Military Review

The development of Soviet rocket artillery in the first period of World War II

44
The development of Soviet rocket artillery in the first period of World War II



The first experimental samples of rockets (RS) and launchers for them, as well as jet weapons for the aircraft were developed and manufactured in our country before the start of World War II. However, they were in the process of polygon and military tests. The organization of mass production of this weapons, the creation and use of units and subunits of rocket artillery had to be dealt with under the most difficult conditions of the first period of the war. The resolution of the USSR Council of People's Commissars on the serial production of jet weapons was adopted on 21 on June 1941 of the year, that is, one day before the start of the war. Subsequent resolutions of the State Defense Committee gave personal responsibility for the production of RSs to the People's Commissar of Ammunition B.L. Vannikova, and for the production of military installations - on the People's Commissar of mortar weapons PI. Parshin.

Among the plants that during the war years were given the task of serial production of rockets, as well as launchers for them, were the Moscow plants named after Vladimir Ilyich, Compressor, Krasnaya Presnya, Voronezh Plant. Comintern and others. The employees of the special design bureau of the Kompressor plant made a notable contribution to the development and introduction into production of new combat rocket launchers.

The difficult situation on the fronts in 1941 year demanded the speedy equipping of active army troops with jet armament. Therefore, already on June 28 began to form on the territory of the 1 Moscow Artillery School. L.B. Krasin battery rocket launchers, it was decided to check the quality and effectiveness of jet weapons directly at the front.

This battery (commander - captain IA Fleur) was created in four days and, on the night of July 2 1941, acted on the Western Front on its own. 5 July 1941, Flerov received the task, and already the 14 battery produced two volleys, which became the first battle volleys of the first type of weapon: the first to concentrate enemy troops on the Orsha railway junction, the second to the enemy crossing the r. Orshitsa. Subsequently, the battery still made a number of quite successful fire strikes near Rudnya, Smolensk and Yartsev, causing great damage to the fascist troops.

Until the beginning of August, 1941, by order of I.V. Stalin had formed another eight batteries of jet installations.

On the night of the 21 on the 22 of July 1941, a second battery of jet-powered mortars commanded by Lieutenant A.M. appeared on the Western Front. Kuhn. She was armed with 9 military installations of the BM-13 type. The battery was subordinated to the commander of the 19 army, Lieutenant-General I. S. Konev, who set the first combat mission for this unit. In 9 h 30 min 25 July, she opened fire on a cluster of enemy infantry. Subsequently, the battery fired two more times at the fascist armored vehicles and infantry, preparing for the attack.



25 July 1941 with a battery of jet mortars consisting of three BM-13 combat vehicles (commander N.I. Denisenko) reinforced the grouping of Major General K. Rokossovsky, who was on the defensive in the Yartsevo direction. The batteries set the task of destroying German troops at a resistance node located four kilometers west of Yartsev. Already in the evening a salvo of rockets was fired. Generals K.K. Rokossovsky and V.I. The Cossacks, who were present at the same time, noted its high performance.

In the evening of July 27, a battery of jet mortars (commander PN Degtyarev) came out from Moscow near Leningrad, which consisted of BM-4 combat installations 13. She followed her own course and in 21 h 30 mines arrived in Krasnogvardeisk. July 31 Lieutenant P.N. Degtyarev and a military engineer, DA, who accompanied the battery. Shitov were summoned to K.E. Voroshilov. During the conversation, which lasted about an hour, the battery was given specific tasks: to prepare personnel and property for combat operations for 3 days, to assist Leningrad factories in establishing ammunition production for rocket launchers.

On August 1, a battery of jet installations arrived at the disposal of the Reserve Front from Moscow (four BM-13). The commander of the battery was Senior Lieutenant Denisov. 6 August with 17 h 30 min to 18 h battery produced three volleys in the offensive zone of the 53 th rifle division, which made it possible for parts of the division to seize the enemy stronghold almost without loss.

Until mid-August, 1941 had sent three more rocket batteries, commanded by NF, to the Western and Reserve fronts. Dyatchenko, E. Cherkasov and V.A. Kuybyshev, and the South-West - battery TN Nebozhenko.

6 September is the tenth rocket mortar battery commanded by V.A. Smirnova arrived on the Western Front. On September 17, a separate Guards Mortar Division (GMD) was deployed at its base, which also included batteries under the command of Flerov and Cherkasov.



The fate of the first Soviet rocket artillery batteries is different. The batteries of Flerov, Cherkasov, Smirnov died on the Smolensk land, the batteries of Dyatchenko, Denisov and Kuhn - in the battles near Moscow. Batteries N.I. Denisenko and V.A. Kuibyshev continued to successfully fight on the Western Front. Somewhat later, they were reformed into separate Guards mortar battalions. Battery P.N. Degtyareva, who fought near Leningrad, in the early autumn of 1941, was deployed in a separate GMD, becoming the basis, formed in November, of a separate Guards mortar regiment (GMP) of the Leningrad Front (commander Major I.A. Potiforov). From 28 February 1942, he became known as the 38-m Guards Mortar Regiment. Battery of jet installations TN Nebozhenko after the Kiev defensive operation was deployed in a separate Guards mortar division, which proved itself well in the battles for Odessa and Sevastopol.



By the fall of 1941, the serial production of PCs and combat installations for them had increased significantly. The BM-13 combat vehicles were upgraded and the RS-X X-mm caliber X-guns installed on ZIS-82 vehicles (6-chargers) and light tanks T-36 were developed by the efforts of the designers, technical staff and workers. (60 Chargers).

The Supreme Command headquarters controlled the progress in the production of new weapons and the combat use of the first units of rocket artillery. I.V. Stalin was presented with the results of their use in battle and the proposal to create regiments armed with rocket launchers.

In August 1941 of the year came the order of the Supreme Command Headquarters to start forming the first 8 regiments of rocket artillery, equipped with BM-13 and BM-8 combat vehicles. Each regiment consisted of three fire battalions of a three-battery (4 combat units in batteries), anti-aircraft and park battalions. All formed regiments were given the rank of Guards, and they began to be called “Guards mortar regiments of the Supreme Command Headquarters”. This emphasized the special significance of the new weapon, the subordination of the regiments to the Supreme Command Headquarters, and the responsibility for recruiting. By the end of September, 9 rocket artillery regiments acted on the fronts, and the 9 regiment was formed over the plan on the initiative and at the expense of the staff of the USSR Mortar Armament.

