Military Review

Features of the combat use of torpedo boats on the Black Sea

51
Features of the combat use of torpedo boats on the Black Sea



In 1928, under the leadership of the famous aircraft designer A.N. Tupolev was designed and built the first Soviet torpedo boat ANT-4. This was followed by a large series of boats of the G-5 type, the number of which made it possible to create brigades and separate divisions of torpedo boats in the fleets (except for the North). On the Black Sea navy Before World War II, there were 2 brigades, a separate division and a detachment of torpedo boats.

The basic documents on the combat use of torpedo boats were the Temporary Combat Regulations of the Red Army 1937 Naval Forces (BU MU 37) and the Manual on the combat activities of torpedo boats (NBTKA). They noted the main purpose of the boats: delivering torpedo attacks on warships and enemy transport ships. In addition, it was said that torpedo boats could be used for antisubmarine defense of the squadron, support of patrols, smoke screens and the rapid transfer of sabotage and airborne groups. On the basis of these provisions, in the course of combat training, the main attention of the personnel was focused on working out shooting at large high-speed warships and ships. However, already in the first days of the Great Patriotic War, instead of the expected attacks of the large ships and transports of the enemy, the Black Sea boats had to solve new problems. The surface ships of the enemy did not decide on active operations on our communications. However, the Soviet torpedo boats, based in Ochakovo and Sevastopol, could not enter the enemy lines of communication between Sulina and Konstanz, since the distance to this area significantly exceeded their tactical radius.

During the period of defense of Odessa (August 5 - 16 October 1941), and then Sevastopol (October 30 1941 - July 4 1942), the main objectives of torpedo boats were: setting smoke screens for covering warships and transport ships from enemy artillery fire at the entrance and exit from Odessa and Sevastopol; participation in escorting ships on the Odessa-Sevastopol communications; Carrying out the guard service while simultaneously searching for submarines independently or together with the MO-4 hunting boats; clearance of fairways from bottom proximity mines by depth charge explosions.

The fulfillment of these tasks required the command, staffs of the formations and, especially, the direct executors, to search for new tactics and methods of action. For example, during the pre-war combat training, boat crews acquired skills in tactical methods of setting smoke screens when attacking ships at sea. However, the installation of a smoke screen at the fairways to the naval bases in the 1941 and 1942 years was carried out under enemy sighting fire, moreover, there was no opportunity to maneuver the courses. Therefore, the boat commanders had to do dozens of experiments, as a result of which the best option was found: shoot down aimed fire, maneuvering only with speeds. With the immobile barrage of fire, the boats hid behind the smoke curtain for a short time and, as soon as the enemy stopped shelling, they continued to set up smoke at high speed. It should be said that the new tactical method of staging the chimney curtain was used later, when the boats had to operate near the coast, in conditions that were constrained to maneuver.

The most difficult was the search for tactical methods, when torpedo boats were the only escort ships in convoys and were forced to protect transport ships from the strikes of enemy aircraft.

Effective were the actions of torpedo boats in the fight against submarines, going under the periscope or on the surface. In such cases, using high speed, the boatmen immediately attacked them and forced them to withdraw from the course of the convoys. Depth bombs were used to destroy non-contact mines. Bombing of mined water areas was carried out by groups consisting of 2-4 boats.
The tasks solved by Soviet torpedo boats have expanded since the fall of 1942. By this time, the overall situation at the Black Sea Theater has changed dramatically for the worse for us. The enemy captured the Crimean and Taman Peninsulas, which left airfields, ports and bases.



The Germans continued to increase their naval and air forces operating on our communications and striking at bases on the coast of the Caucasus, where the Black Sea Fleet ships were concentrated. By the end of 1942, the enemy fleet on the Black Sea was replenished with seven gunboats, 15 torpedo boats, 11 submarines, more than a hundred high-speed amphibious barges (BDB), 130 boats by minesweepers and patrolmen. At the same time, the enemy conducted an intensive transfer of troops and military equipment between the ports of Crimea and the Taman Peninsula. Naturally, all this caused an increase in the tension of the fighting torpedo boats. So, from July 1942 to March 1943 on our coastal communications, primarily between Tuapse and Sukhumi, where there was a clear lack of anti-submarine forces, enemy submarines launched a lot of activity. Torpedo boats joined the fight against them. Located at the base in Tuapse and part of the forces in Sochi, at high speed, the front systems searched for submarines along the course of movement of our convoys, as well as carrying out preventive bombing, driving submarines to depth and preventing their ascent to attack. This method was effective. In a given area of ​​the boat performing several tacks, facilitating the actions accompanying the convoys, escort forces.

At one time, enemy submarines in the dark began to fire at the trains going along the coastal railway from guns. At the suggestion of the commander of the battalion of captain-lieutenant V.A. Rybakov began to convoy them with torpedo boats. The latter followed along the coast by a ledge, somewhat ahead of the train, but with the same speed with it, forcing the enemy to go deep. At the same time, the remoteness of torpedo boats from the coast was determined by the capabilities of artillery systems installed on submarines. The threat of bombardment of our trains by boatmen was eliminated.

It is worthwhile to dwell on the strikes of torpedo boats on ships and transport ships stationed in ports. Such blows were called raids. It should be said that in the interwar years, many experts considered the raids of boats on well-protected ports to be almost impossible. In peacetime, the development of such tasks was not given the necessary attention. "BU MC 37" provided only an attack during the war on the anchorage of ships. However, the hostilities made appropriate adjustments to the theoretical positions. The situation on the Black Sea demanded from torpedo boats to strike at ships that were not only on raids. The first such task was performed by the crews of the detachment of the torpedo boats of Senior Lieutenant K. Kochiev, who developed a plan for the raid on the Yalta port. The commander of the 2 th brigade of torpedo boats S.S. Savin approved this plan. On the night of June 14 1942, the detachment commander on a boat of the D-3 type went to sea. The transition, which lasted seven and a half hours, went well. On the approach to the port, the boat slowed down to the smallest, turned on the silencers, and from the 1.5 distance the cable (270 m) attacked the barge with a torpedo and sank it. The enemy opened heavy artillery and machine-gun fire on the D-3. Responding to machine-gun fire and hiding behind a smoke screen, the boat left the shelling zone and arrived safely at the base.

