Military doctrine of the Russian Federation

Approved by decree of the President of the Russian Federation
5 February 2010 year

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. The military doctrine of the Russian Federation (hereinafter - the Military Doctrine) is one of the main strategic planning documents in the Russian Federation and is a system of officially adopted views on the preparation of armed defense and armed defense of the Russian Federation.

2. The Military Doctrine takes into account the main provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation 2000, the Concept of Long-Term Socio-Economic Development of the Russian Federation up to 2020, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, as well as the relevant provisions of the Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation 2008 and Maritime Doctrine Russian Federation for the period up to 2020 year.

Military doctrine is based on the provisions of military theory and is aimed at its further development.

3. The legal basis of the Military Doctrine is constituted by the Constitution of the Russian Federation, generally recognized principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation in the field of defense, arms control and disarmament, federal constitutional laws, federal laws, and regulatory acts of the President of the Russian Federation and the Government of the Russian Federation.

4. The military doctrine reflects the commitment of the Russian Federation to the use of political, diplomatic, legal, economic, environmental, informational, military and other tools to protect the national interests of the Russian Federation and the interests of its allies.

5. The provisions of the Military Doctrine are specified in the messages of the President of the Russian Federation to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and may be adjusted as part of strategic planning in the military sphere (military planning).

The implementation of the Military Doctrine is achieved through the centralization of government administration in the military field and is carried out in accordance with federal legislation, normative legal acts of the President of the Russian Federation, the Government of the Russian Federation and federal executive bodies.

6. The following basic concepts are used in Military Doctrine:

a) the military security of the Russian Federation (hereinafter referred to as military security) is the state of protection of the vital interests of an individual, society and the state from external and internal military threats associated with the use of military force or the threat of its use, characterized by the absence of a military threat or the ability to counter it;

b) military danger - the state of interstate or intrastate relations, characterized by a combination of factors that can, under certain conditions, lead to a military threat;

c) military threat - the state of interstate or intrastate relations, characterized by the real possibility of a military conflict between the opposing parties, a high degree of readiness of any state (group of states), separatist (terrorist) organizations to use military force (armed violence);

d) military conflict - a form of resolving interstate or intrastate conflicts with the use of military force (the concept covers all types of armed confrontation, including large-scale, regional, local wars and armed conflicts);

e) armed conflict - an armed confrontation of a limited scale between states (international armed conflict) or the opposing parties within the territory of one state (internal armed conflict);

f) local war - a war between two or more states, pursuing limited military-political goals, in which military operations are conducted within the borders of the opposing states and which mainly affects the interests of only those states (territorial, economic, political and others);

g) regional war - a war with the participation of two or more states of the same region, waged by national or coalition armed forces using both conventional and nuclear weapons in the region with its adjacent water areas and in the air (outer) space above it, during which the parties will pursue important military and political goals;

h) large-scale war - a war between coalitions of states or the largest states of the world community, in which the parties will pursue radical military-political goals. A large-scale war may result from the escalation of an armed conflict, a local or regional war involving a significant number of states in different regions of the world. It will require the mobilization of all available material resources and the spiritual forces of the participating States;

i) military policy - the activities of the state in organizing and implementing defense and ensuring the security of the Russian Federation, as well as the interests of its allies;

j) a military organization of the state (hereinafter referred to as the military organization) is a combination of state and military authorities, the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other troops, military formations and bodies (hereinafter referred to as the Armed Forces and other troops), which form its basis and carry out their activities by military methods as well as parts of the country's industrial and scientific complexes, whose joint activities are aimed at preparing for armed defense and armed defense of the Russian Federation;

k) military planning - defining the procedure and methods for implementing the goals and objectives of the development of the military organization, construction and development of the Armed Forces and other troops, their application and comprehensive support.

Ii. MILITARY HAZARDS AND MILITARY THREATS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

7. World development at the present stage is characterized by a weakening of ideological confrontation, a decrease in the level of economic, political and military influence of some states (groups of states) and unions and an increase in the influence of other states claiming comprehensive domination, multipolarity and globalization of various processes.

Many regional conflicts remain unresolved. The tendencies to their power resolution, including in the regions bordering the Russian Federation, remain. The existing architecture (system) of international security, including its international legal mechanisms, does not ensure equal security for all states.

At the same time, despite the decrease in the likelihood of a large-scale war unleashing against the Russian Federation using conventional weapons and nuclear weapons weapons, in a number of areas the military danger of the Russian Federation is increasing.

8. Main external military hazards:

a) the desire to endow the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) power potential with global functions, implemented in violation of international law, to bring the military infrastructure of NATO member countries closer to the borders of the Russian Federation, including by expanding the bloc;

b) attempts to destabilize the situation in individual states and regions and undermine strategic stability;

c) deployment (build-up) of military contingents of foreign states (groups of states) in the territories adjacent to the Russian Federation and its allies, as well as in adjacent waters;

d) the creation and deployment of strategic missile defense systems, undermining global stability and disrupting the existing balance of forces in the nuclear-missile sphere, as well as the militarization of outer space, the deployment of strategic non-nuclear high-precision weapons systems;

e) territorial claims against the Russian Federation and its allies, interference in their internal affairs;

(e) the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, missiles and missile technologies, an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States;

g) violation by certain states of international agreements, as well as non-compliance with previously concluded international treaties in the field of arms limitation and reduction;

h) the use of military force in the territories adjacent to the Russian Federation in violation of the UN Charter and other norms of international law;

i) the presence (occurrence) of hotbeds and the escalation of armed conflicts in the territories adjacent to the Russian Federation and its allies;

j) the spread of international terrorism;

k) the emergence of hotbeds of interethnic (interfaith) tension, the activities of international armed radical groups in the areas adjacent to the state border of the Russian Federation and the borders of its allies, as well as the presence of territorial contradictions, increased separatism and violent (religious) extremism in certain regions of the world.

9. Main internal military hazards:

a) attempts to forcibly change the constitutional system of the Russian Federation;

b) undermining the sovereignty, violation of the unity and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation;

c) disorganization of the functioning of public authorities, important state, military facilities and information infrastructure of the Russian Federation.

10. Major military threats:

a) a sharp aggravation of the military-political situation (interstate relations) and the creation of conditions for the use of military force;

b) obstructing the work of the state and military control systems of the Russian Federation, the disruption of the functioning of its strategic nuclear forces, missile attack warning systems, control of outer space, nuclear ammunition storage facilities, nuclear energy, nuclear, chemical industry and other potentially dangerous objects;

c) the creation and training of illegal armed formations, their activities in the territory of the Russian Federation or in the territories of its allies;

d) demonstration of military force in the course of the exercise in the territories adjacent to the Russian Federation or its allies with provocative purposes;

e) activization of the activities of the armed forces of individual states (groups of states) with partial or full mobilization, transfer of state and military authorities of these states to work in wartime conditions.

