Assets of the near-air defense of the Russian and Western fleets in the realities of promising means of air attack

51

Optical-location sighting system SPARK "Pantsir-С1" (later and Pantsir-M) with a thermal imaging module (right) and an optical-electronic unit (left). This element is the foundation Interference "armor" family: functioning in most of the visible optical and infrared sensors able to fully compensate for possible errors in guidance RLC targeting 1RS2-1E "helmet", which may be allowed as a result of active jamming by the aircraft / UAV EW adversary


In the case when the naval theater of operations, saturated with surface ships, patrol and tactical aviation parties, a large-scale military confrontation occurs, dozens and hundreds of anti-radar and anti-ship missiles, false LA targets, small-sized UABs and other high-precision weapons can be used. In such a situation, not every medium-range and long-range anti-aircraft missile control system can cope with the reflection of a massive "interspecific" attack by various classes of missile weapons. As it turns out, neither the Aegis system with the AN / SPY-1 radar, nor the hastily developed MRLK AN / SPY-6 (V) is an exception. The new multi-channel illumination radars (instead of the old SPG-62) of the latter, in conjunction with the RIM-174 (SM-6) missiles, although capable of simultaneously intercepting more than 20 to 30 different targets, are absolutely not immune to the suppression of modern electronic warfare devices installed on the IEDs themselves or the EW aircraft of the enemy’s naval aviation, as well as from the natural reloading of the computing facilities of the combat information and control system of the URO ship. As a result, a certain part of the RCC or PRLR can break into the near line of the air defense / missile defense system of the naval formation, where the entire complexity of the interception tasks lies with the ship’s self-defense air defense systems.

The effectiveness of the operation of these elements of air defense in modern combat may determine the fate of an entire carrier-based strike force, and therefore even small states of regional importance focus on the modernization of nearby naval air defense missile systems. The most successful in this direction have been achieved by Russian specialists, having developed the famous and effective CIRK “Dirk”, “Palma”, “Pantsir-M”, turret KUV “Gibka”, as well as the air defense system “Dagger”.

The Dirk 3М87 developed by the Instrument Design Bureau, KORTIK, was a real breakthrough in Russian engineering thought at the end of the XX century. The fundamentally new design of the complex, based on the compact 3-XNNXX rocket-gun combat modules, made it possible to install several SPARK modules even on small ships of the frigate and corvette classes. And the high fire performance of each BM 87М3 allowed at the same time intercepting the anti-ship missiles (with 87-4-xsecond intervals from each other) up to 3; The range and density of the effective fire of the artillery unit "Kortika-M" also increased thanks to the new, extended automatic cannon GSH-4-3KD. Compared with the regular GSH-87-1K, the new guns on the 5% increased the firing rate (from 6 to 6 shots / s), as well as on the 30%, the initial speed of the BPS (from 6 to 30 m / s). The new 11M75-83 missile system received a high interception height (up to 27 m), range (up to 860 km). The reaction time was reduced to 1100 - 3 seconds, thanks to which the “Dirk-M” continues to be ahead of the western ship-borne air defense systems of self-defense in terms of key parameters. The most important features of the complex can be considered the autonomy of the BM only in conjunction with the radar detector “Positiv-МЭ311” (without integration into the electronic architecture of the ship's CIU), as well as a hybrid radar-optical guidance system with radio command control of the anti-aircraft missile system, which dramatically increases the noise immunity of the complex.


Optoelectronic and radar sighting systems of the shipborne Kortik / Kortik-M ZRAK received incredibly accurate targeting capabilities (1 m - for OLPK and 2,5 m - for RLPK). For the highest resolution of sighting targets in millimeter range was introduced in the RLPK. This is due to the high requirements of the “equipment” of the high-speed two-stage directional 3М311 SAMs. Splitting a fragmentation-rod warhead after a rupture is only 5 meters, and the deviation of missiles on 2 extra meters would make the complex useless


Later, the Cortika will be replaced by a more long-range and powerful Pantsir-M (Mace), the radar architecture of which is represented by a multipurpose radar with phased array 1PC2-1E Helmet of the millimeter range (Ka), and the optical-electronic - the 10ESXNNXX Vizir E, capable of detecting and “capturing” targets for accurate auto tracking in the optical and infrared channels. The MRLS “Helmet” “captures” targets with 1 m0,1 EPR (PRLR AGM-2 HARM) at 88 distance - 12 km, and OLPC 13ES10-E at 1 km distance, which is significantly more than Kortika. A high initial flight speed (14М) and a low deceleration rate (4,4 m / s on 40 m trajectory) of the “slender” two-stage 1000E57E SAM retained a high speed of its flight even in the far range of the complex, the rocket can vigorously maneuver to the evading target even in 6 km from the launcher. For example, the loss rate of the single-stage anti-aircraft missile 19М9-330 of the ship’s Dagger air defense missile system is much larger, and at a distance of 2 km (range radius) the SAM will not be able to cope with the highly maneuverable medium-high target, since its speed will be less than 12 km / h. But Dagger has serious advantages over Dirks and Pantsiry, thanks to which the complex will remain in service for the majority of Russian surface ships of the frigate, BOD, nuclear-powered cruiser, heavy aircraft carrier classes. missile cruiser ".


The second (marching) stage of the 57E6E anti-aircraft missile, overtaking the target at the speed of 3000 km / h, even in the most difficult jamming environment, is able to maintain a trajectory thanks to two devices - a radio responder and an optical transponder. The first one keeps radio contact with the auxiliary antenna array of the BM “Pantsir” input on the radio channel which jumps with the frequency 3500 Hz (in an arbitrarily specified BTsVM range); the second, using low-level laser radiation (also from the coded component), indicates the exact location of the marching stage to the Pantsir optical / IR sensor with powerful optical-electronic interference from the enemy


Developed by NPO Altair and ICB Fakel of the KZRK self-defense Kinzhal entered service with the Navy in 1989 to replace the aging one-channel Osa-M complex, as well as to supplement the capabilities and cover the dead zone of long-range shipborne air defense systems C-300F / FM. The minimum range of destruction of airborne targets at the Forts was 5 km, which is why the 5-kilometer “dead zone” of flagship ships of the Admiral Kuznetsov type and so on. 1144 overlapped only with ZAK AK-630 and ineffective “Wasps”, which broke through the defenses could even a small amount of "harpoons". Developers "Dagger" solved the problem by designing for complex standalone antenna post K-12-1 with a radar detector and MRLS based on phased array and advanced VPU 3R-95 rotating underdeck svosmironnymi revolving TPK designed for vertical launch air defense missiles 9M330-2 with a “dead zone” of all 1,5 km. One antenna post K-12-1 is capable of automatically accompanying 8 on the 4 aisle and firing 60 air targets in the azimuth and elevation planes of 60x11435 degrees. On the 4 TKR Ave. Admiral Kuznetsov installed the Dagger 4 complex (12 AP K-1-4 and 3 TLU 95Р-16), thanks to which the ship can process only XNUMX enemy attacking missiles at the same time.

The Dirk, Pantsir-M and Osa complexes launch a direct-fire missile, which is why the combat modules and launchers mounted on the opposite side of the ship’s missile direction cannot fire on low-flying anti-ship missiles (the direction of fire for them is blocked by superstructures and other constructive elements of the ship), which exactly 2 times will reduce the chances of repelling an enemy missile strike. Vertically launching the Dagger Zour is all the same: after the ejection launch, the 9М330-2 leans towards the target with the help of gas-dynamic rudders even before the launch of the cruising engine, this happens over the ship superstructures, due to which missiles from all PUs can attack the targets and performance is not lost.

The indisputable advantage of placing under the deck of the Dagger launcher is the survivability of the ammunition of the complex in the event of the destruction of the ship of the high-explosive fragmentation warhead of the PLCR or another EHV; to be incapacitated even from one powerful warhead missile that exploded near the ship.

