Unique anti-aircraft complex medium-range "Buk-2M"

It is well known that in modern military conflicts, one of the main blows is delivered by air defense aviation offensive side.

At present, the confrontation between aviation and air defense means is the main factor determining the further development of a military conflict.

In the conditions of an air attack of the enemy, the task of anti-aircraft missile systems is to destroy the strike group of aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles, attacking from low and high altitudes.

In order to perform these tasks under the conditions of constant electronic countermeasures, domestic developers have developed and launched into production the latest Buk-2М operational mission system, which has 9М317 guided missiles. The complex is exported under the name “Buk-M2E”.

Possessing high mobility, provided with multi-channel equipment with wide combat capabilities, the anti-aircraft RK "Buk-2M" is intended to destroy:
- Strategic and tactical aircraft;
- helicopters;
- aviation, cruise, tactical, ballistic missiles;
- unmanned aerial vehicles;
- aerial bombs.
The complex is also capable of firing:
- ground and surface radar-contrast objects;

The “Buk-2M” air defense missile system can function and carry out assigned tasks both independently and as part of an air defense force group. The control is carried out by the “Polyana-D4M1” automated command and control system of the anti-aircraft missile brigade with a mixed grouping or with the use of another automated control system interfacing with the exchange protocols with the complex.

The command post “Buk-2M” has the ability to process incoming information about the situation on 50-aerial objects. Processing takes place either in the existing SOC, or SOC of a higher command post. Also, the command post of the Buk-2M complex, after processing the information, makes assignment of targets for the RPN and SOU.

The fully equipped Buk-2M complex is capable of simultaneously destroying 24 air targets.

The area of ​​the complex:
- 3-40 kilometers in range at a target speed of about 850 m / s;
- 45 kilometers in range at a target speed of about 300 m / s;
- height of destruction - 15-25000 meters;
- the defeat of missiles at a distance of 20 kilometers;
- the defeat of aerial bombs and aircraft at an altitude of 100-20000 meters;
- the probability of hitting helicopters and enemy aircraft to 0.95;
- The probability of hitting tactical missiles to 0.7;
- the probability of hitting cruise missiles to 0.8;
- The probability of hitting helicopters in hover mode to 0.4.
The reaction time for Buk-2 is about 11 seconds.
The 9М317 guided missile of the Buk-2М anti-aircraft complex uses an inertial method with electronic correction of guidance, on its own target homing system is activated.
The complex is made for all-weather use. Temperature range -50- + 50 degrees Celsius, with air humidity up to 98 percent.
Combat compartments have a heating and air conditioning system. The complex can be installed on a wheeled or tracked chassis with high maneuverability.

The full structure of the Buk-2M system:
fighting means:
- guided missiles 9М317;
- SOU 9А317 and 9А318;
- ROM 9А316 and 9А320;
control systems:
- command post 9C510;
- Radar detection 9C18М1-3;
- “RPN” - radar guidance and illumination 9C36.
In the Buk-2М 9K317 system, two types of fire sections can be used:
- four sections on 1 ROM and 1 SOU with the possibility of simultaneous destruction of 4 goals with the terrain of 2 meter;
- two sections on 2 ROM and 1 RPN with the possibility of simultaneous destruction of 4-s goals with the relief of the area 2о meters;
Chassis installation:
- The sow is installed on the GM-569 tracked chassis;
- ROM - on the GM-577 tracked chassis;
- KP - on the caterpillar chassis GM-579 or 9001 autotrain on a wheeled chassis;
- Radar detection - on the crawler chassis GM-567M;
- on-load tap-changer - on tracked chassis or 9001 road-train on wheeled chassis;
The Ulyanovsk Mechanical Plant is engaged in the serial production of the unique Buk-2М medium-range anti-aircraft missile system and its export version of the Buk-2М.
A whole complex of work was carried out at the plant to reorganize technical processes and retool equipment to a more modern one. The workshop for the production of antenna systems was commissioned. A center of retraining and training of specialists has been created for the training of its own and foreign specialists for the maintenance and repair of the complexes produced.

Comments

[ronin]

To Syria! Urgently send to Syria.

[marauder]

It seems that in Syria they are already on duty.
Therefore, the Pindos point plays, fly over Syria.

[Vadivak]

The Chinese may get ahead, China has already begun to offer copies of the Russian Buk-M2 air defense system for export. Although in this case it does not matter, the question is in the very existence of Syria

[Insurgent]

Syria they can not help them and you must be able to use

[Insurgent]

in Syria, I fly Amer’s drones cheekily and with impunity, and they put armor

[Dimani]

urgently to the troops !!

[vadimus]

This is how much is needed to cover our sky? Hurry up! Technique thing!

[gispanec]

urgently to the troops of the Russian Federation ..... and until we fully equip not figs to drive for export

[urzul]

Export is an increase in the series of output, and, accordingly, a decrease in the cost of each product

[Fuck_usa]

For the army to buy and the more the better !!!

[tronin.maxim]

Very good characteristics, especially work from - 50 to + 50. The most important launch in the series has been made, and in the future the volumes will increase.

[Black Colonel]

It’s also interesting that it can work on both ground and surface targets He served in the early 80s at the Krug complex. "Buk-2M" is of course a great thing !!! There would be more of such products, but the calculations should be properly prepared ...

[Bob]

More to such beauties! It is necessary to launch a series in order to reduce unit costs and put them wherever it is necessary so that not a single fly (adndroid or some other crap) flies.

[wasjasibirjac]

androids don't fly, they run

[dred]

I agree with you Bob. And then just do fear lost.

[Artemka]

They never had it, no one has ever fought with them on their territory.

[Dimka off]

read, rejoiced for the achievements of our designers)) the article is good)

[X-SPIRIT-X]

the western border is already covered
http://www.lenta.ru/news/2011/12/15/torm2/

[NickitaDembelnulsa]

Modifications of the M1 are already on the Kuril Islands, they are waiting for the M2 soon, the complex is really very good, but knowing our Ministry of Defense, such air defense systems will arrive to the troops very late ...

[sedoj]

Sorry you are right.

[serezhafedotow]

Wipe the snot!

[mishan]

An article for those who say that there is no gap between the S-400 and the Pantsir! We also have medium-range complexes, and we also have wonderful Torahs.

[Lord of the Sith]

As of 2010, there are 350 Buk-1Ms on duty in the Russian Armed Forces
There is a gradual re-equipment on the Buk-2M

[Komsomolets]

Lord of the Sith, do not lead people astray. There has never been such a quantity of Buk-M1 air defense systems in the Russian army. And even more so on alert.
And in general, under 350 "Buk-M1" (in your abbreviation "Buk-1M"), what do you understand, the number of air defense missile systems, or SOU, or the number of target channels?
If we take the air defense system's duty as a basis, then there should be at least 87 Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile brigades in Russia, which is obvious nonsense, after the collapse of the Union we got 12 of them. Accordingly, these brigades have 24 SDUs, i.e. a total of 288 SOUs (target channels). How many are now in service, and even in a combat-ready state, history is silent. The state is depressing ....... And "Buk-M2" as part of one "parade" weather division does not play ...

[FROST]

Moved off-top from a neighboring branch.

So all the same, why cannot the BUK medium-range complex be placed closer than 20-30 km? In what charters are these instructions written?

Due to the significantly longer coagulation and deployment time than in short-range systems, the need for prepared interchangeable positions, and vulnerability to conventional shrapnel-fragmentation ammunition, he cannot move at the forefront with advancing tank units. If he turns on the radiation at the forefront, then he will be immediately spotted and covered with artillery while he is being rolled up. These are the basics of using air defense systems.
The range of effective use against a maneuvering approaching target (anti-missile maneuvers "snake", "spiral") is on average 1,5 times less than for a non-maneuvering target. The firing range for low-altitude approaching targets is on average 1,7-1,8 times less than for medium-altitude targets due to the influence of a much higher atmospheric density on the kinetic energy of the rocket and the complexity of radar tracking against the background of the earth. Even if, contrary to all common sense, it is located 10 km (almost behind the back) of the front tanks conducting ground combat, the distance to the low-flying, maneuvering aircraft attacking the tanks will be 20-25 km, and these will not be approaching targets, because planes using missiles let-and-forget, approaching the border of destruction will launch and immediately turn around. Using the latest missile modifications, aircraft can attack from long distances. The range to attack helicopters in hover mode will be the same 20-22 km. The latter, with the use of overhead radars and the possibility of detecting and launching hiding behind breaks in the terrain, are practically invulnerable in the face of defense from advancing tank units.

It does not follow from all this demagogy that aviation itself, without a missile defense system, can suppress air defense like Iraq, Iran, the remnants of anti-aircraft defense of collapsed Yugoslavia with acceptable losses.

Why do you think so? During a desert storm, only 280 tomahawks were fired, destroying pinpoint targets. For 70-75 percent of them, the targets were command and control centers, command headquarters, communications centers, power plants, static positions of surface-to-surface missiles, runways, hangars, troop concentrations, manufacturing plants and WMD warehouses. Only a quarter fell on static air defense objects. According to American data, the effectiveness of the missiles was approximately 80%. According to the Iraqis, they managed to shoot down 29 missiles, although this data may need to be taken with skepticism. As a result, we have 50-60 hit point targets of the static air defense infrastructure. At the same time, the Iraqi air defense had thousands of medium-range missile launchers consisting of 38 S-75 air defense systems, 50 S-125 air defense systems, 36 Kvadrat air defense systems, additionally having 18 Crotal air defense systems, 40 Roland-2 air defense systems of the French production, 23 air defense systems "Osa-M", 1235 MANPADS "Strela-1M, 2M", SAM "Strela-10" SV, 302 MANPADS "Igla-1" and 994 anti-aircraft guns calibers 23 mm, 37 mm, 57 mm, 85 and 100 mm, ZSU-23-4 and ZSU-57-2 Soviet production. Air defense units were equipped with French TOMSON radars, as well as Soviet radars of various types. NATO aircraft made more than 1000 launches of anti-radar missiles harm and more than 300 launches of alarm missiles only on enemy radars. 70-80% of launches were considered successful. This is not counting the huge number of air defense objects affected by other ammunition. In this example, the question of the effectiveness of the Air Force in suppressing air defense can be considered closed.
In addition, cruise missiles are also considered weapons of the Air Force, as are the standard weapons of the B-52 aircraft.

And the Syrians don’t especially drag in the Bekaa Valley, the Bekaa Valley - nothing special - because 20 batteries are not in the territory of Syria itself, of course a powerful grouping.

Do you contradict yourself? Write right there

However, such impressive forces could not resist Israeli aviation.

The grouping of Syrian troops in Lebanon included four air defense brigades equipped with the Kvadrat, S-75M Volga, and Pechora S-125M Russian anti-aircraft missile systems. On the night of June 9–10, 1982, the 82nd Mixed Anti-aircraft Missile Brigade and three anti-aircraft artillery regiments were additionally introduced into Lebanon. There were now 24 Syrian anti-aircraft missile divisions deployed in Lebanon in a tight military formation 30 km long along the front and 28 km in depth. According to Russian military experts, there was no such dense concentration of air defense and artillery forces anywhere in the world.The main purpose of these forces was to cover the Syrian forces in the Lebanese valley of Bekaa, where at least 600 tanks were concentrated.

The personnel did not have the necessary experience, there was almost complete lack of knowledge about the tactics of enemy aircraft, the recommendations of Soviet military specialists were not always fully taken into account, which, however, was characteristic of the Syrian side throughout the entire Soviet-Syrian cooperation.

