Fleet without ships. Russian Navy on the verge of collapse
Prideful reports on missile attacks from the Caspian Sea and surrender the fleet more and more new ships and submarines hide from the public the real state of affairs in the Russian Navy, which can soon be described in just one word - disaster. And it is good if this catastrophe does not result in a military defeat commensurate with Tsushima.
Since the time of Nicholas I, the Navy periodically has problems with the doctrine of use and awareness of the necessity of what they do and why they exist. Being superimposed on each other, these two factors lead to the fact that the fleet begins to exist outside of any coherent and reasonable strategic concept, “grow by itself”, and develop according to the principle of “where the curve will take out”, regardless of which adversary he (if that) will have to face.
At best, the result of the problem was the waste in vain that the fleet had to bear in order to carry out the tasks assigned to it, the last vivid example of which was its participation in the Great Patriotic War. The fleet played a very important role in it, but the price paid was too high, and the damage inflicted on the enemy by his actions could have been much higher.
In the worst case, the Navy encountered an adversary, which he was absolutely not ready to confront, the latest example of which is the participation of the Navy in the Russian-Japanese war. The entire fleet, in addition to individual battles, was carried out by the fleet in the minority, and was almost completely lost, which, in addition to casualties, caused enormous political and economic costs to Russia.
Consider the position of the Navy now. Since Admiral Gorshkov, submarines have been the main striking force of the Navy at sea. Gorshkov, however, together with them also “performed” the powerful Marine missile-carrying aviation - MRA. About her a little later, and now let's move on to the boats. How powerful is our submarine fleet? Can he protect Russia from a hypothetical attack from the sea carried out by a strong adversary?
Unfortunately, the answer to this question is definitely not positive. At present, there are twenty-two multi-purpose submarines and submarines in the Navy armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (boats with ballistic missiles are not included in this number). Twenty-third - "Kazan", recently came to the test and not yet combat-ready. Of the twenty-two of these submarines listed as combat personnel, only ten are actually in the ranks. The twelve boats are in different stages of repair and modernization, and the prospects for their return to service are very vague. The state of the Russian military ship repair industry, unfortunately, does not allow one to accurately predict the dates on which repairs and modernization of submarines will be completed. At the same time, ships carrying combat service are getting old and sooner or later they will also need repair, and they need modernization now.
Moreover, submarines in service are significantly inferior to American submarines in noise, in the detection range of submarines, and in self-defense means — hydroacoustic counteraction systems, and, unfortunately, in torpedoes.
For a long time in the specialized press, mainly in the newspaper "VPK-Courier", articles are published describing the position of the Navy, both in terms of torpedoes and in the state of the sub-melt. For example, "Marine underwater powerlessness. The newest submarines of the Russian Navy are armed with antiques" or last "What to ask from" Ash ". This article contains an interesting fragment that is worth quoting, and to which you should pay attention:
These words belong to Lieutenant-General V.N. Sokerin, former commander of the Air Force and Air Defense of the Baltic Fleet, who served in the Northern Fleet during Soviet times, where the events described above took place. And the “Window” theme is a technology developed by the USSR Navy that allows aircraft to radar search for submarines in submerged (submerged) position according to the disturbances of the surface medium formed by movement (the radar detects “tracks” on the surface of the water that the current in the depths of the submarine). The events described in the quotation occurred in 1988, at the end of the Cold War. The Americans, judging by their activity and the way their anti-submarine aircraft operated from the end of the 80-s, were ahead of the USSR and massively introduced this technology into the design of their base patrol aircraft. And it is this that largely explains the phenomenal effectiveness of their search actions, which was described by Lieutenant-General Sokerin. Moreover, there are signs that since the beginning of the 90's, the Americans have mastered the methods of detecting submarines hiding under the ice. Fantasy? One of the “fathers” of the “Window” theme, an anti-submarine pilot from the Pacific Fleet, Alexander Semyonov stated this in direct text. Unfortunately, Semyonov ran over to the side of Ukraine and now serves as a potential opponent. It remains only to be glad that he has nothing to apply his knowledge and experience. And this, alas, is not fiction; in confirmation of what Semyonov was saying at the time, it is worth quoting another officer of the Navy, the most experienced anti-submarine, the commander of the anti-submarine ship, the captain of the first rank A. E. Soldatenkov:
Having added all of the above, we have to admit that the ability to detect a submarine using radar and optical electronic monitoring of the surface of water or ice is a reality. And this reality, unfortunately, is completely negated by the modern domestic naval strategy.
We rely on submarines, ignoring the fact that anti-submarine planes of a potential enemy "see" them both under water and, possibly, under the ice. Not all modes, of course, and not always, and the search area must somehow be chosen, but the very fact of the existence of such an opportunity should have forced the Navy command to fundamentally reconsider its approaches to military construction, in particular, to providing combat services to the submarines, their support of surface ships and aircraft, including the ship.
In practice, everything was and remains absolutely wrong. The fact that our submarines are extremely vulnerable to basic enemy antisubmarine aviation during military construction is generally not taken into account. The facts of the fact that the enemy's boats exceed our submarines in the stealth, detection range and tactical and technical characteristics of the torpedo weapons - also. So for what huge public funds are spent on the sub-melt? So that he could be quickly drowned, with the loss of thousands of sailors and gigantic means?
The situation becomes simply horrible in its application to the naval component of the SNF. It is the submarines with ballistic missiles that are the most secretive component of our nuclear forces and the only carriers of nuclear weapons, which in theory can be hidden from the enemy. In practice, it turns out that it is almost impossible ...
So when John Lehman, the US Navy minister in the Reagan administration, argued that our submarines would not have survived the first days of the war had it startedHe was apparently not very far from the truth.
Some time ago, the Americans, who were keeping a truly grave silence about their achievements in the anti-submarine search, began to declassify materials related to this subject.
So, now the report is available online. "A RADAR METHOD FOR THE DETECTION OF SUBMERGED SUBMARINES" ("Radar method for detecting submerged submarines"), released by the US Naval Research Laboratory back in the year 1975. Although zone * .mil and is closed to Russian users, a simple anonymizer allows you to download the full text in English. The report shows that for the first time the Americans discovered the phenomenon of a residual mark on the surface, which is noticeable in the radar range, even during the Second World War. And only by the year 1975 came to a consensus that the effect is, and can be used. And after thirteen years, there was the same reconnaissance mission of the Orion ...
In theory, again, naval aviation and surface ships would have to work as a shield for strike submarines, giving them the opportunity to turn in relative safety from both enemy aircraft and enemy submarines, but alas, with surface ships and naval aviation the situation is even worse than with submarines, and they cannot help the boats.
