Military Review

Soviet ingolin torpedo 53-57

30



October 10 1957 of the year passed the first tests of a national torpedo with a nuclear warhead from a submarine. Our fleet received a substantial argument at sea in a dispute over maritime rule in front of a likely adversary. An experienced atomic version of the 53-57 torpedo, launched from the C-144 submarine of the 613 project, having traveled 10 kilometers, exploded at a depth of 35 meters. The result of the explosion was the sinking of two destroyers, two submarines and two minesweepers. There were no more ships in the bay, otherwise they would have been carried into the depths of the sea. Understanding the importance of new weapons, which can determine the result not of a separate sea battle, but of an entire operation, already in 1958, the Navy adopts the 53-57 torpedo with the RDS-9 nuclear warhead and assigns it the 53-58 cipher. However, it is worth noting that the 53-57 torpedo was a step forward in the development of domestic torpedo weapons, not only because of the possibility of using a nuclear weapon, but also thanks to a promising and unusual for that time, peroxide-hydrogen powerplant.

During the First World War, when the fleets were armed with mostly Whitehead gas-vapor self-propelled mines, their significant drawbacks were revealed: short range and speed, visual trace, low reliability and a number of others. Therefore, in the interwar period, the efforts of torpedo builders were aimed at eliminating these shortcomings and, in particular, at finding new power plants for torpedoes.

As one of the solutions, it was supposed to replace compressed air as an oxidizer of the fuel with more active oxygen, obtained by decomposition of hydrogen peroxide. For this, the so-called low-water hydrogen peroxide (MPV) was used, in which the concentration of hydrogen peroxide reached 83%. In the process of decomposition of 1 kg MPV 0,47 kg of free oxygen, water and 197,5 KJ of heat were released.

At that stage, at the beginning of the thirties, German scientists achieved the greatest success. Professor G. Walter patented in Germany a promising way of using MPV for this purpose. Based on the serial piston gas-vapor torpedoes G7-a (letter G means torpedo caliber - 21 inch or 533 mm, and the 7 figure - its length in meters), having 30 km speed and 8 km range, 1939 - 1940 years. They created its modernized version, which received the G7-uk code and the everyday name Ingolin torpedo.

Sea tests showed the stability of the thermal process in its power plant, but the speed of the torpedo was insufficient due to the low power of the piston engine. And although work was going on in parallel to use oxygen-enriched air as an oxidizing agent, as well as electricity (respectively torpedoes of the G7-c and G7-c1 types), fulfilling the order of the German fleet, the company "Walter" has widely launched work to improve, test and manufacture its torpedoes. For this, a special factory was built in Arensburg, near Hamburg, designed to produce 2 thousand torpedoes per year; attracted about 20 counterparty enterprises and a large number of large specialists and scientists. Field tests entrusted the torpedo institute in Eckernfjord.

A new version of this torpedo, the "fish" (code G7-ut), was developed in 1941 year. It used an active-type single-shaft turbine designed for 430 horsepower, with a gearbox that reduced the rotor speed of the turbine from 25000 to 1670 rpm on two propellers of opposite rotation. Debugging of these torpedoes was carried out before the 1942 year. The most reliable option turned out to be developed on the theme "Stone Bass". This torpedo had a length of 7,18 m, a mass of 1680 kg and a negative buoyancy at the beginning of the course 380 kg. In the spring of 1944, their serial production began.



The scope of field tests can be judged by the fact that in 1944, about 1000 rounds of ingolin torpedoes of various types were fired. However, only 30% of them showed full compliance with the requirements, 35% did not fulfill one of the requirements when passing a given distance, 22% had defects that led to "no income", and explosions occurred on 1%. This gave German specialists the opportunity to deeply understand the shortcomings of the design of torpedoes of this type. However, not all of them could be eliminated in a short time. In addition, the Walter firm’s desire to take a monopoly position in the creation of ingolin torpedoes negatively influenced the business, taking into their own hands not only their production and testing, but also all the scientific work on this topic. This was opposed by representatives of the torpedo institute in Eckernfjord, who also had extensive experience in working out torpedoes, both steam and gas, and electric ones. Representatives of the Navy were very worried about the explosiveness of the Walter torpedoes, and therefore, the company's chief designer said: "If the Navy had invented a bicycle, this invention would not have been in the public domain for security reasons today."

Germany’s unfavorable situation on the fronts forced us to force these works to the maximum. The imperial minister of weapons, Speer, even introduced the post of "ingolin dictator" to decide on the sequence of their execution. All specialists were redeployed for revision and development of these torpedoes, and a number of promising developments in other torpedo-building areas were discontinued. It bore some fruit. Ingolin torpedoes were rapidly developed, helped by the high production culture in the German industry, especially in the manufacture of chemically pure components (in particular, the catalyst) and the assembly of turbines and ballasts. However, all these measures turned out to be overdue and, despite the enormous intellectual and material costs, the ingolin torpedoes were not fully developed, and therefore did not enter into service with the German fleet until the end of the war.