To put it mildly, this is not true. There stood the Syrian army, fully equipped with Russian weapons and managed by thousands of Russian "military advisers", led by Colonel General G. Yashkin. Thousands of Russian tanks and aircraft of the USSR were transferred to the Syrians in accordance with the 1980 treaty of friendship and cooperation between the USSR and Syria. The main military adviser and adviser to the Minister of Defense of Syria was Colonel General G. Yashkin, who arrived in Syria from the post of deputy commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Air Force deputies - Lieutenant General V. Sokolov, Air Defense - Lieutenant General K. Babenko, EW - Major General Y. Ulchenko subordinated to him. Thousands of Russian officers were at all levels of command of the Syrian forces - from batteries and companies to the Syrian Ministry of Defense.
Syrian troops under the command of Russian "military advisers" occupied strategically important areas of Lebanon. The Syrians themselves allowed in the air defense were considered an elite, the vast majority of whom had higher education. In addition, these were personnel who had the combat experience of previous wars and trained by such veterans. So, do not la la. The disaster in the Bekaa Valley made a shocking impression on the leadership of the USSR. Already in September 1982. in Moscow, a meeting was held in the Central Committee of the CPSU, devoted to the analysis of the battles in Lebanon, where the command of the Soviet Army and the leaders of the military-industrial complex were called to the "carpet". They had to give an answer for the failed readiness of Russian weapons for a modern war. Then, following the results of this “debriefing,” a decision was adopted by the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR.

In general, Lebanon 82 did not really impress me, all the rather outdated air defense systems

What are you unimpressive)) At that time, these were the latest air defense systems.

Well, no one says that the United States will not be able to suppress Liechtenstein's air defense.
And here you take the current Iranian air defense and crush it with the forces of the Franco / Italian alliance.

Iran has the same air defense systems that were in the Bekaa Valley, as well as their analogues. And 30 years have already passed ... Do you make conclusions yourself?

Syrian air defense suppression scheme

[Kars]

Quote: FROST

Due to the significantly longer coagulation and deployment time than short-range systems, the need for prepared replacement positions, and vulnerability to conventional shrapnel-fragmentation munitions, he can’t move at the forefront with advancing tank units.

Bla Bla Bla ----- for those who are in an armored train ----- ACCORDING TO WHAT CHARTERS AND INSTRUCTIONS it is forbidden to place the BUK air defense system in less than 20 km?

Quote: FROST

prepared replacement positions

Why does the mobile system need a prepared position and what is the preparation of it?

Quote: FROST

vulnerabilities from conventional shrapnel-fragmentation ammunition, he can’t move at the forefront with advancing tank units

Firstly, not at the forefront, but behind the vanguard. Somewhere in 3-5 km --- while the radar of detection is at least 20 km, and the launchers themselves are behind the vanguard.
Secondly, the ordinary Grad fires at a distance of 20-40 km --- and what now, due to the likelihood of defeat, take air defense systems to the rear and bury them?

Quote: FROST

The range of effective use against a maneuvering approaching target (anti-missile maneuvers "snake", "spiral") is on average 1,5 times less than for a non-maneuvering target

This is indicated in the characteristics of the complexes and not the range but the likely defeat ---
Maximum range of destruction of aircraft of the type F-15 42 km [6]
The probability of defeat non-maneuvering aircraft 0,7-0,9
Chance of hitting a maneuvering aircraft (7-8g) 0,5-0,7

Quote: FROST

Only 280 Tomahawks Released During Desert Storm

Just - laugh

Quote: FROST

30 km long order along the front and 28 km deep.

Here is precisely a narrow section, and all 20 batteries, and by the way artillery drove along them, but there was no early warning.

Quote: FROST

As a result, we have 50-60 hit point targets for a static air defense infrastructure

If you are so smart, you might think that these stationary air defense objects are directly related to the effectiveness of air defense - although I think you don’t understand this.

Quote: FROST

Do you contradict yourself? Write right there
However, such impressive forces could not resist the Israeli aviation.

There is none, then I quote the excuse of Soviet instructors.

Quote: FROST

How unimpressive you are)) At that time, these were the latest air defense systems

Well, actually not the newest ones, but also what was used in the 1973 war even without modernization, and Israel used the latest weapons of destruction, at least study the topic

Quote: FROST

Iran has the same air defense systems that were in the Bekaa Valley, as well as their analogues. And 30 years have already passed ... Do you make conclusions yourself?

Of course I’ll do it, you didn’t even try to look for something about IRAN’s air defense, so study and give a map of its suppression by the forces of the Franco-Italian alliance without the use of cruise missiles. You can even use the territory controlled by Libya.
http://alternathistory.org.ua/sily-pvo-irana-sostoyanie-i-perspektivy

Quote: FROST

If he turns on the radiation at the forefront, then he will be immediately spotted and covered with artillery while he is being rolled up. These are the basics of using air defense systems

And why should he turn on the radiation at the forefront? And what will detect it then?
And do not confuse launchers with detection and target designation systems
Target detection range of at least 100 km [4] with digital signal processing
The command post processed messages about 46 targets at altitudes up to 20 km in the zone of radius 100 km for a cycle of review of the detection and target designation station and issued self-propelled firing systems up to 6 target designations with an accuracy of 1 ° in azimuth and elevation, 400-700 m-po range.


But all the same, I wait all the same about where in the instructions the location of the complex is determined --- where is the antenna post, where is the CP, where are the launchers

[Kars]

Quote: Kars

Secondly, the ordinary city fires at a distance of 20-40 km

Wildly sorry phrase should sound like this
Secondly, the ordinary Grad and 6 inch self-propelled guns (under the word 6 inch is meant the caliber 152-155 mm)

[Kars]

[

Quote: FROST

The main military adviser and adviser to the Minister of Defense of Syria was Colonel General G. Yashkin, who arrived in Syria from the post of deputy commander in chief of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany. Air Force deputies - Lieutenant General V. Sokolov, Air Defense - Lieutenant General K. Babenko, EW - Major General Y. Ulchenko, obeyed him.

They obeyed him, and who were their subordinates?

Quote: FROST

Thousands of Russian officers were at all levels of command of the Syrian forces - from batteries and companies to the Syrian Ministry of Defense.

What are the losses suffered by Russian officers in the suppression of Syrian air defense in the Bekaa Valley? They should be if there were thousands of them.

And if you can source.

[Kars]

Quote: FROST

During the desert storm, only 280 tomahawks were released that destroyed point targets

tomahawks engaged in a small settlement account ---- somehow it turned out interestingly
288 (307 were launched, 288,242 were able to fly, hit targets) In the Desert Bure, then during 1993-98 there were 28 launches ---- and this is plus air strikes. and on you please in 2003 you need to issue 725 (from above) Tomahawks to defeat some kind of Iraq, which since 1990 was under an arms embargo ---- so it’s easier, easier, etc. --- everything was messed up over 1040 (most likely more) KR Tomahawk
Draw conclusions (the fact that not all Tomahawks attacked air defense is even more in favor of my opinion ----- it means Aviation could not hit these targets on its own, and had to go the expensive way.)

[FROST]

quote] Of course I’ll do it, you didn’t even try to look for something about IRAN’s air defense, so study [/ quote]

So maybe before writing another stupidity, you should study it yourself?

Iran has no reliable data on the presence of the S-300.

For medium and long range complexes

12-15 (16 according to IISS) divisions - 150 PU air defense systems “Hawk” / “Advanced Hawk”;
8-10 divisions - 45 PU air defense systems HQ-2J (Chinese version of the Soviet air defense system S-75 - SA-2 Gudeline);
2-3 (10 according to IISS) PU SAM S-200 (SA-5 Gammon)
several air defense systems "Square" (SA-6 Gainful, according to JCSS + negotiations on the purchase of additional)

Air defense missile system Hawk, this is an approximate analogue of the Soviet air defense system square, which the Syrians had. As well as the last one, it is long outdated. HQ-2J - about the same C-75 that stood at the Syrians. The S-200 is generally not effective against tactical aircraft in view of the restrictions on attacking targets performing maneuvers with high overload. Not mobile, easily destroyed, has a very low noise immunity, is outdated even more. And besides, only 2-3 launchers. As a result, we have approximately 25-26 divisions of approximately the same complexes as in the Bekaa Valley, to protect the whole Country. The Syrians could not defend just one tank group with 24 divisions. Draw conclusions.
Everything else is short-range air defense systems that can be easily destroyed even with conventional cluster bombs from an altitude of 7-8 km (and that is only in the case of Thor, the rest can be safely and from an altitude of 4-5 km).

[quote] Wildly sorry phrase should sound like this
Secondly, an ordinary Grad and 6 inch self-propelled guns (under the word 6 inch there is a caliber of 152-155 mm in view) [/ quote]

So draw conclusions about the survival of the military air defense systems covering the advancing tank units in this case. And also add mortars with simple howitzers, if you put the complexes on the very front.

[quote] EMU obeyed, and who was in their subordinates? [/ quote]

All surname?)

[quote] What are the losses suffered by Russian officers in the suppression of Syrian air defense in the Bekaa Valley? They should be if there were thousands of them.

And if you can source. [/ Quote]

The union of these data tried not to disclose.

[quote] 288 (307 were launched, 288,242 were able to fly, hit targets) In the Desert Bure, then during 1993-98 another 28 launches ---- and this is plus air strikes. and you, please, in 2003, you need to issue 725 (above) Tomahawks to defeat some kind of Iraq, which since 1990 has been under an arms embargo ---- so it’s easier, simpler, etc. --- over 1040 were messed up with everything (most likely more) KR Tomahawk
Draw conclusions (the fact that not all Tomahawks attacked air defense is even more in favor of my opinion ----- it means Aviation could not hit these targets on its own, and had to go the expensive way.) [/ Quote]

Following your logic, in the second war they should have used much less CR than in the first. Indeed, the air defense system of Iraq in the second war, should have been much weaker given the embargo and the huge number of destroyed systems in the first war. But no, they used 2 times more. Simply using a CD allows you to achieve results faster and reduces risk.
In addition to the cost, the cost of the AGM-88A / B / C / D rocket: about 300 thousand dollars. The cost of the AGM-88 E is about a million dollars, almost the same as the tomahawk. In Iraq, more than 1000 harmas and a total of 50-60 tomahawks were fired at enemy air defense facilities. 200-300 alarm rockets were also used.

[quote] Well, actually, not the newest ones, but also what was used in the 1973 war even without modernization, and Israel used the latest weapons of destruction, at least learn a topic [/ quote]

Perhaps you need to study the topic, a solid space. At that time, these complexes were considered quite modern, there was nothing radically better in service then. And according to statements by representatives of the Israeli Air Force, most of the complexes were destroyed by conventional anti-radar missiles and cluster bombs. And for example, the BUK complex you are considering, which is considered quite modern, is today older than the square at that time.

[quote] here, study and give the alignment of its suppression by the forces of the Franco-Italian alliance without the use of cruise missiles. You can even use the territory controlled by Libya. [/ quote]

Read about Iran's air defense systems above, compare them with Syrian. And add that they will be attacked not by outdated kfirs and phantoms, but by the latest Rafali and Typhoons, with advanced avionics and new weapons.

