Myths of the American strategy of domination "Third Offset" in the dreams of the scout "genius" of James Hasik (part of 2)
History repeated later, namely in November 2015, at the exercises "Malabar-2015", but with our "Halibut" B-898 ("Sindgudhvay") as part of the Indian Navy. DEPL was able to freely destroy the next American MAPL SSN-705 “City of Corpus Christi” (class “Los Angeles”), from which it is becoming increasingly clear that ours and the Swedish, as well as 6 German low-noise submarines of type 212A will be worthy rivals. But ours are still fewer in the Baltic Fleet, and they will have to come up more often, since they are not air-independent. And, as we know, reaching the periscope depth is extremely dangerous on the site of the theater of operations, where anti-submarine patrols are regularly patrolled. aviation of the enemy, since modern search radars with AFAR AN / APS-137D (V) 5 mounted on the P-8A Poseidon have a synthesized aperture that can detect the smallest structural elements of submarines, including periscopes and various antenna equipment on mast devices at ranges up to 50-80 km. For this reason, to act in the vicinity of the island of Gronholm, without revealing for a long time its presence for the NATO naval aviation, the two "Halibut" is unlikely to succeed.
But there are also such aspects of the use of Vyborg and Dmitrov, which the BF can bring tangible success in terms of protection from British or American multi-purpose nuclear submarines like Trafalgar, Astyut and Los Angeles, which may well go to the Baltic Sea to strike Tomahawk cruise missiles deep into our territory. These submarines with 95% probability, as we know from the teachings, will not be able to detect quiet and small diesel-electric submarines, and will be easily destroyed by torpedoes from 6 533-mm TA. Here we can say that Astyuta and Trafalgar can launch Tomahawks from the shores of Denmark or Norway, but this is minus 600 — 700 km of flight distance.
The diesel submarines of the 877 project have one more possibility, which is absent in NATO non-nuclear submarines. Their 533-mm torpedo tubes can launch 3М14 Caliber strategic cruise missiles at strategic targets in any European country from a submerged position. All the diesel-electric submarines / diesel engines of NATO fleets are capable of using only Sub-Harpoon UGM-84 anti-ship missiles. But the question still remains open: the number of NATO naval submarines operating in the Baltic Sea is 10 times larger than ours, and the “anaerobic” autonomy of the underwater stroke of some of them is more than 20-25 times. The only way out is to accelerate the development program of a highly efficient air-independent power plant (VNEU) for non-nuclear submarines of the 677 Ave. Lada.
Lada will equip with a promising VNEU based on an electrochemical generator (similar to the German U-212 concept), but with hydrogen generation by the decomposition of diesel fuel. Work in this area is conducted by the Rubin Central Design Bureau. According to Igor Vilnit, Director General of Rubn, the modular design of the new unit will allow installing it not only on parallel submarines under construction, but also to replace it on submarines already in the fleet. Sea trials of the advanced power plant will begin in the Baltic Sea already this year.
At the end of his article, Hasik begins to simply “shine” with his deep knowledge of modern air defense systems, as well as active protection systems for armored vehicles. He proposes to destroy a mixed anti-aircraft missile unit deployed “near the bridge” by striking one guided bombs with semi-active laser guidance. But this decision does not closely correspond to the realities of modern battle tactics. Firstly, no mixed anti-aircraft missile division (under the command of a sane person) will be a dense concentration of ZRSK, ZRAK, MANPADS and anti-aircraft artillery on a small "heel" of land at the entrance to the bridge. All air defenses will be located at an optimal distance from each other so that ZRSKs can be mutually protected by others: for example, Tor-M2, located at the entrance to the bridge, has a “dead zone” in 1 km, in case it misses the PSLR or UAB, in 300 — 500 meters behind, there can be an Armor “Pantsir-С1”, which will safely “finish off” the flying WTO. Additional air defense systems (MANPADS operators and anti-aircraft artillery complexes) can be scattered in different directions from the entrance to the bridge in the radius 1 — 2 km. Imagine what type of warhead this UAB should have to destroy such an air defense unit. Isn't it a tactical nuclear weapon or a high-frequency electromagnetic generator? Interesting But why then bomb laser guidance?
