Attack from the sea. How to return the navy amphibious capabilities
The abundance of criticism of domestic fleet, and especially of the direction in which naval construction is developing, should, in fairness, be accompanied by a certain explanation of how everything should have been done.
Past article about the crisis of amphibious capabilities of the Russian Navy deserves such a continuation. Consider how you can return the Navy opportunities for amphibious assault landing, without resorting to expensive solutions.
This is especially important now, when economic realities will absolutely not allow the Russian Navy to develop extensively. Of course, to develop extensively is great. There is no possibility to use helicopters in the landing operation - we are building the DVKD or the UDC in general. Few landing ships? Build more ...
The trouble, however, is that on such a path in the budget there will be no money for many years. This means that we have to find another way. Cheap. Its, such as no one has ever used. There is no money, but you hold on there. So it will now be, apparently.
Is it real? Yes, quite, and these opportunities need to "run in the info field" right now.
In order to assess the prospects of the “budget” modernization of the landing forces of the Russian Navy, we first write out the boundary conditions:
1. It is necessary that the new amphibious ships could release military equipment on the water at a great distance from the coast.
2. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure the possibility of delivery to the landing zone of combat helicopters and helicopters with a landing force.
3. It is necessary to ensure the landing of heavy equipment - tanks and sapper equipment in the first wave, self-propelled artillery, more tanks and transport vehicles in the second.
4. In the event of a landing operation failing, the naval personnel must ensure the possibility of evacuating most of the people from the coast, even without the equipment.
5. At the same time it is necessary to do without large specialized landing ships.
Conditions somewhat contradict each other, but, oddly enough, there are solutions that satisfy them.
Historically, Russia, forced to have a large land army, could not invest in the fleet as well as the British, or the Americans. And if the latter, during the last great war, massively built amphibious ships, the Soviet Navy was forced to mobilize combat ships and transport ships for the landing. The landing of the marines from cruisers should be left behind the brackets, but the mobilization of transport ships tells us a relatively unexpected way out.
In 1990, an unusual vessel for the Soviet Navy, the Anadyr high-speed sea transport, entered the Pacific Fleet.
The ship was hardly intended to carry weapons from port to port.
First, its cargo compartment was optimized to accommodate lighters, and lighters are needed to transport heavy loads to an unequipped shore. Secondly, and most importantly, the ship was equipped with cockpits to accommodate the personnel, which in number approximately corresponded to the reinforced battalion - according to various sources, from 650 to 750 people.
Thirdly, in the standard version, the Anadyr had a hangar for two Ka-27 helicopters. And a huge flat cargo deck. The ship in fact most closely corresponded to what in the West is called the Landing ship dock - the landing ship dock. The aft ramp completely allowed the equipment to be loaded onto the water, like a landing ship, and other vessels could have been used instead of lighters. Differences from the landing ship by and large simply did not exist.
In order to engage the Anadyr in the landing operation, he did not need any improvements - none at all. And if the Soviet marines had the naval armored personnel carrier - an analogue of the American LVTP-7, then from Anadyr, using these machines, it would be quite possible to carry out the same over-horizon landing, the same as the Americans are preparing to conduct from their UDC. The downside was only a small hangar, but here we have historical precedent, however, is not domestic.
This is "Konderder bizent." One of the mobilized transport ships that the British used on the Falklands. The flat cargo deck is covered with flooring and turned into a flight deck, and a hangar for Chinook helicopters is mounted from the containers. This ship was not used as a landing ship, but the principle is important to us. If we assume that we are using an analogue of Anadyr as a DVKD, and we need to place more helicopters on it, then it is quite possible to attach a lightweight, fast-built aircraft to a permanent hangar and to add two or six helicopters in a permanent hangar.
If we land the MP battalion, and if the situation requires landing some of the forces in the form of an airborne assault force, then we need to raise a minimum company on helicopters. And these are eight Ka-29 or some hypothetical transport vehicles based on Ka-32. It would be nice to have two or four shock Ka-52K to cover the landing. On such a huge ship, like Anadyr, it is quite possible to place them.