This success was achieved as a result of surprise and tactically competent actions with K. Kochiev. Three days later, he was on an SM-3-type boat with D-3 out of Anapa to repeat the raid on the Yalta port, where, according to air reconnaissance data, there were surface ships and a submarine. In 03 h 45 min, a patrol torpedo boat of the enemy was found at Cape Aytodor, which made a request with light signals and lay on a parallel course. The boatswain SM-3, on orders from the commander, responding to the request, made interruptions, portraying the malfunction of the signal light. Cunning success. Having taken the Soviet boats for their own, the enemy boat increased speed. Having determined that the passage in the side fence was open, the detachment commander ordered the ships to be torpedoed. It was subsequently established that the tugboat was sunk as a result of the attack, the submarine and port facilities were damaged. Coming to their senses, the fascists opened artillery and machine-gun fire on boats, lighting them with searchlights. Maneuvering, firing and hiding behind smoke curtains, the boats moved into the sea. SM-3 received about 80 holes, five people from its crew were killed and three injured.



After the renewal of the SM-3 and D-3 2 in August 1942, the ships left Anapa in Feodosia Bay, where, according to intelligence data, transport ships were hidden in Dvuyakornaya Bay with coastal artillery and ship patrols. This prevented the achievement of surprise. However, the weather (northwest wind, 5-6 points, visibility - less than a kilometer) helped the boatmen secretly bypass patrols. Near the coast occupied by the Germans, they went unnoticed to Dvuyakornaya Bay and attacked two barges anchored and sank them.

After leaving Anapa and Novorossiysk, the boats of the G-5 were relocated under Gelendzhik. The enemy for the transportation of military cargo by sea actively used Anapa, the port of which had a shallow water area. This feature of the port, as well as the fire of coastal and naval artillery significantly complicated the actions of boats, but they, showing courage, initiative and resourcefulness, broke into the port and drowned the enemy ships. Only in one year, since June 1942, has the enemy lost 16 barges loaded with equipment, weapons and living force. The systematic raids of torpedo boats forced the Germans to significantly reduce the volume of shipments of weapons, troops and ammunition by sea. The success of the Black Sea coast in this important form of combat activity could be much greater, provided that not two or three boats, but dozens participated in the raids. But the need of the fleet for them to perform other tasks was also very high. For example, in August and September 1942 from the 425 exits of the boat of the 1 brigade, only 42 exits were made for raiding actions, and the rest for escorting transports (176), various transports (127), covering with smoke curtains (64), etc. d.

After our paratroopers captured in February 1943, the bridgehead near Novorossiysk (Small Land), torpedo boats were used in convoys in the Gelendzhik-Myskhako sector. The importance of this task was determined by the fact that the viability and success of the combat activities of the landing forces on Malaya Zemlya were directly dependent on their regular supply through a single maritime communication.

Torpedo boats had to re-work independent and joint, with small hunters MO, actions during the convoy of vessels. The tactics of independent action boiled down to the following: having overtaken the convoy that had left Gelendzhik, they occupied the watch line in order to prevent the enemy from breaking through for her. With the appearance of the enemy ships, the boats promptly attacked them and thwarted attempts to prevent the movement of the convoy or the unloading of personnel, weapons and ammunition. At the same time smoke screens were installed. The fascists did not dare to cross them, fearing a sudden strike. Such tactics gave our boatmen the opportunity to independently disrupt the plans of the superior enemy in forces, preventing them from escorting them to the distance of torpedo and artillery firing. Boats of the MO type were the main means of artillery combat. Having completed the landing of personnel on the bridgehead, they were located in the center of the watch line, and the torpedo boats — to the right and left of them. When the enemy, having tied our patrol boats with the battle, partly tried to bypass the patrol, torpedo boats entered the business, intercepting the enemy and forcing him to retreat into the sea.

In May, the 1943 of the Black Sea Fleet arrived with six boats that were equipped with RS installations (M-8-M), which in turn allowed the 24 rocket of the 82 caliber mm to be launched in one gulp or another. The presence on the boats of three ammunition made them a powerful means of combating the sea and land adversary. Possessing the experience of raiding actions, the Black Sea people quickly mastered the methods of delivering fire strikes with rocket projectiles at ground targets: clusters near the coast of manpower and equipment, artillery batteries, searchlights, airplanes at airfields, etc. The main tactics of action were as follows: a strike group of two Four boats were firing at the RS, and the 2-4 torpedo boats covered it with smoke curtains and distracted the enemy’s attention to themselves. In this way, in the beginning of June 1943, in the area of ​​Yuzhnaya Ozereyka, they attacked an artillery battery and brought it down. No less effective strikes of the boat were systematically inflicted on the airfield, the port of Anapa and other important objects. It was much more difficult to fight small, highly mobile naval targets, such as enemy torpedo and patrol boats and high-speed landing barges. However, the Black Sea people have found a way to hit such targets, using volley fire.



Especially effective were the joint actions of torpedo and artillery boats against enemy transports and small vessels during the liberation of the Crimea in the spring of 1944. In contrast to strikes on coastal targets in sea battles, the main striking force was torpedo boats, while boats with RSs supported them with their fire. The fact is that at that time the enemy was heavily guarded by all transport ships. In order to get close to them at a distance of 200-500 m, torpedo boats had to overcome the resistance of escort ships and get out to attack at course angles of 60-100 °. Only such short distances and large course angles of a torpedo salvo ensured the greatest probability of hitting a target that had a length in the underwater part of 30-40 m, i.e., in 4,5-6 times smaller than that provided by the pre-war rules, firing tables and launch sights. For firing rockets, the course angle and the distance did not have such a fundamental value. Therefore, boats with jet installations were usually located on sharp course corners and were the first to start a battle with security, maneuvering and pulling it off to themselves. This allowed torpedo boats to come closer relatively safely to transport and to drown it from a short distance.

As mentioned above, torpedo boats were attracted for the implementation of mine settings in the waters controlled by the enemy, on his fairway and at the bases. The task of setting mines turned out to be new and unexpected for them. And since it was necessary to lay mines of all samples, starting from bottom non-contact ones and ending with anchor river, then simultaneously with the development of methods of actions, many technical issues had to be resolved on placing, fixing and dropping mines overboard. The commanders were required to maximize the accuracy of mines at given points (namely, points, not areas), while respecting the secrecy of actions, as well as preventing combat contact with the enemy. In order to fulfill all these conditions, we had to solve a whole range of technical and tactical problems, starting with careful preparation of very poor navigation equipment of boats (there are only two magnetic compasses), double definition of deviation (with and without mines) and ending with the development of combat support.