[Kars]

[quote = FROST] So draw conclusions about the survival of military air defense systems covering the advancing tank units in this case. And also add mortars with simple howitzers, if you put the complexes to the very front. [/ Quote]

Why are they in the rear?
Do not you think your thinking is simply wretched ---- do you remove your anti-aircraft defense from the front end so that the enemy aviation calmly destroys your military assets? Brilliant. Congratulations. And what is it possible to do weak battery work? [Quote = FROST] All surnames?) [ / quote]
10 man along with posts [quote = FROST] Union of these data tried not to disclose [/ quote]
Simply put, you cannot confirm your words
[quote = FROST] Following your logic, in the second war should have applied significantly less CR than in the first [/ quote]
Yes, you already destroyed Iraq’s air defense in 1991 (in your words)
[quote = FROST] But no, they used 2 times more. Just using CD allows you to achieve results faster and reduces risk. [/ Quote]
Exactly, you couldn’t destroy Iraq’s air defense, and the aircraft couldn’t work efficiently because of the losses. [Quote = FROST] In addition to the cost, The cost of the AGM-88A / B / C / D rocket: about 300 thousand dollars. The cost of the AGM-88 E is about a million dollars, almost the same as the tomahawk. In Iraq, over 1000 kharmas and all 50-60 tomahawks were issued on enemy air defense facilities. 200-300 alarm rockets were also used. [/ Quote]
And the cost of 1000 pound joint venture FAP 16 000 dollars, but since Iraq's air defense turned out to be so strong, expensive URs had to be used
[quote = FROST] At that time, these complexes were considered quite modern, there was nothing radically better in service then [/ quote]
Yes, misery continues - technological progress during the Cold War took great strides (I hope you do not need to say that this is a figurative expression?) And all the complexes were in the process of modernization, and after the mentioned events from the USSR deliveries began, for example, C-200 - but then study for yourself, there are also about deliveries of REB
[quote = FROST] Yes, and according to statements by representatives of the Israeli Air Force, most of the complexes were destroyed by conventional anti-radar missiles and cluster bombs [/ quote]
Well, then, according to them, what are unusual missiles?
[quote = FROST] And for example, the BUK complex you are considering, which is considered quite modern, today is older than the square at that time. [/ quote]
Did you come up with this yourself? On what scale did you define it?
[quote = FROST] here, study and give the alignment of its suppression by the forces of the Franco-Italian alliance without the use of cruise missiles. You can even use the territory controlled by Libya. [/ quote]

Read about Iran's air defense systems above, compare them with Syrian. And add that they will be attacked not by outdated kfirs and phantoms, but by the latest Rafali and Typhoons, with advanced avionics and new weapons [/ quote]

Simply put, you can’t do it, but you threatened that a specialist
[quote = FROST] Application of masking measures, selection of areas for laying cables. [/ quote]
For a mobile complex? Cable?
Everything else is bullshit

If you are a professional, write at what distance - MAXIMUM--
maybe STARTING installation from KP
[quote = FROST] Any similar powerful sources of electromagnetic radiation are detected and detected very quickly and easily [/ quote]
It can’t be, right? And so what? The radar is not at the forefront, if you don’t know it, RADIUS 100 km [quote = FROST] locators (for clarity, see the first photo in this article) on the control panels themselves [/ quote]
But you don’t know that they turn on when the Launcher has already received target designation and starts firing at the target, the operating time will be faster than the anti-aircraft missile engine that it launches, and after that the launcher can change its position
[quote = FROST] Antenna post at a distance, gearbox with launchers ranging from several tens to several hundred meters from each other with control and communication via cables, to ensure the necessary reliability of controlling the system in the conditions of radio interference interference [/ quote]
LINK and preferably on the length of the cables.

And again you did not answer the question - I write in capital letters.

IN WHICH INSTRUCTIONS IT IS FORBIDDEN TO PLACE ANTI-AXIS AT DISTANCE LESS THAN 20 KM FROM THE ADVANCED POSITIONS OF ITS EMPLOYEES.
[quote = FROST] Even with such an arrangement, it will not provide effective destruction of low-altitude maneuvering aircraft attacking tanks using modern modifications of high-precision missiles with a range of more than 15 km, and it will also not defeat hovering helicopters in terrain using AGM-114L missiles with distances 10-12 km. And in addition to this, do not forget that it is much easier to hit such air defense systems in such situations. After the radiation is turned on, Harm or Alarm rockets will be launched from them from absolutely safe ranges up to 100 km, [/ quote]

Well, you’re just talking nonsense, where do you get it?
Low-altitude aircraft on tanks ---- and at what distance will they be able to launch their missiles in this case? And read once again the characteristics of the air defense system, you cannot confirm your words.
And so write as if no one except you knows about the same Harm (if it’s so super why do you take away medium-range air defense systems only 30 km away?) That they can’t intercept it? Are there no spare remote radars? and so on? interference cannot be delivered ---- it is clear that you are delitant.
[quote = FROST] AGM-114L from distances 10-12 km [/ quote]
Strange, anti-aircraft missiles have a decrease in range, as you wrote, but there is no Helfaire? Especially the fact that he’s shitty maneuvers on the last part of the trajectory, and so for reference from the 194 Helfaire there were only a few released Apaches in the Desert Bure (not my words, but from the Yankees themselves) defeats of armored vehicles. [quote = FROST] Not to mention that, unlike aircraft [/ quote], still say that the air defense systems are located only at airfields.
Remember once and for all --- everything is vulnerable. But there are still fewer planes.
[quote = FROST] There are two main classes of missile defense maneuvers. [/ quote]
That's just no need for fairy tales ---- give quotes and links, your nonsense .. a sofa .. a strategy to re-read.
What was required to prove, and the rest is UAV UAV UAV
and a sober calculation that it’s better to lose ALL of your troops, or exchange an air defense system’s battery for a squadron of attack aircraft.
[quote = FROST] air defense systems are also very vulnerable from almost all ground-based weapons such as artillery, MLRS, tactical missile systems, ending with tanks, armored vehicles and even infantry, in the case of even small breakthroughs during enemy counterattacks [/ quote]

And why then are they being built? Air defense systems?

Yes, of course, you and the Javelins will be able to go on a counterattack, on my machine gun
[quote = FROST] Military air defense is the same as female pubic hair. Cover, but do not protect. [/ Quote]
Well, is it already like a card will lie down, or you say that without air defense it would be better? [Quote = FROST] The task is to at least be safe from the most massive weapons (given the cost and small number of such complex air defense systems [/ quote]
And at the same time throw your troops to pieces? I am again amazed at your genius
[quote = FROST] Zone Eff. the defeat is the range - at which the rocket maintains sufficient speed for effective maneuvering. [/ quote]
and for ATGMs you don’t even think about it, and so on. Excellent. [quote = Kars] The maximum range of destruction of aircraft of the F-15 type 42 km [6]
The probability of defeat non-maneuvering aircraft 0,7-0,9
The probability of hitting a maneuvering aircraft (7-8g) 0,5-0,7 [/ quote]
And go on ahead of the raspinatsa, and this is not what your stories will outweigh.
[quote = FROST] According to the testimony of Russian military experts, there was no such dense concentration of missile and artillery air defense forces anywhere in the world "you do not understand [/ quote]
Are you looking only for what you like? So look for the reasons for the failure of air defense --- in the first place it will be that the staff was not trained, did not carry out routine maintenance, etc. ---- Speaking more simply, you only see one side, but then your personal problems
[quote = FROST] The Syrians had previously observed the formation of strike groups in the air on their radar [/ quote]
Strange, but is there nothing that MOUNTAINS interfered with the radar? And the fact that from the central radar the information went to the addressee for almost ten minutes? - see the replica above
[quote = FROST] such as almost any howitzer or mortar with the appropriate caliber of which there are a great many, and each of which will become a killer for such a "screaming" target as an air defense object that turned on radiation [/ quote]
Are you so sure that they will survive my tank attack and artillery fire?
And with what kind of joy are flashy? The concept of early warning radar? The remote location of the radar station? Receiving data from others, for example, stationary radars?

Conclusion ---- you are simply frightened by Aviation, having seen enough Discovery about the Desert Storm.

[FROST]

And what is it possible to do counter battery work weakly?

And the enemy will not lead her? In your opinion, you should have complete superiority in artillery so that no one can shoot at your air defense systems.

do you remove your anti-aircraft defense from the front end so that the enemy aviation calmly destroys your military assets? Ingenious. Congratulations

Do not clean, then they will be easily destroyed.

Exactly, you couldn’t destroy Iraq’s air defense

That is, you think that during the Desert Storm, Iraq’s air defense was not suppressed?) Well, well. It is based only on your opinion.

And the cost of 1000 pound joint venture FAP 16 000 dollars, but since Iraq's air defense turned out to be so strong, expensive URs had to be used

So what? It was strong. But they used such expensive UR ​​Harm and Alarm and suppressed it. Q.E.D.

technological progress during the Cold War took great strides (I hope you do not need to say that this is a figurative expression?) And all the complexes were in the process of modernization, and after the mentioned events from the USSR deliveries began, for example, S-200 - but then study for yourself, there’s more about there are also supplies of REB

The S-200 is generally almost useless against tactical aircraft. Regarding the modifications, which were radically different - give facts and systems. The Soviet command considered the air defense systems in Syria to be modern. So, again, only your opinion and no facts.

Strange, anti-aircraft missiles have a decrease in range, as you wrote there and there is no Helfire?

And where do they come from? Can a tank move at different heights? He is always on the earth) Or can he twist the spirals in space for a permanent significant change in the flight path of a rocket? Or can he greatly change the angular position of the rocket when maneuvering at speeds of 10-15 msec over rough terrain and the short time it takes for a half-flyer?)

Well, then, according to them, what are unusual missiles?

There are published data of representatives of their Air Force, and again you only have your opinion? Regarding PRL missiles to the fact that they were not something revolutionary. They were well aware of them and were not ready.

Remember once and for all --- everything is vulnerable.

It only turns out that the planes in this confrontation are vulnerable only to air defense missiles and nothing more, and air defense systems are vulnerable to almost all types of weapons. In addition, the range of use of anti-radar missiles is significantly higher than the range of air defense missiles. Consequently, the vulnerability of air defense systems is incomparably higher than the vulnerability of aircraft. And in addition, the SAM is smaller.

Yah? In the armed forces of Russia there are only 350 of them. Much less than strike aircraft. About the ratio of medium-range air defense systems and aircraft in the armies of the West, generally not worth mentioning. For clarity, you can compare the number of similar air defense systems and aircraft in the Air Force in a very strong Indian army.

Did you come up with this yourself? On what scale did you define it?

According to the dates of adoption. Study the materiel and the truth will be revealed to you)

Simply put, you can’t do it, but you threatened that a specialist

Simply put, I did not cite just my speculation, but a detailed example of the real suppression of the Syrian air defense system, which in terms of quantity and quality is approximately equal to Iran’s air defense system. Moreover, which was suppressed by outdated third-generation aircraft, almost without loss. And the armaments of France and Italy are incomparably more effective Typhoons and Rafali. So that destroy even easier.

For a mobile complex? Cable?

Didn't you know that? So study the materiel. Therefore, the coagulation and deployment time of such complexes is much higher than that of relatively independent short-range complexes such as TOR and OCA.

It can’t be, right? And so what? The radar is not at the forefront, if you don’t know then RADIUS Detection 100 km

Medium and high altitude goals. And low-altitude goals? A hovering low-altitude helicopters? And in conditions of active use of electronic warfare systems?

Here are just no fairy tales ---- give quotes and links

Their descriptions are in all manuals for military pilots. For clarity, I’ll even give links to videos of highly detailed digital flight simulators similar to those used to train pilots. True, there are examples of evasion from air-to-air missiles, but the principles of anti-aircraft missile defense are exactly the same.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YI05NkpQIf0&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hzNTI0lWRJo&feature=related
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-cOvgjCbfoc&feature=related

And go on ahead of the raspinatsa, and this is not what your stories will outweigh.

I have cited the facts. Do you have them?

and a sober calculation that it’s better to lose ALL of your troops, or exchange an air defense system’s battery for a squadron of attack aircraft.

You made this statement, and you give a table confirming it. So far, on my side are the results of all the latest conflicts showing that aviation can easily carry out military air defense. What about yours?

and for the ATGMs you don’t even think about it, and so on.

The maneuverability of the tank is negligible compared to the maneuverability of the aircraft and therefore the birds do not need such maneuverability as anti-aircraft missiles.

So look for the reasons for the failure of air defense --- in the first place will be the fact that the staff was not trained, did not conduct routine maintenance, etc.

Pale, retold attempts of excuses and no more. Historians claim that there were a large number of our advisers, the Syrians in the air defense forces were almost all with higher education, and do not forget that the Syrians had invaluable combat experience at that time. So that is unconvincing. Do you think Iranian rocket launchers are better? After all, they have neither experience nor our advisers.

Strange, but nothing that there MOUNTAINS interfered with the radar?

And didn’t you see the groups of jammers? And did not understand what would happen?

and the fact that from the central radar information to the addressee went almost ten minutes?

Why? By mail, did the information go?))

Are you so sure that they will survive my tank attack and artillery fire?