On the other hand, if an airborne landing is not necessary or impossible, then all the helicopters on board can be shock. Or, if it is planned that there will be no resistance (well, you never know), then you can limit yourself to a pair of sanitary facilities and not to build any additional hangar at all.
Moreover. If you equip the ship with a lift for heavy equipment, now you can place helicopters inside, on the lower cargo deck, increasing their number to dozens. This will make it possible to land an air assault battalion immediately from the air, and to provide its actions with support for attack helicopters.
Or, alternatively, use the upper cargo deck to place ground equipment, as well as the lower one, lowering the armored cars and trucks down and rolling them out from there to the outside.
If necessary, such a ship becomes a very convenient and versatile base for special operations, it can be present at any point of the world ocean, carry special forces, helicopters, boats and boats, UAVs, container systems on board. weapons (cruise or anti-ship missiles) and a large supply of material and technical means. It can be used as a mobile anti-submarine base aviation somewhere in the Sea of Okhotsk, for example, and base on it anti-submarine helicopters.
But the most important thing is that beyond periods of use in combat operations, it is simply a transport, which is used as a transport, for transportation. The Ministry of Defense, as is known, has purchased a large number of vessels of various types to supply the grouping in Syria. Since MO still have to buy transport vessels, why not buy such a vessel? Yes, it is ineffective in comparison with ships specially built for commercial use, but in the end, the military is not required to compete in efficiency with civilian carriers. And surely, such a ship would be much more efficient as a transport in the same Syrian express train - in the upper cargo deck there may well be wide covers on the one side (they had an Anadyr) to load cargo on top with cranes, on the other , openings for container locks, so that, after loading the hold, put on top also piles of containers.
But we do need a dock camera. After all, without it, inside the ship you cannot place a large landing craft or several, and without them, the first wave of the landing will not receive tanks and engineering equipment. A dock camera will interfere with the work of shipping.
In this case, you can provide a removable deck or pontoon, which would align the floor of the dock with the airborne cargo deck. You can also provide on-board lazport for loading and unloading equipment when mooring side to the pier.
Thus, having invested money in high-speed transport of a similar design, the Navy does not lose anything - it still needs transport vessels both to participate in Syrian-type wars and to ensure its daily activities. They still buy. Having bought such a ship, the Navy also receives a large DKD / DVKD "in combination" and removes the need to build specialized ships of this class. In the "Syrian express" similar transport would be most useful that it is now used. And in the landing operation, it is much more efficient than the notorious Mistral (if there are on board the appropriate command and control systems and a medical unit with personnel).
How many such ships are needed? At least one per fleet, except for the Baltic, so that at least one battalion combat group can be disembarked.
Preferably - at least two. Ideally, according to the number of battalions in the MP brigade subordinated to the fleet. Then the issues of landing troops in general will be removed completely, but this is likely to be unreal economically. The Baltic Fleet should be excluded due to the fact that all countries in the region are either neutral or are part of NATO and an offensive operation of such magnitude against them is still fiction, and it will not survive this ship during the first hours of a major war in Europe. But for the Black Sea Fleet, Pacific Fleet, and the Federation Council, the presence of such ships is mandatory.
Thus, the Navy must be “from” three universal transport docks, which must be adapted for use and as amphibious.
But, as has already been said, it would not be possible to put all marines on such vehicles economically. What to land second echelons? What will be the "peacetime landing ship" at the exercises? How to land, if necessary, the marines in the Baltic? At first, it may well be the available BDK. First, in the presence of a seaworthy BTR or BMMP, a BDK that has a fodder lazport can land this technique anywhere on the water. In fact, in the presence of a seaworthy BTR or BMMP, over-horizon landing becomes possible even with a BDK - simply without air landing and without tanks in the first wave. But for the airborne assault, we will have the above-described amphibious vehicles, and the option of parachuting from aircraft cannot be ruled out, it will simply cease to be the only option, and will be one of the possible ones.
So, it turns out that in parallel with transports it is necessary to build "classic" BDK? Not.
BDK should be used, while it is possible, before they are written off, but something else should come to replace them.
