Submarine fighter
New depths of partnership may open up before Moscow and New Delhi
India’s acquisition of six non-nuclear submarines on the 75I project represents a landmark event for the development of the country's naval forces, the national shipbuilding industry and for the global submarine market as a whole. Not surprisingly, the release of the final official Request for proposal (RFP) by the Ministry of Defense of India is eagerly awaited by the entire global submarine industry.
The customer’s decision to build all six planned submarines on the 75I project in Indian enterprises makes the technology transfer issues critical. It makes you look at the possible proposals for the 75I project, including from the Russian side, from a new angle.
Retrospective
Russia's desire to participate in the Project 75I program seems quite logical. Moscow stood at the origins of the Indian underwater fleethaving delivered New Delhi in the 60–70s the eight first submarines of the I641K project (Foxtrot class). In the 80–90s, India acquired from the USSR and Russia ten submarines of project 877EKM (Kilo class), which form the basis of the national submarine forces to date.
“The presence of powerful Club-S type missile systems and potentially BrahMos gives Russian proposals a cardinal advantage”
After 2000, an extensive submarine modernization program for the Indian Navy's 877ECM project is being implemented at the enterprises of both countries. At the same time, they were the first in the world to receive the unique Russian Club-S missile system, including two-stage supersonic anti-ship missiles and subsonic CDs for hitting ground targets.
The depth of our partnership in submarine construction is underscored by unprecedented cooperation in the field of the nuclear submarine fleet. Moscow provided India with a long-term lease on two nuclear submarines - the 670 project (Charle I class) in the 1987 year (returned in 1991) and the 971I project (Akula Mod class) under the 2004 agreement of the year, transferred to India in 2012. This delivery is an absolutely unique fact for international defense cooperation, demonstrating Russia's readiness to share with India the most strategically important, ultra-sensitive military technologies.
French Offer - Scorpene
The DCNS shipbuilding association will offer the next modified version of the Scorpene submarine for the tender, the construction of six units of which is already underway under the 2005 agreement at the Mazagon Dock Limited shipyard in Mumbai. In light of this, the application for six more Scorpene on the project 75I could be considered as a priority, if not for some of the circumstances of the implementation of the already concluded contract.
As far as we know, India is experiencing problems when working together on the Scorpene, facing obstacles in obtaining technology from the French, a number of components, as well as in the implementation of the accompanying package of offset agreements. The customer had to make significant additional payments to DCNS in excess of contractual amounts (according to a number of estimates, up to 600 million dollars in excess of the stipulated three billion). In this program built Scorpene comes with significant delays. If, under the terms of the agreement with DCNS, all six boats were to be transferred to the Indian Navy in 2012 – 2016, now the delivery of the lead Scorpene has been transferred to 2016 – 2017, and the construction of the other five will probably last at least until 2022.
Under these conditions, subscribe to six more Scorpene - put all the eggs in one basket. In fact, it guarantees the stretching of the 75I project to at least the year 2030, with obvious extremely negative consequences for Indian submarine forces.
Of course, the high compatibility of the modified Scorpene with the six submarines of this type already under construction in India is the strength of the French proposal. However, consideration of other aspects makes one doubt the high tactical and technological level of the Scorpene characteristics in the period beyond the 2020 of the year.
A characteristic feature of the French proposals in shipbuilding, and especially underwater, is the desire to offer "purely" their solutions for all technical and combat systems. This reduces the possibility of choice at the customer and puts him in a strong dependence on the suppliers of subsystems and spare parts for the widest range of nomenclature. Nominally, DCNS declares its readiness to integrate solutions of other manufacturers (including Russian) into the design of its submarines, but in fact the French have no such experience.