11. Military conflicts are characterized by goals, ways and means of achieving these goals, the scale and timing of hostilities, the forms and methods of warfare and the weapons and military equipment used.

12. Characteristic features of modern military conflicts:

a) the integrated use of military force and non-military forces and assets;

b) the massive use of weapons systems and military equipment based on new physical principles and comparable in effectiveness to nuclear weapons;

c) expansion of the scale of use of troops (forces) and assets operating in aerospace;

d) strengthening the role of informational confrontation;

e) reducing the time parameters of preparation for the conduct of hostilities;

e) increasing the efficiency of command and control as a result of the transition from a strictly vertical control system to global networked automated systems for the control of troops (forces) and weapons;

g) the creation in the territories of the opposing sides of a permanent zone of military operations.

13. Features of modern military conflicts:

a) the unpredictability of their occurrence;

b) the presence of a wide range of military-political, economic, strategic and other goals;

c) the increasing role of modern high-performance weapons systems, as well as the redistribution of the role of various spheres of warfare;

d) the advance holding of events of informational confrontation to achieve political goals without the use of military force, and subsequently - in the interest of creating a favorable reaction of the world community to the use of military force.

14. Military conflicts will be distinguished by transience, selectivity and a high degree of destruction of objects, speed of maneuver by troops (forces) and fire, the use of various mobile groups of troops (forces). Mastering a strategic initiative, preserving sustainable state and military governance, ensuring superiority on land, sea and in aerospace will be the decisive factors in achieving goals.

15. The military operations will be characterized by the increasing importance of high-precision, electromagnetic, laser, infrasonic weapons, information and control systems, unmanned aerial and autonomous naval vehicles, guided robotic models of weapons and military equipment.

16. Nuclear weapons will remain an important factor in preventing the outbreak of nuclear military conflicts and military conflicts with the use of conventional means of destruction (large-scale war, regional war).

In the event of a military conflict with the use of conventional means of destruction (large-scale war, regional war) that threatens the very existence of the state, the possession of nuclear weapons can lead to the escalation of such a military conflict into a nuclear military conflict.

Iii. MILITARY POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

17. The main tasks of the military policy of the Russian Federation are determined by the President of the Russian Federation in accordance with federal legislation, the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020, and this Military Doctrine.

The military policy of the Russian Federation is aimed at preventing an arms race, deterring and preventing military conflicts, improving the military organization, forms and methods of using the Armed Forces and other troops, as well as means of destruction for the purposes of defense and security of the Russian Federation, as well as the interests of its allies.

The activities of the Russian Federation to contain and prevent military conflicts

18. The Russian Federation ensures the constant readiness of the Armed Forces and other troops to deter and prevent military conflicts, to the armed defense of the Russian Federation and its allies in accordance with the norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation.

Preventing a nuclear military conflict, like any other military conflict, is the most important task of the Russian Federation.

19. The main tasks of the Russian Federation to contain and prevent military conflicts:

a) assessment and forecasting of the development of the military-political situation at the global and regional level, as well as the state of interstate relations in the military-political sphere using modern technical means and information technologies;

b) neutralization of possible military dangers and military threats by political, diplomatic and other non-military means;

c) maintaining strategic stability and the potential of nuclear deterrence at a sufficient level;

d) maintaining the Armed Forces and other troops in a given degree of readiness for combat use;

e) strengthening the collective security system within the framework of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and building up its potential, strengthening interaction in the field of international security within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the development of relations in this area with other intergovernmental organizations (the European Union and NATO);

f) expanding the circle of partner states and developing cooperation with them on the basis of common interests in the area of ​​strengthening international security in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter and other norms of international law;

g) compliance with international treaties on the limitation and reduction of strategic offensive arms;

h) the conclusion and implementation of agreements in the field of conventional arms control, as well as the implementation of measures to strengthen mutual confidence;

i) the establishment of regulatory mechanisms for bilateral and multilateral cooperation in the field of missile defense;

j) the conclusion of an international treaty on the prevention of the placement in outer space of any weapons;

k) participation in international peacekeeping activities, including under the auspices of the UN and in the framework of interaction with international (regional) organizations;

l) participation in the fight against international terrorism.

The use of the Armed Forces and other troops.

The main tasks of the Armed Forces and other troops in peacetime, during the immediate threat of aggression and in wartime

20. The Russian Federation considers it legitimate to use the Armed Forces and other troops to repel aggression against it and (or) its allies, maintain (restore) peace by decision of the UN Security Council, other collective security structures, as well as to ensure the protection of its citizens outside Russia. Federation, in accordance with generally accepted principles and norms of international law and international treaties of the Russian Federation.

The use of the Armed Forces and other troops in peacetime is carried out by decision of the President of the Russian Federation in the manner established by federal law.

21. The Russian Federation regards an armed attack on a State party to the Union State or any actions using military force against it as an act of aggression against the Union State and will carry out retaliatory measures.

The Russian Federation regards an armed attack on a CSTO member state as an aggression against all CSTO member states and in this case will take measures in accordance with the Collective Security Treaty.

22. In the framework of the implementation of strategic deterrence measures of a power nature, the Russian Federation envisages the use of high-precision weapons.

The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the case of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened.

The decision on the use of nuclear weapons is made by the President of the Russian Federation.

23. Tasks assigned to the Armed Forces and other troops are organized and carried out in accordance with the Plan of Use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the Mobilization Plan of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, decrees of the President of the Russian Federation, orders and directives of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, other regulatory legal acts of the Russian Federation and strategic defense planning documents.

24. The Russian Federation allocates military contingents to the CSTO peacekeeping forces to participate in peacekeeping operations by decision of the CSTO Collective Security Council. The Russian Federation allocates military contingents to the CSTO Collective Rapid Reaction Forces (CRRF) in order to promptly respond to military threats to the CSTO member states and to solve other tasks identified by the CSTO Collective Security Council, in accordance with the procedure for rapid deployment, the application and comprehensive provision of the Collective Rapid Deployment Forces of the Central Asian Collective Security Region.

25. For peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate or a CIS mandate, the Russian Federation provides military contingents in the manner established by federal law and international treaties of the Russian Federation.

26. In order to protect the interests of the Russian Federation and its citizens, to maintain international peace and security, the formation of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can be promptly used outside the Russian Federation in accordance with generally accepted principles and norms of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation and federal legislation.