Regiments of rocket artillery continued to be created during October. On the Western Front, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 14 Guards regiments of rocket artillery were formed. The first regiments in the difficult conditions of 1941, were able to successfully fight the enemy. Their personnel demonstrated a high ability to use new weapons. At the same time, combat use during the 1941 summer-autumn campaign revealed the fact that it was not always possible to use the shelves centrally. Of the established regiments, only four (2, 4, 6 and 8) acted compactly, the rest fought in a sub-divisional, on isolated areas of the front. During the period of intense defensive battles with the enemy, having superior strength, with a small number of units equipped with new weapons, it was noted that it was more profitable to use rocket artillery - dispersed, directing separate divisions to the most difficult sectors of the front, to provide fire support to infantry divisions.

As a result, since October 1941, at the suggestion of the Western Front Command, the formation of separate rocket artillery battalions began, and the formation of mortar regiments was suspended. Until 12, December 1941 formed 28 separate divisions of the two-battery (8 units in each battery). From the 14 first mortar regiments 9 reformed into separate Guards battalions of rocket artillery, two-battery.



These activities allowed to increase the number of individual units, although the number of combat installations remained the same, and to provide support for rifle divisions in the main lines. By December 1941, the front had 8 rocket artillery regiments and 35 individual divisions. A single volley of their launchers was about 14 thous. Rockets.

8 September 1941 by the decision of the State Defense Committee established the central governing bodies of reactive artillery in the person of the commander, the military council (subordinate directly to the Supreme Command Headquarters), the headquarters and the Main Directorate of Armament of the Guards mortar units (GUV GMCh). Management of orders for the production of weapons, supplies and organization of repairs GUV GMC (the chief was a military engineer 1 rank N. N. Kuznetsov).

On the fronts, new command and control bodies were created on the fronts to provide guidance for combat activities and to ensure the supply of new missile units — the operational groups of the guards mortar units.

From autumn 1941 to November 1942, FGGGs were formed on all active fronts. In the period of the onset of the Soviet troops in the winter of 1941 / 42 of the year, regular army task forces began to be set up in armies where a large number of rocket artillery units were concentrated. So it was in the North-Western, Kalinin and Western fronts. However, the majority of army FG GMG was led, as a rule, by the commanders of the rocket artillery regiments supporting the actions of the military units of the army.

As you can see, in 1941, rocket artillery developed not only quantitatively, but also in organizational terms.

The most important factor that ensured the rapid development of a new type of weapon during the war years was the organizing activity of the State Defense Committee to create, master and expand the serial production of PCs, combat vehicles and launchers. At the T-bills, a special Council on jet weapons was organized. Production and supply activities of the Guards mortar units, as well as their formation and combat use were under the direct supervision and control of the Supreme Command Headquarters and the State Defense Committee. The best enterprises of the country were involved in the production of jet weapons. A lot of attention was paid personally to the development of this new type of weapon by I.V. Stalin.

The rapid development of reactive artillery was largely due to its combat properties, which met the requirements of highly maneuverable operations during the initial period of the war, as well as the simplicity of the designs of military installations, low consumption of non-ferrous metals and other scarce materials for its production.

An important role was played by rocket artillery during the defense of Moscow, its main forces were concentrated. The front command and army commanders skillfully enough used the high maneuverability and firing characteristics of a new type of weapon, for the sudden launch of powerful fire strikes against the enemy troops wedged in. Guards mortar battalions covered all major highways leading to the capital, ensured the application of counter-attacks and counterattacks. Acting in a broad band, they were used where the enemy posed the greatest threat. Fire strikes of rockets not only caused serious damage to enemy troops, but also produced a strong moral impact on them.



After the start of the counteroffensive near Moscow, the guards mortar divisions were used most effectively in the depths of the fascist defense. While advancing in the combat first echelons, they ensured the breakthrough of the enemy’s defenses at intermediate lines, and also reflected his counterattacks.

In 1942, due to increased production and economic opportunities, the formation of units and subunits of rocket artillery took place on an even larger scale.

In connection with the beginning of the general Soviet offensive and the requirements of the Supreme Command Headquarters, massive use of artillery on the main axes, it became necessary to introduce organizational changes in rocket artillery. Meanwhile, there were known difficulties in managing a large number of divisions in combat. Therefore, in January 1942, under the order of the State Defense Committee, the mass formation of regiments of jet artillery of the new organization was started. At the same time, separate divisions began to unite into regiments (three fire divisions of a two-battery contingent). In the battery, as before, there were 4 installations BM-13 or BM-8. Thus, the salvo of the BM-13 regiment was 384 projectile, and the regiment of the BM-8 - 864. The regiment divisions had their own logistic agencies and could act independently.

The first regiments of the new organization were the 18 and 19 of the Guards mortar regiments. By the middle of the spring, 1942 had formed the 32 regiment and several separate divisions. In this case, 21, 23, 36 and 40-th Guards mortar regiments were created by combining separate battalions located in the North-West, Volkhov and Kalinin fronts. Two regiments from the newly created (32 and 33) were transferred to the Far East.

The combat experience gained during the 1941 / 42 winter offensive showed that new tasks had appeared in front of the rocket artillery units. Now, targets for the firing of rocket launchers were not only living force with military equipment, but also fortifications at the lines of attack. For the breakthrough of the enemy’s equipped defenses, for example, a more powerful and heavy missile capable of destroying fortifications was needed.

By the summer of 1942, Soviet designers had developed two high-explosive rockets: M-20 (caliber 132 mm, longest range 5 km, explosive charge weight 18,4 kg) and M-30 (caliber 300 mm, maximum range 2,8 km, explosive charge weight 28,9 kg ). M-20 shells were fired mainly from the BM-13 rocket launchers, and M-30 shells from specially designed frame-type machines. The Soviet troops received a simple, inexpensive, but powerful tool for breaking through the enemy's positional defense.

4 June 1942 of the State Defense Committee announced the creation of heavy rocket artillery units, which obliged the military council of the GMC to form 30 separate divisions armed with M-30 units in the shortest possible time. The heavy rocket artillery division was of three batteries, each battery had a 32 launcher (frame). They were installed RS M-30 (four per installation). The division had 96 launchers, and its salvo was a 384 projectile. July 1 completed the formation of the first heavy jet divisions (from 65-th to 72-th), which were combined into 68-th and 69-th Guards mortar regiments and sent to the Western Front. The regiments had no means of reconnaissance, communications, and a sufficient number of vehicles. On July 3, on the Volkhov front, the 77 th regiment departed, and the 8 th to the Northwest — 81 th and 82 th regiments.