The weakness of DCNS’s offer is particularly evident in the armaments of their submarine projects. In contrast to the unique Russian Club-S complex, France is ready to offer only subsonic anti-ship missiles MBDA Exocet MM40 Block 3, which are based on 45 technology from years ago. Development in France of the Kyrgyz Republic for the destruction of ground targets MdCN (Scalp Naval), launched from submarines, is only underway. It is unclear when this rocket will be offered for export. In addition, according to known information, MdCN is significantly inferior in terms of a number of characteristics (especially in range) of the Russian KR 3М14Э, which is part of the Club complex.
The French problem is the uncertainty with the anaerobic power plant (AIP) for future Scorpene options. Until now, as an option, the AIP for the Scorpene DCNS advanced its original MESMA installation, which is a steam-turbine system operating from burning ethanol or diesel in a closed loop. In fact, only the Pakistani fleet, who installed these systems on three French-built submarines of the Agosta 90 project, flattered MESMA. As a result, MESMA's marketing now looks unpromising and instead of DCNS, it started advertising its second generation AIP, which is based on the reforming technology of outboard diesel fuel - similar to the Russian and Indian systems. However, this new French AIP system is currently in the initial stages of development, and it is unclear when it will be available for installation on a submarine.
German project
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) will present non-nuclear 75A or 212 submarines (and possibly a new project, for example 214) to the tender for the 218I project. This is a development of a subsidiary Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW). The Indian Navy already has experience in operating German submarines, having received four 80 / 90 submarines in the 209, the beginning of the 1500, two of which were built by HDW and two were licensed by Mazagon Dock Limited in Mumbai.
Of course, the German offerings look very strong, rely on the considerable experience of HDW and an impressive list of operators and customers of non-nuclear 212A or 214 types worldwide. An important factor in the attractiveness is the availability of spent and already operated AIP on submarines of types 212А or 214. The German AIP developed by Siemens is based on electrochemical generators using hydrogen-oxygen fuel cells.
At the same time, German submarines do not use missile weapons long-range and its integration on them (and even more so on Russian systems such as Club or BrahMos) will most likely be extremely difficult for political reasons. In general, it should be noted that strict legislation on export control of armaments and the presence in Germany of significant political groups that are in favor of toughening, make for a country like India the purchase of German military products, including submarines, quite risky. The likelihood of falling under export restrictions or sanctions measures in Germany is higher than in any other country in the world. This creates increased risks, especially for such a long-term project like 75I, the implementation of which will take an estimated at least 15 years.
The cost of the German submarines, both procurement and operational, throughout the life cycle is also, apparently, significantly higher than competing offers. This is especially true of submarines with a Siemens AIP fuel cell system. In fact, for a sustainable supply of power plants with consumables, it will be necessary to build an expensive and vulnerable chemical plant. In addition, this technology places extremely high demands on the quality and organization of personnel operating AIP on fuel cells and ground personnel. In fact, it is compatible almost exclusively with the German labor and military culture and is of little use for its actual use in a situation of a little bit long armed conflict.
Project "Cupid"
Russia is proposing a tender for the 75I project of its most advanced non-nuclear submarine under the code "Amur" - the export designation of the 677 project (Lada class), developed by the Rubin design bureau. We have it designated as a non-nuclear submarine of the fourth generation. Developed with the 80-x as a universal replacement in the Soviet fleet of the third-generation submarines of the project 877 (Kilo class). However, due to the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent economic difficulties, the construction of the head boat of the 677 “St. Petersburg” project for the Russian fleet was delayed. In view of the same economic problems of 90, a number of fundamentally new systems of the 677 project had to be worked out not on experimental ships, but directly on the head submarine. Thus, “St. Petersburg” essentially became at the first stage of its service an experience platform, which has been constantly tested at sea since 2004.
However, every cloud has a silver lining. Such a long period of testing this submarine has allowed to date to grind all the main systems of the project 677. Now it is fully developed and ready for mass production. In 2013 – 2014, the Russian Navy issued to the Admiralty shipyards in St. Petersburg contracts for the final completion of two 677 project submarines previously laid there with the Kronstadt submarine launched by the end of 2015. It is planned to build these ships for the Russian Navy.
