Offensive or defense? There are enough resources for one thing.
In the sea, two lines of defense, one passes through the bases of the enemy, the second - through your own bases.
Winston Churchill.
The naval superiority of a superpower requires offensive operations carried out in the most harmful way for the enemy.
John Lehman
Winston Churchill.
The naval superiority of a superpower requires offensive operations carried out in the most harmful way for the enemy.
John Lehman
Nuclear submarine project 949 and BOD project 1155. These forces can both advance and defend.
The battle of the shield and the sword is more relevant than ever in matters of naval construction. Since the strength of the fleets ceased to be reduced to the number of muzzle-loading guns aboard wooden ships, the division of resources allocated to the fleet between the defensive and offensive forces and assets has become a serious "headache" for all who made fundamental decisions. Build destroyers or battleships? Ocean cruisers or small submarines? Shore-based attack aircraft or deck carrier aircraft aviation?
Small anti-submarine ship project 1124M. Designed for defense
This is a really difficult choice - it is a choice, because it is impossible to have both defensive and offensive forces at the same time. No economy can handle this. There are many examples. How many US antisubmarine corvettes? Not at all. And minesweepers? Eleven or something like that. According to the plans of the US Navy, when mine control modules for the LCS ships finally appear, the fleet will buy eight sets on the Atlantic and Pacific theaters. This is practically zero.
True, mine equipment is now installed on existing ships - for example, on the destroyers Arly Burk. But the destroyers upgraded in this way are few, and with the mine preparation of the crews everything is not going smoothly, in fact, the Berks are fully prepared only for the air defense tasks of the ship formations, some ships can still intercept ballistic missiles, there are problems with the rest.
В stories There is an example of a country that tried to have everything - both forces for attack and forces for defense. It was the USSR.
The Soviet Navy had enormous coastal forces - alternating torpedo and missile boats, small missile and anti-submarine ships, small landing ships, diesel submarines of relatively small displacement, base anti-submarine helicopters Mi-14, amphibious aircraft. There were coastal troops with a large number of missiles on a car chassis. There was one more thing - a huge, hundreds of cars, marine missile-carrying aircraft. All this cost absolutely fantastic money, especially MRA - hundreds of the world's best bombers, armed with the world's best heavy missiles and guided by the world's best naval pilots. It was a very expensive pleasure, and in many respects are right those who believe that the MPA cost approximately corresponded to the carrier the fleet. But it was coastal weapon nevertheless, the forces by which the coast could be defended from enemy ships. Defensive tool, not offensive.
However, the same USSR Navy had something else - nuclear missile submarines, large diesel missile submarines capable of operating in the open ocean, 68-bis artillery cruisers, 58 missile cruisers, 61, 1134 missile cruisers (in fact, anti-submarine cruisers, no matter how it sounds strange), 1134B, anti-submarine helicopter carriers of the 1123 project and a whole brood of destroyers of the 30 project, and later BOD of the 61 project.
Some time later, more advanced ships appeared - the TFR of the 1135 project, the 1143 aircraft carrying cruisers, with ship planes, the destroyers of the 956 project, the BNC of the 1155 project ...
The list can be continued for a long time, there will be more and more sophisticated missile submarines, and the “long arm of the MRA” that appeared “out of date” 80 - missile-carrying Tu-95K-22, rather numerous basic anti-submarine aviation and “under the curtain” of existence The USSR is a fully-fledged aircraft carrier, of which only one could build for itself. The second, as you know, now serves in the PLA Navy, and the third is cut at the readiness stage in 15%.
And the USSR could not stand it. No, of course he could not stand the five types of the Armed Forces (SV, Air Force, Navy, Strategic Rocket Forces, Air Defense), and sixty-four thousand tanks in the ranks, and in general of the army, numerically sufficient for the simultaneous conquest of NATO and China, and the war against the whole world in Afghanistan, and inefficiently managed and therefore continuously stagnating economy. But the gigantic expenses for the fleet also made themselves felt.