It is necessary to revive the now-lost class of Medium landing ships - KFOR. And if the landing of the forward echelon, as well as hypothetical expeditionary actions, fall on amphibious transports, then the reinforcement of the first echelon amphibious assault, the landing of the second echelon and amphibious operations in conditions of weak or absent resistance should be conducted by medium landing ships.
This decision seems paradoxical, but only at first glance. We will first consider what should be the new KFOR and why, and only then we shall understand what advantages this class of ships conceals in itself.
KFOR is a priori small ship. So, cheap compared to BDK. Mass. It can be built at once in all shipyards. With the defeat of such a ship, the loss is much less than in the case of one and a half times more BDK. Currently, Rosoboronexport JSC offers KFOR buyers of the 21810 project. One of the features of this ship is that it can pass through inland waterways. BDK do not have this feature.
What does it mean for amphibious forces to transfer ships from the theater to the theater? The fact that they can be built in limited series, if funding is also limited. Then it is enough for the country to have the number of ships necessary for landing one brigade of marines at once on three potential theater operations - the North, the Baltic and the Black Sea. Hypothetically and on the Caspian Sea. That is, the small size of KFOR makes it possible to save on the number of ships, at least for the first time. Of course, such a maneuver is not easy even in peaceful conditions. In winter, it will require icebreaking and serious engineering support, if only because ice on some rivers cannot be broken into a river icebreaker, it must be blown up first. But with relatively small ships, this at least becomes in principle feasible. With BDK it is impossible to do absolutely.
And it is also impossible to use BDK in river amphibious operations. And this, too, may be needed, at least in the last War - it took, let us recall at least the Tuloksin landing operation.
What should be limited to the size of KFOR? Gateways on inland waterways, the height of the passage of bridges over them and the depths of the rivers. Within these limits, the maximum possible size is necessary, but not exceeding these limits. Naturally, KFOR should have a power plant based on diesel engines, apparently, produced by the Kolomna plant. The weapon with which the ship is equipped should be minimized. The gun 76-mm, AK-630M, MANPADS managed by crew members, and one long-range ATGM to hit point targets on the shore and on the water.
But, and this is important, you should not make our new KFOR look like the old ones. Our ship should be completely different.
More recently, interested observers were shown a draft of the amphibious assault ship, created according to the concept of stern landing vessel, which can be roughly translated as “amphibious assault landing ship”.
The peculiarity of the concept is that this landing ship does not have a forward gate, and when approaching the shore, the ship has to turn around and unload the equipment to the shore using a stern ramp. This solution has a number of drawbacks. Firstly, it is required to ensure the performance and survival of the propeller-steering group with this kind of maneuver. Secondly, the turn is still a dangerous maneuver in conditions when there are a lot of other ships around, which also unfold. Thirdly, the commanders of ships can not “oversleep” the moment when it is necessary to proceed with the maneuver, otherwise it may have to be performed under fire.
But there are pluses. They are well shown here in this video.
Stern landing vessel
Let us briefly list the advantages of the scheme.
First, such a ship is seaworthy. Secondly, it is technically simpler - there are no gates and a mechanism for opening them, there is no weakened zone in the nose of the case. Thirdly, there is no risk of knocking down the door leaves when slamming. Because of this danger, sometimes landing ships have to go tack to be at an angle to the wave, there is no a priori problem here. Fourthly, if such a ship participates in the landing of the first wave of the landing force, the release of amphibious armored vehicles in any case is carried out through the aft ramp, and the presence of gates in the bow is simply not required. Fifthly, a smaller ship is more “profitable” when landing in the port simply because of better maneuverability and less exactingness to the size and location of the moorings. Sixth, this arrangement allows you to equip a sufficiently large helipad on each KFOR, which simplifies takeoffs and landings from it.
Why do you need a helipad? First, helicopters can also be launched from KFOR. They simply do not have and should not have a hangar, but with tactical landings at a short distance from the front line, helicopters can just stand moored on deck for half a day. Secondly, such KFOR can be used as “jump points” - a helicopter that has flown “from its own” shore can get on the deck of this ship, refuel, and continue the sortie. This scheme allows the use of coastal-based combat helicopters over a combat radius of many hundreds of kilometers, more than five hundred for most types of helicopters. In another situation, a modular air defense system or air defense system in a stand-alone module can be installed on a flat deck, additional loads are placed, etc. The small landing ship of traditional architecture is almost completely devoid of all these advantages. In extreme cases, the site for the helicopter will be there, but extremely cramped and dangerous.
