How to save nuclear submarines?

53
How to save nuclear submarines?


On April 7, 1970, completing military service in the Mediterranean and entering the Atlantic, the Soviet submarine K-8 of the project 627A headed for its northern base. Suddenly, in its third compartment, chemical regeneration cartridges ignited, intended to clean the ship's atmosphere. It took quite a bit of time for the fire to escalate into a full-scale fire. As it should be, the emergency protection of the reactors worked, the turbines stopped. The reserve diesel generator could not be started, and the submarine was left without electricity, which significantly complicated the struggle for survivability, which nevertheless lasted more than three days. Having blown the ballast tanks, the boat floated to the surface. Meanwhile, the fire spread through the ship. Outboard glands burned out in two stern compartments (seals of cables removed from the solid hull of the boat). Water began to flow into the compartments, which led to the onset of increasing negative trim (inclination to the stern). After two days, the supply of high-pressure air dried up, and there was nothing to restrain the flow of water into the compartments. The ship was doomed, it was necessary to save the crew. Approached surface ships removed part of the sailors. And the center continued to receive categorical orders - until the last fight to save the ship. On the morning of April 12, the process of increasing the trim was avalanche-like, and the boat, taking almost upright position astern, swiftly went to the bottom, taking the lives of 52 sailors with it.

After 16 years after this tragedy, another Soviet APL was in distress again in the waters of the Atlantic. Now it was K-219, a strategic submarine carrying 16 ballistic missiles with nuclear charges in its mines. October 16 The 1986 of the year in the boat on duty, a fire broke out in the missile compartment. The cause of the fire is the destruction of the rocket with the subsequent violation of the tightness of the mine and hit of the propellant components in the compartment. Further, the development of the catastrophe took place according to the already familiar scenario: fire spreading into compartments, burning outboard seals, water entering the compartments and, as a result, increasing trim, which led to the loss of longitudinal stability by the boat. After the 15-hour stubborn, but ineffectual struggle to save the ship, its rapid flooding occurred. This time they took into account the sad experience of K-8 and most of the crew were transported in time to the approached ships. On the boat were only nine people headed by the captain. Five of them managed to escape, four with the submarine rested on the ocean floor at a depth of about 5000 m.


K-278 "Komsomol member"


Less than three years later, the Soviet Navy was shocked by a new tragedy - the death of the Komsomolets submarine. This unique ship, built according to the 685 project developed by the Rubin Central Design Bureau (code “Fin”), entered the Guinness Book of Records after the World Record Depth Depth for combat submarines (1985 m) was established in 1027. 7 April 1989 of the year in 11 hours, when the submarine, being at a depth of 400 m, was returning from its fifth autonomous voyage, a fire broke out in its stern 7 compartment. After only 11 minutes the boat, completing an emergency ascent, was on the surface of the Norwegian stormy sea. A desperate struggle began to save the ship. And again, as in the cases already described, the flow of water into the feed compartments led to a negative trim.

About upsetting and landing

Here it is necessary to explain why this process is so dangerous for submarines. One of the most important characteristics of any displacement vessel is stability, considered as the ability of a vessel, deduced by an external influence from a position of equilibrium, to return to it after the termination of this influence. There are transverse and longitudinal stability, that is, the ability to restore equilibrium after the occurrence of roll or trim, respectively. The submarine, whose spindle-shaped hull has a length substantially greater than the width, is particularly sensitive to trimming - deviations from the horizontal position in the longitudinal direction. When the boat is in motion, the differences arising for one reason or another are canceled by the action of its horizontal hydrodynamic rudders. But on the boat, not having a course, hydrodynamic control surfaces, of course, do not work. You can fight with trimings only by moving the weight loads inside the ship relative to its center of gravity, reducing them from the side where the inclination takes place, or increasing them from the back side to level the boat. In reality, this procedure consists in purging one and filling with water other ballast tanks located in the bow, stern and along the sides of the submarine. Naturally, from whatever side of the center of gravity weight increases, this leads to an increase in the draft of the ship - the third (along with roll and trim) parameter determining the landing of the ship in the sea. Landing, which has a serviceable ship in calm water, called equilibrium. At the same time, roll and trim are completely absent, and the draft is such that the ship is immersed in water at a constructive (calculated) waterline. When the submarine is on the surface in the stormy sea, the waves, swinging it, continuously change all three parameters that determine the landing. If the submarine is in the normal (intact) state and possesses the necessary stability, its oscillations occur relative to the equilibrium position and do not pose a danger, unless, of course, they exceed critical values. The situation is completely different when, as a result of the accident and the resulting damage, the submarine has a landing other than equilibrium in the surface position, that is, when even in the absence of sea agitation the angles of heel and trim of the ship are not zero, and its draft is not at a constructive waterline. This circumstance must be continuously taken into account during the struggle for survivability of emergency submarines. Fighting fire by flooding emergency compartments, leveling the roll or trim that has arisen using the method of blowing ballast tanks (especially located in the bow or in the stern of the boat), one should understand how these measures affect the change in trim. It is not at all easy to do, since subjective perception can fail, and there is no place to get objective information about the real spatial position of the boat.

