Anti-ship "Standard" in pursuit of "Onyx". Revival of the forgotten American project

47


In 2017, the 50 will be exactly the same year since its adoption by the US Navy of the most popular in the West anti-aircraft guided missile for the naval air defense missile systems - RIM-66A "Standard-1" (SM-1). The product, aerodynamically perfect at that time, gave rise to a whole family of standard-grade SAM systems, which over four decades of improvement managed to replenish with modifications such as the Standard-67ER RIM-1A (two-stage SAM with 65 km range and high speed parameters on the final leg of the flight) , RIM-66C "Standard SM-2МR Block I" (the first modification of "Standard-2" integrated with the "Aegis" BIOS), RIM-156A "SM-2ER Block IV" (two-stage "Standard-2" SAM with long-range flight, about 160 km), RIM-161B "SM-3 Block IA" (anti-missile range 500 km, integrated into the AEgis BMD 3.6.1 software, designed to defeat a BR in near space). According to the last modification, work is being done to further improve the sensitivity of the infrared GOS for the development of the US and allied air defense / missile defense program. On the basis of RIM-161A, a ground-based interceptor missile RIM-161C was created for the “Aegis Ashore” missile defense system, which recently took up duty on duty in Romania.


The RIM-67A "Standard-1ER" SAM at the slightly upgraded guides of the Mk 10 launcher on the stern of the US destroyer DDG-41 USS "King" (class "Farragut"). Initially, two-stage SAM systems of the RIM-10 “Terrier” family were installed on the Mk 2 PU, which had very similar mass-dimensional parameters to the “SM-1ER”. Replacing the “Standards” began in the 70-ies. Anti-aircraft guided missile RIM-67A was the first two-stage long-range missiles in the US Navy, which was able to intercept air targets at a distance of 80 km. It was this rocket that became the prototype for the development of modern long-range two-stage SAMs Standard-2ER (Block I-IV); the latest version of which (RIM-156A), equipped with a solid-fuel stage Mk 72, is capable of hitting targets at a distance of 160 km. Further, the SM-3 and SM-6 were developed using the same “templates”, which became the basis of the promising American AUG air defense and missile defense, as well as a starting point in the recently sensational resumption of the high-speed anti-ship missile program for the US Navy.


But the Standard family was not limited to versions of anti-aircraft missiles. In the 1966 year, even before the SM-1 was commissioned, General Dynamics conducted parallel work on the AGM-78 “Standard-ARM” anti-radar missile, which was adopted by the US Air Force in the 1968 year and was intended to replace less sophisticated PLLR AGM-45 "Shrike"; their shortcomings were identified during the Vietnamese company. In particular, the absence of an inertial targeting unit with a drive to save the coordinates of a disconnected radar did not allow hitting the target in the event of the latter being turned off, and the HOS programmed before the departure caused the narrow Shrike functionality only with a single operating radar. Standard-ARM was devoid of these shortcomings, and therefore belongs to the transitional generation of PRLR, being almost on the same step as the well-known AGM-88 HARM.


AGM-78 Standard-ARM anti-radar missile was unified with almost all tactical carrier-based aircraft aviation US Navy. The missile had a number of characteristic technical features that determined its superiority over the existing AGM-45 Shrike HRD, and in some respects over the existing AGM-88E AAGRM. The mass of the high-explosive fragmentation warhead AGM-78 reached 150 kg, and was the most powerful of the known PRLR (except for the Russian X-58): when it is detonated, a crater with a diameter of 5 meters is formed on the surface, and when detonated at heights of more than 10 m, it can be surely defeated fragments fall to 300-400 meters of the battlefield. Despite the fact that American experts complained about the low average flight speed, the initial speed after leaving the suspensions was 3000 km / h (820 m / s), which is 750 km / h higher than the HARM, therefore, the best flight performance manifested during high-altitude launch, where the rarefied atmosphere did not contribute to the rapid deceleration of the rocket after the main engine burns out. In the photo - an early modification of the A-6B Mod 0 anti-radar carrier-based ground attack aircraft in the parking lot of the Point Mugu Naval Aviation Base of the United States (1967). The tactics of using Standard-ARM, which was then used on the A-6B Mod.1 modification, were tested on an experimental machine. A distinctive feature of the anti-radar version of the aircraft was small passive enemy radar irradiation detectors for target designation AGM-78, which were located on the surface of the nose fairing (12 antennas) and in the tail coke for the observation of the ZPS (6 antennas) (in the bottom photo). The range of "Standard-ARM" was 60% superior to "Shrike" and reached 80 km




Despite the range unprecedented for those years for PRLRT tactical aviation (75 km) and the most up-to-date elemental base of avionics, Standard-ARM ceased to be made due to the high cost of 1976, and the Standard family retained its anti-aircraft and anti-missile assignment up to today’s the day when new realities of military technological progress lead to the return of the most unexpected, sometimes long-forgotten projects.

7 April 1973, in the US Navy, successfully tested the first prototype of the supersonic anti-ship missile RGM-66F, which by tactical and technical parameters (except for the range in 550 km) was absolutely not inferior to our BNT 4K80 "Bazalt". The anti-ship RGM-1F developed on the basis of the SM-66MR missile defense system had a small radar signature (around 0,1 м2). This greatly complicated the detection and “capture” of the then-existing shipborne radar of the M-1 Volna, M-11 Storm and Osa-M radar. Experienced RGM-66F was not yet equipped with a first stage accelerator, and therefore even the ballistic flight path, with access to the lower stratosphere (up to 18 km), did not allow the rocket to hit surface targets at a distance of more than 50 km with a satisfying 2-speed on the final speed stage of the flight path. As with most anti-ship missiles, the RGM-66F provided for the installation of an active radar homing head, thanks to which the product was also known as “Standard Active”. And the unification with the standard-1 family of SAMs allowed it to be used not from the specialized inclined TPK (PU) Mk 141, as was done in the “Harpoons”, but from standard cellars with revolving storages and the feeder to the inclined PU Мk 13 and Mk 26 that did not limit the anti-ship arsenal of American warships.