The baptism of the battalion of heavy rocket artillery took 5 on July 1942 of the year on the Western Front, on the site of the offensive of the 61 Army. On the German centers of resistance, located in Anino and Upper Doltsy (near the town of Beleva), powerful fire strikes were inflicted. As a result, both fortified points were destroyed and our troops were able to occupy them practically, without encountering German resistance. Until mid-July, the 68 army continued to support the 69 and 61 regiments and fired 4 regimental volleys and another 7 divisional, using the X-NUMX M-3469 projectiles.

After the successful combat use of the first heavy battalions, their forced formation began. Already by August 20 80 M-30 divisions were formed, of which 74 were on the fronts.

The results of the heavy battalions of the M-30 were highly appreciated by both artillery and all-arms commanders. At the same time, the shortcomings of the organization of the first units of heavy rocket artillery were revealed in combat practice. Due to the large number of frames (96) in the division, it was difficult to choose and equip firing positions. Difficulties arose when bringing ammunition, since division vehicles could only raise half of a divisional salvo in one flight.



The above, as well as the impossibility at that time to satisfy the needs of the M-30 regiments in reconnaissance, communications and motor vehicles, was abandoned by the regimental organization of heavy rocket artillery. The first five regiments of M-30 were disbanded, and their divisions became independent. In the future, individual M-30 divisions began to be formed according to a changed state (two batteries for 48 frames in each).

Simultaneously with the development of units with M-30 systems, in 1942, rapid growth continued in the Guards mortar regiments that had BM-13 and BM-8 installations.

In the autumn of 1942, in the Caucasus, miner combat installations for the RS M-8 began to be created. From September to October 1942 of the 58 mountain range was built, on the basis of which 12 of miner-cell batteries were formed, four units in each. To protect the coast, mountain combat installations began to be installed on railcars and boats.

In the summer of 1942, the bitter struggle turned south-westward. The main event of this period was the battle of Stalingrad. The active role in it was also played by rocket artillery, which was one of the most effective means of the Supreme Command Headquarters Reserve.

During the defensive battles at Stalingrad, a significant number of rocket artillery units were involved, almost three times as many as they were near Moscow. Unlike the battles near Moscow, rocket artillery units near Stalingrad usually operated in full force. The regimental commanders had the opportunity to continuously lead the battles of the divisions and to use their full maneuverability and fire capabilities. Depending on the importance of the defended areas, the regiment supported from one to three rifle divisions. The divisions, leading the fighting in the main areas, reinforced 1-2 Guards mortar regiments. The army commander usually had a division or regiment of jet artillery in his reserve.



Guards mortar regiments took part in all stages of a defensive battle: they ensured military operations of forward detachments on the distant approaches to the city; destroyed the enemy troops in the areas of concentration and on the march; participated in repelling infantry attacks and armored vehicles on defensive lines around Stalingrad; carried out support of counterattacks and counterattacks of our troops. For the first time, rocket launchers were used in combat operations inside a large city.

To control parts of the reactive systems and provide them with everything necessary, two operational groups of the GMC were created at the Stalingrad and Donskoy fronts. They were headed by General A.D. Zubanov and Colonel I.A. Shamshin. The participation of rocket artillery in the defense of Stalingrad can be traced by the example of the fighting of the 83 Guards mortar regiment of Lieutenant Colonel K.T. Golubeva.

The regiment was armed with BM-8 rocket launchers mounted on T-60 tanks. A part arrived at the Stalingrad front at the time of its creation and joined the battle on the far approaches to the city, in the Chernyshevskaya region. The regiment supported the fighting of the advanced detachment of the 33rd Guards Rifle Division, and later covered with fire from its divisions the withdrawal of the army beyond the Don, provided counterattack by the 1st tank army west of Kalach. During the defense, the regiment participated in repulsing massive enemy attacks on the outer and inner contours of the city, often resorted to firing from open firing positions, and fought surrounded in the vicinity of Peskovatka and Vertyachy. But special difficulties fell on the share of the soldiers of the regiment, with the beginning of fierce battles in the city, reaching melee fights. The guards of the 83rd regiment, along with the soldiers of the 62nd Army, had to repeatedly repel the enemy’s attacks in hand-to-hand combat, and to withdraw their military equipment to a safe place under machine-gun fire. And they with honor passed through all the trials and rendered great help to the infantry in keeping the right bank of the Volga. The regiment’s divisions supported the fighting of the celebrated 13th and 37th Guards, 284th and 308th Rifle Divisions in the city center, near the station and the main crossing, defended the Red October, Barricades and STZ factories, fought on the Mamaev Kurgan.

The most distinguished in the defensive battles of the rocket artillery guard units were awarded government awards. Among them: 2 (commander Col. I.S. Yufa), 4 (Col. N.V. Vorob'ev), 5 (Col. L.3, Parnovsky), 18 (Lieutenant Colonel T.F. Chernyak), 19 (Lieutenant Colonel AI Erokhin), 93 (Lieutenant Colonel KG Serdobolsky), Guards mortar regiments.

The first period of the Great Patriotic War turned out to be the period of the greatest quantitative growth of rocket artillery. In the middle of November, 1942, more than 70% of the total number of battalions in the rocket artillery at the end of the war were in service. At the same time, along with the quantitative growth of the Guards mortar units, their qualitative composition was improved. Thus, from the 365 divisions that existed at the end of the first period, 23% were heavy divisions, 56% were divisions BM-13 and only 21% divisions BM-8.



In the same period, a great deal of experience was gained in the use of jet systems in all types of combat operations, which showed the expediency of the massive use of rocket artillery. By the beginning of the counterattack of our troops at Stalingrad, the rocket artillery was a fairly developed type of Soviet artillery, possessing great firepower and high maneuverability.