For assault forces to ports, the ship must be able to release foot soldiers from either side.
How many such ships are needed? If the large amphibious assault vehicle described above should land a battalion, then it is logical to assume that all the remaining MP battalions in each of the fleets must land such KFOR (we do not know what the marines will be when they adopt the BMMP and how the MP and KFOR capacity will be adjusted, so the numbers are approximate). Then, if there is one transport, about thirty KFOR will be needed per brigade. This is a lot, but small ships give us the opportunity not to build as much for each fleet, but to have one brigade of six to eight ships in the Black Sea Fleet, the Northern Fleet, the Baltic Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla, and concentrate them together to carry out amphibious operations of each fleet. , driving ships on inland waterways. In a bad variant, when the transition was frustrated by the enemy, or when there was not enough time for it, any of the fleets, with the KFOR brigade, with boats and amphibious vehicles, as well as military transport planes, will be able to land at least three battalion troops, which is already much better than now.
It is worth noting that due to good seaworthiness, KFOR can be used at a great distance from its territory. The Pacific Fleet stands apart, but there you can have two vehicles, one MP battalion to use as a parachute, and then you need to have about 20 KFOR so that you can land all the marines of the Pacific Fleet in one operation. At the same time, the simplicity and small size of the ships guarantee the possibility of building them in the right quantity, and fast, and the small crew, diesel power plant based on proven and mastered units, and the same simplicity of the design guarantee low operating costs. And, of course, in transportation such ships can also be used, as well as in the role of mine and network barriers.
It remains to provide opportunities for the landing to protect against naval mines, and artillery support from the sea. But this should already be done by surface ships that are not part of the landing forces, frigates, corvettes and minesweepers. Although it might be worthwhile to work out further the creation of some extremely simple artillery ship armed with a pair of 130 mm cannons in two turret systems, a long-range MLRS, anti-tank systems for hitting target targets and necessarily radar reconnaissance artillery that allows you to fight enemy ground artillery. Such a ship should also pass on inland waterways, and be as simple as possible. In fact, we are talking about the reincarnation of the gunboat.
Naturally, there will not be many of them. It is quite possible that three or four such ships for each of the fleets will be more than enough. Which is also quite within our military budget.
Thus, having shown a non-standard approach, it becomes possible to recreate landing forces in the Russian fleet, which any potential adversary will have to reckon with.
Of course, the marines themselves will have to be transformed. States will have to adapt to the realities of the ship, with armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and armed MTLB marines will have to transfer to special landing machines that can go on a high wave. To save money, you can enter into a partnership with Turkey, which next year, 2019, plans to show its version of LVTP-7.
Although the project Omsktransmash mentioned in the last articleIt looks much better, but the budget is not rubber.
You will need tank landing ships that could be loaded with tanks inside the amphibious transport. Moreover, the size of boats should allow tanks to call in on them with mine trawls. This is a must.
Let us briefly list the current backlog of Russia in order to proceed with the implementation of the project to restore amphibious capabilities:
- There are the necessary diesel engines.
- There are all necessary radio and electronic weapons for ships, as well as weapons for them.
- There is documentation for BMTV Anadyr.
- There is a shipbuilder capable of doing just such technically complicated things quite quickly.
- There is a wonderful sea attack helicopter - Ka-52K.
- There is a suitable basic platform for creating a helicopter landing - Ka-32. Several special amphibious Ka-29 also available.
- There is a BMMP project from Omsktransmash
- It is possible to cooperate with the Turks, or, in extreme cases, buy a seaworthy BMP from the Chinese. This will seriously save time.
- There is a great marines.
- There are a small number of ships that can form the "backbone" of the second line, while everything unfolds.
This is more than enough.
Historical experience tells us that, firstly, when repelling aggression against our country, the ability to conduct amphibious operations is crucial, and, secondly, that without landing on the enemy coast, defeat the enemy “fenced off” from us unreal. In the extremely chaotic and unpredictable twenties of this century, we should be prepared for both.