Tanks will not reach, because they will be met in advance by aircraft, hovering helicopters with ATGMs, against which they are helpless. Neglecting anti-tank artillery, javelins, MLRS with submunitions, complexes like chrysanthemum and other anti-tank systems on armored vehicles. Regarding the artillery fire, and what about your own artillery and the notorious counter-battery shooting? If the opponents are equal, as you said, then with what fright, it is your artillery that will suppress the artillery of the enemy, and for example, not vice versa?

[Kars]

Quote: FROST

Or can he greatly change the angular position of the rocket when maneuvering at speeds of 10-15 msec over rough terrain and the short time it takes for the Helfair to fly?)

Thank you, they mocked, compared the SAM missile with supersonic speed, and the ATR with 300 m / s while the engine is running, and what is its speed at 10 km from the carrier? How is it controlled by rudders at low speed - and the tank jerked off for a little more than 100 m in 4 seconds (T-72)

Quote: FROST

Tanks will not reach, as they will be met in advance by aircraft, hovering helicopters with ATGMs

Where will they stay from? My air defense will knock them out at a distance of 15 km from the tanks, and that the melee complexes will finish the penetration, they will also intercept Mayvriks, and if they do, they will repair it in 80% on the second day.

Quote: FROST

If the opponents are equal, as you said, then with what fright, it is your artillery that will suppress the artillery of the enemy, and for example, not vice versa?

And because you invest money in airplanes and javelins + expensive harms and alarms, and you will not have any money left for artillery.

Quote: FROST

Why? By mail, did the information go?))

Previously answered, an indicator that you did not even try to analyze the data on Bekaa 1982

Quote: FROST

. Do you think Iranian rocket launchers are better? After all, they have neither experience nor our advisers.

But they have the Internet and they will honor you and everyone will understand. Talking already about the inaccessible for you concept of learning from the mistakes of others.

Quote: FROST

The maneuverability of the tank is negligible compared to the maneuverability of the aircraft and therefore the birds do not need such maneuverability as anti-aircraft missiles.

You will be surprised of course, but it’s not,

Quote: FROST

Their descriptions are in all manuals for military pilots

And at the same time, even as C-125 is mentioned here, it’s possible to shoot down planes. How many planes were shot down in the Desert Bure? Did their pilots not read the manuals? What can I say about Vietnam.

Quote: FROST

I have cited the facts. Do you have them?

You haven’t brought anything, but I have given the facts.

Quote: Kars

This is indicated in the characteristics of the complexes and not the range but the likely defeat ---
Maximum range of destruction of aircraft of the type F-15 42 km [6]
The probability of defeat non-maneuvering aircraft 0,7-0,9
Chance of hitting a maneuvering aircraft (7-8g) 0,5-0,7

Do the same

Quote: FROST

For clarity, you can compare the number of similar air defense systems and aircraft in the Air Force in a very strong Indian army.

According to ZeeNews, the country's defense Ministry sent a corresponding request to several national and international companies, in which one of the main requirements is the accelerated delivery of new air defense systems. In the next few months, a tender may be announced for the supply of new air defense systems.

And the ratio? Why do you need it? Better read what is available from air defense in India and what it is developing.


http://pvo.su/other/india/india_pvo_pro.htm
If you have real-time data then share it.



According to Jane's Land-Based Air Defense, the Indian Air Force has 16 S-75M air defense battalions (divisions) (96 launchers, some of which are stored), 24 S-125M air defense divisions from 60 available to and from 4 to the 8 divisions of the Osa-AK air defense system.

In 2001, India acquired from Israel two multifunctional Green Pine radars from the Arrow-2 complex. The contract value is estimated from 250 to 400 million US dollars. The first radar was deployed in India in 2001, the second in the middle of 2002.


However, India has its own vision of this situation - according to press reports, Indian developers are independently developing long-range air defense systems. At the end of 2006, India tested a missile defense system, during which the Prithvi surface-to-surface ballistic missile was shot down. The missile guidance was carried out by the Green Pine multifunctional radar purchased from Israel.

It is planned to sign the contract of the Israeli defense concern IAI with the Organization for Defense Research and Development (DRDO) to create new anti-aircraft missiles. The contract is valued at 300 million US dollars. It is planned that a new Indian missile will be developed on the basis of the Israeli ship-based Barak anti-aircraft missile. At the end of the 2007 year, reports appeared that India was considering a proposal by Israel to jointly develop a medium-range anti-aircraft missile system for object-based air defense using developments from the Barak-8 / Barak-NG naval air defense systems. It is expected that the new "land" complex will have a range of destruction of about 70 km, and according to other sources, all 150 km. The cost of this project will amount to 1,4 billion US dollars.

In the 2001 year, India decided to carry out a deep modernization of the S-125M Pechora air defense system, which were delivered from the USSR during the period from 1974 to 1989. The Indian government planned to upgrade only the 24 of the C-125M complex, for which an international tender was announced in July 2001. According to the results of the tender, Russia and Poland got into the shortlist of finalists. They were instructed to conduct a demonstrative modernization of one air defense system. The main requirements of the Indian military are to increase the missile launch range from 18 to 40 km, replace analog equipment with digital, improve the performance of the missile guidance station, and create a self-propelled launcher with four missiles. As a chassis, the Tatra-816 car chassis, which is manufactured in India under a Czech license, should be used.

The air defense of the Indian ground forces is also mainly represented by systems and complexes of Soviet origin - self-propelled air defense systems 2K12 “Kvadrat” (export version “Cuba”), 9K332 / M3 “Osa-AK / AKM”, 9K35XNXXNXXXX3XXXNXXNXXMXXXXN cannon systems 3K2 "Tunguska", as well as portable air defense systems "Strela-22", "Strela-2", "Igla-3" and "Needle". In addition, there are various types of artillery mounts of the type ZSU-1-23 "Shilka", ZU-4. From foreign equipment there are only 23-mm and 20-mm anti-aircraft installations (Oerlikon, Bofors).

Only Osa-AKM, Strela-10M3 and Tunguska air defense systems, which were supplied by our country in the late eighties and nineties of the last century, meet modern conditions. It is expected that in the near future, India will make a final decision and acquire in Russia a significant number of modernized Tunguska-M1 air defense missile systems, the effectiveness of which has increased compared to the basic version.

The remaining anti-aircraft missile systems are planned to be modernized, as well as to acquire new generation equipment to perform similar tasks. The already mentioned Polish company Centrex in the early 2000-ies received a contract for the modernization of 100 air defense systems "Square" and 50 air defense systems "Osa-AKM" for a total amount of 200 million US dollars.


Instead of the Kvadrat air defense system, Indian engineers offer the Akash air defense system (Sky), which has been under development since the late 1980's. The first tests of the complex began in the 1990 year, in the 2002 year - military tests. And only at the beginning of the 2008 year did messages appear that the complex had been adopted by the Indian army. The complex provides for the destruction of air targets at ranges up to 30 km and at altitudes up to 18 km.

To replace the obsolete Osa-AKM and Strela-10M3 air defense systems, India plans to purchase Spyder self-propelled air defense systems in Israel. Since 2003, Israeli companies Rafael and IAI have been promoting a mobile air defense system to India created using Derby and Python 5 missiles, respectively, with infrared and radar homing mounted on a Tatra (6x6) car chassis. In 2005, the Israeli complex participated with the European MICA-VL air defense system in a tender for the acquisition of short-range air defense systems for the defense of Indian air bases, during which it passed successful firing tests. According to press reports, at the end of 2006, India decided to purchase 18 Spyder air defense systems with a total value of almost 400 million US dollars.



.

[FROST]

Why does the mobile system need a prepared position and what is the preparation of it?

The use of masking measures, the choice of areas for laying cables.

Firstly, not at the forefront, but behind the vanguard. Somewhere in 3-5 km --- while the radar of detection is at least 20 km, and the launchers themselves are behind the vanguard.

And do not confuse launchers with detection and target designation systems
Target detection range of at least 100 km [4] with digital signal processing
The command post processed messages about 46 targets at altitudes up to 20 km in the zone of radius 100 km for a cycle of review of the detection and target designation station and issued self-propelled firing systems up to 6 target designations with an accuracy of 1 ° in azimuth and elevation, 400-700 m-po range.

And why should he turn on the radiation at the forefront? And what will detect it then?

You are a big fan of arguing, but the fact that you ask such stupid questions very characteristically shows that you are completely "out of topic". Picked up the first superficial tabular data from Google and begin to build "couch" theories, completely not knowing the essence and nuances, not understanding radio engineering.
Any such powerful sources of electromagnetic radiation are detected and detected very easily and quickly. For this, there are special calculations as part of the electronic warfare forces in the radioengineering forces. At one time, it was possible to serve in the communications forces.
The antenna post for detection and target designation may be located far from the control center and launchers, but apparently you are not aware that there are also trace locators (for clarity, see the first photo in this article) on the control panels themselves.

But all the same, I wait all the same about where in the instructions the location of the complex is determined --- where is the antenna post, where is the CP, where are the launchers

Remote antenna post, KP with launchers ranging from several tens to several hundred meters from each other with control and cable communications to provide the necessary reliability of the system control in the conditions of radio interference suppression.

Firstly, not at the forefront, but behind the vanguard. Somewhere in 3-5 km --- while the radar of detection is at least 20 km, and the launchers themselves are behind the vanguard.

Even with such a placement, it will not provide effective destruction of low-altitude maneuvering aircraft attacking tanks using modern modifications of high-precision missiles with a range of more than 15 km, and it will also not ensure the defeat of hovering helicopters in terrain folds using AGM-114L missiles from distances of 10-12 km . And in addition to this, do not forget that it is much easier to hit such air defense systems in such situations. After the radiation is turned on, harm or alarm rockets will be launched from them from absolutely safe ranges of up to 100 km, capable of remembering the coordinates of the target and hitting complexes even when the radiation is turned off. Not to mention that, unlike airplanes, air defense systems are also very vulnerable from almost all ground-based weapons such as artillery, MLRS, tactical missile systems, ending with tanks, armored vehicles and even infantry, in case of even small breakthroughs during enemy counterattacks, since you bother to put such complexes on the very front. Perhaps it’s worth giving a characteristic definition popular among themselves, especially experienced and retired rocket launchers. Military air defense is the same as female pubic hair. Cover, but do not protect.

Bla Bla Bla ----- for those who are in an armored train ----- ACCORDING TO WHAT CHARTERS AND INSTRUCTIONS it is forbidden to place the BUK air defense system in less than 20 km?

There are no direct prohibitions in the charter on this, as there are no, for example, prohibitions on sending infantry without covering armored vehicles for the assault on bunkers, mortar and artillery calculations. This is determined by the presence of brains and conscience of the command. The absence of prescribed prohibitions does not exclude the fact that this is insanity.

Secondly, the ordinary Grad fires at a distance of 20-40 km --- and what now, due to the likelihood of defeat, take air defense systems to the rear and bury them?

The task is not to be protected from all means of destruction, there will always be a threat from MLRS, operational-tactical and anti-radar missiles. The task is to at least protect yourself from the most massive means of destruction (given the cost and small number of such complex air defense systems), such as almost any howitzer or mortar with the appropriate caliber, of which there are a great many, and each of which will become a killer for such a "screaming" target as an air defense object turned on the radiation. This is a target that, unlike other types of armored vehicles, does not require visual and other detection by enemy reconnaissance, but which simply "shouts" about itself, its importance (identifies itself) and its location.

This is indicated in the characteristics of the complexes and not the range but the likely defeat ---
Maximum range of destruction of aircraft of the type F-15 42 km [6]
The probability of defeat non-maneuvering aircraft 0,7-0,9
Chance of hitting a maneuvering aircraft (7-8g) 0,5-0,7

There are two main classes of anti-missile maneuvers. Maneuvers designed for the missile's energy consumption (the given "snake" and "spiral" reduce the effective range) and short-term maneuvers performed with high overload when the missile approaches, designed to miss with a rapid angular displacement of the target. (Reduces the probability of a hit when being in the effective zone defeat). The specified probability of defeat refers specifically to the aircraft performing the second type of maneuver (high overload 7-8g) located in the zone of eff. defeat. Zone eff. damage is the range - at which the missile maintains sufficient speed for effective maneuvering. The maximum range is the distance at which damage is simply possible (usually the average distance to an approaching medium-altitude, medium-speed target along a straight path is calculated). In combat conditions, maximum range launches are ineffective.

