the Sangar Strait entered the Sea of Japan.
It was a shock. The radio finding results showed that the newly formed carrier-assault strike compound (Enterprise and Midway), consisting of more than 30 ships, maneuvers 300 miles southeast of Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and conducts flights of deck aircraft at a distance of 150 km from our coast.
Urgent report to the headquarters of the Navy. Commander-in-Chief of the Navy Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union Gorshkov SG make a decision immediately. Urgently send the Sentry Guard patrol ship, three 671 RTM multi-purpose nuclear submarines to track the AUS, organize continuous aerial reconnaissance, bring the entire naval carrier of the Pacific Fleet fully operational, establish close cooperation with the air defense system in the Far East, and bring it into full combat readiness all parts and ships of the intelligence of the Pacific Fleet.
In response to such aggressive actions by the Americans to prepare for the departure a naval division of the naval-carrying aviation in readiness, on Monday to designate an airborne missile attack on an aircraft carrier. At the same time, multi-purpose nuclear-powered submarines with cruise missiles were also preparing to strike.
13 Monday, September. The reconnaissance of the Pacific Fleet will have to locate the AUS and deploy a naval missile-bearing aviation division. But at that time, radio silence was introduced on the ships of the US aircraft carrier. All radar stations are turned off. We are carefully studying the data of optical space intelligence. There is no reliable data on the location of aircraft carriers. Nevertheless, the departure of the MRA from Kamchatka took place. In an empty place.
Only a day later, on Tuesday, 14 of September, we learn from the data of the air defense posts in the Kuril Islands that the carrier-based strike force is maneuvering east of the island of Paramushir (the Kuril Islands), conducting flights of carrier-based aircraft.
Then they managed to send the sentry ship “Storozheva” to the aircraft carriers (TCR “Watchdog” at one time gained notoriety at the Main Command of the Navy after the well-known events in the Baltic Sea connected with the hijacking of the ship in 1975 under the command of the Kremlin’s politician. the crew was disbanded, and the ship was transferred from the Baltic to Kamchatka). Now this ship has become a direct tracking ship for the AUS. Multipurpose submarines sent to monitor the American AUS did not quite cope with their tasks, as this is the most difficult task for the submarine commander. It is necessary to try to be undetected in the composition of the order of connection.
Ultimately, the US carrier strike force passed east of the Kuril Islands, revealing the capabilities of the Soviet air defense to protect its borders. The apotheosis of this transition was the violation of the airspace of the USSR in the area of the Small Kuril chain (the islands of Tanfiliev, Anchuchin, Yuri, Polonsky, Green, Shikotan) by aircraft of carrier-based aircraft. It turned out that our "all-weather" fighter aircraft, represented by outdated MIG-19 and MIG-21 fighters, is not able to withstand the American decked-off phantom and attack aircraft "Intruderam." The weather did not allow them to use. After this next spit in our direction, the carrier connection (Enterprise, Midway) through the Sangar Strait entered the Sea of Japan.
This is how it looked. Moreover, as noted by Karev below, according to the scenario of the American exercises, the attack of the AUS on Kamchatka, to which the Americans were able to make secrets, was preceded by a training attack by cruise missiles from submarines, which the Navy did not suspect.
This is such a non-war. It was with such measures of psychological pressure that the USA broke the will of the Soviet political leadership. And eventually broke. Not just at sea, of course. Those interested in the question can find and read the book by Peter Schweitzer “Victory”, everything is well described there. At the same time, no real "big" war happened.
What was the intention of the American political leadership conducting such provocative exercises? In order for the USSR to understand: should the Americans strike first, and they will not be stopped. It was a banal forcing fear from the enemy. Of course, in a real war already underway, it would not have been possible to do this. But before it began, when preparing the strike, everything worked out perfectly - it really happened. Then there were a lot of such exercises, and not only in the Pacific, but in the mid-eighties, the USSR began to curtail its presence in the World Ocean. That was what the Americans wanted.
The conclusion from all this is this: the fleet, in principle, is capable of forcing the enemy to perform certain actions without war, but for this the threat created by him must be clear and realistic. It must be implementable. And then the enemy may flinch. Although it may become embittered, and then it will only get worse. But this is the task of politicians - to choose the right moment to demonstrate force.
Here are a couple of examples.