“Amur” (in its main version “Amur-1650”) is noticeably smaller and more compact than the Kilo class, but surpasses it in basic characteristics. The main features of the 677 project are the presence of a powerful high-efficiency AC main electric motor (this is a high-tech technology used on Permasin electric motors of the most modern German submarines of the 212A type), as well as high-performance electronic systems, including the latest sonar complex, the most automated combat control system, optoelectronic mast periscopes. All this is the most advanced technology of submarine construction, and they can be transferred to India.
A strong advantage of the Amur project is the presence of the spent Club-S missile system on it, which includes, as already mentioned, two-stage supersonic anti-ship missiles and subsonic CD BD to destroy ground targets. The same complexes are used on Indian submarines Kilo. In addition, the Amur can be additionally equipped with vertical launchers for the Russian-Indian powerful supersonic BrahMos missiles. They can be used from this submarine both in the anti-ship version and in the variant created in India for the destruction of ground targets. Thus, in the case of the purchase of “Amur”, rocket weapon unification with existing Kilo underwater platforms will be ensured, as well as independence from foreign suppliers will be achieved if the powerful BrahMos missile is chosen as the main weapon in the underwater version.
Another option for Amur could be equipping its AIP, both Russian and Indian designs. The installation of the Rubin design bureau is at the final stage - its large-scale tests are planned for 2015, and by the time the submarines of the 75I project are built for the Indian Navy, the Russian AIP will be commercially available. However, equally interesting is the possibility of integration on the Amur perspective Indian AIP. The fact is that both the development of the Rubin and the Indian system being created use the general principle of producing hydrogen onboard a submarine by reforming standard diesel boat fuel. This approach is fundamentally different from the German-type AIP, where a supply of special chemicals is produced on board to produce hydrogen. The common design of the Russian and Indian AIP systems makes it relatively simple to place them on the Russian Amur project. Moreover, both of these systems can act as insurers of each other against technical risks.
Having reached the stage of technical and commercial maturity, the Russian project 677 is actively moving into the international market and attracting considerable attention. It is characteristic that now Amur is actively interested in China, despite the seemingly significant successes in the construction of its own nuclear and diesel-electric submarines. This suggests that Amur is a concentration of truly advanced technologies that are not yet available to the Chinese.
Finally, the fundamental advantage of the Russian choice is the fact that in fact a joint project is proposed, or rather participation in the implementation of the Indian project. The point is that, according to Indian requirements, using advanced, but already highly matured technologies, an underwater system will be designed, which will then be predominantly (if the customer nevertheless agrees to build a lead boat in Russia) or fully embodied in metal at Indian enterprises . At the same time, production cooperation has actually been formed. In this sense, the Russian proposal for project 75I is typologically close to the program for the release of the Su-30MKI fighter, which was designed at Sukhoi Design Bureau according to Indian requirements. The most important elements of this complex, such as a radar with a phased antenna array, an engine with a controlled thrust vector, and an aerodynamic integrated triplane, already existed, but were not yet put into mass production. Thanks to the exceptional professionalism of Commander-in-Chief Krishnaswami and the technical team of the Indian Air Force, India then took a conscious risk, resulting in the emergence of a highly advanced aviation complex, which today, almost 20 years later, remains modern. The exact balance was chosen between the strong innovative impulse received by both Indian and Russian aviation industry, and the feasibility of new technical solutions. All this is strikingly reminiscent of the current situation with Amur boats, where AIP, a permanent magnet electric motor, a hydroacoustic station and BIUS are at about the same technical maturity as a radar with a headlamp or an engine with UVT at the time the Su-30MKI began development.
