The concept of building a tank support combat vehicle
Support combat vehicle tanks was developed and first introduced at arms exhibitions more than ten years ago. On the whole, experts gave her a positive assessment; individual comments were of a private nature. The effectiveness of the BMPT was proved by calculations, high-level managers recommended its introduction into the tank units. Tank support combat vehicles are widely advertised and continue to participate in exhibitions of military equipment. Moreover, in recent years, in the open press, the BMPT is considered an integral part of the tank units operating with the direct support of infantry on the BMP.
The need to provide support for tanks on the battlefield is obvious. However, in the BMPT troops are absent to date, and the prospects for their appearance are still very uncertain. And the reasons for this, apparently, several.
One of them is economic expediency. It is determined using the “cost-effectiveness” criterion. Official data on the cost of BMPTs are not published in the open press, however, despite the base unified with the T-72 tank, the level of its configuration suggests that it is quite high. Nevertheless, the high cost can be considered justified when deciding on the purchase of equipment, subject to the proof of its high efficiency.
And here there are some difficulties. The fact is that the effectiveness of BMPT is not confirmed in practice, and the percentage reduction in tank losses when it is used, calculated by mathematical modeling methods, is not a convincing argument that is guided by the following conclusions:
- the novelty of the existing BMPT consists solely in its purpose and armament complex, in which the artillery component is not sufficiently convincing;
- Armed with the armies of the world there are no analogues with which it would be possible to compare the performance characteristics of this machine, compared with the trends in the development of tank building;
- BMPTs are not in service in the Russian troops, which makes it impossible to appreciate its operational qualities, determine the optimal ratio of "tank - BMPT" in the subunit, understand the methods of combat use of this new product;
- The existing set of weapons BMPT does not provide effective destruction of all types of tank-dangerous targets (TOC).
As you can see, the arguments are serious, and the financial side seems to be secondary here. So, is BMPT needed, and if so, which one?
The development of BMPT is an attempt to systematically solve the problem of reducing tank losses, which requires its logical conclusion. But in order to move on, we need a new concept of BMPT, the main points of which are presented below.
Currently, the fight against tanks and other armored vehicles is conducted not only by special anti-tank weapons, but also aviation, and general purpose tools. In addition, almost all combined arms divisions of the armies of developed countries have in their arsenal the means of fighting tanks. We also note that most of the above funds belong to the category of high-precision weapons. This evolution of anti-tank weapons (PTS), their transformation into an anti-tank defense system, including ground and air vehicles, including those combined into reconnaissance and attack systems, led to the fact that it was necessary to protect tanks, which, due to their heavy losses , "Buried" after each local conflict of the second half of the last century. This is not surprising: in recent years, there were TCP, from which the tanks constructively do not have the necessary protection. For example, helicopters or PTS, striking tanks from above or because of shelters outside the line of sight.
It is known that only a system can successfully operate against a system. And such a layered system of struggle with enemy fire weapons exists. Conventionally, it is subdivided into echelons, starting with aviation - the most long-range means and ending with the last echelon - by tank divisions themselves. But this last echelon now gets too “heavy burden”: a rapid change in the situation, a large number of ground and air tank-dangerous targets on the battlefield, limited visibility in rough and wooded areas, in urban areas, inevitable loss of control. The honored inventor of Russia V. Odintsov in one of his publications called this provision “the tragedy of the tank”. More precisely you will not tell.
Thus, the enemy’s anti-PTS system exists, but its information capabilities and the reaction time of its individual subsystems are insufficient, and tanks, as a rule, in maneuverable combat forms will remain only with the infantry supporting them and covering units of the troop defense system "). However, in local conflicts of the last decades, the “loop” did not confirm its reliability. Especially in repelling the attacks of special attack helicopters (SUV), which are a headache not only for tankers, but also for anti-aircraft gunners. Much has been written about the losses of tanks from SUV strikes, and the conclusions seemed to be made. But they concerned ways of self-defense of tanks and, mainly, the development of military air defense weapons. But it turned out that these conditions are necessary, but insufficient: the tanks cannot protect themselves from the impacts of the SUV. In order for the tanks to fight the helicopters, it is necessary to increase their reconnaissance capabilities, increase the ammunition load (BK) and gun speed (hence the power of the power plant and drive), introduce special ammunition into the BC, and so on. But then it will be the next generation tank.