After the defeat of Germany, work at the torpedo institute in Eckernfjord did not stop until November 1945 of the year, but now the German specialists have already worked under the supervision of the military representatives of the United States and England. Moreover, the latter did not introduce the materials on these works to their ally, the USSR. True, our leadership also sent its specialists to Germany, including to study the experience of using MPV for military purposes. There are employees of the Main Department of the Sudprom. Volin, D.A. Kokryakov, V.V. Lavrentiev, S.I. Litvinov, V.V. Tkachenko, I.A. Starlings and others collected, systematized and studied the available material on this issue. In addition, on reparations, part of the documentation for the ingoline torpedoes, some of their incomplete material parts, separate booths and equipment were sent to the USSR, where several German specialists in naval technology were also sent.

By that time, we also decided to create models of naval weapons based on the use of MPV. A specialized enterprise was established on the basis of the Ostechbureau in the city of Lomonosov, whose director was appointed M.P. Maximov, chief engineer and chief designer - D.A. Kokryakova, head of the department - A.I. Tarasov. It should be repeated once again that the most comprehensive materials on the latest German developments in this field, in particular on the Kamenny Kit torpedo, and the main specialists of this direction turned out to be from the allies, and the German engineers who arrived in the USSR were not sufficiently competent in this business, or did not want to fully share their secrets.

As a result, Soviet engineers faced a difficult task. It was necessary to study the scattered Germanic materials and samples, find out the defects of ingolin torpedoes that did not allow the Germans to adopt them, and taking into account our pre-war developments, for example, turbine torpedoes of Professor Uvarov and the Water torpedoes, which were not completed due to the start of the war, create a reliable and effective peroxide-hydrogen torpedo. For this it was necessary: ​​to find out and eliminate the causes of the explosions of such torpedoes; to work out the thermal process in the engine using outboard seawater; achieve a satisfactory progress of the torpedo on the circulation; build stands and equip bases for testing; to coordinate the issues of the operation of peroxide-hydrogen torpedoes in the naval conditions and on the bases of the Navy weapons.

In 1950, the construction of sites for the preparation and conduct of marine tests of these torpedoes at the Gidropribor plant (Theodosia) began. It was necessary to build, in particular, a special storage facility for the MPV, a chemical laboratory, special stands and a scow for shooting.

In the same year, the first trial test of the combustion chamber with the systems for supplying power components according to the "MPV - fuel - liquid catalyst" scheme ended with an explosion at the plant's stand. As the analysis has shown, this was due to the slow arrival of the igniter into the chamber. In the future, the installation of additional recording equipment made it possible to quickly identify the causes of failures during testing and to achieve the necessary sequence of energy components entering the chamber, as well as to work out the nozzle designs that provide the required spray angles for complete mixing of the components. The transition to another scheme "MPV - fuel - kerosene brand UU" using a liquid igniter and fresh water was made.

After conducting more than 30 tests using this technique, they were transferred to the sighting station in Feodosia. There, in October 1951, a batch of six experimental torpedoes was sent. They were a lightweight (mostly due to their non-refueling components) variant of the developed torpedoes, which ensured the range to 1000 m. The first sea test (in torpedo terminology - braking test) was carried out in March 1952. The torpedo successfully passed a given distance, and its normal start, depth and roll, and most importantly - tracelessness were noted! The latter circumstance was confirmed during the control from the shore of the support ships and the aircraft.

Soviet ingolin torpedo 53-57


The result was confirmed by four more shots, after which they decided to go to the so-called military signboard. However, the torpedo explosion in the launch pad grill, which occurred in May 1952 of the year and led to its drowning (fortunately, according to the safety instructions, the shooting team was on the boat), forced to return to the idea of ​​using a solid catalyst and continuing brake tests.

In accordance with the assignment, they were carried out in seawater, which was first fed into the combustion chamber by displacing it from the tanks, because the corresponding pump with a capacity of 2 l / s, operating at 45 atm. At the time, this was a serious problem. It should be noted that the main difficulty in the use of sea water in torpedoes, noted by domestic developers even before the war, was scaling. Having set itself the goal of eliminating this phenomenon, it was established experimentally that, at a certain temperature regime maintained in all zones of the flow of the working fluid, there is no scaling; moreover, the salts dissolve in a pair that has a moisture content of 95% at a pressure of 30 – 32 atm and a temperature of 235 ° C, and the ratio of components (“kerosene - MPV - water”) should be 1: 6: 15, respectively.

At the same time, the GIPH, together with NIMTI, carried out work on finding a catalyst for the preliminary decomposition of MPV before mixing it with kerosene. And although it was possible to develop a solid catalyst relatively quickly, until its final implementation, it was decided to continue using liquid catalyst and fresh water to study ballistics and gain experience in operating peroxide-hydrogen torpedoes. Such tests continued until November 1952.