However, we have the answer to this option, and not just one. For the destruction of such "smart" aerial bombs, our experts have developed a combat EMP generator "Ranets-E". The specialized protected PBU, located on the MAZ chassis, is equipped with a powerful parabolic mirror with a high-frequency electromagnetic radiator. A focused beam can actually “burn through” the electronics of any promising means of air attack at a distance of about 15 km and make its correct functioning impossible at a distance of 40 km. It is known that “Ranets-E” can be completed with 45 and 50 dB antenna with radiation angles 60 and 20 degrees, respectively. But that's not all. Any controlled aerial bombs, even in the amount of a couple of dozen, can be intercepted directly by anti-aircraft missile systems, which these bombs are intended for. All modern complexes (Tor-M1, Tor-M2, Pantsir-C1) are capable of knocking down similar objects at a distance of 5 — 12 km (depending on the EPR). And if C-300PM / C-400 will operate in the area, such a bomb will not fly to the hypothetical “bridge with anti-aircraft guns” on 20 km. Apparently Hasik re-read the blinkered Western literature about the operation “Desert Storm”, where the “invisible” “Naythoki” destroyed the fortified areas and bunkers of the Iraqi army, which were covered only with outdated OSRs “Wasp” and “Shilkami”.
Then Hasik proposes to fight with the “Russians tanks near the Fulda Gap" by dropping cluster bombs with self-targeting submunitions from IKGSN (Hasik calls them "sensor fuses"). But what does the Fulda corridor have to do with it? In the list of tasks of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, even in the event of a conflict with NATO in Eastern Europe, there are no plans for a forced march of the 20th Combined Arms Army to the center of Western Europe to the French border, where they will have to "mess around" with thousands of NATO units armed with modern anti-tank systems Spike, Javelin and drones with Brimstone tactical missiles on board. The main task of our army is to hold the Belarusian-Polish border, the Kaliningrad region, not to let NATO units in the Baltic states “raise their heads”, to stop the enemy’s possible maneuvers on the territory of Ukraine, by the way, along with the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Our Tu-160 strategic bombers, “equipped” with hundreds of Caliber TFRs, which should successfully overcome all the air defense lines of the alliance, will be engaged in “shaking” the strategic depth of NATO in Western Europe. We will consider the latter at the end of the article. Now back to NATO cluster bombs and Russian tanks.
The fact that our tank brigades will operate under the cover of military air defense, as well as Russian air defense aviation close to the border, the missile and bomb strikes of the NATO airborne assault aircraft will be sporadic. The scenario, when the link of the British or German tactical strike fighters "Tornad GR.4" will carry out unobstructed bombing on our armored vehicles, will not work here. From this it becomes clear that in order to combat our NE, NATO tactical aviation will be forced to use high-precision missile weapons with a range of more than 150 km in order not to enter the defeat zone of our air defense. As an example of such weapons, a tactical long-range cruise missile “TAURUS-M” immediately appears in front of us.
The cruise missile "TAURUS-M" is a cassette modification of the famous concrete-drilling "TAURUS KEPD 350". The rocket is equipped with a powerful TRX P8300-15 Williams International 680 kgf. It gives the rocket flight speed from 650 to 1050 km / h in following the terrain at an altitude of 20-30 m. A rectangular cross section of the hull and the use of composite materials reduces the TAURUS-M radar signature several times, which makes it possible for a local air defense breakthrough organized by C-300PM complexes. After all, such a low-altitude “stealth” rocket can even penetrate the HNO 76H6E area of view at distances more than 30 km, in the most difficult terrain, etc., and the Three Hundred divisions cannot be placed every 20 km in the area of combat action. To destroy "TAURUS-M" can also ZORSK "Tor-М2", covering the tank units; but sometimes everything can go under a worse scenario: a military air defense system overloaded with interception of drones may not have time to react to the low-profile TAURUS, then all hope remains for increasing the capabilities of active defense complexes (KAZ) of our tanks.