Despite the 43-year-old suspension of the RGM-66F supersonic CK development program, another related project to extend the functionality of Standards was a success. It's about the RGM-66D (pictured). Many eminent editions mistakenly attribute this rocket to the anti-ship class. But its characteristics and capabilities make it refer to the ship-based multi-purpose anti-radar missiles (the maritime version of the Standard-ARM). RGM-66D SSM-ARM adopted the Navy in 1970 year. The capabilities of the product included the defeat of the broadest list of radio-emitting targets using passive radar homing systems (from shipborne radars of sight and guidance to ground-based air defense radar and PTV radar); at the same time, the surface combat ship with the turned off radar means RGM-66D was not surprised, and therefore it cannot be classified as anti-ship. Structurally, the rocket completely repeated the same RIM-66B: Aerojet Mk56 solid engine mod 1 runs in 0,5 marching mode with 1,6 tons of tons of minutes, maintaining a high supersonic flight speed, and the starting charge in the combustion chamber accelerates RGM-66D up to a speed of ZNMXNNXXNNXXNNXXNNXXGNUMX in 2500 seconds. The missile can hit the radar on a ballistic trajectory at a distance of 4 km. Was developed and a specialized version of the ship PRLR - RGM-60E. The rocket was unified with the ASROC RUR-66 anti-submarine launchers (bottom photo), which kept the enemy's anti-aircraft defense even if the vulnerable installations Mk 5 / 10 / 13 failed




Regardless of the promising two-stage RIM-67A SAM (radius of action up to 80 km), the US Navy preferred the development of McDonnell Douglas - RGM-84A “Harpoon”, which has much lower-altitude flight profile, which at that time was an advantage in the breakthrough of ship-based air defense, which was not yet endowed with the ability to effectively intercept low-altitude targets, including against the background of the water surface. But "Harpoons", like other subsonic anti-ship missiles, cannot remain on top of technology forever: the noise immunity and resolution of modern radar machines are increasing every day, and even such goals as the low-profile anti-ship missiles "LRASM" will be confidently detected and intercepted by modern Russian and Chinese shipboard SAMs and, therefore, the whole concept of improving air attack weapons cannot do without expanding their speed capabilities. After all, it is not for nothing that the Yakhonts and BrahMosa are being developed for the Russian and Indian fleets. Understood in the American Navy.

Last week, US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced work to create a promising supersonic anti-ship missile based on the Raytheon SM-174 ERAM long-range RIM-6 anti-aircraft missile system. In fact, the advanced project gets forgotten 44 a year ago, but instead of the RIM-66A / RIM-67A, a more advanced and long-range anti-aircraft missile is taken as the basis, which helped the imperfect 4-channel “Idzhis” to maintain stability in the conditions of modern threats. RIM-174 ERAM (Extended Range Active Missile) received a highly efficient ARGSN from the AIM-120C air-to-air missile, but its antenna array area was increased 3,75 times, which increased the target capture range during off-horizon shooting. ARGSN "SM-6" also unloads "Aegis" when repelling the enemy's massive WTO strike, since it does not need to be illuminated with SPG-62 radars.

In contrast to the RGM-66F, the new supersonic SM-6-based anti-ship missile can receive the first solid-propellant accelerating stage with the Mk.72 TRD (from the exoatmospheric interceptor RIM-161), and therefore its range may be more than 370 km. A huge range with this accelerator will be achieved only thanks to the high-altitude ballistic flight profile. Other equipment is also possible with the use of the Teledyne CAE J402-CA-100 compact turbojet engine with the 0,294 ton ton as the first stage of the compact turbojet engine. In this case, a low-altitude flight profile with a final acceleration to 3-3,5М over the crest of a wave is possible, a similar profile is implemented in the Russian RCC 3М54Е Caliber-NKE. The possibilities of such a CRP will correspond to the indicators of "Caliber".

But we will focus on the version with solid propellant stage Mk.72. The anti-ship version of the RIM-174 ERAM will be able to rise to a height of up to 35-40 km, after starting up to 4000 km / h. Then, according to the inertial guidance system and external target designation, the cruise stage will enter into a dive with the accelerator already separated, and after detecting and “capturing” the missile’s GOS surface target, the cruise engine will be activated to maintain high supersonic speed in tropospheric flight.

Also, the supersonic anti-ship missile system based on the Standard-6 boasts high maneuverability capabilities derived from the anti-aircraft version, thanks to which the rocket can reach the limiting (close to 90 degrees) elevation directions relative to the surface target in the stratosphere, and then using aerodynamic control surfaces or gas-dynamic DPU, sharply turn around and vertically "fall" on the target at speeds up to 3,5M. Even today, many multifunctional and survey radars have difficulties with work on air targets with extreme elevation coordinates, which the British-American contingent of specialists from Matra BAe Dynamics and Texas Instruments used to create one of the most advanced in the world. stories PRLR - ALARM.


Without a doubt, the most tactically "sophisticated" anti-radar missile can be considered the British-American ALARM. Not being a speed record holder for this type of missile, the 2,3 fly-flying missile ALARM relies on a specialized flight path and target guidance mode, as well as a small EPR provided by a small body diameter (230 mm) and extensive use of composite materials. Having a good range of application (93 km), flying up to the target. ALARM makes a “slide” maneuver, and at the top of the trajectory (just above the target), at a height of about 12-13 km, the parachute opens from a special container, and the rocket slowly decreases during 120 seconds, scanning the surface for the likely radiation of the enemy’s radar, if a source is detected, the parachute is quickly reset and the rocket engine is activated, ALARM attacks the target from the vertical direction (almost from “blind corners”), where many SAMs (especially with semi-rad olokatsionnym guidance and poor elevation survey parameters) are helpless. Many SAMs can destroy ALARM even before entering blind corners, but for this the rocket has another “trump card in the sleeve” - the small mass and dimensions allow only the “Tornado GR.4” to place the ALARM 7 missiles, the same the link can carry 28 missiles


The command of the US Navy does not hide the fact that new high-speed anti-ship missiles are being developed as an asymmetric response to the modernization of the naval personnel of the Russian Navy (“Admiral Nakhimov”, later “Varyag”) and to update it with promising frigates of the 22350 Ave. Polyment Redut. The new missiles are fully unified with the MUP 41, and therefore their number on one side will be limited only by the number of TPCs. Anti-ship Standards will present a huge danger in a massive use in conjunction with the LRASM anti-ship missiles: dozens of the latter will appear sharply due to the radio horizon, fully loading the EIA of the enemy ships (add false targets and EW airplanes), while the latter with a slight delay will attack 3 flywheel speed, i.e. the two types of impact will occur at one point in time, overloading the capacity of the shipborne air defense missile systems. These missiles will become a real formidable force against our and Chinese CMTs.