By that time, two experimental torpedoes with a solid catalyst had been prepared, and in December 1952 of the year fired the first shot at a distance of 7000 m. Later on, they completed another sea test around 70. But in July 1953, a torpedo explosion at a distance of a stroke revealed a new danger: the accumulation of MPV between the shell and the tank body, its drainage to the stern and rapid decomposition with an explosion, in contact with the hot walls of the combustion chamber and the nozzle box. Such phenomena occurred during the work of German specialists, the relevant documents noted the explosiveness of torpedoes when passing a certain distance.

This required reworking the casing and the device for flushing the MPV supply line — from the tank to the combustion chamber, although the intensive cooling of the hot chamber and the nozzle box should have reduced the turbine economy.

Another problem manifested itself already in ballistic tests. When moving torpedoes on circulation, the results obtained by German specialists were confirmed: when turning, the radius of which was 70 m, which was 2 times less than on other domestic torpedoes, the torpedo was either buried in the ground, or jumped out to the surface. Soviet specialists managed to understand the reason for this behavior. As a result, the domestic torpedo managed to avoid creating a special roll-leveling mechanism, which German specialists had to use, and ensure a steady progress along a given trajectory: shooting at an angle, movement with a long and short zigzag, etc.



So most of the task was successfully solved. Meanwhile, a design team led by N.P. Volkova prepared the technical documentation for the release of an experimental batch of torpedoes and developed the technology for their manufacture. It should be noted that at that time only plants of the Ministry could produce a turbine section of torpedoes aviation industry, but even there faced the difficulty of manufacturing helical gears of the gearbox, which had to withstand a peripheral speed of 50 m / s. A similar value for aircraft engines then reached 20 m / s.

Yet in 1954, an experimental batch of torpedoes in the amount of 10 units was manufactured. Having first received the DBT cipher (“Far-field, traceless torpedo”), it absorbed the ideas and achievements obtained during all the tests. Among them are: tanks of maximum capacity, washed compartments, pumping supply of seawater outboard water driven by a turbine, preliminary decomposition of hard liquids by the solid catalyst, use of contact and non-contact fuses, etc.

Braking torpedoes from the pilot batch was completed only in April 1955. The delay was due to the need to eliminate the causes of the non-return valves, as well as the self-oscillations of the water flow regulator, which reduced the output power of the engine. Then, until October, they were engaged in the adjustment of an experimental batch. And here a new phenomenon was discovered, the study and elimination of the influence of which required a whole quarter.

So, when shooting at full range, after passing about one-third of the distance, a torrent appeared in the torpedo (German experts also noted this). She swayed more and more, could not stand the depth, scoured the course, and then lost controllability. The complexity of solving this problem was aggravated by the fact that this phenomenon was not observed on all torpedoes of the party (it did not appear at all on the stand when checking control devices). Therefore, at first it was assumed that the cause of the buildup is the oscillation of the power components in the liquid mirror reservoirs as they are consumed. The assumption was not confirmed, and the buildup was eliminated by replacing the maneuvering device, developed on the basis of captured documents, similar to a serial domestic device. However, further studies have shown that such a buildup was caused by the inclination of the gyroscope axis due to the increased vibration of the torpedo body at the installation site of the device, to which our device was less sensitive.

After the elimination of this defect, the tests were successful, including from submarines, since the torpedo was designed for them (PL Ave 613, 633 and 641).



However, the Navy proposed to conduct firing from surface torpedo tubes. The first shots from torpedo boats of the Ave 123-K and 183 were carried out at their full speed with the settings of the rudders, similar to those on the serial domestic combined-cycle torpedoes. Thus, we wanted to choose the time of the engine starting deceleration, at which its work would begin, of course, after landing. This was caused by the fear that when starting the engine in the air section of the trajectory, the turbine could go astray.

The results of the first tests turned out to be negative: the torpedo went into a deep “bag” (16 — 20 m) with a large alternating roll, and then jumped out onto the surface, flying through the air 30 — 50 m. revolutions of the turbine, although the destruction of the material part did not occur. A change in the rudder settings, a delay in the disclosure of additional horizontal stabilizers, and the introduction of an elastic coupling between the hydrostat and the pendulum did not lead to positive results. The solution was found in the analysis of one of the non-award tests, when, as a result of a failure of the deceleration system, the engine started on the air portion of the trajectory and the torpedo entered the water with the engine already running and the propellers rotating. In this case, it quickly leveled in depth and roll, making a very small "bag." It turned out that the action of force on the propellers that work when water is flowed at a significant angle of attack, which is well known in theory, “worked”. She stabilized the torpedo after landing.

After that, the bench experimentally determined the rate of refueling torpedoes with oxidizer and fuel, as well as the time required to slow down the engine to avoid unwanted "abandonment" of its speed. These experiments required the rapid creation of home-made devices that record changes in the parameters of the engine state in the interval 1 — 2. Today, it’s curious that when firing a torpedo boat, which was moving at a speed of 40 units, the staff of the design bureau was assigned to monitor the engine start, tied to the bollard in its nose.

