Missile defense missile defense
Despite Russia's well-founded and repeated objections, the United States continues to deploy a global anti-missile defense system (PRO), which seems to be directed primarily against the Russian strategic nuclear forces.
Provisions for these purposes are not reduced. Thus, for the 2016 fiscal year, the Pentagon Directorate of Missile Defense (UPRD) requested 8,127 billion dollars, while the total for the development of a missile defense system, taking into account research and development (R & D), was $ 9,6 billion. with the 2016 to 2020 fiscal year, the FPRO will receive a total of 38 billion.
The Pentagon, which currently has a group of ships equipped with the Ajis combat information management system (BIUS) as part of the 33 pennants, intends to continue to replenish their number. In the current year, two more destroyers will be added to the two ships from the Aegis CMS at the Spanish naval base (Navy), which intend to periodically appear in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.
FEATURES OF TESTS
The program of testing various types of US-assault missile attack weapons will continue: starting from 2001, 82 tests have been conducted, of which 66, or 80%, have been successful. Although some Russian experts dispute these totals, which are regularly updated by the Pentagon’s NMD, they cannot be ignored, since the Russian side is unable to inspect such tests or receive relevant telemetric data from the American side.
It should be borne in mind that the United States continues to test tests of all types of home-launched missile defense systems of the United States, including in land and sea versions. Increased accuracy of destruction, range and speed of interceptor missiles. Anti-missile missile models appeared, equipped with several individual-targeting kinetic warheads, a kind of anti-missile means with repetitive individual-targeting warheads (MILVI).
Anti-missile weapons were tested with simultaneous interception and destruction of several targets (up to four) in the form of ballistic and cruise missiles. The ability to recognize real and false warheads of ICBMs and SLBMs after dilution of the warheads is improved. In February of this year, flight tests of sea-based interceptor missiles with 4.0 software and the use of a simultaneous recognition program for three ballistic targets were conducted.
Combined tests were carried out with the parallel use of attack weapons of land and sea missile defense systems of three different combat echelons: the Patriot air defense missile system, THAAD type missile interceptor missile interceptors for intercepting ballistic and cruise missiles at the final phase of their flight and SM Standard interceptor missiles -3 latest developments.
In the current fiscal year, the Pentagon intends to acquire 209 interceptor missiles of the Standard type SM-3 modified Block IB. In the 2016 fiscal year, the total number of interceptor missiles of a mobile THAAD type theater missile defense system will reach 155 units. I must say that this system shows the highest efficiency in testing (100%).
Successfully, according to the Pentagon, the first phase of the “European Phased Adaptive Approach” to the PRO (EPA) problem was completed. The second phase of the “approach” will be completed on schedule in the current year; it will probably also be fully implemented.
FACTOR OF DEWESELU AND REDZIKOVO
This year, the first ground-based operational complex of the US missile defense system will be put into operation on the Romanian military air base (VVB) Deveselu in the south of the country, which will be equipped with standard SM-3 type antimissiles. In May of this year, the American Pentagon's UMPRO began a three-month commissioning cycle there. Upon their completion in August – September 2015, the facility will be officially transferred to the full control of the Pentagon, and by the end of this year it will take up combat duty with the 24 Standard Missile SM-3 Block IB, becoming the first element of the US ground-based missile defense system in Europe, equipped with the most effective antimissiles. The complex at Deveselu will work in close cooperation with the naval groups of the US Navy deployed in the Mediterranean and Black Seas.
The construction of a second US ground-based operational missile defense system in Poland (in Redzikowo near Słupsk) will begin in the 2016 fiscal year. It will be equipped with new Standard II SM-3 interceptor missiles in the Block IIA modification, capable of intercepting ICBMs, as evidenced by the research department of the American University of Utah. The guidance system for such missiles is being developed by the United States together with Japan. In June of this year, the American-Japanese flight tests of an interceptor missile of this class in the Pacific Ocean without the use of a target missile, which were completed successfully, were first conducted.
This year, the opening of the Joint Center for the Development and Management of a Missile Defense System, in which 5500 specialists working in this field from missile defense, missile defense command, space command, strategic command of the ground forces and other structures will work.