Some mappings
The “Cupid” project looks quite attractive for the 75I program. Russia can offer the Indian Navy a submarine that is well integrated into the system of operation of familiar models of Soviet and Russian design that has already been formed and is functioning in the fleet. The submarines will get into the “Russified” environment of proven principles of combat use and daily operation, an established crew training program, support infrastructure, as well as the availability of proven specialists and facilities for maintenance and repair.
In terms of value, the Russian project will also surely benefit from any Western proposals. This also applies to operational reliability. However, the key point of the attractiveness of the Russian version for India is unprecedentedly wide readiness for the transfer of technologies, including the most advanced and sensitive ones. Joint work on the fifth-generation FGFA fighter, the BrahMos rocket, and the supply of India to the long-range missiles of the Club complex and (once again emphasize the uniqueness of the fact) of nuclear submarines vividly demonstrate this. In many respects, Western developers and suppliers either do not themselves have similar technologies or are not able to effectively share them with a country like India.
An important aspect is the presence of Russian designers and suppliers of already established relations with the fleet and industry of India, formed during the long service in the Navy of this country of Soviet and Russian submarines, especially under the program of repair and modernization of submarines Kilo class. Localized systems and components (including such important ones as a hydroacoustic station) are already being installed on the boats of this class being upgraded by the Indian Navy. All of the above indicates the possibility of full-fledged involvement of the national industry to participate in the construction of submarines of the Russian project under the program 75I. Western competitors can not boast such a broad interaction with the Indian industry in their projects.
Finally, the presence of powerful Club-S types of high-performance missile systems and potentially BrahMos, focused on high-precision destruction of ground targets at large distances, gives Russian proposals a cardinal advantage.
Uncertainty persists regarding the possible wishes of the Indian Navy in the area of equipping submarines of the 75I project with anaerobic power plants. Potentially, the issue of AIP may lead to new serious delays in the implementation of the entire program for the acquisition of new submarines. The Indian fleet, not having the experience even of experimental operation of the AIP, seems to be in this respect in some way at a crossroads.
Recently, in countries already using AIP submarines, there seems to be some disappointment with the experience of using these facilities. They are extremely expensive to operate, especially because of the special consumables, very complex, often capricious and unsafe, require highly qualified, specially trained and well-paid (that is, expensive) personnel. At the same time, the increase in combat value given by the AIP at the present stage does not look so significant.
It is indicative here of the recent sensational decision of the Japanese Navy to abandon the use of AIP installations on its next large non-nuclear submarines under construction, based on the technology of Stirling engines developed over the Swedish license. Instead, the Japanese consider it more appropriate to use new powerful lithium-ion batteries on their large oceanic non-nuclear submarines as giving a more substantial increase in combat potential.
It should be noted that Russia is also actively working to create powerful lithium-ion rechargeable batteries for submarines. According to some reports, an experimental set of such batteries for testing should be installed on the second submarine of the 677 "Kronstadt" project. In this way, India can get the fruits of developments in this direction with the export version of the 677 project.
The leadership of the national naval forces must clearly assess the prospects for the desirability of using AIP in an 75I project in terms of time, cost, and tactical possibilities. The solution of this question, apparently, partly predetermines the choice of the desired type of submarine. For India, the expediency of acquiring an expensive AIP raises great doubts as the country is simultaneously developing the nuclear submarine fleet. Meanwhile, any submarine is integrally deliberately superior in combat effectiveness to a non-nuclear submarine with any type of AIP.
In turn, the already important key decision on the construction of all six submarines of the 75I project in Indian shipyards imposes increased and specific requirements regarding the possibilities of full localization of the selected project, as well as the partnership of the developer with the industry of the country. It should take a closer look at the efficiency and realism of offset requirements. Underestimating these factors could threaten the 75I project with a repetition of current problems with Scorpene.
In the light of the well-known requirements for the possible main forms of combat operations, the Indian Navy at sea, the equipment of a promising non-nuclear submarine with a highly efficient multi-purpose missile system with the most significant ammunition load can be considered as a priority task. This circumstance should be evaluated as decisive when choosing the most desirable project.