After shooting torpedoes from torpedo boats and introducing corrections to slowing the launch of a torpedo engine, depending on the height of the firing ship, the DBT torpedo was shot down from the EM of 30-bis and 56. These tests revealed insufficient rigidity of the sliding feathers of the tail section and excessive elasticity of the mechanical transmission of control actions to the rudders of the torpedo, which required some changes in the design of its tail section.



The state tests completed in 1957 year showed that the new combined-cycle torpedo fully complies with the tactical and technical requirements presented, has good reliability, high accuracy of travel in the direction both to the full forward range and at different trajectories of movement. This was especially emphasized by the chairman of the selection committee, the then commander of the Black Sea Fleet. According to the accepted methodology, the combat use of the torpedo was tested by shooting it in full equipment at the rock (inertial fuse) and at the barge-target (non-contact fuse). After that, the torpedo was adopted under the code "T 53-57", and it became the ancestor of a whole series of peroxide-hydrogen torpedoes of our fleet.



Sources:
Shirokorad A. B. Weapons of the domestic fleet. 1945 — 2000. Minsk: Harvest; M .: ACT, 2001. C. 295-297.
Kolyadin P. Notes of the military representative. Internet edition. 2010. C. 4-8.
Chechot O. Peroxide-hydrogen torpedoes // Sea collection. 1996. No.11. C. 62-66.
Dotsenko V. History naval art. Volume II. Fleets of the twentieth century. Book 2. M .: Eksmo. 2003. C. 346-349
Karpenko A. The fate of the nuclear supertorpedy // Military-industrial courier. No. 42 (459). 24 October 2012 of the year.
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  1. tux
    tux 4 February 2016 06: 10
    11
    Thanks to the author! As always interesting and informative! Keep it up!
    Your regular reader.
  2. magician
    magician 4 February 2016 06: 28
    +8
    Thank! A very interesting topic, I look forward to continuing!
    1. mine
      mine 4 February 2016 16: 57
      -6
      Quote: wizard
      I look forward to continuing!

      God forbid ...
      this "Ynzhyner" (unable to even carefully read the sources to which he refers and from where he rolled "scraps" into his opus) "will write more" wassat
  3. kuz363
    kuz363 4 February 2016 06: 48
    -17 qualifying.
    According to the experts' conclusion, such a peroxide torpedo ("fat girl") was the cause of the death of Kursk, and not only the official conclusion, which many criticize, but also of real professionals. In those distant years of the collapse, there was no proper control over the state of the torpedo in the fleet, the term expired its suitability, the boat's crew had never been trained in firing such specific torpedoes, the high-pressure air lines of the boat were not cleaned of dust, moisture, oil, and they shouldn't have relied on it. ”An extremely unreliable and dangerous weapon even for the boat itself.
    1. Wheel
      Wheel 4 February 2016 07: 24
      12
      Quote: kuz363
      its expiration date has expired, the crew of the boat has never been trained to fire with such specific torpedoes, the high-pressure air lines of the boat were not cleaned of dust, moisture, oil.

      Yeah, and the torpedo and its designers are to blame for all of the above ... belay
    2. Amurets
      Amurets 4 February 2016 08: 31
      +7
      Quote: kuz363
      Extremely unreliable and dangerous weapons, even for the boat itself.

      And the Japanese have been developing oxygen torpedoes since 1916. This is a link. Or you can simply drive it into a search engine: Japanese torpedoes: type 93 or type 94. So the Japanese torpedoes worked on pure oxygen.
      http://wunderwafe.ru/WeaponBook/Jap_Cr_1/67.htm
      And about Kursk, look at the French investigation film where the metal structures of the 1st compartment of Kursk are bent, you will understand a lot.
    3. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 4 February 2016 11: 25
      +8
      Quote: kuz363
      In those distant years of the collapse of the fleet, there was no proper control over the condition of the torpedo, its shelf life expired, the crew of the boat never learned to fire such specific torpedoes, the high-pressure air lines of the boat were not cleaned of dust, moisture, oil. And in vain they relied on her. Extremely unreliable and dangerous weapons, even for the boat itself.

      With exactly the same arguments, you can remove SLBMs with SSBNs (especially liquid ones). Or rechargeable batteries. Or the system of Loch. Because any submarine is crammed with systems that are potentially dangerous and unreliable without proper EU and maintenance by trained personnel.

