Project 26 and 26 bis cruisers. Part of 3. Main caliber

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Of course, the most discussed topic in the design of domestic light cruisers of 26 and 26-bis projects is their weaponry and, first of all, the main caliber. Not only did it give rise to numerous disputes about the classification of cruisers (light or heavy?), The guns themselves were considered to be a masterpiece of artillery, unparalleled in the world, they were declared a deafening failure of Soviet gunsmiths, from which can not even get to the peninsula of Crimea.

So, I.F. Tsvetkov in his work The Guards Cruiser Krasny Kavkaz tells about the prototype guns of the Kirov-type cruisers in the most superlative degree:

“The design office of the Bolshevik plant (formerly the Obukhov Marine Plant Office) has developed an 180-mm gun with a barrel length of 60 caliber. It was the first weapon after the revolution of the new generation of naval artillery. It had unique ballistic characteristics and was far superior to foreign analogues. Suffice it to say that with the mass of the 97,5 projectile and the initial speed of 920 m / s, the maximum firing range of the gun reached more than 40 km (225 cable). "


But AB Shirokorad in "Battle for the Black Sea" speaks of 180-mm guns much more derogatory:

“A group of gunners offered to create an ultra-long 180-mm ship gun. The 180-mm gun fired at a distance of up to 38 km with shells weighing 97 kg, and the armor-piercing projectile contained about 2 kg of explosive, and the high-explosive - about 7 kg. It is clear that such a projectile could not inflict serious damage to the enemy cruiser, not to mention the battleships. And the worst thing is that it was only possible to get into a moving battleship, and even more so into a cruiser from a distance above 150 cable (27,5 km), only by accident. By the way, the “General firing tables” (OTS) for 180-mm guns were calculated only up to the 189 cable distance (34,6 km), while the median deviation in range was over 180 m, i.e. no less cable. Thus, from the firing tables, it follows that the red soldiers from 180-mm guns were not going to shoot even at coastal targets. The probability of dispersion in range was over 220 m, and the lateral - over 32 m, and then theoretically. And in practice, we didn’t have fire control devices (PUS) to shoot at such distances. ”


Thus, some authors admire the power and record range of a Soviet gun, while others (critics, most of them) point out the following drawbacks:

1. Rapid barrel wear and, as a result, low durability of the latter.
2. Low shooting accuracy.
3. Low rate of fire, by virtue of which the 180-mm cannon is inferior even to 152-mm artillery systems in fire performance.
4. Low survivability of the three-gun installation due to the placement of all three guns in one cradle.

In recent years, it has become widely believed that the aforementioned deficiencies made our 180-mm guns almost inefficient. Without pretending to the ultimate truth, we will try to figure out how justified these claims are to the main caliber of our cruisers.

Main weapon Each 26 or 26-bis cruisers made up nine 180-mm / 57 B-1-P cannons and, to begin with, tell you history the emergence of this artillery system as most sources today provide it.

The B-1-P was a “descendant”, or rather, an upgrade of the X-NUMX-mm / 180 cannon, the B-60-K, developed in 1. Then the national design idea swept aside at a lot. First, it was decided to get a record of ballistics in order to shoot a 1931 kg projectile with an initial velocity in 100 m / s. Secondly, it was planned to achieve a very high rate of fire - 1000 rds / min, which was required to ensure loading at any angle of elevation.

The large-caliber guns of those times did not have such luxury, charging at a fixed angle, i.e. after the shot, the gun should have been lowered to the loading angle, loaded, given the desired sight again and only then fired, and all this, of course, took a lot of time. Charging at any elevation angle made it possible to shorten the reload cycle and increase the rate of fire, but for this, the designers had to pile up a rammer on the swinging part of the gun and provide for a very bulky ammunition supply structure. In addition, it was decided to switch from cartridge loading to split-shell loading, as was customary for large German guns fleet, which allowed the use of a wedge shutter, which also reduces the recharge time. But at the same time, when designing the B-1-K, there were also very archaic decisions - the barrel was made fastened, i.e. did not have a liner, which is why after his execution it was required to change the body of the gun. In addition, the barrel was not purged, due to which powder gases entered the tower, a rangefinder was not installed, and there were other disadvantages.



The first experience of the development of the domestic marine medium-caliber artillery system turned out to be negative, since the parameters specified in the design were not achieved. So, to ensure the required ballistics, the pressure in the barrel should have been 4 000 kg / sq. cm, but steel that could withstand such pressure could not be created. As a result, the pressure in the barrel had to be reduced to 3 200 kg / sq. cm, which provided 97,5-kg projectile initial speed 920 m / s. However, with such a decrease, the barrel survivability was extremely low - on the order of 50-60 shots. The practical rate of fire with great difficulty brought to 4 shots / min. but in general, neither the B-1-K nor the single-gun turret in which this artillery system was mounted on the cruiser Krasny Kavkaz were considered successful.

The fleet needed a more advanced gun and made it on the basis of the B-1-K, but now its design was more conservative, abandoning most of the innovations that did not justify themselves. The gun was charged at a fixed angle in 6,5 hail, from a wedge gate and separate sleeve loading returned to the cap and piston gate. Since the power of the gun, compared with the initial requirements, had to be reduced from planned 1000 m / s for 100 kg of projectile to 920 m / s for 97,5-kg of projectile, the barrel length was reduced from 60 to 57 calibers. The resulting gun was called the B-1-P (the last letter meant the type of bolt “K” - wedge, “P” - piston), and at first the new artillery system did not have any other differences with the B-1-K: for example, its barrel also performed bonded.

But soon B-1-P underwent a series of upgrades. At first, the USSR acquired equipment for the production of liners for naval artillery from Italy, and in 1934, the first 180-mm lined gun was already tested at the test site, and later the fleet ordered only such cannons. But even with lined B-1Ps, the barrel survivability grew only slightly, reaching 60-70 shots, against 50-60 shots B-1-K. This was unacceptable, and then the vitality of the trunks was adjusted by increasing the depth of the rifling. The deep-rifled liner now held up not 60-70, but whole 320 shots.

It would seem that an acceptable indicator of survivability was achieved, but it was not there: it turns out that Soviet sources do not mention one very interesting detail: this vitality was not at all provided by the depth of the rifling, but ... by changing the criteria for barrel wear. For B-1-K and B-1-K with fine cutting, the barrel was considered shot if the projectile lost 4% of its original speed, but for lined deep-cut barrels this figure was increased to 10%! It turns out that in actual fact nothing much has changed, and the desired indicator was simply “stretched” by an increase in the wear criterion. And given Shirokorad’s categorical statements about the extremely low accuracy of our guns at large distances (“getting into a moving battleship or cruiser ... can only be completely random”), readers interested in the history of the Russian fleet had a completely unattractive picture in which, what is most regrettable, very easy to believe.

It turned out that the developers of the B-1-K and B-1-P in the pursuit of records overloaded the cannon with an excessively powerful charge and heavy projectile, the artillery system simply could not withstand the loads for it for a long time (such guns are called over-powered) . From this, the trunk was subjected to extremely rapid burnout, as a result of which the accuracy and precision of the fire was quickly lost. At the same time, the gun also did not differ in accuracy in the “non-shot” state, and taking into account the fact that the accuracy dropped after several dozen shots ... And if we also remember that three barrels in one cradle were too close to each other, which caused a volley on The projectiles from the neighboring barrels, which sent the correct trajectory to it, hit the last flight of the projectiles ... What is the pursuit of “faster, higher, stronger”, so characteristic of the 30 of the last century, which once again resulted in solid points iratelstvo and fraud. And the sailors got a completely useless weapon.

Well, let's go from afar. Here is AB Shirokorad writes: "The median deviation in range was over 180 m." What is the median deviation and where does it come from? Recall the basics of artillery case. If you hover a gun at some point on the ground and, without changing the sight, make some shots, the shells fired from it will not go one after the other to the aiming point (like Robin Hood’s arrows split the other in the center of the target) fall some distance away from her. This is due to the fact that each shot is strictly individual: the mass of the projectile differs by a fraction of a percent, the quantity, quality and temperature of the powder in the charge vary slightly, the sight gets lost in thousandths of a degree, and gusts affect the flying projectile even a little - just different than the previous one - and eventually the projectile will fall a little further or a little closer, a little to the left or a little to the right from the aiming point.

The area in which the shells fall is called the ellipse of dispersion. The center of the ellipse is the aiming point where the gun was aimed. And this ellipse of dispersion has its own laws.

Project 26 and 26 bis cruisers. Part of 3. Main caliber


If the ellipse is divided into eight parts along the direction of the projectile, then 50% of all the projectiles will fall into two parts that directly adjoin the aiming point. This law works for any artillery system. Of course, if you release 20 shells from a cannon without changing the sight, it may well turn out that the two specified parts of the ellipse will fall on 10, and 9 or 12 shells, but the more projectiles will be released, the closer to the 50% will be the final result. One of these parts is called the median deviation. That is, if the median deviation at a distance of 18 kilometers from a gun is 100 meters, it means that if you precisely point the gun at the target located in 18 km from the gun, then 50% of the shells dropped at the 200 meter segment, the center which will be the aiming point.

The larger the median deviation, the larger the ellipse of dispersion, the smaller the median deviation, the greater the chances of the projectile hitting the target. But what does its size depend on? Of course, the accuracy of the gun, which, in turn, affect the quality of the manufacture of guns and shells. Still - from the distance of fire: if you do not delve into some nuances that are unnecessary for a non-specialist, then the greater the distance of the fire, the lower the accuracy and the greater the median deviation. Accordingly, the median deviation is a very good indicator characterizing the accuracy of the artillery system. And in order to understand what the B-1-P was in terms of accuracy, it would be nice to compare its median deviations with the guns of foreign powers ... but it turned out to be quite difficult.