Partly the desire of the USSR to grasp the immensity was understandable. Coastal forces lacking a “long arm” are vulnerable to a blow from the sea. For example, we have a naval strike group of MRK, which, however, do not leave the zone of action of coastal aviation, in order not to be killed by a small number of enemy aircraft. But what prevents the enemy to lift into the air from aircraft carriers large aviation forces, and at low altitude, with outboard fuel tanks (and refueling on the way back) to throw them into the attack against our IRAs? Our interceptors? But the air force on duty will not be large a priori, and the attacker will have numerical superiority, which means that the interceptors and the “insurers” of their interceptors will be destroyed, and when the main forces will be raised to the place of slaughter, from the enemy already and the trace cools down. Literally. Powerful forces in the far sea zone in theory give combat stability to coastal forces. However, at present, various types of reconnaissance and basic strike aircraft as a whole make it possible to prevent the enemy from quietly attacking even from the DMZ.
Anyway, the Soviet economy did not endure all this.
In contrast to the Soviet Union, the Americans did not even consider for themselves the possibility of building defensive naval forces. Admiral Zumvalt managed to "pierce" the construction of only six missile boats - and this despite the fact that they had to operate near the territorial waters of the Warsaw bloc countries, that is, the defensive means were purely nominal. But it did not work ...
The Americans understood that it was impossible to have everything. Must choose.
For countries whose budget is limited, the more you need to choose. Russia is one of those countries.
I must say that in fact, the economy of the Russian Federation allows you to build a fairly strong fleet. But the problem is that, firstly, we need to finance the army and the air force, and secondly, we have four fleets, one more fleet, and in most cases, to ensure that in each direction we cannot be stronger than the potential adversary, and maneuver by forces and means between the theaters is almost completely excluded, minus naval aviation. This makes the choice between defense and offensive even more difficult.
But maybe things are not so bad? Maybe it is still possible to provide full-fledged defensive forces, and some opportunities to perform tasks in the far sea zone (off the coast of Syria, for example, if we try to counteract there) at the same time?
Russia has eighteen major major naval bases. In theory, each of them needs anti-mine forces. This means by a brigade of six minesweepers for each naval base. It is necessary, however, to protect the ships leaving the bases from ambushes of submarines. And again it is necessary to have dozens of some kind of anti-raid corvettes, functional analogues of small anti-submarine ships of the Soviet era. But the enemy can attack the coast with cruise missiles. So, we need coastal strike aviation, from regiment to division to fleet. For example, a division to the Northern Fleet, a division to the Pacific and a regiment to the Baltic and the Black Sea. And more submarines.
And here the problems begin. Two divisions and two regiments of airplanes is the equivalent of a naval aviation sufficient to recruit four large aircraft carriers, approximately seventy thousand tons each. A couple of hundreds of small warships of all classes (minesweepers, anti-submarine corvettes, small landing ships) are comparable in number to the ocean fleet.
The crew of the modern PLO corvette may be within the 60-80 person. At first glance, this is the equivalent of one fourth destroyer. But the commander of this ship is a fully-fledged commander of the ship. This is a piece of "goods", which can not be much a priori. It is "equivalent" to the destroyer commander, and, having gained a certain experience, and having passed the minimum training, to the cruiser commander. A good commander can not be anyone. And the same applies to the commanders of combat units, even if they are combined on small ships.
Suppose we have eighty PLO corvettes in four fleets. This means that we keep on them eighty highly professional, experienced and bold (the other PLO “will not master” the corvette, this is not a tanker) of the ships' commanders. That is almost as much as the Americans on all cruisers and destroyers combined. And if we still have the same minesweepers and three dozen RTOs? This is a little less than the US Navy in general, if you do not take into account submarines. But at the same time, we don’t get close to those opportunities for using the fleet in foreign policy that the United States has. We will not, for putting pressure on someone, send an anti-submarine corvette to its shores?
Russia is more than twice less than the USA in terms of population. It is foolish to think that we will be able to form more crews (albeit few) and train more ship commanders and combat units than Americans have. It's impossible.
But can then go the way of the USA? When our submarine attempts to penetrate the Juan de Fuca Bay, she will have to deal not only with the US Navy anti-submarine aircraft, but also with destroyers. The Americans do not have corvettes, they frigates removed from service, but no one will prohibit the use of destroyers for hunting submarines, in conjunction with airplanes. On the other hand, “Arly Burke” can be loaded with Tomahawk missiles and sent to strike at Syria. It is universal in this sense.