In the case of the Komsomoltsa catastrophe, practically the entire struggle to save the nuclear submarine took place on the surface and lasted for almost six hours. The fire, which spread to three fodder compartments, was managed to be tamed. But in the fight against fire, a number of mistakes were made, leading to a gradual but steady increase in negative trim. Less than an hour before the death of the submarine, its feed sank into the water so that a sufficiently high feed stabilizer disappeared under water. By this time, the value of the longitudinal stability of the boat remained so small that the further rapid growth of the trim and the close tragic outcome was obvious. This was confirmed by photographs taken from a rescue aircraft arriving from Severomorsk. In 17: 08, the trim boat on the stern at 80 ° (that is, almost vertically) went under water. The crew, who was on the upper deck, was in the icy water. Of the 69 sailors, 27 survived.

So, all three catastrophes, starting with a fire, ended in the destruction of the submarine as a result of the loss of longitudinal stability and instantaneous flooding. This was noted in the documents of the government commission working to establish the causes of death of Komsomolets. The Commission commissioned one of the enterprises of the Ministry of Shipbuilding to develop a set of hardware designed to objectively monitor the parameters of the landing of submarines in an emergency. The results of the development were planned to be used in the projects of next-generation submarines.

Elemental Mathematics

The terms of reference prepared one of the CDB, designed the submarine. Development work (OCD) began in 1993 year. It soon became clear that the main problem was the absence of an algorithm with which it would be possible to determine the parameters of a ship’s landing under the conditions of the random nature of sea waves. Therefore, it was from the search for the algorithm that OCD began. Experts of many leading scientific and design organizations of shipbuilding and the Navy were involved in its development. Together with them, they created and tested methods of mathematical modeling and experimentally three variants of the algorithm. One of them (the algorithm of the professor at the Sevastopol Instrument-Making Institute, Yu. I. Nechaev) was approved by the customer of the development, the Shipbuilding Research Institute, and was adopted for use in development projects.

The Nechaev algorithm was developed by analyzing the materials of experiments conducted using radio-controlled models of various types of marine vessels under natural waves. Then it was tested on one of the ships of the Black Sea fleet and on ships of the transport fleet.

The principle of operation developed in accordance with this algorithm KPORP based on continuous monitoring of the current values ​​of the three parameters of the landing ship: angles of heel and trim, as well as draft. All these parameters for an emergency ship in conditions of sea excitement are random. Accumulated for a certain period, the data for each of the parameters are averaged over time, and then the results obtained are supplemented with the corrections calculated in accordance with the adopted algorithm.



Sensitive tubes

The implementation of the adopted KPORP algorithm is carried out using a set of sensors of the current values ​​of heel, trim and draft. For measuring the angles of roll and trim, two sensors that were maximally standardized with each other were developed, one of which (inclinometer) is located in the plane of the mid-frame (average cross section of the submarine hull) and the second (trimometer) in the center plane of the ship. The principle of the sensor is based on the control of pressure or vacuum that occurs in the inner cavity of a highly sensitive membrane box as a result of the inclination of a tube connected to this cavity filled with a special non-freezing liquid of a certain density. When, at roll (trim) of the ship, the end of the tube is above the membrane box, some excess pressure occurs in the cavity of the box, which is proportional to the length of the tube multiplied by the sine of the angle of inclination and the specific weight of the fluid filling the tube. When tilting in the opposite direction, the end of the tube is lowered relative to the membrane box, which causes a vacuum in it that is proportional to the same values. To seal the cavity filled with liquid, as well as to compensate for the thermal expansion of the liquid, an elastic diaphragm of almost zero stiffness, mounted on the end of the tube opposite to the membrane box, serves. It also serves to compensate for fluctuations in air pressure in the compartment, equally affecting both the outside of the membrane box and the elastic diaphragm. When a pressure (or depression) occurs in the cavity of the membrane box (due to tilting), it flexes elastically, and its center moves to one side or the other of the core of the electrical transducer, at the output of which a signal of the corresponding polarity arises. The roll and trim sensors differ from each other only by one basic dimension — the length of the tube filled with liquid, which is inversely proportional to the sine of the limit value of the monitored angle. Due to the fact that the limiting values ​​of the trim angles are significantly less than the heel, to get the same signal at the output of both sensors, the trim sensor tube must be longer.

The measurement of the draft is carried out by a pair of pressure drop sensors, the dynamic cavity of which is connected with the overboard space under the submarine heading, and the static cavity with the atmosphere. They use two identical differential pressure sensors with different measuring limits, placed in the same plane and on the same vertical, but in different levels. Depending on the actual value of the current draft, readings are taken from one of the sensors (upper or lower), achieving the required measurement accuracy. When converting the hydrostatic pressure to the draft in the coordinate system associated with the ship's hull, the current values ​​of the heel and trim angles are taken into account.

The set of devices also includes a block of secondary transducers of the above-named sensors and a computational information unit (WBI), which is a mini-computer. The output data is sent to the WBI, which implements the algorithm entered into its memory, and also provides for the introduction of amendments to the values ​​of the measured parameters.