Sources:
Asheulov O. Development of the Guards mortar units in the first period of the Great Patriotic War (June 1941 - November 1942) // Homeland. 2015. No.515 (5). C.118-122.
Koroteev A., Gafarov A. Rocket weapon of victory // Flight. 2010. No.5. C. 39-45.
Degtyarev P. Formation and development of rocket artillery in the first period of the war // Militaryhistorical magazine. 1975. No. 1. S.77-81.
Vasilyev A., Mikhailov V. Rocket launchers in the Great Patriotic War. M .: Science, 1991. C.16-20.
Kuznetsov K. History of missile weapons and their combat use. M .: Military Publishing. 1972. C.118-124.
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  1. qwert
    qwert 9 February 2016 06: 56 New
    +5
    The M-30 mass of the warhead is twice as much as the artillery shell of the caliber 152 mm. To put it mildly, not frail. If I’m not mistaken, they were even launched directly from the packaging during city battles. They dragged into the house and put it on the window in the neighboring house. It turns out that in terms of using TPK (transport and launch containers), we are also ahead of the rest
    1. AK64
      AK64 9 February 2016 09: 43 New
      -1
      Look here: here's a box from which you shot

      [img] [img = | 320 Wk Spreng] http://forum.guns.ru/forums/icons/attachments/18140.jpg [/ img]


      ] media = [/ img] [/ center]

      http://forum.guns.ru/forums/icons/attachments/18140.jpg
  2. Mera joota
    Mera joota 9 February 2016 07: 20 New
    -13
    The last photo clearly demonstrates the so-called "effectiveness" of rocket artillery. It’s called “wherever I want, I’m flying there”, if at the exit from the rails the RSs fly at different angles, then what accuracy can we talk about?
    Having lost the lion's share of the Red Army artillery in the first year, there was no choice but to bet on the ersatz type BM-8 and anti-tank rifles. And now, despite the fact that it was the barrel artillery that pulled out the war, forcing the fired Wehrmacht fighters to piss (the photo that refers to this) and destroying most of the German tanks, praises are sung for some reason to “Katyushas” which incidentally ceased to exist after the war ...
    1. Pig
      Pig 9 February 2016 07: 50 New
      +4
      "by the way after the war and ceased to exist ..."
      they didn’t stop but were modified and modernized! modern MLRS is the modernized Katyusha - the principle of operation is the same
      1. Mera joota
        Mera joota 9 February 2016 09: 32 New
        -6
        Quote: Pig
        they didn’t stop but were modified and modernized!

        Only the principle of jet propulsion is common, nothing else, the Soviet post-war MLRS has "German" roots.
    2. sevtrash
      sevtrash 9 February 2016 09: 45 New
      +4
      Quote: Mera Joota
      And now, despite the fact that it was the barrel artillery that pulled out the war, forcing the fired Wehrmacht fighters to piss (the photo that refers to this) and destroying most of the German tanks, praises are sung for some reason to “Katyushas” which incidentally ceased to exist after the war ...

      I read in someone’s memoirs, if it weren’t for Konev, that when planning the artillery preparation by Soviet troops, rocket artillery was not taken into account. Developed plans, according to which for the suppression of certain goals there were standards for the number of shells of artillery shells. Reactive artillery, by accuracy, could not participate in such a case. Acted on the area.
    3. AK64
      AK64 9 February 2016 09: 49 New
      -3
      Totally agree.
      I will add that in the Soviet SD almost to the end of the war, the proportion of mortars was even by the weight of the volley, which is much higher than the "average European". (Moreover, the artillery salvo of the Soviet SD "in comparison with" was very, very small)

      As for Katyusha: The cause is apparently in the PR capabilities of Kostrikov. Katyusha - a wartime ersatz.
      The accuracy of the battle when firing from the ground was even theoretically ... vanishingly small.
    4. 3news
      3news 9 February 2016 10: 13 New
      +6
      Quote: Mera Joota
      which by the way after the war and ceased to exist ...

      Since 1944 production of a new type of RS (called TS) with oblique plumage has begun. Of course, such a rocket was far from the German Nebelwerfer (oblique nozzles), but it was already at least something. Until 1944 RS flew wherever they wanted. About. But, of course, according to the theory of probability of the enemy, they periodically found.
      But there was a significant plus in the form of a bilateral explosive detonation. Those. if the RS nevertheless flew where it should, then it hit the target well.
      There are a lot of strange things in Agitprop's choice of objects for worship. T.N. Katyusha is one of these disputed objects.
      1. Boos
        Boos 9 February 2016 15: 12 New
        +2
        They perfectly hit targets and found thanks to the effect arising from close mass explosions. In my cavitation, if anything, correct it. In terms of combat effectiveness, the Stalinist bodies were not superior to the Mets donkeys.
    5. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 9 February 2016 11: 11 New
      +7
      Quote: Mera Joota
      Having lost the lion's share of the Red Army artillery in the first year, there was no choice but to bet on the ersatz type BM-8 and anti-tank rifles.

      BM-8 was not so much. Basically there were BM-13 of various types (not in vain in 1943 it was necessary to carry out standardization and develop a “normalized” BM-13N).
      And it’s extremely difficult to call the “ersatz” of the PC, if only for the reason that the ersatz is a cheap substitute. And PCs were an extremely expensive toy:
      At a purchase price, one RS-132 was almost two HE shells of a 203 mm howitzer.
      1. Mera joota
        Mera joota 9 February 2016 11: 47 New
        +3
        Quote: Alexey RA
        And it’s extremely difficult to call the “ersatz” of the PC, if only for the reason that the ersatz is a cheap substitute. And PCs were an extremely expensive toy:
        At a purchase price, one RS-132 was almost two HE shells of a 203 mm howitzer.

        The manufacturing cost of the installation itself (and most importantly the time) was incomparably less than the cost and production time of the M-30 howitzer.
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 9 February 2016 13: 19 New
          +2
          Quote: Mera Joota
          The manufacturing cost of the installation itself (and most importantly the time) was incomparably less than the cost and production time of the M-30 howitzer.

          So what's the point of installing without shells? And each salvo BM-13 costs the state as three dozen 203-mm OFS.

          In today's times, by the way, the difference is even steeper:
          The minimum cost of a shot MLRS "Hurricane" - 220 TR
          The minimum cost of a shot MLRS "Smerch" - 1 million 800 TR
          The minimum cost of a shot "Msta-S" - 10 TR

          So MLRS - not a cheap weapon.
    6. avdkrd
      avdkrd 9 February 2016 19: 35 New
      +4
      Quote: Mera Joota
      Having lost the lion's share of the Red Army artillery in the first year, there was no choice but to bet on the ersatz type BM-8 and anti-tank rifles.