India’s acquisition of six non-nuclear submarines on the 75I project represents a landmark event for the development of the country's naval forces, the national shipbuilding industry and for the global submarine market as a whole. Not surprisingly, the release of the final official Request for proposal (RFP) by the Ministry of Defense of India is eagerly awaited by the entire global submarine industry.
The customer’s decision to build all six planned submarines on the 75I project in Indian enterprises makes the technology transfer issues critical. It makes you look at the possible proposals for the 75I project, including from the Russian side, from a new angle.
Retrospective
Russia's desire to participate in the Project 75I program seems quite logical. Moscow stood at the origins of the Indian underwater fleethaving delivered New Delhi in the 60–70s the eight first submarines of the I641K project (Foxtrot class). In the 80–90s, India acquired from the USSR and Russia ten submarines of project 877EKM (Kilo class), which form the basis of the national submarine forces to date.
“The presence of powerful Club-S type missile systems and potentially BrahMos gives Russian proposals a cardinal advantage”
After 2000, an extensive submarine modernization program for the Indian Navy's 877ECM project is being implemented at the enterprises of both countries. At the same time, they were the first in the world to receive the unique Russian Club-S missile system, including two-stage supersonic anti-ship missiles and subsonic CDs for hitting ground targets.
The depth of our partnership in submarine construction is underscored by unprecedented cooperation in the field of the nuclear submarine fleet. Moscow provided India with a long-term lease on two nuclear submarines - the 670 project (Charle I class) in the 1987 year (returned in 1991) and the 971I project (Akula Mod class) under the 2004 agreement of the year, transferred to India in 2012. This delivery is an absolutely unique fact for international defense cooperation, demonstrating Russia's readiness to share with India the most strategically important, ultra-sensitive military technologies.
French Offer - Scorpene
The DCNS shipbuilding association will offer the next modified version of the Scorpene submarine for the tender, the construction of six units of which is already underway under the 2005 agreement at the Mazagon Dock Limited shipyard in Mumbai. In light of this, the application for six more Scorpene on the project 75I could be considered as a priority, if not for some of the circumstances of the implementation of the already concluded contract.
As far as we know, India is experiencing problems when working together on the Scorpene, facing obstacles in obtaining technology from the French, a number of components, as well as in the implementation of the accompanying package of offset agreements. The customer had to make significant additional payments to DCNS in excess of contractual amounts (according to a number of estimates, up to 600 million dollars in excess of the stipulated three billion). In this program built Scorpene comes with significant delays. If, under the terms of the agreement with DCNS, all six boats were to be transferred to the Indian Navy in 2012 – 2016, now the delivery of the lead Scorpene has been transferred to 2016 – 2017, and the construction of the other five will probably last at least until 2022.
Under these conditions, subscribe to six more Scorpene - put all the eggs in one basket. In fact, it guarantees the stretching of the 75I project to at least the year 2030, with obvious extremely negative consequences for Indian submarine forces.
Of course, the high compatibility of the modified Scorpene with the six submarines of this type already under construction in India is the strength of the French proposal. However, consideration of other aspects makes one doubt the high tactical and technological level of the Scorpene characteristics in the period beyond the 2020 of the year.A characteristic feature of the French proposals in shipbuilding, and especially underwater, is the desire to offer "purely" their solutions for all technical and combat systems. This reduces the possibility of choice at the customer and puts him in a strong dependence on the suppliers of subsystems and spare parts for the widest range of nomenclature. Nominally, DCNS declares its readiness to integrate solutions of other manufacturers (including Russian) into the design of its submarines, but in fact the French have no such experience.