The fact is that in the usual references such data is not found, it is very specialized information. Thus, for the Soviet artillery systems, the median deviations of a specific gun are contained in a special document “Basic firing tables”, which was used by gunners to control the fire. Some "Tables" can be found on the Internet, and the author of this article managed to get the "Tables" of domestic 180-mm guns.



But with foreign naval guns, the situation is much worse - perhaps somewhere in the network there is such data, but, alas, it was not possible to find them. So with what to compare B-1-P?

In the history of the national fleet there were artillery systems that never caused any complaints from naval historians. Such, for example, was the 203-mm / 50 gun, on the basis of which, in fact, was designed B-1-K. Or the famous Obukhov 305-mm / 52, which armed with the battleships of the types "Sevastopol" and "Empress Maria" - it is widely considered an exemplary killing machine. No one has ever reproached the said artillery systems for the excessive dispersion of projectiles, and the data on their median deviations are in Goncharov's "Course of naval tactics" (1932 g).


Note: shooting distances are specified in cable and converted into meters for easy perception. Mean deviations in documents are indicated in fathoms, and also, for convenience, are converted to meters (1 fathom = 6 ft, ​​1 ft = 30,4 cm)

Thus, we see that the domestic B-1-P is much more accurate than the "royal" cannons. In fact, our 180-mm artillery system on the 90 kbt beats more accurately than the 305-mm dreadnought cannon - on the 70 kbt, and even with the 203-mm / 50 - no comparison at all! Of course, progress does not stand still, and perhaps (since the author could not find data on the median dispersion of imported guns) artillery from other countries shot even more accurately, but if the accuracy of 305-mm guns (with far worse fire control systems) was considered sufficient for defeats of surface targets, then why would we consider a much more accurate 180-mm gun "stupid"?

And those fragmentary data on the accuracy of foreign guns, which are still in the network, do not confirm the hypothesis of poor accuracy of the B-1-P. For example, there is data on the German field 105-mm gun - its median deviation at a distance of 16 km is 73 m (for B-1-P at this distance - 53 m), and at the limit for her 19 km the German has 108 m (B -1-P - 64 m). Of course, it is impossible to compare the land “weave” with a naval gun of almost twice the caliber so “in the forehead”, but still these figures can give some idea.

The attentive reader will note that the “Main firing tables” I have provided are compiled in the 1948 year, i.e. after the war. What if by that time in the USSR they had learned to make some better liners than the pre-war ones? But in fact, the strenuous-combat shooting tables were compiled on the basis of the actual shooting in September of 1940 G .:



In addition, this screenshot clearly confirms that the “Tables” used not calculated, but actual values ​​based on the results of the firing.

But what about the low survivability of our guns? After all, our guns are re-forced, their trunks burn out for several dozen shots, the accuracy of fire quickly falls and then the median deviations exceed their tabular values ​​... Stop. And why did we decide that our 180-mm guns had little survivability?

“But how ?! - the reader exclaims. - After all, our designers, in pursuit of record-breaking characteristics, managed to bring the pressure in the barrel channel right up to 3 200 kg / sq. see why the trunks quickly burned out! ”

But what is interesting is that the German 203-mm / 60 gun model SkL / 60 Mod.C 34, which armed the Admiral Hipper-type cruiser, had exactly the same pressure - 3 200 kg / sq. see It was another monster firing 122 kg shells with an initial speed of 925 m / s. However, no one has ever called him recaptured or inaccurate, on the contrary - the gun was considered to be a very prominent representative of average caliber naval artillery. At the same time, this gun convincingly demonstrated its qualities in a battle in the Danish Strait. The heavy cruiser "Prince Eugen", firing at a distance from 70 to 100 KB for 24 minutes, achieved at least one hit in the "Hood" and four hits in the "Prince of Wells." At the same time, the barrel survivability (according to various data) ranged from 500 to 510 shots.

You can, of course, say that German industry was better than the Soviet and allowed to produce better-quality weapons. But not much! Interestingly, according to some sources (Yuren V. “The death of the battle cruiser“ Hood ”), the median deviation of the German 203-mm cannon roughly corresponds to (and even slightly higher) that of the Soviet 180-mm artillery system.

Depth of rifling? Yes, the B-1-K rifles have 1,35 mm, while the B-1-P has whole 3,6 mm, and such growth seems to be suspicious. But here's the thing: the German 203-mm / 60 had a depth of rifling 2,4 mm, i.e. significantly more than the B-1-K, although almost one and a half times less than the B-1-P. Those. the increase in the depth of the rifling is to a certain extent justified, since for their performance characteristics of the B-1-K they were simply underestimated (although, perhaps, they are somewhat overestimated in the B-1-P). You can still remember that the 152-mm gun B-38 (the accuracy of which, again, no one ever complained) had a depth of rifling 3,05 mm

But what about the increase in the execution criteria for guns? After all, there is an absolutely exact fact: for the B-1-K 100%, barrel wear was considered when the projectile speed dropped by 4%, and for the B-1-P - the speed drop was allowed as much in 10%! So, all the same eyewash?

Let me offer you, dear readers, a hypothesis that does not claim to be the absolute truth (the author of the article is not an expert in artillery), but explains well the increase in wear criteria for the B-1-P.

First. The author of this article tried to find out what criteria for the execution of guns were used abroad - this would help to understand what is wrong with the B-1-P. However, such information could not be found. But L. Goncharov in his work “The course of naval tactics. Artillery and Armor »1932 g, which generally speaking served as an artillery training tool, indicates a single criterion for the survivability of a weapon -“ the loss of stability by a projectile ”. In other words, the gun cannot be shot so much that its projectile starts to tumble in flight, because in this case, if it hits, it can either collapse before the explosion, or the fuse will not work. It is also clear that one should expect a breakdown of armor from an armor-piercing projectile if it hits the target with its “head” part, and does not plop about it flat.

Second. By itself, the criterion of wear of the barrel of Soviet cannons looks utterly surprising. Well, the speed fell on 10% of the projectile, so what? Is it difficult to foresee an appropriate amendment when shooting? Yes, not at all - the same “General firing tables” give a whole set of amendments for each percent drop in the velocity of projectiles, from one to ten. Accordingly, it is possible to determine the corrections for both 12- and 15-percent drops, there would be a desire. But if we assume that the change in velocity of the projectile itself is not critical, but with a corresponding drop in speed (4% for B-1-K and 10% for B-1-P) something happens that interferes with the normal firing of the gun - then everything becomes clear.

The third. At B-1-P the depth of rifling is increased. What for? Why do we need rifle gun? The answer is simple - a projectile “twisted” in cuts has greater stability in flight, better range and accuracy.

Fourth. What happens when a shot is made? The shell is made of very strong steel, over which is installed the so-called "belt" of mild steel. Mild steel "pressed" into the grooves and spins the projectile. Thus, the barrel “in depth” of the rifling interacts with the soft steel of the “shell belt”, while the “over the top” rifle interacts with the very hard steel of the projectile itself.



The fifth. Based on the foregoing, we can assume that when firing from a cannon, the depth of rifling decreases. Just because the "top" is erased on hard steel of the projectile faster than the "bottom" - on soft.

And if our assumption is true, then the “casket” with the increase in the depth of rifling opens very simply. The shallow rifts of the B-1-K were erased very quickly, and already with a drop in speed of 4%, the projectile ceased to “twist” with them sufficiently, and this is expressed in the fact that the projectile ceased to “behave” in flight as it should be. Perhaps he was losing stability, or sharply dropped accuracy. A tool with deeper cuts retains the ability to adequately “twist” the projectile even if its initial velocity drops in 4%, and in 5% and in 8%, and so on up to 10%. Thus, no reduction in survivability criteria for B-1-P as compared to B-1-P did not occur.

Of course, all of the above, although it explains very well the reason for the increase in the depth of the rifling, and the reduction in the survivability criteria for the B-1-P cannon, it is still nothing more than a hypothesis, and a person very far from artillery.

An interesting nuance. Reading the sources about the Soviet cruisers, it can be concluded that the shot (that is, the projectile and charge) in which the 97,5 kg projectile was given the initial speed in 920 m / s is the main for our 180-mm guns. But it is not. The initial speed in 920 m / s was provided by a reinforced-combat charge, a mass of 37,5 kg, but apart from it there was a combat (mass -30 kg, accelerated 97,5 kg projectile to a speed of 800 m / s), lower-combat (28 kg, 720 m / s ) and reduced (18 kg, 600 m / s). Of course, with a decrease in the initial speed, the barrel survivability grew, but the armor penetration and firing range fell. The latter, however, is not so significant - if the strenuous combat provided the ultimate range of fire at 203 kb, then the main battle charge was “thrown” by the 180-mm cannon at 156 kbt, which was more than enough for any naval combat.

I should note that in some sources it is indicated that the survivability of the barrel of the 180-mm cannon B-1-P in the 320 shots is provided by using a combat charge rather than a reinforced combat one. But, apparently, this is a mistake. According to the "Instructions for determining the wear of 180 / 57 channels of naval artillery cannons" 1940 g (RGAVMF P-891 Foundation, No. 1294, op.5 d.2150), as quoted on the Internet, 90 battle-fighting V = 100 / s or 320 for combat charge (920 m / s) ". Unfortunately, the author of the article does not have the opportunity to verify the accuracy of the quotation, since he does not have a copy of the “Instructions” (or the opportunity to visit the Russian State Archive of the Navy). But I want to note that such data correlate much better with the survivability indicators of the German 640-mm gun than the idea that with equal pressure inside the barrel (800 203 kg / sq. Cm), the Soviet 3-mm had the vitality of all 200 shots against 180 -70 from German.