However, here we will fail. The United States has a huge barrier in the form of two oceans that separate them from any enemy in Eurasia, and any enemy in Eurasia is surrounded by a dense ring of American allies and simply friendly countries that help America control its rivals right in their territory.
We are wrong, we have Japanese, Polish, Norwegian and Turkish radars provide Americans with intelligence information, highlighting for them the situation in our airspace and in our waters, sometimes in bases, and even these countries are ready, if necessary, to provide their territory for anti-Russian operations. As for us, next to the USA there is only a small and “see-through” Cuba. In such conditions, it is impossible to completely abandon the defensive forces.
Recall the US military operation against Iraq in 1991 year. The Iraqis mined the Persian Gulf, and two American ships blew up on their mines. It is worth thinking - what if the Iraqis would have the opportunity to mine the waters around military bases in the United States? Would they take advantage of this opportunity? Maybe yes. So Russia is just in such a vulnerable position. Most of our potential opponents are close to us. Close enough so that our bases would need to be guarded as best as possible.
There is a third problem.
The fleet is an incredibly specific kind of armed forces. Among other things, this is reflected in the fact that even the technical characteristics of the ships closely depend on what political tasks the state as a whole sets itself. For example, the Chinese are actively preparing to act in Africa - and amphibious ships, complex supply vessels, and floating hospitals for hundreds of beds are massively entering their fleets. It is critical for Americans to carry out a “projection of force” from the sea to the land. And they, in addition to the same as the Chinese, have fantastically developed transport forces, forces ensuring the landing of the second echelon of the amphibious assault forces, and thousands of cruise missiles to strike the coast. Not a single type of armed forces depends to such an extent on the strategic interests of society as a whole, or on the boundary conditions in which it is forced to carry out its policy. Russia is also concerned.
Take, for example, an extreme question for many aircraft carriers.
If we plan to use them for defense, the waters in which they will be used in a defensive war will be the Barents Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the Sea of Okhotsk, the southern part of the Bering Sea, and if a number of circumstances coincide, the Sea of Japan.
In these areas (with the exception of the Sea of Japan), the sea is often very turbulent, and in order for an aircraft carrier to be effectively used in them, it must be quite large and heavy, otherwise it will be impossible to take off (or sit down, which is even worse). In fact, the Kuznetsov is the minimum possible ship for such conditions. But if we are going to dominate the Mediterranean, the Red Sea, and the Persian Gulf, then the requirements for an aircraft carrier are much simpler, and it can be approximately like the Italian Cavour, 30-35 thousand tonnes of displacement. Similar dependencies affect all ships. Should we, for example, be able to launch the Kalibr CD from frigates? And how. And if NATO did not exist, hostile regimes in Eastern Europe, Britain and the United States? Then, in general, the navy would hardly be needed, not to mention rocket weapons. It would be possible to "exhale."
Thus, the political and strategic objectives of the state have an impact on naval construction. In the case of Russia, they require both defensive forces and the ability to operate in the far sea zone, for example in the Mediterranean, at least to prevent the interruption of the Syrian Express. At the same time, the ability to extensively increase the “mosquito fleet” of small rocket ships and corvettes, and the ocean fleet of destroyers and aircraft carriers, Russia does not have a reason for the lack of economic power, and let's say it finally out loud - demography. Plus the factor that we have not one fleet, but four isolated, operating in different conditions.
What to do in this situation?
To begin with - define the tasks and boundary conditions.
Relatively speaking, we do not need PLO corvettes, but PLO itself, provided in any way we like. How? For example, an anti-submarine boat in 350-400 tons, with armament from one bomb, a pair of 324 mm torpedo tubes, four inclined PU PLUR, a pair of AK-630M, with a compact towed, lowered and hydrated GUS. Or with one 76 mm gun mount and one AK-630M (while keeping the rest of the weapon). Sacrificing the ship's air defense, sacrificing the presence of anti-ship missiles, and reducing the crew, we get a cheaper solution than the PLO corvette - although less universal, with less combat stability. Or, in general, a torpedo boat tons in 200, with one bomb bomb, 324-mm torpedo tubes, the same set of HAC, one AK-630М, shelling sector, close to the circular, without PLUR, with an even smaller crew. How will he hit submarines? Transfer target designation to the shore where the coastal-based PLRK will be located. What is the exhaust? The fact that the PLRK is one for the entire naval base, and it should be enough to ensure the release of strike ships and submarines into the sea. That is, the boat seems to be shooting, but not with its own rockets, but with the PCRK missiles. There are many boats, the PLRK is one, but for one or two enemy submarines it is enough.
