Military professionals in the Anglo-Saxon model of command and control of the armed forces. history and modernity
The article is the final part of a series of publications in the journal "Foreign Military Review" on the peculiarities of the formation of professional military in the United States, their role in the management of the armed forces.
Military intellectuals "postclassical era." The American expert in the field of military sociology, Morris Yakovits, sees nothing surprising in the fact that quite a few representatives of the American generals who looked like “guys-shrubaks” and “martinetists” were in fact intellectually developed personalities, which clearly contradicts the thesis about as a rule, "a low level of intelligence in the military."
To the above named so-called. The category of American classics of military affairs on the significance of the contribution to the development of the armed forces adjoins more than once the mentioned general practitioner George Marshall, as if throwing a bridge from the era of American military classicism to the modern era of military science, more practical and pragmatic.
J. Marshall is no accident in the hierarchy of US military leaders is one of the highest places. Possessing an extraordinary natural intelligence, he had a wealth of life and professional experience. Starting an active military career as a topographer and geodesist officer, he then trained reservists, served in various positions in the US ground forces, studied the course of military operations during the Russian-Japanese war, was assigned to Manchuria until he was appointed chief of staff of the Army , having served up to this appointment only three years in the rank of general. During the Second World War, he was rightly considered one of the architects of the Allied victories on the Western Front. His uncommon abilities were highly appreciated by presidential politicians as different in nature as F. D. Roosevelt and G. Truman.
His ability as an organizer, business acumen and versatility allowed J. Marshall after the war to successfully cope with the duties of Secretary of State and Minister of Defense. He was not the sole author of any outstanding theoretical works in the field of military art, but each publication under his name, whether on military subjects or in the field of international relations, caused and continues to cause genuine interest among both military professionals and specialists. internationals and historians.
Another prominent figure in the postclassical era of American military science is President Dwight Eisenhower, a professional military, five-star general, honored hero of World War II. Ike, as friends called the future president in his youth, and then in wide circles of American society, graduated from West Point with distinction, standing out among his fellow students with genuine interests in the works of military classics, above all Clausewitz. Like many outstanding officers, already in the first years of his service he was confronted with a lack of understanding of his zeal in understanding the subtleties of military affairs on the part of his superiors. So, in his memoirs, he described such a case. After his article was published in the November issue of the Infantry Journal in 1920, Hayk’s direct boss, Major General Charles Farnsworth, made claims to him in the sense that his “ideas are not only wrong, but also dangerous, and that keep them with you. " “In particular,” Ike writes, “I was denied the right to publish anything contrary to the existing infantry doctrine.” Nevertheless, the young officer did not lose heart and, continuing to show an interest in the theory, he embodied what he had learned in life, moving quickly in his career. Already during World War II, taking the post of commander-in-chief of the allied forces in Europe, Eisenhower led to considerable dismay of the British, who initially favorably accepted the appointment of an American general to the highest position in the military coalition in the hope that he would devote himself to resolving political problems and quickly The strategic plan will leave to the decision of the British.
But they made a big mistake. In a soft but persistent way, Ike managed to push more than once, as it turned out, the right decisions, despite the often sophisticated intrigues of the allies. In the end, the British, including Prime Minister Winston Churchill, fully trusted the military talent of the American general. But Ike's high intelligence was manifested not only in the military field. George Kennan, one of the most famous statesmen in the recent past, recalled that when at one of the White House meetings, convened on the initiative of President Eisenhower, the problem of economic solvency was raised as a basic element of national security and the need to incorporate this provision into a national security strategy, “Ike proved his intellectual superiority over all who attended this forum.”
American analysts reasonably include such generals as George Patton, Omar Bradley, Creighton Abrams, John Shirley Wood, Admiral Arthur W. Redford and some others to the pleiad of intellectual commanders who positively manifested themselves during the Second World War.
A very curious personality of J. Patton. At its mention, it usually presents the image of a very eccentric commander, from his early years, while still a cadet, who proved to be a person inclined to extraordinary actions. Dashing cavalryman, a member of the expedition 1916 of the year in Mexico, the hero of World War I, turned into a tanker. During the Second World War, he was entrusted with the most difficult tasks, including the rapid re-creation of the fighting capacity of the 2 Army Corps defeated in North Africa. He was an outstanding athlete, a participant from the USA, 12-s of the Olympic Games, finished fifth in pentatlon. At the same time, he was known as a poetry lover, an insatiable book reader, an admirer of the art of war, a collector of rare books ... To descendants he left an exhaustive analysis of the operations of the Second World War.
He expounded his outstanding thoughts on the art of war in numerous articles, lectures and, finally, in the classic work “War, as I understand it.” With J. Patton hand in hand and in the service, and in life went another honored general during the Second World War, Omar N. Bradley. Despite a completely different temperament, characters (Bradley, unlike his colleague, was known as a very restrained person who knew how to get along with both superiors and subordinates), curiosities of the service, when there was alternate submission to one another, both generals respected each other to a friend, on the whole, sharing views on the fundamental principles of military science and its implementation. O. Bradley was not a member of the First World War, guarding the mines in this piece during this period. Montana, however, with perseverance in the knowledge of military affairs, was able to attain high posts, successively going through all the steps of the military hierarchy up to the chairman of the CNSC. The importance of his opinion on current and future military-political problems is indicated by the fact that during the four years of his presidency in this post, O. Bradley 272 met again with the President and participated in the 68 meetings of the National Security Council, which is still considered unprecedented. His contribution to the development of the theory of leadership in the armed forces is quite noticeable. So, he belongs to the thesis that has now become well-known that “leadership is always and unprecedentedly important; no existing or invented in the future weapon can not replace it. The title carries only formal power and emphasizes only the formal position of the commander. To become the undisputed authority of subordinates, the commander needs more than a high rank and exemplary bearing. He must instill trust in those he leads. The same commanders who rely only on the external side of the leadership are doomed to failure, they are not able to be true leaders. ”
Segregating from the generals of the postclassical era of American military science of individual representatives claiming the title of intellectuals, one cannot but mention such an extraordinary person in their own way as was the four-star General Creighton Abrams. By the way, the first and so far the only one history US Army, who died in his office at his desk on an autumn day 1974 of the year. Having a solid combat experience of the Second World War and the Korean War, highly revered by his fellow generals and subordinate officers who gave him the warm nickname “Abe”, this serious and intelligent officer could not stand to “stick out” and “teach”. He calmly, without irritating anyone, led the staff of the US Army ground forces. At the same time, the performance of the general was simply phenomenal. Major Denis Reimer, after a couple of decades himself became the chief of staff of the SV, recalled that Abrams, already "being sick and being in headquarters no more than 2 hours a day, nevertheless did much more work during this time than other young 10 generals for the whole day! ” Quite infrequently, but with great resonance, General Abrams spoke to wide audiences, both military and civilian, wrote articles and pamphlets in which he analyzed not only “the affairs of bygone days”, but also offered constructive solutions to urgent problems.