      Especially in your message, I am glad that the crew of the Kursk, which went to the DB, did not learn how to handle their second main weapon - long-range "thick" torpedoes. But the torpedo designers are to blame for this. belay
      1. Andrey77
        Andrey77 4 February 2016 13: 48
        +4
        Well, torpedo designers cannot yet completely exclude the human factor. That someone too smart of the warhead-3 will start repairing a damaged torpedo in the compartment ...
        1. KVIRTU
          KVIRTU 5 February 2016 00: 28
          0
          Discussed: http://topwar.ru/29752-est-li-torpeda-opasnee-shkvala.html
    4. mine
      mine 4 February 2016 16: 55
      +8
      Quote: kuz363
      In those distant years of the collapse of the fleet, there was no proper control over the state of the torpedo

      if you are talking about 65-75A at the Northern Fleet, then before the start of their re-development, the "Gidropribor" group worked there to train specialists

      Quote: kuz363
      expired

      lie

      Quote: kuz363
      the crew of the boat was never trained in firing such specific torpedoes

      lie


      Quote: kuz363
      high-pressure air lines of the boat were not cleaned from dust, moisture, oil

      "I did not hold a candle in the north", but I (at the Pacific Fleet), despite the most "hungry years" when doing repairs, everything is appropriate. the systems underwent maintenance and obesity (and the relatively rich Techupr paid for this)

      Quote: kuz363
      And in vain they relied on her

      It's a pity that the DST was not accepted (especially considering its technical specifications), but in the situation of the late 90s it was the only torpedo "long arm" of the Navy

      Quote: kuz363
      Extremely unreliable and dangerous weapons, even for the boat itself.

      another lie (and what is 65-76A I know not only from the technical descriptions, but also "quite to myself" in the compartment - they were operated STAFFLY at the Pacific Fleet)

      there was only one weak knot in 65-76А - a two-component pump, came from rocket launchers and the chalk was not an adequate resource for a practical option (i.e., after a good practical shot, it had to be changed)
      1. Alexey RA
        Alexey RA 4 February 2016 17: 11
        0
        Ohhh ... and here the heavy artillery pulled up. smile
      2. Amurets
        Amurets 5 February 2016 01: 21
        0
        Quote: mina
        there was only one weak knot in 65-76А - a two-component pump, came from rocket launchers and the chalk was not an adequate resource for a practical option (i.e., after a good practical shot, it had to be changed)

        That's right. This pump was designed only for the duration of the rocket engine and was destroyed along with the stage of the rocket on which it stood.
    5. mine
      mine 4 February 2016 18: 20
      -1
      Quote: kuz363
      Just according to the conclusion of specialists

      CONSEQUENCES

      but what SPECIALS think is the subject of a separate discussion;)
  4. qwert
    qwert 4 February 2016 07: 30
    15
    Quote: kuz363
    And in vain they relied on her. Extremely unreliable and dangerous weapons, even for the boat itself.

    Strange, but according to the same specialists, for the entire operation of these torpedoes there was only one accident (!!!) in 1975, and that was due to violation of storage and operation conditions. After Kursk, the most powerful torpedoes of 65cm caliber were removed from the armament of domestic submarines, that is, they deprived them of powerful weapons sharpened against aircraft carriers. It is worth knowing that conventional torpedoes of 533mm caliber require 10-12 pieces to ensure the destruction of an aircraft carrier, and only 650-2 torpedoes of 3 mm caliber. In addition, these torpedoes had more than double the range. The speed of the peroxide-kerosene torpedoes of the caliber reached 69 knots, compared to the usual 45-50 knots. According to the French, Kursk was rammed, and the hysteria and the unwinding of the version of the unreliability of peroxide-kerosene torpedoes allowed the United States to cut the long arms of the Russian submarine fleet. By the way, the Shkval has a range of 10 km. Approaching such a "pistol shot" to an aircraft carrier is much more difficult than shmalnu from 50 km range. Moreover, it is also much easier to slap 2 missiles into the side than 10.
    1. Wheel
      Wheel 4 February 2016 08: 09
      +2
      Quote: qwert
      By the way, Flurry has a range of 10km.

      To one more word, "Shkval" was also removed from service in the early 90s ...
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 4 February 2016 11: 36
      +5
      Quote: qwert
      Strange, but according to the same experts, there was only one accident (!!!) in 1975 during the entire operation of these torpedoes, which happened due to violation of the storage and operation conditions.

      EMNIP, on Bigler wrote that the main problem of the peroxide torpedoes was that with them in no case it was impossible to depart from the instructions and rules.
      While "below" they were strictly observed, while "in the middle" their observance was monitored, and while "above" they understood that any non-observance of the rules would inevitably lead to a catastrophe and their observance was not a whim of the commander, but a vital necessity - the torpedo was completely reliable and safe.
      1. mine
        mine 4 February 2016 17: 57
        +3
        well, the main "problem" in operation was their loading (unloading) :)
        - because it was necessary to very accurately set the yoke along the central heating line (due to the presence of a free surface of peroxide in an extended oxidizer tank)
        :)
    3. mine
      mine 4 February 2016 16: 47
      0
      Quote: qwert
      The speed of peroxide-kerosene torpedoes of caliber reached 69 knots

      only here in the ammunition, NOT ONE of the 300-400 order of the 53-65 torpedoes fired was NOT A DAY, and the ONE Navy firing (at the Black Sea Fleet, with the 613 project) ended in EXPLOSION in the order of development immediately after leaving TA
  5. papik09
    papik09 4 February 2016 08: 43
    +5
    Quote: Wheel
    Quote: kuz363
    its expiration date has expired, the crew of the boat has never been trained to fire with such specific torpedoes, the high-pressure air lines of the boat were not cleaned of dust, moisture, oil.