The danger lies in the fact that the speed of 3-3,5M exceeds the speed limit for intercepting KZRAK “Kortik”, SAM “Dagger” and “Osa-MA”, and only S-300F / FM, “Shtil-1”, “Redut” "And" Shell-M "can fight against similar goals, but single ships are now equipped with these complexes fleet, which indicates the need for an early update of all types of air defense systems. In the future, “Harpoons” will be gradually decommissioned, and, by about 2025, they will be completely replaced by “LRASM” and the new “Standards-PKR”. The striking capabilities of the US Navy will increase several times: these types of missiles will also be armed with missile modifications of the landing dock-ship "San Antonio" and the EM class "Zumwalt". The adequate response of our fleet is almost ready: at the final stage of development there is an anti-ship complex with hypersonic anti-ship missiles 3K-22 Zircon. Its 4,5-missile missiles with a mixed flight profile will be able to break through even an anti-ballistic "umbrella" based on the latest vaunted multifunctional radar AMDR.
47 comments
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  1. -11
    17 February 2016 07: 33
    For every tricky bolt, there is a tricky nut. An asymmetric response to the deployment of new anti-ship missiles on American ships could be ... Submarines, 941, in the quantity in which the USSR had them
    1. +5
      17 February 2016 07: 52
      Quote: qwert
      Asymmetrical answer .... could become ... Submarine pr.941,

      belay It may be easier to complete in the right amount:
      only S-300F / FM, Shtil-1, Redut and Pantsir-M can fight against similar goals
    2. +4
      17 February 2016 09: 03
      Quote: qwert
      An asymmetric response to the deployment of new anti-ship missiles on American ships could be ... nuclear submarines pr.941, in the quantity in which the USSR had them

      On before it would be highlighted in bold. For this would completely rule out your theory of asymmetric response.
    3. +2
      18 February 2016 13: 43
      There were 6 of them in the Union. But what does the Shark have to do with it? These giants are the fruits of the Union's insolvency while creating a compact solid rocket like the American Trident. So I had to build a huge and expensive boat under the huge R-39. Now, why such a boat, if the missiles are much more compact than steel and the same Borey is better by a head with a two smaller displacement? I did not understand you...
  2. +14
    17 February 2016 07: 33
    But Kaptsov claims that RCCs are useless, only money is wasted in vain on meaningless research and ideologically harmful production laughing.
    It is good that Eugene brings a certain variety to this question.
    1. +14
      17 February 2016 09: 06
      Quote: inkass_98
      And Kaptsov claims that RCCs are useless, only money is wasted in vain on meaningless research

      Kaptsov claims the uselessness of anti-ship missiles against armored ships, which the world does not exist, and the weak security of modern ships against modern anti-ship missiles. This is somewhat not what you say.
      1. +6
        18 February 2016 10: 06
        for Mera Joota:

        Kaptsov does not pay attention to the rapid development of missiles.
        Including anti-ship.
        1) The ability to make a slide and attack from above strictly vertically.
        2) Possibility to upload photos of a specific ship to the GOS chip
        indicating weaknesses to strike precisely at them.

        This will reset the effectiveness of the armored belts and the armored areas of the ship.
  3. +3
    17 February 2016 07: 45
    The danger lies in the fact that the speed of 3-3,5M exceeds the speed limit for intercepting KZRAK "Kortik", SAM "Dagger" and "Osa-MA"
    They cleverly handed over our complexes for scrap. But there is no reason to stagnate.
    1. -1
      17 February 2016 09: 24
      Quote: Corporal
      They cleverly handed over our complexes for scrap. But there is no reason to stagnate.

      Guidance systems with ARLGSN are suppressed by modern electronic warfare systems, not to mention primitive interference such as dipole reflectors and more advanced systems like MK 234 Nulka /
      Using SM6 against a ship is somewhat wasteful; Harpoon is much cheaper and more reliable.
      1. +8
        17 February 2016 10: 17
        Using SM6 against a ship is somewhat wasteful; Harpoon is much cheaper and more reliable.

        In addition to the "cheap" X-35, we also have more expensive 3m54 and 3m55 (Caliber and Onyx). Are you suggesting not to buy them? Each missile has its own purpose: the Harpoon, like its domestic counterpart, is designed to destroy relatively small ships - missile boats, corvettes, small landing platforms; Onyx from Calibers is already "heavy artillery", their targets are frigates, destroyers and other "elephants"
        And the United States does not have such a "heavy rocket" request
        1. +3
          17 February 2016 11: 04
          Quote: Wiruz
          Apart from the "cheap" X-35, we also have more expensive 3m54 and 3m55 (Caliber and Onyx). Do you offer not to buy them? Each rocket has its own target

          The interception of the SM6 will not be a particular problem for domestic ships, even veterans. It flies along a ballistic trajectory, you can detect at the maximum range of the capabilities of the ship's radar. You can close the dipole reflectors in advance and cut the electronic warheads if missiles miss. Those. only the corvette and less class ships can pose a threat to SM6, the Harpoon can also fail, and it costs half as much ...
          Quote: Wiruz
          Harpoon, like its domestic counterpart, is intended to destroy relatively small ships - missile boats, corvettes, small landing platforms;

          Where did you hear such nonsense?
          Quote: Wiruz
          And the United States does not have such a "heavy rocket"

          The fact that the SM6 lead 1,5t. does not make it heavy due to the fact that the bulk of the rocket is solid fuel, the mass of the warhead is not more than 100 kg. What’s heavy here?
      2. +1
        17 February 2016 20: 15
        Quote: Mera Joota
        Quote: Corporal
        They cleverly handed over our complexes for scrap. But there is no reason to stagnate.

        Guidance systems with ARLGSN are suppressed by modern electronic warfare systems, not to mention primitive interference such as dipole reflectors and more advanced systems like MK 234 Nulka /
        Using SM6 against a ship is somewhat wasteful; Harpoon is much cheaper and more reliable.