In the 70-ies of the Soviet Navy practiced, and successfully, its own set of measures to put pressure on the Americans. These measures consisted in deploying submarines with cruise missiles ready for striking from the American naval formations and tracking the American formations by surface ships. The ship provided target designation, the submarines "struck" a blow. The strike of the submarines could, and if possible should have been, accompanied by attacks from the Naval rocket-carrying aircraft. This tactic, for all its drawbacks, for the time being, was a very effective tool for non-strategic deterrence, and ensured that at the beginning of the war, the US Navy would suffer monstrous losses in ships and people - right away. In the red, it was this that gave rise to the American response in the eighties. But it could have been otherwise, and with proper management of the course of events, it should have been.
TFR "Hot" project 1135 keeps track of the US Navy AUG
How can such measures work today? Well, for example, as soon as NATO began its Trident Juncture teachings, it was necessary not only to “deceive” them with GPS, as it was done, and to spy on them with Tu-142M, but also, for example, to form an ATC of Baltic Fleet ships and frigates of the Black Sea Fleet , and the airborne detachment of the Black Sea and Baltic BDK with the marines (and this is about ten ships, that is, about two battalions with equipment), after which, by the forces of this detachment, "shake" from Gibraltar. Together with the aircraft from Hmeimima. Subtly hinting, so to speak. With the subsequent delivery of a series of real strikes on the pro-British gangster groups somewhere in Syria, with their demonstrative destruction. Yes, it would not have special military significance, but it would have a political one - the Britons would be shown that they could be pressed not quite where they are ready for it. Not necessarily in Gibraltar, anywhere.
Such fleet operations are in fact no less important than preparation for an apocalyptic war with the United States and NATO. Although preparation should take place, otherwise such raids will be a clean and easily recognizable bluff, but the fact of the matter is that it is impossible to focus on one preparation for a “real” war, and even one scenario (we were attacked). What if the enemy does not attack? And investments in the fleet should pay off.
Article “Offensive or defense? There are enough resources for one thing. ” it was stated that in a limited budget, extensive development, such as the necessary forces of the Middle Sea zone (coastal attack aircraft, PLO corvettes, small rocket ships, minesweepers, etc.) will leave power for the Far Sea and Ocean zones not only without money for ships, but without people. Now it's time to complicate the situation even more and to voice another water one - creating a fleet capable of effectively putting pressure on the enemy using the methods described above, and creating a fleet capable of inflicting maximum losses on an enemy in a real war, these are similar tasks, but these are different tasks. They differ from each other, like a multi-shot pistol taken out of a holster in their hands, and a smaller pistol with a silencer, with a smaller ammunition package, hidden under clothes. It seems, but not the same.
For example, in order to "put pressure" on the enemy, we will approach a destroyer or better a URO cruiser with cruise missiles. It is well suited to strike a weak opponent, and to demonstrate strength, and to demonstrate a flag. But for conducting combat operations near its shores, a regiment of Su-30CM armed with anti-ship missiles of various types and pilots with special maritime training will be more useful. Different things.
1988 year, the territorial waters of the USSR. TFR "Selfless" performs bulk on the Ticonderoga class URO cruiser "Yorktown", displacing it into neutral waters. The actions of the Americans are quite in the spirit of the Cold War, and not the real war. The USSR would be better to save your ship, but send a couple of cruisers to Guam
In order to ensure the deployment of SSBN in the period of danger, we need only ships. In order to cover the bases of terrorists in Africa or cause hysteria in the Times - other ships. Sometimes the role will be combined. But often it will be the other way around. For example, minesweepers are vital during a war, but of little use during "force pressure" operations.
One of the tasks of the future naval construction will be to determine the balance between ships more suitable for putting pressure on an opponent and those that will be needed to kill its military in the course of a real, large, escalating spiral of war. Where there is no tracking weapons and counter-tracking, where the commanders do not test each other's nerves, but immediately drown the discovered ship of the "opponent" or at least try. Of course, the ships most needed for power pressure will be able to fight in a full-scale war, and ships built in strict accordance with the requirements of such a war can also be used in peacetime operations, but they will be very "non-optimal" when deciding "not their own "Tasks. Therefore, it will be necessary to reveal this balance and stick to it, because on the one hand, the best fight is the one that did not take place, and on the other, the state is the embodiment of readiness for war. Both of these statements are true, and it will be necessary to correspond to both, having decided in some way the existing contradiction in the requirements for the number and types of ships.
After all, ultimately the goal of the existence of the armed forces is the achievement of the political goals of the country by force. And force can not only be used, but also demonstrated, and this too should be able to do right, if only out of philanthropy.
There is simply no other choice.
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