Let's start with aviation
The USSR had a controversial position with naval aviation. The USSR Navy had a first-class coast-based strike aviation - Naval rocket-carrying aircraft, armed with Tu-16, Tu-22 and Tu-22M aircraft of various modifications capable of carrying anti-ship cruise missiles, both supersonic and subsonic. A little later, the missile-carrying Tu-95K-22, the “long arm” of the Navy, capable of striking surface ships over any point of the World Ocean was added to them. Their range and qualities of avionics made them truly global weapons (although not without flaws). Intelligence aviation was also at the highest level.
But in the part of the anti-submarine aviation, the USSR had a failure - the sighting and search systems of the aircraft did not provide a reliable search for foreign submarines, although aviation still gave a lot of detections. The “Window” theme mentioned above could change the situation, but alas, its practical results were obtained immediately before the collapse of the USSR, and after it new search methods received the most minimal development. Deck aircraft of the USSR Navy in a sense simply “did not have time” to grow. Coastal assault aircraft was not bad, but the fighter aircraft of the Navy experienced a shortage of modern aircraft.
But even these contradictory achievements in naval aviation were completely lost after the collapse of the USSR. The composition of anti-submarine aviation has declined many times, and, most unpleasantly, for all the post-Soviet years, nothing has been done to create a new aircraft to replace the old Be-12, Tu-142М and Il-38. The modernization of the IL-38 in the 38H variant with the Novella complex is a half-measure, with very limited efficiency, and the pace of aircraft modernization is simply depressing.
In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that we simply do not have anti-submarine aircraft. And this is in conditions when the aggregate number of modern submarines of the United States and its allies exceeds far over a hundred. No one thinks to correct the situation: neither the Navy command, nor the Ministry of Defense structures show any serious interest in solving the problem.
But from the anti-submarine aviation even survived the remnants that can be upgraded. But the MPA was eliminated completely. In 2010, all remaining Tu-22M aircraft in the Navy were withdrawn from the Navy and transferred to the Air Force. Now the fleet simply does not have a tool for delivering sudden massive strikes against enemy naval formations, there are no forces that can be maneuvered between theaters in a "big" war, strengthening our scattered fleets in turn. And, of course, there are no guarantees that the videoconferencing system will be perplexed by the issues of assistance to the fleet - the aims of the videoconferencing system in a big war are enough without any naval problems.
If the transfer of bombers to the Air Force is an excuse, in the end, these machines have not been manufactured for a long time and really become “worth their weight in gold”, there are really few of them left, then the actual destruction by the fleet of its own fighter aircraft cannot be called a crime. Five years ago, the Navy had large fighter forces, and, in contrast to the Soviet era, quite modern machines. MiG-31 and Su-27, repaired and in good condition. What is it all over? The fact that the command of the fleets simply ruined the air units entrusted to them, without even selecting kerosene for combat training. Suffice it to say that the fighter units of the Navy in Kamchatka in 2015 had a raid no more than 30 hours per person per year - almost like in the 90s. And this is when the war was already in Syria. The officers of the Navy headquarters openly, without embarrassment, said that without the pilots and their problems it would be easier and easier for them to serve. The result is logical - from 2017, fighter aircraft are being taken from the fleet, and slowly but surely they are transferring it “under the wing” of the newly created Air Force and Air Defense armies. First, the Northern Fleet passed through it, and in the 2018 year - the Pacific. This, of course, saved aviation connections for the future, but now it’s impossible to debug the necessary level of interaction between surface ships and aviation. However, this has never been done before.
But the American fighters from bases in Japan hung “on the tail” of the IL-38 over the Sea of Okhotsk with each departure to search for submarines (in those cases when there were foreign submarines in the Sea of Okhotsk)! How was it possible in such conditions to ruin the entrusted air units? But the Navy did it.
Relatively good things look in the maritime assault aviation regiments. Shelves fly, train, get into service new Su-30CM. That's just the potential of this platform, no one even tries to realize. If in the Indian Air Force Su-30 already allow heavy supersonic anti-ship missiles “Bramos”, in Russia no one is trying to equip naval Su-30CM with similar “Onyxes” in parameters, although this solution would dramatically increase the strike capabilities of the regiments and give them the opportunity to attack modern warships without entering their air defense zone. But this, apparently, no one needs, such work is not conducted, as well as there are no signs that the fleet will strengthen the assault air regiments by tanker aircraft or ARLO. The main weapon of the assault regiments is the X-35 rocket - a very good rocket, but with the breakthrough of the modern echeloned ship's air defense its range is not enough, you will have to substitute the enemy anti-aircraft missiles and the airplanes themselves too.
The new hypersonic rocket "Dagger" also visibly did not interest the naval comrades.
In fact, from the naval aviation of the times of the USSR only lumps remained, and one should not think that the VKS, which are forced to take on more and more “sea” tasks, will become a lifesaver here. They will not, because they have enough work on the ground, and because the naval aviation pilot is a person with extremely specific training and skills that the universal pilot of the VKS will not have to develop once.
It would be naive to think that in such conditions, things that are primarily associated with the fleet (with surface ships) go better. Do not go.
At present, there are thirty-one ships in the near and far sea, as well as oceanic zones (minus non-propelling ships that will not sail into the sea, but have not yet been withdrawn from service). In addition to the five corvettes of the 20380 project and four frigates (three 11356 and one 22350), all of them were laid back in the USSR. Of this amount, ten ships are now under repair, including the only aircraft carrier.
In fact, at present, the Northern Fleet can launch five surface ships of the 1 and 2 rank, including two cruisers, the Black Sea - five TFRs and frigates, the Pacific - six, including one cruiser, the Baltic Fleet - one TFR of the 11540 project and four corvettes 20380 project.
For comparison: Japan has thirty-seven URO combat ships in the ranks and three PLO helicopter carriers, France has twenty-three URO spacecraft and a full-fledged nuclear aircraft carrier.
Of course, we still have a certain number (less than thirty for the entire Navy) of small anti-submarine ships, small rocket ships, rocket boats and auxiliary ships and vessels. But they either cannot act in the far sea zone without large ships, or are necessary for organizing the defense of coastal waters, or both. The same grouping of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Syria is not particularly protected by them, they cannot be fought near Hokkaido or Svalbard. The same new IRAs of the 21631 project, marked by launches of the “Calibrov”, have very limited seaworthiness, and have neither air defense, nor PLO weapons, or at least anti-torpedo protection.
At the same time, all the other large ships naturally “stuck” on repairs that have been going on for years, and whose deadlines are increasing all the time. Last news from the series - the flooding of the PD-50 floating dock, in which the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov was stationed, with the aircraft carrier on the dock wall, and the consequences that were not voiced to the end. How much it will delay the recovery of Kuznetsov and complicate repairs of other ships and submarines, we can only guess.