To date, a very small number of main battle tanks of the Western Military District are equipped with active defense complexes, but work in this area is carried out daily. So, in September 2015 of the year, it became known about the installation of KAZ "Arena-E" for some MBT T-72B3 ZVO. The upgraded Arena-E received several miniature MRLS antenna posts for detecting and “capturing” ATGMs flying up to the tank / BMP, which increased the survivability and reliability of the complex. The main performance characteristics remain the same: the maximum speed of the target being hit is 2520 km / h, the detection range of the attacking projectile is 50 m, the azimuth protection sector is 270 degrees, and the elevation sector is from -6 to + 20 degrees. And it is precisely in the small elevation interception sector that the problem of all existing KAZ is, since the self-aiming combat elements (SPBE) of the TAURUS-M cassette warhead are lowered to the target with angles close to 90 degrees - it is not possible to destroy them with ordinary KAZ. But let us not think so pessimistically: troop "Torahs" and "Pantsiri" hardly leave any chances for a "breakthrough" of our airspace from the side of the western aggressor, and the shooting at the Kapustin Yar proving dozens of times confirmed this.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIFIED NATO AIRCRAFT SYSTEM HAS A VERY STEPPENT POSITION BEFORE THE SWEDGE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF RUSSIA
Returning to the previously promised review of the potential of the Joint NATO Air Defense System in Europe, it is worth noting that any strategic aerospace offensive operation (SVCNO) of the North Atlantic alliance against Russia will last exactly as long as the West needs to fully experience and realize all economic and military-political charms "from the response of our side. The conflict is unlikely to escalate into a nuclear confrontation, and the technical impossibility of completely destroying the industrial and military infrastructure of our country will reduce the confrontation to a limited "attack" of the NATO bloc with far-reaching consequences for it.
In the Baltic and Black Sea operational areas of NATO air defense and missile defense, it is formed on the basis of two regional anti-missile complexes Aegis Ashore (near the Polish city of Redzikovo and the Romanian Deveselu), as well as covering their air defense missile / anti-missile systems Patriot PAC-2 / 3. In the central part of Eastern Europe, there is a 1 division of the S-300PS air defense system of the Slovak Air Force, and about 15 similar Ukrainian complexes. In addition, several Aegis-Arleigh Burke-class URO destroyers and Ticonderoga-class missile cruisers can be additionally sent to the Black and Baltic Seas, which will become the advanced positional missile defense system SM-3 along with Ashora. But, in fairness, I note that these ships can be considered the first contenders from the European missile defense link to destroy our anti-ship missiles and torpedo armament of diesel-electric submarines, especially in the Black Sea, where the dominance of the Black Sea Fleet and Russian naval aviation is most pronounced.
As for the "Patriots", they have very limited abilities to combat cruise missiles and other low-flying targets (NLC). The AN / MPQ-53 multifunctional radars for illumination and guidance are not placed on universal towers, which limits the radio horizon of the 30 — 33 complex to kilometers in the Kyrgyz Republic, flying at an altitude of 60 m (C-300 and C-400, thanks to 25-meter 40В6MMMET systems, the 38 meter and the C-40 system) 3 km for a similar purpose). In addition, the Patriot PAC-3 with its ERINT anti-ballistic missiles is “sharpened” to combat tactical ballistic missiles in the context of low average intensity radio resistance, when intercepted, the ERINT cruise missile will fly up to it in a descending trajectory: in the active radar radar range homing heads will get all of our sources of electronic warfare (airplanes and EW drones, etc.). The maximum speed of targeted targets for the Patriot PAC-5800 is approximately 2 km / h (almost 300 times less than C-1PMU-9), which will create certain difficulties not only in the destruction of new hypersonic Zircon missiles, but and existing high-speed, low-profile and maneuverable "Iskander." Aegis Ashor, which is being developed to combat exclusively ballistic targets, simply “will not pull” the “stealth” rocket 728М174 OTRK Iskander-K and a whole “swarm” of similar “Caliber”. In theory, they could use their “advanced asset” in the land “Ajis Ashorah” - the long-range RIM-6 “SM-240 ERAM” SAM with ARGSN, which would receive target designation from AWACS aircraft. Its range is close to 180 km, NLTs is about 41, but imagine how many MU 150 land UVUs are needed, separated by a fence each km 20 along the line passing through the territories of Eastern NATO countries to reliably protect the alliance airspace from breakthroughs of hundreds of thousands of Russian strategic cruise missiles. No less than 25 — 5 of objects “Ashor”, which will cost approximately XNUMX billion dollars, but still will not guarantee one hundred percent protection.