In general, it can be stated that the accuracy of the Soviet B-1-P cannon is quite sufficient for confident destruction of naval targets at any reasonable range of artillery combat, and although questions on its survivability remain, most likely the publications of recent years have greatly thickened paint on this the issue.

We turn to the towers. The Kirov and Maxim Gorky-class cruisers each carried three MK-3-180 three-gun turrets. The latter are traditionally blamed for the “single-faced” design - all three guns of the B-1-P were placed in a single cradle (like the Italian cruisers, the only difference is that the Italians used two-turrets). There are two claims to this location:

1. Low survivability installation. When knocking out the cradle, all three guns become inefficient, while for an installation with individual guidance of each gun, damage to one of the cradles would disable only one gun.
2. Because of the small distance between the trunks during a salvo firing, the projectile that just left its barrel is exposed to gases from neighboring barrels and “knocks” its trajectory, which is why the dispersion greatly increases and the accuracy of shooting is lost.

Let us see what our designers have lost and what they acquired, using the “Italian” scheme.

Just want to say that the claim about the survivability of the installation is somewhat contrived. Theoretically, of course, it is possible that one or two tower guns fail, and the rest continue to shoot, but in practice this almost never happened. Perhaps the only such case is the damage to the turret of the battle cruiser Lion, when the left gun failed and the right one continued to fire. In other cases (when one turret gun fired, and the other did not) the damage is usually not connected in any way with a vertical pickup device (for example, a direct hit was broken off a piece of the barrel). Having received similar damage to one weapon, the other guns MK-3-180 could well continue the battle.

The second claim is much more weighty. Indeed, having the distance between the axes of the guns only 82, see MK-3-180 could not conduct salvo firing without some loss in accuracy. But here there are two important nuances.

Firstly, the fact is that shooting by full salvoes before World War I was practically never practiced. This was due to the peculiarities of the conduct of fire fighting - in order to ensure effective zeroing at least four guns were needed in the salvo. But if more of them were firing, then this helped little the artillery officer of the firing ship. Accordingly, a ship with 8-9 guns of the main caliber usually fought with half-salts, each of which involved 4-5 guns. That is why, in the opinion of naval artillerymen, the most optimal layout of the GK guns was four two-gun turrets - two in the bow and the stern. In this case, the ship could shoot at the bow and stern with full volleys of the bow (stern) towers, and during firing on board - with half-salts, each of the four towers firing from one gun (the second one was reloading at that time). The situation was similar in the Soviet fleet, so the Kirov could well fire, alternating four and five-guns


Note: shooting trunks are highlighted in red.


At the same time, the distance between the barrels of firing guns increased significantly and was 162 cm. This, of course, did not reach 190 cm for 203-mm towers of Japanese heavy cruisers, and even more so - to 216 cm of the Admiral Hipper-type cruiser towers, but still was not an extremely small value.

In addition, it should be borne in mind that it is still not very clear how much fire accuracy decreases during salvo firing with the "one-man" placement of guns. Usually, the monstrous dispersion of the guns of the Italian fleet is remembered on this occasion, but according to many researchers, it’s not so much the blame for placing all the barrels in one cradle as the ugly quality of Italian projectiles and charges that differed greatly in weight. If high-quality projectiles were used (shells made in Germany were tested), the dispersion turned out to be quite acceptable.

But not only Italian and Soviet tower installations put all the tools in one cradle. The Americans also sinned - the guns of the first four series of heavy cruisers (Pensacola, Northampton, Portland, New Orleans types) and even some of the battleships (Nevada and Pennsylvania types) were also mounted in one cradle. However, the Americans came out of this position, placing automatic time-delay machines in the towers - now the guns were fired with a delay of one hundredth of a second, which significantly increased the accuracy of the shooting. "On the Internet," the author came up with allegations that such gadgets were installed on the MK-3-180, however, no documentary evidence was found for this.

But still, according to the author, "one-man" tower installations have another significant drawback. The fact is that in the Soviet fleet (and not only in it, the method described further was known during the time of the first world war) there existed such a concept as shooting by a “ledge”. Without going into unnecessary details, we note that earlier, when shooting with a “fork,” every next salvo (half-salvo) was made after observing the fall of the projectiles of the previous one and making the corresponding sight adjustment, i.e between volleys a lot of time passed. But when shooting the “ledge” half of the guns, one sight was given, the second half was slightly modified, with an increased (or reduced) range. Then he made two half-heads with a difference of a few seconds. As a result, an artillery officer could assess the position of the enemy ship relative to the fall of two half-salts, and it turned out that it was much more convenient and quicker to determine the corrections to the sight. On the whole, shooting with a “ledge” made it possible to shoot faster than when shooting with a “fork”.

But shooting a "ledge" from "one-man" installations is difficult. There is nothing difficult in an ordinary turret - one angle of elevation was set for one gun, another angle was different, and in MK-3-180, when aiming, all the guns got the same angle. Of course, it was possible to make a half-hub, then change the tip and make the second one, but it was all slower and more difficult.

However, the "single-faced" installations had their merits. Placing guns on different cradles faced the problem of misalignment of the axes of the guns: this is a situation when the guns in the turret are exposed to the same sight, but because of the mismatch of the position of the individual cradles, they have slightly different elevation angles and as a result - increased scatter in the volley . And, of course, "one-man" tower installations greatly won in terms of weight and dimensions.

For example, the rotating part of the three-bomber 180-mm turret of the cruiser Kirov was only 147 tons (247 t is the total weight of the installation, taking into account the barbet mass), while the tower was protected by 50 mm armor plates. But the rotating part of the German three-gun 152-mm turret, in which the guns were placed individually, had a weight of almost 137 tons, while its front plates had only 30 mm thickness, and the sides and roof were generally 20 mm. The rotating part of the 152-mm two-gun British turret of the Linder-type cruisers had only an inch of protection, but at the same time weighed 96,5 tons.

In addition, each Soviet MK-3-180 had its own rangefinder and its own automatic firing, i.e. actually duplicated centralized fire control, albeit in miniature. Neither the English nor the German towers had any rangefinders, nor (even more so!) Firing rifles.

It is interesting to compare the MK-3-180 with the three-gun turrets 152-mm guns of the cruiser Edinburgh. Those had slightly better reservations (board and roof - the same 50 mm, but the front plate - 102 mm of armor) did not have range finders or shooting machines, but their rotating part weighed 178 tons. However, the weight advantages of the Soviet towers did not end there. After all, in addition to the rotating part, there are also non-rotating structural elements, of which barbet has the greatest mass — an armored “well” connecting the tower and reaching either the armored decks or the cellars. Barbet is absolutely necessary, as it protects the feeders of projectiles and charges, preventing fire from entering the artillery range.

But the mass of barbet is very large. So, for example, the mass of barbets in the 68 cruiser (“Chapaev”) was 592 t, while the lengthy 100 mm armor belt weighed almost the same - 689 t. A very important factor affecting the barbet mass was its diameter, and The relatively small-sized MK-3-180 approximately corresponded to that of three-gun 152-mm turrets with tools in individual cradles, but an attempt to place 180-mm in different cradles would lead to a significant increase in diameter, and as a result - barbet mass.

The conclusions are as follows. In general, the tower with the guns in one cradle, though not fatal, still loses in combat qualities of the tower installation with separate vertical guidance of guns. But in the case when the displacement of the ship is subject to restriction, the use of "one-man" towers allows for the same fire weight to provide greater fire power. In other words, of course it would be better to put towers with guns in individual cradles on the Kirov and Maxim Gorky-type cruisers, but at the same time one would expect a significant increase in displacement. And in the existing scales on our cruisers it was possible to install either three three-gun turrets with 180-mm cannons in one cradle (as it was done) or three two-gun turrets with 180-mm guns in different cradles, or the same number of three-gun 152-mm towers with guns in different cradles. Obviously, despite some shortcomings, 9 * 180-mm guns are significantly better than 6 * 180-mm or 9 * 152-mm.

On the subject of the main caliber one should also describe the problems with the MK-3-180 rate of fire, the shells that our 180-mm guns fired, and the fire control system. Alas, due to the large amount of material it was not possible to fit everything into one article, and therefore ...

To be continued!
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  1. +8
    5 August 2016 07: 33
    There is a small clarification regarding the table with dispersion data - it contains data obtained when firing a gun installed on a machine gun range, and when firing volleys from standard gun turrets, real dispersion can easily be 1,5-2 times more. This suffered not only ours, but also gun turrets of more "advanced" sea powers :))
    1. +5
      5 August 2016 08: 56
      It is truth too:)
      1. +4
        5 August 2016 15: 08
        My grandfather fought on Voroshilov, during a torpedo bombardment, he closed a wire out of a fragment from a cable of an anti-aircraft fire control system in his mouth (it was not enough to connect the length). shot down the plane, saved the cruiser. Grandfather Order of the KZ for the feat
        1. 0
          18 August 2016 16: 57
          On Voroshilov and other cruisers, the MPUAZO system was not put into effect until the end of the war.
    2. +3
      5 August 2016 12: 09
      Quote: BORMAN82
      and when firing volleys from standard gun turrets, real dispersion can easily be 1,5-2 times more.