The first production was carried out in Anapa and in the Kerch Strait in the night from 24 to 25 in May 1943, the 10 th torpedo boats, each of which had four 500-kilogram bottom non-contact mines. They were covered with 5 torpedo tubes, 3 boats with jet installations and 2 boats of the MO type. Smoke curtains were placed during the laying of mines. Two aircraft MBR-2 distracted the enemy's attention by bombing at a predetermined coastal targets - anti-aircraft batteries. Eight days later, it became known that a tug, a large dry-cargo barge and a minesweeper were blown up on the delivered mines in the Kerch Strait.

After the first successful mine production on the orders of the Navy Commissar of the Navy, Admiral N. G. Kuznetsova from 14 June to 28 August 1 th and 2 brigade of torpedo boats made more 15 productions mostly contact mines in the Kerch Strait and on the coastal communication going from it to Anapa. A total of 456 mines and 160 mine defenders were supplied, which forced the enemy to increase trawling, attracting a large number of minesweepers and escort ships. The fascists sometimes even had to close the fairways, which negatively affected the intensity of the transport of military goods.



Torpedo boats were widely used in the landing actions of the Black Sea Fleet. In the pre-war years, it was believed that torpedo boats could only be a means of quickly transferring sabotage and airborne groups. These theoretical principles were confirmed during the Kerch-Feodosiya landing operation, but later their tasks became much more complicated. So, in the Novorossiysk landing operation in the autumn of 1943, the main ones were: destruction and suppression of fire weapons located on moles and the shore; destruction of the steel cable that blocked the entrance to the port; destruction of two sections of the bono-network barrier inside the port (anti-torpedo nets suspended on metal balls - “barrels”). Without successful solution of these tasks, there was no question of disembarking the port, therefore special groups of boats were created: to eliminate barriers, attack fire funds on moles and on the shore, a breakthrough in the port. Kaperniki carefully prepared for the upcoming operation. The most difficult thing turned out to be to “force” torpedoes to explode, not with a frontal impact on the target, but when the inertia is redeemed on a gentle coast. A lot of experiments were done by the sailors in order to find a way to undermine the steel cable that blocked the entrance to the port with trapelling devices, as well as to destroy metal balls - “barrels” in the port. All these and other very complex technical problems (including such as towing speedboats of boats such as KM and limousines) were solved. A lot of work katerniki invested in the search for the most effective tactical methods of action that should be performed in a matter of seconds.

After the implementation of preparatory measures, the combat support detachment (27 torpedoes, 4 with jet installations, 2 of type KM and 2 of offshore boats) made a secret transition and took the initial position. In 2 h 44 mines 10 September, the battle began for the landing of troops. Immediately to the entrance to the port rushed groups lacquering. They broke the cable stretched under the water between the moles, destroyed inside the port most of the metal balls - “barrels” that supported the anti-torpedo nets. Simultaneously, 7 launches torpedo attacks on pillboxes on moles, destroying almost all of them. Torpedo explosions destroyed many firing points on the shore. Thus, the seamen fulfilled the main task successfully: they eliminated the most dangerous obstacles, powerful fire weapons at the moles and ashore. 22 pillboxes and bunker were destroyed, 1 searchlight and 10 firing points were destroyed, which allowed the airborne units to disembark.

Katerinniki showed mass heroism and skill. Here is one example. At the entrance to the port of Novorossiysk, the enemy illuminated the boat of Lieutenant B.M. Pershina and knocked him with artillery fire. The torpedo boat of Lieutenant GF was walking next to him. Meisterovic turned round and fired torpedoes at the location of the searchlight and the firing point. After a few seconds, a powerful explosion rang out, the searchlight went out and the fire stopped. These reasonable actions of the officer provided an invaluable service to the airborne detachments: they were no longer subjected to the disastrous dagger-fire at the entrance to the port.



Especially distinguished boatmen on the night of September 11, when the enemy, recovering from the first strikes and pulling up reserves, had a strong opposition to the paratroopers, covering the approaches to the port with multi-layered fire to prevent the delivery of second-tier troops. About any suddenness there could be no question. Only the savvy and courage of the Black Sea allowed them to break through the "gates of death" (the entrance to the port, which was then called boiling from the explosions of the shells, was called that way) and deliver replenishment. The commanders of the boats used this method: they were going in full swing towards the port, on the approaches to which the fascists concentrated the maximum of fire. But with the approach to the fire curtain, the boat was sharply turned to the pier, stopping the course. In this case, the enemy lost sight of them, weakened or completely stopped the fire. Using this, the sailors had time at high speed to break into the port. Despite the losses, the boatmen managed overnight, with a fight, to land the Marines in the port of 360.

In subsequent landing operations, the fleet command used these boats as mobile and reliable forces, not only for combat support purposes, but also for the independent landing of forward detachments. So, on September 19, when the troops of the 318 th rifle division were fighting on the outskirts of Anapa, torpedo boats, with the support of artillery boats, broke through to the pier and landed a company of marine infantry, who quickly cleared the port of fascists. On the night of September 27, forward detachments of this brigade in the number of 542 people near Salt Lake were landed with torpedo boats. It should be noted that in the area of ​​this lake, for the first time in the practice of torpedo boats, they had to land assault forces by day and under heavy fire. But even in such conditions, the boatmen, dispersed along the front, managed to land the paratroopers without a loss, although they themselves suffered losses in people.

A lot of new tactics were used by officers of torpedo boats in the Kerch-Eltigen landing operation. In the shallow water of the Kerch Strait, our sailors found a way to overcome the anti-cocking minefields at high speeds and strike at the superior forces, consisting of special artillery BDB, patrol and torpedo boats. Using torpedo weapons, they sank and damaged 12 enemy ships.

During the war years, the Black Sea Fleet torpedo boats found wide combat use. During the defense of Odessa and Sevastopol, they carried out patrol service, covered warships with smoke screens at their entry and exit from bases, participated in escorting our ships and fighting enemy submarines, and destroyed bottom non-contact mines. During the defense of the Caucasus, the tactics of striking torpedo boats to secure ports and raids, escorting, using them in landing operations and mine setting were improved. During the offensive battles, joint strikes of torpedo and artillery boats on enemy ships on communications received further development. 12 riders for bravery and courage were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union, hundreds of sailors, officers and officers were awarded orders and medals.