27. The main tasks of the Armed Forces and other troops in peacetime:

a) protection of the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, the integrity and immunity of its territory;

b) strategic deterrence, including the prevention of military conflicts;

c) maintaining the composition, state of combat and mobilization readiness and preparation of strategic nuclear forces, forces and means ensuring their functioning and use, as well as control systems at a level that guarantees the infliction of a predetermined damage to the aggressor in any situation;

d) timely warning of the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation about an aerospace attack, notifying state and military authorities, troops (forces) about military dangers and military threats;

e) maintaining the ability of the Armed Forces and other troops to advance the deployment of groups of troops (forces) in potentially dangerous strategic areas, as well as their readiness for combat use;

e) ensuring air defense of the most important objects of the Russian Federation and readiness to repel attacks of aerospace attack weapons;

g) deploying and maintaining in the strategic space zone orbital groups of spacecrafts supporting the activities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation;

h) protection of important state and military facilities, facilities on communications and special cargoes;

i) operational equipment of the territory of the Russian Federation and preparation of communications for the purposes of defense, including the construction and reconstruction of special-purpose objects, the construction and overhaul of highways of defense importance;

j) protection of citizens of the Russian Federation outside the Russian Federation from an armed attack on them;

k) participation in operations to maintain (restore) international peace and security, take measures to prevent (eliminate) threats to peace, suppress acts of aggression (peace violations) based on decisions of the UN Security Council or other bodies authorized to make such decisions in accordance with international right;

m) combating piracy, ensuring the safety of navigation;

m) ensuring the safety of the economic activities of the Russian Federation in the oceans;

o) the fight against terrorism;

o) preparation for carrying out activities on territorial defense and civil defense;

p) participation in the protection of public order, ensuring public safety;

c) participation in emergency response and restoration of special-purpose facilities;

m) participation in ensuring the state of emergency.

28. The main tasks of the Armed Forces and other troops during the immediate threat of aggression:

a) implementation of a set of additional measures aimed at reducing the level of threat of aggression and increasing the level of combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces and other troops, in order to conduct mobilization and strategic deployment;

b) maintaining the potential of nuclear deterrence in the established degree of readiness;

c) participation in ensuring the regime of martial law;

d) implementation of measures for territorial defense, as well as the implementation of civil defense measures in the prescribed manner;

e) fulfillment of the international obligations of the Russian Federation on collective defense, repelling or preventing, in accordance with the norms of international law, an armed attack on another state, which addressed the Russian Federation with a corresponding request.

29. The primary objectives of the Armed Forces and other troops in wartime are to repel aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies, defeat the aggressor’s forces (forces), forcing it to cease hostilities under conditions that meet the interests of the Russian Federation and its allies.

The development of military organization.

Construction and development of the Armed Forces and other troops

30. The main objectives of the development of the military organization:

a) bringing the structure, composition and strength of the components of a military organization in accordance with the tasks in peacetime, during the immediate threat of aggression and in wartime, taking into account the allocation of sufficient financial, material and other resources for these purposes. The planned number and timing of the allocation of these resources are reflected in the planning documents for the long-term socio-economic development of the Russian Federation;

b) improving the efficiency and safety of the functioning of the state and military control system;

c) improving the air defense system and creating an aerospace defense system of the Russian Federation;

d) the improvement of the military-economic support of the military organization on the basis of the rational use of financial, material and other resources;

e) improving military planning;

e) improvement of territorial defense and civil defense;

g) improving the system for creating a stock of mobilization resources, including stocks of weapons, military and special equipment, as well as material and technical resources;

h) improving the efficiency of the operation and repair of weapons, military and special equipment;

i) the creation of integrated structures for material, technical, social, medical and scientific support in the Armed Forces and other troops, as well as military education and training institutions;

j) improvement of the information support system for the Armed Forces and other troops;

k) increasing the prestige of military service, comprehensive preparation of citizens of the Russian Federation for it;

l) ensuring military-political and military-technical cooperation of the Russian Federation with foreign states.

31. The main priorities of the development of the military organization:

a) improving the management system of a military organization and increasing the efficiency of its operation;

b) the development of the mobilization base of the military organization and the provision of the mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces and other troops;

c) ensuring the necessary degree of staffing, equipment, provision of formations, military units and formations of constant readiness and the required level of their training;

d) improving the quality of training and military education, as well as building military-scientific potential.

32. The main task of building and developing the Armed Forces and other troops is to bring their structure, composition and strength in line with the predicted military threats, the content and nature of military conflicts, current and future tasks in peacetime, during the immediate threat of aggression and in wartime, also political, socio-economic, demographic and military-technical conditions and capabilities of the Russian Federation.

33. In the construction and development of the Armed Forces and other troops, the Russian Federation proceeds from the need:

a) improving the organizational structure and composition of the types and types of troops of the Armed Forces and other troops and optimizing the staffing level of military personnel;

b) ensuring a rational balance of permanent-readiness formations and military units and units and military units intended for the mobilization deployment of the Armed Forces and other troops;

c) improving the quality of operational, combat, special and mobilization training;

d) improving the interaction between the branches of the Armed Forces, the branches of the troops (forces) and other troops;

e) providing modern models of weapons, military and special equipment (material and technical means) and their qualitative development;

f) integration and coordinated development of technical, logistic and other types of support systems for the Armed Forces and other troops, as well as military education and training systems, training, military science;

g) training highly professional military personnel loyal to the Fatherland, raising the prestige of military service.

34. The implementation of the main task of building and developing the Armed Forces and other troops is achieved by:

a) the formation and consistent implementation of military policy;

b) effective military-economic support and sufficient funding of the Armed Forces and other troops;

c) improving the quality level of the military-industrial complex;

d) ensuring the reliable functioning of the command and control system of the Armed Forces and other troops in peacetime, during the immediate threat of aggression and in wartime;

e) maintaining the ability of the country's economy to meet the needs of the Armed Forces and other troops;

e) maintaining the mobilization base in a state that ensures the implementation of the mobilization and strategic deployment of the Armed Forces and other troops;

g) the creation of permanent readiness civil defense forces capable of performing their functions in peacetime, during the immediate threat of aggression and in wartime;

h) improving the system of deployment (basing) of the Armed Forces and other troops, including outside the territory of the Russian Federation, in accordance with the international treaties of the Russian Federation and federal legislation;

i) the creation of a strategic infrastructure and operational directions of the military infrastructure system;

j) early creation of a reserve of mobilization resources;

k) optimizing the number of military educational institutions of vocational education in combination with federal state educational institutions of higher professional education, in which citizens of the Russian Federation are trained under the program of military training, and also equipped with modern material and technical base;

m) increasing the level of social security for servicemen, citizens dismissed from military service, and members of their families, as well as civilian personnel of the Armed Forces and other troops;

m) implementation of the social guarantees of military personnel, citizens dismissed from military service, and their family members established by federal legislation, and improving their quality of life;

o) improving the recruitment system for servicemen undergoing military service under contract and conscription, with predominantly recruiting privates and non-commissioned officers, ensuring the combat effectiveness of formations and units of the Armed Forces and other troops, under military service under military service under the contract;

n) strengthening of organization, law and order and military discipline, as well as the prevention and suppression of corruption;

p) improving the pre-draft training and the military-patriotic education of citizens;

c) ensuring state and civil control over the activities of federal executive bodies and executive bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation in the field of defense.