At the same time, the intensive exploitation of ships still in progress will definitely lead to the almost complete development by many of them of a resource by about the 2020 year, before the warships now standing there will start to go out of repair. In fact, the fleet can halve its already modest combat strength, and ship repair already can not cope with the existing scope of work, after this volume grows by sixty percent, it will not cope even more. Especially considering the fact that some ships are already naturally brought “to the handle”, and the volume of work with them is promised to be enormous.
But the worst thing is that the Navy can not update the ship composition. Under the thunder of fanfare and brilliance of the main maritime parades, one “modest” fact left the attention of the public: Russia cannot build warships of the classes it needs. Almost none.
Consider in order
In the segment of small rocket ships (projects 21631 "Buyan-M" and 22800 "Karakurt"), the fleet was faced with the inability to obtain the necessary engines. "Buyan-M" was designed under the German MTU, but they became inaccessible due to the sanctions. Starting from the Vyshny Volochek ship, Chinese diesel engines are put on the ship, but they do not have the necessary technical characteristics for military use, which puts an end to stories a series of these ships. However, after the United States withdraws from the treaty on the elimination of short-range and medium-range missiles, there will be no sense in these ships anyway.
"Karakurt", which was conceived as more high-speed and seaworthy analogues of "Buyana-M" with more powerful weapons and domestic diesel engines, were left without engines in principle. PJSC “Zvezda”, which was supposed to supply for these ships the high-speed diesel engines М507, turned out to be simply incapable of producing them. At a pace that the plant makes engines now, the Karakurt series will be built for a decade, at a minimum. This crisis has led to such proposals as the delivery of ships with used engines that have been overhauled to the fleet. It must be admitted that there are quite grounds for such a tough decision.
All the other larger ships also fell into the “trap” of PJSC Zvezda, because its subsidiary, Zvezda-reduktor, is the only manufacturer of gearboxes in Russia for ship propulsion systems. And the problems there are the same as in diesel production. However, the plant that has already been studied and launched into a series of gearboxes can do with grief in half, albeit long and slowly. But with new designs - trouble. And yet it is precisely these that are required in order for Russia to build ships of the far sea zone — at least frigates.
We note that earlier the gearboxes for large ships were supplied by the Ukrainian enterprise Zorya-Mashproekt, but after the “euromaidan” and the Crimea, these supplies became impossible. Steel shipments of ship gas turbines were also impossible, but they were able to master their production in Russia, but there are no gearboxes, and the plant producing them feels bad.
As a result, the construction of warships in Russia in a reasonable time is now simply impossible.
All these unpleasant facts are superimposed on the inability of the Ministry of Defense and the command of the Navy to determine both the doctrine of military use and the type of ships available and needed for the construction.
About the fact that the giant money tumble into the sub-melt unable to protect itself has already been mentioned, but this is only part of the problem.
The fleet is completely devoid of anti-mine forces. There are no modern minesweepers, there are almost no crewless means, uninhabited anti-mine devices and there is almost no other equipment needed to combat mines. What is being built depends on the products of the Zvezda on the one hand, or does not meet modern requirements on the other. The mining of water areas near the naval bases will lead to the fact that ships and submarines will simply be locked up there, there is nothing to "clear" the exit. Only send a warship or a multi-purpose submarine to the mines in order to "pierce" the corridor with human lives. Well, the English on the Falklands prepared to do that, we are no worse than them, right?
Similarly, there are no anti-submarine forces capable of driving off enemy submarines from our bases. There are neither PLO corvettes in sufficient quantities, nor an underwater warning system of acceptable quality.
Only this year, modern guided torpedoes began to arrive in the fleet (this could have been done many years ago), but the submarine crews still lack experience in their use and the firing statistics are very small.
No work is being carried out on the modernization of anti-submarine helicopters, although there are good developments in lowered hydroacoustic stations, but they are called “do not make progress”.
About naval aviation has already been mentioned.
And in these conditions, the Navy finds nothing better than chasing chimeras.
For some reason, a series of inefficient and unsuitable for conducting combat operations of “patrol” ships of the 22160 project was built. They are positioned as anti-piracy, but a ship of such a displacement cannot work in the Indian Ocean - there is a risk that, due to unrest at sea, it will not be able to take back its boats and helicopters with marines back on board.
These ships do not possess armaments for conducting anti-submarine warfare or the ability to fight with enemy surface ships.
Why were they built then? Why did you spend money?
Another megaspiel is the 20386 project ship. About him already writtenand there are already a lot of potential technical risks in the project. Some of the potential flaws of this ship will appear to be irreparable. In this case, the "Star" and this ship cheated gear. The 6RP reducer provided by the design still does not exist in the metal, and it is not known when it will be, now the shipbuilders cautiously say that the GEM for the ship may be ready in the 2020 year ... but perhaps not.
Anyway, neither the delivery of the ship to the fleet in 2022, nor the laying of the second hull in 2018, will definitely be anymore.
All this, however, did not prevent the project developers and subsystems from mastering the huge budget allocated for the development and construction of this “vundervaffe”.
The development of the only series of ships that Russia could build, the 20380 corvettes, was halted by the will of someone in the Navy. And this is despite the fact that the modernization potential of the ships is far from being revealed, and there is simply no alternative. New ships of this project are not being laid, new ones that are better adapted to anti-submarine warfare or that have more effective air defense modifications are not being developed. It may be objected that we have to wait for years for these gearboxes, but at least they can be waited!
Well, the larger ships Russia either cannot build at all, or it can be very expensive and slow, for example, the frigates of the 22350 project. Very powerful for its class and very expensive ships, with serious combat power. However, this series of ships will not be built anymore either, everything will be limited to four copies.
About such things as intercabel unification, there is no need to say that we do not know what it is all about.
As well as about the development of naval underwater weapons, hydroacoustic countermeasures, hydroacoustic systems and much more, real work and production have long been replaced by ingenious schemes that allow you to master budgets without giving out anything in response, no prototypes, samples, etc. ., - only reports on the development work done, falsified test reports and endless restarts of this process. Net profit without production.
It should be borne in mind that this time all of the above is superimposed on the increased military danger for the Russian Federation, on the presence of an isolated theater of military operations, which is not accessible by land (Syria), on the fact that all our serious opponents today are countries with strong naval forces on sanctions that do not allow purchasing weapons and components abroad, in the coming demographic crisis of 2025-2030-s, when the army, navy and VKS will have to compete for the mobilization resource and people, to achieve growth in the fleet’s combat capabilities without growth consumption in it ...
This is actually an ideal storm, a system that has gone into singularity, into "dressing." All crisis phenomena in peak form and at the same time. The collapse of the fleet, the complete collapse of everything that still holds in it.