Sources:
Taras A., Kalmykov D., Kalmykova I. Tactics of torpedo boats of the Soviet Navy. // History small torpedo ships. Mn .: Harvest, 1999. C. 247-254.
Voronin K. On the Black Sea fairway. - M .: Military Publishing, 1989. C. 11-12, 40-43, 106-110.
Protsenko V. Tactics of torpedo boats of the Black Sea fleet. // Military History Journal. 1974. No.12. C. 35-38.
Pharafonov M. Torpedo boats in battle. // Boats and yachts. 1975. No.2.
Chernikov I. Arms of victory. The use of jet installations on torpedo boats. // Boats and yachts. 1985. No.3.
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  1. Good cat
    Good cat 24 February 2016 06: 31 New
    +11
    Well done katerniki!
    1. Bersaglieri
      Bersaglieri 24 February 2016 11: 35 New
      +6
      Doubly well done, because they had to use such an unsuccessful TK as the G-5 (with its disgusting seaworthiness with excitement and towing TAs) and, at the same time, achieve victories.

      On the other hand, nevertheless, there were no sea battles in the Black Sea or the Baltic Sea. The raiding operations, basically, are “the fleet against the shore.” This is a completely different matter on the Northern Fleet. That's where the cruising forces from the Black Sea Fleet should have been relocated in due time.
      1. shasherin.pavel
        shasherin.pavel 24 February 2016 13: 06 New
        +4
        Quote: Bersaglieri
        TK like G-5

        I could not even apply part of the proposal, since the G-5 were probably the fastest boats in the world, and demanding seaworthiness from them was the same as reproaching fighters that they had not bombed Berlin in 41. The very creation of torpedo boats G-5 depended on the power of aircraft engines AM-35. It was created by the aviation designer Tupolev. Speed ​​and speed again, that’s what was laid in the performance characteristics of the boat. There was not enough industrial capacity to create large boats "D".
        1. Bersaglieri
          Bersaglieri 24 February 2016 14: 01 New
          +3
          High-speed does not mean the best, alas. Manageability at full speed - near-zero, stability - below zero. Unsuccessful "shell" of supercritical parameters. It’s not a matter of creating a TK from a redundant sportsboat by banal forcing a remote control, oh, it’s not a thing ...
          1. PKK
            PKK 24 February 2016 18: 47 New
            +1
            Moreover, the feat of sailors is more beautiful. Unfortunately, we understand this, and not modern youth.
        2. papik09
          papik09 24 February 2016 15: 59 New
          +2
          Quote: shasherin.pavel
          There was not enough industrial capacity to create large boats "D".

          Hindsight is all literate ...
    2. Pig
      Pig 24 February 2016 14: 38 New
      +6
      "" Well done katerniki! ""
      desperate people ... on such a boat in windy weather and it’s dangerous to go out to sea and they also fought
    3. Civil
      Civil 24 February 2016 18: 38 New
      +1
      The Black Sea Fleet, of course, could have come out better in the war.
  2. Amurets
    Amurets 24 February 2016 06: 58 New
    +11
    The article is interesting! To the author, plus. I read a lot of interesting things about the Black Sea Fleet from L. Sobolev. I had to solve many different problems to the Black Sea Fleet. Well, whoever is interested, I can recommend the directories: Gazenko. "Torpedo boats", Taras. "The history of top-rated boats." Belavin. “Combat boats.” By the way, they used cake boats for the first time on the Black Sea. Gazenko has this in detail.
    1. Alex_59
      Alex_59 24 February 2016 09: 48 New
      +4
      I will add some more links for fans of the history of our fleet during the Second World War:
      http://sovnavy-ww2.ho.ua
      http://www.navy.su/other/lost/index.htm

      Books (if you can find it, it's already a rarity):
      A. Shirokorad, "Ships and boats of the USSR Navy 1939-1945 gg"
      Bogatyrev SV, Strelbitsky KB, "Losses of enemy fleets in naval theater operations in 1941-1945 years"
      1. Ingvar 72
        Ingvar 72 24 February 2016 11: 42 New
        +3
        And there is also an art book: I. Vsevolozhsky - "Night Mists". Read in childhood. Who has children boys - I recommend slipping it. hi
    2. mine
      mine 24 February 2016 19: 21 New
      -5
      article - cheap and dumb Zampolitovskaya campaign
  3. aba
    aba 24 February 2016 07: 05 New
    +10
    As a youth, I drew well and the military theme probably was in the first place: tanks, planes, ships. But among the marine themes, torpedo boats were my favorite. Apparently for the swiftness and importance of the tasks that they performed.
    1. igordok
      igordok 24 February 2016 08: 19 New
      +4
      Quote: aba
      As a youth, I drew well

      If preserved, then to the studio. It would be interesting to see.
  4. parusnik
    parusnik 24 February 2016 07: 49 New
    +5
    Definitely a plus .. An article at the height of information content and presentation .. Thank you!
  5. bionik
    bionik 24 February 2016 08: 14 New
    +5
    The crew of a long-range torpedo boat of the SM-3 type is engaged in loading a torpedo on board the boat. A boat from one of the divisions of the 1st brigade of torpedo boats of the Black Sea Fleet.
  6. The comment was deleted.
  7. bionik
    bionik 24 February 2016 08: 22 New
    +5
    Soviet torpedo boats D-3 and G-5 in Virtsu during preparation for the landing of the sea landing on the island of Muhu (Moon) in the Moonsund archipelago.
  8. Alex_59
    Alex_59 24 February 2016 08: 22 New
    +12
    The article is good, but too official.
    Effective were the actions of torpedo boats in the fight against submarines going under the periscope or in the surface position.
    TKA at the Black Sea Fleet did not sink a single submarine.
    In just one year, starting on June 1942, the enemy lost 16 barges loaded with equipment, weapons and manpower.
    In the 1942 year at the BSF TKA sank:
    1. Ital. SMPL SV-5 13.06.1942, Yalta (this is stated in the article)
    2. BDB MFP-334A 01.08.1942 Dvuyakornaya bay (this is stated in the article)
    3. TCA S-27 05.09.1942 in the Anapa area.
    4. BDB MFP-131 06.10.1942 in the Anapa area.
    Everything. 16 barges - this is from the Suvorovsky region "write the adversary number more - why pity him." If we count their enemy’s barges in 1942, 9 on mines died, 3 from aircraft operations, 5 due to accident reasons. Well, TCA chalked up 2 pieces. At the same time, in the same 1942 year, Soviet TKA lost 11 boats of the type "G-5", 3 of the boat "Sh-4".
    Torpedo boats were widely used in the landing operations of the Black Sea Fleet.
    Specially suited for this G-5 deprived of the deck as such. It is not necessary to talk about how paratroopers sat in torpedo gutters flooded on the move with sea water. And about their fighting efficiency after such a transition on the coast too. All this is a consequence of the fact that in the prewar years for the fleet, 0 (zero!) Landing ships were built.
    1. Dart2027
      Dart2027 24 February 2016 09: 00 New
      +1
      Quote: Alex_59
      TKA at the Black Sea Fleet did not sink a single submarine.