Deliberately limiting the list and characteristics of representatives of the highest generals of the US Armed Forces, it is impossible not to mention outwardly harsh commanders like Matthew Rogers, a linguist who taught French and Spanish for a long time at West Point, but also tactics, or who died in 2008, 28- By the account of the Chief of Staff of the US Navy, General Bernard Rogers, who became famous as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of NATO’s Allied Command in Europe, he is an extraordinary person, striking his surroundings, both military and civilian, with his extensive knowledge in many areas.
In addition to high-ranking intellectual commanders revered in the American armed forces, tactical generals who have proven themselves not only on the battlefield are often cited as role models. American analysts include, for example, the division commander of the Second World War, John Shirley Wood and Maxwell Taylor, the commander of the unit during the Vietnam War, William Depewy, to such intellectual generals. The first, J. Sh. Wood, like most American officers traditionally, in the years of his officer's youth was known as an excellent athlete, a desperately brave soldier, awarded the "Cross of Excellence." As the commander of the 4th Armored Division in the first echelon of the 3rd Army, led by J. Patton, he brilliantly participated in the liberation of France. The famous British military historian B. Liddell Garth awarded him the nickname "Rommel of American tank troops "and described as" one of the most decisive tank commanders in World War II. " But this is at the top of his military career. It is known that at the age of 16 he entered the University of Arkansas, where he successfully studied chemistry. But life turned so that he ended up in a teaching job at West Point, where he gained fame as a tutor, pulling up the lagging students to the required level, for which he even received the nickname "Pi" (from "professor"). He became interested in the theory of the use of armored forces, wrote many articles on this topic, was a very erudite, interesting interlocutor, knew several foreign languages, read the theoretical works of Charles de Gaulle and Heinz Guderian on the use of tanks in originals. "
General Maxwell Taylor was akin to Voodoo. The same dashing, well-built officer, who was thrown into Italy in 1943 for the front line to carry out a secret mission, and during Operation Overlord, already in 1944, parachuted into the rear of the German forces in France as commander of the 101 military unit. But in the interwar period, Taylor devoted himself to philology and linguistics, he studied and taught himself. He mastered several foreign languages deeply enough, having written two fundamental works. For some time he worked as president of the Lincoln Center for Fine Arts in New York, and already in the post-war period he was entrusted with the most difficult mission of the American ambassador to Saigon in the period of the disastrously emerging Vietnam War for the USA.
General William Depyuy, participating in World War II, became famous for having received the informal title of "Best Combat Army of the United States." After the war, he was going to resign from the Armed Forces, but the service, as they say, sucked him with giblets. Among the best I graduated from several educational institutions, but at the same time I always repeated that the main way of learning is self-education. Working in headquarters at all levels in leadership positions, he tried to break the routine analytical work of officer-operators, who, he said, “digged too much into details” without first grasping, without understanding the essence of the whole concept. As a divisional commander in Vietnam, Depyuy has accumulated a huge amount of impressions and experience, which he actively tried to summarize, summarize, analyze and issue to the leadership of the Armed Forces as one of the conceptual foundations of the military reform that took place after the end of the Vietnam War. Most of his theoretical studies are published in a separate book, The Selected Works of General Depyuy in Leavenworth. It was he who was entrusted in 1973 to lead the famous school of military thought - Command Command and Military Studies of the US Army (TRADOC).
Naval officers and admirals in the US Armed Forces, as in other countries, differed from their counterparts from the NE and Air Force by a higher level of education due to incomparable special traditions (fostered back in the British "gentlemanly" navy and widely used in the fleets of other states). Against the background of the "green-gray mass" of the officers of the ground and air forces, they always seemed intellectuals who had put on a military uniform temporarily. This cultivation of the special internal content of naval officers and their corporate psychology was facilitated by a long separation from civilian and military centers of civilization, the inevitability of a long and forced stay in officer teams closed to external penetration, where the rules of honor and a high level of culture were undeniable requirements and the law of life. But all this could not but give rise to some alienation of the sailors from their colleagues in the military department and even some arrogance. The reaction from the army officers was similar in relation to them.
Anyway, admirals-intellectuals in the US Armed Forces in percentage terms were always more than in other types of armed forces. Bearing in mind the purpose of this work and not particularly spreading along the tree, we recall only two of them.
Honored Combat Admiral Louis E. Defield, who served as chief of staff of the US Navy from 1947 to 1948, left his mark on history as a passionate supporter of the comprehensive development of the naval forces. His "skate" as a theorist of the fleet and admiral-practitioner was aviation Navy. His innumerable speeches on this subject both in the media and at official briefings, meetings, etc., on the one hand, earned him credibility, and not only among his fellow sailors, but, on the other, caused serious discontent with sides of the civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Department of Species. Of course, this admiral did not work out with a career, but his reasoned ideas and proposals, in particular regarding the development of naval aviation, nevertheless made their way into life, later being enthusiastically supported by congressmen.