From all we make the unequivocal and unpleasant conclusion for NATO that whatever the "Great Wall of China" from "Ashorov" and "Patriots" the Americans did not build in Eastern Europe, their anti-aircraft and anti-missile qualities will not allow us to achieve comprehensive defense from our Sun in the European theater. At the same time, the capabilities of our air defense and missile defense systems, at a quite satisfactory level, ensure the safety of most strategically important industrial enterprises and military facilities, especially in the center of the state, and also create favorable conditions for the actions of the Russian ground forces in the border areas where there is a danger of work assault and strike aircraft of the enemy. This has been achieved not only due to the geographical factor of the gigantic area of the Russian Federation, but also thanks to a more advanced technological base of air defense weapons. With the entry of 8-channel anti-aircraft missile systems С-350 "Vityaz" into Russian videoconferencing systems, Russian air defense will acquire improved "all-view abilities" at the division level to combat the "complex" CU, attacking from different directions.
The overall assessment of the results of the likely use of the Pentagon’s “Third Offset” strategy in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe does not allow the West to feed itself with any illusions about the domination of NATO in this region. This is well understood in Washington and Brussels, and therefore the “loud” article by James Hasik, mentioned at the beginning of our review, is a real propaganda “zomb” of the leading Western press.
But there are also such aspects of the use of Vyborg and Dmitrov, which the BF can bring tangible success in terms of protection from British or American multi-purpose nuclear submarines like Trafalgar, Astyut and Los Angeles, which may well go to the Baltic Sea to strike Tomahawk cruise missiles deep into our territory. These submarines with 95% probability, as we know from the teachings, will not be able to detect quiet and small diesel-electric submarines, and will be easily destroyed by torpedoes from 6 533-mm TA. Here we can say that Astyuta and Trafalgar can launch Tomahawks from the shores of Denmark or Norway, but this is minus 600 — 700 km of flight distance.
Unique ultra-quiet diesel-electric submarine pr.677 "Lada". In addition to 6 standard 533-mm torpedo tubes, the submarine has a ten-fold universal vertical launcher for anti-ship missiles 3M55 Onyx and all modifications of the Caliber cruise missile, including the strategic 3M14. All 3 submarines under construction and tested (St. Petersburg, Kronshtadt and Velikiye Luki) are for the North fleet The Russian Navy, while the military-political situation for several years dictates an urgent need to replenish the underwater components of the Baltic Fleet
The diesel submarines of the 877 project have one more possibility, which is absent in NATO non-nuclear submarines. Their 533-mm torpedo tubes can launch 3М14 Caliber strategic cruise missiles at strategic targets in any European country from a submerged position. All the diesel-electric submarines / diesel engines of NATO fleets are capable of using only Sub-Harpoon UGM-84 anti-ship missiles. But the question still remains open: the number of NATO naval submarines operating in the Baltic Sea is 10 times larger than ours, and the “anaerobic” autonomy of the underwater stroke of some of them is more than 20-25 times. The only way out is to accelerate the development program of a highly efficient air-independent power plant (VNEU) for non-nuclear submarines of the 677 Ave. Lada.