The model KORPP was manufactured and passed under the supervision of the interdepartmental commission a multi-stage test cycle, including tests of resistance to all types of mechanical and climatic influences, as well as tests on a multi-dimensional roll stand. At the same time, the serviceability of a KPORP was tested with separate and simultaneous effects of two types of pitching with the setting of roll and trim angles that simulate the emergency position of the ship. The test results confirmed the full compliance of the TORC with the requirements of the TOR, both in terms of the accuracy of determining the equilibrium landing parameters and in terms of resistance to all types of shipborne effects.

Pressure game

A complex of original technical solutions helped to maintain a constant automatic control over the landing of the underwater ship. The sensor system responds to changes in fluid and air pressures.

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  1. +15
    7 December 2014 06: 07
    In the morning, information is difficult to read, especially about KPORP and sensors,
    I thought that the problem is not in the sensors, but in this.
    Further, the development of the disaster took place according to the already familiar scenario: fire spreading through compartments, burning outboard seals, entering water compartments
    1. +2
      7 December 2014 13: 40
      That's right .... at one time we were given secret (at the wrong time) orders ... plus I’ll add ..- the rupture of the VVD system and its entry into the compartment ... i.e. created the effect of a blast furnace.
      1. +2
        7 December 2014 15: 34
        On Komsomolets? Yes, there the commander decided to purge the tank, not considering that the VVD purge pipes of this tank passed through the emergency compartment. Are you talking about this?
  2. +2
    7 December 2014 06: 46
    Everywhere the same thing - burning outboard seals. Are there really not enough refractory materials? Or, as always, save?
    1. +2
      7 December 2014 13: 42
      Yes, not the outboard seals burned out, but the inter-compartment ones, which contributed to the depressurization of the emergency compartment, the flow of smoke into adjacent compartments, and then read my post above
      1. +2
        7 December 2014 15: 45
        The pipes were not blocked (and there are a lot of them on the boat). It's just not enough to close the bulkhead hatch. It is also necessary to cut off all lines to / from the emergency compartment. Nothing was blocked there, moreover, the people in the 5th compartment joined the "oxygen" pipe wearing masks (by order they will be included in the SDA - hose breathing apparatus). But since it was not blocked, they breathed in shit from the emergency compartments.
    2. +2
      7 December 2014 15: 49
      Can you offer material withstanding 3000-5000 centigrade? Probit VVD - oxygen at high pressure enters the emergency compartment - blast furnace heating stove, in comparison with this. Such a fire is extinguished by FULL sealing (cut off oxygen, no oxygen - no burning) compartment. And if there are also regeneration reserves (cartridges that produce oxygen themselves) ...
      1. +5
        7 December 2014 17: 57
        Quote: Andrey77
        Can you offer 3000-5000 celsius resistant material?

        In principle, there are such materials - modified silicones. I don’t know the intricacies, but on the whole something like this. At high temperatures in the presence of oxygen, the organic part burns out to carbon dioxide (partially carbon monoxide, which is not good) gas and water, and the inorganic part at temperatures above 1500 C is sintered into a glassy mass. The addition of a fine alumina-based composite reduces fluidity and promotes better sintering. I don’t know what and what else is being modified, but in general, somewhere like that. The only problem here is the applicability of these materials to submarines: maybe, what is not allowed? Or just our own "maybe", coupled with savings on matches.
        1. 0
          14 December 2014 13: 10
          I don’t know the subtleties, but in general, something like this
          --
          3000 Celsius Does your material last 5 minutes?
          1. +2
            14 December 2014 17: 47
            Quote: Andrey77
            3000 Celsius Does your material last 5 minutes?

            Quartz - silicon dioxide - can withstand even more, it has nowhere to break down, decomposition into elements is not observed at all known temperatures (breakage in reference books or thermodynamic calculations involved). Another thing is that it melts and becomes fluid, but the addition of the same alumina or nitrides / carbides of metals of the tungsten, titanium or iron group significantly reduces fluidity.

            I do not claim that these materials are used on submarines, I don’t even know if their use is possible there at all. But I know that they were and are now being used in laboratory equipment operating at ultrahigh temperatures. he worked for her. I heard that coatings based on such modified silicones are used in coatings of the inner walls of rocket taxiways. The principle is the same: when burning, they cover the glassy mass of the nozzle wall. True, there are different requirements - the product is one-time. I simply said that fundamentally such materials exist, but I don’t know what’s next.