      Where do you come from? Unfortunately, anti-tank rifles were absent from the army on June 22, 1941, as it was believed that Germany had more powerful tanks (KV level). There were many errors in artillery and in the army before the war, but the PTR was by no means an ersatz, but an effective means of fighting tanks, until 1943. confidently coped with the whole menagerie, and even after a decrease in efficiency due to heavy German tanks, they found their niche. Soviet PTRs became the prototypes of modern large-caliber rifles, it was their experience of application that gave rise to the concept of antimaterial rifle. About BM-8, tell that Hans what he knows in the photo with wet pants. 82mm shells had their own niche of use, and most importantly, they were in excess.
      In the photo, shooting from closures (wooden frames). Massively used by both parties, mainly to break through the defense. Of course, both range and accuracy were not what they were, often the frames were not single, but quadrupled, and after the first rocket left the rest did not fly exactly. By the way, it was the Germans who installed such ersatz on Wurfrahmen 40 mobile platforms (determine the year by name). Soviet MLRS were much more effective, mainly due to tactics of use and mass, RS were ideal for military production. This is not called ersatz (replacement), but the best technical solution for wartime. Again, the Soviet concept of use affected the shells themselves. German turbojets were more accurate, but expensive and difficult to manufacture, which resulted in (thank God) their relatively insignificant use by the Wehrmacht compared to the SA.
      1. Stas57
        Stas57 9 February 2016 21: 19 New
        +1
        but the PTR was by no means an ersatz, but an effective means of fighting tanks, until 1943. confidently coped with the whole menagerie and even after a decrease in efficiency due to heavy German tanks, they found their niche

        these are fairy tales, even in 41 it coped only against the ganomags.

        The created film of the effectiveness of the PTR has nothing to do with reality. The problem was to ensure normal armor penetration, so the Rukavishnikov rifle was adopted in the 1939 year and removed from it in August 1940. PTR penetrated 20 mm at 500 meters, but when tested on 200 and 100 meters with an 30-mm armor plate, the PTR did not pierce it. The problem was the 14,5 mm cartridge with the B-32 bullet with a steel core. Only in August 1941 of the year (they began to produce steel from October 1941 of the year), a cartridge with a BS-41 bullet with a ceramic-metal core was adopted.
        The main reason that led them to begin mass production was not the effectiveness of the PTR, which was realized after the outbreak of war, but the need to make up for the huge losses of guns, at least something.
        PTR could hit the tank only in the side and the stern, hitting the driver and radiator. Low penetration capabilities forced to fire from the minimum distance, which was difficult psychologically. In addition, it was not enough to pierce the armor, it was necessary to get into the crew and the vital mechanisms of the machine. The calculations were very vulnerable to enemy fire.


        http://topwar.ru/4392-strelki-protiv-tankov.html

        and the sadness was absolutely sad there

        About BM-8, tell that Hans what he knows in the photo with wet pants.

        this movie is the Bridge, what can he know about the war then?

        Yu). Soviet MLRS were much more effective
        nor start an unfounded opinion

        German turbojets were more accurate, but expensive and difficult to manufacture, which resulted in (thank God) their relatively insignificant use by the Wehrmacht in comparison with the SA.

        oh yes, but soviet are free ?!
      2. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 10 February 2016 10: 28 New
        +1
        Quote: avdkrd
        Unfortunately, anti-tank rifles were absent from the army on June 22, 1941, as it was believed that Germany had more powerful tanks (KV level). There were many errors in artillery and in the army before the war, but the PTR was by no means an ersatz, but an effective means of fighting tanks, until 1943. confidently coped with the whole menagerie, and even after a decrease in efficiency due to heavy German tanks, they found their niche.

        Excuse me, why before the war the Red Army needed PTR? The Red Army, in fact, had as many as 12 anti-tank guns of 000 mm caliber.
        However, the topic of PTR before the war surfaced regularly. And also regularly stalled according to test results.
        In 1939, during tests of the captured Polish PTR, it turned out that the result of 38 penetrations of the armor was the "conditional wound" of one of the mannequins, nevertheless, the tank’s mechanisms survived the shelling. We decided to increase the caliber. We got RTR Rukavishnikov’s PTR, which in tests failed to cope with 30 mm of armor - and this is the board of a German tank.
        But even after this, the infantry was not left without anti-tank weapons of small caliber. Because KPV-41 - a heavy machine gun of Vladimirov arr. 41. And a 23 mm anti-tank anti-aircraft gun was actively developed (the disruption of work on which was one of the points in the Taubin case).
        But the war began before they were debugged and put into production. However, the KPV-41 served the front - the production of 14,5 mm rounds deployed for it supplied the whole of the war with PTR ammunition.
        1. 3news
          3news 10 February 2016 12: 03 New
          +1
          Quote: Alexey RA
          The Red Army, in fact, had as many as 12 anti-tank guns of 000 mm caliber.

          14900 pcs. 45 mm cannons in a portable version and a little more than 13100 pcs. in a self-propelled version (T-26, BT-5, BT-7) in combat condition. There were also about 150 combat-ready BT-2s with a 37-mm cannon (like the Germans had).
    7. avdkrd
      avdkrd 9 February 2016 20: 00 New
      +2
      Quote: Mera Joota
      Having lost the lion's share of the Red Army artillery in the first year, there was no choice but to bet on the ersatz type BM-8 and anti-tank rifles.

      I want to upset you about your thesis about the "ersatism" of the M-8. Directly some kind of complex you have. At the end of the war (1944), the Germans, having copied an M-8 shell along with guides (an I-beam) mounted a 48 charging launcher on the SdKfz 4 chassis and the captured French SOMUA MCL half-tracked armored vehicle and transferred it to the SS troops. It is very significant in terms of evaluating the effectiveness of these missiles by the Germans.
      1. 3news
        3news 9 February 2016 20: 12 New
        +1
        Quote: avdkrd
        At the end of the war (1944), the Germans copied the M-8 shell along with the guides (I-beam) mounted a 48 charging launcher on the SdKfz 4 chassis and the captured French SOMUA MCL half-tracked armored vehicle and transferred it to the SS troops. It is very significant in terms of evaluating the effectiveness of these missiles by the Germans.