Arthur U Radford, another admiral of the American fleet, was a fighting admiral; the post of the chairman of the JSSh became the pinnacle of his official career, where he demonstrated his highest level of education and intelligence. In the most difficult discussions with opponents, mainly with colleagues from the military camp, he had to demonstrate knowledge and strategies, tactics, and economics, to prove the timeliness and logicality of the unpopular cuts in military spending in order to “today redirect these funds to business, and later , after a certain number of years, they (the means) will return to the same aircraft, but in the form of new, modern weapons and military equipment samples by that time. ” S. Hundington, comparing the two first chairmen of the SCN, O. Bradley and A. Redford, stresses that "both of them were people of exceptional kind, intelligence and energy ... In six short years they managed to turn their department (CSL) into the most authoritative state body authorities. They were samurai in spirit, but military statesmen to a greater extent than just military advisers to the leaders of the country. ” American experts point out that their role in the formation of the CNS can only be compared with the vigorous activity of Colin Powell at the turn of 80 - 90 of the last century, when he had to “change the vicious traditions of interspecific egoism” and restructure the work of the committee under the urgent requirements of creating “really united sun.
American analyst Ward Just emphasizes: “Clausewitz has never been in the American army, since writing about“ War ”type takes time and requires serious thoughts ...”, which is allegedly not inherent in the American national military character. In other words, America is unable to produce military geniuses. However, this passage does not look so convincing and relevant today, as, for example, 200 years ago.
In the nineteenth century there was a very popular theory in both Europe and North America, according to which the generals as such are the product of the realization of military geniuses. The ability to command troops was recognized akin to art, such as music or sculpture, where natural talent is needed. Therefore, supposedly military competence cannot be learned: it is a product of purely subjective factors that exist beyond the will of the people.
It is easy to see that these arguments are from the so-called region. theories of the elect, for example, by the birth of aristocrats, according to which a person is already born as a commander. Further, in life, only it is polished. With the descent from the arena of the social life of the aristocracy in developed societies and the various theories of exclusives that accompanied it, the theory of military geniuses has gone nowhere.
At the same time, the role of talent in military affairs, which is a component of natural data, intensive training and self-education, no one dares to refute. The Duke Wellington, an eminent statesman and commander of Great Britain, the winner of the French, once remarked that "the appearance of Napoleon in the troops on the battlefield can only be compared with the strengthening of thousands of bayonets in 30." The general professionalization of the military since the second half of the nineteenth century, specialization in their preparation began to produce in the most natural way the masses of capable officers, from which talented military leaders would later be formed. Germany served as an example of emulation for almost all the armies of the advanced states, where, as one of the organizers of the modern military education system in the United States pointed out at the beginning of the twentieth century, “the training of officers and honing them through the GSH system is not aimed at forming a super soldier or genius, but those who just clearly perform their duties. "
Something similar, at least declaratively, exists in the United States. In any case, as a result of the reform of military education, initiated by War Minister I. Ruta at the beginning of the twentieth century and completed by the beginning of the First World War, the US armed forces began to replenish with fairly well-educated officers. But, on the one hand, understanding the correctness in modern conditions of such a formulation of the case, the public wants to see officers, and even more so in generals, individuals who can confidently entrust children, sons, daughters and who by their inappropriate actions do not bring trouble to their country, and Means, and on the average man.
In Western societies, IQ tests have been used for a long time to determine the mental abilities of an individual. Assuming that for most people it varies between 90 and 110 units, and for the great scientist Isaac Newton it was only 130 units. (which is considered a mediocre result), then, according to Stanford-Bynet’s criteria, some prominent figures who had or were related to military affairs, this coefficient fluctuates within the normal range and even higher: Schwarzkopf - 170 unit., Napoleon - 135, R. Lee - 130, Sherman - 125, J. Washington - 125, G. Nelson - 125, G. Cortes - 115, Joachim Murat - 115, US Grant, F. Sheridan and G. Blucher - by 110.
But from this, by some harsh critics of the generals, it is concluded that this indicator cannot be called the only “criterion of mental development”. Recent testing of US Army Brigadier Generals in command skills development courses at the Creative Leadership Center in Greensboro, PA North Carolina showed an 124 grade point average, which was rated by the management of the Center as “almost definitely not enough”. These data were transferred to the leadership of the ground forces to analyze the situation with the intelligence state of future command personnel of the Armed Forces type and take appropriate measures.
In modern conditions, in the US armed forces, among the senior officers, two contradictory tendencies coexist: on the one hand, cultivating supposedly axioms about the absolute superiority of practice over "fruitless theorizing", and on the other, widespread propaganda of the desire to acquire knowledge.
American analyst Matthews Lloyd, mentioned above, quotes a statement from Marine Corps General Alfred M. Gray at a meeting at the Pentagon, published several years ago in the Colorado Springs Newspaper Telegraph: "There are too many intellectuals in the top of the US armed forces today ..., and old-fashioned warriors who like good slaughter, and not abstract reasoning are required. ”
Another, and a very honored four-star general, whose name was not called, somehow, in passing, told the same M. Lloyd that, they say, he never read anything except the contents of his mailbox. "And in that and in the other There is, of course, a lot of posture and bragging, but this is evidence of demonstrative disrespect for intellectual activity.
Meanwhile, the honored American military British admiral G. Nelson once remarked that “although in battle many admirals and officers behaved bravely, sometimes they even showed reckless personal bravery, they instantly tried to catch the decision. The reason for this was an elementary lack of education and a lack of habit of thinking. ”
Or one more statement to this effect, no less appreciated by the US military, Napoleon Bonaparte: “The calculations required to solve problems on the battlefield were made by Newton, but when the choice needs to be made immediately, only to the highest degree can the trained brain ".
Acknowledging the fact that the first tendency in the modern American military environment prevails, the well-known military specialist Theodore Krackel bitterly emphasizes that “if Clausewitz and Jomini served today in the American armed forces, their teaching would be in any school for no more than three years, and then quiet resignation. " The former head of the JSS David Jones, in principle, supporting the pessimistic attitude of his colleague, said: “Most likely, under our system, today Clausewitz would have served as a colonel, and after 20 years of service he left civilian scientists to some scientific institution.” To a certain extent, emphasizes M. Lloyd, the words of both analysts are not far from the truth.
In reality, the departments of American military schools are filled to capacity with professional intellectuals, but they seem to be locked in the educational and scientific unit and have too few chances, even if they wish, to enter the service space, forced to be dismissed as a lieutenant colonel, at best Colonel.