As you can see, the various defensive air defense systems of our Navy's short range perfectly complement and replace each other, turning the 15-kilometer zone around the KUG into a “shield of total missile defense”, forcing the enemy to only dream of a successful concept of a “lightning fast” on the naval theater. How are things going in the “friendly western camp” and what should particular attention be paid to by our RCC developers?

"SEA RAM" - HALF-MILLION ADVERTISING "PROBLEM" FROM "RATHEON"


The latest version of the short-range PUZRM SeaRAM Mk 15 Mod 31 CIWS. 11 inclined guides for the RIM-116B missiles in the "package". Unlike the reinforced PU Mk 49, the cells are assembled in a single combat module with a radar and optical-electronic correction module for facilitated placement on small warships. The estimated cost of one RIM-116 is about 450 thousand dollars


The short-range anti-aircraft missile system SeaRAM (ASMD) was developed by the joint US-German efforts of Raytheon and RAMSYS as early as the end of 70. of the last century and adopted by the US Navy and Western European countries in 1987 year (two years before entering our Navy "Kortikov" and "Daggers"). The complex was developed as an autonomous near-air defense and missile defense system to protect ships from massive anti-ship missiles and other enemy air attack systems, as well as to complement the capabilities of the Vulcan Phalanx Mk 15 anti-aircraft artillery complex and to block the “dead zone” of the SM-1 / 2 air defense system ". For the complex, three types of inclined rotary launchers were developed: Mk 49 - on 21 TPK for large displacement ships, Mk 15 Mod 31- on 11 TPK for small NK corvette / frigate classes, and also Mk 29 - modified Sea Sparrow TPK with 10 guide cells for the RIM-116A / B. In order to minimize the architecture of the Mk 15 Mod 31 to the requirements of small ships, a radio transparent radome with a target designation radar and optical thermal imaging aiming complex was placed on the MI 15 CIWS platform with the TPK; as a result, the complex began to fully comply with the rocket version of the Volcano Falanx.

Despite the large spatial sector of rotation of the launcher (310х90 degrees, respectively), the complex has similar limitations in the fight against low-altitude targets flying up from the ship superstructures. The reaction time of the SeaRAM is close to 7-8 seconds, which is 2 times longer than that of the Dirk or the Shell. For example, during the firing of the USS Onyx surface ship, the SeaRAM SAM can launch the RAM Block 2 (RIM-116B) only through 5-7 from its entry into the 10-kilometer affected area, during this time 3М55 overcome more than 4 km, get closer with the ship to 6 km, and begin to perform energetic anti-aircraft maneuvers, which RAMs, to put it mildly, “dislike”.

Despite the manipulation of some Western PR experts with information about the successful use of SeaRAM in the VandalEx shooting practice, where the complex is tasked with intercepting the Vandal 2-swing training rocket, the actual effectiveness of the RAM Block 1 / 2 against the modern highly maneuverable RCC is significantly lower declared 95%. First, the Vandal target rocket moves along a known trajectory at a speed of 2,1M (2300 km / h) and enters the speed range of the targets of the SeaRAM complex, which is approximately 2550 km / h. The Russian ClubNSXM3E RCC of the Club-S / N complex at the final leg of the flight accelerates to 54 km / h with energy maneuvering, which is beyond the reach of the officially declared speed of the targeted SeaRAM target equal to 3500 m / s. Secondly, “Vandal” flies at an altitude of 700 m, which is 15 - 3 times the final segment of the trajectory of any modern anti-ship missiles (5-3 meters), which allows RIM-5 to reach the attacking enemy without any difficulty. Thirdly, it is quite obvious that the RIM-116A / B SAM, launched from one NK, absolutely cannot protect the neighboring ship AUG, remote on 116 - 4 km, from the 5-fly-by air attack: not enough speed. The 3EX57 ZUR of the Pantsir-M complex in 6 is faster on any part of its trajectory (2 - 1300 m / s). Calling SeaRAM a promising means of self-defense from an enemy MRAU is simply not turning the language. For successful interception of a maneuverable WTO, Zour should have 800-3 times the maximum permissible overloads and such quality as a high angular reversal speed, and now look at the area of ​​the RIM-4 aerodynamic controls - the answer is obvious.

Now consider the "stuffing" of anti-aircraft missiles RIM-116A / B. For the “capture” and the defeat of the target is the combined dual channel homing of homing, the first and main channel of which is represented by EKGSN of the POST / POST-RMP type used in the “Stinger” MANPADS. GOS POST also has an additional UV subchannel of target direction finding, which contributes to increased noise immunity of the GOS when the enemy uses infrared traps, as well as during natural high-temperature phenomena caused by combat operations at sea (aircraft kerosene ignites on the deck of an aircraft carrier, etc.). An advanced POST-RMP modification can be pre-programmed to meet the conditions of a reconnoitered tactical situation, including the enemy's electronic equipment and the presence of optical-electronic interference complexes.

The second channel is represented by two compact passive radar GOS, operating on the principle of GOS anti-radar missiles. Multi-frequency radiation receivers (radio interferometers) are housed in miniature fairings located on special remote nose rods placed in front of the ICGSN. Passive direction finders are designed for early detection of anti-ship missiles by the emission of working ARGSN or radio altimeters, which are usually activated 35-40 km from the target ship, this increases the chances of successful interception, but it does not guarantee anything if the attacking missile also uses the passive method of targeting.

If the ship is attacked by an anti-radar missile with a passive RGSN, the missile defense system will be put in a difficult position. The passive radio interferometer will not detect radiation, and the RLPR will move by inertia with the long-burnt rocket engine; the only thing that the infrared / UV channel of the RIM-116 anti-aircraft missile can orient itself for is the increased temperature of the radome of the PRLR, observed as a result of friction against dense layers of the troposphere. But here, our developers have a huge field for action.

Anti-radar missiles, similarly to the 15G65 Topol-M ICBM, can be equipped with various enemy missile defense systems (complexes of missile defense systems) of the enemy, which can be based on the capillary tubule system in the radome PRLR to create a thick haze of infrared aerosols-IR radiation generators around it. This haze completely distorts, or even masks the thermal signature of the rocket for atmospheric interceptors with ICGSN. This once again underlines the futility of the development of the American-German project SeaRAM with the existing guidance system. The complexities of interception for the complex can also be observed in relation to other passive or satellite-guided anti-aircraft weapons, including ADB, adjustable ammunition and missiles with a thermal guidance system.

BALANCED FRENCH APPROACH

Despite the widespread use of the SeaRAM air defense system (ASMD) in fleets Some Western European and Asian partner states of the United States, France, as the military-technical leader of Western Europe, models sometimes much more advanced defensive weapons systems for all branches of the military, and the Navy is no exception.

The short-range anti-aircraft missile system VL MICA was presented to a wide audience at the Asian Aerospace Exhibition in Singapore. It was a ground modification of a promising air defense system, which proved to be effective by the beginning of 2005. MICA-IR, unified with an air-to-air missile from a MICA infrared homing system, MICA-IR successfully hit small-size target missiles imitating CD in the following terrain mode, at a distance of 12 - 15 km. In the same 2000 year, work began on the ship version of the VL MICA, which later became the basis for the self-defense of the Indonesian corvettes of the Nakhoda Ragam class, the Moroccan small frigates Sigma, the Emirati small corvettes of the Falaj 2, Polish Corvettes of the SROzak URO (621 "Gavron") and the Omani patrol ships of the type "Khareef".