That's what awaits the Navy in the near future.
Will it survive the fleet? Is not a fact. But the worst thing would be if it was at this moment that the Navy would have to be used in combat operations. Tsushima will seem like a small river cruise against the backdrop of what may happen in the very next few years. Moreover, in order to “overgrown”, we will not necessarily fall into conflict with the United States: almost any more or less developed naval country will be able to break such an unstable system as the Russian Navy after 2020.
Who is to blame for the fact that all this has become possible?
This is undoubtedly the Ministry of Defense, including the Department for the Provision of the State Defense Order, the commanders of the Navy, the personnel of the Main Committee of the Navy responsible for shipbuilding, the Ministers of Defense - all for about the last 12-13 years.
Someone was flawed, someone closed his eyes to the flaws of some and direct sabotage of others, someone carried out this sabotage. And in the end we have what we have. The Military-Industrial Commission is unequivocally guilty, at least, all those who are in its composition responsible for shipbuilding.
Guilty and the FSB, because it did not keep track of the folding of truly mafia clans in the military-industrial complex, and the fact that the activities of some comrades in the “near-fleet” (we will not point the finger), “gives” to foreign special services.
What to do?
First, replace the people responsible for these failures with others. This is fundamentally important. Everyone who was behind bringing the fleet "to the handle" should go look for another place of work. Secondly, firmly, with the announcement of targets and the appointment of deadlines, to take up the elimination of all the above problems, not only in industry, but also in the Navy itself. Starting from answering the question “Why do we need a fleet in principle?” And ending with working out the interaction between aviation and surface ships. From restoring competences in shipbuilding to restoring order in the financing of the ROC of the fleet. From increasing the frequency of torpedo firing to giving naval aviation proper status within the fleet structure. With the research exercises necessary to determine the appearance and composition of the fleet of the future. With the improvement of funding in terms of the distribution of funds between the submarine, surface fleet and aircraft.
With the necessary changes in the regulatory framework and stripping those who do not want or can not work "for the result."
As quickly as possible - because there is no time left. He is not there at all, and very soon it will become obvious.
Probably, this time it will not be possible to do without “manual control” by the president and the minister of defense, this crisis itself will not “resolve”.
Otherwise, we will only have to wait for the next Tsushima and wait for it.
And very soon.
Since the time of Nicholas I, the Navy periodically has problems with the doctrine of use and awareness of the necessity of what they do and why they exist. Being superimposed on each other, these two factors lead to the fact that the fleet begins to exist outside of any coherent and reasonable strategic concept, “grow by itself”, and develop according to the principle of “where the curve will take out”, regardless of which adversary he (if that) will have to face.
At best, the result of the problem was the waste in vain that the fleet had to bear in order to carry out the tasks assigned to it, the last vivid example of which was its participation in the Great Patriotic War. The fleet played a very important role in it, but the price paid was too high, and the damage inflicted on the enemy by his actions could have been much higher.
In the worst case, the Navy encountered an adversary, which he was absolutely not ready to confront, the latest example of which is the participation of the Navy in the Russian-Japanese war. The entire fleet, in addition to individual battles, was carried out by the fleet in the minority, and was almost completely lost, which, in addition to casualties, caused enormous political and economic costs to Russia.
Consider the position of the Navy now. Since Admiral Gorshkov, submarines have been the main striking force of the Navy at sea. Gorshkov, however, together with them also “performed” the powerful Marine missile-carrying aviation - MRA. About her a little later, and now let's move on to the boats. How powerful is our submarine fleet? Can he protect Russia from a hypothetical attack from the sea carried out by a strong adversary?
Unfortunately, the answer to this question is definitely not positive. At present, there are twenty-two multi-purpose submarines and submarines in the Navy armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (boats with ballistic missiles are not included in this number). Twenty-third - "Kazan", recently came to the test and not yet combat-ready. Of the twenty-two of these submarines listed as combat personnel, only ten are actually in the ranks. The twelve boats are in different stages of repair and modernization, and the prospects for their return to service are very vague. The state of the Russian military ship repair industry, unfortunately, does not allow one to accurately predict the dates on which repairs and modernization of submarines will be completed. At the same time, ships carrying combat service are getting old and sooner or later they will also need repair, and they need modernization now.
Moreover, submarines in service are significantly inferior to American submarines in noise, in the detection range of submarines, and in self-defense means — hydroacoustic counteraction systems, and, unfortunately, in torpedoes.
For a long time in the specialized press, mainly in the newspaper "VPK-Courier", articles are published describing the position of the Navy, both in terms of torpedoes and in the state of the sub-melt. For example, "Marine underwater powerlessness. The newest submarines of the Russian Navy are armed with antiques" or last "What to ask from" Ash ". This article contains an interesting fragment that is worth quoting, and to which you should pay attention:
In the management of the 57 Scud (Severomorsk-3) served one smart officer. Entered the VMA, there is a "wicked" in the topic "Window." He expounded his views on it to me, while studying at the Higher Military Academy, when I was in it for about a month, as Chairman of the State. commissions at the final examinations for students of the 6 (aviation) faculty. Then this officer served in the PLV department of the SF headquarters. He constantly himself "was asking" to go to the sea, collecting information on the "Window". Several times, on the go, we communicated at the fleet headquarters on the same subject.
Somewhere in a month after the regular gathering of the ships of the Northern Fleet, he “caught” me at the exit from the hall where the next weekly fleet planning took place and offered to see its analysis. We went to his office, where they were laid out numerous schemes and tracing paper. I am writing this in such detail that it is clear that he has done a great job, i.e. analyzed the tracing of the movement of all our boats, which took part in the gathering campaign, "wiring" all the foreign aircraft in the area of operations of the fleet forces by means of malware.
Then participated 10 PL: 4 - diesel and 6 - atomic. Each boat was "cut" a large area from which she, for security reasons, should not have gone without a team. But, inside this area, her place could be any ("decision of the commander"), i.e. arbitrary.
On the first and third day of the forces in the sea, one Orion flew from the Annenes (Anneya) to the sea, which, flying over some broken route, went back. That clever officer, having analyzed, i.e. “putting” Orion’s route on the map and, from the submarine, the tracing of their actual location for the Orion’s span, made the unequivocal conclusion that using the Window or something else, but both all ten times the “turning points” of its actual track line were absolutely exactly above the actual place (at the time of the flight) of all 10 (!) boats. Those. for the first time in 1 an hour and 5 minutes, the second - in an 1 hour and 7 minutes, one plane covered all 10 PLs. From the words of this officer, he had seen more than once that the Orion was leaving, without any tacks, like on the square, threw one buoy, usually with a VIS (for “control”), and went on.