Moreover, the opponents of “excessive intellectualism” complain, more recently, the alleged possession of a degree has become fashionable and even mandatory for getting into the military elite. Higher education institutions of the Armed Forces are already competing for greater coverage of their graduates with master's degrees for work in the field of strategy. It is expected, M. Lloyd concludes, that in the near future it will be mandatory to have two academic degrees, civil and military, in order to insure against early dismissal and, at best, guaranteed to become a general. On the one hand, it is possible to understand the officers who have dedicated their lives to the armed forces and who are afraid to be left out in just 30 years of service, or even earlier. On the other hand, this process rather resembles the “unhealthy collecting” of degrees, titles and titles, which in no way testify to the true level of intelligence of its carrier.
Other experts do not see this as a particular negative, but rather even believe that the work on the dissertation, if you want to - do not want it, still adds a mind. It is negative, in their opinion, that the fact that the officer corps has been divided into “purely theoreticians” and “purely practitioners” has already happened in the US Armed Forces. Retired General William R. Richardson paid attention to this without a proper reaction, however, from the audience, back in June 2001, at a conference on improving the quality of the command personnel of the Ground forces, held at the command of educational and scientific research of ground forces. If, in accordance with the analysis carried out at the beginning of the 50 of the last century by John Masland and Lawrence Redway, only one third of the generals' corps, numbering in the NE about 500 people, served "in the field", and the remaining two thirds - in the administrative, technical and teaching positions, now this proportion has changed for the worse, of course, not in favor of the commanders of military formations.
Supporters of military "intellectualism" usually parry with the fact that over the past decades, even with significant reductions in the Armed Forces, the proportion of combat and service (their) formations has changed in about the same way. (But here there is slyness, because in accordance with a well-known and universal, but tacit law, or tradition, with the reduction of troops, the number of generals always decreases disproportionately). In addition, not every general rubak can correspond to headquarters, in fact, intellectual activity. Yes, and a sharp, almost collapse inclusion in staff work at all levels of information technology, as practice shows, simply discouragingly affects combat commanders, who by virtue of rotation find themselves in sometimes completely “unwanted” staff posts.
In the address of the commanders-practitioners and their fierce advocates, opponents also feel free to express sharply critical comments. Analyzing the reasons for the incompetence of many military commanders, retired Lieutenant General Walter Almer states that often “an officer who showed himself well at the tactical level of leadership, and even afterwards gaining some experience and having learned a little, can be completely dysfunctional at the strategic level”. Another specialist, Colonel Michael Cody, supports the idea of his senior colleague, stressing that “the practice of serving the troops legitimized the tradition, according to which it is believed that if an officer succeeds in the lower level, he will automatically be able to cope with his duties at a higher level ". At the same time, the experience of the Second World War, the Vietnam War and the Korean War, when the sergeants summoned from the reserve, showed themselves from the best side as military platovers and even the mouth, showed complete incompetence, finding themselves in the battalion headquarters, were allegedly completely forgotten. According to M. Lloyd, the history of wars is full of examples of the greatest failures, when corps and sometimes the army entrusted successful commanders and even divisional divisions. Obviously, a higher level of leadership requires a broader perspective, in addition to purely military knowledge, the ability to navigate in politics, diplomacy, economics, regional geography, finally ... As Clausewitz said, the commander, remaining a soldier, must to some extent be statesman. At the same time, the lawyers of the practical commanders nod at Moltke Sr., who somehow cynically declared that, they say, “sometimes it takes the loss of an entire division to learn one major general”!
In fact, it turns out that, as a rule, intellectuals deprived of “cheekiness” “plow” in non-prestigious positions, having little chance to make a constructive contribution to the overall climate of an influential military environment. In the meantime, the “practitioners” are methodically moving towards the monopolization of the general’s posts. John Hillen, a veteran of the Gulf War, the author of works on military professionalism and military ethics, a former member of the bipartisan group on the analysis of problems of national security, commented on it as follows: "Four-star generals prefer to produce the next similar portion of four-star, thereby retaining themselves as a caste . They are good guys, they are just great guys, they are even heroes! But I sincerely believe that they feel more comfortable with the Bass Phishing magazine (for fishermen) in their hands than with a book on military theory ... "
But try to destroy this vicious order of things! Robert Bateman, an expert in the field of military history, in this connection gives such an imaginary algorithm of behavior of the highest leader when he thinks about the dismissal of a negligent general: further analyzed numerous political and other consequences in case of his dismissal; the decision is made not to dismiss this general. " Moreover, the analyst concludes, only in his memory Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Bush Sr. and Clinton came up against such a situation. And only the first two were able to bring the matter to the logical end a couple of times. "
As if to continue this topic, another critic of the American generals shares the following conclusions from his analysis. So, according to his calculations, in 2002, in the US ground forces, 330 generals served, which is enough to form a battalion without service units. Having the same 10 - 11 division equivalents as part of the SV, the country simply does not need as many army generals. It’s just that, with all the desire, they allegedly did not find the relevant posts, but practical workers will surely make sure that there are posts or appear. The command will have to appoint generals-warriors to positions where it would be appropriate to keep the intellectual general, but the former will have priority.
It is comforting that, as M. Lloyd writes, “even in the darkest times of anti-intellectualism, a healthy army organism always squeezed out of itself generals-intellectuals, such as E. Goodpaster, W. Depyuy, G. Sullivan, and others, who were guided the postulate that “reform is not an expletive and that professional disagreement with a boss is not a manifestation of disrespect”. And supporters of the rampant intellectualization of the US military leadership, and even advocates of the hard practicality of the American generals unanimously recognize that the armed forces, rejecting constructive-minded officers, isolating themselves from innovative ideas, depriving the officer environment of intellectual self-reproduction, will inevitably eat the bitterness of defeat on the battlefield. "Only continuous training and experience in the aggregate form a successful general," emphasized the absolute authority of military science in the United States D. H. Mahan.
The above analysis, of course, does not exhaust all the features of such a complex topic as the birth, formation and functioning of professional military as a separate social group in the system of social relations in a state, in this case the United States, where military construction is carried out according to a specific, historically established model, received in the scientific journalistic literature the definition of "Anglo-Saxon". As in the alternative to the “Prussian (or Soviet) model” of the military structure, professional military, especially the generals, being in the focus of increased attention from society, have always been, are and will be the object of a constructive, sometimes biased, criticism, formally declared, with good intentions, is to ensure an appropriate level of combat readiness of the armed forces led by them as the main element of the national security of a particular state.