        Where can I read about it? I am referring to the "assessment of the effectiveness of these missiles by the Germans." Because the Germans just didn’t do anything, just to use trophies. That captured shells RS-82 (M-8) could well put into action in this way. Why good disappear.
        1. avdkrd
          avdkrd 10 February 2016 01: 42 New
          0
          Quote: 3news
          Where can I read about it? I am referring to the "assessment of the effectiveness of these missiles by the Germans." Because the Germans just didn’t do anything, just to use trophies. That captured shells RS-82 (M-8) could well put into action in this way. Why good disappear.

          Google, but for trophies at 44, in the amount suitable for creating a system ... for the SS troops .... divisions ...
          In fact, the Germans made a copy of the M-8, saving time for development, since their own approach gave rise to expensive and low-tech products. For comparison, the entire range of our PCs could be done in any locksmith workshop - German turbojets required a different production culture and high accuracy
  3. semirek
    semirek 9 February 2016 07: 25 New
    +6
    The article is certainly interesting, but the author somehow abruptly begins the article: it is not known who invented the rocket launchers, what role Comrade Stalin played in their fate, and why the development of rocket launchers began exactly when the enemy approached Moscow, because they were still used at Khalkhin Gol aviation RS.YA, as you know, not a supporter of the Americans, but looking at the old newsreel with our Katyushas, ​​they mostly stand on Studebaker’s chassis, why? Some comrades constantly tell us that staffing was scanty.
    1. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 9 February 2016 11: 19 New
      +1
      Quote: semirek
      and why the development of rocket launchers began exactly when the enemy approached Moscow, because even at Khalkhin-Gol aviation aircraft were used

      Probably because in peacetime the GAU was extremely skeptical of weapons with such performance characteristics:
      2. For armor penetration of 20 mm armor plate.
      a) from a distance of 200 meters.
      5 shots were fired, while no shells hit the armor platedue to the fact that with the existing dispersion of rockets, both in distance and in the lateral direction, the probability of getting into an armored plate is extremely negligible (*). Due to the impossibility of hitting the armored plate from a distance of 200 meters, the firing range was reduced to 100 meters.

      1) The accuracy of the battle. To get 80% hit in the shield 10 x 5 mtr. at a distance of 1500 mt. required BB = WB = 1/1200 X. Missile shells currently give accuracy of the order of 1/150 X.
      Repeated quality control of manufactured rockets, batches that gave an unsatisfactory result during the accuracy test, showed that the rockets were made in full accordance with the drawing and technical conditions.
  4. parusnik
    parusnik 9 February 2016 08: 04 New
    +5
    Much is not told, but most importantly, yes .. Thank you!
  5. Bormanxnumx
    Bormanxnumx 9 February 2016 09: 04 New
    +5
    Quote: Mera Joota
    The last photo clearly demonstrates the so-called "effectiveness" of rocket artillery. It’s called “wherever I want, I’m flying there”, if at the exit from the rails the RSs fly at different angles, then what accuracy can we talk about?

    M-13 shells at a range of 3000m. the deviation from the aiming point was: lateral-57m. range-257m. The German opponent :) Nebelwerfer on 6000 m: in range - 80-100 m, side - 60-90 m.
    In 1943, a modernized version of the M-13-UK missile (improved accuracy) was developed. To increase the accuracy of firing of the M-13-UK projectile, 12 tangentially arranged holes were made in the front centering thickening of the missile part, through which part of the powder gases came out during the operation of the rocket engine, causing the projectile to rotate (German experience came in handy). The projectile range decreased somewhat (up to 7,9 km), the improvement in accuracy led to a decrease in the dispersion area and to an increase in the density of fire by 3 times in comparison with M-13 shells. The adoption of the M-13-UK shell for service took place in April 1944.
    1. Mera joota
      Mera joota 9 February 2016 09: 44 New
      +2
      Quote: BORMAN82
      M-13 shells at a range of 3000m. the deviation from the aiming point was: lateral-57m. range-257m.

      Take a photo, draw vectors from each shell and see the real dispersion.
      I repeat, the Germans were afraid of our artillery, not of fireworks.
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. Lopatov
        Lopatov 9 February 2016 10: 26 New
        +3
        At first, there was a big problem with the PC - during their transportation they did not pay much attention to impacts on the stabilizer, leading to a change in their geometry.
        Plus there were problems with uniformity in the manufacture of PC engines.

        All this was decided.
        1. AK64
          AK64 9 February 2016 11: 20 New
          -1
          At first, there was a big problem with the PC - during their transportation they did not pay much attention to impacts on the stabilizer, leading to a change in their geometry.
          Plus there were problems with uniformity in the manufacture of PC engines.

          All this was decided.

          Yeah ... Yeah ...
          In addition to transportation - a manufacturing culture. Yes, and the soldiers who were charging, too, had the habit of Ps on the ground casually throwing.

          But this is not only the case: even theoretically, the accuracy of firing winged (stabilized air) RS from the ground is stunningly low.
          When shooting from an airplane, everything is much better (in theory, at least, because nobody canceled the bent stabilizers) because there is an incoming air flow due to the movement of the aircraft. But from the ground ... from the ground the guard is simple.

          The PC made a nod at the exit from the guide - and this nod was that theoretically incorrigible (unlike theoretically correctable stabilizers) cause of dispersion.
        2. Mera joota
          Mera joota 9 February 2016 11: 54 New
          +2
          Quote: Spade
          All this was decided.

          I do not argue that the RS had their deserved place on the battlefield, but the war was won by the barrel artillery, which is really GOD OF WAR.
        3. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 9 February 2016 13: 38 New
          +1
          Quote: Spade
          At first, there was a big problem with the PC - during their transportation they did not pay much attention to impacts on the stabilizer, leading to a change in their geometry.

          1) The accuracy of the battle. To get 80% hit in the shield 10 x 5 mtr. at a distance of 1500 mt. required BB = WB = 1/1200 X. Missile shells currently give accuracy of the order of 1/150 X.
          Repeated quality control of manufactured rockets, batches that gave an unsatisfactory result during the accuracy test, showed that rockets are made in full accordance with the drawing and specifications.
      3. avdkrd
        avdkrd 9 February 2016 20: 10 New
        +4
        Quote: Mera Joota
        Quote: BORMAN82
        M-13 shells at a range of 3000m. the deviation from the aiming point was: lateral-57m. range-257m.

        Take a photo, draw vectors from each shell and see the real dispersion.
        I repeat, the Germans were afraid of our artillery, not of fireworks.