Just - laugh

Yes, just. What are 50-60 targeted targets among air defense, compared with thousands of targets destroyed by aviation, despite the fact that the vast majority of Iraq’s air defense and location systems were mobile and cruise missiles were not affected at all.

Here is a narrow section

Just the same site of the concentration of the tank fist of the Syrians, the military air defense of which has proved its failure.

and only 20 batteries

What exactly is in the phrase "According to Russian military experts, such a dense concentration of missile and artillery air defense forces was not anywhere in the world"Don't you understand?) A grouping of only six hundred tanks simultaneously covered over 1000 (!) deployed medium-range anti-aircraft missiles, three anti-aircraft artillery regiments and a large number of MANPADS calculations, and then they could not oppose anything to aviation. If such a concentration of military air defense could not cover your tank grouping, then what to talk about at all.

, and by the way, they were driven by agony as well artillery

Well, what did you want, I already told you about the vulnerability of air defense systems even from artillery.

and there was no early warning

The Syrians had previously observed the formation of strike groups in the air on their radar. Active interference indicative of an early operation to suppress air defense in large quantities began to be applied in advance.
What warning are you talking about? Also early. In your opinion, a week before the operation, a postman should have arrived from Tel Aviv and brought a warning letter?)

If you are so smart, you might think that these stationary air defense objects are directly related to the effectiveness of air defense - although I think you don’t understand this.

So what, the vast majority of Iraq's air defense systems were mobile.

There is none, then I quote the excuse of Soviet instructors.

Of course, apart from excuses, they had nothing left.

[Kars]

As I understand it, the Indians are not familiar with your theories and the fact that there is a super duper Harm

Quote: FROST

C-200 is generally almost useless against tactical aircraft.

But what is she not shooting at for other purposes? But to turn on the logic and think that C-200 will force them to lower the same tactics, and they will successfully fall into artillery-missile ambushes? As I understand it, the complexity of solving air defense tasks does not load into your brain?

Quote: FROST

Medium and high altitude goals. And low-altitude goals? A hovering low-altitude helicopters? And in conditions of active use of electronic warfare systems?

Of course, or do you think that none of the projectors knows that there are electronic warfare?
Read carefully carefully - low altitude is an innovation of the Vietnam war against S-75

Quote: FROST

Therefore, the coagulation and deployment time of such complexes is much higher than that of relatively independent short-range complexes such as TOR and OCA.

Well, give links to the cable length "weakly" to the maximum distance between the CP, Radar post and PU. Give with reference, of course, to the area inside which the work is being done .. SAM BUK m2, etc.

[kvang]

Quote: Dimani

urgently to the troops !!

Gentlemen patriots))) Your naivety delivers lulz ... Your knowledge of air defense technology is impressive ... aahahahahah. Only one small detail ... AND WHO WILL PRODUCE ALL THIS ???? Have you sent your sons to technical universities for the specialty "Metalworking"? And the daughters in vocational school for the specialty "Radio installer" ?? There is no vocational school left ?? .. What a joy ... Aaa .. not prestigious? Better as a lawyer-economist-manager ??? That is it .... And who will do the improvements ... Who will come to the troops in the role of "breeders"? (Who in the subject understood this word)))). There is no one to produce these developments of the 80s. .. NOT-TO-MOU, unfortunately .... Yes, and Ashuluk and KapYar are far from Emba .... All this idle talk .. What 350 BukM2 ??? And why 350 ?? .. Batteries? PU? .. Or the total number of iron units, including AB? .. Ahahahahahahahahahahahah. Dreaming is not harmful ...

[FROST]

Which 350 BukM2 ???

Not an M-2 beech, but just a BEECH in the majority. Although the modifications are not specified. The calculation is carried out mainly on self-propelled firing systems. That is, about 60 divisions.

[Komsomolets]

kvang very nice to read a colleague's comment. Everything is correctly said. Most people don't even realize that the Buk-M2 is a development of the 80s. During its non-production period, the production base has degraded specifically, it is generally sad to talk about personnel.
But the question of the availability, age and combat readiness of missiles, as well as the possibility of producing them today, has not yet been raised.
And the majority of urapatriots revere a similar article and think all Buki in the troops poured into the river. Yes, and in Syria in batches, but immediately with the prepared calculations ......

[FROST]

trace locators (for clarity, see the first photo in this article) on the control panels themselves
But you don’t know that they turn on when the Launcher has already received target designation and starts firing at the target, the operating time will be faster than the anti-aircraft missile engine that it launches, and after that the launcher can change its position

Firstly, if you do not hit the target under your nose, then the flight time of the missiles to the target will be higher than the engine’s operating time, this time. Secondly, and if you need to make successive launches in case of not hitting the target? Thirdly, after turning off the radar, there is also a coagulation time. If counter-battery firing at self-propelled guns is effective, which can actually move right after the shot, then the effectiveness of the destruction of such an air defense system will be significantly higher. Thirdly, even if the fire is delayed and the air defense system starts moving, the square can be covered with homing ammunition. Fourth, how are you going to protect such unarmored systems from the now-common plastic mini-drones of kamikaze with a negligible EPR, with miniature video cameras and which can be launched en masse?

And so write as if no one except you knows about the same Harm (if it is so super, why do you take medium-range air defense systems only 30 km?

Do you even understand what you wrote? What is the point of moving the complex away from the charms if you don’t move it, the distance of destruction of a missile of a carrier aircraft will always be less than the range of the PRL.

that they can’t intercept it? there are no spare remote radars? and so on? interference cannot be delivered ---- it is clear that you are delitant.

The amateur is you. What kind of interference are you talking about? Do you know the principles of guidance? They are passive, are guided by the source of the EMR radar and remember the coordinates. It is very difficult to intercept a target like PRL, very small EPR and high speed. The probability of defeat in combat conditions with the active use of electronic warfare 0,2-0,3, no more. And they can be used in one gulp. Alarm-type missiles can generally be launched in advance to a height of 10-12 km, open a parachute above the front line of the front and wait for the radar to turn on gradually decreasing, after turning on the radar, shoot the parachute and hit the target from above while in the dead zone for anti-aircraft air defense. And there is no confirmed data on the successful interception of the PRL in military conflicts. And the facts of their defeat of the air defense system are sea.

With the javelins against your machine gun? to disarm the air defense system, machine gun fire is enough.

Conclusion ---- you are simply frightened by Aviation, having seen enough Discovery about the Desert Storm.

Actually, I’m an aviation radio engineer by profession. He worked at the TAPOICH aircraft manufacturing plant in Tashkent. And I can evaluate the technical data objectively.

And here is the main question.

And why then are they being built? Air defense systems?

Based on the concepts of the objectively strongest NATO military bloc to date, they believe that the best air defense is the strong air force. And they focus on them, and not on the SAM. And they build air defense systems in small quantities, mainly to cover stationary objects, airfields, strategic objectives from sudden attacks by the Air Force (since it will take some time to suppress air defense before it can attack the object and the effect of surprise will be lost), winged and tactical missiles, and not for reliable protection of advancing troops. This is evidenced by the extremely low number of air defense systems in the armies of Western countries and the significant investment of money and resources in the Air Force. The same picture can be seen in the concepts of the Indian army. Creating one of the most powerful air force in the world.
And I will give an opinion from the interview of the representative of the Israeli Air Force about the fighting in Lebanon, given to the correspondent of the magazine "Flight International"

FI: How effective were the enemy anti-aircraft missiles?
IAF: I already mentioned the 1973 war. I don’t know, do you know, but then the Syrians and Egyptians launched 2600 ground-to-air missiles. They shot down only 39 aircraft. The remaining 102 aircraft we lost from anti-aircraft artillery fire. By the way, they shot down 45 of their planes. The capabilities of their missile defense system were exaggerated. They believed that they would provide reliable protection - a clear sky under a rocket umbrella. Therefore, they invested so much money. But in this war, they lost 100 aircraft and all anti-aircraft missile systems in Lebanon. I believe the Syrians today are in a quandary.
FI: That is, the Russians also face the dilemma of air defense?
IAF: Yes.
FI: Are these flaws in technology or tactics? If the Israelis controlled anti-aircraft missile batteries, would the results be different?
IAF: I don't think so. They made some mistakes, but they did everything they could to do with the equipment that they had. I believe that the flaws of anti-aircraft missile systems are such that for us they will never become the main weapon.
FI: Why?
IAF: This is a passive system. You are investing money and human resources in a system that sits and waits for enemy planes to fly over it. Aircraft can be used for other purposes.

[Kars]

Quote: FROST

As a replacement, it was planned to purchase, starting from the 2009 of the year, the Norwegian-American air defense systems NASAMS with the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile

Now, if they even refused air defense then your babble would mean something

Quote: FROST

first, if you don’t hit the target under your nose, then the flight time of the missiles to the target will be higher than the engine’s operating time, this is the time.

Engine run time only 15 seconds

Quote: FROST

. Secondly, and if you need to make successive launches in case of not hitting the target?

Well, write as a professional how much time it takes to detect a radar of an air defense system of an air defense system, to provide coordinates to a means of destruction, and to react a weapon to surely defeat an object of attack. And how many enemy targets can hit an air defense system of air defense during this time.

Quote: FROST

Thirdly, after turning off the radar, there is also a coagulation time

Well, and how much time is it in an emergency? What should an anti-aircraft missile system do from the moment the enemy’s target is paralyzed to remove it?

Quote: FROST

the effectiveness of the defeat of such an air defense system will be significantly higher.

It’s already like a card will fall, nobody is going to live forever and there will always be losses (although of course you are closer to the concept of the USA against Liechtenstein)

Quote: FROST

Fourth, how are you going to protect such unarmored systems from the now-common plastic mini-drones of kamikaze with a negligible EPR, with miniature video cameras and which can be launched en masse?

Oh yoy yoy --- plastic mini drones, the Werthers robots don’t come there? Where did they get their distribution? And of course, these super-duper mini drones do not react to interference, nor to the smoke of the curtain, nor to anything else — just the perfect weapon.

Quote: FROST

. Thirdly, even if the fire is delayed and the air defense system starts moving, the square can be covered with homing ammunition.

You have already told so many fairy tales ---- you have this and that, and it is ---- then let me tell you TCR - I will destroy your airfields, and the MLRS will knock you the whole cutting edge --- you vet all the headstock on drones and airplanes .Not exactly zombie who believes that everyone can print dollars.

Quote: FROST

Do you even understand what you wrote? What is the point of moving the complex away from the charms if you don’t move it, the distance of destruction of a missile of a carrier aircraft will always be less than the range of the PRL.

I understand that, but you don’t. I ASK YOU ----- WHY DO YOU REMOVE A MEDIUM-RANGE AREA ONLY ZO km, if the NARM hits on 100?

and if in my version of the air defense system it will be closer, there is a chance that they will not be noticed, and the carrier will fly closer to try to strike at Long-Range Air Defense --- but I already understand that you are insane.

Quote: FROST

And the facts of their defeat air defense missile systems sea

Which brings us back to the option of Iran against the Italo-French confrontation ---- there is a fact you asserted about the use of several thousand PRLs against IRAQ in combination with tomahawks --- making a logical assumption (I hope you can understand) that without the use of tomahawks a larger amount of RLPs will be required missiles ------ so you are sure that there are so many of them in the arsenal of Franco-Italians.

Quote: FROST

So what? It was strong. But they used such expensive UR ​​Harm and Alarm and suppressed it. Q.E.D.