Military intellectuals "postclassical era." The American expert in the field of military sociology, Morris Yakovits, sees nothing surprising in the fact that quite a few representatives of the American generals who looked like “guys-shrubaks” and “martinetists” were in fact intellectually developed personalities, which clearly contradicts the thesis about as a rule, "a low level of intelligence in the military."
To the above named so-called. The category of American classics of military affairs on the significance of the contribution to the development of the armed forces adjoins more than once the mentioned general practitioner George Marshall, as if throwing a bridge from the era of American military classicism to the modern era of military science, more practical and pragmatic.
J. Marshall is no accident in the hierarchy of US military leaders is one of the highest places. Possessing an extraordinary natural intelligence, he had a wealth of life and professional experience. Starting an active military career as a topographer and geodesist officer, he then trained reservists, served in various positions in the US ground forces, studied the course of military operations during the Russian-Japanese war, was assigned to Manchuria until he was appointed chief of staff of the Army , having served up to this appointment only three years in the rank of general. During the Second World War, he was rightly considered one of the architects of the Allied victories on the Western Front. His uncommon abilities were highly appreciated by presidential politicians as different in nature as F. D. Roosevelt and G. Truman.
His ability as an organizer, business acumen and versatility allowed J. Marshall after the war to successfully cope with the duties of Secretary of State and Minister of Defense. He was not the sole author of any outstanding theoretical works in the field of military art, but each publication under his name, whether on military subjects or in the field of international relations, caused and continues to cause genuine interest among both military professionals and specialists. internationals and historians.
Another prominent figure in the postclassical era of American military science is President Dwight Eisenhower, a professional military, five-star general, honored hero of World War II. Ike, as friends called the future president in his youth, and then in wide circles of American society, graduated from West Point with distinction, standing out among his fellow students with genuine interests in the works of military classics, above all Clausewitz. Like many outstanding officers, already in the first years of his service he was confronted with a lack of understanding of his zeal in understanding the subtleties of military affairs on the part of his superiors. So, in his memoirs, he described such a case. After his article was published in the November issue of the Infantry Journal in 1920, Hayk’s direct boss, Major General Charles Farnsworth, made claims to him in the sense that his “ideas are not only wrong, but also dangerous, and that keep them with you. " “In particular,” Ike writes, “I was denied the right to publish anything contrary to the existing infantry doctrine.” Nevertheless, the young officer did not lose heart and, continuing to show an interest in the theory, he embodied what he had learned in life, moving quickly in his career. Already during World War II, taking the post of commander-in-chief of the allied forces in Europe, Eisenhower led to considerable dismay of the British, who initially favorably accepted the appointment of an American general to the highest position in the military coalition in the hope that he would devote himself to resolving political problems and quickly The strategic plan will leave to the decision of the British.
But they made a big mistake. In a soft but persistent way, Ike managed to push more than once, as it turned out, the right decisions, despite the often sophisticated intrigues of the allies. In the end, the British, including Prime Minister Winston Churchill, fully trusted the military talent of the American general. But Ike's high intelligence was manifested not only in the military field. George Kennan, one of the most famous statesmen in the recent past, recalled that when at one of the White House meetings, convened on the initiative of President Eisenhower, the problem of economic solvency was raised as a basic element of national security and the need to incorporate this provision into a national security strategy, “Ike proved his intellectual superiority over all who attended this forum.”
American analysts reasonably include such generals as George Patton, Omar Bradley, Creighton Abrams, John Shirley Wood, Admiral Arthur W. Redford and some others to the pleiad of intellectual commanders who positively manifested themselves during the Second World War.
A very curious personality of J. Patton. At its mention, it usually presents the image of a very eccentric commander, from his early years, while still a cadet, who proved to be a person inclined to extraordinary actions. Dashing cavalryman, a member of the expedition 1916 of the year in Mexico, the hero of World War I, turned into a tanker. During the Second World War, he was entrusted with the most difficult tasks, including the rapid re-creation of the fighting capacity of the 2 Army Corps defeated in North Africa. He was an outstanding athlete, a participant from the USA, 12-s of the Olympic Games, finished fifth in pentatlon. At the same time, he was known as a poetry lover, an insatiable book reader, an admirer of the art of war, a collector of rare books ... To descendants he left an exhaustive analysis of the operations of the Second World War.
He expounded his outstanding thoughts on the art of war in numerous articles, lectures and, finally, in the classic work “War, as I understand it.” With J. Patton hand in hand and in the service, and in life went another honored general during the Second World War, Omar N. Bradley. Despite a completely different temperament, characters (Bradley, unlike his colleague, was known as a very restrained person who knew how to get along with both superiors and subordinates), curiosities of the service, when there was alternate submission to one another, both generals respected each other to a friend, on the whole, sharing views on the fundamental principles of military science and its implementation. O. Bradley was not a member of the First World War, guarding the mines in this piece during this period. Montana, however, with perseverance in the knowledge of military affairs, was able to attain high posts, successively going through all the steps of the military hierarchy up to the chairman of the CNSC. The importance of his opinion on current and future military-political problems is indicated by the fact that during the four years of his presidency in this post, O. Bradley 272 met again with the President and participated in the 68 meetings of the National Security Council, which is still considered unprecedented. His contribution to the development of the theory of leadership in the armed forces is quite noticeable. So, he belongs to the thesis that has now become well-known that “leadership is always and unprecedentedly important; no existing or invented in the future weapon can not replace it. The title carries only formal power and emphasizes only the formal position of the commander. To become the undisputed authority of subordinates, the commander needs more than a high rank and exemplary bearing. He must instill trust in those he leads. The same commanders who rely only on the external side of the leadership are doomed to failure, they are not able to be true leaders. ”
Segregating from the generals of the postclassical era of American military science of individual representatives claiming the title of intellectuals, one cannot but mention such an extraordinary person in their own way as was the four-star General Creighton Abrams. By the way, the first and so far the only one history US Army, who died in his office at his desk on an autumn day 1974 of the year. Having a solid combat experience of the Second World War and the Korean War, highly revered by his fellow generals and subordinate officers who gave him the warm nickname “Abe”, this serious and intelligent officer could not stand to “stick out” and “teach”. He calmly, without irritating anyone, led the staff of the US Army ground forces. At the same time, the performance of the general was simply phenomenal. Major Denis Reimer, after a couple of decades himself became the chief of staff of the SV, recalled that Abrams, already "being sick and being in headquarters no more than 2 hours a day, nevertheless did much more work during this time than other young 10 generals for the whole day! ” Quite infrequently, but with great resonance, General Abrams spoke to wide audiences, both military and civilian, wrote articles and pamphlets in which he analyzed not only “the affairs of bygone days”, but also offered constructive solutions to urgent problems.