Short-range anti-aircraft systems (ZKBD) - the main means of covering those parts and divisions. They were the main focus in the fight against WOS. But it did not come true because of the difficulty of detecting helicopters using the terrain to attack, the relatively long reaction time of these complexes and their high vulnerability to all types of enemy fire. After all, the tactical zone, within which most of the anti-aircraft units are located, is most densely suppressed by various means of enemy fire attack. At the same time, the reduced damage area of the ZSU, ZPRK and short-range air defense systems is several times larger than that of the tank. In addition, they are one of the main targets of enemy artillery.
Deleting an airborne safety control system at a safe distance may result in the terrain conditions not allowing to detect the target in time and open fire on it. Yes, and fire capabilities in range in this case may be insufficient. This also applies to the Tunguska air defense missile system. Even its high fire capabilities will not save from losses due to enemy artillery fire. Meanwhile, the importance of timely impact on the target, using the terrain to select the line of attack, suggests the presence of means of cover that are in close proximity to the object of cover.
Considering the situation of the opposition "tank - TOTS" even in a simplified form as a duel, it is necessary to note three circumstances.
Firstly, on the battlefield, all targets, with the exception of fortifications, have a limited time during the periods of observation and shelling, that is, they are, by definition, temporarily operational. Most of all this is characteristic of WOS, which relate to goals for which time of visual or instrument contact with air defense weapons is limited.
When assessing the effectiveness of shooting at such a goal, it is necessary to take into account the point in time at which the defeat of the target was achieved. The sooner this moment comes, the more effective the shooting will be. If the target has finished its action (shooting, launching rockets, etc.), then shooting at it, as a rule, is impossible or ineffective. Using the methods of investigating operations, it is proved that in the duel situation under consideration SUV - ZK, even if we take the probability of hitting an air target as a unit (hypothetical case), the damage from its action will not be zero, but will depend on the ratio of the time of the start of fire and the duration of the target.
Secondly, the probability of hitting targets during combat due to objective technical and tactical reasons for tanks and BMPs supporting them will inevitably be significantly lower than the range. The same applies to the air defense systems covering the tanks and infantry. A possible solution to the problem in this situation may be an increase in the number of target channels acting on the principle of "saw-shoot". Fearing excessive concentration of fire in this case is not worth it because of the low probability of detection and the short duration of the targets. In such conditions, BMPT with a more advanced than the tanks, information management system (ICS) would be very useful. Unlike the tank, the design features of the BMPT make it possible to have such a system and more effectively carry out the search and defeat of the TOC.
Thirdly, it is impossible not to note one more circumstance that eludes the attention of the authors of publications on tank topics. At one time, when the danger of batches to tanks was realized, pilot exercises were held in the Soviet Union, during which tactical methods of dealing with this type of targets were developed. It turned out that tankers, psychologically purely, pay more attention to defeating those targets that are easier to destroy, that is, tanks. This is natural, since all the tanks are created according to the principle of “beat the equal,” for which they have the appropriate armament. Another matter of the BMPT: “having taken over” the air and ground TOC, they would greatly facilitate tank crews to fight against enemy tanks.
It seems that the presence of BMPT in combat formations will to some extent solve these problems.
Another important aspect of the use of BMPT is the fight against the enemy’s tank-dangerous manpower (TOGS). The BMPT armament complex, consisting of an automatic cannon, anti-tank guided missiles, an automatic grenade launcher and machine guns, cannot be solved.
Shooting from a cannon at tank-dangerous manpower, located in shelters, is ineffective, and behind obstacles (for example, on the reverse slopes of heights or behind buildings when conducting combat in a populated area) is completely impossible.
Do not provide reliable destruction of such targets and automatic grenade launchers due to the weak power of the grenade and low accuracy at short distances. As a matter of fact, the BMPT course grenades are not intended for this: the angle of elevation is not designed for shooting indirect fire. Not much benefit from them will be when shooting in the winter with deep snow cover. To defeat such targets, it is necessary that the BMPT weapon set contains a weapon that can fire not only direct, half-direct, but also indirect fire, that is, combining the qualities of a cannon and mortar (it’s not by chance that Israelis install 60 mm mortars on their towers "Merkav").