Especially since it is not so expensive.
Past article about the crisis of amphibious capabilities of the Russian Navy deserves such a continuation. Consider how you can return the Navy opportunities for amphibious assault landing, without resorting to expensive solutions.
This is especially important now, when economic realities will absolutely not allow the Russian Navy to develop extensively. Of course, to develop extensively is great. There is no possibility to use helicopters in the landing operation - we are building the DVKD or the UDC in general. Few landing ships? Build more ...
The trouble, however, is that on such a path in the budget there will be no money for many years. This means that we have to find another way. Cheap. Its, such as no one has ever used. There is no money, but you hold on there. So it will now be, apparently.
Is it real? Yes, quite, and these opportunities need to "run in the info field" right now.
In order to assess the prospects of the “budget” modernization of the landing forces of the Russian Navy, we first write out the boundary conditions:
1. It is necessary that the new amphibious ships could release military equipment on the water at a great distance from the coast.
2. At the same time, it is necessary to ensure the possibility of delivery to the landing zone of combat helicopters and helicopters with a landing force.
3. It is necessary to ensure the landing of heavy equipment - tanks and sapper equipment in the first wave, self-propelled artillery, more tanks and transport vehicles in the second.
4. In the event of a landing operation failing, the naval personnel must ensure the possibility of evacuating most of the people from the coast, even without the equipment.
5. At the same time it is necessary to do without large specialized landing ships.
Conditions somewhat contradict each other, but, oddly enough, there are solutions that satisfy them.
Historically, Russia, forced to have a large land army, could not invest in the fleet as well as the British, or the Americans. And if the latter, during the last great war, massively built amphibious ships, the Soviet Navy was forced to mobilize combat ships and transport ships for the landing. The landing of the marines from cruisers should be left behind the brackets, but the mobilization of transport ships tells us a relatively unexpected way out.
In 1990, an unusual vessel for the Soviet Navy, the Anadyr high-speed sea transport, entered the Pacific Fleet.
The ship was hardly intended to carry weapons from port to port.
First, its cargo compartment was optimized to accommodate lighters, and lighters are needed to transport heavy loads to an unequipped shore. Secondly, and most importantly, the ship was equipped with cockpits to accommodate the personnel, which in number approximately corresponded to the reinforced battalion - according to various sources, from 650 to 750 people.
Thirdly, in the standard version, the Anadyr had a hangar for two Ka-27 helicopters. And a huge flat cargo deck. The ship in fact most closely corresponded to what in the West is called the Landing ship dock - the landing ship dock. The aft ramp completely allowed the equipment to be loaded onto the water, like a landing ship, and other vessels could have been used instead of lighters. Differences from the landing ship by and large simply did not exist.
In order to engage the Anadyr in the landing operation, he did not need any improvements - none at all. And if the Soviet marines had the naval armored personnel carrier - an analogue of the American LVTP-7, then from Anadyr, using these machines, it would be quite possible to carry out the same over-horizon landing, the same as the Americans are preparing to conduct from their UDC. The downside was only a small hangar, but here we have historical precedent, however, is not domestic.
This is "Konderder bizent." One of the mobilized transport ships that the British used on the Falklands. The flat cargo deck is covered with flooring and turned into a flight deck, and a hangar for Chinook helicopters is mounted from the containers. This ship was not used as a landing ship, but the principle is important to us. If we assume that we are using an analogue of Anadyr as a DVKD, and we need to place more helicopters on it, then it is quite possible to attach a lightweight, fast-built aircraft to a permanent hangar and to add two or six helicopters in a permanent hangar.
If we land the MP battalion, and if the situation requires landing some of the forces in the form of an airborne assault force, then we need to raise a minimum company on helicopters. And these are eight Ka-29 or some hypothetical transport vehicles based on Ka-32. It would be nice to have two or four shock Ka-52K to cover the landing. On such a huge ship, like Anadyr, it is quite possible to place them.
On the other hand, if an airborne landing is not necessary or impossible, then all the helicopters on board can be shock. Or, if it is planned that there will be no resistance (well, you never know), then you can limit yourself to a pair of sanitary facilities and not to build any additional hangar at all.