Military planning

35. Military planning is organized and carried out in order to implement measures for the development of a military organization coordinated in terms and provided with resources, as well as the construction and development of the Armed Forces and other troops, their effective use.

36. The main objectives of military planning:

a) the definition of agreed goals, objectives and measures for the construction and development of the Armed Forces and other troops, their use, as well as the development of an appropriate scientific, technical and production-technological base;

b) choosing the best directions for the construction and development of the Armed Forces and other troops, the forms and methods of their use based on forecasts of the development of the military-political situation, military dangers and military threats, the level of socio-economic development of the Russian Federation;

c) achieving compliance of the resource support of the Armed Forces and other troops with the tasks of their construction, development and use;

d) development of documents for short-term, medium-term and long-term planning, taking into account the results of the implementation of plans (programs) for the construction and development of the Armed Forces and other troops;

e) organization of control over the implementation of plans (programs) for the construction and development of the Armed Forces and other troops;

(e) Timely updating of military planning documents.

37. Military planning is carried out in accordance with the Regulations on Military Planning in the Russian Federation.

Iv. MILITARY AND ECONOMIC SUPPORT OF DEFENSE

38. The main task of providing military-economic defense is creating conditions for sustainable development and maintaining the capabilities of the military-economic and military-technical potential of the state at the level necessary to implement military policy and reliably meet the needs of the military organization in peacetime, during the immediate threat of aggression and war time.

39. Tasks of the military-economic support of defense:

a) the achievement of the level of financial and material and technical support of the military organization, sufficient to accomplish the tasks assigned to it;

b) optimization of defense expenditures, rational planning and distribution of financial and material resources allocated for the provision of a military organization, increasing the efficiency of their use;

c) timely and full resource support for the implementation of plans (programs) for the construction and development of the Armed Forces and other troops, their use, combat, special and mobilization training and other needs of the military organization;

d) concentration of scientific forces, financial and material and technical resources to create conditions for quality equipment (re-equipment) of the Armed Forces and other troops;

e) integration in certain areas of production of civil and military sectors of the economy, coordination of the military-economic activities of the state in the interests of defense;

f) ensuring legal protection of the results of intellectual activities of military, special and dual use;

g) fulfillment of the obligations of the Russian Federation in accordance with the international agreements concluded by it in the military-economic sphere.

Equipping the Armed Forces and other troops with weapons, military and special equipment

40. The main task of equipping the Armed Forces and other troops with weapons, military and special equipment is the creation and maintenance of an interconnected and integrated weapons system in accordance with the objectives and purpose of the Armed Forces and other troops, their forms and methods, and the economic and mobilization capabilities of the Russian Federation.

41. The tasks of equipping the Armed Forces and other troops with weapons, military and special equipment:

a) complex equipment (re-equipment) of modern models of armaments, military and special equipment of strategic nuclear forces, formations and military units of permanent readiness of general-purpose forces, anti-terrorist units, military engineering units and road-building military units, as well as their maintenance providing their combat use;

b) the creation of multifunctional (multipurpose) weapons, military and special equipment using unified components;

c) development of forces and means of information confrontation;

d) qualitative improvement of information exchange tools based on the use of modern technologies and international standards, as well as a single information field of the Armed Forces and other troops as part of the information space of the Russian Federation;

e) ensuring the functional and organizational-technical unity of the weapons systems of the Armed Forces and other troops;

e) the creation of new types of precision weapons and the development of their information support;

g) the creation of basic information management systems and their integration with weapons control systems and complexes of automation equipment for control bodies of strategic, operational-strategic, operational, operational-tactical and tactical levels.

42. The implementation of the tasks of equipping the Armed Forces and other troops with weapons, military and special equipment is provided for in the state armament program and other state programs (plans).

Operational decisions on the development of military and special equipment in the case of equipping a foreign state with new types of weapons are made by the Government of the Russian Federation.

Provision of the Armed Forces and other troops with material resources

43. The provision of the Armed Forces and other troops with material resources, their accumulation and maintenance are carried out within the framework of integrated and coordinated technical and logistic systems.

The main task of providing the Armed Forces and other troops with material resources in peacetime is the accumulation, layered deployment and maintenance of material reserves ensuring mobilization and strategic deployment of troops (forces) and military operations (based on the timing of the transfer of the economy, its individual industries and industry organizations to work in wartime conditions), taking into account the physiographic conditions of the strategic directions and capabilities of the transport system.

The main task of providing the Armed Forces and other troops with material means in the period of a direct threat of aggression is the additional provision of troops (forces) with material means according to states and wartime norms.

44. The main tasks of providing the Armed Forces and other troops with material means in wartime:

a) the supply of stocks of material resources, taking into account the purpose of the groups of troops (forces), the order, the timing of their formation and the expected duration of the conduct of hostilities;

b) replenishment of losses of weapons, military and special equipment and materiel in the course of military operations, taking into account the capabilities of the Armed Forces and other troops, industry organizations for the supply and repair of weapons, military and special equipment.

Development of the military-industrial complex

45. The main objective of the development of the military-industrial complex is to ensure its effective functioning as a high-tech diversified sector of the country's economy, able to meet the needs of the Armed Forces and other troops in modern weapons, military and special equipment and to ensure the strategic presence of the Russian Federation in the global markets of high-tech products and services.

46. The objectives of the development of the military-industrial complex include:

a) improvement of the military-industrial complex on the basis of the creation and development of large scientific and production structures;

b) improving the system of interstate cooperation in the development, production and repair of weapons and military equipment;

c) ensuring the technological independence of the Russian Federation in the production of strategic and other types of weapons, military and special equipment in accordance with the state armament program;

d) improvement of the system of guaranteed material and raw material supply for the production and operation of weapons, military and special equipment at all stages of the life cycle, including domestic components and element base;

e) formation of a complex of priority technologies ensuring the development and creation of advanced systems and models of weapons, military and special equipment;

f) maintaining state control over strategically significant organizations of the defense industry complex;

g) enhancing innovation and investment activity, allowing for a qualitative update of the scientific, technical and industrial-technological base;

h) the creation, maintenance and implementation of military and civilian base and critical technologies that ensure the creation, production and repair of existing and advanced weapons, military and special equipment, as well as providing technological breakthroughs or the creation of advanced scientific and technological reserve in order to develop fundamentally New types of weapons, military and special equipment with previously unattainable capabilities;

i) improving the system of target-oriented planning of the development of the defense-industrial complex in order to increase the efficiency of equipping the Armed Forces and other troops with weapons, military and special equipment, ensuring the mobilization readiness of the defense-industrial complex;

j) development and production of advanced systems and models of weapons, military and special equipment, improving the quality and competitiveness of military products;

l) improving the mechanism for placing orders for the supply of products, the performance of works and the provision of services for federal needs;

m) implementation of measures of economic incentives provided by the federal defense order provided for by federal legislation;

m) improvement of the activities of organizations of the military-industrial complex through the introduction of organizational and economic mechanisms ensuring their effective functioning and development;

o) improvement of the personnel structure and building-up of the intellectual potential of the defense-industrial complex, ensuring the social security of the workers of the defense-industrial complex.