      Naturally, it is one thing if the platform from which the fire is being fired is completely motionless and completely different when it can perform various longitudinal-transverse vibrations, which happens even with small waves, here the question of stabilizing both the guns and the line of sight is of great importance, and of course the work PUAO, about the low quality of the latter, by the way, Shirokograd "stutters". So, it's not just the tools themselves, but the rest.
    3. +1
      5 August 2016 13: 47
      to a greater extent, the dispersion of shells from a movable platform (ship) depended on rolling (excitement)
    4. 0
      8 August 2016 08: 38
      Quote: BORMAN82
      There is a slight refinement regarding the spread data table.

      Andrey responded quite well to the half-truths of various kinds of historians - non-gunners, about too much dispersion, in their opinion.
      Here it would not hurt to interpret the concept of exceeding the trajectory at a distance at which this dispersion is observed.
      Then it would immediately become clear to "some civilians" that for a target with a height of tens of meters, the difference in trajectory exceedances of 0,5-1,5-2.5 m and the dispersion at a distance of 70-100 m are quite acceptable for barrel artillery at sea ranges. battle.
      These are not guided missiles and not even adjusted artillery ammunition or air bombs. By the way, they also have dispersion, only smaller; meters from 2 to 25.
  2. +23
    5 August 2016 07: 45
    I personally like such articles. In the case, with an attempt to look at the problem from different angles, without pathos, without ignoring other points of view. Chic plus good
    For the millionth time, I repeat that the ship is a bunch of compromises for a given displacement (hence, to some extent, the price), and therefore the achievement of certain parameters cannot but affect other characteristics. Sacrifice some characteristics for the sake of others. And sometimes you have to make very interesting decisions, which from the outside can look as if to put it mildly, almost wrecking. But with a thoughtful look are the best for translating ideas into metal.
    These are the main turrets on the cruisers of the project 26,26-bis. Boilers on German ships with high steam parameters look like this. The same four-gun towers on King George V, Richelieu ... And if you dig deeper, then on almost every ship you can find "strange" solutions, which are quite understandable if you keep in mind that the ship is it is a compromise, performance, displacement and price. request
    Therefore, it is always necessary to approach the conceptualization of the problem from different angles; then one-sided condemnations will not arise, criticism and everything falls into place.
    One more plus hi
    1. avt
      +5
      5 August 2016 08: 21
      Quote: Rurikovich
      I personally like such articles.

      Well, somehow - YES. Arguments his opinion.
      1. 0
        5 August 2016 14: 35
        But the question now, for example, the reincarnation of the example of the cruiser Mikhail Kutuzov, standing in Novorossiysk is possible, or is it a dead end?
    2. +1
      5 August 2016 08: 58
      Quote: Rurikovich
      Therefore, it is always necessary to approach the conceptualization of the problem from different angles; then one-sided condemnations will not arise, criticism and everything falls into place.

      That's right. So I try :)))
      Quote: Rurikovich
      One more plus

      Thank you!
      1. +1
        5 August 2016 09: 45
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Thank you!

        You're welcome hi We will wait for the continuation smile
    3. +2
      5 August 2016 12: 13
      Quote: Rurikovich
      I personally like such articles

      I am joining. Moreover, I support the author’s desire to understand the question posed. By the way, it may still be worthwhile to study the issue of the operation of these systems during the Second World War. Then they worked on ground targets often, so there should be a lot of information, moreover, it is nevertheless more objective, since the craters on the ground have been visible for a long time, unlike the sea surface, so the question of accuracy can be better assessed.
  3. +2
    5 August 2016 08: 37
    Article plus.
    Just because the “top” is rubbed off on the hard steel of the projectile faster than the “bottom” - on the soft.
    - And is it exactly so? Does the soft shirt of the projectile correspond in thickness to the height of the rifling, and when crimped in the barrel, cut into rifling to a solid body? I'm not special, but something is wrong here. If a soft shirt is equal in thickness to the depth of the grooves, then after some wear on the grooves they should become shorter and stop cutting through the soft part to hard and wear should slow down dramatically. Or the soft shirt of the projectile is still thicker than the height of the rifling and the top of the rifling does not touch the solid body. Then the cause of wear of the rifling is not in contact with the solid shell of the projectile. Or am I not catching up with something ...
    1. +1
      5 August 2016 08: 56
      Quote: Alex_59
      - But is it exactly so?

      But I don’t know :) But presumably so, because the projectile belt is precisely a small and narrow strip on top of the "strong body" of the projectile. "Stand" between the grooves and a solid body, it is unlikely to match
      1. +2
        5 August 2016 13: 59
        "soft belt" - seals the gap between the projectile body and the grooves (prevents wear of the grooves and twists the projectile body along the grooves).
        The concept that defines barrel wear (barrel shooting) is a drop in accuracy - here you are right. The drop in the initial velocity of the projectile (firing range) is not so critical (and as you rightly noted, it is adjusted according to the tables).
    2. +7
      5 August 2016 09: 54
      Article plus. The leading belt made of mild steel was only seen on a 75 mm Germanic rocket projectile; in the rest of the shells it is made of copper alloy (although perhaps the author had in mind a centering belt, but it is not included in the cuts). 1/262 shooting distance is a very good result, standard 1/225 shooting distance. The decrease in the initial velocity of the projectile occurs from an increase in the volume of the chamber due to its height and increase in its length. The height, in turn, depends on the caloric content of the powder (temperature and burning rate, a steeper pressure curve). Subsequently, in 305 mm systems, Soviet gunsmiths achieved accuracy in 1/400 of the distance, which is an outstanding result. According to the Italians ... poverty and because of this the use of high-calorie, unstable gunpowders, plus guns that are excessively forced in terms of loading density.
      The fact that the USSR was able to create world-class products in such a short time speaks volumes, everything else is from the evil one (read Grabin’s memoirs.)
      According to Shirokord, my personal opinion: as a systematizer is good, but here are the conclusions ....
      1. 0
        18 August 2016 17: 02
        The 305-mm system of the Obukhov plant is Vickers guns.
        406 mm pre-war for battleships of the type Soviet Union-Kruppovskie.
        100 mm anti-aircraft guns on cruisers-Italian.
        180 mm is the same.
    3. 0
      5 August 2016 12: 18
      Quote: Alex_59
      Then the cause of wear of the rifling is not in contact with the solid shell of the projectile. Or am I not catching up with something ...

      Even soft metal still produces "erasure", the high temperature during the shot still has a very strong effect. And the last - the "erasure" of the rifling is not uniform, it is greatest at the charging chamber and towards the cut of the barrel it becomes less and less.
      In addition, pay attention to the "belt one" and it is in the back of the long body of the projectile, which is understandable, since the powder gases press from behind, this belt also plays the role of a kind of "sealant" preventing them from breaking through, between the projectile and the gun along slicing. But here the front part of the projectile, during movement, makes a circular motion, set by the grooves, and under some conditions associated with the peculiarity of the manufacture, it can hit the same grooves, riveting them, and this means reducing their height.
  4. +1
    5 August 2016 09: 28
    Reading the article, I thought to myself: "Look how it is, Mikhalych!" The next thought: "A professional artilleryman would come here and say that everything is nonsense and began to prove his own, tady how?"
    N-yes, all the same it is necessary to have an education on a profile, for work with such articles, here neither logic, nor common sense will channel ... (this to myself).
    1. +2
      5 August 2016 13: 13
      Quote: King, just king
      The next thought: "A professional artilleryman would come here and say that everything is nonsense and began to prove his own, tady how?"

      That's the problem, that over the past eighty years, not a single gunner has come. At least one would come - there wouldn’t be any need for me to twist the gyrus to the side, in an attempt to understand what happened there. And those who praise the B-1-P, and those who criticize it, are not gunners.
      1. +3
        5 August 2016 13: 25
        Well, I really doubt that a professional artilleryman would be "the ultimate truth" here - if only because any weapon system is a compromise, and "ultimate systems" (and the B-1 cannon is just that) always give rise to different assessments .. And professionals are no exception here, because everyone has their own preferences and even habits based on personal experience ... Unfortunately, we are unlikely to find a specialist who actually exploited this gun and could share his impressions of real and not "tabular" data.
        1. 0
          5 August 2016 14: 06
          No, I understand how Andrei wrote - no one came. Maybe he "came", but somewhere in the special storage.
          You can go the other way. All the same, "Kirov" more than actively shot in Tallinn. With a very strong desire, you can dig in the archives for a couple of years, compare information on the repair of guns and data on shooting along the shore ... But who needs it. You and I, Andrei, have already talked about this topic, in Jutland, who got how much of what they got there.
  5. -6
    5 August 2016 09: 29
    The qualifications of the Soviet commandants remained on the sidelines, although this also affects the accuracy of the guns.
    Almanac "Typhoon", No. 3 1999
    BATTERIES AGAINST BATTERIES: KBF SCADA OPERATIONS IN THE BIERK ARCHIPELAGUS
    According to the report of the NSF KBF Yu.A. Panteleev, the squadron spent 402 305 mm and 176 130 mm HE shells on the Saarenpä coastal batteries, and a total of 578 shells.
    The KBF commission working after the war came to the conclusion that there were no direct hits on the yards of the guns of the 254 mm Saarenpä battery. In the area of ​​the firing positions and fortifications of the battery there were many traces of the fall of LC shells, but most of them were flights.
    “The shells fell anywhere, but not on the batteries, due to inaccurate knowledge of the places of these batteries by ship artillerymen,” such a verdict was issued by the People's Commissar of the Navy N.G. Kuznetsov in his directive No.16015ss / s from 14 February 1940. , 8 on April, at a meeting of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet armed forces, he noted that our failures in the Bierk Archipelago are explained by the fact that the fleet acted "uncivilized and illiterate."