Moreover. If you equip the ship with a lift for heavy equipment, now you can place helicopters inside, on the lower cargo deck, increasing their number to dozens. This will make it possible to land an air assault battalion immediately from the air, and to provide its actions with support for attack helicopters.
Or, alternatively, use the upper cargo deck to place ground equipment, as well as the lower one, lowering the armored cars and trucks down and rolling them out from there to the outside.
If necessary, such a ship becomes a very convenient and versatile base for special operations, it can be present at any point of the world ocean, carry special forces, helicopters, boats and boats, UAVs, container systems on board. weapons (cruise or anti-ship missiles) and a large supply of material and technical means. It can be used as a mobile anti-submarine base aviation somewhere in the Sea of Okhotsk, for example, and base on it anti-submarine helicopters.
But the most important thing is that beyond periods of use in combat operations, it is simply a transport, which is used as a transport, for transportation. The Ministry of Defense, as is known, has purchased a large number of vessels of various types to supply the grouping in Syria. Since MO still have to buy transport vessels, why not buy such a vessel? Yes, it is ineffective in comparison with ships specially built for commercial use, but in the end, the military is not required to compete in efficiency with civilian carriers. And surely, such a ship would be much more efficient as a transport in the same Syrian express train - in the upper cargo deck there may well be wide covers on the one side (they had an Anadyr) to load cargo on top with cranes, on the other , openings for container locks, so that, after loading the hold, put on top also piles of containers.
But we do need a dock camera. After all, without it, inside the ship you cannot place a large landing craft or several, and without them, the first wave of the landing will not receive tanks and engineering equipment. A dock camera will interfere with the work of shipping.
In this case, you can provide a removable deck or pontoon, which would align the floor of the dock with the airborne cargo deck. You can also provide on-board lazport for loading and unloading equipment when mooring side to the pier.
Thus, having invested money in high-speed transport of a similar design, the Navy does not lose anything - it still needs transport vessels both to participate in Syrian-type wars and to ensure its daily activities. They still buy. Having bought such a ship, the Navy also receives a large DKD / DVKD "in combination" and removes the need to build specialized ships of this class. In the "Syrian express" similar transport would be most useful that it is now used. And in the landing operation, it is much more efficient than the notorious Mistral (if there are on board the appropriate command and control systems and a medical unit with personnel).
How many such ships are needed? At least one per fleet, except for the Baltic, so that at least one battalion combat group can be disembarked.
Preferably - at least two. Ideally, according to the number of battalions in the MP brigade subordinated to the fleet. Then the issues of landing troops in general will be removed completely, but this is likely to be unreal economically. The Baltic Fleet should be excluded due to the fact that all countries in the region are either neutral or are part of NATO and an offensive operation of such magnitude against them is still fiction, and it will not survive this ship during the first hours of a major war in Europe. But for the Black Sea Fleet, Pacific Fleet, and the Federation Council, the presence of such ships is mandatory.
Thus, the Navy must be “from” three universal transport docks, which must be adapted for use and as amphibious.
But, as has already been said, it would not be possible to put all marines on such vehicles economically. What to land second echelons? What will be the "peacetime landing ship" at the exercises? How to land, if necessary, the marines in the Baltic? At first, it may well be the available BDK. First, in the presence of a seaworthy BTR or BMMP, a BDK that has a fodder lazport can land this technique anywhere on the water. In fact, in the presence of a seaworthy BTR or BMMP, over-horizon landing becomes possible even with a BDK - simply without air landing and without tanks in the first wave. But for the airborne assault, we will have the above-described amphibious vehicles, and the option of parachuting from aircraft cannot be ruled out, it will simply cease to be the only option, and will be one of the possible ones.
So, it turns out that in parallel with transports it is necessary to build "classic" BDK? Not.
BDK should be used, while it is possible, before they are written off, but something else should come to replace them.
It is necessary to revive the now-lost class of Medium landing ships - KFOR. And if the landing of the forward echelon, as well as hypothetical expeditionary actions, fall on amphibious transports, then the reinforcement of the first echelon amphibious assault, the landing of the second echelon and amphibious operations in conditions of weak or absent resistance should be conducted by medium landing ships.
