Military Review

The anti-missile appearance of San Antonio as part of enhancing the survivability of American AUG: a new challenge for the Russian Navy

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Widespread promising anti-ship missiles, as well as other high-precision weapons in the Armed Forces of Russia, China and Iran, it had a very negative impact on the defensive capabilities of the US Navy, which, even with the most powerful naval personnel, are not able to dominate in the immediate vicinity of the maritime borders of the Eurasian superpowers.

Remarkable is the fact that the first American warship with the AEgis CMS, the CG-47 USS “Ticonderoga” missile cruiser, launched its military service 23 on January 1983, and in March of the same year, the most powerful Russian PKRC R -700 "Granit" with supersonic anti-ship missile 3М-45 with a range of 600 km. By that time, American intelligence was already aware of both the “Basalts” and the developed “Granites”, so the whole concept of the Aegis system can be considered as an asymmetric response to our anti-ship complexes with elements of advanced artificial intelligence.

But the vaunted BIUS “Aegis”, developed for AUG anti-aircraft defense against massive enemy EIA attacks in a difficult jamming environment and PLO, had serious technological flaws that were preserved in all subsequent versions, which ultimately made the system vulnerable by the beginning of the 21st century. Initially, the Ticonderoga RKR class (CG 47 — 51) was equipped with the SM-2 airborne SAM system with a dual inclined Mk26 PU, which severely limited the fire performance and survivability of the ship as a whole. For example, one Mk26 oblique-type PU has an extremely low rate of fire (5 s), as well as additional 2 seconds to reload Mk26 with anti-aircraft missiles from underdeck weapons storage. This disadvantage almost completely eliminated all the advantages of the high capacity of the Aegis system, which is capable of consistently firing 18 air targets with simultaneous illumination (accurate auto-tracking) of 2-4-s of them. Two PU McNUMX, installed on the first five Ticonderoga class cruisers, allowed to realize the rate of fire only around 26-3 c, which absolutely did not allow fully reflecting the massive missile attack of the PCRC of the Basalt and Granit type, the missiles of which fly at speeds up to 4M at low enough heights.

Later, the flaws were smoothed out by equipping the Mk41 with the most advanced universal built-in launchers (UVPU). Their performance exceeds the Mk26 by about 5 times, and their rate of fire is 1 with. Nasal and stern UkPU Mk41, installed on the "Ticonderog" and "Arley Burke", allow approximately 8-10 with release on targets to 16 SAMs of the type RIM-67D or RIM-156A, with two Mk26, this procedure was spent in less than one hour. During this time, for example, the shock train from 48 CRP 24-3 Granit launched from MAPL Ave 45A Antey overcomes from 949 to 21,2 km (depending on the profile and airspeed, 34 - 1600 km / h) It is worth noting the extremely high vulnerability of the Mark 2600 when anti-ship and other elements of the WTO enter the ship (even if it breaks at a certain distance from the ship): the guide pylons are the suspension points for the 26-ZUR, their rotating platform, and the elevator drive mechanism are out ship hulls, i.e. open air. All TPK modular TLU Mk2 below deck, and even if several of them are damaged, the rest will continue to function.

But even though the performance and survivability of the new launcher was increased, other disadvantages of Aegis related to the radar architecture of the BIUS have made themselves felt.

The Mk99 fire control subsystem of the SM-2 / 3 anti-aircraft missile systems is the basis of the Aegis BIUS anti-aircraft and anti-missile capabilities. The principle of its operation is based on the energy and transmission capabilities of the MRLS AN / SPY-1A / B / D, as well as on the accuracy of the auto-tracking (illumination) of the AN / SPG-62 continuous-radar radars. The use of the latter is the main disadvantage of Ajis, which has passed from the 20 to the 21 century. Most modern ship MRLSs use only one antenna post to track their targets and further defeat the most priority of them. These include such multifunctional RLC as the Dutch APAR and the Russian "Polyment". In the pyramidal superstructure of the European frigates of the type “Saxony”, “Ivar Huitfeld”, “De Zeven Provinsien”, as well as the Russian SC Ave 22350 “Admiral Gorshkov”, there is an antenna post with four-sided AFAR that accompanies and hits targets without the help of any specialized light stations and radar "searchlights", limiting the direct channel of the air defense system. The active phased arrays of APAR and Polyment work in the centimeter wavelength range, and therefore another important task is being solved: noise immunity when tracking and capturing air targets against the background of the water surface. The decimeter MRLS AN / SPY-1A (S-band) has serious problems in working on low-altitude targets, and therefore, when targeting SPG-62 illumination radar, errors often occur in determining the exact location of the target, which is near the radio horizon.

It is also known about another type of shipborne multifunction radar. Its representative is the Japanese-Dutch FCS-3A, installed on the Japanese destroyers of the Hyogo type and the destroyers of the Akiozuki type URO (“19DD”). Antenna post of this MRLS consists of 8 AFAR antenna patterns (2 antenna arrays to the side). The Big AR operates in the C-band of decimeter waves and is intended for viewing and targeting small multichannel on-load tap-changers. Small radar works in the X-range, and is designed to "capture" and fire targets. But unlike the American SPG-62, the Japanese radar of illumination is multichannel and is represented by a compact AFAR. This suggests that FCA-3A are able to provide defense against a massive strike with low-flying anti-ship missiles.

Later, improved versions of the Aegis main radar - AN / SPY-1B / D / D (V) appeared, which received new software and design solutions, which increased the noise immunity and the range of viewing angle of elevation. This allowed us to consistently accompany and hit some low-flying targets, as well as the WTO, diving at AUG with angles up to 85-90 degrees. Undoubtedly, the system has improved performance, but the overall radar architecture and its principle of operation remain the same: only 3-4 SPG-62 do not allow Aegis to hit multiple low-altitude and high-speed targets with low ESR. Therefore, the US Navy continues to search for the most appropriate and economically viable solution that allows the Aegis to successfully confront modern PKR. After all, a complete replacement of the radar complex on the 102's Aegis ships will cost hundreds of billions of dollars and is unlikely to pay for itself, as the era of ships like the promising low-profile Zumwalt class destroyers will soon come.

And one such decision is reflected in the topic of recent consultations between the US Navy command and the American leader in naval shipbuilding, Huntington Ingalls Industries (HII). Meeting between representatives fleet and the first persons HII was held on January 15, 2016 during the symposium of the US Navy Association. The technical and organizational issues of the development and construction of a heavy missile defense ship based on the LPD-17 San Antonio class landing helicopter-docking ship were agreed. The decision is very bold, given the multi-billion-dollar estimated cost of re-equipping several existing 25000-ton military transports into anti-missile super-cruisers or building new ships, but the game is worth the candle.


The AMDR AMRL antenna post is located on the main superstructure of the landing ship of the San Antonio class in a truncated pyramidal structure, the construction of which is similar to that of the Dutch APAR multifunctional radar. As you can see, the last frontier of the new Aegis-giant air defense will be formed by an inclined PU (Rolling Airframe Missile) self-defense SAM SAM system with 4-swing anti-aircraft missiles like RIM-116


The San Antonio DVKD have important design features that allow: to operate in inaccessible for Tikondero sites of the seas and oceans, to “look” much further than the radio horizon adopted for the early Ages, to maintain the combat stability of the AUG by an order of magnitude longer than it could have done “ Arleigh Burke ", look at enemy radar indicators with ordinary frigates of the Oliver Hazard Perry class or even smaller ships.

A ship of length 208,5 m and displacement 25 thousand tons has significantly larger internal volumes due to the greater length and due to the width of the hull 32 m (2 times wider than Ticonderoga, and 56% more than that of Arleigh Burke "). The huge width of the deck allows you to install 4 UVKU Mk41 modification Mk158, in which the 61 TPK is placed under the SM-2 / 3 SAM, RIM-162 ESSM SAM, LRASM CRM, BGM-109C SC-Tok-shk-kha-kha-kha-kha-kha-cham-ZNXX, and the AHR-UNSX X-ROM. complex "Asroc-VLA". Four such Mk 139 will accommodate different types of 41 missiles, i.e. 244 times as much as the Ticonderoga class (2 Mk 2 on the 41 TPK). The ship turns into a real floating "Aegis-arsenal", adapted to long-term military operations under the blows of hundreds of anti-ship missiles.

The use of the self-defense Mk 25 self-defense container, which represents the quad version of the WPC for the RIM-162A interceptor missile, allows you to fit ESSM missiles into the 2 Mk 41 488 missiles, with a significant numerical superiority of enemy air attack weapons. Add to this number another 61 distant RIM-161A and 61 “Tomahawk” missile in the two remaining Mk 41 - no modern warship with such ammunition is known.

The anti-missile giant based on San Antonio will be managed by the promising AMDR AMDR developed on the basis of the latest AN / SPY-1D (V) modifications integrated into the latest versions of Aegis (BMD 5.1.1. 4 block).


Multifunctional radar station of the new generation AMDR, made in the body of an improved EM class “Arleigh Burke Flight III”. Dark violet rays are radiation from promising multichannel AFAR-RPN of the centimeter range, which will replace the outdated single-channel radar of continuous radiation SPG-62; yellow rays - radiation of an AFAR 4-three-sided survey and accompanying decimeter radar based on the latest AN / SPY-1



Based on the upper figure with the scheme, you can see that the AMDR MRLS consists of two main elements, similar to the standard version of "Aegis". The detection and tracking radar is performed by 4 large S-band antenna arrays, the backlighting is performed by additional 3 X-band RPNs, but these are not old SPG-62s, but new and powerful AFAR webs, each of which is capable of capturing at least 10 goals.