ATTRACTING ALLIES
The USRO Department of Defense continues to engage NATO allies in expanding missile defense cooperation. The relevant command and staff structures of the United States and NATO to manage the forces and means of the global anti-missile defense infrastructure have been created and are operating. A real-time communications system for command and control structures of the United States and NATO global missile defense system, including jointly with US Navy command and control groups equipped with Aegis ICS, through anti-missile control centers, including Integrated Functional Component Command, was created and tested in real time. integrated missile defense system (WWB Shriver, Colorado, USA), the Operational Missile Defense Support Center (Ramstein, Germany) and the Pentagon.
In March of this year, the United States offered all countries of the Transatlantic Alliance to purchase from them a “fully operational missile defense system,” including appropriate sensors, interceptor missiles and command and control means to control this system. NATO allies are also invited to modernize their existing missile defense sensors, as well as join four countries (Spain, Poland, Romania and Turkey), which have already provided their territory for the deployment of US operational anti-missile systems on it. Washington draws attention to the importance of strengthening interoperability of such systems within NATO.
The FRG decided to purchase European MEADS advanced air defense / anti-missile defense systems (up to 12 complexes), which will replace the Patriot air defense system by the 2025 year.
Photo from www.navy.mil
The search continues for the optimal location for the deployment of a third positional area in the continental United States for the installation of a ground-based missile defense system: Fort Drum near New York, Portsmouth military range in Maine, military base Ravenna in Ohio or Fort Custer in Michigan. These works are expected to be completed in the 2016 year. All 44 interceptor missiles (2017 year) will be installed on time.
The US missile defense system is posed a strategic task - first of all, to increase the defense of the continental US from cruise missiles of various basing methods, since the Pentagon believes that such missiles can be used against the metropolitan region before a potential enemy launches a nuclear missile attack with the help of ICBMs and SLBMs. The shock-kinetic warhead of the interceptor missiles deployed on the continental US will be updated.
The second US AN / TPY-2 mobile anti-missile defense radar system was introduced in Japan at Kyogamisaki in the south of Japan. In total, five such radars have already been installed in the United States and its allies (Israel, Turkey, Japan, and the United States). In the future, it is planned to install 12 such radars in aggregate in the continental American territory and abroad.
US cooperation with Israel will continue in the area of improving the Israeli missile defense system “Iron Dome”, “Prasta David”, as well as joint tests of the Israeli missile defense system “Arrow-3”.
The Pentagon will continue to interact with the states of the Persian Gulf to develop their missile defense system. Over the past two years, senior State Department officials have visited the region seven times for this purpose. Washington’s motives remain the same: it is necessary to jointly confront the remaining threats to the countries of the region and uphold common security interests. On the basis of an agreement from 26 December 2014, an agreement was reached on strengthening the operational cooperation of the parties in the field of missile defense between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which will cover the entire area of this area. In April of this year, a first missile defense seminar was held in Washington between representatives of the United States and the GCC, and in May, a broad discussion was held at Camp David with the participation of President Barack Obama on US-SSG cooperation in the field of anti-missile defense. In particular, an agreement was reached on deploying an early-warning of a missile attack in the Gulf zone with American technical assistance from the radar station.
For the first time, the most intensive degree of interaction between the United States and the GCC is achieved, in particular, there is an agreement to expand the planning and conduct of exercises using strike-fighting missile defense systems. In the UAE will be delivered all the means of a mobile TV missile defense system type THAAD, that is, radar, controls and interceptor missiles needed to complete two batteries.
THREATS ARE NOT ONLY FOR RUSSIA
There are two types of prospective threats associated with the US missile shield, which are rarely paid attention or not paid attention at all either in our country or abroad.
The first threat: the real possibility of an overwhelming concentration of missile defense weapons of the United States and its allies in the oceans, where up to 95% of US interceptor missiles will be concentrated. In total, the naval fleets of 12 states of the world have the means of missile defense. They have carrier ships of strike-and-combat weapons of missile defense systems of 20 type. Such ships can be completely uncontrolled and pre-move in the oceans, using the right of freedom of navigation in the open sea beyond the outer limit of territorial waters.