            And by the way, why such a crazy temperature? Is it really only from the influx of high pressure air?
  3. +5
    7 December 2014 08: 46
    The reason for everything is low discipline from design to operation. The submarine fleet does not forgive this.
    1. -17
      7 December 2014 08: 59
      namely, we must take an example from the US Navy - not a single serious accident at sea
      1. +21
        7 December 2014 09: 24
        Quote: Turanchox
        namely, we must take an example from the US Navy - not a single serious accident at sea


        USS Nautilus (SSN-571)- Fire in the turbine compartment.,USS Sargo (SSN-583)fire and subsequent explosion of batteries of two electric motor torpedoes Mark-37. The submariner responsible for the transfer of oxygen, which was closed in the burning compartment, died USS Permit (SSN-594)- collision with a cargo ship.
        USS Thresher (SSN-593) -129 dead. With planned immersion to the maximum depth, poor-quality soldering of the seam of the pipeline with overboard water led to the penetration of water into the reactor compartment, reactor shutdown and loss of stroke. This is the first nuclear submarine death in history and this accident has remained a record in the submarine fleet according to the number of victims in post-war history.
        USS Scorpion (SSN-589)-99 dead. The cause of death is still not clear, although the official version is the Mark-37 torpedo explosion.
        USS Guitarro (SSN-665)- Sank at a depth of 10 m right at the pier as a result of alternating filling of the bow and stern ballast tanks with two different groups of specialists who needed different trim of the boat to work, and who did not know about each other's actions. Raised after 3 days, the repair cost, according to various sources, $ 15-35 million
        USS Grayback (LPSS-574)- Former missile carrier converted into a transport boat capable of landing divers. During the exercises, as a result of a valve malfunction, not only water, but also air was pumped out of the diving bell. Only one diver survived. Five died.
        USS Guitarro (SSN-665)-Atomic submarine. During a training shooting 65 miles from San Diego, California, a fire occurred on board. No data on victims. The boat remained afloat and towed to the port, only there the fire was extinguished.
        1. +18
          7 December 2014 09: 33
          USS Nathanael Greene (SSBN-636)-The first serious incident with an American nuclear submarine with ballistic missiles. Stranded in the Irish Sea, damaging the steering wheel and ballast tanks. There were no injuries, but the damage to the boat was considered so serious that it was decommissioned and disposed of.
          USS San Francisco (SSN-711)- Multipurpose nuclear submarine. Collision with a seamount south of the island of Guam at a speed of 35 knots and a depth of 525 feet. Of the 137 people on board, 98 were injured, 30 of them seriously, one later died. The boat received significant damage to the hull, sonar, ballast tanks, torpedo tubes. The repair was valued at $ 88 million, excluding the cost of repairing 15 torpedoes and 2 Tomahawk missiles.
          USS Miami (SSN-755)-Atomic shock submarine type “Los Angeles.” On board the submarine during repairs in Portsmouth, a fire occurred. The reason for this was the 24-year-old painter Casey Fury, who, during the investigation of the incident, admitted that the arson was intentionally set up by him. The purpose of the arson was to evacuate workers from a smoky room and speedy dissolution of their homes. On March 15, 2013, Furi was sentenced to 17 years in prison and a fine of $ 400 million. The boat is not subject to restoration and was decommissioned.

          Some post-war submarine accidents in the United States and its allies

          The experience of operating submarines with nuclear power plants in the US Navy suggests that their accident rate is associated with the following main reasons (expressed as a percentage of the full list of causes of accidents):

          navigation - about 49%;
          accidents of energy equipment, including nuclear installations - up to 31%;
          explosions and fires, including incidents with ammunition - about 16%;
          accidents for other reasons - 4%.
          According to statistics, In terms of the total number of known incidents and accidents of its nuclear submarines, Russia is inferior this time to the “superiority” of the US Navy. If we take another additional criterion - accident rate, i.e. the ratio of the total number of submarine accidents to the number of built, then for the US Navy the result looks even more pessimistic. In the Russian submarine fleet, this coefficient is 0,2, and in the American - 0,3. In other words, for every 100 nuclear submarines in the Russian fleet there are about 20 accidents, and in the US - about 30. The ratio is not in favor of the United States.
          1. +1
            7 December 2014 09: 55
            Well, Ascetic aperitil.
          2. The comment was deleted.
          3. -5
            7 December 2014 10: 01
            Are you familiar with the term "operating voltage ratio"?
            and so, if our fleet were at least equal to the American in this indicator, it would almost certainly have been several times more accidents.
            in our country it was barely 0,2-0,3, against 0,6-0,7 among the Americans
            1. jjj
              +8
              7 December 2014 10: 22
              Here is a familiar argument. Type walk a little - less sinking. In the times of glasnost, they actively used such an appeal for ears in order to direct the consciousness of society that our fleet is bad and should be abandoned. Already ripened
              1. +2
                7 December 2014 10: 24
                no need to refuse, it is necessary to work so that the boats do not burn and drown
            2. +8
              7 December 2014 10: 29
              Quote: Turanchox
              Are you familiar with the term "operating voltage ratio"?
              and so, if our fleet were at least equal to the American in this indicator, it would almost certainly have been several times more accidents.
              in our country it was barely 0,2-0,3, against 0,6-0,7 among the Americans


              In total, during the existence of the nuclear submarine fleet, about 250 submarines (from K-3 to the modern Borea) passed through the hands of our sailors, while the Americans had slightly less ≈ 200 units. However, the Yankees' nuclear submarines appeared earlier and were operated two to three times more intensively.
              Quote: Turanchox
              in our country it was barely 0,2-0,3, against 0,6-0,7 among the Americans

              Obviously, the whole point is not in the number of boats ... Much depends on the calculation method. As the old joke says: "it doesn’t matter how they did it, the main thing is how they calculated it."