The AMDR MRLS will surpass all versions of AN / SPY-1, APAR and Sampson in TTX and catch up with the domestic Polymer, as well as the Japanese-Dutch FCS-3A. AMDR has a high energy potential and range. When used in the main “San Antonio” add-on, the AMDR antenna post will be 1,5 — 2 times higher than AN / SPY-1, and therefore the radio horizon will increase by tens of kilometers. The AMDR operators on the new ship will be able to detect more distant targets without retransmitting the tactical situation from the E-2C DRLO aircraft. In addition, new X-band and multi-channel on-load tap-changers of the new multifunctional radar, in contrast to the “ancient” SPG-62, will be able to scan the sea surface for the presence of small radio-contrast targets such as “periscope”, “small landing craft”, etc., which was not available for decimeter S-band AN / SPY-1.

The new BIUS for the AMDR radar will be built on the basis of the latest supercomputers, and therefore the number of air-guided missiles may increase from 22 (in Aegis) to 7 and more than a dozen. The seven-meter “San Antonio” sediment will allow the ship to enter shallow waters, as well as shallow seaports, which will further expand its functionality in marine theaters.

Americans have all the shipbuilding, technological and material capacities for the construction of a large series of such ships in the near future, and therefore it will be very difficult to give an adequate answer. The re-equipment of Admiral Nakhimov into the most powerful shock and defensive instrument of the Russian Navy will certainly make a good contribution to countering the threat from the US Navy's arsenal ships, but this is just a drop in the sea, large-scale construction of 22350 Ave., 885 Ave. "Ash" and other anti-ship surface and submarine cruisers with Onyx, Caliber missiles and more promising products, the production of which must be urgently accelerated.
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  1. 31rus
    31rus 26 January 2016 06: 32 New
    +6
    Dear, interesting material, but this is still a project, one thing is theoretical justification, another is real opportunities, I do not agree with the author that the answer to future US ships is only in increasing the number of both carriers and missiles, we simply will not have time to launch so many ships, at our time of construction. If the missiles cannot break through the defenses, it means to make a "smart torpedo", with a large power reserve and a powerful warhead, but this is the opinion of a divan delitant
    1. Falcon
      Falcon 26 January 2016 09: 28 New
      +7
      Quote: Author
      SAM "X-2" with dual inclined launchers Mk26, which severely limited fire performance and survivability of the ship as a whole


      How famously jumped from the 80's to the 21 century! And where is the Mk26 on American ships now?

      Quote: Author
      Most modern shipborne radar systems use only one antenna post to track target tracks // Russian Polyment. Russian SC Ave. 22350 “Admiral Gorshkov” is an antenna post with four-sided AFAR that accompany and hit targets without the help of any specialized lighting stations and radar “spotlights”


      1. Well, it seems to have sailed. Polement does not perform the function of highlighting targets. He has nothing to highlight. 9m96 with an active seeker leads it to the target by radio correction, and not backlight, until the AGSN grabs the target.

      2. AN / SPY-1 can do the same with SM-6 which is also with AGSN. Do not confuse sour with fresh.

      3. In addition to the notions of journalists - there is no real evidence that Polyment is an AFAR. The manufacturer gives the data - that this is just a phased array. And the AFAR was already attributed to her by the journalists and the error swam.
      AFAR only in the project


      4. and certainly Polyment is not multifunctional, otherwise why the scattering of the remaining radars on Gorshkov, the cougar monolith, artillery. And certainly she cannot highlight the goals

      Quote: Author
      Active phased arrays of APAR and Polymenta operate in the centimeter wave range, and therefore another important problem is being solved - noise immunity when tracking and capturing air targets against a water surface.


      Let's get more detailed here. How is this solved the problem of noise immunity of short-wave radars ?! The shorter the wavelength, the easier it is to block it with interference, at least the higher the coefficient. atmospheric attenuation ...

      Quote: Author
      Decimeter radar AN / SPY-1a (S-band) has serious problems in working with low-altitude targets


      Oh, of course it does. With increasing wavelength, the ESR of the object decreases. Just do not forget that with increasing radar power, efficiency also increases. and AN / SPY-1 6 megawatts at the peak - and did not dream of competitors.
      Only the main thing is not said - AN / SPY-1 should determine distant targets - at altitude. On which all Granites Volcanoes fly, etc.

      Quote: Author
      The technical and organizational issues of the development and construction of a heavy missile defense ship based on the LPD-17 "San Antonio" class docking helicopter dock were agreed.


      Certainly not a missile defense with an X-band antenna. They want to monitor the final stage of the RCC approach, missile defense and the far zone will continue to be provided by Burke with AN / SPY-1!
      1. Operator
        Operator 26 January 2016 12: 05 New
        +3
        The centimeter range (radio waves of length 3,2 cm - window of radio transparency in the atmosphere with water vapor) is the coolest.

        Radar AN / TPY-2 mobile complex air defense / missile defense THAAD:
        - area AFAR 9,2 sq.m;
        - number of transceiver modules 25344;
        - power supply power 80 kW;
        - aerial target detection range with an EPR 0,005 m2 200 km.

        Regarding the ease of jamming the centimeter range with interference - first you need to manage to deliver a jammer with an antenna of comparable size to the AN / TPY-2 radar, and only then try to “hammer” laughing
        1. opus
          opus 26 January 2016 19: 54 New
          +4
          Quote: Operator
          The centimeter range (radio waves of length 3,2 cm - window of radio transparency in the atmosphere with water vapor) is the coolest.

          In water vapor, resonant absorption occurs at wavelengths λ = 1,7 mm (attenuation coefficient α = 14 dB / km) and λ = 1,35 cm (α = 0,1 dB / km), and in oxygen at λ = 1,7 mm (α = 12 dB / km)


          Quote: Operator
          first you need to manage to deliver to the AN / TPY-2 radar a source of interference with an antenna of comparable size, and only then try to "hammer

          nothing "to deliver" is necessary and "comparable size" has nothing to do with it.
          The radar of the complex must be emitted to the target and receive a ("worthy" threshold) power REFLECTED signal.
          power flux density is known (signal radiated from the radar and reflected from the target) on radar receiver (at the location of the receiving radar antenna) will be:


          DEGREE 4

          and here is the power flux density(emitted by the jammer) on radar receiver(at the location of the receiving radar antenna) will


          DEGREE 2
          KA-coefficient of directional action (KND)
          Ri-pulse power in the direction of the target (on the radar)
          D is the distance from the radar to the target.
          Sefts. -effective scattering area (EPR)


          more...
          Часть radiated power enters the radar antenna: the receiving antenna in accordance with its effective area SeFA (approximately equal to 0,7SA) leads to the signal power matched to it by the receiver


          This expression is called basic radar equation. It establishes the relationship between the power of the received signal Pc and the radiation power Pu with active radar for passive targets. As can be seen from the equation, with increasing range to target D, the power of the signal supplied to the receiver decreases very quickly - to the fourth degree from the range. Such a large dynamic range of received signal powers requires the use of effective automatic adjustment
          gain (AGC) in the receiver.
          But the main conclusion is different: since the noise power does not depend on the range D, the ratio signal / noise with increasing D decreases as quickly as the signal level, i.e., inversely proportional to D

          Do you need to explain? laughing
          1. Operator
            Operator 26 January 2016 20: 50 New
            0
            Explain the last point - how does it relate to the issue of suppressing the operation of the radar? laughing

            Modern radars with AFAR perceive the source of interference as just a point source of radio emission with excellent visibility, clear coordinates and a motion vector. Moreover, the radar computing equipment perfectly classifies the air carrier of a point source as RC according to its speed, flight altitude and acceleration during the maneuver.

            Therefore, an attempt to install a jammer on a cruise missile will only lead to its self-illumination in the radio band. Building a multitude of rockets into a chain behind the leader’s tail, although it will disguise the number of rockets in the attack, it will at the same time allow the ships to shoot them sequentially rather than simultaneously, as if they would fly up like a fan from different azimuths.

            In addition, as part of the ship's connection, there are many ships with their own radars, irradiating a chain of rockets from different angles. The jamming transmitter aboard the KR leader will silence only one of them, the other radars will see the rest of the chain.

            The problem of radar jamming in another - how to suppress the work of the radar in a large sector of the review, and even when exposed to radiation from many angles. Having a cruise missile and centimeter radar as the carrier of a jammer, the answer is: no way (except for a nuclear explosion).
            1. opus
              opus 26 January 2016 21: 50 New
              0
              Quote: Operator
              Explain the last point - how does it relate to the issue of suppressing the operation of the radar?

              The most direct.
              No wonder asked
              Quote: opus
              Do you need to explain?