The second threat: the greatest military-strategic danger due to the uncontrolled deployment of the US missile defense system will manifest itself in the coming years. Supposedly, in 7 – 10 years or even earlier, the United States will produce more interceptor missiles for the global land-based and sea-based missile defense system than Russia will have for strategic nuclear carriers in accordance with the provisions of the Prague START-3 treaty after its full implementation. By this time, the US will have 2400 interceptor missiles of all types of bases and functional missions against 700 deployed Russian START carriers. Hiding behind a powerful anti-missile shield, the United States can launch a first nuclear strike on any of the seven states that are listed as objects of the “initiative” nuclear attack in their “master plan for a nuclear missile war,” including the Russian Federation, China, Iran and some other states.
The United States continues to use the old arguments in justifying its long-term strategic course for the deployment of a missile defense system. The need for its continuation is justified by the "North Korean missile threat", including the appearance of the KN-08 and intermediate-range ICBMs in Pyongyang (according to the American classification with a firing range from 3000 to 5500 km), as well as the improvement of medium and medium-range ballistic missiles shorter range.
Touching upon the “Iranian missile threat”, the Pentagon pays attention to the appearance of an intercontinental range ballistic missile in the future, the development of improved medium and short range missiles with enhanced pointing accuracy. The fact that an interim agreement was reached on the Iranian nuclear issue at the X6 talks of the Sixth Party in Lausanne on April of this year did not affect the presentation of such arguments.
Speaking of missile threats in general, the Pentagon's UROA noted in March 2015 their general increase due to the fact that many states, they say, continue to acquire an increasing number of ballistic missiles (as indicated, 1200 units over the past five years). It is also stated that the opponents of Washington in the international arena are striving to increase the range of such missiles, to equip them with means of overcoming missile defense, to improve them, by increasing the survivability, reliability and accuracy of guidance. In this regard, a direct task is posed: to increase the potential and technical capabilities of the US anti-missile infrastructure in the global dimension, without any restrictions whatsoever.
Promising developments in the American anti-missile arsenal are the creation of anti-missiles, equipped with several shock-kinetic warheads for individual targeting, as well as the placement of sensors and strike-fighting missile defense equipment on board unmanned aerial vehicles with a large payload.
The US side still claims that it does not deploy a global missile defense system, but only regional structures. In words, it is argued that this infrastructure is not directed against Russia.
NEW EXPLANATIONS
Recently, Washington has some new explanations.
This year, for the first time, the Americans reacted to our comments on the possibility of their use of the Mk-41 vertical launch launchers, originally designed to deploy missile-interceptor missile defense systems, under the loading of Tomahawk cruise missiles, which are clearly offensive and very destabilizing weapons.
As you know, such manipulations are prohibited by the Treaty on the Elimination of Medium and Shorter Range 1987 missiles of the year, which is indefinite. There is a real opportunity to load in the Mk-41 universal launchers of operational anti-missile systems in Romania and Poland not only defensive interceptor missile systems of the missile defense system and extended-range cruise missiles, but also in the long-term shock hypersonic high-precision weapon, also long range.
Representatives of the US State Department claim that the universal launchers for deploying missile-interceptors of the missile defense system and the Tomahawk KR are supposedly different from each other and that a separate program is provided for each type of missile, which does not allow the Tomahawk CD to be loaded into them.
The statement of the American side that the ground version of the Aegis system has never been used to launch cruise missiles is true. It is also true in this statement that each strike-combat system has its own launch program, fire control program and various auxiliary means. But this is exactly the same installation that has been repeatedly used by US Navy ships to launch the Tomahawk CD family during military operations against Afghanistan, Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. Therefore, that part of the statement by representatives of the United States, which refers to differences in launchers for loading missile defense interceptors and the Tomahawk missile, does not correspond to reality.