    Yeah, and the torpedo and its designers are to blame for all of the above ... belay

    Yeah, here in Ukraine (I write "v", because Ukraine is "in f @ ne") they say: "Who is guilty? Nevysta. That її is dumb in the house ?! And there is a spіdnytsya hanging ..."
  6. Volzhanin
    Volzhanin 4 February 2016 11: 36
    +4
    Nuclear torpedoes are our everything.
    Country marine americedia and small britain. Japs too.
    It remains to improve the delivery vehicles, the torpedoes themselves and increase their number.
    They are not limited to any contract.
    Checkmate.
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 4 February 2016 13: 59
      +1
      Torpedoes SBN - tactical nuclear weapons of the sea. Those. in fact, to achieve what the Strategic Missile Forces could not hit in the first hour of Armagedon. Why this is all of us is incomprehensible.
  7. Resistance
    Resistance 4 February 2016 13: 46
    +4
    Quote: Alexey RA
    Especially in your message, I am glad that the crew of the Kursk, which went to the DB, did not learn how to handle their second main weapon - long-range "thick" torpedoes. But the torpedo designers are to blame for this.


    Right. For 949, 949A, the peroxide torpedo is alien. I won’t write further ...
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 4 February 2016 14: 02
      +1
      You can continue. Just do not understand.
    2. Alexey RA
      Alexey RA 4 February 2016 15: 17
      +2
      Quote: Persistence
      Right. For 949, 949A, the peroxide torpedo is alien.

      That is, a 650-mm TA at 949 / 949A was needed only for PLUR?
      Then everything becomes even sadder ... but the main problem is still not in the design of the torpedo.
      1. mine
        mine 4 February 2016 16: 39
        +2
        at 949, DST (65cm) and UGST (53cm) (which is not "Physicist", now forgotten "Tapir") were originally supposed to come
        1. Alexey RA
          Alexey RA 4 February 2016 17: 12
          0
          Thanks for the information!
      2. mine
        mine 4 February 2016 17: 51
        0
        taking into account only 2 THAT 65 cm on 949A, of course, PLUR is needed there (because the effectiveness of 86Р was much higher than 83РН)
    3. mine
      mine 4 February 2016 16: 41
      0
      and do not, for you do not know ...
      56-76A were routinely "registered" with, EMNIP, order 617 (with all accompanying modifications)
    4. mine
      mine 4 February 2016 17: 52
      -1
      for 949 - yes (DST was "registered" there)
      but for 949A, 65-76A (as well as DST) was already regularly prescribed
  8. sub307
    sub307 4 February 2016 15: 21
    +3
    In the photo, the submarines (including the model) 641B of the project, the one that is "natural" is B-307 (in the museum of Togliatti). I know for sure because he himself served on it since its launch in Sormovo in 1980.
    And torpedoes 53-57 (58) ..., well, they were "loaded" on board (2 "pieces" with nuclear warheads) before military service, or combat duty. They were not stored on the shelves, they were immediately placed in the lower torpedo tubes, away from the surface ..., probably, so that the "foes" have difficulties in determining: why are we so "interesting" going. Ah ..., I remembered: our miner called them "TV-13". We had no problems with these torpedoes.
    1. mine
      mine 4 February 2016 17: 49
      0
      Quote: sub307
      And torpedoes 53-57 (58) ..., well, they were "loaded" on board (2 "pieces" with nuclear warheads) before military service, or combat duty.

      53-57 (like 53-58) in 80x you physically could no longer load
      53-65К (or SAET-60М)
    2. mine
      mine 4 February 2016 18: 12
      0
      you already had 53-65К (or SAET-60М)
  9. mine
    mine 4 February 2016 16: 44
    0
    to the author of KOL, for "looking into a book - sees a fig":
    - shooting from the nuclear warhead in 1957. performed 53-58 - OXYGEN;
    - to consider BRAKE tests for "sea" - this is how you need to "smoke" ...
    (the list is far from complete)

    those. this affftor did not even bother to carefully read what is referenced
  10. mine
    mine 4 February 2016 17: 04
    +1
    Well, and another comment - in the style of a "cold shower" by "Marine Engineering":
    1. 53-57 is actually a deep modernization of the "stone whale" (ie with extensive use of German EXPERIENCE).
    2. The next torpedo, the 53-61, was handed over to the fleet with the BIGGEST design mistake, and only after 9 years of operation in the fleet, the fact was revealed that most of the time the torpedo was aboard was unfeasible.
    3. 53-65 was NOT in the ammunition day.
    4. "Tapir" (UGST 70s-80s) - also "work in the basket"