Demonstration of a variety of modular vertical PU on 8 TPK "Sylver A-43" for Navy Naval Forces and ground vertical PU for VL MICA complex, launch of MICA-EM SAM


All modifications of the VL MICA air defense system have a vertical launch type of missile defense, the merits of which we have already discussed with the example of our “Dagger”. The next advantage of the complex is the use of the MICA family of missiles with different principles of homing: passive infrared and active radar. MICA-IR SAM is equipped with highly sensitive IKGSN operating in the mid-wave infrared range (SVIK) in the 3-5 μm spectrum and in the long-wave infrared range (DVIK) in the 8-12 μm spectrum. Both the first and last ranges provide an excellent display of most warm-contrast targets, and SWIK (3-5μkm) also has the possibility of improved selection of selected warm-contrast targets against the background of a complex (thermally) earth surface. Improves the "capture" advanced high-performance onboard computers missiles with loaded algorithms for tracking air targets with medium and small infrared signature, these include advanced low-profile tactical and strategic cruise missiles with a complex design of the nozzle contours to reduce the thermal glow of a jet, etc., and also subsonic targets that converge with missiles on intersecting courses. The operation algorithm of IKGSN can be quickly “reflashed” thanks to the digital communication channel synchronized with MIL-STD-1553 from the ship's BIOS or directly via the KZRK interface. IKGSN MICA-IR has a good flow angle of the coordinator (+/- 60 degrees), which allows her to follow complex targets with high angular velocity (more than 4 degrees / s) relative to the spatial view of the GOS for 30-s and more seconds. This homing head surpasses the American POST / POST-RMP (“RAM”) not only in the target viewing angles, but also in the detection and capture range of approximately 2-2,5 times due to a larger matrix receiver with a higher resolution.

MICA-EM is equipped with an active radar seeker AD4A. She entered the modular composition of the anti-aircraft MICA from the same air version of the rocket, and is designed to eliminate some of the disadvantages of the infrared MICA-IR. The latter, like all thermal missiles, has problems with the defeat of “cold” planning means of air attack, some UAVs, as well as free-falling and guided bombs. The AD4A GOS with a slit antenna array hides under the radio transparent fairing and operates in the high-frequency J-band of centimeter waves (10-20 GHz), which theoretically gives it a higher, compared to X-band GOS, accuracy of target “capture” with a small reflecting surface ( ESR). AD4A has a good modernization potential, especially due to the possibilities of enhancing energy parameters, some sources feature instrumental capture range 50-60 km (for large targets like “bomber” or “transport aircraft”), it means that the WTO with 0,05 2 ESR will be detected on 6 km removal. MICA-EM is capable of hitting any radio-contrast target entering the 20-kilometer range, with virtually no delay time, since even before an object enters the affected area, target designation on the VL MICA KZRK will come from any radar or optical-electronic detection equipment on the ship or from another networked centric unit.

The Protac rocket engine nozzle has thrust vector deflection (OAT) drives in the form of four controlled aerodynamic lobes, which, together with the large aerodynamic control surfaces, allow MICA IR / EM rockets to maneuver overloads over 50 units. The engine itself accelerates the missiles to speeds in 3600 km / h and allows you to go 9-kilometer altitude interception line, and also provides interception targets in pursuit (in the rear hemisphere), thereby protecting friendly ships; for SeaRAM, this ability is out of reach.

Even more interesting and original solution is the unification of the MICA anti-aircraft missiles with the most common European universal built-in launchers of the Sylver vertical launch. Sylver A-35 and A-43 vertical modules are designed for the MICA-IR / EM SAM, which can easily replace A-50 and A-70 in order to increase the individual defensive capabilities of the EM Daring or La Fayette frigate "In favor of maintaining the fleet ammunition more expensive and long-range" Aster-30 ".

In comparison with the mediocre US-German “SeaRAM”, the VL MICA can be considered the most developed and adapted to repel large-scale missile strikes against the enemy by shipboard SAM systems of Western Europe. The American ESSM is approaching it with the highly mobile RIM-162 SAM, which can be used both with the Mk 29 inclined PU (version RIM-162D) and the MK 41 (RIM-162A) PU, but this is different storysince the rocket belongs to the class of medium range (50 km), providing not only the individual defense of a small KUG within 10 - 15 km, but also the protection of a large compound.

There are a number of similar foreign shipboard air defense systems. The South African KZRK “Umkhonto” also belongs to one of them. Two types of his missile defense systems (thermal Umkhonto-IR and active radar Umkhonto-R), in combination with various ship fire control systems and a CICS, are capable of providing simultaneous 8 attack of air targets in any direction for the ship, but low speed of these missiles (2300 km / h) limits the defense of even a small ship group, and therefore only Russian and French short-range naval air defense systems can rightly be considered the real “last line” of the fleet.
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  1. -15
    26 February 2016 07: 27
    Bullshit abundantly equipped with intricate abbreviations and indices ...
    Typical Eugene Damantsev.
    1. +7
      26 February 2016 07: 59
      Quote: Mera Joota
      Bullshit abundantly equipped with intricate abbreviations and indices ...

      Your truth, some daggers, daggers ..... how can the weapons of backward Russia withstand the best weapons in the world of the best weapons in the world in the world .... definitely crazy! Just ... On October 17, on October 2000, in the command hall aboard the USS Kitty Hawk (CV-63) multipurpose aircraft carrier, a meeting of the American AUG crew was held, which was suddenly interrupted by the roar of turbines of Russian aircraft circling the aircraft carrier’s cabin.
      Perhaps the great Americans considered the appearance of the Su-24MP pair and the Su-27 pair an unsuccessful joke and did not pay attention to their approach, only the fresh sea air around Kitty Hawk after that had a disgusting smell ...
      1. +2
        26 February 2016 08: 25
        Quote: Serg65
        how can the weapons of backward Russia withstand the best weapons in the world of the best weapons in the world

        In vain you ernichat. The author replaced the analysis of the capabilities of the near-air defense systems with a fog of abbreviations and firmly supplied the patriotic porridge.
        Quote: Serg65
        That's just ..

        If you evaluate the technical characteristics of patriotic delights, then what's the point in the performance characteristics of products?
        1. +2
          26 February 2016 09: 12
          Quote: Mera Joota
          If you evaluate the technical characteristics of patriotic delights, then what's the point in the performance characteristics of products?

          By no means, dear you are our patriot of America! In addition to the SeaRAM air defense system of the 1987 model and the Mark 15 Phalanx CIWS ZAK of the 1980 model, your friends in the near air defense zone have nothing else! After the Falklands, the Great Britains, with fright, even included light machine guns in the air defense of their new destroyers. Phalanxes were also abandoned on the famous destroyer Arlie Burkes in the IIA series, and instead they were replaced by 25-mm Bushmasters and Browning machine guns.
          Quote: Mera Joota
          The author replaced the analysis of the capabilities of the near-air defense systems with a fog of abbreviations and firmly supplied the patriotic porridge.

          Equip patriotic porridge with your complexes of near air defense, then we’ll talk about the advantages and disadvantages.
          Quote: Mera Joota
          In vain you ernichat.

          And I am not making jokes. Surrounded by Kitty Hawk were CD URO like "Tikonderoga" and three EM URO like "Arleigh Burke" with their super "Aegis", all this armada saw Russian planes literally at the last moment .... what kind of mockery is there?
          1. +1
            26 February 2016 10: 11
            Of course, there is no insurmountable air defense system, this applies to both NATO and us.
            Quote: Serg65
            Quote: Mera Joota
            If you evaluate the technical characteristics of patriotic delights, then what's the point in the performance characteristics of products?

            By no means, dear you are our patriot of America! In addition to the SeaRAM air defense system of the 1987 model and the Mark 15 Phalanx CIWS ZAK of the 1980 model, your friends in the near air defense zone have nothing else! After the Falklands, the Great Britains, with fright, even included light machine guns in the air defense of their new destroyers. Phalanxes were also abandoned on the famous destroyer Arlie Burkes in the IIA series, and instead they were replaced by 25-mm Bushmasters and Browning machine guns.
            Quote: Mera Joota
            The author replaced the analysis of the capabilities of the near-air defense systems with a fog of abbreviations and firmly supplied the patriotic porridge.