        Guidance systems of modern missiles have long been not as stupid as it seems.
        And that. how 20 years ago fought against missiles - is now not applicable.
        The same AMRAAM (even anti-air, but with an active radar), but is able to work in passive radar. Moreover, this mode works for him regularly, constantly.
        Can make 4 active pulse, then passively for some time.
        Thus, the target field is formed. Constantly analyzed with the allocation of location in space. Forecasts are calculated based on previously calculated courses, potential maneuvers, etc.
        If the interference clogs the reflection and is at the same point as the predicted reflection - the passive RLSGS mode - prevails. And it is already pointing at the combined point of the source of interference.
        If the rocket calculates that the reflection has changed (the version with dipoles) unpredictably diverged from the source of interference and again the source of interference at a potentially predicted point, then the rocket also goes to the source of interference.
        If an opportunity has happened and passed by, it will go a bit, go around in a circle, wait some time (for example, the lifetime of the dipole field) and turn on again in the active search.
        nothing prevents the implementation of such an algorithm of work in avionics of anti-ship missiles.
        Modern conformal radar navigation systems allow one to have both an active and a passive guidance system at the same time.
        The radar signatures of modern warships are stored in memory.
        They are used to select targets, exchange data between missiles and distribute targets between them.
        Modern microprocessors - calculate this whole thing just instantly.
  4. +6
    17 February 2016 09: 30
    In the near future, they will adopt the Zircon complex with a hyper-fast missile. It will be interesting to see how the adversary can respond to it.
    1. +5
      17 February 2016 10: 20
      I'm more interested in what it will be launched from. If it is done in the dimensions of Onyx (which is very unlikely), then the question is removed, and the UKKS.
      If he will be large (and his sketches go around the network, where he is 77n6 in size) then who / what will they shoot? Long-range aviation?
      hi
      1. +2
        17 February 2016 18: 27
        Quote: Wiruz
        If it is done in the dimensions of Onyx (which is very unlikely), then the question is removed, and the UKKS.

        Is a new fuel invented?
        Quote: Wiruz
        who / what will they shoot? Long-range aviation?

        or will be the second or third stage of a rocket starting from the ground
      2. +1
        17 February 2016 20: 29
        In dimensions "slightly smaller than" Granite ""
    2. 0
      17 February 2016 20: 39
      Quote: NEXUS
      In the near future, they will adopt the Zircon complex with a hyper-fast missile. It will be interesting to see how the adversary can respond to it.


      It seems to me that with the creation of Zircon there are many questions.
      If he, like all hypersonic aircraft, flies high, then he will be removed "at the expense of times."
      If low - how designers are going to solve the problem of overheating in dense layers and guidance in such a flight. Heating up to 500-600 degrees of almost all surfaces - as I understand it, is commonplace in this mode.
      Where will the GOS be located?
      Where will the possible plasma go?
      GOS in her case, anything other than inertial becomes useless.
      How to maneuver?
      The darkness of questions and theories of answers is not visible yet.

      The only thing that comes to mind is the idea of ​​a fix for use as RCC.
      Normal-looking RCC.
      Supersonic with M2. (because the direct-flow pump will not be able to accelerate at lower speeds, and it will not even be able to start).
      Capture a target at an altitude of 10km and a distance of 50 km.
      Knowing. that the ship’s maneuvers are very inertial and knowing that this hyper is at least 1,7 km / s, suppose.
      In 30 seconds, from the moment the target is captured and its course and potential coordinates miscalculated, the hypersonic blank (absolutely no GOS) is separated to the lead point.
      Having passed a blank in these 30 seconds, it gets where you need to.
      The ship does not have time to maneuver in any way.
      The response time of the crew to the maneuver, plus the inertia of the maneuver is a zero chance.
      Such a pistol shot.
      Ala Flurry.
      Fantasy! :)))
  5. +6
    17 February 2016 09: 34
    "... in no way inferior to our RCC Basalt ..."
    ... The range of the rocket, depending on the chosen flight profile, can reach 500 km. The missile uses the "high altitude - low altitude" mode; on the marching section, the rocket flies at an altitude of up to 5000 meters (to reduce air resistance and fuel consumption), and near the target, after capturing such a homing head, the rocket drops to a height of 50 meters and flies at low altitude, hiding behind the enemy’s radar horizon. Defeat the target is ensured by semi-armor-piercing (according to other sources, high-explosive) warhead weighing 1000 kg. For issuing primary target designation to a missile system, data from the LEGEND marine reconnaissance and target designation system are used.
    For the first time in world practice, the P-500 was equipped with an airborne jamming station 4B89 “Bumblebee”, which determined the operation mode of the enemy tracking radar and exposed the interference at the desired frequency. Thus, the rocket increases its resistance to enemy missiles. The missile is also capable of performing programmed dodging maneuvers ....
    All of our sea-based air defense systems were able to hit surface targets in surface-to-surface mode, starting with the S_75 mounted on the cruiser pr68 bis Dzerzhinsky, S_125 Volna, M-11 Shtorm, at a speed of 1200 m / s, Osa-MA and ending with Fort-M S-300FM.
    They’ll do it, we’ll see, and they’re mistaken about the guidance systems. Glavnyuki, what to take from them?
    Here, the fact that they could not repel the attacks of Mosquito during the tests, this is known.
    1. 0
      17 February 2016 20: 24
      And what has the picture with the experienced launcher "Brahmos" on the Indian frigate (more precisely, on the SKR built in the 70s for India on 61I)? Correct, please. Really there was no picture from 1164;)
  6. +6
    17 February 2016 09: 55
    Quote: Author
    But we will focus on the version with solid fuel booster stage Mk.72.


    SM-6 initially comes with such a launching stage and in the option of air defense. There are no other options, what's new?

    Quote: Author
    using aerodynamic steering wheels or gas-dynamic dpu


    Where does gas dynamic taxiing come from on the SM-6?

    Quote: Author
    "Calm-1", "Redoubt" and "Shell-M" can fight against similar goals, but single fleet ships are now equipped with these complexes


    Shell-M does not stand on any ship! During the tests of the Shell, it caused great doubts about the ability to combat targets at speeds greater than 400 m / s. About 3,5m is a big question. One of the reasons is the radio command guidance of missiles.