The weakness of DCNS’s offer is particularly evident in the armaments of their submarine projects. In contrast to the unique Russian Club-S complex, France is ready to offer only subsonic anti-ship missiles MBDA Exocet MM40 Block 3, which are based on 45 technology from years ago. Development in France of the Kyrgyz Republic for the destruction of ground targets MdCN (Scalp Naval), launched from submarines, is only underway. It is unclear when this rocket will be offered for export. In addition, according to known information, MdCN is significantly inferior in terms of a number of characteristics (especially in range) of the Russian KR 3М14Э, which is part of the Club complex.
The French problem is the uncertainty with the anaerobic power plant (AIP) for future Scorpene options. Until now, as an option, the AIP for the Scorpene DCNS advanced its original MESMA installation, which is a steam-turbine system operating from burning ethanol or diesel in a closed loop. In fact, only the Pakistani fleet, who installed these systems on three French-built submarines of the Agosta 90 project, flattered MESMA. As a result, MESMA's marketing now looks unpromising and instead of DCNS, it started advertising its second generation AIP, which is based on the reforming technology of outboard diesel fuel - similar to the Russian and Indian systems. However, this new French AIP system is currently in the initial stages of development, and it is unclear when it will be available for installation on a submarine.
German project
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS) will present non-nuclear 75A or 212 submarines (and possibly a new project, for example 214) to the tender for the 218I project. This is a development of a subsidiary Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft (HDW). The Indian Navy already has experience in operating German submarines, having received four 80 / 90 submarines in the 209, the beginning of the 1500, two of which were built by HDW and two were licensed by Mazagon Dock Limited in Mumbai.
Of course, the German offerings look very strong, rely on the considerable experience of HDW and an impressive list of operators and customers of non-nuclear 212A or 214 types worldwide. An important factor in the attractiveness is the availability of spent and already operated AIP on submarines of types 212А or 214. The German AIP developed by Siemens is based on electrochemical generators using hydrogen-oxygen fuel cells.
At the same time, German submarines do not use missile weapons long-range and its integration on them (and even more so on Russian systems such as Club or BrahMos) will most likely be extremely difficult for political reasons. In general, it should be noted that strict legislation on export control of armaments and the presence in Germany of significant political groups that are in favor of toughening, make for a country like India the purchase of German military products, including submarines, quite risky. The likelihood of falling under export restrictions or sanctions measures in Germany is higher than in any other country in the world. This creates increased risks, especially for such a long-term project like 75I, the implementation of which will take an estimated at least 15 years.
The cost of the German submarines, both procurement and operational, throughout the life cycle is also, apparently, significantly higher than competing offers. This is especially true of submarines with a Siemens AIP fuel cell system. In fact, for a sustainable supply of power plants with consumables, it will be necessary to build an expensive and vulnerable chemical plant. In addition, this technology places extremely high demands on the quality and organization of personnel operating AIP on fuel cells and ground personnel. In fact, it is compatible almost exclusively with the German labor and military culture and is of little use for its actual use in a situation of a little bit long armed conflict.
Project "Cupid"
Russia is proposing a tender for the 75I project of its most advanced non-nuclear submarine under the code "Amur" - the export designation of the 677 project (Lada class), developed by the Rubin design bureau. We have it designated as a non-nuclear submarine of the fourth generation. Developed with the 80-x as a universal replacement in the Soviet fleet of the third-generation submarines of the project 877 (Kilo class). However, due to the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent economic difficulties, the construction of the head boat of the 677 “St. Petersburg” project for the Russian fleet was delayed. In view of the same economic problems of 90, a number of fundamentally new systems of the 677 project had to be worked out not on experimental ships, but directly on the head submarine. Thus, “St. Petersburg” essentially became at the first stage of its service an experience platform, which has been constantly tested at sea since 2004.
However, every cloud has a silver lining. Such a long period of testing this submarine has allowed to date to grind all the main systems of the project 677. Now it is fully developed and ready for mass production. In 2013 – 2014, the Russian Navy issued to the Admiralty shipyards in St. Petersburg contracts for the final completion of two 677 project submarines previously laid there with the Kronstadt submarine launched by the end of 2015. It is planned to build these ships for the Russian Navy.