Photo from www.mda.mil
The fact is that the ground-based version of the missile defense system, which is installed by the United States in Romania and Poland, repeats the similar shipboard Aegis launcher of Ticonderoga type URO cruisers and Arly Burk type UW destroyers, into the mines of which four different types can be loaded missiles: missile defense interceptors, anti-ship, anti-submarine and anti-aircraft guided missiles (up to 120 units on cruisers and up to 96 – 98 on destroyers). Although all such strike-fighting vehicles have their own programs for launching and controlling fire, they can nevertheless be loaded in any set into the same launch-ship mines, depending on the tasks assigned to each combat ship, taking into account the state and development of the military political environment. Therefore, such installations are called universal installations.
Thus, the launcher for launching interceptor missiles at the US operating bases in Deveselu and Redzikovo will allow launching missile defense interceptor missiles on the 24 and can be used to load Tomahawk cruise missiles, which can thus be classified as land-based cruise missiles. (CRNB).
In the future, in about three to four years, when the US Armed Forces hypersonic high-precision missiles, provided for by the Lightning Global Strike strategy, are deployed, the missiles of the new types can be installed in US missile defense system launchers in Deveselu and Redzikovo.
Attention should be paid to the recent (in May of this year) statement by US Undersecretary of State for Arms Control and International Security Rose Gottemoeller, who cautiously called for the possibility of developing a new ABM treaty between Moscow and Washington. No substantive explanations from the American side on this issue followed.
Indeed, a new missile defense treaty is needed, but on a multilateral basis, which would introduce limits on missile defense weapons and allow them to have them only in a national territory with a limited number of interceptor missiles that could be deployed in the World Ocean only from their own maritime frontiers, of course, on the basis of reciprocity, subject to the complete withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons from Europe and the resolution of other problems in the field of arms control.
OSTRIE ABM USA
Consistently and uncontrolledly developing the global missile defense system and its regional segments in Europe, the Middle East, the Asia-Pacific region and the Persian Gulf, Washington is clearly making efforts to solve the main promising task: by all means and resources to reduce the impact, in the number of antimissile, the potential of strategic and tactical nuclear forces of Russia. The hype he invented with the “violations” by Moscow of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is one of the means to achieve this goal. At the Pentagon, they would like to just by verbal statements prevent the appearance of promising means of destroying US missile defense facilities in Romania and Poland, as well as the US anti-missile infrastructure on a global scale. Will not work. The KRNB R-500 and the new Frontier ICBM RS-26 will be deployed in Russia regardless of pressure from the American side, since they are not limited in their category by any bilateral Russian-American agreements.
Washington still does not want to give Russia legally binding guarantees or the introduction of other restraints about not using missile defense weapons under the pretext that such guarantees "will limit the American missile defense system and undermine its ability to withstand future ballistic missile threats." The American side did not disclose the content of the “cooperative missile defense system”, which it allegedly intended to create with Russia. In fact, it didn’t meet during the long consultations that took place until their full stop 12 years.
The military-political leadership of the United States often uses a very narrow group of Russian experts in the field of arms control to test their ideas and proposals aimed at weakening the military power of the Russian Federation, or to protect such ideas. It is necessary to subject without delay the detailed examination of the “proposal” of Russian and Western experts who support all sorts of ideas aimed at reducing Russia's military potential, and give them a fundamental public assessment without delay. In the published monographs and articles of the author, this line remains unchanged.
For the Russian side, it is also important that the build-up of anti-missile potential occurs under conditions when the Pentagon practically created a fundamentally new strategic offensive combined “Chicago triad” in 2012 (it was approved at the NATO summit in Chicago in May 2012) in the form of nuclear missile, anti-missile and conventional weapons, as well as maintaining unchanged the offensive doctrines of delivering the first preemptive and preemptive nuclear strike. It is fundamentally important that the "Chicago triad" refers to the means of "forward basing" and is directed mainly against the Russian Federation.
SUMMARY AND SUGGESTIONS
In the face of constant threats against our country (for example, in the US National Security Strategy updated in February this year, it is referred to as the “aggressor” six times), and also against the background of an unprecedented five-fold increase in NATO military activity near the borders of Russia, including a twofold increase military exercises of the bloc, the Russian military-political leadership is forced to take constant care to equip their army and fleet promising weapon systems and systems that neutralize the potential of the American advanced missile defense system and other types of offensive weapons.