That is why I wrote that before this incident I had little faith in this “phenomenon”, but probably not we, but the Americans, but “brought this to the mind”.
Somewhere in a month after the regular gathering of the ships of the Northern Fleet, he “caught” me at the exit from the hall where the next weekly fleet planning took place and offered to see its analysis. We went to his office, where they were laid out numerous schemes and tracing paper. I am writing this in such detail that it is clear that he has done a great job, i.e. analyzed the tracing of the movement of all our boats, which took part in the gathering campaign, "wiring" all the foreign aircraft in the area of operations of the fleet forces by means of malware.
Then participated 10 PL: 4 - diesel and 6 - atomic. Each boat was "cut" a large area from which she, for security reasons, should not have gone without a team. But, inside this area, her place could be any ("decision of the commander"), i.e. arbitrary.
On the first and third day of the forces in the sea, one Orion flew from the Annenes (Anneya) to the sea, which, flying over some broken route, went back. That clever officer, having analyzed, i.e. “putting” Orion’s route on the map and, from the submarine, the tracing of their actual location for the Orion’s span, made the unequivocal conclusion that using the Window or something else, but both all ten times the “turning points” of its actual track line were absolutely exactly above the actual place (at the time of the flight) of all 10 (!) boats. Those. for the first time in 1 an hour and 5 minutes, the second - in an 1 hour and 7 minutes, one plane covered all 10 PLs. From the words of this officer, he had seen more than once that the Orion was leaving, without any tacks, like on the square, threw one buoy, usually with a VIS (for “control”), and went on.
That is why I wrote that before this incident I had little faith in this “phenomenon”, but probably not we, but the Americans, but “brought this to the mind”.
These words belong to Lieutenant-General V.N. Sokerin, former commander of the Air Force and Air Defense of the Baltic Fleet, who served in the Northern Fleet during Soviet times, where the events described above took place. And the “Window” theme is a technology developed by the USSR Navy that allows aircraft to radar search for submarines in submerged (submerged) position according to the disturbances of the surface medium formed by movement (the radar detects “tracks” on the surface of the water that the current in the depths of the submarine). The events described in the quotation occurred in 1988, at the end of the Cold War. The Americans, judging by their activity and the way their anti-submarine aircraft operated from the end of the 80-s, were ahead of the USSR and massively introduced this technology into the design of their base patrol aircraft. And it is this that largely explains the phenomenal effectiveness of their search actions, which was described by Lieutenant-General Sokerin. Moreover, there are signs that since the beginning of the 90's, the Americans have mastered the methods of detecting submarines hiding under the ice. Fantasy? One of the “fathers” of the “Window” theme, an anti-submarine pilot from the Pacific Fleet, Alexander Semyonov stated this in direct text. Unfortunately, Semyonov ran over to the side of Ukraine and now serves as a potential opponent. It remains only to be glad that he has nothing to apply his knowledge and experience. And this, alas, is not fiction; in confirmation of what Semyonov was saying at the time, it is worth quoting another officer of the Navy, the most experienced anti-submarine, the commander of the anti-submarine ship, the captain of the first rank A. E. Soldatenkov:
... my friend Seryoga, commander of the anti-submarine helicopter KA-25 of the Northern ship-based fleet, made another training flight over the ice field. He repeatedly complained to his beloved wife that when flying over ice fields, the standard filters of the pilots' helmets of the Navy did not sufficiently protect the vision from the super-reflective surface of the ice. His beloved wife made incredible efforts, but for his birthday Seryoga received French-made polarizing light-protective glasses, which were used by pilots of Canadian Arctic Airlines (Air North).
Here he is flying in these glasses over a solid ice field and visually detects a contrasting (relative to the rest of the white field) circumference of a very large diameter. It seems to not understand what kind of optical phenomenon. The cabin glazing polarizes the light, the helmet's light filter contributes to polarization, plus imported light-protective glasses. But suddenly, almost in the center of the giant circle, ice is being cracked and the cabin of our nuclear submarine is shown!
... When the submarine is moving in a submerged position, a given depth of immersion is held by horizontal rudders, which are controlled by the boatswain or the autopilot. Accuracy of retention of a given stroke depth within ± 5 meters. That is, the gigantic mass of the metal (from 6000 to 33800 tons) makes vertical oscillations in depth, and its gravitational field also oscillates with the mass. Part of the gravitational field of the hull of the underwater ship, with the intensity detected by the measuring instruments, goes to the surface of the water, to the boundary of two media, water and air. Remember and excitement on the surface. This part of the gravitational field, at some equal level of its intensity, comes into resonant interaction with the near-surface layers of sea water and air. The interaction produces orientation of salt domains in the upper layers of water and air (as is well known at the water surface in the air, a high concentration of salty water droplets), which leads to the summation (a kind of modulation) of the strength of their electric fields. Hence the ring or elliptical shape of the figures on the radar screens. And the interaction of the summed electric fields with the electromagnetic field from the antennas of radar stations (absorption or reflection) leads to the appearance of ring or elliptical effects on the screens of the radar stations.
Opponents have a question: why the ring effect is not detected around large surface ships or ships? They, too, have a gravitational field? The answer is that the volume of the zone of interaction of the gravitational field of a surface ship with intensity for the desired resonant interaction with salt water is spatially too thin due to the angles of intersection of the intensity vectors of the fields close to 90 °. And in these volumes there are no conditions for resonant interaction with the electromagnetic field of the search radar, especially if they are of any other frequency range. For surface ships and ships, the effect may be observed briefly when they are sinking (sinking).
Thus, quite randomly, the frequency range of the radar stations of the over-the-horizon target designation of the “More” system was chosen so that it was at these frequencies that the interaction of the total electric field of the surface salt domains of the sea water modulated by the flickering gravitational field of large underwater objects with the electromagnetic field of the search radar was detected.
A particular case of the manifestation of the ring effect can be considered a change in the polarization of sunlight reflected from the ice cover, as my friend Seryoga observed during one of his flights over the ice through polarization pilot glasses. Ice, for all its hardness, has in its composition non-freezing cool-salted inclusions, which are affected by the gravitational field of the submarine, which is under the ice.
Here he is flying in these glasses over a solid ice field and visually detects a contrasting (relative to the rest of the white field) circumference of a very large diameter. It seems to not understand what kind of optical phenomenon. The cabin glazing polarizes the light, the helmet's light filter contributes to polarization, plus imported light-protective glasses. But suddenly, almost in the center of the giant circle, ice is being cracked and the cabin of our nuclear submarine is shown!