Deliberately limiting the list and characteristics of representatives of the highest generals of the US Armed Forces, it is impossible not to mention outwardly harsh commanders like Matthew Rogers, a linguist who taught French and Spanish for a long time at West Point, but also tactics, or who died in 2008, 28- By the account of the Chief of Staff of the US Navy, General Bernard Rogers, who became famous as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of NATO’s Allied Command in Europe, he is an extraordinary person, striking his surroundings, both military and civilian, with his extensive knowledge in many areas.
In addition to high-ranking intellectual commanders revered in the American armed forces, tactical generals who have proven themselves not only on the battlefield are often cited as role models. American analysts include, for example, the division commander of the Second World War, John Shirley Wood and Maxwell Taylor, the commander of the unit during the Vietnam War, William Depewy, to such intellectual generals. The first, J. Sh. Wood, like most American officers traditionally, in the years of his officer's youth was known as an excellent athlete, a desperately brave soldier, awarded the "Cross of Excellence." As the commander of the 4th Armored Division in the first echelon of the 3rd Army, led by J. Patton, he brilliantly participated in the liberation of France. The famous British military historian B. Liddell Garth awarded him the nickname "Rommel of American tank troops "and described as" one of the most decisive tank commanders in World War II. " But this is at the top of his military career. It is known that at the age of 16 he entered the University of Arkansas, where he successfully studied chemistry. But life turned so that he ended up in a teaching job at West Point, where he gained fame as a tutor, pulling up the lagging students to the required level, for which he even received the nickname "Pi" (from "professor"). He became interested in the theory of the use of armored forces, wrote many articles on this topic, was a very erudite, interesting interlocutor, knew several foreign languages, read the theoretical works of Charles de Gaulle and Heinz Guderian on the use of tanks in originals. "
General Maxwell Taylor was akin to Voodoo. The same dashing, well-built officer, who was thrown into Italy in 1943 for the front line to carry out a secret mission, and during Operation Overlord, already in 1944, parachuted into the rear of the German forces in France as commander of the 101 military unit. But in the interwar period, Taylor devoted himself to philology and linguistics, he studied and taught himself. He mastered several foreign languages deeply enough, having written two fundamental works. For some time he worked as president of the Lincoln Center for Fine Arts in New York, and already in the post-war period he was entrusted with the most difficult mission of the American ambassador to Saigon in the period of the disastrously emerging Vietnam War for the USA.
General William Depyuy, participating in World War II, became famous for having received the informal title of "Best Combat Army of the United States." After the war, he was going to resign from the Armed Forces, but the service, as they say, sucked him with giblets. Among the best I graduated from several educational institutions, but at the same time I always repeated that the main way of learning is self-education. Working in headquarters at all levels in leadership positions, he tried to break the routine analytical work of officer-operators, who, he said, “digged too much into details” without first grasping, without understanding the essence of the whole concept. As a divisional commander in Vietnam, Depyuy has accumulated a huge amount of impressions and experience, which he actively tried to summarize, summarize, analyze and issue to the leadership of the Armed Forces as one of the conceptual foundations of the military reform that took place after the end of the Vietnam War. Most of his theoretical studies are published in a separate book, The Selected Works of General Depyuy in Leavenworth. It was he who was entrusted in 1973 to lead the famous school of military thought - Command Command and Military Studies of the US Army (TRADOC).
Naval officers and admirals in the US Armed Forces, as in other countries, differed from their counterparts from the NE and Air Force by a higher level of education due to incomparable special traditions (fostered back in the British "gentlemanly" navy and widely used in the fleets of other states). Against the background of the "green-gray mass" of the officers of the ground and air forces, they always seemed intellectuals who had put on a military uniform temporarily. This cultivation of the special internal content of naval officers and their corporate psychology was facilitated by a long separation from civilian and military centers of civilization, the inevitability of a long and forced stay in officer teams closed to external penetration, where the rules of honor and a high level of culture were undeniable requirements and the law of life. But all this could not but give rise to some alienation of the sailors from their colleagues in the military department and even some arrogance. The reaction from the army officers was similar in relation to them.
Anyway, admirals-intellectuals in the US Armed Forces in percentage terms were always more than in other types of armed forces. Bearing in mind the purpose of this work and not particularly spreading along the tree, we recall only two of them.
Honored Combat Admiral Louis E. Defield, who served as chief of staff of the US Navy from 1947 to 1948, left his mark on history as a passionate supporter of the comprehensive development of the naval forces. His "skate" as a theorist of the fleet and admiral-practitioner was aviation Navy. His innumerable speeches on this subject both in the media and at official briefings, meetings, etc., on the one hand, earned him credibility, and not only among his fellow sailors, but, on the other, caused serious discontent with sides of the civilian leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Department of Species. Of course, this admiral did not work out with a career, but his reasoned ideas and proposals, in particular regarding the development of naval aviation, nevertheless made their way into life, later being enthusiastically supported by congressmen.
Arthur U Radford, another admiral of the American fleet, was a fighting admiral; the post of the chairman of the JSSh became the pinnacle of his official career, where he demonstrated his highest level of education and intelligence. In the most difficult discussions with opponents, mainly with colleagues from the military camp, he had to demonstrate knowledge and strategies, tactics, and economics, to prove the timeliness and logicality of the unpopular cuts in military spending in order to “today redirect these funds to business, and later , after a certain number of years, they (the means) will return to the same aircraft, but in the form of new, modern weapons and military equipment samples by that time. ” S. Hundington, comparing the two first chairmen of the SCN, O. Bradley and A. Redford, stresses that "both of them were people of exceptional kind, intelligence and energy ... In six short years they managed to turn their department (CSL) into the most authoritative state body authorities. They were samurai in spirit, but military statesmen to a greater extent than just military advisers to the leaders of the country. ” American experts point out that their role in the formation of the CNS can only be compared with the vigorous activity of Colin Powell at the turn of 80 - 90 of the last century, when he had to “change the vicious traditions of interspecific egoism” and restructure the work of the committee under the urgent requirements of creating “really united sun.