              The domestic submarine fleet traded reliability for outrageous technical characteristics of boats. The design of submarines of the Navy of the USSR has always been distinguished by a high degree of novelty and a large number of innovative solutions. Testing of new technologies was often carried out directly in military campaigns. The fastest (K-222), the deepest (K-278), the largest (Project 941 "Shark") and the most secretive boat (Project 945A "Condor") were created in our country. And if there is nothing to reproach “Condor” and “Shark”, then the operation of the other “champions” was regularly accompanied by major technical problems.high accident rate on Soviet submarines - not miscalculations of designers and not crew errors. This was often inevitable. The high price paid for the unique characteristics of submarines.
              Analysis of the loss of nuclear submarines of the Soviet Navy and the US Navy
              1. +3
                7 December 2014 10: 40
                high accident rate on Soviet submarines - not miscalculations of designers and not crew errors. This was often inevitable. The high price paid for the unique characteristics of submarines.

                K-8 excess reserves of regeneration cartridges, probably stored in violation of the rules, which led to the fire
                K-219 defective rocket, which was known even before going to sea
                k-278 unfinished crew, not qualified for the "first line"
                1. +1
                  7 December 2014 16: 02
                  I subscribe. All is correct. Only to K-8 - also negligent service.
                  1. 0
                    8 December 2014 15: 50
                    And "storming", as usual. "Record for the holiday date."
              2. +1
                7 December 2014 16: 00
                Dofig boat, you need crews on them. Cooked hastily. This is not bad and not good - it was necessary. All our losses are due to illiterate crew actions.
              3. +1
                7 December 2014 20: 55
                The domestic submarine fleet exchanged reliability for the outrageous technical characteristics of the boats.

                This is despite the fact that our submarines have a higher buoyancy margin ?! Plus double-shell, which reduces the load of the internal volume?
                This "inevitability" is primarily negligence and perhaps. In the second, the designers' miscalculations were "driven to the big holidays".
            3. +1
              7 December 2014 16: 24
              Are you familiar with the term "operating voltage ratio"?

              Sign. And with stress, you can walk safely, moreover, successfully. If you don’t have a crew, prepare it in ADVANCE, and not when the party orders.
          4. -1
            7 December 2014 10: 33
            "It was now the K-219, a strategic boat carrying 16 nuclear-powered ballistic missiles in its silos." и "Five of them managed to escape, four, together with the nuclear submarine, rest on the ocean floor at a depth of about 5000 m." Is it about this super nuclear weapon, embedded in a tectonic fault off the coast of the United States, Zhirinovsky said hi morning, sorry for the question.
          5. 0
            7 December 2014 13: 37
            USS Nathanael Greene (SSBN-636) - fact number 2. Collision with the Soviet nuclear submarine K-306. The article "Underwater battering ram" on this site.
          6. +3
            8 December 2014 06: 04
            Article title "How to save nuclear submarines?".
            And the author is talking about some sensors ... Well, they made them. How to deal with volumetric fire? What is new and effective here? How do these sensors help fight fire? And with the arrival of water? It reminded a joke about a student: if the fish had wool, then there would be fleas. And all about fleas ...
            Gouging is what leads to accidents in most cases. On K-219, KBCH-2 was not trivial, and that was breathed in by components through a poorly worn gas mask.
            Never has his personnel been allowed to be unshaven, to wear rings and chains. Only personal number. All b / w should participate in the exercises on the BJ, even though you have thrice grown over shells. Timely inspection and maintenance of weapons and equipment significantly reduce the likelihood of accidents. Those buttons for inspecting the compartments are not in vain because they invented it, otherwise the personnel will simply get lazy. As long as you do not kick a fighter with a bandage on his sleeve and a remote control on his belly, he will not move.
            1. 0
              11 December 2014 14: 23
              +100 It’s good that you even force the remote control to wear.
      2. 0
        7 December 2014 09: 51
        You are sure of this, read about Thresher.
      3. 0
        7 December 2014 13: 44
        Immediately offhand comes to mind - death of "Scorpion", death of "Thresher" ... about serious accidents, you can go on much longer
      4. +1
        7 December 2014 15: 55
        Accident at the USA dofiga. Do not. Another thing is that they have fewer losses or come out with fewer losses - this is the crew qualification.
  4. +2
    7 December 2014 09: 58
    the overwhelming majority of these accidents occurred on old boats of the first series, before the year 70 and related to the tests, you read about the tests of our boats, with flooding at the berth and at the training grounds, about fires during repairs ..
    Yes, and the total account of the dead boats in our much more
  5. +4
    7 December 2014 10: 39
    Very heavy and immensely dangerous service on the submarine.
    1. +3
      7 December 2014 16: 03
      Service in the navy is generally dangerous, by definition. Nowhere to run. :)
      PS Now only subcontractors are being taken to the submarine. In the second crew ... Not everything is so bad.
    2. 0
      7 December 2014 16: 39
      And where is the light and dustless service with army equipment?
      It’s just that technical units need to be equipped with either personnel officers or contract soldiers.
      Annual conscripts have nothing to do there!
      1. 0
        7 December 2014 16: 53
        He has six months UPP (diving school), six months to study the boat and surrender to self-management. And here is the demobilization. If a year old could do something else, then now nothing at all.
        1. +1
          8 December 2014 06: 37
          Previously, the training was called UCPP. Indeed, a sailor could only be allowed to approach the materiel after one and a half to two years of service. We didn’t have any anniversary in our crew; we made sailors in the second or third year of service as squad leaders. So the authority rose, and you can ask the young people legally, and the record in the military ticket for demobilization that you are the foreman of 1 article or the chief foreman warmed the soul. I remember my sailors very warmly, I remember by name and who was called from where. Two of them remained on the extra urgent, one of them became my midshipman, foreman of the team.
          But before, between the autonomous regions, the crews drove to the training center in Obninsk or Paldiski depending on the projects, but now how?
          1. 0
            11 December 2014 14: 29
            Obninsk. As I know.
  6. +8
    7 December 2014 10: 41
    Accidents in the Navy were, are and will be - unfortunately.
    But! The overwhelming majority of them are due to the "human factor" - first of all, violations (at all levels) of safety measures and operating rules.
    However, it is the inability of our Navy to carry out rescue operations that causes great casualties.
    Until now, in each of our fleets there are no specialized rescue ships capable of going to sea in any weather, equipped with the necessary list of means, and having a trained rescue team on board.
    The second factor leading to the victims is the inability of our command at all levels to make quick, competent and responsible decisions to save people. Cowardice in making decisions and taking responsibility for giving orders!
    First they are afraid to report "upward", and then - "they are waiting for instructions."
    After disasters - big bosses get off, in the worst case, by dismissal.
    And they must be judged! And plant! - they must bear personal responsibility for the inability and unwillingness to save dying people!
    1. 0
      7 December 2014 16: 08
      Cowardice in making decisions and taking responsibility for giving orders!