              Statement
              Quote: Operator
              first you need to manage to deliver to the AN / TPY-2 radar a source of interference with an antenna of a comparable size,

              to put it mildly delusional.
              Let me explain.
              1.You have 1 kW radar
              2. The target at a distance of 1 km = 1000m.
              3. The radar will come to the receiving antenna (I simplified the EPR, etc., out of brackets)
              1000W / 10000 ^ 4 = 0,1 ^ -4 watts (1 μW)
              I use power specifically in watts, not power flux density (W / m ^ 2)
              Sefa, in principle, does not "interfere" here
              4.you have
              Quote: Operator
              source of interference with antenna of comparable size

              only not with a "comparable" antenna (the antenna does not play a role here), but with a comparable power of 1 kW.
              5. The jammer sends interference to No. 1
              6. On the receiver arises
              1000вт/10000^2=0,1^-2Вт( 1мВт)
              Mile Watts and Micro Watts
              Need to continue?
              Of course, no one carries 6 MW on board an aircraft to drown out AN / SPY-1 ...
              The jammer is ALWAYS more profitable by the inverse square of the distance
              Quote: Operator
              Modern radars with AFAR perceive the source of interference as just a point source of radio emission with

              tell this to the Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) capability of the radar defeats conventional RWR / ESM systems ... he will laugh for a long time

              Radar with AFAR, this is a radar with several hundred (or thousands) of anti-missile systems
              1. He himself does not "perceive" anything. Reflected radiation (OI) comes as a stream with a solid angle, at an angle to the axis, and even reflections from the underlying surface (if any)
              2. OOI falls on 10,20,100 or StopItsot PPM. For anything, for that matter.
              further percent of the radar naichnaet "to process", according to the algorithm on which PPM got a large flux density, angle, etc.
              and a "picture" is built in the UIS brain
              And this is no different from
              Quote: Operator
              perceive
              Radar with headlight, with ball or with a parabola
              The unique ability of AFAR systems is the ability to multichannel reception and selective three-dimensional data processing (and, of course, the ability to change the phase and amplitude of radiation).
              1. opus
                opus 26 January 2016 21: 50 New
                0
                therefore
                Quote: Operator
                perceive the source of interference as just a point

                to put it mildly, not true
                Quote: Operator
                Therefore, an attempt to install an interference transmitter on a cruise missile will only lead to its self-illumination in the radio range

                same for PAR and parabola.
                But the emitter of interference of the required power (or at the required distance) will clog the receiving channel and the AFAR, and the headlamp and ball and parabola.
                AFAR really will jump faster in frequency

                Quote: Operator
                The problem of radar jamming in another - how to suppress the radar in a large sector of the review.

                using a regiment of jammers and attacking the entire sector simultaneously
                1. Operator
                  Operator 27 January 2016 00: 24 New
                  0
                  Yes, even two air regiments of jammers - anyway, each airplane for a radar with AFAR looks like a bright point source of radio emission.

                  Firstly, where is the obstacle to the detection of cruise missiles - or will the n-th number of missiles fly in radio shades behind each production aircraft? And so on until the missile (or plane) hits the target?

                  Secondly, a rocket attack on a naval compound in the open ocean is initially considered; no airplanes are planned to be covered. Therefore, the situation looks exactly the opposite - monstrous shipboard EWs deliver targeted obstacles to virtually every rocket that leaves the radio horizon, and they try to keep them as far as possible.

                  Third, you yourself mentioned the mode of operation of the radar with a low probability of interception (Low Probability of Intercept) with frequency, phase and polarization tuning in each pulse. It is complicated only by one thing - the inability of the pulses to be copied by the transmitter of interference in real time mode to create address interference. But shipboard EW of high power can put a weak GOS of missiles barrage of noise interference (hello to the basic law of radar) without a hearing in the algorithms of the formation of impulses of missile radars.
                  1. opus
                    opus 27 January 2016 01: 14 New
                    +1
                    Quote: Operator
                    for radar with AFAR

                    repeat
                    What is AFAR, what is HEADLAND, what is SCAR
                    Quote: Operator
                    as a bright point source of radio emission.
                    there will be no interference.
                    This is nonsense. It will be so, so, or so.

                    and it doesn’t matter that now the indicator is not used, but the TFT (LCD) screen or HUD, and the radar screen does not rotate(mechanically)

                    The level of the side lobes of the daylight is one of the decisive factors determining the quality of the radar. When the level of the side lobes of the daylight is small, then in the presence of deliberate active interference created by the probable enemy, the radar will have good detection characteristics in azimuthal directions other than the direction to the interference provider.


                    FAR PAP allows you to concentrate all the energy in a narrow beam and direct it to the suppressed RES.

                    Quote: Operator
                    First, where is the hindrance to the detection of cruise missiles -

                    all the same

                    instead of the target LA-target RCC

                    Quote: Operator
                    Therefore, the situation looks exactly the opposite - monstrous shipborne electronic warfare systems put sighting barriers to literally every rocket,

                    with accuracy as it should.
                    The ship’s ESR (and the REP facilities COMBINED with it) has 10 -000m ^ 20, for the main missile system the missile launcher already has too little time for the receiver to light (distance), and the ship doesn’t have time to go anywhere. With La with accuracy to the contrary
                    Quote: Operator
                    Third, you yourself mentioned the Low Probability of Intercept mode of operation

                    I mentioned him, about
                    Quote: Operator
                    Modern radars with AFAR perceive the source of interference as just a point source of radio emission

                    what is "point" in LJ?
                    One PPM "lit up"? pfuy

                    AFAR has the ability to form: failures in the NAM in the direction of the jammer; several rays of NAM; independent MDs for transmitting and receiving, and effectively combine target detection and tracking modes + interference suppression in a modular AFAR can be performed twice: during processing in a module and during intermodular processing
                    1. opus
                      opus 27 January 2016 01: 16 New
                      0
                      Quote: Operator
                      can put weak GOS missiles barrage noise interference (hello to the basic law of radar) without consideration in the algorithms for generating pulses of missile radars.

                      "weak" seeker very hard to drive crazywhen she captured a target with an EPR of 10 -000m ^ 20 and having a thermal signature of 000MW, as well as a luminescence of 2-30 MW in the radar range
                      1. Operator
                        Operator 27 January 2016 12: 16 New
                        0
                        A weak missile seeker can be driven astray by a strong source of interference such as a centimeter radar with an AFAR area under 10 sq. M. And if there are two such radars with a distance of several kilometers between them, even more so.

                        About the thermal signature of the ship I agree with you. But this is already beyond the scope of discussing radio location / interference problems.
                    2. Operator
                      Operator 27 January 2016 11: 57 New
                      0
                      The RCS of the ship is, of course, large, but not so much - "cut the sturgeon" (C).

                      All your methods of suppressing radar primarily relate to the rocket equipment - low-power and small-sized. The equipment of the ship allows to fully apply the LPI mode, increase the signal-to-noise ratio and separate from interference.

                      In addition, when attacking a naval compound, each air target will be irradiated with a multitude of radars, therefore, the operation of the phased array of a missile in the interference mode on one radar will not affect the location of the missile from the radars of other ships.

                      In any case, there is no reception against scrap - the missile computer is not able to simultaneously process the location data of its radar, identify and determine the bearing to external radio signals, build the flight path to the priority target, interfere with ship radar and carry out an anti-aircraft maneuver.

                      Moreover, the rocket does not need to be sprayed on such a number of overwhelming tasks: it has other problems - according to external target designation to go to the area of ​​the naval junction, according to the leader’s rocket, choose a target, separate from radar interference, carry out a maneuver (including anti-foam) , reach the line of capturing the ship of thermal seeker and hit the target.

                      You misunderstand the LPI mode (a complex discrete-coded signal has long been known): it is intended only to impede the targeting of the echo interference to the radar operating in this mode. And the fact of the work of the LPI-radar, as well as the bearing on it, is easily determined by means of RTR.
                      The only problem with the definition of the bearing is only in old open source aircraft, which can identify the source of radio emission only after the accumulation in memory of several equally coded signals (which is not in LPI).
                      New SPO aircraft simply record the bearing to the radio source. If there are two airplanes, the range and speed of the source is determined, after which it is identified as a threat or target. If necessary, planes put a barrier in the form of a flickering signal with the formation of virtual targets.

                      Bistatics, however laughing
                      1. opus
                        opus 27 January 2016 12: 32 New
                        +1
                        Quote: Operator
                        The RCS of the ship is, of course, large, but not so much - "cut the sturgeon" (C).

                        Why "cut the golden chicken"?