    When they begin to write with pathos about how the naval artillery of the KBF smashed the Germans on the approaches to Leningrad, I would like to quote N.G. Kuznetsov
    at the firing of 1940, the ships of the KBF squadron were shot so that they blocked all the "achievements" of the past year. For example, the "advanced" Marat "conducted 11 satisfactory and 10 unsatisfactory firing against 6 good and 1 (!) Excellent, and the" October Revolution "- 15 satisfactory and unsatisfactory against 13 good and excellent. Well, the cruiser "Kirov" just broke the record - 17 satisfactory and unsatisfactory firing against 5 good and excellent. This gave occasion to N.G. Kuznetsov to note at the gathering of fleet and fleet commanders in December 1940 that "this year the KBF combat training resulted in an unconditional failure."
    1. 0
      5 August 2016 09: 42
      I agree. It is not enough to create a model of weapons. You still need to learn to use it perfectly. Gunners need to be able to hit targets, pilots need to control a fighter so that they don’t think about the plane, but be one with them. Tankers need to be able to use the characteristics of the vehicle on the ground, and then they can win in battle. you need to know the math and correctly and quickly count in order to fire a torpedo at the target. Well and so on, in the text.
      After all, the whole point is that there will be no use from the AK-47, even if it’s the best in the world, if you can’t combine the front sight with the notch of the sight and establish the correct range to the enemy what The machine turns out to be a simple piece of iron in inexperienced hands, which will lead to defeat (death) request
      "It is not ships that are fighting, but people" smile
      1. +3
        5 August 2016 10: 47
        Quote: Rurikovich
        The qualifications of the Soviet commandants remained on the sidelines, although this also affects the accuracy of the guns.

        Well, let's put it this way. On the battleship "October Revolution" this qualification was quite enough to destroy the enemy observation balloon from a distance of 28 cables with the very first shot of a shrapnel projectile from a main battery gun on August 1941, 136. It is curious that on September 15, 1941, a battleship fire from the Peterhof raid destroyed an enemy command post, the distance to which was 220 cab. To do this, they created an additional list of the ship of 6 degrees, taking water into the compartments. So, the shooting was actually not bad.
        1. +2
          5 August 2016 11: 48
          Quote: Verdun
          so what, actually shot, not bad.

          Comrade Leto is not important. How many do not read his posts - one negative. Everything is gone, the boss, the plaster is removed, the client leaves ...
          1. -5
            5 August 2016 12: 48
            Quote: Alex_59
            Comrade Leto is not important. How many do not read his posts - one negative.

            Unfortunately, reality is much worse than what they say to us.
            1. +3
              5 August 2016 12: 52
              Quote: Leto
              Unfortunately, reality is much worse than what they say to us.

              Reality is neither worse nor better - it is as it is, and it contains both good and bad. And you have not "reality", but a dystopian fantasy, where good has no place in principle. In reality, this has never happened and cannot be.
            2. +3
              5 August 2016 16: 05
              Reality in general is very far from ideal and a lot depends on military training. As Classic used to say ... to study military affairs in this way ...
        2. 0
          18 August 2016 17: 08
          You read these tales in the Red Star? So Ortenberg destroyed the Luftwaffe in August. And in September they drowned Marat and Oktyabrina got it.
      2. +2
        5 August 2016 12: 45
        Welcome Andrew hi !
        Quote: Rurikovich
        "It is not ships that are fighting, but people"

        You're right, just look at the history of the Admiral Hipper-class sisterships. What is the fate of "Hipper" and "Prince Ogain" and how ingloriously "Blucher" perished!
        1. +1
          5 August 2016 13: 17
          Quote: Serg65
          how ingloriously "Blucher" perished!

          My regards hi
          Here, by the way, everything is relative. The Germans fought a priori with a more numerous enemy. And if in the First World War they still tried to compete with the British and built a good series of dreadnoughts, capable of withstanding a two or threefold advantage of the enemy (Jutland) in short skirmishes, then in World War II such a number does not roll. The advantage is too impressive for all classes of ships, the quality cannot be taken in view of various restrictions, then again I had to look for compromises, relying on speed characteristics. that is why the Scharnhorst with the Bismarck appeared, which de facto could leave the British battleships. The "hippers", with their declared 33 knots, were not able to provide such a speed because of the capricious Le Mont and Wagner boilers with high steam parameters. Therefore, their use directly depended on the qualities of the commanders and the tasks of the MGS. If the English could afford to lose the cruiser, then the Germans no longer exist, which constrained the initiative of the commanders. If at the beginning of the war, due to the confusion, the cruisers could still raid, then towards the end they already met not only numerical superiority, but also the reasonable use of their forces by the British. able to radically change forces, is not capable. Alas, the Germans did not get a chance in that war.
          And "Blucher" died, because there is nothing to climb into the narrow strait, where it is impossible to maneuver such large ships. As a result, having received its portion of torpedoes and shells on board, this creation rests at the bottom of the Oslo fiord. In those conditions, even the yellow-mouthed Norwegian artillerymen and torpedoists could not miss smile
          hi
          1. +2
            5 August 2016 14: 24
            Quote: Rurikovich
            And "Blucher" died, because there is nothing to climb into a narrow strait, where it is impossible to maneuver

            This is probably not so much a matter of the impossibility of maneuver as of the stupidity of the Kriegsmarine command and Rear Admiral Kummets in particular.
            Directive of 1 March 1940
            “In principle, we must strive to give this operation the character of a friendly takeover, the purpose of which is the armed defense of the neutrality of the northern states. Relevant requirements will be transferred to governments with the capture. Demonstrations of fleets and air demonstrations will give the necessary emphasis, if necessary ”
            In this regard, an order was issued by Admiral Kyummets ... German ships can open fire only at the signal from the flagship, ignoring warning volleys and not paying attention to the searchlights, which are recommended not to shoot, but to blind their operators with their own combat lighting!
            1. 0
              5 August 2016 16: 16
              Correctly! They drove the ship into w ... pu, I apologize for my French, stuff it to the eyeballs of the infantry and then guess ... will the Norwegians notice it or not? Norway not only noticed, but also poked holes. Here's a blitzkrieg.
        2. 0
          18 August 2016 17: 10
          Cruisers covered Courland and Prussia to the last. Changed the liners, covered and ensured the evacuation of 2,5 million people by sea.
          They were sunk by the British.
    2. 0
      5 August 2016 13: 04
      Quote: Leto
      The qualifications of the Soviet commandants remained on the sidelines,

      What does he have to do with the technical qualities of a cruiser?
      Quote: Leto
      Almanac "Typhoon", No. 3 1999

      There is such a letter and there is such an author - Petrov. But his analysis is somehow not impressive.
    3. +2
      5 August 2016 13: 42
      Quote: Leto
      The KBF commission working after the war came to the conclusion that there were no direct hits on the yards of the guns of the 254 mm Saarenpä battery. In the area of ​​the firing positions and fortifications of the battery there were many traces of the fall of LC shells, but most of them were flights.

      No wonder. As written in the article you are quoting:
      Surprisingly as it may seem, the very object of our shelling — the Finnish coastal battery Saarenpä (as, incidentally, other enemy batteries) —was completely unknown to our command. Everything rested on the fact that The intelligence department (RO) of the fleet headquarters knew practically nothing about the true whereabouts, nor about the composition, nor about the type, nor about the firing range of the enemy battery.
      According to the RO headquarters of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet it was believed that on Fr. Bierke is a 4-gun 254-mm battery, which is an ordinary open-type Russian battery on the so-called. "Machine tools Durlyakhova." According to the scheme stored in the RO, the Finnish 10-inch battery was located in the Pitkäniemi metro area, i.e. in the place where it was installed in World War I. In fact, the picture was somewhat different.
      At the place where the main battery was supposed, the Finns had a 2-gun 152-mm battery. A 6-gun 254-mm battery (and not a 4-gun, as we expected - approx. Author) was located in the southern part of Bierke, on a slope facing the sea and covered with forest, about 800 m from the coast.

      That is, the preparation of the Soviet commandants has nothing to do with it - they simply did not have real data for shooting.
      Quote: Leto
      When they begin to write with pathos about how the naval artillery of the KBF smashed the Germans on the approaches to Leningrad, I would like to quote N.G. Kuznetsov

      Ahem ... how correct is it to use the results of firing a moving ship at a sea target, speaking about firing of ships anchored at exactly known coordinates, at fixed targets also with known coordinates?
      1. +3
        5 August 2016 16: 26
        Quote: Alexey RA
        That is, the preparation of the Soviet commandants has nothing to do with it - they simply did not have real data for shooting.

        My own uncle, who commanded a battery of B-4 howitzers in the WWII, showed me somehow the main gunner’s weapon - binoculars, tape measure and a stopwatch. Using binoculars, the enemy was detected visually. Using a tape measure and a stopwatch, the latent position was calculated. By the nature and size of the funnel, it was possible to determine the direction of the shot, the type and caliber of the projectile. Knowing the type and caliber were determined with the flight speed of this projectile and, using a stopwatch, hearing a shot and waiting for the projectile to fall, they obtained a range, in other words, the distance to the target. Based on these data, they returned fire, trying to win an artillery duel. Judging by the fact that his uncle began to fight in 1941, and finished in forty-fifth in the Far East, being in good health, he used his weapons well. It is clear that not all land artillery techniques are applicable to naval art, but they also have their own tricks that you need to know and be able to use.
        1. +1
          5 August 2016 18: 57
          Quote: Verdun
          It is clear that not all land artillery techniques are applicable to naval art, but they also have their own tricks that you need to know and be able to use.