    Quote: Author
    The adequate response of our fleet is almost ready: at the final stage of development there is an anti-ship complex with hypersonic anti-ship missiles 3К-22 Zircon. Its 4,5 flywheel missiles with a mixed flight profile will be able to break through even an anti-ballistic "umbrella" based on the latest vaunted multi-function AMDR radar.


    To start, hypersound starts with 5M. 4,5 is supersonic. Secondly, all of our anti-ship missiles develop such a speed only at high altitude flight. On which they are perfectly visible to ship radars - and long-range missiles can shoot down.

    I especially note the statement about AMDR. Where the hell ??? Aegis accompanies BR hypersonic BBs for SM-3 adjustment. He pointed it at a satellite at which speed was in 9 km / s, what is the feature of Cyclron's invulnerability ???
  7. -1
    17 February 2016 10: 19
    The best defense against anti-ship missiles is betting on a submarine fleet (nuclear and diesel-electric) armed with long-range cruise missiles.

    The US Navy is rapidly increasing the number of surface targets - up to 96 destroyers and 12 aircraft carriers by 2042. To neutralize them, no more than 1000 "Calibers" and "Zircons", based on 10-30 submarines, will be required.
    1. -6
      17 February 2016 10: 26
      At one time, Fleet Admiral Kuznetsov, for his desire to build aircraft carriers, grew into conflict with the leadership that country, was "demoted" to rear admirals.
      But during the Caribbean crisis, due to the inability to demonstrate the power of the Soviet surface fleet, submarines were forced to walk along the islands in the surface.

      Are you really suggesting "going under water" again? belay
      1. +2
        17 February 2016 10: 40
        no one forced to walk in the water position, it was just that there were diesel engines that had to come up (the mattress fleet was round and the battery needed to be charged)
        1. 0
          17 February 2016 12: 43
          argue about boats
      2. +3
        18 February 2016 10: 16
        for Viruz:
        "Are you really suggesting 'go under the water' again? ///

        Going under water is a completely non-silly trick.

        When a battleship cruiser is driven like an elephant to "show the flag"
        demonstrating the power of the state is cool and spectacular.
        But it has nothing to do with war.

        On the photo: "General Belgrano" (with all sorts of missiles, by the way).
        Handsome!
        And the British nuclear submarine, which effortlessly sent it to the bottom, is, alas, not photogenic -
        - nothing to show ...
    2. 0
      April 15 2016 20: 46
      Tales did not try to write, you will succeed.
  8. +6
    17 February 2016 11: 13
    Submersion: this is a stealth radar plus "armor" several hundred meters thick (glory to O. Kaptsov laughing ).
    1. -1
      17 February 2016 20: 28
      No, it won’t save, if a direct hit of anti-ship missiles with a 200 kiloton of SBP is :)
      1. -2
        17 February 2016 20: 32
        Direct hit RCC - in what?
        1. 0
          18 February 2016 00: 14
          Into the side, "protected by a hundred meters of armor named after Oleg Kaptsov."
          If a direct hit with an undermining of the SBCH, then it evaporates just :)
          It was a joke.

          And against the submarine, respectively, a missile-torpedo with SBN (which would be guaranteed to be hollowed out within a radius of 500 meters in all directions :))
          1. -3
            18 February 2016 02: 05
            The standard payload of a rocket torpedo is 450 kg - the actual weight of the torpedo. The range of such a mini-torpedo will not exceed 10 km. At the same time, the weight of the SBN can be estimated in 50 kg, respectively, the capacity will be about 20 ct.

            The submarine will strike at the KUG / AUG at a distance from 500 km (KR "Zircon") to 1500 km (KR "Caliber"). A response in the form of a rocket-torpedo will fly the same distance for 40-120 minutes.

            During this time, the submarine will have time to leave the launch point of the Kyrgyz Republic at a distance of 30-90 km in any direction. The range of missile and torpedo sonar is less than 30 km. Therefore, it is only possible to undermine the UBC at the launch point of the RC. An 20 CT underwater explosion at a distance of 30 km will not harm the submarine.

            The answer will not work.
            1. +1
              18 February 2016 07: 10
              Quote: Operator

              The submarine will strike at the KUG / AUG at a distance from 500 km (KR "Zircon") to 1500 km (KR "Caliber"). A response in the form of a rocket-torpedo will fly the same distance for 40-120 minutes.


              Again we compare the method of a snake and a hedgehog.
              Who is stronger than an elephant or a whale.
              Abstract situations sucked out of a finger.

              How does the submarine find out about the location of the KUG / AUG? Who will give the target designation?

              and further. In vain the additional 1200 km was painted for the anti-ship Caliber ...
              Funny.
              It seems you are reasoning about an adult. The terms of the ship strike group are familiar. And how recklessly repeat about 1500 km ...
              1. -2
                18 February 2016 09: 17
                It is necessary to distinguish between export (300 km range in accordance with the missile technology control treaty), internal conventional (1600 km range) and internal nuclear (2500 km range) modifications of the Caliber.

                Before entering the KUG / AUG radar control zone, Caliber maneuvers in azimuth up to 100 km or more, thereby masking the launch point and making it impossible to retaliate against the submarine.

                In a combat situation, the KUG / AUG shines like a Christmas tree with its radars - otherwise how to notice the approach of the Kyrgyz Republic. Therefore, the RTR satellites and drones (located outside the radar monitoring zone) will give target designation of the KUG / AUG area. And the specific location of the ships in the travel order will be given by the KR leader equipped with a radar instead of the warhead.
                1. 0
                  18 February 2016 20: 28
                  Quote: Operator
                  It is necessary to distinguish between export (300 km range in accordance with the missile technology control treaty), internal conventional (1600 km range) and internal nuclear (2500 km range) modifications of the Caliber.

                  Before entering the KUG / AUG radar control zone, Caliber maneuvers in azimuth up to 100 km or more, thereby masking the launch point and making it impossible to retaliate against the submarine.

                  In a combat situation, the KUG / AUG shines like a Christmas tree with its radars - otherwise how to notice the approach of the Kyrgyz Republic. Therefore, the RTR satellites and drones (located outside the radar monitoring zone) will give target designation of the KUG / AUG area. And the specific location of the ships in the travel order will be given by the KR leader equipped with a radar instead of the warhead.