                        Destroyer-10000m ^ 2
                        Aircraft carrier-50000m ^ 2
                        --------------------
                        SUV-VEP "Sword"


                        Moreover, the angle of reflection

                        there it is so amazing (the backscattering diagram (DOR) will be so beautiful multi-petal) that we can’t talk about the out-of-phase addition of signals at the receiving point
                        Quote: Operator
                        All your radar suppression methods

                        tse not mine, and not for "low-power", these are general principles
                        Quote: Operator
                        The equipment of the ship allows you to fully apply the LPI mode,

                        The radar station with LPI for ships is just beginning to "take its first" steps.
                        as an example (almost the only one) CLOSE LPI radar from CelsiusTech Systems

                        or ALPER Naval LPI Radar


                        Because the ships do not really need it, since
                        Quote: opus
                        when she captured the target with an EPR of 10 -000m ^ 20 and

                        Saab Sea Giraffe-does not have LPI mode (it makes no sense even for Victory-class corvette)

                      2. opus
                        opus 27 January 2016 12: 35 New
                        0
                        Quote: Operator
                        In any case, there is no reception against the scrap - the rocket calculator is not able to simultaneously process the data of the location of its radar

                        Chu ... not funny.
                        the average performance for spatial and time-frequency signal processing (the most loaded for AFAR, the rest is generally minor)) is 1011 ... 1012 op / s valid operations.
                        with this EASY to handle commercially available signal processors: Tiger Shark (Analog Device), TMS (Texas Instruments) and Power PC (Motorola), products by Bit Ware (designed to be embedded in buses for organizing data exchange (Compact PCI, PMC, PCI, VME), domestic processors - cells of multichannel ADCs and signal processors based on threshold-logic integrated circuits (FPGAs) of Xilins company, computer cells based on domestic neural-matrix
                        NM 6403 and NM 6404 signal processors, DSM chips containing four channels of high-speed ADCs and DACs, and a scalar processor, the NM 6404 neurochip (allowing you to perform vector-matrix operations with a dimension of 64 x 64 with a clock frequency of 100 ... 200 MHz).
                        Quote: Operator
                        tune out radar interference

                        you have a wrong idea about the ship’s rep for missile defense.
                        Shot foil lining, spraying (water curtain) of a ship with seawater (possibly with dipoles or suspension) is against anti-ship missiles (their GOS), etc.
                        electronic warfare subsystem AN / SLQ-32 does not act against them and in a completely different way

                        Quote: Operator
                        You misunderstand LPI mode

                        I understand everything correctly. I do not understand where you came up with
                        Quote: Operator
                        Modern radars with AFAR perceive the source of interference as just a point source of radio emission with excellent visibility,

                        ?
                        about "point"
                      3. Operator
                        Operator 27 January 2016 14: 29 New
                        0
                        If everything were so "chocolate" for missiles with the mass and dimensions of computing equipment for processing received radar signals, no one would bother with the construction of cyclopean volumes to accommodate the same equipment on ships.

                        There is no magic in SDKS (or LPI in the English version), except for changing the parameters of each pulse according to a pseudo-random algorithm. SDKS is designed to deceive the software of old Pastel-type aircrafts, which are taught to first accumulate the received pulses, then decode the algorithm and then classify the target emitting them.

                        One has only to abandon the decoding of pulses and the classification on this basis of the goal, as the pulse source immediately turns into a self-illuminated target, the radiation power of which exceeds the power of the background radio emission by several tens of decibels. In this sense, the source becomes a point in space.

                        Another thing is that the range and speed of the source without decoding the pulses can no longer be determined using the SPO of only one aircraft, but if there are a couple of aircraft, this is not a problem. Airplanes in battle order fly in pairs, many of them have onboard systems for the exchange of digital data (MiG-31, F-22), which can be used to synchronize the work of open source software in the triangulation mode of radiating targets.

                        And it is quite possible to classify a target from the point of view of a threat or an object of attack not according to the structure of the radar pulses, but according to the distance and speed of movement of the target.
                      4. opus
                        opus 27 January 2016 19: 34 New
                        0
                        Quote: Operator
                        no one would bother with the construction of cyclopean volumes for placing the same equipment on ships.

                        heh ....

                        1. Kutsaya radar radar seeker RCC and AGROMAD TARGET (50000m ^ 2 by EPR), 99% of the metal and.
                        The target also, moreover, crawls at 20-30 nodes on a 2D plane.
                        Ugh.
                        2.Approximately 10-60 attackers on the TRANSMISSION or SUPERSONIC speed in 3D small-sized targets (EPR from 5m ^ 2 or less)
                        Wow.
                        But "brain supply" of the radar SPC, SOTS, SN or 3 in 1. (control unit of the radar with HEADLIGHT (AN / SPY-1)) on the BIUS (CIC) is assigned:
                        - helicopter subsystem LAMPS;
                        - equipment of the helicopter subsystem LAMPS Mark З;
                        - Radar detection of airborne (type AN / SPS-49) and surface (type AN / SPS-55) targets;
                        - Identification station own — alien AN / UPX-29;
                        EW subsystem AN / SLQ-32;
                        -navigation equipment;
                        -BIUS (integrated on the BIC) PLO AN / SQQ-89 with the internal hull AN / SQS-53 and the towed HAS AN / SQR-19;
                        -terminal equipment of a digital radio communication line (LINK-11);
                        -automatized command and control subsystem (Mark 1);
                        -automatized subsystem of coordinated control of ship weapon systems (Mark 1);
                        -Automated subsystem for functional testing, troubleshooting and localization of faults (Mark 545);
                        -subsystem of information display;
                        - radio communication equipment;
                        -terminal devices of a digital radio communication line (LINK-4A);
                        - launcher of the passive jamming subsystem (Mark 36 SRBOC);
                        -automated artillery fire control subsystem (Mark 86);
                        -Automated fire control subsystem SAM "Aegis" (Mark 99);
                        - launchers for shipboard missiles, missiles and missile systems (UVP Mark 41);
                        - Automated fire control subsystem of the Kyrgyz Republic “Tomahawk”;
                        -Automated fire control subsystem RCC "Harpoon";
                        - anti-aircraft artillery complex "Volcano-Falanx" (Mark 15);
                        -automatized subsystem for firing anti-submarine weapons (Mark 116) [22].
                        and pairing with
                        -GEU + auxiliary power plants (and this is the same level of good TPP / HPP)
                        -conditioning systems, water supply and sewerage

                        uhhhh
                      5. opus
                        opus 27 January 2016 19: 34 New
                        0
                        3.On the other hand:
                        F-22 (up to upgrade Block 30/35 since 2013) has a birthmark of a computer based on Intel 960mx, developed in 1984 (production in the USA was then at 1000-1500nm)

                        Max CPU clock rate 10 MHz to 100 MHz (for F-22 33 MHz, cache (4 KB instead of 1 KB) and added 1 KB of data cach, 32-bit multiplexed address / data bus) This (photo) is not a military option ( almost on such a F-22, casing ceramics only)



                        Apollo Guidance Computer with Keyboard and Display Module


                        Distinctive super computer x F-16?
                        on the F-16 are Central Air Data Computer (CADC)


                        APG-68 has SIGNAL PROCESSOR & COMPUTER

                        types 682R670G01,750R088G01,750R908G01 and so on up to ... 811R940G01
                        (depending on the radar version)

                        Quote: Operator
                        If everything was so "chocolate" for rockets with mass

                        rockets are not "chocolate", the F-16, F-22 and Apollo -13 are "chocolate"
                        Cyclopean?
                      6. opus
                        opus 27 January 2016 19: 37 New
                        0
                        Quote: Operator
                        There is no magic in SDKS (or LPI in the English version)

                        I'm talking about "magic"! no guogu at all.
                        I'm talking about noise and about
                        the AN / APG-77 emits low energy pulses over a wide frequency band using a technique called spread spectrum transmission. When multiple echoes are returned, the radar's signal processor combines the signals. The amount of energy reflected back to the target is about the same as a conventional radar, but because each LPI pulse has considerably less amount of energy and may not fit normal modulation patterns
                        I'm only talking about
                        Quote: Operator
                        Modern radars with AFAR perceive the source of interference as just a point source of radio emission

                        Here is interesting interference signal (in your opinion) they perceive as a "point", and reflected from the target (previously emitted by its own radar), how do I perceive?
                        -how's the line?
                        -like an ellipse (or rather an overlay of ellipses)?
                        -How square?
                        -or?
                        and why? Enlighten! request

                        Quote: Operator
                        it is quite possible not by the structure of the radar pulses, but by the range and speed of the target.

                        Yeah.
                        introduction: the SR-71, U-2, F-15 SE, B1-B, Cessna CJ3, etc. are approaching the missile defense destroyer at the SAME speeds, ranges (fan, azimuth).
                        Classify
                        Quote: Operator
                        threat or attack target
                        only for V, S, H?
                        What is more dangerous?
                      7. Operator
                        Operator 27 January 2016 20: 40 New
                        0
                        As part of the modern radar, the target perceives not the antenna or purely radar equipment, but the computing part of the station, including the equipped one. software.
                        So, thanks to the last constituent elements, the radar sees a simple noise source of interference, not as screen illumination (hi to technologies of the last century), but as a point source of its own radiation. Also, air points reflecting alien (radar) radiation are represented as points.
                        Exceptions to the rule:
                        - generation of echo interference with a time delay, then the radar sees a chain of points, the first of which is real, the rest are virtual;
                        - generation of flickering interference by two transmitters, the radar sees a virtual target between the two real ones.
                        In other cases, it is necessary to provide direct support of the missiles by jammers, so that the missiles hide in light from the points of the jammers.

                        First, the SR-71, U-2, F-15SE, B-1B and Cessna CJ3 in a combat situation will develop different speeds and choose different heights when attacking the destroyer in accordance with their flight performance.
                        Secondly, if the speed and altitude are the same, say 900 km / h and 50 meters, then the F-15SE and B-1B (other planes from the list will not be able to) will differ in the order of their EPR.
                        Thirdly, if, in battle, a target with an RCS of 5 square meters or more approaches a destroyer at an altitude of 20000 to 0,1 meters at a speed of one to several hundred kilometers per second, which does not respond to the request "friend or foe", the only correct the solution will be to launch an anti-aircraft missile into it, and it will be possible to classify the target after the battle by its debris.
                      8. opus
                        opus 27 January 2016 21: 00 New
                        0
                        Quote: Operator
                        As part of a modern radar, the antenna does not perceive the target

                        it's funny.
                        Perceives the antenna (canvas or PPMy)
                        MRP - here he is

                        and there is no difference in the "reception" m / u him (CAR) and SHAR -NO

                        and in the radar 1L13 (“Sky-SV”)

                        From the output of the auto-compensator active noise interference signals in analog form on two (in-phase and quadrature) phase detectors and two analog-to-digital converters (ADC). Converted digitally the signals went to the SDC equipment and then to the optimal filtering equipment, where compression was provided
                        useful signal up to a duration of 3,3 μs and then to an incoherent drive. SDC equipment was completed based on digital notch filter with a device for automatic compensation of the Doppler frequency shift of passive noise at the input of the filter. Filter output by
                        According to the inter-surveillance jamming mapping scheme, the level of false alarms was automatically stabilized. From the incoherent drive, the signals were sent to the information auto-acquisition system, and through the ADC, to the all-round visibility indicator.