“Amur” (in its main version “Amur-1650”) is noticeably smaller and more compact than the Kilo class, but surpasses it in basic characteristics. The main features of the 677 project are the presence of a powerful high-efficiency AC main electric motor (this is a high-tech technology used on Permasin electric motors of the most modern German submarines of the 212A type), as well as high-performance electronic systems, including the latest sonar complex, the most automated combat control system, optoelectronic mast periscopes. All this is the most advanced technology of submarine construction, and they can be transferred to India.
A strong advantage of the Amur project is the presence of the spent Club-S missile system on it, which includes, as already mentioned, two-stage supersonic anti-ship missiles and subsonic CD BD to destroy ground targets. The same complexes are used on Indian submarines Kilo. In addition, the Amur can be additionally equipped with vertical launchers for the Russian-Indian powerful supersonic BrahMos missiles. They can be used from this submarine both in the anti-ship version and in the variant created in India for the destruction of ground targets. Thus, in the case of the purchase of “Amur”, rocket weapon unification with existing Kilo underwater platforms will be ensured, as well as independence from foreign suppliers will be achieved if the powerful BrahMos missile is chosen as the main weapon in the underwater version.
Another option for Amur could be equipping its AIP, both Russian and Indian designs. The installation of the Rubin design bureau is at the final stage - its large-scale tests are planned for 2015, and by the time the submarines of the 75I project are built for the Indian Navy, the Russian AIP will be commercially available. However, equally interesting is the possibility of integration on the Amur perspective Indian AIP. The fact is that both the development of the Rubin and the Indian system being created use the general principle of producing hydrogen onboard a submarine by reforming standard diesel boat fuel. This approach is fundamentally different from the German-type AIP, where a supply of special chemicals is produced on board to produce hydrogen. The common design of the Russian and Indian AIP systems makes it relatively simple to place them on the Russian Amur project. Moreover, both of these systems can act as insurers of each other against technical risks.
Having reached the stage of technical and commercial maturity, the Russian project 677 is actively moving into the international market and attracting considerable attention. It is characteristic that now Amur is actively interested in China, despite the seemingly significant successes in the construction of its own nuclear and diesel-electric submarines. This suggests that Amur is a concentration of truly advanced technologies that are not yet available to the Chinese.
Finally, the fundamental advantage of the Russian choice is the fact that in fact a joint project is proposed, or rather participation in the implementation of the Indian project. The point is that, according to Indian requirements, using advanced, but already highly matured technologies, an underwater system will be designed, which will then be predominantly (if the customer nevertheless agrees to build a lead boat in Russia) or fully embodied in metal at Indian enterprises . At the same time, production cooperation has actually been formed. In this sense, the Russian proposal for project 75I is typologically close to the program for the release of the Su-30MKI fighter, which was designed at Sukhoi Design Bureau according to Indian requirements. The most important elements of this complex, such as a radar with a phased antenna array, an engine with a controlled thrust vector, and an aerodynamic integrated triplane, already existed, but were not yet put into mass production. Thanks to the exceptional professionalism of Commander-in-Chief Krishnaswami and the technical team of the Indian Air Force, India then took a conscious risk, resulting in the emergence of a highly advanced aviation complex, which today, almost 20 years later, remains modern. The exact balance was chosen between the strong innovative impulse received by both Indian and Russian aviation industry, and the feasibility of new technical solutions. All this is strikingly reminiscent of the current situation with Amur boats, where AIP, a permanent magnet electric motor, a hydroacoustic station and BIUS are at about the same technical maturity as a radar with a headlamp or an engine with UVT at the time the Su-30MKI began development.
Some mappings
The “Cupid” project looks quite attractive for the 75I program. Russia can offer the Indian Navy a submarine that is well integrated into the system of operation of familiar models of Soviet and Russian design that has already been formed and is functioning in the fleet. The submarines will get into the “Russified” environment of proven principles of combat use and daily operation, an established crew training program, support infrastructure, as well as the availability of proven specialists and facilities for maintenance and repair.