          There are no funnels at sea. smile
          As for the rest, here's what the positions of the Finnish 10 "BO battery looked like:
          A 6-gun 254-mm battery (and not a 4-gun, as we expected - approx. Author) was located in the southern part of Bierke, on a slope facing the sea and covered with forest, about 800 m from the coast. The guns were placed in spaced blocks, at a distance of 175-325 m from one another. The linear arrangement of the guns was not observed. Each gun was in a reinforced concrete courtyard with a diameter of 13,5 m. The length of the front of the battery from west to east was approx. 1000 m, and from south to north - 500 m. In the rear of the battery, at a distance of 300 m from the 4th gun, was a CP, which was a reinforced concrete tower 18 m high.

          As a result, the determination of its location was delayed until mid-December 1939 - after the first shelling (which disabled 10 "gun No. 6), it was necessary to conduct reconnaissance in force by the LD" Minsk "and" Leningrad "together with the EM" Guarding ".
          As a result of the operation, our information on the Saarenpya battery was somewhat refined. On the basis of direction finding and visual observation, it turned out that the 10-inch battery is located in several blocks, one tool in each, separated from each other by 3-4 cab.

          In subsequent shellings, ours used an 18-meter battery tower as a guideline. But due to inaccurate attachment of firing positions, frequent poor visibility and inept air adjustment, almost all of the shells went down with flights. Ours got into the tower, but not in the courtyards (they just filled up yard 5).
          1. 0
            5 August 2016 22: 13
            Quote: Alexey RA
            There are no funnels at sea.

            Of course. But there are bursts that tell a lot of things to a person who knows and knows how to analyze.
            A 6-gun 254-mm battery (and not a 4-gun, as we expected - approx. Auth.) Was located in the southern part of Bierque, on a slope facing the sea and covered with forest,
            I don’t understand how with fire contact you can’t detect a position located on a visible slope of a mountain. It is impossible to mask the shot of a 254 mm gun. And if you know which guns are installed, then by the time of the shot and the moment the projectile falls, you can determine the location of the guns with an accuracy of several meters. At least that's what my uncle claimed. I don’t see the reasons not to trust him as a specialist - the artillery school, the Odessa artillery school, the Frunze academy, the iconostasis of awards - not to take away, and not only Soviet ... The man knew his job. In short, whatever weapon you have in your hands, you need to be able to fight them.
            1. 0
              8 August 2016 10: 04
              Quote: Verdun
              I don’t understand how with fire contact you can’t detect a position located on a visible slope of a mountain. It is impossible to mask the shot of a 254 mm gun. And if you know which guns are installed, then by the time of the shot and the moment the projectile falls, you can determine the location of the guns with an accuracy of several meters.

              Interestingly, the enemy’s battery with each salvo showed 6 flashes, and only 3 shells fell. Most likely, 3 outbreaks belonged to the enemy’s false guns, and this was done in order to prevent the LC from determining the exact location of the firing guns.
              (...)
              After the 3rd volley of LC, the battery again opened fire on him. The Finnish volleys, as before, were 3-guns, although at the same time 5-6 outbreaks were observed spread across the southern part of the island.
            2. 0
              8 August 2016 14: 26
              The problem of suppressing coastal artillery is that ship guns are not designed for this. The trajectory is flat. Need howitzers)))). Everyone had problems with coastal artillery. Even the Americans drove the monstrous forces to the shore often and did not suppress it.
              I happened to visit the old Russian battery in Port Arthur. The same electric cliff. You can’t do anything with it from the water. Only a direct hit in the cannon or from a canopy into the battery itself. The second option is only with long range. You can still collapse the entire cliff in the sea. And she is not at all what they began to do to the Second World. the war. Kabanov, you can read what Finnish batteries were. I won’t say the name of the book. But about the defense of Hanko.
              1. 0
                18 August 2016 17: 23
                Yeah, the Germans of Hood drowned CORRECTLY CHOOSE !!! the distance of the opening of fire. Marine guns are not an anti-tank gun. And the projectile trajectory is a ballistic curve. And to the bulb where the gun is on which slope. The main thing is the brains of the gunner controlling the shooting. With what in the KBF there was, VERY VERY! tight.Tributs smart did not tolerate. Loved toadies.
          2. 0
            18 August 2016 17: 19
            But it was not enough to produce aerial photographs? And prepare spotters in advance, and not at the last moment. By the way, then they could not establish radio communications with the aircraft. They did not know !!!!! that the frequencies do not match! These self-propelled fleets led the fleet and led the country.
      2. 0
        18 August 2016 17: 16
        So this is the level of the Red Army and the Navy. Neither intelligence nor corrections fell into the white light. But here are the orders and stripes-GIVE OUT !!!
        Fucking level bvl. That's all.
        The Baltic Fleet allowed the Germans to lay 3000 mines and mine defenders in three days, Tributz ditched the entire transport fleet, together with Panteleev, and became the GSS for it. 30 people and equipment for several divisions drowned in vehicles.
        He only had to be put for Hanko against the wall. And for the murder of the Baltic Subway.
        If it weren’t for the report of Grishchenko, whom this drunk then scribbled, he would have melted all the submarines.
    4. 0
      18 August 2016 17: 07
      The situation was even worse at the Black Sea Fleet. The Paris Commune, shooting without spotters, didn’t get anywhere. As it turned out, the position of the ship was not correctly determined in a number of shootings, they got confused in the bays of Sevastopol. Well, when shooting from the sea, it’s a deplorable result.
      The loss of Moscow during the first shooting at Constance and then several more ships forced the Headquarters to ban the entire surface fleet from going to sea.
      According to post-war verification, it turned out that the result of these shooting exercises is ZERO.
  6. The comment was deleted.
  7. 0
    5 August 2016 09: 38
    ... it was not possible to create steel capable of withstanding such pressure.
    It is fully applicable not only to this weapon, but also to the "killing machine" - the "famous" 12 "of the Obukhov plant. That is why, instead of 50 calibers, the barrel length increased to 52. Initially, the gun was designed for a shell weighing 331 kg. To design a projectile weighing 470 kg Already initially heavy for this system But, after all, there was also a projectile weighing 512 kg For comparison: a projectile for a 343 mm gun had a mass of 567 kg and 635 kg, and for 340 mm - respectively 538 kg and 575 kg.
  8. +5
    5 August 2016 09: 42
    Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
    Quote: Alex_59
    - But is it exactly so?

    But I don’t know :) But presumably so, because the projectile belt is precisely a small and narrow strip on top of the "strong body" of the projectile. "Stand" between the grooves and a solid body, it is unlikely to match

    In projectiles of classical design, the grooves contact only the surface of the leading belt, which is a ring of copper, copper-nickel alloy rolled into a special groove on the body of the projectile. Accordingly, when using "serviceable" :) shells, the contact of the rifling fields directly with the shell of the shell is excluded.
    1. 0
      5 August 2016 13: 08
      Quote: BORMAN82
      In shells of a classic design, rifling contacts only with the surface of the driving belt

      I don’t understand a bit. Please explain again. I see a leading belt. I understand that it is he who "enters" the rifling. But where is the shell itself? He's not hanging in the air, is he?
      1. +3
        5 August 2016 13: 55
        I'll put in my five cents. Firstly, many thanks for this series of articles. I will not be mistaken if I say that you have a degree and were engaged in (do) research.
        Now about the shells. They, depending on the caliber and type, have differences in body. An obturating or guiding belt located closer to the bottom of the projectile is typically made of copper or copper alloys. Its purpose is to impart rotational motion to the projectile and tightly seal the bore in the projectile area. There can be one, two, rarely three. The projectile must be held strictly along the axis of the barrel. For this, one or two centering thickenings are often used, cast and processed at the same time as the glass of the shell body. And for caliber armor-piercing shells this is necessary, since the body is made of metal comparable to the density of the barrel metal. Rarely, instead of centering thickenings, a front obturating belt of copper was used.
        Many factors affect barrel wear: the friction of guiding and obturating belts, and the friction of centering thickenings, in the absence of shell and shell, and, above all, the effect of powder gases of high temperature and high pressure, even barrel copper coating, which causes electrochemical reaction.
    2. +3
      5 August 2016 14: 11
      Axiom :)
      Cleaning the trunk is associated not so much with the removal of soot as with the cleaning of the rifling from the remnants of the soft material of the belts.
  9. +6
    5 August 2016 10: 16
    By the way, the Kirov's gun turrets can be seen even now. See, touch, touch.
    1. 0
      5 August 2016 10: 21
      Quote: VohaAhov
      By the way, the Kirov's gun turrets can be seen even now. See, touch, touch.

      Where is this beauty?
      1. +4
        5 August 2016 11: 03
        Peter, there are shells on display there ... I've been there, felt ... Inspire ...
      2. +2
        5 August 2016 13: 47
        Quote: Alex_59
        Where is this beauty?

        St. Leningrad, Baltic Fleet Square (Vasilievsky Island, Morskaya Embankment, between 15 and 17 houses).
        1. +2
          5 August 2016 14: 30
          Quote: Alexey RA
          St. Leningrad, Baltic Fleet Square (Vasilievsky Island, Morskaya Embankment, between 15 and 17 houses).

          As far as I remember (maybe I'm mistaken) earlier these towers and a bunch of towers of the 68 bis avenue were on conservation in Liepaja near the wall of support vessels.
  10. +9
    5 August 2016 10: 28
    Well, once again I must note that, in general, for the sake of such articles, I am reading this resource ... "Kaptsov's fantasies" certainly amuse, but no more ... Here is the argument and facts and careful analysis.
    Again, I must note that the most interesting thing is precisely the attempt to ponder even the seemingly "well-known" moments. Well, the interpretation of "tabular data" from different points of view and justification.
    It was always incomprehensible to me why polar opinions about any weapon system prevail in our country ... It is either declared "wundrewffe" or "sucks" - but if the first is impossible in principle, then the second is also a great rarity in the series ... Another question is that any system is needed considered not as "closed" - but as an integral part of the common with a large set of internal and external connections and interactions - and in this regard, these articles are a pleasant exception against the general background.
    1. -1
      5 August 2016 11: 21
      Quote: Taoist
      Well, once again, I should note that in general, for the sake of such articles, I read this resource ...