... When the submarine is moving in a submerged position, a given depth of immersion is held by horizontal rudders, which are controlled by the boatswain or the autopilot. Accuracy of retention of a given stroke depth within ± 5 meters. That is, the gigantic mass of the metal (from 6000 to 33800 tons) makes vertical oscillations in depth, and its gravitational field also oscillates with the mass. Part of the gravitational field of the hull of the underwater ship, with the intensity detected by the measuring instruments, goes to the surface of the water, to the boundary of two media, water and air. Remember and excitement on the surface. This part of the gravitational field, at some equal level of its intensity, comes into resonant interaction with the near-surface layers of sea water and air. The interaction produces orientation of salt domains in the upper layers of water and air (as is well known at the water surface in the air, a high concentration of salty water droplets), which leads to the summation (a kind of modulation) of the strength of their electric fields. Hence the ring or elliptical shape of the figures on the radar screens. And the interaction of the summed electric fields with the electromagnetic field from the antennas of radar stations (absorption or reflection) leads to the appearance of ring or elliptical effects on the screens of the radar stations.
Opponents have a question: why the ring effect is not detected around large surface ships or ships? They, too, have a gravitational field? The answer is that the volume of the zone of interaction of the gravitational field of a surface ship with intensity for the desired resonant interaction with salt water is spatially too thin due to the angles of intersection of the intensity vectors of the fields close to 90 °. And in these volumes there are no conditions for resonant interaction with the electromagnetic field of the search radar, especially if they are of any other frequency range. For surface ships and ships, the effect may be observed briefly when they are sinking (sinking).
Thus, quite randomly, the frequency range of the radar stations of the over-the-horizon target designation of the “More” system was chosen so that it was at these frequencies that the interaction of the total electric field of the surface salt domains of the sea water modulated by the flickering gravitational field of large underwater objects with the electromagnetic field of the search radar was detected.
A particular case of the manifestation of the ring effect can be considered a change in the polarization of sunlight reflected from the ice cover, as my friend Seryoga observed during one of his flights over the ice through polarization pilot glasses. Ice, for all its hardness, has in its composition non-freezing cool-salted inclusions, which are affected by the gravitational field of the submarine, which is under the ice.
Having added all of the above, we have to admit that the ability to detect a submarine using radar and optical electronic monitoring of the surface of water or ice is a reality. And this reality, unfortunately, is completely negated by the modern domestic naval strategy.
We rely on submarines, ignoring the fact that anti-submarine planes of a potential enemy "see" them both under water and, possibly, under the ice. Not all modes, of course, and not always, and the search area must somehow be chosen, but the very fact of the existence of such an opportunity should have forced the Navy command to fundamentally reconsider its approaches to military construction, in particular, to providing combat services to the submarines, their support of surface ships and aircraft, including the ship.
In practice, everything was and remains absolutely wrong. The fact that our submarines are extremely vulnerable to basic enemy antisubmarine aviation during military construction is generally not taken into account. The facts of the fact that the enemy's boats exceed our submarines in the stealth, detection range and tactical and technical characteristics of the torpedo weapons - also. So for what huge public funds are spent on the sub-melt? So that he could be quickly drowned, with the loss of thousands of sailors and gigantic means?
The situation becomes simply horrible in its application to the naval component of the SNF. It is the submarines with ballistic missiles that are the most secretive component of our nuclear forces and the only carriers of nuclear weapons, which in theory can be hidden from the enemy. In practice, it turns out that it is almost impossible ...
So when John Lehman, the US Navy minister in the Reagan administration, argued that our submarines would not have survived the first days of the war had it startedHe was apparently not very far from the truth.
Some time ago, the Americans, who were keeping a truly grave silence about their achievements in the anti-submarine search, began to declassify materials related to this subject.
So, now the report is available online. "A RADAR METHOD FOR THE DETECTION OF SUBMERGED SUBMARINES" ("Radar method for detecting submerged submarines"), released by the US Naval Research Laboratory back in the year 1975. Although zone * .mil and is closed to Russian users, a simple anonymizer allows you to download the full text in English. The report shows that for the first time the Americans discovered the phenomenon of a residual mark on the surface, which is noticeable in the radar range, even during the Second World War. And only by the year 1975 came to a consensus that the effect is, and can be used. And after thirteen years, there was the same reconnaissance mission of the Orion ...
In theory, again, naval aviation and surface ships would have to work as a shield for strike submarines, giving them the opportunity to turn in relative safety from both enemy aircraft and enemy submarines, but alas, with surface ships and naval aviation the situation is even worse than with submarines, and they cannot help the boats.
Let's start with aviation
The USSR had a controversial position with naval aviation. The USSR Navy had a first-class coast-based strike aviation - Naval rocket-carrying aircraft, armed with Tu-16, Tu-22 and Tu-22M aircraft of various modifications capable of carrying anti-ship cruise missiles, both supersonic and subsonic. A little later, the missile-carrying Tu-95K-22, the “long arm” of the Navy, capable of striking surface ships over any point of the World Ocean was added to them. Their range and qualities of avionics made them truly global weapons (although not without flaws). Intelligence aviation was also at the highest level.
But in the part of the anti-submarine aviation, the USSR had a failure - the sighting and search systems of the aircraft did not provide a reliable search for foreign submarines, although aviation still gave a lot of detections. The “Window” theme mentioned above could change the situation, but alas, its practical results were obtained immediately before the collapse of the USSR, and after it new search methods received the most minimal development. Deck aircraft of the USSR Navy in a sense simply “did not have time” to grow. Coastal assault aircraft was not bad, but the fighter aircraft of the Navy experienced a shortage of modern aircraft.
But even these contradictory achievements in naval aviation were completely lost after the collapse of the USSR. The composition of anti-submarine aviation has declined many times, and, most unpleasantly, for all the post-Soviet years, nothing has been done to create a new aircraft to replace the old Be-12, Tu-142М and Il-38. The modernization of the IL-38 in the 38H variant with the Novella complex is a half-measure, with very limited efficiency, and the pace of aircraft modernization is simply depressing.
In fact, it is no exaggeration to say that we simply do not have anti-submarine aircraft. And this is in conditions when the aggregate number of modern submarines of the United States and its allies exceeds far over a hundred. No one thinks to correct the situation: neither the Navy command, nor the Ministry of Defense structures show any serious interest in solving the problem.
But from the anti-submarine aviation even survived the remnants that can be upgraded. But the MPA was eliminated completely. In 2010, all remaining Tu-22M aircraft in the Navy were withdrawn from the Navy and transferred to the Air Force. Now the fleet simply does not have a tool for delivering sudden massive strikes against enemy naval formations, there are no forces that can be maneuvered between theaters in a "big" war, strengthening our scattered fleets in turn. And, of course, there are no guarantees that the videoconferencing system will be perplexed by the issues of assistance to the fleet - the aims of the videoconferencing system in a big war are enough without any naval problems.