Mobilization training of the economy, public authorities, local governments and organizations

47. The main task of the mobilization preparation of the economy, state authorities, local governments and organizations is to prepare in advance for the transfer to work in wartime conditions, to meet the needs of the Armed Forces and other troops, as well as to ensure state needs and the needs of the population in wartime.

48. Tasks of the mobilization preparation of the economy, government bodies, local governments and organizations:

a) improving mobilization training and increasing the mobilization readiness of the Russian Federation;

b) improving the regulatory framework for mobilization training and the transfer of the economy and organizations to work in wartime conditions;

c) preparing the economic management system for sustainable and efficient functioning during the period of mobilization, during the period of martial law and in wartime;

d) development of mobilization plans for the economy of the Russian Federation, subjects of the Russian Federation and the economy of municipalities, mobilization plans for organizations;

e) the creation, development and maintenance of mobilization capacities for the production of products necessary to meet the needs of the Russian Federation, the Armed Forces and other troops, as well as the needs of the population in wartime;

e) the creation and training of special formations intended for transfer to the Armed Forces and other troops when declaring mobilization or use in their interests, as well as in the interests of the economy of the Russian Federation;

g) preparation of equipment intended for delivery to the Armed Forces and other troops for mobilization;

h) the creation, preservation and updating of stocks of material values ​​of the state and mobilization reserves, the irreducible stocks of food products and petroleum products;

i) the creation and preservation of an insurance fund of documentation on armaments and military equipment, the most important civilian products, objects of increased risk, life support systems of the population and objects that are national treasure;

j) preparation of the financial, credit, tax systems and the money circulation system for the special regime of functioning during the period of mobilization, during the period of martial law and in wartime;

k) creating conditions for the work of all levels of government, including the creation of reserve control points;

m) organization of military registration;

m) booking citizens for the period of mobilization and for wartime;

o) organization of joint mobilization training of state authorities, local governments and organizations having mobilization tasks, as well as providing mobilization measures for the transfer of the Armed Forces and other troops to the organization and composition of wartime.

Military-political and military-technical cooperation of the Russian Federation with foreign countries

49. The Russian Federation carries out military-political and military-technical cooperation with foreign states (hereinafter referred to as military-political and military-technical cooperation), international, including regional, organizations based on foreign policy, economic expediency and
in accordance with federal legislation and international treaties of the Russian Federation.

50. Tasks of military-political cooperation:

a) strengthening international security and meeting international obligations of the Russian Federation;

b) the formation and development of allied relations with the CSTO member states and the CIS member states, friendly and partner relations with other states;

c) development of the negotiation process for the creation of regional security systems with the participation of the Russian Federation;

d) development of relations with international organizations for the prevention of conflict situations, the preservation and consolidation of peace in various regions, including with the participation of Russian military contingents in peacekeeping operations;

e) maintaining equal relations with interested states and international organizations to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery.

51. The main priorities of military-political cooperation:

a) with the Republic of Belarus:

coordination of activities in the development of national armed forces and the use of military infrastructure;

development and coordination of measures to maintain the defense capability of the Union State in accordance with the Military Doctrine of the Union State;

b) with the CSTO member states - the consolidation of efforts and the creation of collective forces in the interests of ensuring collective security and joint defense;

c) with other states - participants of the CIS - ensuring regional and international security, the implementation of peacekeeping activities;

d) with the SCO states - to coordinate efforts in the interests of countering new military dangers and military threats in the joint space, as well as creating the necessary regulatory framework;

e) with the UN and other international, including regional, organizations - involving representatives of the Armed Forces and other troops in the leadership of peacekeeping operations, in the process of planning and implementing training activities for peacekeeping operations, as well as participating in the development, coordination and implementation of international agreements on arms control and strengthening military security; increasing the participation of units and military personnel of the Armed Forces and other troops in peacekeeping operations.

52. The task of military-technical cooperation is the realization of the goals and basic principles of state policy in this area, which are defined by federal legislation.

53. The main directions of military-technical cooperation are determined by the relevant concepts approved by the President of the Russian Federation.

* * *

The provisions of the Military Doctrine may be updated with changes in the nature of military dangers and military threats, tasks in the field of military security and defense, as well as conditions for the development of the Russian Federation.

Comments

[tronin.maxim]

I read the article, I liked it. The doctrine accurately reflects the reality of today's world, as well as methods for solving various problems. (Especially with regard to NATO).

[Alexey Prikazchikov]

Yes, he always said the best analysts in the world are sitting in the General Staff and Russian special services, because when compiling this material, you just can not do without them.

[alatau_09]

Everything is laconic, concrete and accessible ... Only the "gifted" with stupidity will not understand,
but we hope to understand ...

[grizzlir]

Only the naive will believe the words.

[alatau_09]

Military doctrine is the authority of the state and a preemptive attack ...
You want to say that the Russian Federation does not have authority and its military doctrine is toothless?

[grizzlir]

I don’t want to say, I’m sure that the policy is doing more harm to the state every year. We managed to quarrel with everyone, even our closest allies, and frankly betrayed some. I'm afraid to even imagine what could happen if we take the same course .

[alatau_09]

specifically, what course do you offer for the Russian Federation and what do you dislike in the doctrine?

and I ask you to take into account some of those present here, I do not "minus" anyone, this is a forum for the exchange of opinions, but what I like - I note ...

[grizzlir]

A military doctrine based only on words, without a material basis, actually remains a word. It is necessary to really assess the state of the Russian Armed Forces, and not to throw loud populist slogans, plans and doctrines. You can write anything, paper can tolerate everything.

[alatau_09]

thus, the proposed policy course of the Russian Federation?

[grizzlir]

The course is to change the course for the collapse and reduction of the army, the course is to restore its own military-industrial complex rather than the purchase of weapons in the west, the course is to actually inject finance into the economy and not just Skolkovo, which has remained PR, but for this we need finances and finances we can only get if we drastically change the current course and nationalize the main areas of income for Russia, the extraction of natural resources and energy.

[alatau_09]

if you look at the Russian press, you will notice that the government of the Russian Federation listened to you in the field of restoring the country's industry, builds the armed forces and invests everything that it saves into the Army as much as the economy allows ...
and it’s too early to nationalize part of the economy, the time has not come ...
- restore order in domestic politics, including social,
- restore order in personnel policy, corruption,
- gain time for rearmament / from 39 to 41 years. we did not have enough time /,
- increase the welfare of the population ...
then it can be nationalized, but in such a way that the oligarchs themselves transfer property to the state, otherwise there will be no rise but chaos and civil war ..., the owners are also Russians and very rich ...
Skolkovo - this is the technology of the future without which there is no future of the same aircraft and state money there is not much there, it was conceived as attracting investment and as a fight against the leakage of golden goals from Russia and attracting strangers, and this is a lot of money ...

emotions are not the most faithful advisers in such a matter as state policy ...
with respect ...