In terms of value, the Russian project will also surely benefit from any Western proposals. This also applies to operational reliability. However, the key point of the attractiveness of the Russian version for India is unprecedentedly wide readiness for the transfer of technologies, including the most advanced and sensitive ones. Joint work on the fifth-generation FGFA fighter, the BrahMos rocket, and the supply of India to the long-range missiles of the Club complex and (once again emphasize the uniqueness of the fact) of nuclear submarines vividly demonstrate this. In many respects, Western developers and suppliers either do not themselves have similar technologies or are not able to effectively share them with a country like India.
An important aspect is the presence of Russian designers and suppliers of already established relations with the fleet and industry of India, formed during the long service in the Navy of this country of Soviet and Russian submarines, especially under the program of repair and modernization of submarines Kilo class. Localized systems and components (including such important ones as a hydroacoustic station) are already being installed on the boats of this class being upgraded by the Indian Navy. All of the above indicates the possibility of full-fledged involvement of the national industry to participate in the construction of submarines of the Russian project under the program 75I. Western competitors can not boast such a broad interaction with the Indian industry in their projects.
Finally, the presence of powerful Club-S types of high-performance missile systems and potentially BrahMos, focused on high-precision destruction of ground targets at large distances, gives Russian proposals a cardinal advantage.
Uncertainty persists regarding the possible wishes of the Indian Navy in the area of equipping submarines of the 75I project with anaerobic power plants. Potentially, the issue of AIP may lead to new serious delays in the implementation of the entire program for the acquisition of new submarines. The Indian fleet, not having the experience even of experimental operation of the AIP, seems to be in this respect in some way at a crossroads.
Recently, in countries already using AIP submarines, there seems to be some disappointment with the experience of using these facilities. They are extremely expensive to operate, especially because of the special consumables, very complex, often capricious and unsafe, require highly qualified, specially trained and well-paid (that is, expensive) personnel. At the same time, the increase in combat value given by the AIP at the present stage does not look so significant.
It is indicative here of the recent sensational decision of the Japanese Navy to abandon the use of AIP installations on its next large non-nuclear submarines under construction, based on the technology of Stirling engines developed over the Swedish license. Instead, the Japanese consider it more appropriate to use new powerful lithium-ion batteries on their large oceanic non-nuclear submarines as giving a more substantial increase in combat potential.
It should be noted that Russia is also actively working to create powerful lithium-ion rechargeable batteries for submarines. According to some reports, an experimental set of such batteries for testing should be installed on the second submarine of the 677 "Kronstadt" project. In this way, India can get the fruits of developments in this direction with the export version of the 677 project.
The leadership of the national naval forces must clearly assess the prospects for the desirability of using AIP in an 75I project in terms of time, cost, and tactical possibilities. The solution of this question, apparently, partly predetermines the choice of the desired type of submarine. For India, the expediency of acquiring an expensive AIP raises great doubts as the country is simultaneously developing the nuclear submarine fleet. Meanwhile, any submarine is integrally deliberately superior in combat effectiveness to a non-nuclear submarine with any type of AIP.
In turn, the already important key decision on the construction of all six submarines of the 75I project in Indian shipyards imposes increased and specific requirements regarding the possibilities of full localization of the selected project, as well as the partnership of the developer with the industry of the country. It should take a closer look at the efficiency and realism of offset requirements. Underestimating these factors could threaten the 75I project with a repetition of current problems with Scorpene.
In the light of the well-known requirements for the possible main forms of combat operations, the Indian Navy at sea, the equipment of a promising non-nuclear submarine with a highly efficient multi-purpose missile system with the most significant ammunition load can be considered as a priority task. This circumstance should be evaluated as decisive when choosing the most desirable project.
Information