                        A technology of digital chart formation (CDO) [AFAR]. Digital beamforming (both in transmit and receive mode).
                        CDO technology and full digital signal processing (DSP) provide radar with the following advantages.
                        1. The radar is able to perceive all the information of the spatio-temporal fields in the aperture of the AR.
                        2.Digital frequency filters, whose characteristics are highly repeatable, provide almost complete interference compensation.


                        Not any
                        Quote: Operator
                        The radar perceives the target not as an antenna or purely radar equipment, but as a computing part of the station, including software

                        и
                        Quote: Operator
                        Each director of a radar with AFAR looks like a bright point source of radio emission.
          2. Operator
            Operator 27 January 2016 13: 58 New
            0
            A rocket after leaving the radio horizon flies at an altitude of 5 meters and sees, at best, the side profile of the ship. The question is - what is the side projection profile area of ​​the destroyer and its relation to the ESR declared by you in 10000 sq. M?

            When a low-flying rocket in the 25 km range begins to shine, two radar spaced from AFAR to 10 sq. M. GOS missiles with an antenna area of ​​0,2 sq. M no longer see their impulses reflected at least from an aircraft carrier (the main law of radar).
          3. opus
            opus 27 January 2016 19: 40 New
            0
            Quote: Operator
            A missile after exiting from the radio horizon flies at an altitude of 5 meters and sees, at best, the side profile of the ship.

            it is nonsense
            The harpoon goes 15 m on a march (no 5 m) and at the same height includes ARLGSN, with a maximum search under 45 degrees to the course:

            at 2-5 m, it fails before the goal, bypassing the air defense


            and "5m" you confuse with anti-ship missiles Tomahawk
            but there 5 m the same "conditional"



            on the march here ARLGSN is turned off, the rocket moves along the INS to a given area, what the fuck is "target search" with a low-altitude flight profile?

            jump from 5 to 100 m with the inclusion of ARLGSN

            ARLGSN they have the same AN ​​/ DSQ-28 and

            Our "Klabs" 3M-54E work according to the same scheme: 20 m on the march on subsonic - a slide with ARGS -54 switched on - 10 m in attack (though at 3M speed - that's all).
            Quote: Operator
            Question - what is the profile area of ​​the side projection of the destroyer and its relationship

            communication, that with the lateral, that with the front (etc.), the EPR does not.
            It is nonsense.
            I will make the aircraft carrier EPR with corner reflectors (practically without a "profile")
            Quote: Operator
            When in the forehead of a low-flying rocket at a distance of 25 km two radars spaced apart in space from an AFAR of 10 square meters each, the GOS of a rocket with an antenna area of ​​0,2 square meters ceases to see its impulses reflected even from the aircraft carrier (basic law of radar).

            same nonsense, especially link to ESD
          4. Operator
            Operator 27 January 2016 20: 02 New
            0
            5 or 15 meters of rocket altitude - everything is the same for seeing only the side projection of the ship, and there are still cases of approaching from the bow or stern.

            In your words - what, what, is the rocket flight under control of the inertial guidance system after when it goes out of the radio horizon to the target area (at a distance from 15 to 25 km from it)?
            It is at this moment that the active CWGS of the rocket is turned on in the search mode, since before this the rocket has coordinates not for the target, but only for its area of ​​location.
            And the rocket jumps to a height of 100 meters only in close proximity to the target. Otherwise, in the 15-25 flight distance, it will be shot in a dash.

            Where did you see the destroyer assembled from corner reflectors? laughing

            In fact, it is useful to know that new centimeter-range radars have, including electronic suppression function of its mono-range. Otherwise, why bother with the transition to centimeters?
          5. opus
            opus 27 January 2016 21: 06 New
            0
            Quote: Operator
            Where did you see the destroyer assembled from corner reflectors?

            it didn’t get to you.
            Quote: opus
            i to you corner reflectors (practically without "profile") do EPR aircraft carrier
            or tanker, I don't care

            Quote: Operator
            In general, it is useful to know that the new centimeter range radars include function of electronic suppression of their single-band.

            thank you belay
            Eka Seen

            AFAR?
            Quote: Operator
            new centimeter range radar





            ZY.Listen, I got tired of "chewing" the same thing.
            As I tried to explain, you don’t understand, you don’t want to. Live in "pink" dreams.
            I sympathize (not with you, but with the crew of the ship) when you perceive the obstacle (along with your AFAR) at the BIC console as
            Quote: Operator
            a source of interference as just a point source of radio emission with excellent visibility,
            .
        2. Operator
          Operator 27 January 2016 21: 15 New
          -1
          Your picture for the Harpoon anti-ship missile system clearly shows the exit from under the radio horizon at an altitude of 15, not 100 meters. Determining the coordinates of the target, turning the rocket onto the target and flying at a height of no higher than 5 meters to the target - all this will already occur at a distance of 10 km.

          At the same time, the figure of 10 km is shown conditionally in the figure - if the rocket’s seeker sees a higher target at twice the distance, then the reduction to 5 meters will occur earlier.
  • The comment was deleted.
  • opus
    opus 26 January 2016 20: 51 New
    0
    Quote: Falcon
    They want to monitor the final stage of the RCC approach, missile defense and the far zone will continue to be provided by Burke with AN / SPY-1!

    not. It is looking whose concept.
    Lockheed AMDR:


    S and X
    Northrop Grumman AMDR S-Band only
    [img] [/ img] http://ipic.su/img/img7/fs/-02.1453830666.jpg

    but "light"

    Raytheon
    S and X


    And then there's Australia with its ANZAC upgrade (S-band active array and X-band phased-array technology)
    [img] http://ipic.su/img/img7/fs/01.1453830553.jpg [/ img]



    yes and CEAFAR / CEAMOUNT (S-band active phased array radar, and it's designed to be supplemented with the X-band CEAMOUNT Solid State)


    AUSPAR project (CEA Saab 9LV)


    pinned:
    Quote: Author
    Based on the top figure with the diagram, you can see that the AMDR radar is composed of two main elements, similar standard version of Aegis.

    MRLS and BIUS are still different things.
    It’s much more correct to talk about radar



    and there is nothing "similar"
    Already SPY-1E may affect stability (stability) of the upgraded Arly Burks, because the phased array panels of the radar weigh more, than early SPY-1 radar panelswhich she will replace. While the SPY-1E's stuffing is concentrated in the panels, freeing up more space below deck, this more weight will be added to the ship's superstructure. Combined with the DDG-51's relatively narrow hull width and short length, this can cause stability problems, especially when sailing in stormy weather. "
  • Alex_59
    Alex_59 26 January 2016 07: 10 New
    10
    AMDR antenna post will be 1,5 — 2 times higher than AN / SPY-1, and therefore the radio horizon will increase by tens of kilometers.
    Why not hundreds of kilometers? At Burke, AN / SPY-1 is located 15 meters from the water, which gives a radio horizon of 15,5 kilometers. If you raise it 2 times higher, up to 30 meters (at such a height, for example, there is a radar of BPC ave. 1155), then the radio horizon will increase to 21 kilometers. 15,5 and 21 are on dozens of kilometers more? Physics is not the Senate; you cannot fool it.
    1. Bennert
      Bennert 26 January 2016 07: 50 New
      +1
      Quote: Alex_59
      U Berk AN / SPY-1 is located 15 meters from the water, ..If you raise it 2 times higher, up to 30 meters (at this height, for example, there is a radar BOD pr. 1155)


      BOD "Admiral Panteleev" and Burke

      then the horizon will increase to 21 kilometers

      Do not forget to take into account your own target height, this is a minimum of 1,5-2 times greater detection range for low-flying anti-ship missiles

      So the Berks are not so helpless, but about tens of kilometers the author, of course, bent
      1. Alex_59
        Alex_59 26 January 2016 08: 05 New
        -2
        Quote: BENNERT
        Do not forget to take into account your own height goals

        This is the radio horizon for the target at an altitude of 5 meters, and not along the water's edge. The water will be even smaller. You can calculate for yourself, the radius of the Earth is known.
        1. Bennert
          Bennert 26 January 2016 08: 28 New
          +1
          Quote: Alex_59
          You can calculate for yourself, the radius of the Earth is known.



          5 meters is too small. From such a height the missile seeker will not see the ship, especially when the waves

          1. Alex_59
            Alex_59 26 January 2016 09: 05 New
            +2
            Quote: BENNERT
            meters - too few. From such a height the missile seeker will not see the ship, especially when the waves
            Yes, that’s understandable. This is all very approximate. How it will turn out in real life only Allah knows.