[grizzlir]

Quote: alatau_09

then it can be nationalized, but in such a way that the oligarchs themselves transfer property to the state

Dear, do you really believe in what you wrote? And as for the fact that the time has not come to begin nationalization, the longer we spend with it, thereby losing precious time, the country is gradually slipping into the abyss. You can compare this with the treatment of the patient, the longer it takes with treatment disease, the less likely to be cured.

[Kashaverskiy]

Quote: grizzlir

And for this we need finances, and we can get finances only if we radically change the current course and nationalize the main areas of Russian income, natural resources and energy

I support you.
"As a reminder, since 1999, when Hugo Chavez became President of Venezuela, part of the Venezuelan oil enterprises have been nationalized as part of a campaign to combat poverty."
Hugo Chavez also decided to find money in the nationalization of enterprises, especially since this is THEIR (Venezuelans) money, and not robbed and taken from someone (as some countries do, for example, you can read what happened to the gold reserves of France in the second world, who and how helped them get rid of the heavy burden of gold - the closest "allies", whose names are known now).
Source - here
http://top.rbc.ru/economics/09/01/2012/632748.shtml

[Alexey Prikazchikov]

You know who I hate most stupid but even more stupid populists especially when they get to power.

[Patriot of Russia]

not in the eyebrow, but in the eye! even take the request of the Kosovo Serbs for citizenship.

[APASUS]

Serious work. External and internal dangers for the state are clearly described. I just don’t understand what guarantees the President demands from NATO, because according to this doctrine this is the main threat. Even fewer points are devoted to terrorism than NATO.

[abc4free]

about anything, blurry, no specifics.

[Nick]

And what specifics do you need? This is a military doctrine, not a plan for a military operation, where, when, by what forces.
In the doctrine, everything is specifically for the doctrine. Read the post by Alex Ukr. a little lower.

[AleksUkr]

"The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies, as well as in the event of aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons, when the very existence of the state is threatened . "------- Clearly and specifically. Let those who dare to attack Russia and its allies think about it.

[Ivan Krasov]

This provision of the Military Doctrine first of all lowers the nuclear safety threshold and is dangerous not only for a hypothetical adversary, but also for us.
In addition, it testifies that we are seriously behind in conventional weapons.

[Nick]

That's right, Ivan. Nuclear weapons in the modern world are the weapons of the poor. Compensating for the nuclear potential with conventional weapons is now beyond our power.

[Vladimir 70]

This paragraph of military doctrine applies to Pindos and company. That is, the presence of a heap of AUG does not give the right to bomb Russia’s territory with impunity.

[J_silver]

As they say and write about similar texts on the Internet - a lot of buffs, not assy ...
Although I personally read everything carefully ...
No specifics, much seems to be correct, but not backed up by concrete deeds ...

[Ivan Krasov]

"The military doctrine is based on the provisions of military theory and is aimed at its further development."
Good words, however, at the beginning of last year the NHS publicly stated that the military reform of the Armed Forces was carried out without a scientifically based Concept of Wars. What does it mean?
On the one hand, the VD allows for the possibility of a large-scale war and a lot of attention is paid to the mobilization training of the Armed Forces and the economy, but in practice we see a serious reduction in mobilization needs.

[sashalenovo]

The war of Russia most likely can only be with the fourth Reich.
Because all the best equipment, even now, is German and every year Germany is becoming stronger.

[VY16]

You yourself, then realized what he said? "fourth reich" damn it.

[kosmos84]

Germany - ONE OUR ALLY IN EUROPE

[sashalenovo]

Stalin thought so too.

[kosmos84]

THE DOMAIN MOMENT THEY ONLY DO NOT HAM TO US AND DO NOT BEND THE FINGERS = WE COMBINED WITH THE NEW VERMAKHT + INDIA AND DELIVER THE WHOLE WORLD ON THE KNE

[J_silver]

And on someone’s horseradish put on his knees? Will it make it easier for you?

[kosmos84]

THIS IS ON A CASE IF SOMEONE KULAKS WILL SCATCH (CHINA. BRITS. UWB AND OL PASTERS)

[Kashaverskiy]

Quote: sashalenovo

Stalin thought so too.

We can say that, by analogy with the current situation, Stalin believed that Hitler would not attack. And that the border units were removed, "so as not to provoke."
So, in this part, that Stalin thought so, I agree with you, and as for the part of the war with Germany, as you think, I cannot agree. Judging by the analogy I gave, the enemy is still the United States. Some of us, too, think that the United States will not attack, call them strategic "partners", disarm to please them, like Stalin disarmed the border units ... But a war is possible with Germany if they go along with the United States and we do not have to fight separately with the United States, but with the NATO bloc (after all, Germany is a NATO member).
If something goes wrong, correct me.

[kosmos84]

AGAINST US EVEN IN THE BLOC WILL NOT BE LIABLE (I THINK THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTRY IS NOT TEACHED BY AN AMERICIAN SAMPLE)

[sashalenovo]

The European Union is the economic empire of Germany. The US is getting worse every year, Germany is getting better. I do not think that the role of subordinate suits Germany. And the bankruptcy of some European countries will make them economic slaves of Germany.

[Aleksys2]

Well, let's just say that Stalin never thought Hitler:
1. Hitler Germany is our ally (We fought with the Germans since 36)
2. Hitler will not attack. The question was the timing of the attack.
No one removed the border units, the border guards took the battle at their outposts. Border cover troops, too, didn’t clean up anywhere, they took the battle on June 22.

[sashalenovo]

Maybe so. But we were not ready for war.

[Aleksys2]

It depends on what is called readiness for war ....

Quote: sashalenovo

Stalin thought so too

Now the situation is completely different. The Germans, too, had already lost sight of dancing to the Pindos pipe, and the stronger Russia becomes, the better relations between our countries will be.
I agree with the kosmos84. Germany, if not yet an ally, is the most friendly country in Europe for us. And when you consider that this is the first economy in Europe, then this is very good.

[maximus]

Quote: sashalenovo

The war of Russia most likely can only be with the fourth Reich.
Because all the best equipment, even now, is German and every year Germany is becoming stronger.

You are so mistaken that you are even mistaken about the depth of your error.

[sashalenovo]

German fascism, Chechen banditry, theft of cygan, etc. - it is not treated. As the priests say generic sin, the program is at the genetic level.