American analyst Ward Just emphasizes: “Clausewitz has never been in the American army, since writing about“ War ”type takes time and requires serious thoughts ...”, which is allegedly not inherent in the American national military character. In other words, America is unable to produce military geniuses. However, this passage does not look so convincing and relevant today, as, for example, 200 years ago.
In the nineteenth century there was a very popular theory in both Europe and North America, according to which the generals as such are the product of the realization of military geniuses. The ability to command troops was recognized akin to art, such as music or sculpture, where natural talent is needed. Therefore, supposedly military competence cannot be learned: it is a product of purely subjective factors that exist beyond the will of the people.
It is easy to see that these arguments are from the so-called region. theories of the elect, for example, by the birth of aristocrats, according to which a person is already born as a commander. Further, in life, only it is polished. With the descent from the arena of the social life of the aristocracy in developed societies and the various theories of exclusives that accompanied it, the theory of military geniuses has gone nowhere.
At the same time, the role of talent in military affairs, which is a component of natural data, intensive training and self-education, no one dares to refute. The Duke Wellington, an eminent statesman and commander of Great Britain, the winner of the French, once remarked that "the appearance of Napoleon in the troops on the battlefield can only be compared with the strengthening of thousands of bayonets in 30." The general professionalization of the military since the second half of the nineteenth century, specialization in their preparation began to produce in the most natural way the masses of capable officers, from which talented military leaders would later be formed. Germany served as an example of emulation for almost all the armies of the advanced states, where, as one of the organizers of the modern military education system in the United States pointed out at the beginning of the twentieth century, “the training of officers and honing them through the GSH system is not aimed at forming a super soldier or genius, but those who just clearly perform their duties. "
Something similar, at least declaratively, exists in the United States. In any case, as a result of the reform of military education, initiated by War Minister I. Ruta at the beginning of the twentieth century and completed by the beginning of the First World War, the US armed forces began to replenish with fairly well-educated officers. But, on the one hand, understanding the correctness in modern conditions of such a formulation of the case, the public wants to see officers, and even more so in generals, individuals who can confidently entrust children, sons, daughters and who by their inappropriate actions do not bring trouble to their country, and Means, and on the average man.
In Western societies, IQ tests have been used for a long time to determine the mental abilities of an individual. Assuming that for most people it varies between 90 and 110 units, and for the great scientist Isaac Newton it was only 130 units. (which is considered a mediocre result), then, according to Stanford-Bynet’s criteria, some prominent figures who had or were related to military affairs, this coefficient fluctuates within the normal range and even higher: Schwarzkopf - 170 unit., Napoleon - 135, R. Lee - 130, Sherman - 125, J. Washington - 125, G. Nelson - 125, G. Cortes - 115, Joachim Murat - 115, US Grant, F. Sheridan and G. Blucher - by 110.
But from this, by some harsh critics of the generals, it is concluded that this indicator cannot be called the only “criterion of mental development”. Recent testing of US Army Brigadier Generals in command skills development courses at the Creative Leadership Center in Greensboro, PA North Carolina showed an 124 grade point average, which was rated by the management of the Center as “almost definitely not enough”. These data were transferred to the leadership of the ground forces to analyze the situation with the intelligence state of future command personnel of the Armed Forces type and take appropriate measures.
In modern conditions, in the US armed forces, among the senior officers, two contradictory tendencies coexist: on the one hand, cultivating supposedly axioms about the absolute superiority of practice over "fruitless theorizing", and on the other, widespread propaganda of the desire to acquire knowledge.
American analyst Matthews Lloyd, mentioned above, quotes a statement from Marine Corps General Alfred M. Gray at a meeting at the Pentagon, published several years ago in the Colorado Springs Newspaper Telegraph: "There are too many intellectuals in the top of the US armed forces today ..., and old-fashioned warriors who like good slaughter, and not abstract reasoning are required. ”
Another, and a very honored four-star general, whose name was not called, somehow, in passing, told the same M. Lloyd that, they say, he never read anything except the contents of his mailbox. "And in that and in the other There is, of course, a lot of posture and bragging, but this is evidence of demonstrative disrespect for intellectual activity.
Meanwhile, the honored American military British admiral G. Nelson once remarked that “although in battle many admirals and officers behaved bravely, sometimes they even showed reckless personal bravery, they instantly tried to catch the decision. The reason for this was an elementary lack of education and a lack of habit of thinking. ”
Or one more statement to this effect, no less appreciated by the US military, Napoleon Bonaparte: “The calculations required to solve problems on the battlefield were made by Newton, but when the choice needs to be made immediately, only to the highest degree can the trained brain ".
Acknowledging the fact that the first tendency in the modern American military environment prevails, the well-known military specialist Theodore Krackel bitterly emphasizes that “if Clausewitz and Jomini served today in the American armed forces, their teaching would be in any school for no more than three years, and then quiet resignation. " The former head of the JSS David Jones, in principle, supporting the pessimistic attitude of his colleague, said: “Most likely, under our system, today Clausewitz would have served as a colonel, and after 20 years of service he left civilian scientists to some scientific institution.” To a certain extent, emphasizes M. Lloyd, the words of both analysts are not far from the truth.
In reality, the departments of American military schools are filled to capacity with professional intellectuals, but they seem to be locked in the educational and scientific unit and have too few chances, even if they wish, to enter the service space, forced to be dismissed as a lieutenant colonel, at best Colonel.