                  First of all.
                  You need to learn how to distinguish between anti-ship and tactical versions.
                  And no distribution agreements are worth mixing here.

                  You need to know that the RCC Caliber does not fly further than 320 in the mid-high mode, and if it is low-altitude, God forbid, and 230 will fly by.
                  We have no satellite system. Now there is no and the next 5 years will not be.
                  Do we have strategic drones capable of controlling the ocean zone, like the Global Hawke?
                  And so that with a viewing range greater than that of Hokai + his distance from the AUG, i.e. 600 + 300 = 900km
                  Those. what size will this very drone be? Which radar and RTR should you imagine?
                  There are no such and also the coming years 10 will not.

                  What kind of leader are you talking about?
                  There are no such missiles with the absence of warheads.

                  And who will give her the initial target designation herself if there are no satellites or drones in reality?
                  Even let us realize your imagination, let it be one KR - calculates all the coordinates of the ships and constantly 100 once a second gives constant corrections to the rest, which are not equipped with blanks.
                  And will AUG watch?
                  Aegis is a very powerful system. And she is not alone there.
                  And she is able to work together and launch missiles from other ships, without the participation of their crews. And she is capable of launching rockets beyond the horizon according to Hokai’s commands. And much more.
                  Well, they will knock down this active KR leader, for she is the only one emitting and will be beaten first of all.
                  What will happen to everyone else? become helpless and eyeless - whipping carcasses?

                  Once again, you forget about the combat order and order.
                  Hokai always hangs in the air above the same AUG.
                  Hangs on top in 8-10k.
                  Do you know its characteristics?
                  Detection range:
                  Aircraft of the Tu-22 or Tu-160 class - 500-600 kilometers.
                  Rocket launch from a submarine, as a low-flying target - 350-400 km.
                  For the climb at the start is quite noticeable.
                  What kind of surprise are we talking about?
                  The launch of rockets and, accordingly, the boat - right there.

                  Do not abstract from reality. Do not invent spherical vacuum horses.
                  Study the subject of discussion.
                  Characteristics, tactics of application.
                  Then there will be less room for fantasy ...
                  And then you live in a parallel universe.
                  1. -2
                    18 February 2016 23: 04
                    Could you give a link to the range of the anti-ship modification "Caliber"?

                    Meet the Russian RTR satellite Lotos-S, which is a component of the Liana space system.

                    The power of the direct radar signal is more than an order of magnitude higher than the power of the reflected radar signal. Therefore, the on-board RTR means of unmanned aerial vehicles are less overall and energy-intensive than the radar station of the AWACS aircraft. A UAV weighing several tons and a flight range of up to 10 thousand km can quite cope with the detection of the Hokaya's radar signal.

                    The detection range of the Hokaya radar for cruise missiles is 258 km, for bombers - 540 km. The detection range of the Hokaya radar station is about 1000 km. Those. "Hawkeye" will not detect RTR-UAVs with passive radio reconnaissance equipment.
                    To clarify the location of the ship’s warrant, there is the possibility of provocation — launching towards the ACG a small-sized UAV with a very low ESR, which will allow itself to be detected only at the entrance to the area of ​​operation of ship’s radars.

                    In addition, in a combat situation, AUGs are constantly covered by barrage aircraft, the takeoff and landing of which is accompanied by the operation of the aircraft carrier’s radio facilities. This allows you to uniquely determine its place in the order.

                    Do not be so categorical about installing a radar instead of a warhead on the CR leader. It would be knocked down (that’s his plan), but only after the high-flying KR leader turns on the radar, determines the location of the ships in the warrant, distributes the targets and transfers information to low-flying shock KR equipped with warheads.
                    Impact CDs are equipped with millimeter-wave GOS, an additional thermal imaging channel and memory with recorded ship silhouettes from different angles. After receiving the layout of ships in the warrant and target designation from the leader of the Kyrgyz Republic, they no longer need information from an external source.

                    Indeed, the SM-3 anti-aircraft missiles can be guided by external target designation from the same "Hokai" to the calculated area of ​​the meeting with the roofed missile. After that, the final targeting is carried out using the active radar seeker of anti-aircraft missiles. But their GOS works in the millimeter range (suddenly laughing ) and in this regard are subject to radio interference from the GOS of cruise missiles.

                    All that is described above applies to the case of an ACG attack with cruise missiles with conventional warheads, which is unlikely in a military conflict between Russia and the United States. When using nuclear weapons (more likely), resolving the conflict will look much simpler:
                    - in 20-40 minutes after the start of the conflict over the location of each AOG, one ICBM warhead with a capacity of 1 Mt will explode;
                    - carrier-based aircraft patrolling the AUG area, including the notorious "Hokai", will fall into the sea;
                    - AUG shipboard radars will fail;
                    - add-ons, aircraft lifts and catapults of an aircraft carrier will also fail;
                    - no later than an hour and a half later, a flock of cruise missiles with nuclear warheads with a capacity of 3 kt each will fly up to the AUG and start "beating up babies."
                    1. 0
                      19 February 2016 09: 23
                      It seems to me that you are deliberately looking in the wrong direction.

                      1. According to Liana.
                      The Liana system is not formed. I didn’t just write about the coming 5 years.
                      The first satellite 14F138, after being put into orbit, is completely unfit. Half of all on-board equipment did not start.
                      14F139 satellites - the campaign is not even ready yet.
                      Space launch - stopped until the final analysis.
                      With reduced funding and a mess in the space industry - this process may stretch for an additional 5-10 years.

                      2. According to Hokai.
                      You may be able to detect Hokai by radiation.
                      But how are you going to detect KUG / AUG? Knowing that Hokai is at a distance of 300-350 km from AUG. Imagine the size of the water area with a radius of 300 km, let it be possible to assume that the sector is not 360, but only 270?
                      It’s easier to find a needle in a haystack.
                      Again.
                      Do we have RTR aviation tools that can detect ships at a distance of 1000km? No, and never will be.
                      About the range of Hokai. Do not write here the numbers 70-80's. The devices are being upgraded. Look for the latest data. There on low-flying targets 400 km.