    PS One of the most important problems of Physics (Gosy - 2007) was the head performer, who before that was able to really bring to the series and pass the Navy only 53-57 (1957 - with significant "German experience") and 53-61 ( 1961 - with a gross constructive error of the combat version of the torpedo)
  11. Technical engineer
    4 February 2016 18: 58
    +1
    God, how many messages did Mr. mina leave? Usually we try to immediately express our thoughts immediately without firing messages like from a machine gun, creating a reputation of being active and erudite.
    I will not raise disputes here on each point, I will just take the first one, where you specifically poked my nose and I will answer not in the style of "myself", but with links, so that it is clear that this is not only my (or the authors of these sources) opinion ( or delusion).
    Quote: mina
    to the author of KOL, for "looking into a book - sees a fig":
    - shooting from the nuclear warhead in 1957. performed 53-58 - OXYGEN;


    SOVIET TORPEDA WITH NUCLEAR CHARGE: Published in World Weapons by Armsmaster
    Soviet torpedo with nuclear charge:
    T-5 / T-V / 53-58 / 233 Product

    Straight torpedo with a nuclear warhead. The development of a torpedo with a T-5 nuclear warhead was carried out by the Scientific Research Institute-400 (Central Research Institute Gidropribor) since October 1953. The chief designer of the torpedo is A. Borushko; according to the Central Research Institute "Gidropribor" and Kolyadin - V.A. Kalitayev and, later, G.I. Portnov. The RDS-9 nuclear charge was developed at KB-11 of the USSR Ministry of Agriculture under the direction of Yu.B. Khariton. The combat part of the charge, automation - developed by the Moscow branch №1 KB-11, the main designer - N.L. Dukhov. The first test of the RDS-9 charge was conducted at the Semipalatinsk test site 19 in October 1955 (?) - the test did not take place - the explosion of the initiating explosive did not cause a fission reaction of nuclear materials (for the first time in the national history of nuclear testing).

    When conducting sea trials on Lake Ladoga in inert equipment in 4 shots from 15, when the torpedo made about half the way, it made a “bag”, the hydrostatic closure worked prematurely, which is equivalent to issuing a blasting command. It was also a problem to ensure the temperature regime of a special warhead - from + 5 to + 25 grad.S. in unheated torpedo tubes. According to the Resolution of the USSR CM from 13.04.1955, at the Novaya Zemlya 21 September September 1955 test site, the T-5 torpedoes nuclear test compartment was tested (12 depth m, BSW lowered from the minesweeper 253L).

    Torpedo T-V was a modified torpedo 53-57. Chief Designer - GI Portnov.
    State tests of T-5 torpedoes took place at 1957. The test program included two sighting shots with torpedoes without a special warhead, one shot with a special warhead without fissile materials (“control equipment”) and one shot with a fully equipped nuclear warhead. The depth of the blast was planned - 35 m (at the early planning stage - 25 m). One shot from the first three was unsuccessful. Shooting a nuclear torpedo in combat equipment was carried out by the submarine 613 C-144 of the 73-th separate submarine division of the Northern Fleet. The shot was fired at Novaya Zemlya 10 October 1957 from the periscope depth with undermining at a depth of 35 m, travel range 10 km, torpedo speed 40 knots, torpedo deflection - 130 m, visibility - 20 km, air temperature -6 degrees. WITH.

    It is from here: http://warweapons.ru/sovetskaya-torpeda-s-yadernyim-zaryadom/
    1. mine
      mine 4 February 2016 19: 12
      0
      Quote: Technical Engineer
      Torpedo T-V was a modified torpedo 53-57.


      Do not hurt bullshit, it hurts!
      53-58 - PISTON, OXYGEN, and ONLY with UPS
      53-57 - TURBINE, PEROXIDE and with BZO (including ASBZO)

      the fact that it was developed by DIFFERENT Chief Designers and even ORGANIZATIONS (NII-400 - 53-58 and Marine Engineering - 53-57) are apparently unknown to some "YnzhynEram"
      :)
  12. Technical engineer
    4 February 2016 18: 58
    0
    Real torpedo shooting
    The torpedo firing was performed on October 10 1957. The peculiarity of this experiment was that it was carried out under the conditions of a nuclear attack by a torpedo from a submarine at the ships in the base. Shooting was carried out from the periscope depth from the stern torpedo tube by the C-144 submarine of the 613 project from the 10 km distance. Commanded the boat captain 2 rank GV. Lazarev. After the release of the torpedo, the boat was to be in full swing under water to leave the shooting area. The torpedo passed the distance and exploded at a depth of 35 meters.