[sashalenovo]

The share of German weapons in the world market reached 11%. Germany took third place in arms exports after the United States (market share - 30%) and Russia (23%). The main buyers of German weapons are Turkey, Greece and South Africa, reports Lenta.ru
http://inukr.net/foreign/25885-germaniya-udvoila-yeksport-vooruzhenij.html

[J_silver]

In order to know who your allies or enemies are, you must at least have an ideology, but today there is no ideology in Russia ...
What are the goals of Russia? The well-being of the people through the development of their state? Something is not noticeable, and it looks rather weak on the final goal ...
Ensuring the energy needs of Western Europe, China or someone else? I deeply had in mind such a goal ...

[grizzlir]

Quote: J_Silver

In order to know who your allies or enemies are, you must at least have an ideology, but today there is no ideology in Russia ...

You are wrong, in Russia there is only one ideology, maximizing profits at any cost and at the lowest cost. And the country's defense does not even remain in second or third place, but at the end of the list of tasks. Because profit gives financial welfare, and with finances you can get to any country in the world and not think about the country where this capital was earned.

[dred]

Naive. Nobody puts us in a penny. And we have already lost our last friends.

[Aleksey67]

dred, I don’t know you, but I’m minus you for all your Dumb and ONE-LINE posts, I understand that I am acting as Don Quixote, but life goes on. When a person understands participation in the portal only as epaulettes - this is DIAGNOSIS. in my humble opinion it is necessary to communicate with smart people, with contactees (a stupid word, but answers komentu) according to interests. Dreadlock got your SLAG in ALL topics.
PS I urge everyone else to join the boycott of such CROPS

[recruit]

And they want to turn it into reality after their military reform. This is more like a fantasy.

[Kashaverskiy]

Quote: grizzlir

. And for this we need finances and we can get finances only if we radically change the current course and nationalize the main areas of income of Russia, the extraction of natural resources and energy resources.

I support you.
"As a reminder, since 1999, when Hugo Chavez became President of Venezuela, part of the Venezuelan oil enterprises have been nationalized as part of a campaign to combat poverty."
Hugo Chavez also decided to find money in the nationalization of enterprises, especially since this is THEIR (Venezuelans) money, and not robbed and taken from someone (as some countries do, for example, you can read what happened to the gold reserves of France in the second world, who and how helped them get rid of the heavy burden of gold - the closest "allies", whose names are known now).
Source - here
http://top.rbc.ru/economics/09/01/2012/632748.shtml

[Sleptsoff]

The sense of this doctrine if we have long been won from the inside, as planned, made a raw materials appendage for the rest of the world. Well, they’ll attack Iran, what will we do? Let's run to complain to the UN again? Even in Georgia, we did not finish the matter.

[BAT]

Did we have friends? In politics, as well as in war, there are no friends. There are only enemies, allies and neutrals. So, it is not surprising that our allies of yesterday became the worst enemies,
And sworn enemies become our allies. This is politics, gentlemen. It has always been and will be.

[Farkash]

Probably, such documents of all states are similar, like twins - a minimum of specifics, well-known truths, clothed in the most correct formulations, information content is extremely low, 99% is water. This is understandable - the document is not so much a military as a diplomatic one, but in diplomacy any comma can cause an international conflict. Personally, two points aroused my interest.
First, the possibility of Russia's use of nuclear weapons first is clearly spelled out in response to aggression that threatens the existence of the state. However, nothing is said about a preventive nuclear strike on the territory of a likely enemy, and about this, in due time, a lot of copies were broken.
The second - priorities in military-political cooperation with other countries are unequivocally set: Belarus - CSTO - CIS - SCO - UN.
The UN and "other international and regional organizations" are in the last place, there is something to think about.

[Fireman]

Russia's military doctrine is 10 years behind the US and NATO. Russia is no longer a global player, such as the Kremlin thinks it is, but it is a solitary fighting machine that does nothing and does not depend on it.

[sergeant]

13. Features of modern military conflicts:

a) the unpredictability of their occurrence;

Well ... The fact of the collapse of the SVR even in the Military Doctrine was recorded!

[Nechai]

Quote: kosmos84

I THINK THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTRY IS NOT TEACHED BY THE AMERICIAN SAMPLE

In Japan, a survey of young people was conducted: MORE THAN HALF of the respondents are SURE that the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagosaki were carried out by RUSSIANS ... It is not easy to “rewrite” history out of sports interest ...

[fktrctqxbr]

Ohhhh guys, it smells like kerosene.
I suggest to sit still and think more with your head.

[sergeant]

Slowly thoughtfully I read on ... The document is really interesting and important. But it raises a number of questions.

27. The main tasks of the Armed Forces and other troops in peacetime:
...
i) ... the construction and overhaul of roads of military importance;

As I understand it, the main federal highways are of defense significance ... The same route is Chita-Khabarovsk ... It turns out that their construction and overhaul is the task of the armed forces in peacetime? I’m embarrassed to ask, maybe the budget of the Moscow Region and the money for this are included, since they are prescribed in the Doctrine?

in the same paragraph 27

p) participation in the protection of public order, ensuring public safety;

Well, who said that the army is not entrusted with "police functions"? The Doctrine directly says that in peacetime it is quite possible to restore order with tanks! :)

[Aleksey67]

CAN MINUS, BUT:
Russia needs a defense doctrine in terms of closing all borders in the nipple system, on the contrary (leave freely, but with verification (money, position type clearance, well, specifics)), and entry is strictly controlled - tourists are free, but with control (so that they don’t stay), labor reserves when necessary, investments only in enterprises approved by the government (natural resources excluded).
Based on this, and the order of armaments.

[sergeant]

Alexei, what you offer does not apply to the Military Doctrine, but to migration policy ...

PS: I will not minus :)

[Aleksey67]

sergeant,
I mean, we have a defensive policy (a lot of land, a lot of resources), defensive weapons (air defense, strategic missile forces), short-range ships with the connection to the detention of poachers,

[kosmos84]

from me + everything is correct

[LiRoy]

For some reason, the doctrine contains no words about teaching everyone and all of democracy. How else could one explain the purchase of the French Mistrals?

[sergeant]

Mistrals are purchased for Pacific Fleet, and in fact, for the defense of the islands, more precisely, their repulsing after a sudden capture by the Japanese ... The capture itself is now difficult to prevent, due to geographical features and the balance of forces.
But this is a separate topic for discussion.