        Enough of bending over the photograph. Shooting from the ground from wooden closures was present on both sides. Missiles quite often flew away with the box and the Germans (survivors) joked that the Russians were shooting coffins again. The accuracy is of course terribly low, but this is not related to the BM-8, or 13. By the way, the RS-8 and RS-13 (like the M-8, M-13) were never shot from the ground, they used the M-31 for shooting coffins .
    2. 3news
      3news 9 February 2016 10: 20 New
      +2
      Quote: BORMAN82
      M-13 shells at a range of 3000m. the deviation from the aiming point was: lateral-57m. range-257m.

      Painfully optimistic numbers. Even for TS. What can we say about PCs?
      1. Lopatov
        Lopatov 9 February 2016 10: 33 New
        +1
        ?
        What have you been optimistic about here?
        All regularly descended RSs flew into an ellipse with a minor axis of 456 meters and a large axis of 2056 meters.

        For 3 km. range is a lot.
    3. Lopatov
      Lopatov 9 February 2016 10: 22 New
      +1
      German PCs were much more expensive. Drilling inclined holes in graphite with high accuracy is another problem ...
      Which was decided only by the Chinese.
  6. Stas57
    Stas57 9 February 2016 09: 13 New
    0
    The firing of rockets did not only cause serious damage to enemy troops, but also produced a strong moral impact on them.

    Like ours, donkeys are not uncommon in memoirs
  7. Vladycat
    Vladycat 9 February 2016 09: 39 New
    0
    I remembered about the bike. That when loading a large-caliber installation, our fighters partially did not remove the wooden box in which they were packed. So they shot. The Germans then swore that the Russians were dead, shooting with sheds. :)
  8. Nexus 6
    Nexus 6 9 February 2016 10: 14 New
    +1
    My grandfather, an artilleryman, said that barrel artillery was more accurate and efficient! Well here, of course, "corporate patriotism" was present.)
    1. Stas57
      Stas57 9 February 2016 10: 30 New
      +1
      Nothing was present, and so is the receiver - much more accurately, and most often more effective.
      Now with the RZSO there are a lot of videos from the Donbass, where the bombardment of the package by position with minimal effect.
      Although if you are lucky to get into the cluster, then the jackpot will be ripped off, definitely.
    2. The comment was deleted.
    3. AK64
      AK64 9 February 2016 11: 23 New
      +1
      My grandfather, an artilleryman, said that barrel artillery was more accurate and efficient! Well here, of course, "corporate patriotism" was present.)


      Your grandfather is absolutely right.
  9. Bormanxnumx
    Bormanxnumx 9 February 2016 10: 52 New
    -2
    Quote: Mera Joota
    Quote: BORMAN82
    M-13 shells at a range of 3000m. the deviation from the aiming point was: lateral-57m. range-257m.

    Take a photo, draw vectors from each shell and see the real dispersion.
    I repeat, the Germans were afraid of our artillery, not of fireworks.

    I beg your pardon - I’m not Kashpirovsky and ~ to heal using a photograph leaning against the TV ~ I don’t know how to dissipate RSa at a distance of 3000m from the vectors drawn in the start photo.
  10. qwert
    qwert 9 February 2016 11: 07 New
    +3
    Quote: Mera Joota
    The last photo clearly demonstrates the so-called "effectiveness" of rocket artillery. It’s called “wherever I want, I’m flying there”, if at the exit from the rails the RSs fly at different angles, then what accuracy can we talk about?

    So MLRS same. Here, without dispersion, firstly, it doesn’t work, and secondly, if there were even accuracy of shells in artillery, then they would be deliberately bred. The effectiveness of the MLRS is assessed by the KVO, but rather by the area of ​​the coverage area.
  11. qwert
    qwert 9 February 2016 11: 16 New
    0
    Quote: AK64
    As for Katyusha: The cause is apparently in the PR capabilities of Kostrikov. Katyusha - a wartime ersatz.
    The accuracy of the battle when firing from the ground was even theoretically ... vanishingly small.

    Quote: Mera Joota
    I repeat, the Germans were afraid of our artillery, not of fireworks.

    Quote: 3news
    Until 1944 RS flew wherever they wanted. About. But, of course, according to the theory of probability of the enemy, they periodically found.

    It would be nice to tell the Germans near Moscow and Stalingrad))))
    1. AK64
      AK64 9 February 2016 11: 22 New
      -2
      It would be nice to tell the Germans near Moscow and Stalingrad))))

      That is, there is nothing to say on the topic?

      What you ... dim and not smart.

      Tell us about the quality of the Soviet gun to those who used it, huh? Especially those who did not survive as a result.

      Where do people like you come from?
      1. Flatter
        Flatter 9 February 2016 15: 05 New
        0
        I would like to remind you that during the Second World War artillery fire was always completed by Katyush volleys. It is clear why, and the effectiveness of this, apparently, was tested by experience.
    2. nimboris
      nimboris 20 February 2016 09: 39 New
      0
      Especially Guderian near Mtsensk in 1941, who got the teeth from Katyusha.
  12. The comment was deleted.
  13. Bormanxnumx
    Bormanxnumx 9 February 2016 11: 53 New
    +1
    Quote: 3news
    Painfully optimistic numbers. Even for TS. What can we say about PCs?
    Quote: qwert
    Quote: Mera Joota
    The last photo clearly demonstrates the so-called "effectiveness" of rocket artillery. It’s called “wherever I want, I’m flying there”, if at the exit from the rails the RSs fly at different angles, then what accuracy can we talk about?

    So MLRS same. Here, without dispersion, firstly, it doesn’t work, and secondly, if there were even accuracy of shells in artillery, then they would be deliberately bred. The effectiveness of the MLRS is assessed by the KVO, but rather by the area of ​​the coverage area.

    CVO and effective lesion area are closely connected :))
    https://u.dirty.ru/chto-nuzhno-chtoby-pritselno-streliat-iz-grada-s-20-km-574966
    /
    the article shows how the calculated deviations in range and lateral affect the formation of a full projectile dispersion ellipse in a salvo. Regarding the ellipse of dispersion of the salvo of the RS m-13 at a range of 3000 m in size roughly 2000x500 m, the distinguished Lopatov indicated above.
  14. qwert
    qwert 9 February 2016 14: 55 New
    0
    Quote: AK64
    That is, there is nothing to say on the topic?