This decision seems paradoxical, but only at first glance. We will first consider what should be the new KFOR and why, and only then we shall understand what advantages this class of ships conceals in itself.
KFOR is a priori small ship. So, cheap compared to BDK. Mass. It can be built at once in all shipyards. With the defeat of such a ship, the loss is much less than in the case of one and a half times more BDK. Currently, Rosoboronexport JSC offers KFOR buyers of the 21810 project. One of the features of this ship is that it can pass through inland waterways. BDK do not have this feature.
What does it mean for amphibious forces to transfer ships from the theater to the theater? The fact that they can be built in limited series, if funding is also limited. Then it is enough for the country to have the number of ships necessary for landing one brigade of marines at once on three potential theater operations - the North, the Baltic and the Black Sea. Hypothetically and on the Caspian Sea. That is, the small size of KFOR makes it possible to save on the number of ships, at least for the first time. Of course, such a maneuver is not easy even in peaceful conditions. In winter, it will require icebreaking and serious engineering support, if only because ice on some rivers cannot be broken into a river icebreaker, it must be blown up first. But with relatively small ships, this at least becomes in principle feasible. With BDK it is impossible to do absolutely.
And it is also impossible to use BDK in river amphibious operations. And this, too, may be needed, at least in the last War - it took, let us recall at least the Tuloksin landing operation.
What should be limited to the size of KFOR? Gateways on inland waterways, the height of the passage of bridges over them and the depths of the rivers. Within these limits, the maximum possible size is necessary, but not exceeding these limits. Naturally, KFOR should have a power plant based on diesel engines, apparently, produced by the Kolomna plant. The weapon with which the ship is equipped should be minimized. The gun 76-mm, AK-630M, MANPADS managed by crew members, and one long-range ATGM to hit point targets on the shore and on the water.
But, and this is important, you should not make our new KFOR look like the old ones. Our ship should be completely different.
More recently, interested observers were shown a draft of the amphibious assault ship, created according to the concept of stern landing vessel, which can be roughly translated as “amphibious assault landing ship”.
The peculiarity of the concept is that this landing ship does not have a forward gate, and when approaching the shore, the ship has to turn around and unload the equipment to the shore using a stern ramp. This solution has a number of drawbacks. Firstly, it is required to ensure the performance and survival of the propeller-steering group with this kind of maneuver. Secondly, the turn is still a dangerous maneuver in conditions when there are a lot of other ships around, which also unfold. Thirdly, the commanders of ships can not “oversleep” the moment when it is necessary to proceed with the maneuver, otherwise it may have to be performed under fire.
But there are pluses. They are well shown here in this video.
Stern landing vessel
Let us briefly list the advantages of the scheme.
First, such a ship is seaworthy. Secondly, it is technically simpler - there are no gates and a mechanism for opening them, there is no weakened zone in the nose of the case. Thirdly, there is no risk of knocking down the door leaves when slamming. Because of this danger, sometimes landing ships have to go tack to be at an angle to the wave, there is no a priori problem here. Fourthly, if such a ship participates in the landing of the first wave of the landing force, the release of amphibious armored vehicles in any case is carried out through the aft ramp, and the presence of gates in the bow is simply not required. Fifthly, a smaller ship is more “profitable” when landing in the port simply because of better maneuverability and less exactingness to the size and location of the moorings. Sixth, this arrangement allows you to equip a sufficiently large helipad on each KFOR, which simplifies takeoffs and landings from it.
Why do you need a helipad? First, helicopters can also be launched from KFOR. They simply do not have and should not have a hangar, but with tactical landings at a short distance from the front line, helicopters can just stand moored on deck for half a day. Secondly, such KFOR can be used as “jump points” - a helicopter that has flown “from its own” shore can get on the deck of this ship, refuel, and continue the sortie. This scheme allows the use of coastal-based combat helicopters over a combat radius of many hundreds of kilometers, more than five hundred for most types of helicopters. In another situation, a modular air defense system or air defense system in a stand-alone module can be installed on a flat deck, additional loads are placed, etc. The small landing ship of traditional architecture is almost completely devoid of all these advantages. In extreme cases, the site for the helicopter will be there, but extremely cramped and dangerous.