            Equip patriotic porridge with your complexes of near air defense, then we’ll talk about the advantages and disadvantages.
            Quote: Mera Joota
            In vain you ernichat.

            And I am not making jokes. Surrounded by Kitty Hawk were CD URO like "Tikonderoga" and three EM URO like "Arleigh Burke" with their super "Aegis", all this armada saw Russian planes literally at the last moment .... what kind of mockery is there?
            1. +2
              26 February 2016 15: 50
              Despite the advanced air defense system of the UAE, in Yemen last year, 2 corvettes were destroyed by P-200 anti-ship missiles (possibly of Iranian origin). One of the videos showed the launch of an air defense missile, which missed. So in a modern naval battle, most likely, a salvo of anti-ship missiles is capable of hitting any ship, even adversaries with the Aster, even our corvettes and frigates. Not to mention 22160 and 22800, where apart from "bending" nothing special is provided.
              However, HZ may be flexible to fight off 1-2 anti-ship missiles, although, frankly speaking, I don't want to test this in practice.
              1. 0
                27 February 2016 10: 00
                Quote: Botanologist
                Despite the UAE’s advanced air defense system, in Yemen last year 2 corvettes were destroyed by P-200 anti-ship missiles (possibly of Iranian origin).

                And which ones? Type, side numbers?
          2. +7
            26 February 2016 10: 24
            Dear Serg65.
            The CIA told you that "this whole armada saw Russian planes literally at the last moment." Or other reliable, respectable (Dorenko, Zhirinovsky) sources? Or were you yourself on the deck of the Aegis?
            1. +2
              26 February 2016 10: 33
              Quote: hrad
              The CIA told you that "this whole armada saw Russian planes literally at the last moment." Or other reliable, respectable (Dorenko, Zhirinovsky) sources? Or were you yourself on the deck of the Aegis?

              bully For our Czech "friends" ..... First, we should give the floor to the American pilot, who was a direct eyewitness to the events described (the text of his letter sent by e-mail from the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk, against the will of the author of the message, became public). http://politikus.ru/events/10711-rossiyskie-istrebiteli-su-27-nadrugalis-nad-ame
              rikanskim-avianoscem-kiti-hok.html
          3. +3
            26 February 2016 10: 53
            Quote: Serg65
            On the famous destroyer Arly Burke in the IIA series, the Phalanxes were also abandoned, and instead of them they installed the 25-mm Bushmaster and Browning machine guns.

            EMNIMS, these "Burks" initially did not install R2D2 due to the fact that its tasks were to be taken over by the next iteration of the Sea Sparrow - RIM-162 ESSM with the ability to pack 4 pieces in a UVP in a standard cell.
            But later the fleet changed its mind and decided to complete all IIA series EMs with at least one "droid".
          4. 0
            26 February 2016 12: 35
            Quote: Serg65
            By no means, dear you, our patriot of America!

            Personally, I think the best short-range defense complex is ZAK "Goalkeeper", he comes from Holland. You can call me a Dutch patriot.
            Quote: Serg65
            in the near air defense zone, except for the SeaRAM air defense system of the 1987 model and the Mark 15 Phalanx CIWS ZAK of the 1980 model, there is nothing else

            There are EW AN / SLQ-32 tools, MK 36 SRBOC jammers, MK 53 Decoy Launching System (DLS) false targets.
            And why the emphasis on the years of adoption? Are "Dagger" and "Dagger" younger?
            Quote: Serg65
            On the famous destroyer Arly Burke in the IIA series, the Phalanxes were also abandoned, and instead of them they installed the 25-mm Bushmaster and Browning machine guns.

            Why so unfounded. Here's an example of the destroyer USS Oscar Austin (DDG 79), the first in the Flight IIA series, you can see the account of the Phalanx, photo dated 20.05.2014/XNUMX/XNUMX.

            Quote: Serg65
            And I am not making jokes. Surrounded by Kitty Hawk were the Tikonderoga-type CR URO and the Arleigh Burke-type EM URO troika with their super Aegis, this whole armada saw Russian planes literally at the last moment ...

            Well, I saw and what's next? Should they shoot down? What is so incredible about this? We don’t seem to be at war with the Americans. Here is a photo of Orion over Kuzey, do you think our sailors also spoil the air?
            1. 0
              26 February 2016 17: 18
              Quote: Mera Joota
              Personally, I think the best short-range defense complex is ZAK "Goalkeeper", he comes from Holland. You can call me a Dutch patriot.

              But what about the Italian "Dardo"? The only ZAK capable of operating on anti-ship missiles not only in the near zone (subcaliber on warheads), but also in the far (fragmentation on the airframe).
              Quote: Mera Joota
              And why the emphasis on the years of adoption? Are "Dagger" and "Dagger" younger?

              Heh heh heh ... you can still remember - when it was adopted by the AK-630M, put on the latest 11356 instead of those standing on the project-ancestor of the ZRPK. smile
            2. +1
              27 February 2016 10: 25
              Quote: Mera Joota
              Personally, I think the best short-range defense complex is ZAK "Goalkeeper", he comes from Holland. You can call me a Dutch patriot.

              laughing Well, in the parents of the "Goalkeeper" and the Americans are present. In my opinion, "Kortik-M" is not worse than the "Goalkeeper", and in some places it surpasses the result of combined weapons. In addition, a smaller mass.

              Quote: Mera Joota
              There are EW AN / SLQ-32 tools, MK 36 SRBOC jammers, MK 53 Decoy Launching System (DLS) false targets.

              EW, this is a completely different song, we are talking about ZAK and ZRAK.

              Quote: Mera Joota
              Well, I saw and what's next? Should they shoot down? What is so incredible about this? We don’t seem to be at war with the Americans. Here is a photo of Orion over Kuzey, do you think our sailors also spoil the air?

              smile By my logic, they’re horny, then the BCH-7 warhead after the discovery of this Orion still managed to score a goat, the more Orion is not an indicator of radar performance, they flew according to the schedule, sometimes even the clock checked against them hi
          5. Hon
            +1
            26 February 2016 13: 00
            Quote: Serg65
            In addition to the SeaRAM air defense system of the 1987 model and the Mark 15 Phalanx CIWS ZAK of the 1980 model, your friends in the near air defense zone have nothing else!

            LAV-AD, RIM-174 SM-6, RIM-162 ESSM, these are relatively new developments. And the systems developed earlier are being modernized and improved.
      2. -2
        26 February 2016 10: 19
        Dear Serg65.
        Would you feel better if the Americans shot down these planes? And they could bring them down. There are only smart heads and the Intergovernmental Agreement on the prevention of incidents in the open sea and in the airspace above it.
        1. +3
          26 February 2016 10: 27
          It's not about knocking down, it's about seeing

          The Americans are really too keen on the air component of their air defense. Moreover, both at sea and on land. This is due to tradition or to the economy / logistics - the question is different.
          But the fact remains - the United States lags behind Russia in the area of ​​ground / ship components of the air defense system.
          1. +1
            26 February 2016 11: 09
            I do not know how much and what kind of radar sees and warns, not all information is available in plain text. Neither the Russian nor the American services always know everything at once. I'm talking about something else now. Regarding yesterday's reaction of one of the members of the forum to an article about the deployment of the Pantsir-C2 systems in Syria.
            A member of the forum asked why the "Pantsir - C2" abandoned cannon armament? I think the answer to this question can be found by looking at https://youtu.be/lv57h6fZqvA, after the 25th minute.
            I’m interested, but if this is a military secret, then do not answer, how many seconds does the main engine of the 57E6E rocket work? 4 seconds? 8 seconds?
            Judging by the photographs, the rocket’s aerodynamic rudders (the second or combat, the stage flies by inertia and at high speed) will not be able to provide reliable maneuvering and access to the detonation point when working against a high-speed and highly maneuverable enemy rocket. Rather, the rocket will behave like a rebounding blank until the moment of self-destruction. If, before this, it does not collapse from overloads.
            1. +1
              26 February 2016 11: 59
              Quote: hrad
              The member of the forum asked why the "Pantsir - C2" abandoned cannon armament?