Lada will equip with a promising VNEU based on an electrochemical generator (similar to the German U-212 concept), but with hydrogen generation by the decomposition of diesel fuel. Work in this area is conducted by the Rubin Central Design Bureau. According to Igor Vilnit, Director General of Rubn, the modular design of the new unit will allow installing it not only on parallel submarines under construction, but also to replace it on submarines already in the fleet. Sea trials of the advanced power plant will begin in the Baltic Sea already this year.
At the end of his article, Hasik begins to simply “shine” with his deep knowledge of modern air defense systems, as well as active protection systems for armored vehicles. He proposes to destroy a mixed anti-aircraft missile unit deployed “near the bridge” by striking one guided bombs with semi-active laser guidance. But this decision does not closely correspond to the realities of modern battle tactics. Firstly, no mixed anti-aircraft missile division (under the command of a sane person) will be a dense concentration of ZRSK, ZRAK, MANPADS and anti-aircraft artillery on a small "heel" of land at the entrance to the bridge. All air defenses will be located at an optimal distance from each other so that ZRSKs can be mutually protected by others: for example, Tor-M2, located at the entrance to the bridge, has a “dead zone” in 1 km, in case it misses the PSLR or UAB, in 300 — 500 meters behind, there can be an Armor “Pantsir-С1”, which will safely “finish off” the flying WTO. Additional air defense systems (MANPADS operators and anti-aircraft artillery complexes) can be scattered in different directions from the entrance to the bridge in the radius 1 — 2 km. Imagine what type of warhead this UAB should have to destroy such an air defense unit. Isn't it a tactical nuclear weapon or a high-frequency electromagnetic generator? Interesting But why then bomb laser guidance?
However, we have the answer to this option, and not just one. For the destruction of such "smart" aerial bombs, our experts have developed a combat EMP generator "Ranets-E". The specialized protected PBU, located on the MAZ chassis, is equipped with a powerful parabolic mirror with a high-frequency electromagnetic radiator. A focused beam can actually “burn through” the electronics of any promising means of air attack at a distance of about 15 km and make its correct functioning impossible at a distance of 40 km. It is known that “Ranets-E” can be completed with 45 and 50 dB antenna with radiation angles 60 and 20 degrees, respectively. But that's not all. Any controlled aerial bombs, even in the amount of a couple of dozen, can be intercepted directly by anti-aircraft missile systems, which these bombs are intended for. All modern complexes (Tor-M1, Tor-M2, Pantsir-C1) are capable of knocking down similar objects at a distance of 5 — 12 km (depending on the EPR). And if C-300PM / C-400 will operate in the area, such a bomb will not fly to the hypothetical “bridge with anti-aircraft guns” on 20 km. Apparently Hasik re-read the blinkered Western literature about the operation “Desert Storm”, where the “invisible” “Naythoki” destroyed the fortified areas and bunkers of the Iraqi army, which were covered only with outdated OSRs “Wasp” and “Shilkami”.
Then Hasik proposes to fight with the “Russians tanks near the Fulda Gap" by dropping cluster bombs with self-targeting submunitions from IKGSN (Hasik calls them "sensor fuses"). But what does the Fulda corridor have to do with it? In the list of tasks of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces, even in the event of a conflict with NATO in Eastern Europe, there are no plans for a forced march of the 20th Combined Arms Army to the center of Western Europe to the French border, where they will have to "mess around" with thousands of NATO units armed with modern anti-tank systems Spike, Javelin and drones with Brimstone tactical missiles on board. The main task of our army is to hold the Belarusian-Polish border, the Kaliningrad region, not to let NATO units in the Baltic states “raise their heads”, to stop the enemy’s possible maneuvers on the territory of Ukraine, by the way, along with the activities of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Our Tu-160 strategic bombers, “equipped” with hundreds of Caliber TFRs, which should successfully overcome all the air defense lines of the alliance, will be engaged in “shaking” the strategic depth of NATO in Western Europe. We will consider the latter at the end of the article. Now back to NATO cluster bombs and Russian tanks.