Such guns belong to the guns of the combined type and are capable of firing both mines and projectiles (rockets). They are in service in the Russian army and in the armies of some other countries. But they were not designed to solve the problems under consideration. However, in the creation (refinement) of such weapons is not unusual. How many such problems have already arisen and were successfully resolved by Russian gunsmiths.
It is advisable that the caliber of the combined gun (CO) was 82-mm. In this case, the task of creating a KO will be greatly facilitated due to the fact that: there is one of the two types of ammunition - 82-mm mine; since the Great Patriotic War, technical solutions are known that make it possible to combine the features of mortar firing with a classic cannon shot in one semi-automatic weapon; there will be no big problems with the automatic loader; IUS is similar to that of BMPT. This list can be continued further. However, it should be borne in mind that KO is not a universal weapon and integration with 30-mm AP, AGS and machine gun will be necessary. There is a good groundwork for the development of this tool. Prospects are attractive at all: if there is a projectile in the ammunition with ready striking elements and undermining at a set range, homing roof-breaking mine and reconnaissance mine, BMPT can become a tactical reconnaissance and firing complex with good prospects.
It is known that the emergence of fundamentally new models or weapon systems, even if they are not based on the latest scientific discoveries, but developed using the technological level already achieved, can influence the tactics of combat. This provision fully applies to BMPTs: equipping tank units with them, of course, will not make a revolution in military affairs, like nuclear weapons, or will radically change the strategy of warfare thanks to advances in information and computing systems. However, they will have an impact on the tactics of combined-arms combat:
- losses of tanks in all types of combat and infantry fighting vehicles supporting tanks will decrease;
- it will be more rational to use ammunition (BC) tanks and, perhaps, there will be no need to increase the range of ammunition in the BC because of the inclusion of fundamentally new with increased efficiency of TOTs;
- tank units will acquire greater autonomy, which is important given the dynamic nature of modern combined-arms combat and actions under special conditions;
- BMPT can be very effective and as an independent fire weapon in anti-terrorist operations and local conflicts of low intensity;
- Tactical standards of air defense systems may change due to the greater distance from the combat contact system. This will reduce their losses, will allow better use of the terrain to select starting (firing) positions and, accordingly, will increase the effectiveness of the air defense system as a whole.
As we see, the considered tactical aspect of the problem is important in itself. But there is another equally significant aspect - military-political, expressed in the form of military-technical cooperation (MTC), one of the directions of which is the export of weapons. Needless to say, how important it is for Russia - one of the world's largest exporters. In this regard, export prospects for the promotion of BMPT in the arms market, from a tactical point of view, should be very favorable.
There are a number of arguments in support of the BMPT, but we will dwell on one thing - the prestige of the state. This concept has a pronounced political character and is in some way related to another - a priority in development. We make one small excursion into history.
In Russia, the tank’s birthday is considered 18 May 1915. It was on that day, near Riga, that the tests of an armored combat vehicle created by Alexander Porokhovshchikov and having all the attributes of a modern tank began. "All-terrain vehicle" (the so-called this fighting machine) successfully passed the tests, and the team of creators was ready in the shortest possible time to "bring" the machine and even make it floating. However, due to the short-sightedness of the leadership of the Main Military Technical Directorate, A. Porokhovshchikov’s project did not receive support. A number of other projects of tracked combat vehicles that were developed at about the same time as the Rover were also not accepted.
Almost a year and a half after A. Porokhovshchikov, England opened a new era in the development of means of warfare. Russia has lost priority in creating a new type of combat vehicles, which received the short and expressive name "tank". Of course, the works of the first Russian tank builders were not in vain. The rapid development of tank building in the Soviet Union in the 20 – 30-s of the last century, equipping the army with tanks that are not inferior to the best world models, and according to a number of indicators and superior to them - this is also the merit of the predecessors.
With that said, let us allow ourselves to express such a perhaps somewhat categorical idea: the fate of the BMPT, a new direction in the development of armored vehicles created in Russia several years ago, can repeat the fate of the all-terrain vehicle. This once again proves the importance of developing a new concept of BMPT, which incorporates all the best that exists in the existing model, and fully meets the conditions of the contact phase of a modern war. The concept, in which, in addition to the detailed look of the BMPT, issues of structure, management and information support (interfacing) with higher-level systems, including military air defense, are resolved. Only with this approach is it possible to quickly advance the project and retain the achieved priority.
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