      This is it. We have few of them, and indeed in the world. Everything must be agreed with the party line / congress. And there are fat politicians who decide, but they don’t understand.
    2. 0
      8 December 2014 12: 49
      During the first stage of state tests, the crew will check the operation of the ship’s life support systems, propulsion systems and mechanisms, radio navigation equipment, RIA Novosti reports with reference to the official representative of the Russian Navy, Captain 1st Rank Igor Dygalo.

      During the second stage of state tests, which will begin in the third decade of December, a number of tasks will be fulfilled by the crew of the Bester-1 unique deep-sea rescue vehicle. These tasks will be fulfilled in conjunction with the testing of rescue equipment that are part of the standard on-board equipment of Igor Belousov.

      Igor Belousov is the lead rescue vessel of project 21300C, built for the Russian Navy. Laid on December 24, 2005 at the Admiralty Shipyards in St. Petersburg. The ship is designed to assist emergency crews of submarines lying on the ground or in the water position, supplying air, electricity and rescue equipment to submarines and surface ships. In addition, the vessel can search for and examine emergency facilities, including as part of international marine rescue units.
    3. The comment was deleted.
  7. +4
    7 December 2014 12: 08
    If we take it on a large scale - the Americans lost 2 nuclear submarines, the USSR / Russia - 4. American losses partly look inevitable - something happened deep down, everything ended there. The domestic ones look different (partly with the exception of Kursk) - after the initial event, the boat on the surface, it would seem that all or almost all should be saved, and then ends as always. The attitude towards people is different, from the authorities first of all. Well, the quality of technology. You can compare the quality of Soviet cars, televisions, radios, computers, airplanes, helicopters, etc. with foreign ones. You can compare how they look inside the submarine. For comparison, pioneers 50 or 60 years old fly, and the lifespan of satellites. On the other hand, everything breaks, but for someone more often and with worse consequences.
    1. +2
      7 December 2014 15: 06
      It is foolish to compare the quality of cars or military equipment ...... I will not compare cars, but I will say about boats ... for those who boldly believe in the American dream ...... the buoyancy of our ships is much higher than American. ..about habitability you mentioned here ...... so our sailor (foreman, midshipman, officer) sleeps each in his bunk, unlike them, where, like 50 years ago, they sleep in three shifts in turn ... about the pools , saunas and lounges I don’t even say ..... for them it’s fantastic ..... well, about the accident rate read above, accident statistics are given there ... that's it !!!!!
      1. 0
        7 December 2014 16: 15
        Or maybe it's time for us to sleep in three shifts in turn? Then, by emergency alarm, you don’t have to wake everyone up?
      2. -5
        7 December 2014 16: 21
        Quote: FREGATENKAPITAN
        It is foolish to compare the quality of cars or military equipment

        Technological excellence, production culture are reflected not only in household appliances.
        Quote: FREGATENKAPITAN
        I don’t even speak about swimming pools, saunas and lounges ..