Correctly the concept of the USA against Liechtenstein

Quote: FROST

They are passive, are guided by the source of the EMR radar and remember the coordinates.

And they will hit false targets or, in extreme cases, easily replaceable antenna posts

Quote: FROST

And didn’t you see the groups of jammers? And did not understand what would happen?

I already told you that you are a looped victim of the discovery propaganda.

The general failure of the air defense in the fight against Israeli aviation in this war is due to the following main reasons.

1. The level of preparation of the calculations ensured the conduct of hostilities only in simple conditions. The moral and psychological impact Israel exerted on the personnel in the course of demonstrative actions and the implementation of a range of disinformation measures demoralized most of the calculations. There were cases when the surviving crews, who saw the death of people and the destruction of equipment, refused to conduct military operations.

2. Radar reconnaissance did not ensure the timely detection and bringing of combat information to air defense systems. When controlling from the central control unit, the delay time reached 6-8 minutes, information from the nearest radar companies at the control tower of anti-aircraft units and subunits was not received and was not used.

3. The combat control was carried out with the KP ZRBR and a group of anti-aircraft missile divisions on the radio, and the interaction between the anti-aircraft missiles was not organized. With the beginning of the production of massive electronic jamming, centralized control was lost, which led to the autonomous actions of the fire units and the absence of mutual fire cover. Interaction with his IA was not carried out.

4. Engineering equipment of battle formations was carried out in the field version. The system of false and reserve positions was not created, the camouflage of military equipment was not performed. The divisions of the S-75 and S-125 air defense systems have practically not changed their positions since the moment of deployment, and the maneuverable capabilities of the Kub air defense missile system and the Shilka air defense system were not used. In general, no proper measures were taken to ensure the survivability of the air defense grouping.

[FROST]

Now, if they even refused air defense then your babble would mean something

And who said that they generally refuse them?
What exactly in the phrase And they build air defense systems in small quantities, mainly to cover stationary objects, airfields, strategic objectives from sudden attacks by the Air Force (since it will take some time to suppress air defense before it can attack the object and the effect of surprise will be lost), winged and tactical missiles, and not for reliable protection of advancing troops. is it not clear to you?) According to 2010 data in Finland, only 3 full-fledged divisional complexes BUK-M1 (1 CP 9C470, 1 SOC 9C18 and 6 self-propelled guns 9A310 each) are armed with air defense from medium-range systems, each of which have combat watch on guard Helsinki. At the same time, the Air Force has 128 combat aircraft (63 F-18C / D fighter bomber and 65 Hawker Siddeley Hawk attack aircraft.

Quote: FROST
the effectiveness of the defeat of such an air defense system will be significantly higher.

I gave you the figures of the ratios of the ranges of the SAM and the PRL, the facts of the vulnerability of the air defense missile system to almost all types of weapons and the invulnerability of aircraft for everything except anti-aircraft missiles, the facts and figures of the results of real military conflicts (including the conflict of approximately equal groupings of troops in the Bekaa Valley) refuted your statement "there are always fewer planes" with real figures of the ratio of air defense missile systems and aircraft in the leading armies of the world. And you get it besides your statement

Here already as the card will lie down, nobody is going to live forever

is there nothing else?

Engine run time only 15 seconds

Plus, an average of 20-30 seconds, the flight time with the engine off when attacking targets at medium distances. Most launches will generally be unsuccessful, as airplanes will always do missile maneuvers designed for the expenditure of ammunition of air defense forces in the form of tactical lapels at the entrance to the zones of destruction of air defense systems and missile launchers. Therefore, with several launches of missiles, the operating time of the trace locators will take several minutes.

Well, write as a professional how much time it takes to detect a radar of an air defense system of an air defense system, to provide coordinates to a means of destruction, and to react a weapon to surely defeat an object of attack. And how many enemy targets can hit an air defense system of air defense during this time.

Well, and how much time is it in an emergency? What should an anti-aircraft missile system do from the moment the enemy’s target is paralyzed to remove it?

It will take several minutes to collapse to disconnect and rewind the cables, then start the engines and forward. In addition to the few minutes required to trace targets, the time for the likely destruction of the complex by artillery is enough. Because the reaction time will be even slightly shorter than with counter-battery fire, as after turning on the EMP, it is detected almost instantly, and determining the azimuth and range to the target takes only a few seconds or less (depends on the computational power of the digital computer calculations) as on board fighter with PRL. Next is the transfer of coordinates to the gunners, making amendments to the ACS and MLRS themselves and the implementation of a salvo.

I understand that, but you don’t. I ASK YOU ----- WHY DO YOU REMOVE A MEDIUM-RANGE AREA ONLY ZO km, if the NARM hits on 100?

No, you don’t understand anything. At 20-30 km, I take it away because it is located far from most artillery, closer to my air defense systems my tanks at the forefront will not let it in. And if I take the air defense system inland from Kharmov, what will stop the enemy’s aircraft from getting closer and again use the PRL? Also tanks?) Forgot, only air defense systems can resist aircraft in these conditions. Run, do not run from planes, all the same they are incredibly mobile and, in the absence of opposition, will approach the distance from which they will open fire. So the withdrawal in range from the charms is insanity. Therefore, only strong air forces can provide reliable air defense for my advancing units.

Oh yoy yoy --- plastic mini drones, the Werthers robots don’t come there? Where did they get their distribution? And of course, these super-duper mini drones do not react to interference, nor to the smoke of the curtain, nor to anything else — just the perfect weapon.

In the USA, Israel. Production begins in Europe, ours caught on and also began to pay active attention to the mini UAV. Everything reacts to interference, but this does not mean that they are fatal. Regarding smoke, do you suggest always keeping everything in smoke?) In addition, there is no problem installing compact thermal imagers on them. After all, a self-propelled launcher is not a person, it will not be difficult to detect it from a height of several hundred meters. Compared to efficiency, the cost of such a bird is extremely low (a plastic case, a transceiver and control circuit of the size of 2-3 microcircuit boards, a cheap miniature gasoline engine with a propeller, a cheap camera and a couple of kg of plastid), you can run entire packs. The effectiveness of such swarms will be significant. Everyone sees, is detected and even more so intercepted is very difficult and deadly. One such crashing gift with a pair of kg of plastid and no SAM.

And they will hit false targets or, in extreme cases, easily replaceable antenna posts

What other false goals? Do you even understand what you are writing about? This is not ARGSN guidance. Here, the PRL is aimed at a very characteristic EMR corresponding to the radar, and not just radio-emitting objects. But in the situation with the Air Force, everything is exactly the opposite. False targets depicting aircraft with ARGS guidance, for air defense is complete. Easily replaceable posts? Do not make me laugh. And easily replaceable SDAs, they also have locators. Maybe then immediately say easily replaceable air defense systems.

First, how much more? On those 50-60 pieces? Secondly, where does Iraq, its air defense in 1991 year was much more numerous than Iran’s air defense, in addition they had much more radar detection of separate from the composition of the air defense system, Soviet and French production. But nothing helped.

You have already told so many tales ---- you have this and that, and it is ---- then I tell TKR - I will destroy your airfields, and the MLRS will knock you the whole cutting edge

He just spoke about the use of conventional submunitions induced by heat, released not over the areas but into the square from which the source of electromagnetic radiation was detected.

Correctly the concept of the USA against Liechtenstein

No, that was the USA-Iraq concept. Whose air defense experts were considered quite impressive at that time. And you have nothing besides this hackneyed record. Can you give figures comparing air defense of Iraq and Liechtenstein?)))

Regarding the dubious justifications for the defeat of the Syrians. It looks much more like propaganda, simply because you are not an engineer, you cannot distinguish without seeing the lies and inconsistencies in the nuances.
Rough discrepancy

Radar reconnaissance did not ensure the timely detection and bringing of combat information to air defense systems. When controlled from a central gearbox, the delay time reached 6-8 minutes

What fright is such a delay time? Did they transmit information with a bell ringing? If clogged with interference, then either there is a transmission, or not, or is interrupted. There can be no lag. The transmission speed of both air and cable is known to 300000 km. sec The decoding time of the received signals is milliseconds.

The moral and psychological impact Israel exerted on the personnel in the course of demonstrative actions and the implementation of a range of disinformation measures demoralized most of the calculations.

Calls Lulz)

[Kars]

Quote: FROST

According to 2010 year in Finland

A genius, Finland is a non-aligned country, and in the foreseeable future has no opponents. And why did you Krotalz forget and ItPsv 90 ZSU Finland is a small country. And with India it has pierced to the full. Give China data.

Quote: FROST

He just talked about the use of conventional heat-induced submunitions fired not over the areas but into the square from which the source of electromagnetic radiation was detected

who told me about corpses, stray cats? fires are on you too.

You did not answer the question ----- how much time will pass from the moment the EMR is detected (by the way, what kind of device does this? Can it select signals and determine where it is needed, and where is the trap? So the name and brand of the device are in the studio. I personally I’ll carry out counter-battery shooting with the help of ..Zoo ..) until the moment of the arrival of ammunition at a given point.
As for the sub ammunition, let's also give the brand - so that I know what you mean (or else I’ll think about you too well)

Quote: FROST

No, that was the USA-Iraq concept

The United States is the one and only; you give a country that does not print dollars

Quote: FROST

First, how much more? On those 50-60 pieces? Secondly, where does Iraq, its air defense in 1991 year was much more numerous than Iran’s air defense, in addition they had much more radar detection of separate from the composition of the air defense system, Soviet and French production. But nothing helped.

Let's compare, do not forget to add C-200 to Iran. And also that you have nothing to destroy long-range radars. And also do not forget that Iraq’s French devices were turned off.

Quote: FROST

Here, the PRL is aimed at a very characteristic EMR corresponding radar, and not just radio-emitting objects

What are you. And the manufacturers of electronic warfare systems do not know about this?

Quote: FROST

And easily replaceable SDAs, they also have locators.

What is SOU?

Quote: FROST

What fright is such a delay time? Did they transmit information with a bell ringing? If clogged with interference, then either there is a transmission, or not, or is interrupted. There can be no lag

you don’t need to tell tales, sort it out and then fantasize. Ask your friends, read anything except the Israeli version.

Quote: FROST

In the USA, Israel. Production begins in Europe

That’s how China starts. I’ll also buy from them. What then?

Quote: FROST

Everything reacts to interference, but this does not mean that they are fatal.

So then do not whine with obstacles for air defense. And your snotty hacker will hack into your drone, and will land in Iran - as has already happened.

Quote: FROST

Compared to efficiency, the cost of such a bird is extremely low (a plastic case, a transceiver and control circuitry of the size of an 2-3 circuit board, a cheap miniature gasoline engine with a propeller, a cheap camera and a couple of kg of plastid), you can run whole flocks

That’s how cheap they will fall, such shilka will beat in packs, and even infantrymen will practice shooting.

Quote: FROST

Regarding smoke, suggest you always keep everything in smoke?) In addition, there is no problem installing compact thermal imagers on them

Well, then a nuclear battery, its determinant is alien --- And by the way, how much do they stay in the air?

Quote: FROST

The moral and psychological impact Israel exerted on the personnel in the course of demonstrative actions and the implementation of a range of disinformation measures demoralized most of the calculations.

Quote: FROST

Calls Lulz)

It is you who call Lulza, and give me unique pleasure.
It’s immediately clear that the complete delatant is not only in technology, but also in psychology, and you don’t know the moral qualities of the wars of Islam-- that’s the only thing that causes me fear for Iran’s air defense.

Quote: FROST

Easily replaceable posts?

Well, certainly they are cheaper than the Alarm, and the plane that will be shot down during this attack.
This is not saying that ktozh will let him start it if there is C-200 (I will not take C-300 already)
Although you probably have the concept of echeloned air defense does not say anything.

[Kars]

The anti-aircraft complex uses modern phased antenna arrays with an effective command method of phase control, which simultaneously allow tracking and destroying up to 24 targets with a minimum time interval. The presence in the composition of the SAM of the radar for illumination and guidance of the on-load tap-changer with an antenna post rising to a height of 21 ensures defeat of targets flying at low and extremely low altitudes, in wooded and rough terrain.