            And you have some kind of brain-bearing formula. Everything is simpler seems to be considered. (ACOS (R / (R + H))) * 3,14 * R / 180
            The numbers on 10 meters are the same for Burke - 23 km.
            1. Bennert
              Bennert 26 January 2016 09: 14 New
              0
              Quote: Alex_59
              And you have some kind of brain-bearing formula.

              much easier
              3,5 to the root of the height
              observer height, result in kilometers
          2. aleks 62 next
            aleks 62 next 26 January 2016 12: 04 New
            0
            ..... 5 meters is too small. From such a height, the ship will not see the missile’s missile, especially when the sea is rough ...

            .... And she actually does not need it throughout the flight .... Rocket flight profile: start (direction according to preliminary data), climb, at altitude - adjust the direction to the target, go down, on approach (for 10- 20 km) turning on the GOS (she will already see) and the final adjustment of the direction to the target and the mode of approach to it .... Something like this .... Options are possible ... hi
            1. goose
              goose 26 January 2016 13: 41 New
              -2
              I’m afraid to grieve you all: winged anti-ship missiles of the sizes Harpoon, Uranus, Exoset or Granite flying at an altitude of 5 m with a wave of about 1-2 m are an extremely difficult target, both in terms of detection, and in tracking, and in target designation. ARGSN capture such a target uncertainly, and the illumination from the ship takes place to give large errors and uncertain selection on the background of the sea. For semi-active missiles, the centimeter range has a huge advantage over the decimeter range.
            2. opus
              opus 26 January 2016 20: 45 New
              0
              Quote: aleks 62 next
              . Possible options ..



              Quote: BENNERT
              5 meters is too small. From such a height the missile seeker will not see the ship, especially when the waves


              options are

              Harpoon is coming 15 m on the march (no 5 m) and at the same height includes ARLGSN, and the search is at a maximum of 45 degrees to the course:

              at 2-5 m, it fails before the goal, bypassing the air defense


              and "5m" you confuse BENNERT with anti-ship missiles Tomahawk
              but there 5 m is the same "conditional"





              on the march the ARLGSN is off, the rocket moves along the INS to a given area, what the fuck is "target search" with a low-altitude flight profile?

              jump from 5 to 100 m with the inclusion of ARLGSN

              ARLGSN they have the same AN ​​/ DSQ-28 and

              Our "Klabs" 3M-54E work according to the same scheme: 20 m on the march on subsonic - a slide with ARGS -54 switched on - 10 m in attack (though at 3M speed - that's all).

              Quote: goose
              extremely difficult target, both in detection range and in tracking



              For subsonic (at the attack site) RCC low altitude one of the few advantages to overcome shipborne missile defensedifficult to detect
            3. Boa kaa
              Boa kaa 26 January 2016 22: 32 New
              +1
              Quote: aleks 62 next
              Rocket Flight Profile: Options ...
              When firing at 500-600 km, our products are forced to follow the B14 trajectory. Considering that the "window" of sighting r / l of the seeker is about 150 km, then at this distance the seeker is switched on. Single-channel has long been gone. Therefore, the anti-ship missile system goes under the radio zone after capturing the target, about 100 km before the target. Further VZOI and target distribution of salvo missiles. Further cover by means of REP. The caliber to increase the speed and reduce the EPR generally "shoots" a warhead of 200 kg of explosives. The "ax" is looking for targets in the OVPC, flying along the "snake" at an altitude of 50-100m. "Harpoon", as a rule, is fired according to VII data. And all modern anti-ship missiles, having an on-board computer, operate according to the "fire-forget" principle. After launch, the carrier is free, it does not control the anti-ship missile system, as it was previously with the P-5. (P-35).
              Therefore, the statement of the esteemed Mladá Husa
              illumination from the ship takes place to give large errors and uncertain selection on the background of the sea.
              Rather, it refers to the RCC of the last century, having the TU + SN scheme.
              Yours faithfully, hi
          3. The comment was deleted.
  • Mera joota
    Mera joota 26 January 2016 07: 27 New
    +2
    How easily the author jumps from 1983. currently drawing an analogy of the first Tiki with Gorshkov who has not yet been accepted by the fleet.
    But the vaunted AEGIS CUS

    Well, what without contemptuous spitting.
    Initially, Ticonderoga-class RKRs (CG 47-51) were equipped with SM-2 naval air defense systems with the Mk26 dual inclined launcher

    The author, how many Tiki buildings were without UVP and where are they now? It has long been written off and remained only in memory.
    rocket attack of the Bazalt and Granit-type rocket launchers, whose missiles fly at speeds of up to 2M at fairly low altitudes.

    The author likes to load with abbreviations clearly not knowing what is behind them. NOT UP TO 2M, but up to 1,5M when flying at low (relatively) altitude. Despite the fact that the range is 600 km. achieved ONLY when flying at "high enough altitudes". And "Granite" and "Basalt" when starting at max. the range represented fairly simple targets for air defense, albeit supersonic because they had dimensions slightly less than the MiG-21 and glowed on the radar indicators like garlands on a Christmas tree.
    Later, improved versions of the Aegis main radar appeared - AN / SPY-1B / D / D (V)

    Maybe the author will immediately start with Aegis baseline 9? Nine Karl!
    but the general radar architecture and the principle of its operation remained the same: only 3-4 SPG-62 do not allow Aegis to hit multiple low-altitude and high-speed targets with low EPR. Therefore, the US Navy continues to search for the most correct and economically feasible solution that allows Aegis to successfully counter modern anti-ship missiles.

    The decision has long been made, his name AN ​​/ SPQ-9B, stands on all of Nimitz, San Antonio, America and the upgraded Ticks.
    The technical and organizational issues of the development and construction of a heavy missile defense ship based on the LPD-17 "San Antonio" class docking helicopter dock were agreed.

    The decision is delusional and rejected. And so yes, in the style of Oleg Kaptsov (although he is not the author), there would still be 300 mm armor in a circle including a superstructure and deck and nuclear power plant ...
    1. Bennert
      Bennert 26 January 2016 08: 01 New
      +1
      Quote: Mera Joota
      And so yes, in the style of Oleg Kaptsov (although he is not the author), there would still be 300 mm armor in a circle including a superstructure and deck and nuclear power plant ...

      Kaptsov did not call for the creation of super-expensive missile defense ships with an ammunition charge for a billion dollars on the basis of unprotected bulk carriers

      And where does the atomic power plant?

      Incidentally, the San Antonio was also considered an artillery support ship - a cheap replacement for the Zamvolt. Stable platform with a pair of 155mm AGS cannons.
  • Bennert
    Bennert 26 January 2016 07: 41 New
    +5
    Quote: Author
    Big AR works in the C-band of decimeter waves and is intended for the review and target designation of small multi-channel on-load tap-changer. Small radar operates in the X-band, and is designed to "capture" and firing targets. But unlike the American SPG-62, the Japanese illumination radar is multi-channel and is represented by a compact AFAR. This suggests that the FCA-3A is able to provide defense against a massive strike with low-flying anti-ship missiles.

    C-range - centimeter waves, length 3,5 ... 7,5 cm

    The loss of signal power increases with its frequency (and is inversely proportional to the wavelength)



    Therefore, unlike the American Aegis, the Japanese radar is unsuitable for zonal air defense / missile defense.
    The system is used for defense in the near zone and is installed on the Akizuki mini-destroyers and Hyuga helicopter carriers (the Izumo has a stripped-down version - 4 observation grids, no guidance)
    fit in 2 Mk 41 ESSM missiles, which can be used with significant numerical superiority of enemy air attack means. Add to this number another 488 long-range missile defense RIM-61A and 161 “Tomahawk” in the remaining two Mk 61 - not a single modern warship with such ammunition is known.

    The cost of such ammunition would be more than $ 1,5 billion, more expensive than the ship itself

    Why put all your eggs in one basket?
    When used in the main “San Antonio” add-in, the AMDR antenna post will be 1,5–2 times higher than AN / SPY-1, and therefore the radio horizon will increase by tens of kilometers.

    Check it out?

    The height of the HEADLIGHTS on the Berks is about 12 meters above sea level.
    In this case, the detection range of low-flying anti-ship missiles (10 meters) would be: 12 + 11 = 23 km

    The height of the HEADLIGHT installation on San Antonio is, say, 2 times higher, 24 meters
    In this case, the detection range of low-flying anti-ship missiles (10 meters) would be: 17 + 11 = 28 km