        If you are about 941, then it is hardly possible to consider its gigantic mass an advantage. It was developed for solid-fuel rockets, which turned out to be heavier and longer than Trident and 1 and 2. I won’t even mention the military equipment for which a large mass and size would be an advantage. A log for a ram? Exaggerate, of course. But in general, with the same level of armament and defense / combat properties, less mass and size is an advantage. Ohio has a displacement of almost 2 times less, more missiles (warheads, KVO, range in WIKI) - energy costs - traffic noise is less, how many in the Ohio service, how many Sharks?
        A swimming pool, a sauna, a smoking room - all this is cool, I think we could build a couple of gyms as well as it would be appropriate.
        Regarding the accident rate - I strongly doubt that the overall accident rate among Americans is higher, based on the tendency of the naval and other authorities to hide the accident. Breakdowns in technology undoubtedly occur, which when a combination of different circumstances sometimes leads to accidents, when a different quantity / quality of circumstances is combined, a catastrophe with human casualties. The fact that breakdowns of the accident and catastrophe correlate among themselves is beyond doubt?
    2. xren
      0
      8 December 2014 22: 36
      If we take it on a large scale, the Americans lost 2 nuclear submarines, the USSR / Russia - 4.


      But what about K-429?
  8. +2
    7 December 2014 12: 41
    Quote: Leader
    However, it is the inability of our Navy to carry out rescue operations that causes great casualties.
    Until now, in each of our fleets there are no specialized rescue ships capable of going to sea in any weather, equipped with the necessary list of means, and having a trained rescue team on board.

    I would not be so categorical in claiming the inability of our fleet to rescue operations. In confirmation of this, I propose to read the article: http: //flb.ru/info/51925.html. Interview with an ACC SF officer, there he talks about the status of ACC at that time, the interview was taken in 2012, and now, as far as I remember, several rescue vessels were commissioned at VO, so there are positive changes in this direction.
  9. 0
    7 December 2014 15: 28
    "carrying 16 nuclear ballistic missiles in its silos"

    15 rockets. One mine was brewed long before the ill-fated campaign.
  10. +5
    7 December 2014 17: 31
    Quote: sevtrash
    A swimming pool, a sauna, a smoking room - all this is cool, I think we could build a couple of gyms as well as it would be appropriate.

    Imagine that you are in an iron barrel at a depth of 500m, for six months ... Yes, you do not need a pool, a sauna, a smoking room or a gym. And your own bunk in general, as well as the large size of the ship, on a small boat, ass to ass is much better, is not it?
    1. +1
      7 December 2014 18: 41
      Quote: DmitriyDonskoj
      at a depth of 500m, for six months.

      Some kind of traditional care to the side, it was about accident rate, but clung to the pool, sauna and bed. Well, yes, of course, even if it’s gigantic, noisier, there is more KVO, less often it goes into the sea, but there is a pool and a sauna. Well then, it’s better to build something like Queen Mary 2 with rockets, you can add a dozen pools, saunas, massage rooms, restaurants, an ice rink to them, as without it.
      Well, then what are the Boreas building then, and not something like the Shark?
      1. 0
        8 December 2014 15: 54
        sauna, massage ... and brothel. :)
        1. 0
          11 December 2014 14: 39
          Brothel first. Massage and sauna are two in one. But then you need to create a separate medical warhead. fellow
  11. 0
    7 December 2014 17: 32
    The commander of the boat is responsible for everything, and the decision to go to sea and the actions to rescue the boat are taken on the shore by large shoulder straps. In the event of an accident on a nuclear submarine, the best option is for the crew to die and then end up in the water. There was a long article about the death of a boat with a fire in the missile compartment. Before going to sea, it was revealed that a pipeline was dripping from a silo with a missile. Deny exit find out the reason. Now you never know where the boat is dripping. Don't be idiots in the sea. The result of the missile crushed .. in the mine and the fuel got into the compartment. The result of the death of people and the boat. I would also like to share what I learned at the time of the sinking of the "Kursk" all information from the 1st channel. In the morning Andrey Borovik reports from the deck of the ship and says that together the accident I saw an emergency buoy (white - green coloring). Each fleet has its own coloring (white-red) this was the only time. Further, this moment is cut out of all the reports. In the future, all who commented unanimously say that Borovik was wrong, as the logical conclusion of the air disaster, the charter flight Yak40 and Borovik dies. Another thing that makes me wonder is, how many submarines did the foreigners raise for us? The torpedo compartment is cut off, the missile compartment is raised (nuclear missiles need to be taken off a lot of money) and the torpedo compartment was simply destroyed. I read in an interview that the nuclear submarine is 120m long. should not dive into a 70m deep pool. How much I really don't know.
    1. +4
      7 December 2014 18: 12
      A stream of consciousness of some kind, along with paranoia. Excuse me.

      I read in the Interview that the submarine is long 120m. should not be immersed in a pool of deep 70m.

      This explains a lot.
  12. -1
    7 December 2014 19: 42
    Quote: Andrey77
    A stream of consciousness of some kind, along with paranoia. Excuse me.

    I read in the Interview that the submarine is long 120m. should not be immersed in a pool of deep 70m.

    This explains a lot.