      Unfortunately, in recent years, VO has been slipping into frankly gorlopanism and patriotic hysteria ...
      1. +3
        5 August 2016 11: 43
        Well, the other side of the coin is also enough ... Worse, there are too many "militant amateurs" - on both sides. However, this is a general trend in the general level of both education and culture.
  11. +1
    5 August 2016 10: 32
    I would like to bring some clarity to the fog of assumptions made by the author.
    1.
    Based on the foregoing, we can assume that when firing from a cannon, the depth of rifling decreases. Just because the "top" is erased on hard steel of the projectile faster than the "bottom" - on soft.
    No we can not. Of course, the barrel of a gun cannot be considered in isolation from the ammunition used. But when moving along the bore, the fixation of the projectile and the creation of compression occurs due to the obturation rings - those same "soft metal" rings - which are mentioned in the article. The rest of the surface of a properly designed projectile, if it touches the barrel, is extremely insignificant. An analogy is the piston of an internal combustion engine and piston rings. Obturation rings, depending on the design of the projectile, can be of a different number - from one to several. Their poor-quality manufacturing leads to the rupture of the rings and tumbling of the projectile in flight. It is these shells that emit a characteristic howl, and it is almost impossible to hit the target with them.
    2. The depth of the rifling affects not so much the promotion of the projectile - this is ensured by the cutting step and its profile - how much the resource of the cutting itself and the nature of the movement of the projectile in the barrel. As far as I know, exact calculation methods do not exist, and with the final determination of the depth of cuts are determined empirically. Too deep cutting leads to the breakthrough of powder gases through the rifling, lower compression and partial loss of energy needed for the shot.
    3. When they talk about the low survivability of trunks stacked in one cradle, they mean damage that does not occur from enemy shells, but from possible explosions inside the tower itself. Their causes may be different, but when installed separately, the tower space is separated by protective partitions, thus protecting each gun.
    4. About lined and fastened trunks. It is known for sure that at the time the construction of the Kirov-class cruisers was completed, not a single serial gun with a liner had been manufactured. So we installed the stapled ones. How things were on the cruisers "bis" and whether they were replaced later is a question.
    1. 0
      5 August 2016 11: 29
      1.

      3. When they talk about the low survivability of trunks stacked in one cradle, they mean damage that does not occur from enemy shells, but from possible explosions inside the tower itself. Their causes may be different, but when installed separately, the tower space is separated by protective partitions, thus protecting each gun.


      Let me disagree. Both in Des Moines and Iowa there were internal explosions in the towers. Despite individual cradles, the towers failed.

      On October 1, 1972, during live fire, the Newport News suffered a shell explosion in the barrel of the central gun of the cruiser’s elevated bow tower. A defective fuse led to the explosion of the shell right at the time of the shot, which killed nineteen and injured ten sailors. The damaged cruiser tower was completely disabled; they discussed the issue of replacing it with a similar one from the Salem or Des Moines in the reserve, but in the end the cost of the work was considered excessive and the entire remainder of the Newport News career was spent with an inactive tower

      In 1989, during firing at the exercises "FLEETEX 3-89", a powder charge of one of the main caliber guns ignited. Killed 47 sailors. The causes of the fire have not been reliably established, including because the place of the tragedy was promptly “put in order”: the very next day the tower was completely cleaned and repainted, the wreckage was thrown overboard. The fleet initially accused one of the sailors of suicide through the arson of gunpowder, but then refused the charges.

      Gunpowder ignited on the battleship, so the tower was relatively quickly brought into working condition. (Quotes taken from Wikipedia)
      1. 0
        5 August 2016 11: 46
        Quote: demiurg

        Let me disagree. Both in Des Moines and Iowa there were internal explosions in the towers. Despite individual cradles, the towers failed.

        This only speaks of a worthless tower design. However, no one claims that in this way you can protect the tower completely. But minimizing damage in a partitioned tower is easier.
        1. 0
          5 August 2016 11: 53
          Note that if the shell of Kirov’s tower was disabled, the whole world would write that no survivability, no design school, lack of technology. Like we talked, and we warned about the low survivability of the towers with a common cradle.
          And here are two examples, and no conclusions, it just happened lol
          How, due to one torpedo, which successfully hit Bismarck, they reached far-reaching conclusions.
          1. 0
            5 August 2016 12: 27
            Quote: demiurg
            Note that if the shell of Kirov’s tower was disabled, the whole world would write that no survivability, no design school, lack of technology

            Any design is a compromise of technical solutions for solving specific problems. In order to achieve an advantage in one thing (in the case of the Kirov cruisers, the power of artillery fire), one has to sacrifice something else. For example - booking and protective characteristics. It should be noted that in this regard, Project 26 still looked good. Most of the light and even Washington cruisers of that time sin with a weak defense. Just remember the French "cardboard" cruisers, which had no onboard booking at all. Against the general background, the Italian cruisers Zara, the French Algeria and La Galissoniere seem to be the exception rather than the rule. This was primarily due to views on the tactics of using cruisers in general, and light ones in particular, which in no way assumed at that time the battle of these cruisers with their peers. Their task was to inflict a quick and strong blow on a weaker enemy and retreat just as quickly. Another question is how feasible this tactic was.
        2. 0
          5 August 2016 12: 14
          It’s hard to design it. Knockdown panels are required, but do not make bulkheads thicker than armor, which will be greatly weakened from external influences.
      2. +1
        5 August 2016 12: 55
        Yes, and the Soviet Navy did not pass this attack - an explosion
        in the gun turret of the GC cruiser
        Project 68-bis "Admiral Senyavin" in 1978
        1. +1
          5 August 2016 14: 34
          Quote: BORMAN82
          explosion
          in the gun turret of the GC cruiser
          Project 68-bis "Admiral Senyavin" in 1978

          On October 5 of 1946, during the firing on the Tendra raid in the reloading compartment of tower No. 2, a shell ignited, but the timely flooding of the tower prevented the explosion of ammunition. During this incident, one foreman and 22 sailor died, and 20 received injuries and burns of varying severity. An examination showed that the fire occurred due to a structural flaw in the elevator.
          1. +1
            5 August 2016 18: 16
            From the act of the commission to investigate the incident (cited from the memory of the compilers): "When the electric signal was applied to the production of the ninth volley, the right gun of tower No. 1 did not fire. By mistake, another shell was sent to the loaded gun. As a result, the charge ignited in the chamber - part of the charging mechanism of the gun The charges prepared for firing ignited from the escaping stream of gases, a fire broke out in the tower, which quickly spread to the upper reloading compartment ... It was not the ammunition supply elevator that was to blame, but the person who gave the order to remove the double automatic blocking of the non-fired gun bolt, after which it followed ... ...
    2. 0
      5 August 2016 12: 52
      Quote: Verdun
      I would like to add some clarity to the fog of assumptions made by the author.

      Thank! I am always for constructive criticism
      Quote: Verdun
      The depth of the rifling affects not so much on the promotion of the projectile - this is ensured by the cutting step and its profile - how much on the resource of the cutting itself and the nature of the movement of the projectile in the barrel

      Then what follows from this? What are the implications of introducing deep slicing for B-1-P?
      Quote: Verdun
      When they talk about the low survivability of trunks stacked in one cradle, they mean damage that does not occur from enemy shells, but from possible explosions inside the tower itself. Their reasons may be different, but when installed separately, the tower space is separated by protective partitions, thus protecting each gun.

      Alas, I cannot agree with this. The tower of Admiral Senyavin with an internal explosion is completely disabled.
      Quote: Verdun
      It is known for sure that at the time the construction of the Kirov-class cruisers was completed, not a single serial gun with a liner had been manufactured.

      I ask you to tell the source of this information.
      1. 0
        5 August 2016 13: 55
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk

        I ask you to tell the source of this information.

        There are many sources. Napimer
        http://armyman.info/oruzhie-flota/morskaya-artilleriya/32334-180-mm-korabelnaya-
        pushka-b-1-p.html
        here.
        Alas, I cannot agree with this. The tower of Admiral Senyavin with an internal explosion is completely disabled.
        I already wrote in another comment that such incidents only speak of the unsuccessful construction of a specific tower. In general, towers with separate cradles, the space inside which was divided by partitions, have more chances to survive with an internal explosion.
        What are the implications of introducing deep slicing for B-1-P?
        But it is unknown. The test data is rather contradictory. But apparently the survivability of the liner was still raised. However, when creating the Chapaev-class cruisers, the B-1-P was abandoned, which means that the guns were still problematic.
    3. 0
      5 August 2016 14: 19
      An analogy is the piston of an internal combustion engine and piston rings.

      Still, this is not a completely correct example. On the engine piston, the rings are evenly distributed over almost the entire ego length (or most of it), which allows it to be held strictly along the axis of the sleeve. And in the projectile guiding belts are located near the bottom of the projectile. A simple experiment. If you remove the piston and place it on the table, it will rest on the rings and will not touch the table body. If you put a shell on the table, it will touch the surface with both the body and the belt (even if we reduce the height of the belt to the depth of the rifling).
      1. 0
        5 August 2016 14: 39
        Quote: Army 2
        On the engine piston, the rings are evenly distributed over almost the entire ego length (or most of it)
        This is where you saw such a piston? belay
        You remove the piston and put it on the table, then it will stay on the rings and will not touch the table body.
        Tell me honestly, have you ever seen a car piston at all?
      2. +1
        5 August 2016 14: 44
        Quote: Army 2
        If you put a shell on the table, it will touch the surface with both the body and the belt (even if we reduce the height of the belt to the depth of the rifling).


