Recently, Russian President D. Medvedev spoke rather harshly about the Euro-Atlantic missile defense system. This statement has already been said a lot and the same will be said. Among other things, it spoke about the deployment of Iskander tactical missiles in the Kaliningrad region as a symmetrical response to the deployment of radars and antimissiles in Europe.
Probably, it is not necessary to say what the missilemen will have to do near Kaliningrad in the appropriate case. However, when attacking missile defense facilities there are some characteristic and not always pleasant features. Firstly, tactical missiles have a relatively short range and, as a result, can “work” on targets in a very, very limited territory. Secondly, while Iskander is too small for Russia to reliably cover up its strategic missiles from foreign countermeasures in all potentially dangerous areas. The conclusion is obvious - to preserve nuclear parity, strategic missiles must have their own missile defense systems.
Although the first experiments on missile defense were conducted half a century ago, for quite a long time strategic missiles did not require any special tricks for their successful breakthrough. The main emphasis at the same time designers of rockets did on electronic countermeasures: so far, the main means of detection are radars, subject to interference. In addition, the first missile defense system had a relatively short detection range. As a result of all this, the banal shooting of dipole reflectors delivers a lot of problems to anti-missile defenders, because reliable identification takes time, which, as always, is not enough. Some sources indicate that using only passive radio interference, the domestic R-36M rocket could deliver at least half of the warheads to the targets, “breaking through” the American Sentinel system, which was created approximately at the same time as it. Nevertheless, the Sentinel was never able to fully turn around and normally enter service. R-36М, in turn, were built serially in several modifications.
Domestic and foreign missiles, over time, began to be equipped with active jamming stations. They had a number of advantages over the passive ones: firstly, a small device can easily, at a minimum, prevent the ground-based radar from normally “seeing” and identifying the combat unit. Secondly, the station of interference can be installed without special losses directly on the combat unit. Thirdly, the station does not need to be reset, and the alignment of the block does not change, which is why its ballistic characteristics do not deteriorate. As a result, the MTS system (selection of moving targets), used on radars to separate passive targets from real ones, becomes almost useless.
Understanding what kind of problem in the future radio interference can make up, at the end of 60's, the Americans decided to transfer the detection of missile warheads to the optical range. It would seem that optical location stations and homing heads are not sensitive to radio-electronic interference, but ... After entering the atmosphere, not only the warhead, but everything that it resets, heats up and does not allow to accurately determine the real target. Of course, nobody even thought of launching a couple dozen antimissiles on each infrared illumination.
On both sides of the Arctic Ocean, the designers tried to determine the combat unit of an enemy rocket according to its dynamic characteristics: speed, acceleration, deceleration in the atmosphere, etc. An elegant idea, but she did not become a panacea. The stage of separation of the rocket can carry not only the warheads themselves, but also their weight and size simulators. And if it can, then it will be - by sacrificing a couple of blocks, the designers of the rocket can increase the probability of hitting the remaining ones. In addition to constructive and combat advantages, such a system also has political ones. The fact is that the installation on one rocket and combat units and simulators simultaneously allows the offensive power of the Strategic Missile Forces to be maintained and at the same time remain within the limits on the number of warheads prescribed by international treaties.
As we see, any existing equipment for missile defense and for its breakthrough is not omnipotent. So a certain number of warheads of missiles on approaching the target will be shot down. However, a downed warhead can only interfere with anti-missile defense. Even now, schoolchildren, who do not skip the lessons of life safety, know that one of the most damaging factors of a nuclear explosion is electromagnetic radiation. Accordingly, if the anti-missile system causes an explosion of the nuclear part of the combat unit, a large illumination will appear on the radar screen. And not the fact that it will disappear quickly enough to have time to detect and attack a new target.
It is clear that at those speeds with which strategic missiles fly, every minute counts, if not seconds. Therefore, as early as the end of 50, both superpowers were preoccupied with creating missile attack warning systems (SPRN). They were supposed to detect launches of the enemy’s missiles and give the anti-missile missiles more time to respond. It should be noted that in the composition of both the Euro-Atlantic and Russian missile defense systems there are such radars, so the concept of the EWS is still not outdated. Moreover, modern radars, including those beyond the horizon, can not only record the fact of a missile launch, but also track it down to the detachment of warheads. Due to their large distance from the launch complex, it is rather difficult for them to interfere. So, for example, to use traditional stations of interference placed on rockets does not make sense: for an effective “clogging” of the frequency, the station must have adequate power, which is not always feasible or advisable. Probably, the rockets would not be offended if they were also helped to break through a similar missile defense system from their native territory.
At the end of this November in a number of publications appeared information about some, five minutes to a revolutionary source of interference. It is argued that with small dimensions and simple operation, it can counteract all existing types and instances of the radar. The principle of operation of the device is not disclosed, unless, of course, this unit exists at all. Some sources say that the new noise generator somehow adds to the enemy’s radar signal some frequencies that turn its signal into a “mess”. And, as stated, the level of interference is directly proportional to the power of the enemy radar. Representatives of science, industry and the Ministry of Defense didn’t say anything about this, so the new jamming system remains at the level of rumors, even if they are very expected. Although you can approximately imagine its appearance: judging by the description, the system somehow changes the state of the ionosphere used by over-the-horizon radar stations (the most frequent type of SPAR radar) and prevents it from being used as a “mirror”.
It can be assumed that the emergence of such "anti-radar" systems will lead to the next international negotiations on the subject of a new treaty, similar to the agreements on missile defense from 1972, SALT or START. In any case, such “boxes” can significantly affect parity in the sphere of nuclear weapons and means of delivery. Naturally, such systems will first be kept secret - it is even possible that the aforementioned domestic “jammer” already exists, but for the time being is hiding behind the secrecy bar. So the general public will be able to track the emergence of such systems solely on indirect grounds, for example, at the beginning of the relevant negotiations. Although, as has happened more than once, the military can even “boast” new clothes with direct text.