In fact, it’s not a fact that this is the way to be done — this is just an example of how an expensive solution — the PLO corvette — is being replaced by a cheap boat. With minimal (subject to complete air cover) loss of effectiveness when used according to the main purpose. But with a significant loss of versatility, this is no longer to be such a guard. But instead of eighty people, headed by a lieutenant commander, we “spend” about thirty and a senior lieutenant on such a boat (for example) as a commander.
What else, besides such simplification, will allow "saving" money and people for the forces operating in the far sea and ocean zones?
Universalization. Let us give an example such as the defense of narrowness, for example, the second Kuril pass. We will not consider air defense issues yet - we proceed from the assumption that aviation provides it. In theory, small rocket ships, RTOs, would be useful here. But we have bad money, and therefore, instead of IRAs, there are several diesel-electric submarines with guided torpedoes. They themselves are more expensive than RTOs, but we also use them for firing with the “Gauges”, we will also engage them in the PLO of the Naval bases, and we will also attack the surface ships of the enemy, both with torpedoes and missiles, somewhere we land saboteurs - or we select them. They are used to solve very different and numerous tasks. DEPL us in any case to buy. Of course, the RTOs with some of these tasks would have done much better, but it is not capable of accomplishing all the tasks. But, because we have high-speed surface and underwater targets, for which the diesel-electric submarines simply can not keep up, even if you do not try to preserve secrecy, right? So, they are transferred to aviation - which you still need to have. In the red - the loss of the "option" tracking weapons. But it can be replaced by an air reconnaissance and aviation forces on the ground ready for an air attack — during a threatened period it is more expensive than sending RTOs, but at other times it is cheaper, because both aviation and air reconnaissance need to be paid anyway. Thus, in one case, we need the diesel-electric submarines, and in the other, diesel-electric submarines and interregulators. The choice is obvious.
What else could be the tricks? Placement of underwater vehicles-seekers of mines, unmanned boats with anti-mine GAS, and destroyers on the main warships of the DM & OZ. On the same frigates. This increases the cost of the ship, and inflates the state of the warhead-3. But this rise in price and inflation is incomparable with the need to have a separate minesweeper, even a small one.
By the way, one does not interfere with the other - the minesweepers are also needed in this case, they just need less, and significantly. Which is the goal. The naval base, on which the surface ships are based, will need far fewer minesweepers than if the PMO were carried out only by them, it would be necessary to hold large trawling forces only at submarine bases.
And of course, the provision of maneuver forces and means. For example, as stated in the article about the revival of landing forces, small landing ships, around which it is necessary to build the landing forces of the future, must pass along inland waterways so that a ship from the Black Sea could get into the Caspian, the Baltic, and the White Sea. Then the three “European” fleets and the Caspian flotilla will need to have fewer ships, and the lack of forces in one or the other direction will be compensated by transferring reinforcements from the other.
And the combat boats described above must also pass by water. And for their posting in the winter, engineering (ice reconnaissance of the rivers, blasting of the ice cover with the help of explosives) and icebreaking equipment should be worked out.
Another way to reduce fleet costs is to create reserves in advance. First of all, from ships that are no longer needed in combat, but for the time being at least limited in combat capability. For example, the light cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov, although it operates as a cell phone tower and a museum, is in fact listed as a reserve ship in the Navy. Its combat value, of course, is near zero, this is just an example of the fact that we have some reserves even now. On the approach, in the next decade, the retirement of the "Sharp-witted", perhaps some small ships, some of which, after a refurbishment, could be preserved. Also, it makes sense to consider reviving the practice of mobile reserve from civil courts.