    And where are the promised dozens ??
  • gregor6549
    gregor6549 26 January 2016 07: 59 New
    +5
    The project is very serious, but so far only a project. How many such projectors have already been covered with a copper basin after the tests showed that "it was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines ...." This applies to the radar, and the super duper computer, and to the ship as a whole, and to whoever will catch up with whom and will overtake and what. Life has already shown that any most sophisticated ship in itself in the field is not a warrior. When he works in a ship group (not necessarily AUG) balanced in manpower and resources and is provided with information about the tactical situation in the required volume and quality, then each ship and the group as a whole is a serious force.
    The same calibers were effective in Syria because the Navy was able to provide sufficiently complete and accurate information about the targets. And by definition, the ships themselves cannot obtain such information even if they hang the most radar radars with a very active array on them. Here, the satellite constellation must admonish, and AWACs, and special forces special purpose illumination at the final stage, will not hurt.
    1. Vadim237
      Vadim237 26 January 2016 11: 35 New
      0
      In technical terms, the United States will not have any problems - they will already combine serial ships and missiles with the new radar, but they will bring these works to the end - the country is not backward in US electronics.
      1. gregor6549
        gregor6549 26 January 2016 12: 07 New
        +1
        Not everything is so simple even for a country with a high level of development of radio electronics. The Customer strives to equip each new ship with the latest weapons and other equipment. Including those that are often in a "raw" form, despite the fact that the United States pays great attention to risk assessment and tries to minimize them.
        Particular difficulties, as a rule, relate to the development of software and the integration of different types of weapons into a single system.
        At one time, the Australians made a big mistake when developing software for their Collins-class submarines, although from the point of view of technology, the submarines were built from components that were ready-made and mastered by industry and also by the fleets of other countries.
        The same "Zamvolt" is still "limping" on one or the other leg, although it is based on a completely developed design of catamarans and trimaranes, mass-produced by Austal.
        When you are dealing with a projected missile defense ship that must withstand the modern and promising missile and anti-ship missiles of a potential enemy, i.e. Russia and China, the difficulties increase by an order of magnitude or even two compared to ships of other types. Moreover, no country has yet had a solid base for testing technical solutions for missile defense systems in any country. Single targets and simple stirring conditions are not yet the base. What will happen to this system with the combined effects of BR, KR EW, EMI and other things, God alone knows, but God, alas, does not design and build ships.
        1. Vadim237
          Vadim237 26 January 2016 20: 13 New
          +1
          Apart from nuclear submarines with ICBMs, the US Navy has nothing to oppose our fleet with.
        2. Boa kaa
          Boa kaa 26 January 2016 22: 54 New
          +2
          Quote: gregor6549
          but God, alas, does not design and build ships.
          This is done by people - scientists, engineers, technologists and shipbuilders - whom he touched with his hand!
          Therefore, our submarines (modestly keep silent about NK) have always stood in the breakthrough directions of the development of the fleet.
      2. Orionvit
        Orionvit 26 January 2016 17: 03 New
        +1
        She was not backward, well, maybe now by inertia, and even then, judging by the iPhone. The states have a terrible shortage of qualified personnel, as in Europe. More will come next. In most large corporations, most engineers are Chinese, Russians, Hindus, Japanese, and even Vietnamese. There are already not enough of them.
    2. Orionvit
      Orionvit 26 January 2016 17: 11 New
      0
      "It was smooth on paper, but they forgot about the ravines ...." That's for sure. You can endlessly discuss the characteristics of ships and aircraft, but until it comes to a direct combat collision, this is all talk. It's great when there are ships and complexes, but everything is decided by specialists, trained crews and fighting spirit. The states have had some problems with this lately.
  • red_october
    red_october 26 January 2016 09: 34 New
    +9
    From the memoirs of a retired fleet admiral, Selivanov, Valentin Yegorovich, commander of the Mediterranean 5 th squadron (recorded in 2009)

    ... The sea was filled with warships from many countries, constantly ready for combat. All the time there were two American aircraft carriers. One carrier group is based in Naples, the other in Haifa, Israel. My forces were so strong that one part was in the Tunis region, the other in the Sallum Bay. Each unit was aimed at its own enemy aircraft carrier group. Each aircraft carrier was accompanied by our submarines with anti-ship missiles. Our tracking ship was always near the aircraft carrier, which tracked every takeoff of an American carrier-based aircraft and transmitted this data to the boats. In addition to boats, each aircraft carrier was accompanied by our KUG-s (ship strike groups). If this is a cruiser with a missile range of three hundred to three hundred and fifty kilometers, then it goes at a distance of three hundred kilometers from the enemy's AUG (aircraft carrier strike group). I tried to distribute forces in such a way that at least thirty of our missiles were aimed at each American aircraft carrier, ready to launch missiles in two minutes. And every hour I gave all the means of the squadron updated target designation, the enemy was constantly on the crosshair. And we, of course, were also targeted by the Americans. At the same time, twenty-five percent, that is, every fourth of our missiles, were equipped with nuclear weapons. There are eight missiles on the boat, two of them with nuclear warheads. On the RRC (missile cruiser) "Slava" - sixteen missiles, four of them with nuclear warheads. The Soviet Union once assumed the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. But it is difficult to say how it would have been done during the war. For example, if in battle I have already fired all my missiles with conventional ammunition, but they continue to attack me from all sides, and no one can help me? How can you end resistance without exhausting your main striking power?
    Our calculations showed that in those years their AUG was capable of assassinating twenty-two missiles. Already the twenty third rocket aircraft carrier catches overboard. Twenty-fourth could be shot down again, but then they could miss three consecutive and so on. That is, when exceeding twenty-two missiles in a simultaneous salvo, we have already with a high degree of probability hit the main target - an aircraft carrier. Therefore, we believed that thirty missiles should always be ready for launch. But I honestly never believed that the Americans would really be able to shoot down all the first twenty-two rockets. I am sure that this number would not exceed ten. I have observed the combat training of their anti-aircraft gunners many times. They always fired only at parachute targets. We didn’t even think of shooting, we never shot at parachute targets. It's just a laugh, giveaway! We always fired on practical rockets. Those that fly to you clearly, at real speeds, from different directions.
    1. Bennert
      Bennert 26 January 2016 10: 02 New
      +2
      Quote: red_october
      Many times I watched the combat training of their anti-aircraft gunners. They always fired only at parachute targets.

      High-speed target simulator AQM-37 "Jayhawk". The first flight took place in May 1961, entered service with the US Navy in 1963. 5000 units were built.

      Able to simulate the flight of supersonic cruise missiles and ballistic missile warheads for the training and training of Navy defense / missile defense calculations. The U.S. Navy used the F-4 Phantom (also the A-4 and A-6 carrier-based attack aircraft).



      Length: 4,27 m
      Wingspan: 1,00 m
      Height: 0,66 m
      Total weight: 280 kg
      Propulsion: 1hRD Rocketdyne LR64-NA-4 with a thrust of 3,78 kN
      Maximum speed: Mach 4,0
      Distance: 180 km
      Ceiling: 30000 m
    2. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 26 January 2016 11: 51 New
      -5
      "We have always fired at practical missiles. Those that fly at you clearly,
      at real speeds, from different directions. "////

      Missile defense at that time was not. Radars with computers connected to anti-aircraft guns - too.
      That is, they fired from anti-aircraft guns with a daytime optical sight.

      And they shot down all the rockets? But did the Americans have marine CDs at that time?
      They usually attacked aircraft with aircraft carriers in large numbers.
  • red_october
    red_october 26 January 2016 09: 34 New
    +6
    ... I remember when I was a division commander in the Baltic Fleet we conducted exercises. At Cape Taran, in my detachment, twelve missiles were launched simultaneously from different directions. Part of the missiles was launched at us from a submarine, and at the same time missile boats attacked us from different sides. We then shot down nine missiles on our own. At the same time, our missiles are smart, they, if they meet a less interesting target, they miss it, look for something larger. If the destroyer is on the way to the aircraft carrier, then a missile from the starboard or port side will bypass it and fly to that target with a larger reflecting surface, that is, it will find the aircraft carrier. Moreover, the accuracy of our missiles is simply phenomenal. I saw dozens of missile training launches and almost always they hit not just the target, but also the geometric middle of the target.
    There was such a case, our destroyer, project 956, was sold to the Chinese. And there, in China, the first shooting was carried out, which was attended by our specialists. The Chinese set a goal: a decommissioned tanker for one thousand and one and a half tons. Usually the target is placed on two anchors so that the working width of the target is large. But then this tanker fell off the stern barrel and stood up to the firing destroyer stern so that the target width turned out to be no more than fifteen meters, and the tanker, apparently, was full of holes, gradually sagging in the water and by the time of launch its nose was heavily lifted. So, our rocket hit exactly the middle of the deck, into the superstructure, pierced through it, went through the hull and turned the bow of the tanker along the stem. The Chinese were shocked. On submarines, missiles were even smarter. If the commander decides to fire a salvo of eight missiles at once, then he fires them one by one, then the missiles themselves in the sky line up in battle formation, and only then they go to the target. There were summaries when it was reported that all missile launches were one hundred percent hits. Sometimes, quite rarely, there could be problems with the rocket itself at launch, engine failure or some kind of system. But if our rocket has entered the course, then you can be sure that it will find its target and will definitely hit the geometric mean. So we were proud of our weapons, respected our weapons. Therefore, I am sure that the Americans would never have shot down our twenty-two missiles in case of war! And, as I said, there were at least thirty for each AUG! And that was 1977-78. Then our training and weapon capabilities only improved.
    1. voyaka uh
      voyaka uh 26 January 2016 11: 41 New
      -7
      "We then shot down nine missiles on our own." ////

      What if this is no longer a secret? And what missiles did you shoot down?
      1. aleks 62 next
        aleks 62 next 26 January 2016 12: 20 New
        +2
        ..... We then shot down nine missiles on our own. "////

        What if this is no longer a secret? And what missiles did you shoot down?

        ... In vain you make mistakes .... At long range - with air defense missiles, close ("last chance") - AK-630 (it was created precisely for such purposes, and not to beat planes and scows), consumption of 1 CD up to 1200-1500 rounds (well, or so), well, and "very close" (1-3 km) RBU complexes (low-flying -5-10 m) .... hi
      2. red_october
        red_october 26 January 2016 13: 17 New
        0
        Quote: voyaka uh
        "We then shot down nine missiles on our own." ////

        What if this is no longer a secret? And what missiles did you shoot down?