Moreover, the opponents of “excessive intellectualism” complain, more recently, the alleged possession of a degree has become fashionable and even mandatory for getting into the military elite. Higher education institutions of the Armed Forces are already competing for greater coverage of their graduates with master's degrees for work in the field of strategy. It is expected, M. Lloyd concludes, that in the near future it will be mandatory to have two academic degrees, civil and military, in order to insure against early dismissal and, at best, guaranteed to become a general. On the one hand, it is possible to understand the officers who have dedicated their lives to the armed forces and who are afraid to be left out in just 30 years of service, or even earlier. On the other hand, this process rather resembles the “unhealthy collecting” of degrees, titles and titles, which in no way testify to the true level of intelligence of its carrier.
Other experts do not see this as a particular negative, but rather even believe that the work on the dissertation, if you want to - do not want it, still adds a mind. It is negative, in their opinion, that the fact that the officer corps has been divided into “purely theoreticians” and “purely practitioners” has already happened in the US Armed Forces. Retired General William R. Richardson paid attention to this without a proper reaction, however, from the audience, back in June 2001, at a conference on improving the quality of the command personnel of the Ground forces, held at the command of educational and scientific research of ground forces. If, in accordance with the analysis carried out at the beginning of the 50 of the last century by John Masland and Lawrence Redway, only one third of the generals' corps, numbering in the NE about 500 people, served "in the field", and the remaining two thirds - in the administrative, technical and teaching positions, now this proportion has changed for the worse, of course, not in favor of the commanders of military formations.
Supporters of military "intellectualism" usually parry with the fact that over the past decades, even with significant reductions in the Armed Forces, the proportion of combat and service (their) formations has changed in about the same way. (But here there is slyness, because in accordance with a well-known and universal, but tacit law, or tradition, with the reduction of troops, the number of generals always decreases disproportionately). In addition, not every general rubak can correspond to headquarters, in fact, intellectual activity. Yes, and a sharp, almost collapse inclusion in staff work at all levels of information technology, as practice shows, simply discouragingly affects combat commanders, who by virtue of rotation find themselves in sometimes completely “unwanted” staff posts.
In the address of the commanders-practitioners and their fierce advocates, opponents also feel free to express sharply critical comments. Analyzing the reasons for the incompetence of many military commanders, retired Lieutenant General Walter Almer states that often “an officer who showed himself well at the tactical level of leadership, and even afterwards gaining some experience and having learned a little, can be completely dysfunctional at the strategic level”. Another specialist, Colonel Michael Cody, supports the idea of his senior colleague, stressing that “the practice of serving the troops legitimized the tradition, according to which it is believed that if an officer succeeds in the lower level, he will automatically be able to cope with his duties at a higher level ". At the same time, the experience of the Second World War, the Vietnam War and the Korean War, when the sergeants summoned from the reserve, showed themselves from the best side as military platovers and even the mouth, showed complete incompetence, finding themselves in the battalion headquarters, were allegedly completely forgotten. According to M. Lloyd, the history of wars is full of examples of the greatest failures, when corps and sometimes the army entrusted successful commanders and even divisional divisions. Obviously, a higher level of leadership requires a broader perspective, in addition to purely military knowledge, the ability to navigate in politics, diplomacy, economics, regional geography, finally ... As Clausewitz said, the commander, remaining a soldier, must to some extent be statesman. At the same time, the lawyers of the practical commanders nod at Moltke Sr., who somehow cynically declared that, they say, “sometimes it takes the loss of an entire division to learn one major general”!
In fact, it turns out that, as a rule, intellectuals deprived of “cheekiness” “plow” in non-prestigious positions, having little chance to make a constructive contribution to the overall climate of an influential military environment. In the meantime, the “practitioners” are methodically moving towards the monopolization of the general’s posts. John Hillen, a veteran of the Gulf War, the author of works on military professionalism and military ethics, a former member of the bipartisan group on the analysis of problems of national security, commented on it as follows: "Four-star generals prefer to produce the next similar portion of four-star, thereby retaining themselves as a caste . They are good guys, they are just great guys, they are even heroes! But I sincerely believe that they feel more comfortable with the Bass Phishing magazine (for fishermen) in their hands than with a book on military theory ... "
But try to destroy this vicious order of things! Robert Bateman, an expert in the field of military history, in this connection gives such an imaginary algorithm of behavior of the highest leader when he thinks about the dismissal of a negligent general: further analyzed numerous political and other consequences in case of his dismissal; the decision is made not to dismiss this general. " Moreover, the analyst concludes, only in his memory Presidents Johnson, Nixon, Bush Sr. and Clinton came up against such a situation. And only the first two were able to bring the matter to the logical end a couple of times. "
As if to continue this topic, another critic of the American generals shares the following conclusions from his analysis. So, according to his calculations, in 2002, in the US ground forces, 330 generals served, which is enough to form a battalion without service units. Having the same 10 - 11 division equivalents as part of the SV, the country simply does not need as many army generals. It’s just that, with all the desire, they allegedly did not find the relevant posts, but practical workers will surely make sure that there are posts or appear. The command will have to appoint generals-warriors to positions where it would be appropriate to keep the intellectual general, but the former will have priority.
It is comforting that, as M. Lloyd writes, “even in the darkest times of anti-intellectualism, a healthy army organism always squeezed out of itself generals-intellectuals, such as E. Goodpaster, W. Depyuy, G. Sullivan, and others, who were guided the postulate that “reform is not an expletive and that professional disagreement with a boss is not a manifestation of disrespect”. And supporters of the rampant intellectualization of the US military leadership, and even advocates of the hard practicality of the American generals unanimously recognize that the armed forces, rejecting constructive-minded officers, isolating themselves from innovative ideas, depriving the officer environment of intellectual self-reproduction, will inevitably eat the bitterness of defeat on the battlefield. "Only continuous training and experience in the aggregate form a successful general," emphasized the absolute authority of military science in the United States D. H. Mahan.
The above analysis, of course, does not exhaust all the features of such a complex topic as the birth, formation and functioning of professional military as a separate social group in the system of social relations in a state, in this case the United States, where military construction is carried out according to a specific, historically established model, received in the scientific journalistic literature the definition of "Anglo-Saxon". As in the alternative to the “Prussian (or Soviet) model” of the military structure, professional military, especially the generals, being in the focus of increased attention from society, have always been, are and will be the object of a constructive, sometimes biased, criticism, formally declared, with good intentions, is to ensure an appropriate level of combat readiness of the armed forces led by them as the main element of the national security of a particular state.
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