• Placement of military equipment on high-speed self-propelled tracked chassis makes it possible to deploy and collapse air defense systems in no more than 5 minutes. It only takes 20 seconds to change positions with the equipment turned on. All this testifies to the high mobility of the complex.

[FROST]

Finland has 3 divisions of Buk-M1 air defense systems, delivered in 1997 to pay off the state debt of the USSR. In 2008, Finland decided to abandon the operation of Buk-M1 anti-aircraft missile systems, which are on alert for the protection of Helsinki. The decision was made due to the fact that control systems (communication of the control center with the remote air defense headquarters) are subject to decryption. As a replacement, it was planned to purchase, starting in 2009, the Norwegian-American air defense systems NASAMS with the AIM-120 AMRAAM missile in the amount of about $ 458 million. As of 2010, they are in service and are used under the designation ITO 96

[FROST]

Regarding the use of engineering equipment, ensuring survival measures, our advisers who organized the construction of the air defense forces were responsible for this before the outbreak of hostilities. Maybe the Syrian rocket launchers were not particularly outstanding, but in the air defense forces, the elite of the army was really assembled. So, for your part it is only unknown whose dubious excuses, and for my part, the real result of the military conflict about which any arguments based on speculation are broken.
And in addition, I will give in my opinion the much less propaganda opinion of the representative of the Israeli Air Force, who quite frankly indicates in which Syrian troops there were misses in tactics, because he does not sing American equipment at all, but rather objectively evaluates what he saw.

My opinion is just an opinion, not an assessment: Russian planes are very good, judging by what we know about their capabilities and their capabilities, which we saw with our own eyes. The problem is that their Syrian pilots were mistaken in choosing a place and time. Their manner of piloting is difficult to understand, so their losses were so great.
FI: Is it a lack of pilots or command?
IAF: I suppose that both. Maybe it all started with the wrong team decisions that did not keep pace with the events on earth. And the pilots behaved as if they could not prevent an undesirable course of events, or simply did not know how to shoot down our planes. This is strange because the Syrians were aggressive in the 1973 war. This time it was different, so it’s very difficult to compare planes. If the Syrians had the best planes in the world, but the same manner of warfare, the results would be exactly the same without the slightest change on our part. This is a defeat of tactics, not technology. Look at the war zone and note that we could not fly over the Syrian border. They were two minutes away from their air bases, we were 10-40 minutes away, and some planes flew to the Negev desert from Ovda. Most of the losses - 85-90% - occur in the Bekaa Valley - this is less than a minute of summer from the Syrian border. We only had two minutes to cross the war zone if they wanted to get out of the Bekaa Valley and we did not pursue them beyond the Syrian border. It was not easy for us, maybe for them, too.
FI: According to you, it seems that the Syrians were an easy target.
IAF: They launched rockets, they fought, but very peculiarly. I did not mean that they were easy prey, but they obviously lacked a sense of tactics. Maybe, from their point of view, the best tactic was to get out faster - I don’t know. But the results show that it was strange - we are still trying to evaluate what they were trying to do.
FI: Restrictions on the area of ​​operations, didn’t they lead to the fact that the main weapons of the fighting were guns, not rockets?
IAF: We shot down a lot of enemy planes with air guns, a large percentage fell on our own Shafrir missiles, and something fell on the share of all types of Sidewinder missiles that we have in service. Amazingly, the percentage of shot down with air guns was much higher than we expected. A very limited area of ​​operations and a large number of aircraft forced us to get close to the enemy for visual identification, and at short distances we used air guns.

and again, quite frankly says

Are these flaws in technology or tactics? If the Israelis controlled anti-aircraft missile batteries, would the results be different?
IAF: I don't think so. They made some mistakes, but they did everything they could to do with the equipment that they had. I believe that the flaws of anti-aircraft missile systems are such that for us they will never become the main weapon.
How did the Syrians counteract your attacks?
IAF: They have the most complex and dense missile defense system in the world: SAM-6, SAM-3, SAM-2. In each battle, they had 3-4 Gun Dishes radars (fire control radar used in SAM-9 and ZSU-23-4 systems), plus anti-aircraft guns of 23, 37 and 57 mm caliber. They knew that we were going to attack. They were waiting for us and were ready. The only thing they relied too much on is anti-aircraft missiles.

and if in my version of the air defense system it will be closer, there is a chance that they will not be noticed, and the carrier will fly closer to try to strike at Long-Range Air Defense --- but I already understand that you are insane.

No one will break into the rear to suppress long-range air defense systems without special tactical importance until your front is suppressed. If your medium-range air defense systems are silent, then there is a chance of being relatively inconspicuous (despite the fact that there will be radar reconnaissance from AWACS and fighters, video reconnaissance from a heap of UAVs), but at the same time, my aviation will simply burn all your ground insisting parts, while not flying into your territory. Left without a ground, with only one air defense system, I think there is no need to say what will happen to you in this war. If, again, all the same, they act and turn on the radiation, making launches, then they will be destroyed as standard, with the whole range of ground weapons, UAVs and aircraft using PRL from long distances.

I gave you a lot of figures, facts, links, examples of real conflicts, figures of the most characteristic tendencies of emphasis on the Air Force, and not on military air defense systems in advanced armies, expert opinions on the flaw of military air defense systems. You again brought nothing but speculation, incompetent questions instead of answers, and the ongoing trollism in the transitions to individuals

then your babble

Not exactly zombies

I already told you that you are a looped victim of propaganda

-but I already understand that you are insane.

The scheme of tactical lapels for spending ammunition missiles at the entrance to the air defense zone on the example of the actions of an air reconnaissance.

[Kars]

Yes, the tolle burst in full, the lapels have already gone - but what about the alarm?

What scale in the picture is what professional? What kind of air defense system?
Where is the 1-2-3 trace? Where are the missile launches with short-range air defense? Why are the air defense positions only one and not separated?
generally enough whining trollik, your picture belongs to C-75

About the cable burned, about a long time leaving the position burned, about the false targets from Narma burned

[FROST]

About the cable burned

Their length is from several tens to several hundred meters. If it were in kilometers, what kind of mobility would it be? How long would it take to unwind, unwind the cables? And this is not important at all, because on each JMA, there is a separate trace locator and it is the goal.

What is SOU?

You don’t even know this? See the first photo in the article)

about a long time leaving the position burned

It also says in black and white that the position change time is 20 seconds withincluded equipment. With cables connected and working radiation, it can move a hundred meters, so what?
It also says coagulation time - i.e. disconnecting cables, turning off radiation, is 5 min. Or doesn’t it reach your brain?

about false targets from Narma burned

False targets such as a newsboy or other radio-emitting devices in the radar range with a certain degree of probability affect only the first models of charms. Harmas of the latest modifications analyze both the frequency and amplitude of the signals, as well as the pulse repetition rate. They have the ability to recognize images of EMR of various types of radars in service, stored in the memory of the on-board computer PRR. To copy them you need to actually do the same radar. They do not respond to the disconnection of the radiation source, which is usually automatically done by the same device when detecting PRR. Also, these tricks no longer work with an alarm. But you are not an engineer, argue even physicists without knowing.

and turn on the logic and think that the S-200 will force to lower the height of the same tactics, and they will successfully fall into artillery-rocket ambushes?

Do you even understand this nonsense that you wrote? Why should the S-200 reduce the height of tactical fighters? A simple 4-5g maneuver in a horizontal plane is enough and all the missiles will go into milk, where does the height go? What artillery ambushes if my aircraft destroy your land without even flying into someone else's territory?

Where will they stay from? My air defense will knock them out at a distance of 15 km from the tanks, and that the melee complexes will finish the penetration, they will also intercept Mayvriks, and if they do, they will repair it in 80% on the second day.

Is math bad? How many shooting range on a hovering helicopter? If the BUK is 5 km from the tanks, and the helicopter is 12 km from them on the other hand, then a range of 17 km is obtained. Well, how will he bring him down? Learn the materiel.

and a tank with 300 m / s while the engine is running, and what is its speed 10 km from the carrier? how is it controlled by rudders at low speed

Enough, she usually makes a slide and then falls along a downward path. After all, nobody shakes it with maneuvers, and the tank in the final section moves only at a speed of about 10 msec, and this is mainly in PPS.

and with India pierced in full

Are you even capable of elementary analysis? I repeat for those who are in the tank) There is an air defense section ground forces

The air defense of the Indian ground forces is also mainly represented by systems and complexes of Soviet origin - self-propelled air defense systems 2K12 “Kvadrat” (export version “Cuba”), 9K332 / M3 “Osa-AK / AKM”, 9K35XNXXNXXXX3XXXNXXNXXMXXXXN cannon systems 3K2 "Tunguska", as well as portable air defense systems "Strela-22", "Strela-2", "Igla-3" and "Needle". In addition, there are various types of artillery mounts of the type ZSU-1-23 "Shilka", ZU-4. From foreign equipment there are only 23-mm and 20-mm anti-aircraft installations (Oerlikon, Bofors).

Have you read? So, not even a BEECH. Only Square. What with squares in Lebanon did you remember? Everything else is short-range complexes that your front can’t cover. Aviation will shoot the ground without entering their coverage area. And how many Squares do you have? A few dozens? A hundred? So turn on the brain and compare them with the forces of the Indian Air Force. For 2007 Indian Air Force has more than 1130 combat and 1700 auxiliary aircraft and helicopters
All other air defense forces of the object and tanks to cover is not their task. And then, compared with the Indian Air Force, they have purely nominal air-forces mainly for covering airfields.

And the ratio? Why do you need it?

Are you pretending or really don't understand anything so much? Didn’t you write in response to the fact that air defense systems are incomparably more vulnerable than airplanes, which

And there are still fewer planes

??
It turns out that the Air Force has much less vulnerable aircraft than much more vulnerable air defense systems as part of military air defense. Only on the basis of this, it can already be concluded that the complete inconsistency of your theory that military air defense systems can withstand aviation and protect tank units has been proved.

Although you probably have the concept of echeloned air defense does not say anything.

Aviation absolutely does not need to fly into your territory where layered air defense is located to burn your tanks. Plus aviation is much more.

That’s how China starts. I’ll also buy from them. What then?

But nothing, because they are useless against airplanes, and just right against air defense systems. Yes, and I think any tank from them will have to be weak, if 2-3 kg of cumulative charge will hit the roof)

[FROST]

such shilka will be beaten in packs, and infantrymen will also be trained in shooting

Dreamer. And about negligible EPR and small size forgotten? When swarms will fly them, how much will you bring down?) About the infantryman he smiled at all. To get into a small target at a height of several hundred meters moving at a speed of 20-30 msec? Have you ever held a machine gun in your hands?)

who told me about corpses, stray cats? fires are on you too.

How can you confuse the thermal signature of a corpse / living animal, etc., with the signature of an air defense system? Do you again pretend that there are no arguments for a long time or do you really think so?

What scale in the picture is what professional? What kind of air defense system?
Where is the 1-2-3 trace? Where are the missile launches with short-range air defense? Why are the air defense positions only one and not separated?

Can't you understand that this is just a diagram showing the general principle of the "tactical lapel" maneuver. You seem to have never heard of anti-missile maneuvers at all.

And because you invest money in airplanes

Apparently the Ministry of Defense of the same India, forgot to consult with you) How much are they going to invest in military air defense of ground units? (radars and missile defense systems, we do not take into account the development of object-based air defense systems)
A few hundred million.
How much do they invest now in the air force?
With a total production volume (produced and currently being produced) of about 300 Su-30 MKI purchased by MiGs, development and production plans for their own Tejas, a contract for 126 rafals, development and purchase plans for more than 200 FGFAs, as well as the creation and purchase of aviation weapons for them, investment figures in the air force are several tens of billions


In general, because in addition to repeating amateurish questions, going over to personalities, you never brought any real numbers, real facts and examples of real conflicts, the topic can be considered closed.