The fact that our tank brigades will operate under the cover of military air defense, as well as Russian air defense aviation close to the border, the missile and bomb strikes of the NATO airborne assault aircraft will be sporadic. The scenario, when the link of the British or German tactical strike fighters "Tornad GR.4" will carry out unobstructed bombing on our armored vehicles, will not work here. From this it becomes clear that in order to combat our NE, NATO tactical aviation will be forced to use high-precision missile weapons with a range of more than 150 km in order not to enter the defeat zone of our air defense. As an example of such weapons, a tactical long-range cruise missile “TAURUS-M” immediately appears in front of us.
The cruise missile "TAURUS-M" is a cassette modification of the famous concrete-drilling "TAURUS KEPD 350". The rocket is equipped with a powerful TRX P8300-15 Williams International 680 kgf. It gives the rocket flight speed from 650 to 1050 km / h in following the terrain at an altitude of 20-30 m. A rectangular cross section of the hull and the use of composite materials reduces the TAURUS-M radar signature several times, which makes it possible for a local air defense breakthrough organized by C-300PM complexes. After all, such a low-altitude “stealth” rocket can even penetrate the HNO 76H6E area of view at distances more than 30 km, in the most difficult terrain, etc., and the Three Hundred divisions cannot be placed every 20 km in the area of combat action. To destroy "TAURUS-M" can also ZORSK "Tor-М2", covering the tank units; but sometimes everything can go under a worse scenario: a military air defense system overloaded with interception of drones may not have time to react to the low-profile TAURUS, then all hope remains for increasing the capabilities of active defense complexes (KAZ) of our tanks.
To date, a very small number of main battle tanks of the Western Military District are equipped with active defense complexes, but work in this area is carried out daily. So, in September 2015 of the year, it became known about the installation of KAZ "Arena-E" for some MBT T-72B3 ZVO. The upgraded Arena-E received several miniature MRLS antenna posts for detecting and “capturing” ATGMs flying up to the tank / BMP, which increased the survivability and reliability of the complex. The main performance characteristics remain the same: the maximum speed of the target being hit is 2520 km / h, the detection range of the attacking projectile is 50 m, the azimuth protection sector is 270 degrees, and the elevation sector is from -6 to + 20 degrees. And it is precisely in the small elevation interception sector that the problem of all existing KAZ is, since the self-aiming combat elements (SPBE) of the TAURUS-M cassette warhead are lowered to the target with angles close to 90 degrees - it is not possible to destroy them with ordinary KAZ. But let us not think so pessimistically: troop "Torahs" and "Pantsiri" hardly leave any chances for a "breakthrough" of our airspace from the side of the western aggressor, and the shooting at the Kapustin Yar proving dozens of times confirmed this.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIFIED NATO AIRCRAFT SYSTEM HAS A VERY STEPPENT POSITION BEFORE THE SWEDGE OF THE ARMED FORCES OF RUSSIA
Returning to the previously promised review of the potential of the Joint NATO Air Defense System in Europe, it is worth noting that any strategic aerospace offensive operation (SVCNO) of the North Atlantic alliance against Russia will last exactly as long as the West needs to fully experience and realize all economic and military-political charms "from the response of our side. The conflict is unlikely to escalate into a nuclear confrontation, and the technical impossibility of completely destroying the industrial and military infrastructure of our country will reduce the confrontation to a limited "attack" of the NATO bloc with far-reaching consequences for it.
In the Baltic and Black Sea operational areas of NATO air defense and missile defense, it is formed on the basis of two regional anti-missile complexes Aegis Ashore (near the Polish city of Redzikovo and the Romanian Deveselu), as well as covering their air defense missile / anti-missile systems Patriot PAC-2 / 3. In the central part of Eastern Europe, there is a 1 division of the S-300PS air defense system of the Slovak Air Force, and about 15 similar Ukrainian complexes. In addition, several Aegis-Arleigh Burke-class URO destroyers and Ticonderoga-class missile cruisers can be additionally sent to the Black and Baltic Seas, which will become the advanced positional missile defense system SM-3 along with Ashora. But, in fairness, I note that these ships can be considered the first contenders from the European missile defense link to destroy our anti-ship missiles and torpedo armament of diesel-electric submarines, especially in the Black Sea, where the dominance of the Black Sea Fleet and Russian naval aviation is most pronounced.