    Well, why is there nothing here:
    The range of the M-13 projectile reached 8470 m, but there was a very significant dispersion. According to the 1942 firing tables of the year, with 3000 m firing range, the lateral deviation was 51 m, and in range - 257 m. Of course, in the D-30 howitzer, this figure will be 5,5x6m. But we never compare accuracy for example AKM and SVD. Especially when firing from an AKM fire. Each kind of artillery. And as for universality, this has already passed in the thirties. However, back to Katyusha
    In 1943, a modernized version of the rocket was developed, which received the designation M-13-UK (improved accuracy). To increase the accuracy of firing of the M-13-UK projectile in the front centering bulge of the missile part, 12 of tangentially arranged holes were made through which part of the powder gases escaped during the operation of the rocket engine, causing the projectile to rotate. Although the projectile range decreased slightly (up to 7,9 km), an improvement in accuracy resulted in a decrease in dispersion area and an increase in fire density in 3 times compared to M-13 shells.
    And in general, logically, how can shooting at 3000 meters result in an ellipse in range of 2000 meters?
    1. AK64
      AK64 9 February 2016 15: 09 New
      -4
      Well, why is there nothing here:
      The range of the M-13 projectile reached 8470 m, but there was a very significant dispersion. According to the 1942 firing tables of the year, with 3000 m firing range, the lateral deviation was 51 m, and in range - 257 m.


      This is a lie. Feed your wranbey onwards.
      1. alex86
        alex86 9 February 2016 20: 17 New
        0
        This is not a lie.
  15. yury74
    yury74 9 February 2016 16: 16 New
    +2
    It seems that most of you have made a time jump and found yourself on the sidelines of that Great War .... Weapons were born in such a short time, which you don’t even have to dream about now ... It’s been rolled in not at test sites, but at terrible and fierce enemy .... It helped to defeat our grandfathers and fathers, helped .... So with his criticism more modest ..........
  16. glasha3032
    glasha3032 9 February 2016 16: 31 New
    0
    I’ve been tormented by the question for a long time, maybe someone knows: how were the rockets mounted on the Katyusha rails, and even from the bottom?
    1. igordok
      igordok 9 February 2016 18: 05 New
      0
      T-shaped opening. Subtleties in the manual - 12-13 p.
      BM-13. Fighting vehicles BM-13N, BM-13NM, BM-13NMM. Service Guide. 3 Edition. 1974 (djvu) - https://yadi.sk/i/ijGo3lSToZQxu
      1. glasha3032
        glasha3032 11 February 2016 02: 07 New
        0
        Thank you! I somehow did not realize that everything can be found on the Internet.
  17. Technical engineer
    9 February 2016 17: 00 New
    +1
    Quote: semirek
    The article is interesting, of course, but the author begins the article as something steep: it is not known who the inventors of the rocket launchers are, what role did Stalin play in their fate, and why the development of rocket launchers began exactly when the enemy approached Moscow, because even at Khalkhin Gol they used Aviation RS.

    Quote: parusnik
    Much is not told, but most importantly, yes .. Thank you!

    The article as a whole was conceived in accordance with the title. On the history of the creation of the RSs in the Soviet Union, the creators, the use in aviation and in the navy, I think it is worth telling in separate articles. And in general, there are such plans.
    1. mine
      mine 12 February 2016 23: 15 New
      0
      Quote: Technical Engineer
      And in general, there are such plans.

      those. the crap will screech, and the afftor will smack her further ...

      Monsieur Inzhiner, - look at Yakovlev, that he had written about this in his memoirs ... - ONE, but EXCLUSIVE phrase

      maybe after that comes the "price" of YOUR "pipax"
  18. Bormanxnumx
    Bormanxnumx 10 February 2016 21: 41 New
    0
    Quote: AK64
    Well, why is there nothing here:
    The range of the M-13 projectile reached 8470 m, but there was a very significant dispersion. According to the 1942 firing tables of the year, with 3000 m firing range, the lateral deviation was 51 m, and in range - 257 m.


    This is a lie. Feed your wranbey onwards.

    Give the correct, in your opinion, data.
  19. Rosinmn
    Rosinmn 11 February 2016 17: 00 New
    0
    The disputants do not attach their arguments to the combat mission.

    1. If it is necessary to destroy the barn in the visibility zone or with the help of a spotter, the gun gives two sighting shots: under-flight - and the barn is hit with a third shot. The rolling one will put shells at a distance of 100 meters from each other and, even if the shed enters the ellipse zone, the barn is likely to remain unharmed. The walls will simply be cut with fragments.

    2. Moving targets: infantry, cavalry, vehicles - after the first shot they will scatter to the sides and cannon fire across the squares will be extremely inefficient. Rolling on the contrary, the very first shot can cause significant damage. If it gets.

    3. When firing at closed moving targets, guns are generally ineffective. Suppose, the data came that the enemy train is unloaded at the train station. Where to shoot? Maybe they are not unloaded at the station, but on the siding? Maybe they have already unloaded and went to the meadow to prepare for the campaign, maybe they went to the village to the well? At the very first shots, the command “Scatter, gather two kilometers east in the meadow” will go. Damage in this case can only give a volley Katyusha. A volley of one Katyusha covers an area of ​​half a kilometer for half a kilometer. In this zone, many will be killed or injured. There will be few unranked. Katyushas don't need an ellipse better than a few hundred meters. Remember Volnovakha in Ukraine? The salvo lay down in front of the post of the Ukrainian Army, without causing harm to the post. The distance between the explosions was 50 meters. If the accuracy were worse, then the post would also be affected. There was one explosion by the bus, next to the post. People died, but it was most likely a mine at the side of the road. I can’t believe that a missile that fell 12 meters doesn’t even hit glass. Participants in the war said that the Katyusha shell, which fell into the tank, tore down his tower ...

    4. Attack. Hourly processing of advanced enemy cannons will allow the enemy to unravel the plan and tighten reserves at the expected breakout site. In addition, accuracy is absolutely not needed. Guns hit the squares. But, if you handle trenches with guns (which Katyusha is not capable of because of the large dispersion of shells), so that the infantry attacks the trenches, advancing abroad, and treat the enemy’s rear rear several kilometers deep at that time with several dozen Katyushas, ​​then the infantry, advancing behind the fire shaft, he will have time to go behind the enemy lines, which physically will not be able to tighten reserves during this time.

    In the reports, as I recall, it was said about Katyush firing at clusters of enemy troops. War is not a game of static soldiers. Often you have to figure out the probability and give a volley over the areas. Rolling in this are indispensable.