For assault forces to ports, the ship must be able to release foot soldiers from either side.
How many such ships are needed? If the large amphibious assault vehicle described above should land a battalion, then it is logical to assume that all the remaining MP battalions in each of the fleets must land such KFOR (we do not know what the marines will be when they adopt the BMMP and how the MP and KFOR capacity will be adjusted, so the numbers are approximate). Then, if there is one transport, about thirty KFOR will be needed per brigade. This is a lot, but small ships give us the opportunity not to build as much for each fleet, but to have one brigade of six to eight ships in the Black Sea Fleet, the Northern Fleet, the Baltic Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla, and concentrate them together to carry out amphibious operations of each fleet. , driving ships on inland waterways. In a bad variant, when the transition was frustrated by the enemy, or when there was not enough time for it, any of the fleets, with the KFOR brigade, with boats and amphibious vehicles, as well as military transport planes, will be able to land at least three battalion troops, which is already much better than now.
It is worth noting that due to good seaworthiness, KFOR can be used at a great distance from its territory. The Pacific Fleet stands apart, but there you can have two vehicles, one MP battalion to use as a parachute, and then you need to have about 20 KFOR so that you can land all the marines of the Pacific Fleet in one operation. At the same time, the simplicity and small size of the ships guarantee the possibility of building them in the right quantity, and fast, and the small crew, diesel power plant based on proven and mastered units, and the same simplicity of the design guarantee low operating costs. And, of course, in transportation such ships can also be used, as well as in the role of mine and network barriers.
It remains to provide opportunities for the landing to protect against naval mines, and artillery support from the sea. But this should already be done by surface ships that are not part of the landing forces, frigates, corvettes and minesweepers. Although it might be worthwhile to work out further the creation of some extremely simple artillery ship armed with a pair of 130 mm cannons in two turret systems, a long-range MLRS, anti-tank systems for hitting target targets and necessarily radar reconnaissance artillery that allows you to fight enemy ground artillery. Such a ship should also pass on inland waterways, and be as simple as possible. In fact, we are talking about the reincarnation of the gunboat.
Naturally, there will not be many of them. It is quite possible that three or four such ships for each of the fleets will be more than enough. Which is also quite within our military budget.
Thus, having shown a non-standard approach, it becomes possible to recreate landing forces in the Russian fleet, which any potential adversary will have to reckon with.
Of course, the marines themselves will have to be transformed. States will have to adapt to the realities of the ship, with armored personnel carriers, infantry fighting vehicles and armed MTLB marines will have to transfer to special landing machines that can go on a high wave. To save money, you can enter into a partnership with Turkey, which next year, 2019, plans to show its version of LVTP-7.
Although the project Omsktransmash mentioned in the last articleIt looks much better, but the budget is not rubber.
You will need tank landing ships that could be loaded with tanks inside the amphibious transport. Moreover, the size of boats should allow tanks to call in on them with mine trawls. This is a must.
Let us briefly list the current backlog of Russia in order to proceed with the implementation of the project to restore amphibious capabilities:
- There are the necessary diesel engines.
- There are all necessary radio and electronic weapons for ships, as well as weapons for them.
- There is documentation for BMTV Anadyr.
- There is a shipbuilder capable of doing just such technically complicated things quite quickly.
- There is a wonderful sea attack helicopter - Ka-52K.
- There is a suitable basic platform for creating a helicopter landing - Ka-32. Several special amphibious Ka-29 also available.
- There is a BMMP project from Omsktransmash
- It is possible to cooperate with the Turks, or, in extreme cases, buy a seaworthy BMP from the Chinese. This will seriously save time.
- There is a great marines.
- There are a small number of ships that can form the "backbone" of the second line, while everything unfolds.
This is more than enough.
Historical experience tells us that, firstly, when repelling aggression against our country, the ability to conduct amphibious operations is crucial, and, secondly, that without landing on the enemy coast, defeat the enemy “fenced off” from us unreal. In the extremely chaotic and unpredictable twenties of this century, we should be prepared for both.
Especially since it is not so expensive.
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