    The power of a torpedo explosion with a modified 19T nuclear warhead was 10 CT. At the beginning of 1958, the first nuclear torpedo T-5, which received the index 53-58, was adopted by the Navy, and in 1960, these torpedoes arrived in parts of the fleet.
    And this is from here: http://www.korvet2.ru/jadernaja-torpeda.html As you can see, the first nuclear torpedo was the T-5 torpedo (which received the 53-58 index in the series) and based on the 53-57, which was always peroxide-hydrogen and did not have an oxygen modification.

    Regarding the passions with the 53-65 torpedo (by the way, there are no words about it in the article), then all the information about its shortcomings and "fools of designers who let a lot of money down the drain" comes from the book "Torpedo Life" by two other authors this story is just repeating itself from the words of the specified book. Well, that the author of "Torpedo Life" may have his own opinion, but that's why I try to use several sources, because it is possible that sometimes any author may be mistaken or cunning. Imagine what would happen if we had an idea of ​​the Soviet Union using only Solzhenitsin's books for studying? A terrible story appears before your eyes. Endless like a zombie apocalypse.

    Well, and more, purely friendly advice. The young man, believe me, tact and respect in communicating with opponents only beautifies, and the accusations of colleagues in the illiteracy and positiveness of personal judgments, by no means, do not increase the argument. hi
    1. mine
      mine 4 February 2016 19: 15
      -3
      Quote: Technical Engineer
      Well, what the author of "Torpedo Life" can have his own opinion, but that's why I try to use several sources

      1. YOU are not using sources but HELPS
      2. Even when YOU use sources YOU are not able to read and perceive them normally.
      3. Bozin - former head of the torpedo exploitation department of the weapon research institute
      4. If you had at least slightly bothered to take an interest in the issue, you would not have passed by Gusev (among other things, Deputy Chief of the Navy UPV)
      5. After all YOUR nonsense, a one-way conclusion - YOU are not a "technical engineer" but a "mare driver" "who accidentally got to the Internet"
      6. YOU http://topwar.ru/user/engineer-tekhnar/ have written down as "journalists". Can you tell me which "Horns and Hooves" you write in, eh?
    2. Andrey77
      Andrey77 6 February 2016 23: 58
      -1
      Engineer, you have read a lot of yellow press. "Torpedo Life" is just like an altar for you. From the entire list given, perhaps Karpenko is even more or less. The rest is consumer goods. Yes, and Shirokorad - he is a specialist in artillery, but not in torpedoes.
      1. mine
        mine 19 February 2016 16: 06
        -1
        Quote: Andrey77
        You've read a lot of tabloids. "Torpedo Life" is just like an altar for you. From the entire list given, perhaps Karpenko is even more or less. The rest is consumer goods

        Are you from the "oak collapsed"?
        Just Bozin is the SOURCE (although there are errors)

        another question is that "Ynzhyner" could not even "rewrite" it adequately
  13. mine
    mine 4 February 2016 20: 03
    0
    A specialized enterprise was established on the basis of the Ostekhbyuro in the city of Lomonosov
    it's just "ten" !!!!
    Affftor, why are you smoking? Amanita? Or were you banned in Google? Or in Norilsk introduced coupons for the Internet?
    :))))))))))))))))))))))))
    1. Andrey77
      Andrey77 7 February 2016 00: 03
      0
      He stupidly interrupted from one "smart" book. I gave a list of "literature", and thanks for that.
  14. PKK
    PKK 4 February 2016 20: 28
    +1
    I won’t write too much. A huge respect for the enormous work of designers, testers and workers. Separately, the courage and courage of the sailors. Before this article, I thought that mostly my fellow rocketers got it. But it turns out that the Fleet is a hero even more. Good luck to everyone.
  15. Dmitry Ukraine
    Dmitry Ukraine 4 February 2016 22: 04
    0
    Thanks to the author for interesting material. I have long known that the production of torpedoes is the destiny of only a few technically very developed countries of the world, but thanks to your article I now understand much better why.
  16. qwert
    qwert 5 February 2016 07: 30
    0
    Quote: Dmitry Ukraine
    Thanks to the author for an interesting material.

    I support. There is practically nothing on the Internet about 53-57.
    Once again, I wish the author, or rather all the authors, strong nerves and patience.)
    1. mine
      mine 5 February 2016 13: 05
      -1
      Quote: qwert
      There is practically nothing on the Internet about 53-57. Once again, I wish the author, or rather all the authors, strong nerves and patience.)

      1. There is, at least in "frontal", through "Google" and is not always searched.
      2. Even a lack of information is not a "reason" for replacing it with HELPS (which is this VYSER "YnzhynEra")
      1. Andrey77
        Andrey77 7 February 2016 00: 07
        +1
        Absolutely agree. And do not read books of people who only saw torpedoes in the picture. As well as the author who compiled these books and gave this opus.
  17. Ustinov 055 055
    Ustinov 055 055 15 March 2016 11: 40
    -1
    Thank you interesting article
    1. mine
      mine 15 March 2016 12: 04
      -2
      Quote: Ustinov 055 055
      Thank you interesting article


      stupid and illiterate article of an absolutely incompetent afftor