If the transfer of bombers to the Air Force is an excuse, in the end, these machines have not been manufactured for a long time and really become “worth their weight in gold”, there are really few of them left, then the actual destruction by the fleet of its own fighter aircraft cannot be called a crime. Five years ago, the Navy had large fighter forces, and, in contrast to the Soviet era, quite modern machines. MiG-31 and Su-27, repaired and in good condition. What is it all over? The fact that the command of the fleets simply ruined the air units entrusted to them, without even selecting kerosene for combat training. Suffice it to say that the fighter units of the Navy in Kamchatka in 2015 had a raid no more than 30 hours per person per year - almost like in the 90s. And this is when the war was already in Syria. The officers of the Navy headquarters openly, without embarrassment, said that without the pilots and their problems it would be easier and easier for them to serve. The result is logical - from 2017, fighter aircraft are being taken from the fleet, and slowly but surely they are transferring it “under the wing” of the newly created Air Force and Air Defense armies. First, the Northern Fleet passed through it, and in the 2018 year - the Pacific. This, of course, saved aviation connections for the future, but now it’s impossible to debug the necessary level of interaction between surface ships and aviation. However, this has never been done before.
But the American fighters from bases in Japan hung “on the tail” of the IL-38 over the Sea of Okhotsk with each departure to search for submarines (in those cases when there were foreign submarines in the Sea of Okhotsk)! How was it possible in such conditions to ruin the entrusted air units? But the Navy did it.
Relatively good things look in the maritime assault aviation regiments. Shelves fly, train, get into service new Su-30CM. That's just the potential of this platform, no one even tries to realize. If in the Indian Air Force Su-30 already allow heavy supersonic anti-ship missiles “Bramos”, in Russia no one is trying to equip naval Su-30CM with similar “Onyxes” in parameters, although this solution would dramatically increase the strike capabilities of the regiments and give them the opportunity to attack modern warships without entering their air defense zone. But this, apparently, no one needs, such work is not conducted, as well as there are no signs that the fleet will strengthen the assault air regiments by tanker aircraft or ARLO. The main weapon of the assault regiments is the X-35 rocket - a very good rocket, but with the breakthrough of the modern echeloned ship's air defense its range is not enough, you will have to substitute the enemy anti-aircraft missiles and the airplanes themselves too.
The new hypersonic rocket "Dagger" also visibly did not interest the naval comrades.
In fact, from the naval aviation of the times of the USSR only lumps remained, and one should not think that the VKS, which are forced to take on more and more “sea” tasks, will become a lifesaver here. They will not, because they have enough work on the ground, and because the naval aviation pilot is a person with extremely specific training and skills that the universal pilot of the VKS will not have to develop once.
It would be naive to think that in such conditions, things that are primarily associated with the fleet (with surface ships) go better. Do not go.
At present, there are thirty-one ships in the near and far sea, as well as oceanic zones (minus non-propelling ships that will not sail into the sea, but have not yet been withdrawn from service). In addition to the five corvettes of the 20380 project and four frigates (three 11356 and one 22350), all of them were laid back in the USSR. Of this amount, ten ships are now under repair, including the only aircraft carrier.
In fact, at present, the Northern Fleet can launch five surface ships of the 1 and 2 rank, including two cruisers, the Black Sea - five TFRs and frigates, the Pacific - six, including one cruiser, the Baltic Fleet - one TFR of the 11540 project and four corvettes 20380 project.
For comparison: Japan has thirty-seven URO combat ships in the ranks and three PLO helicopter carriers, France has twenty-three URO spacecraft and a full-fledged nuclear aircraft carrier.
Of course, we still have a certain number (less than thirty for the entire Navy) of small anti-submarine ships, small rocket ships, rocket boats and auxiliary ships and vessels. But they either cannot act in the far sea zone without large ships, or are necessary for organizing the defense of coastal waters, or both. The same grouping of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in Syria is not particularly protected by them, they cannot be fought near Hokkaido or Svalbard. The same new IRAs of the 21631 project, marked by launches of the “Calibrov”, have very limited seaworthiness, and have neither air defense, nor PLO weapons, or at least anti-torpedo protection.
At the same time, all the other large ships naturally “stuck” on repairs that have been going on for years, and whose deadlines are increasing all the time. Last news from the series - the flooding of the PD-50 floating dock, in which the aircraft carrier Admiral Kuznetsov was stationed, with the aircraft carrier on the dock wall, and the consequences that were not voiced to the end. How much it will delay the recovery of Kuznetsov and complicate repairs of other ships and submarines, we can only guess.
At the same time, the intensive exploitation of ships still in progress will definitely lead to the almost complete development by many of them of a resource by about the 2020 year, before the warships now standing there will start to go out of repair. In fact, the fleet can halve its already modest combat strength, and ship repair already can not cope with the existing scope of work, after this volume grows by sixty percent, it will not cope even more. Especially considering the fact that some ships are already naturally brought “to the handle”, and the volume of work with them is promised to be enormous.
But the worst thing is that the Navy can not update the ship composition. Under the thunder of fanfare and brilliance of the main maritime parades, one “modest” fact left the attention of the public: Russia cannot build warships of the classes it needs. Almost none.
Consider in order
In the segment of small rocket ships (projects 21631 "Buyan-M" and 22800 "Karakurt"), the fleet was faced with the inability to obtain the necessary engines. "Buyan-M" was designed under the German MTU, but they became inaccessible due to the sanctions. Starting from the Vyshny Volochek ship, Chinese diesel engines are put on the ship, but they do not have the necessary technical characteristics for military use, which puts an end to stories a series of these ships. However, after the United States withdraws from the treaty on the elimination of short-range and medium-range missiles, there will be no sense in these ships anyway.
"Karakurt", which was conceived as more high-speed and seaworthy analogues of "Buyana-M" with more powerful weapons and domestic diesel engines, were left without engines in principle. PJSC “Zvezda”, which was supposed to supply for these ships the high-speed diesel engines М507, turned out to be simply incapable of producing them. At a pace that the plant makes engines now, the Karakurt series will be built for a decade, at a minimum. This crisis has led to such proposals as the delivery of ships with used engines that have been overhauled to the fleet. It must be admitted that there are quite grounds for such a tough decision.
All the other larger ships also fell into the “trap” of PJSC Zvezda, because its subsidiary, Zvezda-reduktor, is the only manufacturer of gearboxes in Russia for ship propulsion systems. And the problems there are the same as in diesel production. However, the plant that has already been studied and launched into a series of gearboxes can do with grief in half, albeit long and slowly. But with new designs - trouble. And yet it is precisely these that are required in order for Russia to build ships of the far sea zone — at least frigates.