                      3. By high flying RCC.
                      Thanks for a long time so did not laugh.
                      It will be knocked down, in principle, in any case, and even if it is a high-flying one, then at a distance of 200 km from the AUG, he won’t be able to turn on the radar even before.
                      Read again about Hokai, Aegis, Standard, Link-16, etc.
                      Radio resistance on Russian missiles is a complete myth.
                      All words about this electronic warfare are not confirmed by anything.
                      What would be the radio resistance - we need conformal antennas and a bunch of volumetric and energy-intensive equipment.
                      Which there is no place in the layout of the body, nor the power of the engines.
                      Aircraft do not cope with their electronic warfare with a tiny GSN of the same AMRAAM.
                      It's blah blah blah.

                      4. When using nuclear weapons, KUG / AUG will be targets of 3-4 degree of importance.
                      For the beginning of the massive use of nuclear weapons is immediately aimed at the state infrastructure. Destruction of the state, and then some sort of aircraft carrier hanging out in the Mediterranean.
                      When they start chopping a huge cedar, they do not pay attention to the growth of grass around the cedar. here AUG- in the situation with nuclear weapons is grass.

                      5. It is impossible to direct a real nuclear ICBM into the KMG / AUG. The process of target designation is too long. First, satellite analysis, then data transfer, then uploading to ICBMs will take at least an hour, or even a half. Plus the flight. 30-40 minutes.
                      An hour an aircraft carrier always passes at least 30 km. And in combat mode 50km, maneuvering all the time.
                      And in an hour and a half there will be a field with a radius of 70km.
                      You won’t get anywhere.

                      A plane at a distance of 10 km from the explosion will be nothing.
                      An aircraft carrier at a distance of 3-5 km from the point of explosion will not be anything.
                      See real data on nuclear tests.

                      Output.
                      You do not understand even half of what you talk about.
                      I already wrote.
                      Quote:
                      "Study the subject of discussion.
                      Characteristics, tactics of application.
                      Then there will be less room for fantasy ... "
                      This is advice. Because. that in your judgments you do not think about the realities.
                      Learn to play chess - it can make you think in two directions at once in parallel.
                      When you learn to look at the subject from all sides of the interactions, for yourself, for that guy, and from the side, and from above, and from 5 meters ...
                      Only then will you learn to analyze for real.
                      And not to be "one-sided judgment" ...

                      This is not a praise of the amers.
                      Put a potential Il instead of Hokai.
                      Instead of Aegis, a potential upgrade to the Polyment-Redut system.
                      Instead of Caliber - Tomahawk.
                      And you will understand the situation as it can be.
                      1. 0
                        19 February 2016 12: 56
                        1. You asked to name the Russian satellite RTR - I complied with the request ("Lotos-S").

                        2. If Hawkeye moves 300 km from the AUG order, what will control the airspace in the direction opposite to its displacement?
                        The instrumental range of the Hokaya radar is limited by the radio horizon, and not by technical capabilities.
                        It is also useful to remember the basic equation of radar - the power of the probing signal quadratically depends on the distance.
                        At the same time, the power of the reflected signal also depends on the EPR of the target - one thing is Tu-95 with 100 sq.m, another is Su-34 with 10 sq.m. and the third is a cruise missile with 0,1 sq.m. Hint - EPR reduction by a factor of ten reduces the detection range by half.

                        3. You are struggling with windmills - I have already said that the high-flying RCC leader has such a plan - to be shot down (even at a distance of 200 km). But before it is taken down, it will have time to take a picture of the AUG order using the on-board radar (from an altitude of 12 km the order will be visible as palms - the ship’s ESR is 10000 square meters or more) and transmit information to low-flying shock RC.
                        Familiarize yourself with the characteristics of domestic anti-ship cruise missiles - their electronic equipment includes electronic warfare equipment.

                        4. The AUG is armed with carrier-based aircraft - a carrier of nuclear weapons. Therefore, AOG is included in the list of primary goals of a nuclear strike.

                        5. Do not fantasize - RTR spacecraft provide tracking of AUG and data transmission to the control center in real time. After a decision is made on the use of nuclear weapons, a blow will be struck at the calculated point of the ACG motion vector, based on the latest data.
                        The approach time of an ICBM combat unit is measured in 20-40 minutes, depending on the distance to the ACG from the launch site of the ICBMs. During this time, the AUG will go to a distance of no more than 20 km and it is not a fact that in the non-direction of the calculated point - the order as a whole, unlike individual ships, does not zigzag. The megaton warhead is absolutely violet, as individual ships will maneuver as part of the warrant.
                        Well, at least you agreed with the disabling of aircraft and ship radars - and that’s bread. And now the question is - in the absence of radars, how will you direct anti-aircraft missiles to the RCC?

                        Thank God that the Americans invested in a bunch of surface and aviation weapons that were absolutely useless in a nuclear conflict, while we invested in absolutely effective submarine and missile weapons.
                      2. 0
                        19 February 2016 18: 56
                        1. Once again, satellite constellation for real-time target designation does not exist.
                        No amount required.
                        With an orbit of 1100 kilometers, what will be the real-time coverage area?
                        Will you be able to calculate the number of satellites yourself to control all the main places of concentration of AUG adversary?
                        Only 4 satellite plans, respectively a real-time liana system for target designation for the world's oceans - zilch.

                        2. Again about the leader rockets.
                        Explore the materiel on the topic of the detection range of the GOS RCC of the surface target.
                        This distance does not exceed 70 kilometers.
                        No one else could do it.
                        Accordingly, he does not even have time to squeak, and he will be beaten.
                        I am repeating this to you for the second time. And you do not want to understand this.
                        Abstract example.
                        You are a special knife fight.
                        But I have a gun in my hands.
                        You will amaze me if you approach me at 1 meter.
                        But I won’t let you go even up to 10 meters.
                        And you will not have a single chance to show your skill.