      Well, the article does not say this:
      Effective were the actions of torpedo boats in the fight against submarines going under the periscope or in the surface position. In such cases, using high speed, katerniki immediately attacked them and forced to leave off course convoys.
    2. Amurets
      Amurets 24 February 2016 09: 22 New
      +4
      Quote: Alex_59
      Specially suited for this G-5 deprived of the deck as such. It is not necessary to talk about how paratroopers sat in torpedo gutters flooded on the move with sea water. And about their fighting efficiency after such a transition on the coast too. All this is a consequence of the fact that in the prewar years for the fleet, 0 (zero!) Landing ships were built.

      Here I don’t agree with you. So there were few of them, I agree with this that they were used as gunboats, I also agree that five ships were handed over to the merchant fleet, but there were also Elpidifors, prototypes of universal ships for the Black Sea Fleet, . And the first three ships were used both as landing and mine-sweeping ships. Drive Elpidifor, Krasnaya Adzharia, Krasnaya Abkhazia into the search engine and you will fall into this class of ships, designed to operate in shallow water. And torpedo boats, act as landing ships should not, they have their own tasks. And the fact that the G-5 and its predecessors Tupolev Design Bureau made on the basis of a seaplane float is also not the fault of the sailors. They imposed this boat. And how many defects these boats had, look in the literature.
      1. Alex_59
        Alex_59 24 February 2016 09: 39 New
        +5
        Quote: Dart2027
        Well, the article does not say this:
        Effective were the actions of torpedo boats in the fight against submarines going under the periscope or in the surface position. In such cases, using high speed, katerniki immediately attacked them and forced them to leave the course of the convoys.
        In fact, the MO should have been doing this. But Moscow Region was engaged in landing and transportation, as more adapted ships. Those. no one was familiar with the tasks that were planned. Anti-submariners engaged in landing and transportation, torpedoes engaged in the fight against submarines. Hello to the addict Kuznetsov! Well, you also need to consider that in reality the activity of German submarines at the Black Sea Fleet in the 41 year was zero, in the 42 year it was low, and the peak of the sunk tonnage fell already in the 1944 year. While this fun was not interrupted by ground forces occupying Constanta.
        Quote: Amurets
        The fact that there were few of them, I agree with this that they were used as gunboats, I also agree that five ships were handed over to the merchant fleet, but there were also Elpidifors, prototypes of universal ships for the Black Sea Fleet, there were. And the first three ships were used and how landing and like mine-sweeping ships. Drive Elpidifor, "Red Adzharia", "Red Abkhazia" into the search engine and you will fall into this class of ships, designed for operations in shallow water.
        Elpidifora - ships of the royal fleet. How many specialized landing ships were built for the Red Navy - that is the question! From 1920 to 1941 years. Well, not zero, but very few. These are essentially SB barges 4 pieces, built in the 1940-1941 years, all on the BF, in / and 720 tons. Type "Tender" in construction since 1942 of the year, etc. 165 - also from 1942 of the year. What are several Elpidifora against this background? The real needs of the fleet during the war were such that through the war passed:
        4 type "SB"
        2 type "LCVP"
        25 Trophy Type MFP
        30 type "LCI"
        13 type "LCT"
        122 type "Tender"
        99 project 165
        12 type "DMB"
        And this was not enough, they drove the landing on boats KM, MO, G-5, BO, 1124, 1125, D-3, etc. So Elpidifora is two percent of the need.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 24 February 2016 11: 16 New
          +4
          Quote: Alex_59
          Those. no one was familiar with the tasks that were planned. Anti-submariners engaged in landing and transportation, torpedoes engaged in the fight against submarines.

          At the KBF, it was even cooler - there, in the summer and autumn of 1941, the precious BTSC were used as high-speed transports.

          As for the MO - not so simple. These ships were originally created as multi-purpose boats - patrol boats, hunters, and small minzags. So bringing them to the landing was only a matter of time.
          1. avt
            avt 24 February 2016 11: 35 New
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            As for MO, not everything is so simple. These ships were originally created as multipurpose boats - patrol boats,

            The NKVD guard’s sea border in particular. But it turned out, with weak armament with 45mm semiautomatic devices, in fact ships of all trades, and in fact, like torpedo boats.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 24 February 2016 13: 50 New
              +2
              Quote: avt
              The NKVD guard’s sea border in particular. But it turned out, with weak armament with 45mm semiautomatic devices, in fact ships of all trades, and in fact, like torpedo boats.

              At Tsushima, a pomnitsa, they wrote that for the MPO the NKVD MO was also poorly suited - the "small hunters" were poorly controlled on small moves, which were extremely important for the MPO - the approach / departure from the search craft.
              And about the weapons ... so, there were no other options. Either 21-K or nothing. We even lacked a DShK. The ICH, in the first place, the DShKs went to equip the MO with the same IGO, because the fight against smuggling is an income to the treasury.
          2. shasherin.pavel
            shasherin.pavel 24 February 2016 13: 11 New
            0
            Quote: Alexey RA
            In summer and autumn, HNUMX vehicles were used as high-speed transports.

            Only for transporting bombs for the Preobrazhensky squadron, bombs for Berlin. Only BTSC could pass through minefields.
            1. Alexey RA
              Alexey RA 24 February 2016 13: 43 New
              0
              Quote: shasherin.pavel
              Only for transporting bombs for the Preobrazhensky squadron, bombs for Berlin. Only BTSC could pass through minefields.