Conclusion - In a modern conflict, reliable air defense of ground units can only be provided by strong air forces.

Although no, you brought one figure after all, after which any continuation of the dialogue with you absolutely loses all meaning. (incompetents not only in the field of air defense and armored vehicles, but also in elementary mathematics.) Your final pearl, aka mega-lulz)

and the tank jerked off, for example, extending almost 100 m in 4 seconds (T-72)

Well, if the T-72 is over 100 m in 4 seconds, then this is just a sports car) Of course you can say that you read it at the patriotic forum, or heard from a neighbor, but using the physical formula for calculating the acceleration of uniformly accelerated movement
2S
A = ------
t ^ 2

(As I do not correct, the editor mows, the doubled distance and the square of the time should be above and below the fraction bar, respectively.)
we find that with a uniformly accelerated mega-jerk of the tank, acceleration = 12,5 m / s.
Therefore, more than the acceleration of gravity (a brick thrown down) And the speed at the finish will be 50 m / s, i.e. 180 km / h. Acceleration to 100 km / h will take about 2,2 seconds, which is much faster than any Porsche or Ferrari.
Conclusion 1. With such dynamic x-kami T-72 can win the Formula 1 race
Conclusion 2 (more likely) Stop skipping school !!!

generally enough whining trollik,

Yes, the tolol burst in full

Dear, it looks like you have mental problems. And the purpose of your stay on the site is definitely not an adequate assessment of military review. Successes.

[Kars]

Yes, and forgot about the TOP

Helicopters located on the ground, with the screws turned on at a distance of 6 — 7 km, can be detected with a probability of 40 — 70%, hovering in the air at a distance of 13 — 20 km — 60-80%, when jumping to a height of 20 m at a range of 12 km - not lower than 60%

[Komsomolets]

FROST and where and by whom did you serve, if not secret?

[FROST]

In the communications forces. He was the operator of the mobile complex of VHF communications.

[Komsomolets]

FROST Well, it’s not surprising that you know very little about air defense. It is especially annoying to hear about the unnecessary air defense. This suggests that you are very poorly versed in the vision of modern armed conflicts, in most of which anti-aircraft defense has shown its importance, and for example in Yugoslavia it is also of the highest efficiency.
And the military position as "operator of a mobile VHF-communication complex" and further delitant hobby for military topics gives you the exclusive right to speak here in high air defense matters .........

[FROST]

FROST Well, it’s not surprising that you know very little about air defense

Believe me, I do not know by hearsay about air defense and aviation.

And the military position "operator of the mobile VHF communication complex" and the further delitant hobby for military topics gives you the exclusive right to speak here in high air defense matters

It was only after military service in the army, I became a radio engineer and with location and other radio equipment, I know from the inside, which allows me to evaluate it more objectively than any warriors. Who exactly are you?

and for example in Yugoslavia also the highest efficiency

Do you have confirmed data of high losses?
In 2000, the Ministry of Defense of Yugoslavia announced the destruction of 31 aircraft (including one F-117), 6 helicopters, 11 unmanned aerial vehicles and approximately 40 cruise missiles, which is significantly higher than NATO data.

NATO recognized the combat loss of only 2 aircraft

March 27, 1999 - F-117A Nighthawk (ser. Number 82-0806, 7th tactical fighter squadron of the 49th tactical fighter wing of the US Air Force). The S-125 air defense missile system (3rd battery of the 250th Air Defense Brigade, commander Zoltan Dani) was shot down near the village of Budanovtsy. There is also a version that it could be shot down by a MiG-29 fighter piloted by Gvozden Dukich. According to the Serbian newspaper Politika, Gvozden uki is a combat pseudonym used by Zoltan Dani during the war. Pilot Lt. Col. Dale Zelko catapulted and was rescued.
May 2, 1999 - F-16C Fighting Falcon Unit 40D (ser. Number 88-0550, 555th US Air Force Fighter Squadron). It was hit in the Nakuchani area of ​​the S-125 air defense system. Pilot Commander of the 555th Squadron Lt. Col. David Goldfein catapulted after an engine failure and was rescued.
Initially, the data of the Yugoslav side sinned with absurdity and contradictions.
Andrei Martynov, who fought in Kosovo as a volunteer, expressed the following opinion in the magazine “Soldier of Fortune” (No. 12, 1999)

Enemy aircraft sometimes went literally over our heads, confident in their impunity. The victorious reports of the command of the Serbian army about allegedly dozens of downed planes are a fairy tale. For two months of bombing on TV showed downed F-117 and F-16. Where are the wrecks of other aircraft? But didn’t they all fall into the sea? And if shot down on land, then where are the pilots? For example, the NATO rescuers pulled out a night bomber pilot almost from the center of Belgrade.

Indeed, the Yugoslav side did not present in the media a single captured NATO pilot, although the three US military personnel captured on March 31, 1999, were demonstrated. In the Belgrade Museum of Aviation, there are fragments of only those aircraft that were recognized by NATO as shot down during the hostilities (F-117, F-16 and fragments of the engine of the A-10 attack aircraft, which made an emergency landing on the second engine in Skopje) So are they really even found the damaged A-10 engine, then could not provide a single wreckage from the remaining 29 supposedly downed aircraft? Neglecting already that there was not a single pilot.
So rely on facts, not propaganda.

It’s especially a shame to hear about the unnecessary air defense

I have not said this anywhere and do not think so.

PS If there are objective arguments and facts, provide, if not, then do not start talking about amateurism. (usually such empty transitions to personalities testify to him)

[Kars]

Quote: FROST

Dreamer. And about the negligible EPR and small size forgotten

Is it you ..GENIY ..------ say that they are not visible to a simple eye or optics? With a gasoline engine are not visible to thermoscanners? So they will be spotted visually and shot from small arms, finally an anti-aircraft machine gun is suitable for tanks and armored vehicles.

Quote: FROST

To get into a small target at a height of several hundred meters moving at a speed of 20-30 msec? Have you ever held a machine gun in your hands?)

And you can only see that they were holding, but they didn’t shoot. Or do you think one person will shoot at these super drones from a machine gun, you are naive.

Quote: FROST

How can you confuse the thermal signature of a corpse / living animal, etc., with the signature of the SAM

Oh please, how does a tank look for a Javelin, so a cat is an obstacle ----- but as a one-time submunition - By the way, to what? He already distinguishes everything in the world. And fires? And heat traps? Well, you're definitely a dreamer.
Or do you consider yourself the smartest and that no one knows about the possibility of using such weapons?

Quote: FROST

parts? (radars and missile defense systems, we do not take into account the development of object-based air defense systems)
A few hundred million.

Well, you don’t even read the lulz - only on one of the 1.2 BILLION dollars projects. And no one in India forbids developing Aviation ---- but your fairy tale

Quote: FROST

And they build air defense systems in small quantities, mainly to cover stationary objects, airfields, strategic objectives from sudden attacks by the Air Force (since it will take some time to suppress air defense before it can attack the object and the effect of surprise will be lost), winged and tactical missiles, and not for reliable protection of advancing troops. don't you understand?)

India’s actions are not at all consistent ---- So the TROLLE FALLED AGAIN. Like Finland’s air defense, it couldn’t even determine it.

Quote: FROST

2S
A = ------
t ^ 2

Well, a natural lulz ----- from the spot, a jerk from the brake to overdrive --- for the transmission, of course, is not fun, but when Helfire flies you can --- study the topic of BTT mobility at T-80 and Leclerc even more.

Quote: FROST

Conclusion - In a modern conflict, reliable air defense of ground units can only be provided by strong air forces.

The conclusion is fundamentally wrong ----- only joint actions of the Air Defense, Missile Forces, Artillery and the Air Force can ensure the fulfillment of a combat mission. The actions of the Air Force alone are possible only against an enemy significantly inferior in military potential, with outdated weapons for several generations.

Quote: FROST

Their length is from several tens to several hundred meters

The cable teller ---- cables have a specific length - they do not stretch ---- so what about the professional ---- tell me how much? 32 m? 100m? 500m?
Pairing occurs via telecode communication with the command post 9С470

And so you got completely exhausted

Quote: Kars

It only takes 20 seconds to change positions with the equipment turned on

Quote: FROST

You don’t even know this?

In your performance you need to ask again, it is not known what is in your head, I call it PU in our conversation

Quote: FROST

It also says in black and white that the time for changing the position of 20 seconds with the equipment turned on. With cables connected and working radiation, it can move a hundred meters, so what?

But what prevents the working emitter? And by the way, can it really not just be turned off?
And the lulz about the cable is already surprising

Pairing via Telecode

Quote: FROST

even though they themselves understood this nonsense, what did they write? Why on earth would the C-200 reduce the height of tactical fighters? A simple maneuver in the 4-5g in a horizontal plane is enough and all the missiles will go into milk

What are you? Really chtoli? And why, then, after Vietnam with all the attack aircraft was obliged to have a flight mode with envelope of the terrain? Speaking more simply, you are a storyteller. Not saying that she doesn’t even need a direct hit with her warhead --- -simple maneuver - you are touching me.

Although these goals were not massive, the very fact of the existence of C-200 to a large extent determined the transition of US aviation to operations at low altitudes, where they were exposed to the fire of more massive anti-aircraft missile and artillery weapons. In addition, the undeniable advantage of the complex was the use of homing missiles - even without fully realizing their range capabilities, the C-200 complemented the C-75 and C-125 systems with radio command guidance, significantly complicating the tasks of conducting electronic warfare and high-altitude reconnaissance for the enemy . Particularly clearly, the advantages of C-200 over these systems could be manifested during the shelling of directors of active interference, which served as an almost ideal target for homing missiles C-200. For this reason, for many years, reconnaissance aircraft of the United States and NATO countries, including the SR-71, were forced to conduct reconnaissance flights only along the borders of the USSR and countries

So covered your REB and AWACS

Quote: FROST

What with squares in Lebanon did you remember?

Nu-nb just do not cry and look at the Indo-Pakistan conflict, how many tank battles were there, and even the use of helicopters did not cancel them

Quote: FROST

At 2007 year, the Indian Air Force had more than 1130 combat and 1700 auxiliary aircraft and helicopters

What are you, and all super duper is modern - well, well.
Do you know that China and Pakistan have nuclear weapons? Ballistic missiles? How many planes do you think will remain at airfields after launching missiles at LARGE and MOBILE aerodromes with missiles even with conventional warheads? And this will be done from 1130 planes several hundred at best. .
I’m saying no idea — do you think if Iraq couldn’t strike at the American forces (by the way, about the suppression of Iraqi air defense in the Boer - do not forget that there was a coalition, and all that was achieved was the liberation of Kuwait) to airfields doesn’t mean that they won’t be able to make india and china with pakistan.

Quote: FROST

It turns out that the Air Force has much less vulnerable aircraft than much more vulnerable air defense systems as part of military air defense

If you count the PLANE = BATTERY OF SAM, and I prefer to count the PLANE = 2 anti-aircraft missiles.

Quote: FROST

Only on the basis of this, it can already be concluded that the complete inconsistency of your theory that military air defense systems can withstand aviation and protect tank units has been proved.

You see, and here you are trying to take things in pieces, which completely undermines your theories. If an anti-aircraft missile system (if it is more convenient for you than an anti-aircraft missile system), before it is destroyed, it destroys the 3 of the 4 aircraft with missiles, then it completed its mission.

Quote: FROST

Aviation absolutely does not need to fly into your territory where layered air defense is located to burn your tanks. Plus aviation is much more

another lulz? the same mathematician --- С-200 at 50 km from the front line, SOU Buk at 5 km behind the front, follow the advancing equipment, Torahs, Tungusks on 200 m behind the tanks.
And the hovering helicopter still needs to sneak up, not talking about that device with the radar on the remote boom.

Quote: FROST

Dear, it looks like you have mental problems. And the purpose of your stay on the site is definitely not an adequate assessment of military review. Success

Thank you. I especially liked the way you cried to the professor about the Israeli missile defense. You can’t save your face.