                        3. Target designation in ICBMs - at least 20-25 minutes. This is a very quick process.
                        Plus the flight.
                        Plus time to make a decision.
                        Aircraft carrier does not go in a straight line.
                        Forecasting is unrealistic.
                        The forecast will be from the series "50/50 - hit / miss"

                        4. In the exchange of nuclear strikes by intercontinental ballistic missiles - carriers of tactical nuclear located in the oceans - grass.
                        has no value as a goal.
                        Realize this at last.
                        Why should they bomb something?
                        All really important and strategic goals of the coastal zone will already be destroyed with the help of ICBMs.
                        And deep down - they will not reach.
                        The radius will not allow even refueling.
                        In addition, they have to go some more time to reach the coast. And it can be day or week.
                        In the ashes or what?
                        Well think right God. that would cling to erroneous assumptions with all their might ...
                      3. 0
                        19 February 2016 20: 58
                        1. You yourself give five years to prepare - for the 2020 year of the Russian Aerospace Forces, they will form the RTR satellite constellation laughing

                        2. Ancient "Yakhont" with placement on board and a radar seeker and warhead has a radar range of 95 km. So figure out what will be the range of a powerful radar installed on board the "Zircon" or "Caliber" instead of the warhead.
                        Since the KR leader has a plan to die, what for does he need a warhead?

                        3. We are talking about target designation for ICBMs in a special period when the passage of the coordinates of targets and launch commands will go in real time.

                        4. The list of targets for existing ICBMs on each side is approximately equal to 550 units (several warheads for some targets). And the number of military and military-industrial facilities is much larger. That's what nuclear ammunition in the form of sea-based cruise missiles, carrier-based aviation, land aviation and operational-tactical missiles serves for their completion.
                        Otherwise, why are the same nuclear bombs preserved in arsenals?

                        Combat radius of "Hornets" is 1065 km. In your opinion, in the event of a nuclear conflict, the US Navy will take the position of "my hut on the edge" such as the main task of the fleet - the projection of force in peacetime?
                      4. 0
                        19 February 2016 21: 57
                        Again disagree with your conclusions.

                        1. Yakhont is the edge of 50 at an altitude of 14 km.
                        Onyx is the edge of 75 at the same height.
                        If both fly on a low altitude trajectory, then the flight range is only 120 km.
                        Again zilch against the aircraft AWACS.

                        2. Target designation of ICBMs is a thing outside of special periods. there is a data transfer protocol - it will not work faster.

                        by land.
                        3. We have 300 missiles and 1000 warheads
                        The adversary has 450 missiles and 950 warheads.

                        by SSBN
                        We have 112 missiles and 460 warheads
                        amers have 300 missiles and 1200 warheads

                        There is an accepted scheme that at the first sudden hit, the 1 warhead destroys the 9 warheads of the enemy.
                        Accordingly, the fastest missiles are aimed precisely at the ICBM and naval base of the SSBN.
                        Subtract them from the start.
                        we will have 450 war blocks
                        they have 300 blocks.

                        Consider that we have 260 monoblocks, they have 200 monoblocks.

                        As a result, we get 1200-1700 goals.
                        This is more than enough to destroy the entire military, military-industrial, state-forming infrastructure and drive the enemy into feudalism.
                        It’s not necessary to beat even the cities.
                      5. 0
                        19 February 2016 22: 44
                        1. KP-leader always flies high. RGSN "Yakhonta" / "Onyx" with a range of 75 km and a mass of 85 kg is given as an example. It is possible to estimate what the range of the radar seeker will be with an increase in its weight six times 450 + 85 = 535 kg.

                        2. The protocol for transmitting data on targets and commands to the launch of ICBMs cannot be longer than the time it takes for medium-range missiles to fly from Europe to Moscow — from 11 to 15 minutes.

                        3. We must not forget about the need to maintain the nth number of warheads in reserve to deter China, Pakistan and India. The presence in the arsenal of the Russian Federation and the United States of aviation nuclear weapons is proof of this.

                        A sudden strike is possible only with medium-range ballistic missiles, and even then in the absence of a special period.
                        In all other cases, missile attack early warning satellites, over-horizon and over-horizon missile defense radars will warn the attacked side within a few minutes after the mass launch of ICBM / RSD. After that, the return-start launch of ICBMs will follow until the first RSD of the enemy arrives.
                      6. 0
                        19 February 2016 23: 28
                        World Peace! :)
                      7. 0
                        19 February 2016 23: 50
                        I agree, but

                        Washington, 18.02.2016/XNUMX/XNUMX, White House spokesman Josh Ernest: "We will stand shoulder to shoulder with Turkey and other NATO allies in countering Russian provocations in the region."
                      8. 0
                        20 February 2016 14: 54
                        2012 year
                        OCD "Development of an industrial technology for the production of airborne radar with increased noise immunity with selection modes for detectable marine surface targets."
                        Cipher "Pugach".
                        The technology being developed is planned to be used in the Uran, Caliber and Zircon complexes.
                2. 0
                  April 15 2016 21: 00
                  Unknown Soviet Pearl Harbor: http: //kryaker.dwg.ru/? P = 13669
    2. 0
      17 February 2016 20: 51
      Quote: Operator
      Submersion: this is a stealth radar plus "armor" several hundred meters thick (glory to O. Kaptsov laughing ).


      Against stealth in peacetime, a cure has almost been found.
      Namely, the constant support by unmanned aerial vehicles of surface and underwater.
      They will simply accompany.
      Being in active acoustic contact with the submarine and satellite contact with the headquarters.
      There will be for example 2 above-water and one underwater. Behind each boat.
      The underwater will always be on the tail and can in passive mode.
      All information about the submarine maneuver. he will receive including and from surface drones.
      They will wait immediately from the territorial waters and accompany so much. How many do you need.
      To leave them in such a situation is unrealistic.
      how do you like this forecast?
      More than real and feasible.

      They finish the adversaries with such crap.
      Years through 5 we will see the current samples.
      1. -2
        17 February 2016 21: 45
        For each accompanying underwater drone there is our underwater drone - a submarine simulator.
      2. +1
        18 February 2016 00: 27
        To wait for the submarine as much as you need and then follow it, you need a nuclear reactor on a drone.
  9. 0
    17 February 2016 20: 27
    And I remember the old monster Thalos ARM. That was "almost an anti-missile missile defense system." True, it was based only on a very small pool of ships ... "Long Beach" and "Legs" with "Bainbridge". "10 years before the first" Standard ""
    1. 0
      19 February 2016 12: 53
      Here was such a bandurin:
  10. 0
    17 February 2016 23: 40
    Quote: kote119
    no one forced to walk in the water position, it was just that there were diesel engines that had to come up (the mattress fleet was round and the battery needed to be charged)


    In fact, Khrushchev forced. Submariners obeyed the order.
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