              Not only. More HSCs were used to supply Hanko.
              And ability to walk through minefields it didn’t play a role here: in operation 24-26.10.1941 3 BTSCs (T-210 Gak, T-215 and T-218 marching with cargo) went under wiring of 2 BTSCs (T-203 Patron and T- 217).
      2. avt
        avt 24 February 2016 10: 16 New
        +3
        Quote: Amurets
        .A torpedo boats, should not act as landing ships, they have their own tasks.

        The cruisers also have their own kind, however, they called the “Red Crimea” naval witters by the landing cruiser. Life will make you not get upset, well, there wasn’t enough modern quality of the landing forces at that time, no. Yes, actually now No, only screams that we, Mistral, are not needed and they cannot swim in the ice, as it has calmed down.
        Quote: Amurets
        . And the fact that the G-5 and its predecessors of the Tupolev Design Bureau were made on the basis of a seaplane float is also not the fault of the sailors. They imposed this boat on them.

        fool What was ordered, by order of the congenial marshal of all times and peoples of Tukhachevsky, taking the Aglitz trophy as an analog and not a float (so first learn the materiel, then you don’t have to give out your own glitch for truth) then Grandfather performed and performed ha-ra-sho. Then the technical characteristics changed and other cars appeared, the same D, then ,, Komsomol members. "
        Quote: Alex_59
        Hello to the addict Kuznetsov!

        Another wise guy who personally saw how Kuznetsov was composing the ship program and directly cutting the ship program according to a living program, and then, well, during the war, participated in making decisions on the distribution of forces and means of specific operations. wassat Or maybe in the first part ask Zhdanov a question, but the second all the same, and the fleet command? Again - why don’t you immediately say hello to Stalin?
        1. Alex_59
          Alex_59 24 February 2016 10: 35 New
          +1
          Quote: avt
          Another wise guy who personally saw

          Yes, I'm smart. I read a single book on the topic, and personally crawled along the Crimean coast to see how it looked in reality. My grandfather shed blood there, so I wonder where and how it happened. Of course, I didn’t personally know the People’s Commissar Kuznetsov.
          Quote: avt
          Or maybe in the first part ask Zhdanov a question, but the second all the same, and the fleet command?

          Fair remark. I undertake to correct myself. The phrase is changed to "greetings to comrade Zhdanov, comrade Stalin, comrade Oktyabrsky and comrade Kuznetsov."
          1. avt
            avt 24 February 2016 10: 48 New
            0
            Quote: Alex_59
            personally crawled off the coast to see how it looked in reality.

            Now, after familiarizing yourself with the theater of war, it's time to familiarize yourself with the specific state of the forces and assets of the Black Sea Fleet and archival documents at that time, then you will not send yourself any regards
            Quote: Alex_59
            . The phrase is changed to "hello to comrade Zhdanov, comrade Stalin, comrade Oktyabrsky and comrade Kuznetsov."

            vaapche in a fit of passion, or maybe write an article with an analysis of the operational tactical use of the forces and means of the fleet, taking into account the technical condition, basing and the paramount importance of the tasks assigned to the fleet by the highest command for immediate execution. Well, the conclusions are quite justified for yourself, as you write about the type of analysis of the unsuccessful landing in Peterhof. Then I will definitely believe that the wise guy is quite concrete, operating with facts in the dynamics of time of the events that happened.
            1. Alex_59
              Alex_59 24 February 2016 11: 38 New
              0
              Quote: avt
              or maybe write an article with an analysis of the operational tactical use of forces and means of the fleet, taking into account the technical condition,

              To be honest, there is such a desire. But each time I begin such work, I understand that to create high-quality material, I still do not have sufficient knowledge. There are drafts. I don’t want to publish yet.
              1. avt
                avt 24 February 2016 15: 40 New
                +2
                Quote: Alex_59
                . There are drafts.

                Count on the sketches which and how German submarines got to the Black Sea and how they fired at the coast and the railway, again for comparison, I don’t remember, but the German luffsen also did not go into torpedo attacks on transports. So there is nothing beyond the natural and criminal regime that, based on the presence of the crew, the torpedo boats shugan the pop-up submarine, they just went on patrol, especially if it really helped and escorted armored trains along the coast. Consider the fact that there were simply no extra guns
                Quote: shasherin.pavel
                The G-5 completely repeated the seaplane floats with its contours.

                Quote: Amurets
                . Secondly: N.S. Nekrasov, the leader of the group designing the torpedo boats, wrote in his memoirs that the increased air float was taken as the basis.

                So what ? Well, what is so super criminal? Float he what? It was not intended for high-speed movement on water?
                Quote: Amurets
                .And if Tupolev did the job well,

                Not, if, but fulfilled.
                Quote: Amurets
                , then why of the 59 Sh-IV torpedo boats on June 22, 1941, seven boats in the Baltic and five boats in the Black Sea Fleet remained in service.
                And the G-5 is not Tupolev!? Well, of which 329 boats of the G-5 type were built, of which 76 were during the war? Or Tupolev exclusively
                Quote: Amurets
                from 59 torpedo boats Ш-IV

                But why there is nothing to trifle - only ,, Firstborn " wassat Again, nothing in line
                Quote: avt
                What was ordered, by order of the congenial marshal of all times and peoples of Tukhachevsky

                and made them for the near zone, and then
                Quote: avt
                about . Then the performance characteristics were changed and other cars appeared, the same D,

                Long-range type D-3 entered the fleets in 1941. They were built in a wooden hull with harmless contours and developed deadlift. Notice in a wooden hull.
                Quote: Amurets
                Firstly: 40 and 55-foot English boats were made of plywood and mahogany, and therefore they did not have such a defect as cracks in the hulls in the redan area and under the foundations of the engines.