As for the "Patriots", they have very limited abilities to combat cruise missiles and other low-flying targets (NLC). The AN / MPQ-53 multifunctional radars for illumination and guidance are not placed on universal towers, which limits the radio horizon of the 30 — 33 complex to kilometers in the Kyrgyz Republic, flying at an altitude of 60 m (C-300 and C-400, thanks to 25-meter 40В6MMMET systems, the 38 meter and the C-40 system) 3 km for a similar purpose). In addition, the Patriot PAC-3 with its ERINT anti-ballistic missiles is “sharpened” to combat tactical ballistic missiles in the context of low average intensity radio resistance, when intercepted, the ERINT cruise missile will fly up to it in a descending trajectory: in the active radar radar range homing heads will get all of our sources of electronic warfare (airplanes and EW drones, etc.). The maximum speed of targeted targets for the Patriot PAC-5800 is approximately 2 km / h (almost 300 times less than C-1PMU-9), which will create certain difficulties not only in the destruction of new hypersonic Zircon missiles, but and existing high-speed, low-profile and maneuverable "Iskander." Aegis Ashor, which is being developed to combat exclusively ballistic targets, simply “will not pull” the “stealth” rocket 728М174 OTRK Iskander-K and a whole “swarm” of similar “Caliber”. In theory, they could use their “advanced asset” in the land “Ajis Ashorah” - the long-range RIM-6 “SM-240 ERAM” SAM with ARGSN, which would receive target designation from AWACS aircraft. Its range is close to 180 km, NLTs is about 41, but imagine how many MU 150 land UVUs are needed, separated by a fence each km 20 along the line passing through the territories of Eastern NATO countries to reliably protect the alliance airspace from breakthroughs of hundreds of thousands of Russian strategic cruise missiles. No less than 25 — 5 of objects “Ashor”, which will cost approximately XNUMX billion dollars, but still will not guarantee one hundred percent protection.
The SM-174 ERAM long-range interceptor RIM-6 is equipped with an active radar homing head from an AIM-120C AMRAAM air-to-air missile, thanks to which all Aegis ships, and in the long run Ages Ashor. capable of intercepting either trans-horizon low-altitude targets or targets concealed by natural landforms. Considering that the ground construction of the Aegis Ashor anti-missile complex with the AN / SPY-1D MRLS is located at 15 — 20 m altitude, external targeting from E-3C aircraft will be very difficult to destroy over-the-counter cruise missiles working conditions of Russian fighter aviation with EW complexes on board
From all we make the unequivocal and unpleasant conclusion for NATO that whatever the "Great Wall of China" from "Ashorov" and "Patriots" the Americans did not build in Eastern Europe, their anti-aircraft and anti-missile qualities will not allow us to achieve comprehensive defense from our Sun in the European theater. At the same time, the capabilities of our air defense and missile defense systems, at a quite satisfactory level, ensure the safety of most strategically important industrial enterprises and military facilities, especially in the center of the state, and also create favorable conditions for the actions of the Russian ground forces in the border areas where there is a danger of work assault and strike aircraft of the enemy. This has been achieved not only due to the geographical factor of the gigantic area of the Russian Federation, but also thanks to a more advanced technological base of air defense weapons. With the entry of 8-channel anti-aircraft missile systems С-350 "Vityaz" into Russian videoconferencing systems, Russian air defense will acquire improved "all-view abilities" at the division level to combat the "complex" CU, attacking from different directions.
The overall assessment of the results of the likely use of the Pentagon’s “Third Offset” strategy in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe does not allow the West to feed itself with any illusions about the domination of NATO in this region. This is well understood in Washington and Brussels, and therefore the “loud” article by James Hasik, mentioned at the beginning of our review, is a real propaganda “zomb” of the leading Western press.
Information