              Do not refuse. C-2 has cannon weapons.

              It covers the dead zone ZURok. And it is the last frontier of protection when it is too late to let the zur out. Since zur is able to hit targets at altitudes from 15m and distances from 1200m. Anything closer is hit by a gun.

              Quote: hrad
              I’m interested, but if this is a military secret, then do not answer, how many seconds does the main engine of the 57E6E rocket work? 4 seconds? 8 seconds?


              in the 3's area, that's just the connection? The main engine of the 48н6 rocket runs for 10-12 seconds, while it flies to a range of 250km. The aster marching stage works in the 8 sec region (from memory) then it also separates and everything else flies by inertia.

              The problem of the Shell is not in the operating time of the marching stage. And the fact that his rocket was redone from the ATGM and has radio command guidance. Which introduces its limitations on the defeat of maneuvering and speed targets.
              1. +1
                26 February 2016 12: 23
                On the video, the work of the guns is not impressive. Maybe you need to switch to 40-mm or return to 57-mm, but with shells with a programmable fuse and with increased shrapnel action?
                1. 0
                  26 February 2016 12: 56
                  Quote: hrad
                  On the video, the work of the guns is not impressive. Maybe you need to switch to 40-mm or return to 57-mm, but with shells with a programmable fuse and with increased shrapnel action?


                  Difficult choice. 40mm is not held in high esteem, a lot of space is of little sense, if only telescopic shells. 57 is certainly interesting, only he will weigh a lot. It will be difficult to place both missiles and a cannon on one machine.

                  The video does not understand what the range was, what the weather (wind) was, we could have some kind of program malfunction. In any case, the gun is the last frontier.
                2. 0
                  26 February 2016 18: 31
                  Do you propose to switch to a larger caliber and thereby further reduce the density of fire and the mobility of the gun?
                  A programmed shrapnel shell is also not an option at such distances and speeds, although perhaps I am mistaken here.
                  ...
                  Personally, I do not understand the objective reason why something like the GSh-6-23 is not considered as an anti-aircraft gun ....
              2. 0
                26 February 2016 12: 51
                Quote: Falcon
                And the fact that his rocket is redone from the ATGM

                Uh ... Pretty bold statement 8)))

                Quote: Falcon
                has radio command guidance. Which introduces its limitations on the defeat of maneuvering and speed targets.

                At this stage in the development of technology, the loss of time for receiving equipment controlling data on the position of the rocket and transmitting a control signal does not really matter
                In addition, such a system has an order of magnitude higher noise immunity than systems with fire-and-forget missiles - to drown out the control signal is something from the category of unscientific fiction. As well as at the same time to blind both the optical coordinator and the radar system for determining the position of the missile relative to the target.
                Moreover, such a system gives an advantage in hitting targets with low ESR, low IR visibility and using active interference in the IR and radar ranges
                1. 0
                  26 February 2016 13: 11
                  Quote: Spade
                  At this stage in the development of technology, the loss of time for receiving equipment controlling data on the position of the rocket and transmitting a control signal does not really matter


                  It has a huge.

                  Quote: Spade
                  In addition, such a system has an order of magnitude higher noise immunity than systems with fire-and-forget missiles - to drown out the control signal is something from the category of unscientific fantasy.


                  Where such air defense missiles fired and forgot? All missiles with AGSN go on ANN + radio correction. AGSN allows induced at the very final stage. Since the rocket itself is very light, the warhead mass is small. Therefore, accurate guidance is important.

                  Quote: Spade
                  Moreover, such a system gives an advantage in hitting targets with low ESR, low IR visibility and using active interference in the IR and radar ranges


                  She gives nothing. All modern air defense and so are adjusted by radio commands. She does not give a clear sight of a maneuvering target. Especially at the last stage. Therefore, radio command guidance on long-range complexes, without active or semi-active in the final section, has long disappeared, since it is not effective.
                  1. +2
                    26 February 2016 13: 42
                    Quote: Falcon
                    It has a huge.

                    And you count 8)))

                    Quote: Falcon
                    Where such air defense missiles fired and forgot?

                    Almost all MANPADS.

                    Quote: Falcon
                    She does not give a clear sight of a maneuvering target.

                    Myth.
                    Ground equipment by default is able to more accurately determine the position of the rocket relative to the target.


                    Quote: Falcon
                    Therefore, radio command guidance on long-range complexes, without active or semi-active in the final section, has long disappeared, since it is not effective

                    The question is not about efficiency at all, but about fire performance. The less ground-based equipment will control the missile, the more targets can be hit in one and the same time. For long-range complexes, this is of great importance.
                    In addition, the size of long-range missile systems allows you to place more advanced means of guidance.
                    1. 0
                      26 February 2016 14: 29
                      Aiming anti-aircraft missiles using infrared and radar (with a wavelength of 8 mm) on-board seekers allows to achieve greater accuracy in hitting targets than guidance with a ship's radar (with a wavelength of 3,2 cm).

                      The reason is simple - the closer the rocket flies to the target, the better the angular resolution of the onboard seeker and the worse the resolution of the ship’s radar.

                      Another thing is that until the target is captured by an on-board seeker, an anti-aircraft missile needs to be accompanied by a ship radar, since in difficult weather conditions the target detection range of a millimeter seeker is up to 5 km, and an infrared seeker is up to 500 meters.
                      1. +1
                        26 February 2016 15: 07
                        Quote: Operator
                        Aiming anti-aircraft missiles using infrared and radar (with a wavelength of 8 mm) on-board seekers allows to achieve greater accuracy in hitting targets than guidance with a ship's radar (with a wavelength of 3,2 cm).

                        Let's start with IR ... The default ship / ground-based optoelectronic system is more accurate. For "size matters" (c) Several orders of magnitude greater resolution, the ability to use multispectral sensors, powerful computers that perform work on image processing and improvement ... It's corny not to ram it into a rocket.

                        According to radar detection, as I understand you, does accuracy increase with decreasing antenna size? To say the least, debatable. Radars with a wavelength of 8 mm are planned to be used for satellite radio-vision systems. So I personally don’t see the problems with installing fire control of this range on the SAM radar.

                        So we have information about the position of the target. In the IR, optical and radar range. Moreover, freed from interference due to the processing of these signals by a powerful computer. We have information about the position of the rocket in the IR and RL ranges. Also with interference cleaning. We have a control system, again with a powerful computer, with several orders of magnitude higher information processing speed than the onboard equipment of the rocket.

                        I apologize why you think that such a missile will be less accurate than a missile with an active or semi-active radar seeker or infrared seeker?

                        The only problem with such systems is the limitation of the number of control channels / the number of targets fired simultaneously. Especially in the case of an attack from different angles. The rest is a total advantage.
                      2. 0
                        26 February 2016 15: 36
                        The closer the rocket flies to the target (from several kilometers to several meters), the better the target sees its on-board seeker compared to the ship’s optical-location station, the distance between which and the target from the moment of detection to the moment of destruction is about several kilometers.

                        The size of the transceiver modules of the phased antenna of the millimeter range is equal to a quarter of the wavelength, i.e. 2 mm, which allows you to create an antenna field up to 1000 PPM in the dimensions of the GOS anti-aircraft missile. This is quite enough for high-quality angular resolution.

                        To a greater extent, the same can be said about the number of uncooled infrared radiation detectors in GOS missiles.

                        The power of a modern on-board GSN processor is quite sufficient for processing a multi-point (facet) radar / infrared signal and target selection against the background of artificial and natural interference.

                        In addition, in the fog, the ship’s optical station detects a target at a distance of 500 meters or less (less than 0,5 seconds of flight), which is not enough to intercept from the point of view of reaction not only SAM, but also SAM.