                ABOUT ! II-dasist fancy a tree! Nothing that as you gain experience in designing and taking into account all factors, including electrochemical corrosion, the designers have solved and will solve similar problems, again, with the release of high-quality duralumin in those days.
                1. Alex_59
                  Alex_59 25 February 2016 07: 12 New
                  0
                  Quote: avt
                  Count on the sketches which and how German submarines got on the Black Sea and how they fired at the coast and the railway, again for comparison

                  German submarines entered the Black Sea Fleet through the Danube in the 42 year. It was just a few (I don’t remember from 5 to 7) outdated type IIB boats. Their only artillery weapon was the 20-mm anti-aircraft gun.
                  Quote: avt
                  Since there is nothing beyond the natural and criminal regime that, based on the presence of the crew, the torpedo boats shugan the pop-up submarine, they just went on patrol, especially if it really helped and escorted armored trains along the coast.
                  Of course there is nothing criminal in this (I didn’t even mention the regime by the way). This is normal when it is a one-time episode.
                  But the landing on Mr. 5 to carry is just a tin. As well as the march replenishment on cruisers and destroyers. But this does not apply to boats and the topic of another conversation.
        2. Amurets
          Amurets 24 February 2016 13: 00 New
          +1
          Quote: avt
          What was ordered, by order of the congenial marshal of all times and peoples of Tukhachevsky, taking the Aglitz trophy as an analog and not a float (so first learn the materiel, then you don’t have to give out your own glitch for truth) then Grandfather performed and performed ha-ra-sho. Then the technical characteristics changed and other cars appeared, the same D, then ,, Komsomol members. "

          Firstly, the 40 and 55-foot English boats were made of plywood and mahogany, and therefore they did not have such a defect as cracks in the hulls in the redan area and under the foundations of the engines. Secondly: that the increased air float was taken as the basis wrote in his memoirs N.S. Nekrasov, the head of the group that designed torpedo boats. And if Tupolev did a good job, then why out of 59 Sh-IV torpedo boats on June 22, 1941, seven boats in the Baltic remained in service and five boats on the Black Sea Fleet. Link: Gazenko. "Torpedo boats." Taras also writes: "History of torpedo boats."
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 24 February 2016 17: 20 New
            0
            Quote: Amurets
            And if Tupolev did a good job, then why out of 59 Sh-IV torpedo boats on June 22, 1941, seven boats in the Baltic and five boats in the Black Sea Fleet remained in service.

            And for the same reason why by the beginning of the war half of the destroyers of the Northern Fleet were either under repair or demanded it.
            One of the Gangut issues contained an article on the first Soviet boats. So it was noted there that the duralumin hull, with all the convenience of its construction and other positive characteristics of the duralumin, required careful maintenance and compliance with the conditions for inter-passage storage of boats (especially in the fall-winter-spring time). For the duralumin case did corrode - even the Kuzbasslak coating did not save.
            TCA, after returning from each voyage, was required to be raised to the shore wall, wiped with kerosene and stored in covered, well-ventilated rooms.

            Failure to comply with these requirements, the boats pretty quickly deteriorated.
            1. Amurets
              Amurets 25 February 2016 00: 00 New
              0
              Quote: Alexey RA
              Failure to comply with these requirements, the boats pretty quickly deteriorated.

              Here I completely agree with you. And not only about duralumin. Any case needs care. I mean that in addition to the low corrosion resistance of materials, the case had design miscalculations leading to cracks, and judging by the comments you’re a techie, it’s fine you know that the wedge and vibration will destroy any structure. And the higher the stiffness, the faster the structure will collapse, under conditions of high vibration loads.
        3. shasherin.pavel
          shasherin.pavel 24 February 2016 13: 22 New
          +2
          Quote: avt
          aglitz trophy

          The G-5 completely repeated the seaplane floats with its contours. Gabriel smashed his English torpedo boats into chips with his 100 mm guns. And the characteristics of the boats of that time only for the First World War could be called high-speed. The most difficult task was to create screws that could withstand such speeds. These developments were then used for leaders such as Tashkent. Yes, I know ... the leaders built Italian shipyards, but only the towers with guns and propellers were installed by our domestic. Neither the Germans nor the British could solve the problem for screws at speeds above 35 knots for a long hike. Only our G-5 and leaders walked at speeds above the 42 hub. Then, after the war, the same problem was solved for hydrofoil boats.
          1. Alexey RA
            Alexey RA 24 February 2016 17: 12 New
            +1
            Quote: shasherin.pavel
            Gabriel smashed the English torpedo boats into chips with his 100 mm guns.

            I am embarrassed to ask - and then what?

            PMSM, Gabriel got some big chips. smile
  9. bionik
    bionik 24 February 2016 08: 25 New
    +3
    Soviet torpedo boats of the Northern Fleet type D-3 on a campaign. In the background is a boat with a tactical number TK-15.

    In the foreground are two 533-mm torpedoes of the 1939 model, the mechanisms of the tow-mounted torpedo tubes of airborne dropping, ventilation heads and the smoke equipment pipeline.
  10. altman
    altman 24 February 2016 09: 55 New
    +3
    Service on boats was very difficult. On such small ships in any weather in the Black Sea it is simply unsafe to perform tasks. And I had to not only walk, but also to fight. Iron were people.
  11. Alexey RA
    Alexey RA 24 February 2016 10: 59 New
    +2
    The tricky thing, after all, is the language of official history. For example, it speaks of a "torpedo boat of the SM-3 type." The reader is under the impression that there were many such TCAs - once it is said about “type”.
    In fact, the SM-3 was a single experimental boat - a prototype that never went into production.
    1. Alex_59
      Alex_59 24 February 2016 11: 48 New
      0
      Quote: Alexey RA
      For example, it refers to a “torpedo boat of the type CM-3”. The reader is under the impression that there were many such TCAs - once it is said about “type”.
      After all, D-3 mentioned in the article was only one at the Black Sea Fleet. The remaining boats of this type fought in other theaters.
  12. Resistance
    Resistance 24 February 2016 12: 45 New
    -1
    Tupolev designing airplanes and boats, in fact, I never thought about people: about (((
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 24 February 2016 13: 54 New
      +2
      Quote: Persistence
      Tupolev designing airplanes and boats, in fact, I never thought about people: about (((

      Yes, yes, yes ... KB is to blame. And how are such planes and boats taken into service? The customer who tested and accepted the products did not see anything and was generally not able to compile a list of comments - deviations from TK?
      1. Amurets
        Amurets 24 February 2016 15: 07 New
        +2
        Quote: Alexey RA
        Yes, yes, yes ... KB is to blame. And how are such planes and boats taken into service? The customer, who tested and accepted the products, did not see anything and was generally unable to compile a list of comments - deviations from the statement of work?