Continuing the implementation of the US and NATO anti-missile plans poses a real threat to Russian strategic nuclear forces and to the global military-political situation as a whole. In the context of the new phase of the Cold War initiated by Washington in 2014, building up, along with its allies in the NATO military unit, armed forces and armaments along the perimeter of the Russian borders, the task of strengthening national independence and security, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation is its primary task of particular national importance .
In these conditions, it seems inappropriate to reduce Russian strategic offensive nuclear weapons and tactical nuclear weapons as a means of retaliation in general and apart from solving other problems in the field of arms control (in particular, space weapons, high-precision hypersonic weapons, etc.).
Russia's response should be aimed primarily at equipping the Russian Armed Forces with promising armament complexes and systems that can neutralize the potential of the US missile defense system, as well as those with enhanced capabilities to overcome it. It is necessary to vigorously develop a national missile defense system, in particular, sea and air-based, capable of intercepting the first massive American nuclear missile and high-precision non-nuclear strike on long-distance approaches to the territory of our country. It is also necessary to increase the intellectual and production efforts aimed at developing the own space component of the Russian missile defense system.
Talking about the need to implement some kind of budget cuts in this direction, which some “researchers” throw up, seems inappropriate.
The Russian military-political leadership correctly raises the question of strengthening the radar system for early warning missile systems. In April, the full-scale operation of the radar station near Armavir began. Subsequently, it will control the western strategic direction. Starting from this year, the same node will also be created in the eastern direction, Vladimir Putin said at the Army-2015 International Military-Technical Forum. In the next decade, the entire perimeter of the territory of Russia will be “covered” with high-readiness radar missile defense systems capable of “seeing” potential targets for many thousands of kilometers. The president also said that this year the composition of the country's nuclear forces will replenish more than 40 new ICBMs, "which will be able to overcome any, even the most technically advanced, missile defense systems."
A roundtable on the destabilizing role of the global missile defense infrastructure of the United States and its regional components, held at this forum, Russian experts voiced a number of additional radical asymmetric countermeasures to such a system that cannot be minimized by the American side and its NATO allies.
In particular, in his speech at the event held, Konstantin Sivkov, President of the Academy of Geopolitical Problems, noted that effective countering of the US missile defense system can only be implemented with a comprehensive application of a wide range of military, military-technical and non-military measures.
He believes that the seven key principles of such counteraction must be implemented:
- “comprehensiveness of the impact”, which requires the use of a wide range of measures in their close coordination on the goals, place and time of their implementation;
- “threat omnidirectionality”, implying the creation of the possibility of launching missile strikes from all geostrategic directions;
- “spatial actualization of threats”, consisting in the fact that the zone of possibility of causing unacceptable damage to a potential aggressor should be spatially significantly extended to areas where it is difficult or even practically impossible to do this with the necessary efficiency;
- “the unacceptability of a single nuclear missile strike”, which is that conditions are created when even a breakthrough of a single nuclear warhead could cause unacceptable damage to the United States (according to current estimates, unacceptable damage can be achieved when the American territory reaches 150– 200 warheads ICBM);
- “pre-emptive defeat”, which consists in the fact that the objects of the American antimissile system should be included in the list of priority targets for their defeat in the event of the outbreak of hostilities and for this purpose must be created means of defeating operational missile defense systems, providing a breakthrough to them even in conditions of domination enemy in the air and the sea;
- the principle of the “red nuclear line”, in accordance with which the transition to the use of strategic nuclear weapons should be carried out immediately with the start of an attack on Russian strategic nuclear forces, regardless of the state of the other components of the RF Armed Forces and the negotiation process with the aggressor;
- “activation of the population” of the territory deployed by the US missile defense system, suggesting that protest movements of the local population of such magnitude should be initiated in countries where it is planned to deploy or have deployed components that would impede the implementation of these plans or complicate the normal functioning of such a system.
These and other Russian countermeasures would be completely natural, logical and adequate to counter the uncontrolled and destabilizing development of the US-NATO missile defense system in the global dimension, which, in the words of the head of the Russian state, worries Russia more as a “serious thing of strategic importance” which radically changes global security.
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