We note that earlier the gearboxes for large ships were supplied by the Ukrainian enterprise Zorya-Mashproekt, but after the “euromaidan” and the Crimea, these supplies became impossible. Steel shipments of ship gas turbines were also impossible, but they were able to master their production in Russia, but there are no gearboxes, and the plant producing them feels bad.
As a result, the construction of warships in Russia in a reasonable time is now simply impossible.
All these unpleasant facts are superimposed on the inability of the Ministry of Defense and the command of the Navy to determine both the doctrine of military use and the type of ships available and needed for the construction.
About the fact that the giant money tumble into the sub-melt unable to protect itself has already been mentioned, but this is only part of the problem.
The fleet is completely devoid of anti-mine forces. There are no modern minesweepers, there are almost no crewless means, uninhabited anti-mine devices and there is almost no other equipment needed to combat mines. What is being built depends on the products of the Zvezda on the one hand, or does not meet modern requirements on the other. The mining of water areas near the naval bases will lead to the fact that ships and submarines will simply be locked up there, there is nothing to "clear" the exit. Only send a warship or a multi-purpose submarine to the mines in order to "pierce" the corridor with human lives. Well, the English on the Falklands prepared to do that, we are no worse than them, right?
Similarly, there are no anti-submarine forces capable of driving off enemy submarines from our bases. There are neither PLO corvettes in sufficient quantities, nor an underwater warning system of acceptable quality.
Only this year, modern guided torpedoes began to arrive in the fleet (this could have been done many years ago), but the submarine crews still lack experience in their use and the firing statistics are very small.
No work is being carried out on the modernization of anti-submarine helicopters, although there are good developments in lowered hydroacoustic stations, but they are called “do not make progress”.
About naval aviation has already been mentioned.
And in these conditions, the Navy finds nothing better than chasing chimeras.
For some reason, a series of inefficient and unsuitable for conducting combat operations of “patrol” ships of the 22160 project was built. They are positioned as anti-piracy, but a ship of such a displacement cannot work in the Indian Ocean - there is a risk that, due to unrest at sea, it will not be able to take back its boats and helicopters with marines back on board.
These ships do not possess armaments for conducting anti-submarine warfare or the ability to fight with enemy surface ships.
Why were they built then? Why did you spend money?
Another megaspiel is the 20386 project ship. About him already writtenand there are already a lot of potential technical risks in the project. Some of the potential flaws of this ship will appear to be irreparable. In this case, the "Star" and this ship cheated gear. The 6RP reducer provided by the design still does not exist in the metal, and it is not known when it will be, now the shipbuilders cautiously say that the GEM for the ship may be ready in the 2020 year ... but perhaps not.
Anyway, neither the delivery of the ship to the fleet in 2022, nor the laying of the second hull in 2018, will definitely be anymore.
All this, however, did not prevent the project developers and subsystems from mastering the huge budget allocated for the development and construction of this “vundervaffe”.
The development of the only series of ships that Russia could build, the 20380 corvettes, was halted by the will of someone in the Navy. And this is despite the fact that the modernization potential of the ships is far from being revealed, and there is simply no alternative. New ships of this project are not being laid, new ones that are better adapted to anti-submarine warfare or that have more effective air defense modifications are not being developed. It may be objected that we have to wait for years for these gearboxes, but at least they can be waited!
Well, the larger ships Russia either cannot build at all, or it can be very expensive and slow, for example, the frigates of the 22350 project. Very powerful for its class and very expensive ships, with serious combat power. However, this series of ships will not be built anymore either, everything will be limited to four copies.
About such things as intercabel unification, there is no need to say that we do not know what it is all about.
As well as about the development of naval underwater weapons, hydroacoustic countermeasures, hydroacoustic systems and much more, real work and production have long been replaced by ingenious schemes that allow you to master budgets without giving out anything in response, no prototypes, samples, etc. ., - only reports on the development work done, falsified test reports and endless restarts of this process. Net profit without production.
It should be borne in mind that this time all of the above is superimposed on the increased military danger for the Russian Federation, on the presence of an isolated theater of military operations, which is not accessible by land (Syria), on the fact that all our serious opponents today are countries with strong naval forces on sanctions that do not allow purchasing weapons and components abroad, in the coming demographic crisis of 2025-2030-s, when the army, navy and VKS will have to compete for the mobilization resource and people, to achieve growth in the fleet’s combat capabilities without growth consumption in it ...
This is actually an ideal storm, a system that has gone into singularity, into "dressing." All crisis phenomena in peak form and at the same time. The collapse of the fleet, the complete collapse of everything that still holds in it.
That's what awaits the Navy in the near future.
Will it survive the fleet? Is not a fact. But the worst thing would be if it was at this moment that the Navy would have to be used in combat operations. Tsushima will seem like a small river cruise against the backdrop of what may happen in the very next few years. Moreover, in order to “overgrown”, we will not necessarily fall into conflict with the United States: almost any more or less developed naval country will be able to break such an unstable system as the Russian Navy after 2020.
Who is to blame for the fact that all this has become possible?
This is undoubtedly the Ministry of Defense, including the Department for the Provision of the State Defense Order, the commanders of the Navy, the personnel of the Main Committee of the Navy responsible for shipbuilding, the Ministers of Defense - all for about the last 12-13 years.
Someone was flawed, someone closed his eyes to the flaws of some and direct sabotage of others, someone carried out this sabotage. And in the end we have what we have. The Military-Industrial Commission is unequivocally guilty, at least, all those who are in its composition responsible for shipbuilding.
Guilty and the FSB, because it did not keep track of the folding of truly mafia clans in the military-industrial complex, and the fact that the activities of some comrades in the “near-fleet” (we will not point the finger), “gives” to foreign special services.
What to do?
First, replace the people responsible for these failures with others. This is fundamentally important. Everyone who was behind bringing the fleet "to the handle" should go look for another place of work. Secondly, firmly, with the announcement of targets and the appointment of deadlines, to take up the elimination of all the above problems, not only in industry, but also in the Navy itself. Starting from answering the question “Why do we need a fleet in principle?” And ending with working out the interaction between aviation and surface ships. From restoring competences in shipbuilding to restoring order in the financing of the ROC of the fleet. From increasing the frequency of torpedo firing to giving naval aviation proper status within the fleet structure. With the research exercises necessary to determine the appearance and composition of the fleet of the future. With the improvement of funding in terms of the distribution of funds between the submarine, surface fleet and aircraft.
With the necessary changes in the regulatory framework and stripping those who do not want or can not work "for the result."
As quickly as possible - because there is no time left. He is not there at all, and very soon it will become obvious.
Probably, this time it will not be possible to do without “manual control” by the president and the minister of defense, this crisis itself will not “resolve”.
Otherwise, we will only have to wait for the next Tsushima and wait for it.
And very soon.
Information