                        The main trend in air defense systems now is the use of millimeter and infrared seeker missiles "air-to-air" as part of anti-aircraft missiles.
                      3. 0
                        26 February 2016 16: 50
                        Quote: Operator
                        The closer the rocket flies to the target (from several kilometers to several meters), the better the target sees its on-board seeker compared to the ship’s optical-location station, the distance between which and the target from the moment of detection to the moment of destruction is about several kilometers.

                        It's not an eye, it's an electro-optical system. A professional digital camera from 10 meters will make a better picture than a "soap dish" from a meter

                        Quote: Operator
                        The size of the transceiver modules of the phased antenna of the millimeter range is equal to a quarter of the wavelength, i.e. 2 mm, which allows you to create an antenna field up to 1000 PPM in the dimensions of the GOS anti-aircraft missile. This is quite enough for high-quality angular resolution.

                        And it does not impede the manufacture of a radar control with a several orders of magnitude larger antenna and, as a result, a higher resolution.

                        Quote: Operator
                        In addition, in the fog, the ship’s optical station detects a target at a distance of 500 meters

                        Bad station. Replacing with a good one is not a problem. Technically, 500 meters is not the limit. "Transparency windows" to help.
                      4. 0
                        26 February 2016 17: 09
                        A shipborne radar, while simultaneously irradiating several targets, sees some of them with "peripheral vision" - at a large angle to the plane of the antenna, which significantly reduces the angular resolution.
                        A radar seeker sees the target at an optimum angle of 90 degrees.

                        In dense fog, all types of infrared receivers see the same at a range of no more than 500 meters. The same applies to millimeter-wave seekers operating in an atmospheric transparency window with a wavelength of 8 mm - in rain their range does not exceed 10 km.

                        Therefore, shipborne radar air defense systems have a wavelength of 3,2 cm, the range of which does not depend on weather conditions.
                      5. 0
                        26 February 2016 17: 59
                        Quote: Operator
                        A shipborne radar, while simultaneously irradiating several targets, sees some of them with "peripheral vision"

                        Here.
                        The only problem is the number of channels of destruction. If the goal is one, then no "lateral vision" is needed.

                        Quote: Operator
                        In dense fog, all types of infrared receivers see the same at a range of no more than 500

                        No. In dense fog, the range is different in different ranges of the IR spectrum.

                        Quote: Operator
                        Therefore, shipborne radar air defense systems have a wavelength of 3,2 cm, the range of which does not depend on weather conditions.

                        Which of them? Radar detection? Highlights and target tracking? What prevents to make tracking radar operating in several wave bands?
                      6. 0
                        26 February 2016 18: 32
                        Modern ships and their weapons are equipped with three types of radars:
                        - universal decimeter antennas, whose antennas are located on superstructures, with a range of several hundred km;
                        - specialized centimeter antennas at ZRAK installations with a range of several tens of kilometers;
                        - airborne millimeter anti-aircraft missiles with a range of several km.
                        The number of universal and specialized radars does not exceed a dozen pieces per ship, and more than ten missiles can simultaneously participate in an attack on it. Therefore, it is more efficient to shift part of the work to airborne anti-aircraft missile radars.

                        Can you give a link to a greater than 500 meters range of vision in any infrared range in dense fog?

                        AFAR radars have a matrix of a set of unified transceiver modules optimized for a specific radio range (dm, cm or mm). It also allows to ensure the absence of mutual interference with the simultaneous operation of the detection, tracking and guidance stations.
                      7. 0
                        26 February 2016 20: 31
                        There are ship radars of various ranges. There are radars located on airplanes / helicopters / UAVs.
                        There are many sensors that work in the UV, visible and infrared range.
                        There are electronic intelligence tools capable of detecting not only radiation-powered equipment, but simply working.
                        There are modern communication systems with huge bandwidth.
                        There are computers with enormous speed.

                        Are we going to use this wealth to aim missiles at aerial targets on the principle of "dumb cheap missile and smart launcher"? No, this is ineffective.

                        We need the most expensive, the most specialized, the most vulnerable to electronic or optoelectronic suppression rocket. A missile that can be easily fooled. Its only advantage is its high cost.
                      8. 0
                        26 February 2016 21: 27
                        In the EW arsenal of attacking missiles, there is only one effective means of confusing air defense radar: flickering interference - a synchronous echo signal broadcast by two missiles flying in parallel. As a result, the radar sees one virtual target in the space between two real ones and, naturally, directs the missile into an electronic "ghost".

                        This EW technique is equally effective both against shipborne radars and against airborne anti-aircraft missile radars. There are no other ways to effectively suppress air defense radars. Therefore, it makes no sense to block the super-duper radar and ASU as part of the ship's air defense system.

                        The trick to using a radar on board an anti-aircraft missile is different: according to the basic equation of radar, the detection range of a target by a radar depends on the antenna area in the first degree, and on the range to the target in the fourth degree.
                      9. 0
                        26 February 2016 15: 41
                        Quote: Spade
                        Let's start with the IR ... The ship / ground optoelectronic system is more accurate by default.


                        Not when in front of her is a rocket torch.

                        Quote: Spade
                        According to radar detection, as I understand you, does accuracy increase with decreasing antenna size? To say the least, debatable. Radars with a wavelength of 8 mm are planned to be used for satellite radio-vision systems.


                        The antenna size and wavelength are related, but not in this case. And the dependence is not direct and not mandatory.

                        Quote: Spade
                        So I personally don’t see the problems with installing fire control of this range on the SAM radar.


                        There is. Coef. attenuation is higher - hence the range is less. Immunity is less.

                        Quote: Spade
                        I apologize why you think that such a missile will be less accurate than a missile with an active or semi-active radar seeker or infrared seeker?


                        As you do not understand, there is radio command guidance there anyway. Radar seeker or infrared seeker only supplement it in the final section for greater accuracy.
                      10. 0
                        26 February 2016 17: 18
                        Quote: Falcon
                        Not when in front of her is a rocket torch.

                        Firstly, there is no torch.
                        Secondly, if he were, removing him is not a problem.
                        Thirdly, there is no absolute need to conduct a rocket so that the target is constantly covered by its torch. Moreover, it is almost impossible. Otherwise, second-generation ATGM would not make sense.

                        Quote: Falcon
                        There is. Coef. attenuation is higher - hence the range is less.

                        And therefore, the use of radar sensors of this range for sensing the earth's surface cut means and deceiving the electorate, in fact, they do not work, but does the student Vasily create photos in Photoshop?


                        Quote: Falcon
                        As you do not understand, there is radio command guidance there anyway. Radar seeker or infrared seeker only supplement it in the final section for greater accuracy.

                        Do you even know what radio command guidance is?
                        This is when the rocket has only a gyroscope that determines which of the control surfaces and how much to deflect. Missiles with ANNs with the possibility of radio correction have nothing to do with radio command guidance.
                      11. 0
                        26 February 2016 20: 55
                        Quote: Spade
                        And therefore, the use of radar sensors of this range for sensing the earth's surface cut means and deceiving the electorate, in fact, they do not work, but does the student Vasily create photos in Photoshop?


                        What is the joke? And do you think the same time of signal accumulation for satellite and onboard radar?

                        ASAR Envisat wavelength 5,6cm ...

                        Quote: Spade
                        Missiles with ANNs with the possibility of radio correction have nothing to do with radio command guidance.


                        those. missiles with ins do not have radio correction belay Or maybe 9m96 goes only by ANN without correction? belay Or maybe you confuse radio correction with target illumination? Well, yes, the radio correction does not give a signal to undermine - it is issued by the GOS.
                        You darken something completely.
                    2. 0
                      26 February 2016 15: 15
                      Quote: Spade
                      Almost all MANPADS.


                      And then MANPADS? belay
                      What do they have to do with air defense systems ???? We talk about pointing missiles on radio commands

                      Quote: Spade
                      Myth.
                      Ground equipment by default is able to more accurately determine the position of the rocket relative to the target.