        And you send the shell into the barrel, and see what it will rely on.
        1. 0
          5 August 2016 18: 42
          Quote: Parsec
          And you send the shell into the barrel, and see what it will rely on.

          The main thing is not to do this at the time of the shot so as not to violate safety precautions. wink
  12. 0
    5 August 2016 11: 21
    Thanks again to Andrey.
    To the question of two-three-gun towers. The decision on the three GK guns was correct. Everyone came to this.

    Andrey, can you make a comparison of the projects of the cruisers 26 and 68?
    And one more Wishlist, a comparison of 68 and Des Moines. feel
    1. 0
      5 August 2016 11: 24
      Quote: demiurg
      The decision on the three GK guns was correct. Everyone came to this.

      They came, but in different ways. Not all three-gun turrets fit the guns in one cradle. Take Gangut, for example. The towers are three-gun, and the cradles are separate.
      1. +1
        5 August 2016 11: 31
        I have already given examples above that in any three-gun towers, an internal explosion put the tower out of action.
        1. +3
          5 August 2016 11: 54
          And did they have longitudinal armored partitions?
          Won LC Dunkirk at Mers al-Kebir received 381 mm in the roof of the second tower. Either struck, or chipped off a piece of armor, but the charges of the right half tower ignited (the servant died), but the left remained valid. The partition saved.
        2. 0
          5 August 2016 12: 34
          Quote: demiurg
          I have already given examples above that in any three-gun towers, an internal explosion put the tower out of action.

          Not at all. On "Dunkirk", "Richelieu" and even on our pre-revolutionary battleships, explosions took place inside the tower compartments, which did not disable the entire tower. By the way, it was the French battleships that suffered most from problems with the main battery guns. The same "Richelieu" was forced to withdraw from the battle at Oran-la-Seña as a result of a cannon explosion inside one of the turrets, which allegedly led to jamming of both main battery turrets.
          1. +1
            5 August 2016 18: 45
            Quote: Verdun
            The same "Richelieu" was forced to withdraw from the battle at Oran-la-Seña as a result of a cannon explosion inside one of the turrets, which allegedly led to jamming of both main battery turrets.

            “On September 24, he fired at the British battleships Barham and Resolution.” Only tower # 2 fired. At the first salvo, gun # 7 exploded and it was torn apart - only a stub several meters long remained sticking out of the tower. Cannon No. 8 also failed. After the shot, a flame burst out of the bolt and jammed. Further examination showed that the barrel was swollen and the rifling was destroyed at a length of 8 meters. The shooting of guns No. 5 and 6, although it continued, was ineffectual " (FROM)
            1. +2
              5 August 2016 19: 23
              On navweaps they write that the problem was the poor design of the projectile: in its stern there were 4 cavities for chemical weapons, closed with a lid. At the first salvo of Tower No. 2 "Richelieu" with full charges, the lid collapsed, its fragments pierced the bottom of the shell weakened in the region of the cavities and flew into the explosive, which immediately detonated.
              Result:
              - gun number 7 lost the barrel almost in the tower;
              - gun number 8 fanned at a length of 8 m
              Guns # 5 and # 6 continued to fire, but the next day the Richelieu fired only from Tower # 1, with reduced charges.
              The misfortunes of the French did not end there: after the first day of firing, guns No. 5 and No. 6 Towers No. 2 remained charged. And a few days after the battle they decided to defuse them. A shot. The end is a bit predictable.:
              - gun number 5 was inflated as number 8, and the barrel was stuck on a rollback with an air defense of 15 degrees.
              After all this, the French decided that gun No. 6 would be safer to discharge through the breech.

              As a result of all this circus, the design of the aft shell cover was redesigned, and the cavities were filled with cement.
  13. +1
    5 August 2016 11: 34
    By the way, I really hope to read in the sequel a general analysis of the project as a "weapon system".
  14. +3
    5 August 2016 11: 39
    Thanks to the author!

    Maybe the author will also consider this bit in the sequel, but he wanted to emphasize that with lowered charges, the 180 mm gun hit the horizontal armor of all German cruisers, including heavy and so-called pocket "battleships", at a distance of 19-21 kilometers normal for sea combat.
    Horizontal booking of Soviet cruisers made their way through armor-piercing shells of German 203 mm guns only over 24 km and German 280 mm guns over 22 km. Of course, this is not some great transcendence, but on certain exchange rate angles, although in theory, there was some transcendence.
    The fact that the artillery naval battles of the cruisers in the Black and Baltic Seas did not hit is another matter. Soviet ships did not avoid the battle. For more than a year they acted without air cover in the zone of complete domination of enemy aircraft. When they carried the ammunition, they carried ammunition for the troops under the nose of the Luftwaffe and in the end, no cruiser Project 26 was lost.
    One of these cruisers fired 2,5 munitions against the German army and, therefore, they did the decisive year on the decisive front of the war itself.
  15. exo
    0
    5 August 2016 11: 52
    Interesting study. Definitely a plus article
  16. +2
    5 August 2016 11: 52
    By the way, the question of the lower survivability of guns in a single cradle is very controversial, if only because any combat damage to the tower cannot be systematized - the random factor is too large. It is clear when the "French" divided the "half-towers" - with an armored partition - this really increased survivability ... In the case of "compressed" cruising towers, the probability of failure of the entire tower is always higher than that of a separate weapon, regardless of the design. Perhaps the only drawback of such a construct is the increased mutual influence of guns when firing ...
  17. 0
    5 August 2016 12: 14
    Quote: Leto
    When they begin to write with pathos about how the naval artillery of the KBF smashed the Germans on the approaches to Leningrad, I would like to quote N.G. Kuznetsov

    It's okay that the artillery of the Red Banner Baltic Fleet, when firing at land targets during the blockade of Leningrad, mainly conducted barrage fire on squares, or area targets, and you compare it with the results of firing at sea targets. So yeah, brute. Funnels from "suitcases" and their unexploded specimens are now ubiquitous in German positions.
    In addition, there was an article on VO about "Petropavlovsk" - "Cruiser L" and an example of the results of its firing. So I don't think you should lump it all together. But on the whole, you are right, without trained gunners even the best guns will not survive the situation.
    PS About the battery on Saarenpa, too, everything is not so simple, they beat him heap. The article, by the way, excerpts from which you quoted "LINCORS AGAINST BATTERIES: OPERATIONS OF THE ESCADRA KBF IN BIYORKSKY ARCHIPELAGUE PV Petrov. Almanac" Typhoon "No. 3/1999" also sheds light on events.
  18. +1
    5 August 2016 12: 15
    Many thanks to the author for the work done! hi
  19. +1
    5 August 2016 14: 11
    In recent years, it has been widely believed that the aforementioned shortcomings made our 180-mm guns almost unworkable

    Welcome Andrew! hi Firstly, I want to say thank you for the articles, thanks to them I began to refresh my memory by rereading materials about pr. 26-26 bis and about B-1-P, paying attention to those facts which I passed without hesitation. In my opinion, the combat effectiveness of the B-1-P was proved by the 315th and 314th coastal batteries of Moonsund. I was looking for accurate data on the losses of the Germans on October 19, 1941 from the fire of the cruiser "Voroshilov" at a distance of 200 cab., But unfortunately I did not find it. I would like to note that the projects 26 and 26-bis served rather longer than some newer projects.
    1. +2
      5 August 2016 14: 55
      I also agree with this opinion, I think that the B1 was abandoned on the ships not because of the shortcomings of the gun, but because of its "redundancy" ... Well, the increase in the range does not justify the decrease in the "fire performance" ... but the weight of the projectile is still strong 8 "we lose. But for coastal batteries it is a very interesting weapon ... from the point of view of range reach. Especially considering the possibilities offered by coastal placement ... It is not in vain that the railway option was" noted "in this regard.
      1. Cat
        0
        5 August 2016 16: 15
        If I'm not mistaken, the post-war "hills" were 180mm caliber.
  20. +1
    6 August 2016 13: 22
    Of course, everything stated is correct. The 180mm gun should not be bad. They also made land options and coastal (railway) ones. They stood in service for a long time. One thing confuses me: after the construction of 6 cruisers, I read it several times in the literature, sailors categorically insisted on the use of 152 mm. About 180 mm did not want to hear anything.
    In the 30s there were no other guns.
    1. +1
      6 August 2016 14: 28
      There were guns, but there was no point. For a light cruiser, fire performance is more important - to drive destroyers to it ... And for a battle with heavy ships, it is still not suitable for one thing. Hence the pointlessness as a result of using such guns on ships. It's just that initially they were too "inspired" by ballistics - but it turned out that it was impossible to use it ... so why "fence the cities"?
  21. +1
    6 August 2016 22: 04
    Good article, respect to the author. And then Shirokorad has recently become very annoying with his maxims about our "wretched" weapon.
  22. 0
    9 August 2016 12: 34
    Quote: Rurikovich

    And "Blucher" died, because there is nothing to climb into the narrow strait, where it is impossible to maneuver such large ships. As a result, having received its portion of torpedoes and shells on board, this creation rests at the bottom of the Oslo fiord. In those conditions, even the yellow-mouthed Norwegian artillerymen and torpedoists could not miss smile
    hi


    So, they had to go where they were ... there was no other way to go ... if you didn’t want to, you would have to climb anyway