        Conduct a dialogue with Valentin Yegorovich Selivanov (retired fleet admiral, commanded the 5 squadron), I published his memoirs, about which I wrote in the 1 post.

        In the photo: Valentin Egorovich in the foreground. TAKR, March 1987
        1. tlauicol
          tlauicol 26 January 2016 15: 15 New
          0
          And what kind of submarine did the RCC launch in the Baltic, if not a secret?
          1. opus
            opus 26 January 2016 22: 20 New
            0
            Quote: Tlauicol
            And what kind of submarine did the RCC launch in the Baltic, if not a secret?

            project 877 "Halibut" most likely B-227 "Vyborg", Kyrgyzstan Turquoise 3M-54TE1K
          2. Boa kaa
            Boa kaa 27 January 2016 00: 10 New
            +2
            Quote: Tlauicol
            And what kind of submarine did the RCC launch in the Baltic, if not a secret?
            DPLC pr 651 and let. 16 dpi
            1. tlauicol
              tlauicol 27 January 2016 07: 24 New
              0
              this (pr 651) is more like the truth hi
        2. voyaka uh
          voyaka uh 28 January 2016 17: 47 New
          0
          for red_october:

          Excuse me, claims, of course, are not against you, but against the admiral, or rather, I think
          to the journalist who edited his memoirs.
          The fact is that in those years neither Russians nor Americans knew how to
          knock down kp. Automatic guns only in the last decade
          received radars, computers and SLAs, allowing you to lead and hit such targets.
          Therefore, I tend to doubt the fidelity of his memoirs.
          The USSR’s naval KR was then very advanced, but the ship’s missile defense
          was still, as they say, "in diapers."
      3. The comment was deleted.
  • The comment was deleted.
  • Forest
    Forest 26 January 2016 10: 52 New
    0
    What is the confrontation with the US Navy? First we need to at least catch up in the region with the rather weak Navy of our neighbors, and only then think about competition with the most powerful fleet in the world.
    1. Vadim237
      Vadim237 26 January 2016 11: 39 New
      0
      If we have a sharp budget cut, then most likely the cost of re-equipping the fleet will be reduced - as the most expensive part of the defense budget, only R&D will leave the construction of strategic nuclear submarines and auxiliary vessels.
  • voyaka uh
    voyaka uh 26 January 2016 11: 39 New
    0
    Specialized missile defense ship based on the converted
    helicopter carrier to guard the aircraft carrier?

    A curious, albeit clearly temporary solution.
    1. gregor6549
      gregor6549 26 January 2016 14: 39 New
      0
      And why is it a bad decision? Such a ship is quite suitable for locating the radars used in the missile defense system, and in terms of the number of vertical missile launcher installations and replenished ammunition, it has fewer restrictions than the destroyer. With the deployment of near-missile defense systems (missile and artillery), everything should also be OK.
      1. Mooh
        Mooh 27 January 2016 01: 10 New
        0
        Its cons stem from its pros. It is large, cheap and highly specialized.
  • sevtrash
    sevtrash 26 January 2016 14: 22 New
    0
    It seems like a temporary step in relation to the confrontation with China. AOG with such an element of a missile defense system will probably be able to withstand hypothetical attacks by anti-ship missiles; therefore, American admirals can send AUGs to problem areas.
    1. Boa kaa
      Boa kaa 27 January 2016 00: 20 New
      +1
      Quote: sevtrash
      therefore, American admirals can send AUGs to problem areas.
      Of course they can! That's what they are admirals!
      That's just the question: is it necessary? Until they neutralize the DF-21D, closer than 800 miles they will not dare to approach. Chinese PLA (rattles) against the Elk will not pull. Therefore, the main threat to Amer’s AVUs is ballistic anti-ship missiles, aviation and AvKPR.
      1. Falcon
        Falcon 27 January 2016 09: 03 New
        0
        Quote: Boa constrictor KAA
        Until they neutralize the DF-21D, closer 800 miles will not dare to approach


        I believe that the abilities of DF-21D are greatly exaggerated. And many are cunning - saying that this is a super rocket capable of sinking everything and everyone.

        Enough at a distance of hundreds of kilometers. to have a couple of burks with sm-3 - which will calmly cover the whole group from any anti-ship missiles.

        The price-effectiveness of DF-21D is greatly exaggerated ... But there have been solutions for a long time.

        At worst, a barge with THAAD laughing
  • rubidiy
    rubidiy 26 January 2016 17: 18 New
    +2
    Quote: voyaka uh
    Missile defense at that time was not. Radars with computers connected to anti-aircraft guns - too.

    who told you this? Specify what "that time" is. Do they teach you this in Israeli schools?

    on this topic:

    the entire article is packed with jumping from one unsupported conclusion to another. It makes no sense to refute or confirm it, because It’s no secret that the closest development of high-precision weapons is a weapon with hypersonic speed. Moreover, the fact that such weapons will be created and adopted in the near future does not raise questions. But what will bring him down is a big question.
    1. misterwulf
      misterwulf 26 January 2016 20: 01 New
      0
      Electromagnetic gun? So it is necessary to bring it to mind and learn how to get out of it for hypersonic targets ... belay
  • misterwulf
    misterwulf 26 January 2016 19: 15 New
    0
    Why should you shoot rockets at this coffin at all? Thank God that we got rid of the likes of Mistrals. The German submarine of WW2 will cope with it without any missiles. And Marinesco on his own with two.
    It’s a lot of honor to shoot at such a RCC trough.
    For such a cargo ship you need a full-fledged AUG (in the sense of escort).
  • Operator
    Operator 27 January 2016 15: 36 New
    0
    Quote: opus
    Radar with LPI for ships is just starting to take its first "steps

    Radar "Obzor" http://rawenstvo.ru/ru/products/radar
    1. opus
      opus 28 January 2016 21: 23 New
      +1
      Quote: Operator
      Radar "Obzor"

      1. Is it for "ships"?

      Repetition
      Quote: opus
      Shipborne LPI Radar just beginning to take the first "steps


      2.This radar has no LPI (R) mode

      If it looks like a picture:

      this does not mean that the "Review" has an LPI mode.
      You just think fool -civil low probability of intercept radar -not needed.
      ====================
      Threat at least read what it was about, Before nonsense to write

      Low probability of interception
      <br>•
      Another is to try to make the signal so weak
      that the ESM system cannot detect it.
      Intercepting Modern Radar
      • Lower Peak Power helps the radar
      • Earlier Radar designs were concerned with
      target detection and with ECM
      • Today's radar designs are also concerned
      with Countering ESM (Intercept Receivers)
      • Tomorrow's Intercept Receivers must cope
      with new types of Radar Signals
      .

      Today's LPI Radars
      <br>•
      Netherlands–
      Signaal: Squire Portable Battlefield
      Surv. (Man @ 10km, jeep @ 16 km); Scout FMCW Naval / Coastal Border Surv.
      (Ship / Truck mount); Page FMCW Gap filler SHORAD
      (manpack and other platforms available) (fighter at 16 KM)
      • Sweden–
      CelciusTech: Pilot FMCW, Shipboard, RF Switch to use
      existing T / R and Antenna or LPI (1MW-1W)
      -
      Ericsson: HARD (60W peak power in Whispering mode) used
      for SHORAD
      <br>•
      FGAN (Germany) OLPI-- Dev. Model

      Quote: Operator
      Out of date - Russian X-band PMM based on LTCC ceramics has dimensions of the order of 20x20x13 mm

      Another stupid thing.
      Does the size of the MRP for the issue matter?
      Are you striving for a point?
      1. Operator
        Operator 29 January 2016 10: 28 New
        0
        LPI it is such a LPI laughing

        The presence of LPI depends on the corresponding digital (high-current and computing) equipment of the RL system. It will be necessary, fastened such to the listed domestic radars.

        Look at your own graph of the power of two radar signals - the areas of the high-power and low-power signals are equal to each other, which means that the signal energy is also equal. The difference is that the first one "pierces" a greater distance than the second one.
        LPI, being defective in terms of target detection, is strong in another — deception of old SPO aircraft due to the noise-like nature of signals that cannot be classified by these same STRs. And the passive means of the RTR itself (both old and new) perfectly catch the source of LPI radio emission, and (as you understand) at a distance exceeding the detection range of the radar (exactly as they catch the signals of radio altimeters, cell phones, etc., etc. .P.).
        Well, the power of the LPI pulse is not 10, but, say, 1 kW (kilowatts, Karl), it is still nothing compared to the radio airspace measured in watts (Watts, Karl).

        The size of the APM AFM when digitally processing a signal (and the other is not there) matters - the smaller the pixel (i.e. the single channel PPM, up to a quarter of the wave inclusive), the more pixels in the matrix (i.e., AFAR with given dimensions), the greater the resolution RL system as a whole.
  • Operator
    Operator 27 January 2016 15: 54 New
    0
    Radar complexes;
    - "Prut" development NIPKTI "Radar";
    - “Garpun-Ball”, “Borey”, “Ash”, “Kodak” and “Monument” developed by FGUP TsNII “Granit”;
    - “MRK-50” developed by FGUP PP “Equality”.
  • Operator
    Operator 27 January 2016 22: 03 New
    0
    Quote: opus
    PMM - here he is

    Out of date - Russian X-band PMM based on LTCC ceramics has dimensions of the order of 20x20x13 mm
    http://www.niipp.ru/catalog/detail.php?ID=245