                      The wavelength of the GOS is always less than that of ground equipment, not to mention thermal guidance.
                      2 station always determines with an error - which contributes to the attenuation coefficient of radio waves and refraction due to the heterogeneity of the toposphere.

                      Nobody cancels the ground! It is complemented.


                      Quote: Spade
                      The question is not about efficiency at all, but about fire performance. The less ground-based equipment will control the missile, the more targets can be hit in one and the same time.


                      Nonsense is complete!
                      The target guides the locator and gives a radio correction in any beam. With radio command guidance, performance is greater. Since it is in both cases. But with the active in the final section, it is still necessary to get an answer that the AGSN has captured (following the example of AIM-120) and in case of a failure of the capture, again introduce corrections. The equipment is even more complicated !!!

                      Quote: Spade
                      In addition, the size of long-range missile systems allows you to place more advanced means of guidance.

                      The Derby missile from the short range spyder is active! GSN range in 50 km and weight 118 kg ...

                      1. 0
                        26 February 2016 17: 36
                        Quote: Falcon
                        And then MANPADS?
                        What do they have to do with air defense systems ????

                        Uh ... Hello, here we are. You have reported, my friend. MANPADS are directly related to air defense systems 8)))

                        Quote: Falcon
                        The wavelength of the GOS is always less than that of ground equipment, not to mention thermal guidance.
                        2 station always determines with an error - which contributes to the attenuation coefficient of radio waves and refraction due to the heterogeneity of the toposphere.

                        For religious reasons?
                        The wavelength of the ground / ship system can be any. Moreover, multispectral and even hyperspectral sensors are by no means news today.
                        Quote: Falcon
                        Nonsense is complete!
                        Target leads the locator

                        Which one, dear? Radar tracking? Or a radar for detecting targets, which, when changing the trajectory of the target, will command the inertial missile control system to change the coordinates of the point at which it is necessary to launch the missile?
                      2. 0
                        26 February 2016 21: 08
                        Quote: Spade
                        Uh ... Hello, here we are. You have reported, my friend. MANPADS are directly related to air defense systems 8)))


                        True, it's cool. Then let's take Aegis for discussion. You can also discuss the BAZ chassis.
                        What does MANPAD have to do with the air defense systems under discussion.
                        Let’s discuss 52-k then - also shot and forgot ...

                        Quote: Spade
                        For religious reasons?

                        Decided to juggle?
                        According to the radar equation, for starters. With decreasing wavelength, the ESR of the object increases. With a small distance coefficient. attenuation is no longer important.

                        Quote: Spade
                        The wavelength of the ground / ship system can be any.


                        Yeah cool laughing And where do our millimeter-wave radars stand on ships? But how do they take into account changes in the toposphere? Can an UAV scout before launching a rocket?

                        Quote: Spade
                        Which one, dear? Radar tracking? Or a radar for detecting targets, which, when changing the trajectory of the target, will command the inertial missile control system to change the coordinates of the point at which it is necessary to launch the missile?


                        Where? Each complex has its own radar. For example, the hero has 50n6
            2. 0
              26 February 2016 12: 24
              Quote: hrad
              Judging by the photographs, the rocket’s aerodynamic rudders (the second or combat, the stage flies by inertia and at high speed) will not be able to provide reliable maneuvering and access to the detonation point when working against a high-speed and highly maneuverable enemy rocket.


              Have you heard of the Italian Otto Melar anti-aircraft anti-aircraft missile? There is no engine at all. However, the energy is enough to hit highly mobile targets, including anti-ship missiles.
              The second example is the American anti-tank hypersonic missiles CKEM. They are controlled only on the acceleration section, and that is characteristic, this is enough.

              The higher the speed of the rocket, the smaller the angular movement of the target during its flight. In principle, it is theoretically possible to create an uncontrolled hypersonic missile having the same probability of hitting a target as a guided supersonic one.
              1. 0
                26 February 2016 12: 41
                I know something about the OTO MELARA company, but I don’t know about the anti-aircraft guided projectile (it happens). I know about programmable anti-aircraft shells.
                I know about CKEM, I also know about "railguns". All this is great when dealing with stationary or relatively sedentary targets such as ships, tanks, houses or fortifications.
                1. 0
                  26 February 2016 13: 20
                  Quote: hrad
                  I know something about the OTO MELARA company, but I don’t know about the anti-aircraft guided projectile (it happens). I know about programmable anti-aircraft shells.

                  http://www.finmeccanica.com/documents/63265270/66959012/STRALES_2013.pdf?downloa
                  d_file
                  In PDF, you have to download.

                  This is a 76/62 sub-caliber fragmentation guided projectile. There is a system for programming undermining time. But unlike other anti-aircraft shells of this type, a change in the time of detonation is possible during the flight of the projectile.
                  The Italians plan to use gun mounts with such shells on land. For C-RAM systems (protection against artillery shells, mines and missiles)

                  Quote: hrad
                  All this is great when working with stationary or relatively inactive targets.

                  That's the whole ficus picus 8)))))
                  The higher the speed of the rocket, the less mobile the target 8)))

                  If the rocket flies to the target for 10 seconds, then the target moving at a speed of 100 km / h will move 278 meters
                  If 1 second, then 28 meters.

                  According to "Pantsir" - the first stage engine accelerates the rocket for two seconds.

                  The advantages of this solution:
                  - provides higher resistance to overloads. The solid propellant engine is a delicate thing, one crack in the powder checker and the rocket will begin to tumble.
                  - provides problems for aircraft protection systems. No engine, no torch in the UV range. The basic method for determining the position of an attacking rocket does not work.
          2. 0
            26 February 2016 12: 43
            Quote: Spade
            The Americans are really too keen on the air component of their air defense.

            Because it is the most effective. At all times, it was fighter aircraft that posed a threat to attacking aircraft, but not barreled artillery or air defense systems.
            Quote: Spade
            But the fact remains - the United States lags behind Russia in the area of ​​ground / ship components of the air defense system.

            Where are such conclusions from? It's just the opposite.
            1. 0
              26 February 2016 13: 29
              Quote: Mera Joota
              Because it is the most effective.

              I agree. But with one very unpleasant correction: in the presence of dominance in the air. If it is not, the troops are defenseless.
              In addition, the effectiveness of fighter aircraft as a means of protecting troops from UAVs and modern high-precision near-zero weapons

              Quote: Mera Joota
              Where are such conclusions from? It's just the opposite.

              8))) Have you ever seen the OSH of the US Army and the ILC?
              The Stinger is the alpha and omega of the American air defense battlefield. Not able to defend, only able to prevent the enemy from becoming impudent, shooting ground units with aircraft cannons.
              Therefore, they are now rushing about with an ass in the soap with a bunch of projects designed to correct this bias.
              1. 0
                26 February 2016 14: 09
                Quote: Spade
                The Stinger is the alpha and omega of the American air defense battlefield.

                Not without it. They have much better air defense in the Navy, all altitude ranges are covered.
                Quote: Spade
                Therefore, they are now rushing about with an ass in the soap with a bunch of projects designed to correct this bias.

                As it is not noticeable. They do not think of anything like "Torah".
                The superiority of the Americans in accuracy, they have mastered the destruction of the AC with a direct hit, which allows to reduce the dimensions of missiles and thereby increase the BC or mobility. So far they have been implementing this in medium and long-range air defense systems, but there are no barriers (other than financing) in creating short-range air defense systems.
                Quote: Spade
                But with one very unpleasant correction: in the presence of dominance in the air. If it is not, the troops are defenseless.

                Without gaining dominance in the air, they do not fight if you notice, in the sense, a ground operation does not begin without it.
                1. 0
                  26 February 2016 15: 12
                  Quote: Mera Joota
                  As it is not noticeable. They do not think of anything like "Torah".