Currently, thanks to the program of the Ministry of Industry and Trade "keel in exchange for quotas", a definite renaissance of the construction of fishing vessels is underway. It is quite possible, in exchange for additional subsidies, to provide for them additional means of communication and units for fastening removable, modular weapons, obliging the shipowners to maintain it all in good condition (which would be quite profitable for them financially). And keep in mind in advance that in the event of a big war, the auxiliary tasks will be solved by these mobilized ships, and not build them specifically for the fleet, spending money and forming crews.
But the main thing is the transfer of some functions to aviation. Unfortunately, airplanes cannot replace ships. The ship has the opportunity to be present in the right area for weeks, for aviation such a presence turns out to be inconceivably expensive. But she still has to reassign part of the tasks, if only because she can be transferred from theater to theater in 24 hours, which is absolutely impossible for ships. So, instead of creating numerous naval forces in each of the fleets, you can take turns attacking the enemy in different theaters with the same aircraft, but with a small shift in time.
The less money, and, most importantly, people, went to the mosquito fleet, the more the ocean remains.
And the last - and most important. Part of the tasks in the BMZ may well perform the DMiOZ ship. So, if it presses very strongly, then the frigate, and not the IRAs, can follow the weapon to the enemy. It looks irrational, but in this case we need only a frigate, and in the other, a frigate and IRAs, with the corresponding involvement of personnel and expenses. Similarly, it is possible to use frigates to ensure the deployment of SSBNs and protect them from enemy nuclear submarines, it is not necessary to build corvettes for this purpose. Not always, but often this is the case.
Once again, all the examples above are just a demonstration of the approach.
We list the main tasks of the Navy in the coastal zone:
- Mine security.
- Anti-submarine defense.
- Strikes on surface ships, including from the tracking position.
- Air defense bases, deployment areas of submarines and ship groups.
- Antiamphibious defense.
- Fire support landing.
- Protection of shipping, protection of convoys and amphibious units at the transition.
- Strikes on the shore with guided missiles and artillery.
- Statement of mine and network obstacles.
In principle, this list can be continued for a long time, the principle is important.
First, we determine which tasks from the list (however long this list may be) can be solved by aviation, and without prejudice to the quality of their implementation. These tasks are transferred to aviation. After all, you still need to have it.
Then we determine which tasks from the remaining ones can be solved by ships of the far sea zone, which will temporarily operate in the near (for example, the frigate covering the submarine’s transition from the Vilyuchinsk base to the Sea of Okhotsk, after the operation is completed, can be used for completely different purposes, including and in the DMZ), and how many such ships are needed. Then we determine how much we have to have real ships of the near-sea zone, and how many of them can be simplified - boats that replace corvettes, or mobilized by civilian ships in general.
This will determine the minimum number of BMZ ships of various types that the Russian Navy should have, the minimum number of combat boats operating from the coast of aviation, modular weapons for mobilized ships, reserve ships and people. And it is these minimal forces that must be created.
And all other tasks, even in the BMZ, must be carried out by ships "from the frigate and above", ships of the far sea and ocean zones, nuclear submarines and anti-submarine long-range aircraft. And the main money should be spent on them. Because a frigate or a destroyer can fight submarines from its base, but to fight a few thousand miles from its native shores for a corvette of one and a half thousand tons is a difficult task, if at all.
Of course, in the construction of new ships will have to show economical approaches, and somewhere to combine tasks, for example, so that the landing ship could be transport at the same time and replace two ships.
But this does not negate the main thing.
Forces capable of acting only in the BMZ in our fleet, of course, should be. But to rely only on them, or to develop them extensively, as the USSR did, would be a fatal mistake. Because in this case it is on them that all available resources will go, and to fight the enemy in the far sea zone, where he will actually be, and from where he will strike his blows, nothing will remain, nothing will remain and the tasks peacetime, on Syrian-type operations, on “status projection,” as the Americans say, or “flag demonstration,” as we used to say to this day. To achieve the strategic goals of Russia in the world.
And this is unacceptable.
And although it is difficult to combine the presence of forces for the distant sea and ocean zones, with the defense forces for the near sea zone, both technically and organizationally, but this is feasible. You just need to correctly prioritize, and take non-standard approaches.
In the end, you can defend and in line with enemy bases. Wherever they are.
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