[sergeant]

I read further ...
Still, there are too many common phrases and model declarations ... If you leave only that, in essence, then there will be a maximum of half.
There are also "funny" moments that reflect the harsh financial reality, for example:

39. Tasks of the militaryeconomic defense support:

a) the achievement of the level of financial and material and technical support of the military organization, sufficient to accomplish the tasks assigned to it;

Those. there should be enough money to have enough for everything ... Bravo!
... but the following paragraph:

b) optimization of defense expenditures, rational planning and distribution of financial and material resources allocated for the provision of a military organization, increasing the efficiency of their use;

If someone does not know, in the Russian bureaucratic language the term "Optimization" means abbreviation.
But the next point is again on the positive:

c) timely and complete resource support for the implementation of plans (programs) for the construction and development of the Armed Forces and other troops, their use, combat, special and mobilization training and other needs of a military organization;

Does it mean all the same full support, not "optimized"? But no!

d) concentration of scientific forces, financial and material and technical resources to create conditions for quality equipment (re-equipment) of the Armed Forces and other troops;

Again, translated from bureaucratic into Russian, "concentration of resources" means that not everyone will be given money ... there will not be several design bureaus, several types of weapons, etc. Let's "concentrate" on one tank, one aircraft, etc.
In general, it is not clear ... some kind of "Jewish" section on economics turned out ...

[Strabo]

I draw attention to 22 points

The Russian Federation reserves the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction against it and (or) its allies

The decision on the use of nuclear weapons is made by the President of the Russian Federation.
Who else can apply in the absence of the president? Why is this case not provided? Does this document have the force of law? Where was this decree signed? The number of this decree? I strongly doubt that this is a legal document. If so, then very illiterate.

[Ascetic]

Decree of the President of the Russian Federation of February 5, 2010 N 146 "On the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation"

[marauder]

I did not understand something. This is "Voennoye Obozreniye" or we will re-publish laws and government statements here.

I can see this document on the official website.
One could understand if it is fresh, but here is February 5, 2010.

or on the site http://kremlin.ru you can’t comment.

ps I am not against the doctrine and support with both hands.
(this is not to think that I am an enemy of the people.)

[Ascetic]

If compared with the previous VD of the Russian Federation, then in my opinion the following things can be distinguished:
1. The military doctrine provides for an aerospace defense system
2. Recognition that any military conflict can develop into a nuclear
3. Dangers for the Russian Federation in the Military Doctrine called the expansion of NATO and missile defense
4. The new Military Doctrine provides for the use of the RF Armed Forces abroad
There is also a secret application, “Fundamentals of State Policy in the Field of Nuclear Deterrence,” where the program for the development of the strategic nuclear forces of Russia is apparently laid down, the results of which we gradually observe and feel with our aircraft

[dred]

Quote: Aleksey67

dred, I don’t know you, but I’m minus you for all your Dumb and ONE-LINE posts, I understand that I am acting as Don Quixote, but life goes on. When a person understands participation in the portal only as epaulettes - this is DIAGNOSIS. in my humble opinion it is necessary to communicate with smart people, with contactees (a stupid word, but answers komentu) according to interests. Dreadlock got your SLAG in ALL topics.
PS I urge everyone else to join the boycott of such CROPS

I have never seen utter nonsense in my life. Besides, you will see a dumb man in the mirror.

[_CAMOBAP_]

It would be logical to believe that the reform of the Armed Forces will be carried out taking into account the provisions set out in the military doctrine (VD). And what is in practice? But in fact - at least in relation to the Ground Forces (Land Forces) - one with the other does not fit well. So, in the VD one of the threats - quite justifiably - named the possibility of regional military conflicts. The ground forces of the states participating in such a conflict - wars, in fact - should be able to solve operational and strategic tasks. However, the transition to the brigade principle of the organization of ground forces contradicts this. The brigade - whatever you call it, even light, even heavy - even super-heavy is sharpened for solving tactical problems. And a division - a compound designed to solve operational-tactical tasks - will not work out of three or four brigades. But from its composition for the solution of individual tasks, the division can easily select a regiment, if necessary, strengthen it so that no brigade was standing nearby. In general, this is just, so, questions lying on the surface - in reality there are still many problems that have never been discussed anywhere. As an example - the famous "Iskander", operational-tactical, by the way. And, accordingly, he solves the tasks in the interests of the army, well, the division - in case of emergency. Are they going to reinforce the brigades? One installation per brigade? With the same success, you can optimize the organizational structure of the ground forces "further and deeper" - why not switch to the battalion or company principle of manning?
Some points, of course, have been deliberately exaggerated - but the essence does not change. I don’t know if the divisions will remain in the SV, if so, how many, in what directions, what composition, etc. And I also have no fundamental objections to the brigades in the SV — the optimal balance is important. It was high time that the same airborne forces were completely transferred to brigades - already in the days of the USSR, almost the entire military aviation was needed to land one airborne landing force.
PS: You can fight with brigades with Georgia, but if - God forbid - something more serious?

[Victor]

In general, a military doctrine is a document announcing to the whole world the vision of Russia as foreign policy threats to itself and its allies, and warning potential enemies what and at what level will be implemented within the state (bloc, union) to prevent and eliminate these threats, and it also sets the direction of development of the military-industrial complex and the composition of arms and the organizational structure of the country's armed forces. Roughly speaking, this document is a document of intent and should not have strict specialization and detail for each declared intention. To do this, there are by-laws and decisions of the Supreme Commander and the government, determining the specification of a particular direction. The fact that the doctrine was posted on the site is very good. The site is called military review, and the doctrine is military. To everyone who is dissatisfied, I want to remind you that war is a continuation of politics by violent means, therefore any political or legislative news related to peace and war on the site is necessary and should be discussed. For whom only weapons are of interest, there are a number of specialized sites and publications.
By itself, this military doctrine quite accurately and straightforwardly places all the points over I in the system of the modern world order and clearly reflects the directions of development of our armed forces. You cannot demand more from military doctrine.

[UI-Spb]

Doctrine is a vector in which Russian military force should develop. Based on it, other components will also develop. It will work, it won’t work - this is gossip for lovers! The direction is given, so there is something to strive for! By screws!

[Bad thing]

Good doctrine! It is a pity that war doctrines alone will not win, especially if you have to fight not with crumbs like Georgia ... and even when the assets and spare airfields of the Russian "elite" in the hostile west together with children :) under the protection of the hostile NATO bloc :))

[755962]

Compliance with the main messages of the doctrine lies entirely with the guarantor of the constitution. Most likely it will be observed without any BUT, knowing who will be next after March 4 ...

[STARIK]

"It was smooth on paper" ... but what in reality? The RF Armed Forces (all types) are simply destroyed by government agencies. Ask any mid-level officer about this.

[Strabo]

Those who minus, then you are for an illiterate document? and it doesn’t matter to you that the most important points are not taken into account there. Now it’s clear why Russia in ... not because of people like you. I can only advise you to read carefully and think about the consequences of such a document.

[Andriuha077]

Thanks, re-read. There are lots of gaps. Apparently, the internal enemy is strong.
A couple.
II. 8. j) the spread of international terrorism;
He was supported by the surrender of Libya, the perpetrators to account.
II. 9. Major internal military hazards
As modestly, only three letters were enough. The main thing is not reflected, the defeat of the foundations of the state through such an attitude to strategic sectors, the guilty again walk and live.