                  For a start:
                  http://defense-update.com/20150328_mml.html#.VRhIE5s4dAs

                  Quote: Mera Joota
                  Without air supremacy they do not fight

                  That is, if the enemy gains local dominance in the air, the Americans will immediately surrender? Original
                  1. 0
                    26 February 2016 17: 28
                    Quote: Spade
                    That is, if the enemy gains local dominance in the air, the Americans will immediately surrender? Original

                    No. It’s just that Americans believe that gaining air supremacy is the main condition for a successful ground operation. And before starting any ground operation, you must first clear the sky from enemy aircraft.

                    By the way, from the experience of the Arab-Israelis: if fighter aircraft cannot gain air supremacy, then the ZRV will begin to have big problems. Alas, the Air Force always finds a weak link, a strike on which destroys the ground-based air defense system. Yes, and pure defense (PVО) is always doomed to failure.
                    1. +1
                      26 February 2016 18: 02
                      Quote: Alexey RA
                      Yes, and pure defense (air defense) is always doomed to defeat.

                      The thing is that excessive enthusiasm for the air defense component of the battlefield is as detrimental to effectiveness as excessive enthusiasm for the ground.
                  2. 0
                    27 February 2016 09: 44
                    Quote: Spade
                    For a start:
                    http://defense-update.com/20150328_mml.html#.VRhIE5s4dAs

                    These are stationary systems for providing air defense of objects in hazardous areas, such as intercepting a mortar mine or a self-propelled rocket. In terms of providing short-range air defense of the troops on the march, they have no developments.
                  3. 0
                    27 February 2016 13: 11
                    MHTK short-range air defense systems are equipped with 69 cm long missiles, 4 cm diameter and 2,2 kg weight with a passive radar seeker.

                    Due to their light weight, the missiles are designed to intercept mortar mines, artillery shells and ATGMs at the turn of 1 km or less - in the range of ship's 30-mm gun mounts.
            2. 0
              26 February 2016 14: 47
              Now the main threat to surface ships is cruise and ballistic missiles with a flight speed of 1 km per second or more. Against these targets, air-to-air missiles are powerless.

              According to the Americans themselves, the capabilities of carrier-based aviation to defend the US Navy's naval formations against missile attacks by the Russian Navy are reduced to zero:

              US aircraft carriers' 'unchallenged primacy may be coming to a close'

              https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/checkpoint/wp/2016/02/22/report-u-s-aircraft
              -carriers-unchallenged-primacy-may-be-coming-to-a-close /
        2. +2
          26 February 2016 10: 32
          Quote: hrad
          And they could bring them down.

          And they could also lift the duty link into the air in order to somehow indicate their "phi", and not clap with a mitten.
          1. +1
            26 February 2016 10: 57
            Quote: Gray Brother
            And they could also lift the duty link into the air in order to somehow indicate their "phi", and not clap with a mitten.

            Here I am about the same thing!
        3. +3
          26 February 2016 10: 52
          Quote: hrad
          Would you feel better if the Americans shot down these planes? And they could bring them down. There are only smart heads and the Intergovernmental Agreement on the prevention of incidents in the open sea and in the airspace above it

          A flight over a warship along the DP line (in length), even in peacetime, according to international rules, is considered a combat approach to the target and, in principle, could easily make a decision to shoot down. Those. "in principle" ... but your FRIENDS, who vowed to promise you protection from wild Russians, simply missed the approach and there was no time to react. If memory serves, in 1974, the "Elusive" missile launcher, when entering the Aegean Sea from the Dardanelles, shot down an American under similar circumstances. The ZIF-75 gunner has a 10-day vacation home, and the commander is demoted.
          1. 0
            26 February 2016 11: 16
            Well then. Advise Americans to behave like the "Elusive" DBK in 1974! And soon the Earth will become a dead planet.
            1. +1
              26 February 2016 11: 26
              smile You are ridiculous, Mr. Hrad, if the war did not start in 74, then why should it start now? Elusive actions were legal!
              1. 0
                26 February 2016 11: 59
                The agreement was signed in 1972. The incident with EM, later BOD, even later DBK, “The Elusive”, according to the MIF publishing house (is it an official source of information or just a mouthpiece of conspiracy theories?), Occurred in 1974. Officially, neither the United States nor the Soviet Union commented on the incident. Bulgarians, Romanians, Yugoslavia, however, like Greece, Turkey, and Italy know about the incident according to tourists from the USSR, later from Russia. If your friend was a participant in this incident, I’ll call you on a visit. Let her speak on our TV.
                1. +2
                  26 February 2016 12: 21
                  Quote: hrad
                  Bulgarians, Romanians, Yugoslavia, however, like Greece, Turkey, and Italy know about the incident according to tourists from the USSR, later from Russia.

                  I served in the Black Sea Fleet from 86 to 93. DBK "Elusive" had an unofficial name "Nepoimanny", which interested me very much. My interest was satisfied by the old boatswain with OT-463 (SP-10), who served on the Elusive at that time midshipman. At the moment, the youngest sailor of the DBK is already 61 years old, so I can hardly help you. Although on the Internet you can probably find this trace. hi And about all-knowing tourists, vague doubts gnaw me, in those days a lot was classified.
  2. +1
    26 February 2016 08: 06
    there is little concrete information about the use of systems at training ranges and in combat conditions. Wikipedia article.
  3. +5
    26 February 2016 08: 21
    Normal article, information taken from open sources, a bit messy, but readable. The arguments are given, if there is something to argue specify. (the abbreviation is unfamiliar - wiki, google to help).
    1. 0
      26 February 2016 08: 38
      Quote: jonht
      The arguments are given

      What kind? Like there is publicly available data on the interception of high-speed targets by the RAM complex and the conditions of the interception are criticized, while there is NO data on a similar interception by the Kortik SAM system, like, is everything clear? If the author criticizes the target environment for RAM tests, then if you please provide data on similar tests of "Dirk", if there is no such data, then what the hell are you drawing conclusions?
  4. +2
    26 February 2016 09: 52
    Thanks to the author, in my opinion a good article, a good stylistic and quite decent overview of short-range marine air defense systems.

    If you paint in detail and specifically, it will turn out to be a very large and complex article that will not be easily understood by non-air defense specialists.
  5. +2
    26 February 2016 11: 31
    The performance characteristics of the stations are taken from open sources, therefore, they are not entirely true (I’m talking about CORTIC).
  6. exo
    0
    26 February 2016 21: 04
    TTX, in open sources, is a crafty thing. Unfortunately, only real combat operations reveal all the strengths and weaknesses of weapons.
  7. 0
    26 February 2016 21: 11
    Quote: Mera Joota
    Bullshit abundantly equipped with intricate abbreviations and indices ...

    did not find a single illegible abbreviation. I know almost everything, despite the fact that I have not the slightest relation to the fleet. Hence the question: "How can a person who does not know elementary abbreviations give an assessment in the form of the word" nonsense "to an article in the topic of which he obviously does not understand?"
  8. -1
    28 February 2016 16: 38
    Quote: Mera Joota
    ... Here is a photo of Orion over Kuzey ...

    Funny b / w photo (for December 2011!), And where does it follow that on the composition of TARK Kuznetsov ???
    Convincing, if you can, without the tales of Dmitry Kaystro))))
    When, where, on-board numbers of P-3 Orion?

    Well, at least like this:
    "Shortly before takeoff of Shishov, at a distance of less than three hundred meters from the aircraft carrier, following a parallel course at an altitude of about two hundred meters, a basic marine patrol aircraft of the P-3 Orion type flew tail number 3298 Norwegian Armed Forces with the inscription "Viking". The MiG-31 climbed to intercept;
    flying at a distance of one and a half kilometers and an altitude of about two thousand meters, the fighter crossed the course of the ship and, having made a turn in the direction of the outgoing Orion, rushed towards the latter to “sort things out”. "©
    Well, or at least such a photoshop:
    http://navsource.narod.ru/photos/02/173/02173096.jpg