        I wouldn’t say that. But the fact that TK constantly changed, even in construction, is a Russian disease. Not only the Soviet period, but also tsarist Russia. And you can’t blame the design bureau for any design bureau. And the most striking examples : IL-2 and Tu-2. See how they were created and how many times the customer changed the technical specifications. Since there are no suitable engines, the views of the leadership suddenly changed.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 24 February 2016 17: 26 New
          +2
          Quote: Amurets
          . And you can't blame the design bureau here, whatever the design bureau was. And the most striking examples are the IL-2 and Tu-2. Look at how they were created and how many times the customer changed the technical specifications. Since there are no suitable engines, the views of the management suddenly changed.

          Ahem ... with IL-2, according to Perov / Rastrenin, the cant was largely KB. For Ilyushin was running out of time - he tried with all his might to win the competition for the attack aircraft. And in order to fit into the TK, he did not wait for a more powerful engine, but threw out the second crew member along with the defensive fire.
  13. chunga-changa
    chunga-changa 24 February 2016 12: 48 New
    +1
    An article of a celebratory panegyric type - heroism, iron people, on a holiday it is understandable and appropriate, especially since heroism and personal fearlessness did take place.
    Although of course it is great far from reality in essence. For a long time there is a normal analysis of the activities of the fleet in the Second World War. Boats are characterized by high intrinsic losses with minimal effect. There are design flaws and non-core use. The fleet fell victim to the pre-war concept of development. It was assumed that the Black Sea Fleet would impede the breakthrough into the Black Sea of ​​a powerful Italo-Turkish-German fleet and facilitate a successful offensive on land, training and personnel were imprisoned for this. In reality, the enemy’s first year was not stupid at sea, and instead of relocating to Constanta and blocking the Bosphorus, there were tasks of supplying and protecting their bases. After the defeat of the main forces of the Black Sea Fleet by enemy aviation and the capture of Sevastopol, “barges”, “boats” and enemy submarines appeared in more or less commodity quantities. In general, we didn’t even have to hammer in nails with microscopes, but screw in the screws, of course it turned out so-so.
  14. a housewife
    a housewife 24 February 2016 15: 49 New
    +4
    Monument TK-718, Novorossiysk.
    1. avt
      avt 24 February 2016 21: 16 New
      0
      Quote: housewife
      Monument TK-718, Novorossiysk.

      ,, Komsomolets "and the campaign 123K project after 1950, Well, judging by ,, Zarnitsa", which the radar station .123s were already going to the near zone instead of the Tupolev ones. Moreover, with deep bombs - they loaded them during the war laughing to the detriment of range and speed. The project was pre-war, but since there was a G5 series, they both released and
      Quote: Amurets
      First: 40 and 55-foot English boats were made of plywood and mahogany, and therefore they did not have such a defect as cracks in the hulls in the redan area and under the foundations of the engines

      everything as it is duralumin. wassat 123 bis-enyats with Pack cards Lend Liz and ... 1946 release.
  15. Dimon19661
    Dimon19661 24 February 2016 15: 50 New
    +2
    The G-5 torpedo boat was in principle a practically useless ship that could carry out raiding operations in a calm sea, at a short distance, with complete absence of opposition from the enemy fleet. As a landing ship, it was also unsatisfactory.
    The Germans used high-speed landing barges, which were easily delivered by railway to any theater of war.

    Almost invulnerable due to low draft (1,45 m in the stern and less than a meter in the bow) for torpedoes, the MFP outperformed various enemy boats in the power of artillery weapons, while at the same time being sufficiently protected from light weapons. The number of air defense weapons deployed on the MFP, taking into account the relatively small size of the barges, made them very difficult targets for enemy aircraft.

    Self-propelled barges and ferries were also used in the Mediterranean and Barents Seas.

    In the new theaters of war, the Germans used almost all of the medium amphibious assault forces mainly to transport troops and cargo, as well as to cover coastal convoys.

    It should be noted that, firstly, after the Veserubung, Germany did not carry out any major naval landing operations anymore, and secondly, for small tactical and sabotage landings, the Kriegsmarine had a significant number of small boats and die-boats.

    The German small landing boat had a displacement in the cargo of about 40 tons with a length of 18,7 m and a recess of 0,4 m. Two gasoline engines with a total capacity of 180 hp allowed to develop a speed of 13 knots. The boat was armed with one 20-mm anti-aircraft machine gun and could carry 50-70 people.

    For small landing operations, the so-called “assault boat” was used - a lightweight aluminum boat equipped with an outboard motor that could accept six soldiers with light weapons. In calm coastal waters, the bot could develop up to 18 knots, being the fastest landing craft of the Second World War.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 24 February 2016 17: 30 New
      +3
      Quote: Dimon19661
      The torpedo boat G-5 was, in principle, a practically useless ship that could carry out raiding operations in a calm sea, at a small distance in the complete absence of opposition from the enemy fleet.

      So it was intended to work in the coastal zone and the defense of its bases. Like submarines, "little ones."
      It’s always like this with us: at first they try to hammer a screw with a hammer, and then they complain that the screws are bad - they do not hold and clog poorly. smile
  16. mine
    mine 24 February 2016 19: 15 New
    -1
    another stupid vyser of "InzhinEr-tynkhologa"

    The afftor’s “brew” recipe is simple - tear out several sheets from one book, then from another, pee and poop, and “beat with a mixer”

    what kind of "effective action" TCA against submarines?!?!?
    what nafig "effective use" of NURS with an unstabilized boat launcher?!?!?

    in the opus there is NOTHING about the problems of using boats (seaworthiness, range, Messer, DShK deficit, “we fight on carts against tanks” - KChF Vladimirsky fighting in the Krechchensky Strait)
    1. Operator
      Operator 24 February 2016 22: 36 New
      0
      You are wrong - the facts cited by the author testify to the high efficiency of the use of high-speed watercraft when landing amphibious assault to capture the enemy’s key defense objects - ports, and even in conditions of unsuppressed fire resistance.

      The conclusion from the facts is unambiguous - the Black Sea Fleet command absolutely rationally used the technical potential that was at its disposal.

      Based on claims to the author of the article, one would think that the Black Sea Fleet in 1930-40 was one in three persons - the customer, manufacturer and operator of military equipment laughing
  17. KakoVedi
    KakoVedi 24 February 2016 23: 13 New
    0
    In the second photo, from above, just the boat (and pl on the far pier) of the Northern Fleet ... Catherine’s harbor is quite recognizable.