    “We asked what the former submariner, retired captain of the first rank, ex-commander of the K-147 submarine, representative of the Society of Veterans of the Third Division of Nuclear Submarines of the Northern Fleet Alexander Leskov thinks about the explosion on the Kursk.
    He was one of the first to go on Soviet atomic submarines. And in 1967, as an assistant commander of the first nuclear submarine, the K-3 survived a terrible fire on a nuclear submarine. The disaster occurred under the water 8 September in the Norwegian Sea. The commander was seriously wounded, and Alexander Yakovlevich then had to take command.
    In the future, Leskov more than once had to participate in the elimination of emergency situations on nuclear powered ships.
    “SP”: - Alexander Yakovlevich, why the official version of the death of “Kursk”, voiced by the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, does not seem convincing to you?
    - The fact is that the then General Prosecutor of Russia, setting out the official version of the death of Kursk, did not answer a number of questions that immediately arose among specialists and, in particular, among the commanders of nuclear submarines.
    "SP": - For example?
    - The official version claims that the Kursk was under water at the time of the explosion. This could not be, because with the length of the submarine of 153 meters, it cannot dive where the sea depth does not exceed 115 meters - namely, this was the depth at the sinking site of the Kursk, which, by the way, is a training ground for surface ships, and no submarines. Such a depth for a huge boat is like a puddle for a pike. To submerge, the submarine must have at least three of its lengths under the keel, that is, in this case, at least half a kilometer. And any submarine commander knows this. At depths of 100 meters, no one would have allowed diving. "The above quote is taken from the article" Captain of the nuclear submarine-Kursk: We were shot by Earth-to-Earth missiles "in the Free Press in August 2012
    1. +1
      7 December 2014 20: 37
      http://www.sovross.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=56129
      ... "THE SHADOW OF LITERACY" About the death of the submarine "Kursk"
      I accidentally read the article “On the death of the Kursk submarine” in the newspaper Sovetskaya Rossiya No. 89 dated August 20, 2009 - an interview with the former submariner A. Leskov, which he gave to the journalist of the Free Press. My name is Ryazantsev Valery Dmitrievich. I, too, am a former submariner. I served on various types of nuclear submarines of the Pacific Fleet for more than 25 years. Just like A. Leskov, he commanded a nuclear submarine. But in my past and present life and in the life of A. Leskov there are, in my opinion, five significant differences ... etc.
  13. +1
    7 December 2014 21: 17
    Quote: sevtrash
    http://www.sovross.ru/modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=56129
    ... "THE SHADOW OF LITERACY" About the death of the submarine "Kursk"

    I have read the article at the link you provided. Thank you, as this article will go to my archive for Kursk. The only thing that I didn’t understand was you cited this article to refute Leskov’s words? Then it makes sense to say who Ryazantsev is (this is from the comments to the article) 9. Posted by Slavan39 (2009-09-17 15:35:54)
    Re: “THE SHADOW OF LITERACY”

    Information for consideration.
    1) Vice-Admiral V.D. Ryazantsev, Deputy Head of the Main Combat Training Directorate of the RF Armed Forces for the Training of the Navy. was the main expert of the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Ustinov in the investigation of the Kursk nuclear submarine disaster, he is not an outsider in this story, an interested person (or maybe the culprit - why is he an expert ?!), one of the creators of the official version, in which neither one normal citizen.
    2) Why did he get so alarmed after Leskov's article ("BUT TODAY I DIDN'T STAND"), what is the reason for such hysteria and anger towards a combat colleague, which every line defecates ("TO CALL THIS VERSION FULL RADIANT IS LITTLE. A LIVING BEING OF NON-TERRESTRIAL ORIGIN, WHICH DOES NOT KNOW THE LIFE OF PEOPLE ON OUR PLANET "). Oh, apparently "hot".
    3) And what does the strange and not to the village phrase mean: "I DIDN'T CONSTITUTE AND DO NOT ARE IN ANY VETERAN AND PUBLIC ORGANIZATIONS" - is this an oath of selfless loyalty to the regime !?
    4) "I KNOW THE TRUTH, HOW THE KURSK nuclear submarine died, I WRITTEN ABOUT THIS BOOK THAT IS NOT PUBLISHED BY ANY PUBLISHING HOUSE." With this phrase, the vice admiral actually accuses all official Ustinov materials on the case and Prosecutor General Ustinov's book "The Whole Truth About the Kursk" that they do not reveal the truth to us, that we have yet to learn the truth from the lips of the Vice Admiral. But if Ustinov is hiding the truth, misleading the public and covering up some kind of criminal offense, then why is he still in the Prosecutor Generals !?
    5) "THE STATE SECRET SHOULD BE PROTECTED. THEREFORE, THE 1ST SECRET WAS PROTECTED FROM" UNCOMPLETED GUESTS "UNTIL ITS COMPLETE DESTRUCTION. This statement, together with the sensational theory of bending the edges of the hole from the explosion towards the source of the explosion, is puzzling and raises doubts about the author's adequacy. If the pathologist undertakes to issue a conclusion about death from a shot in the head on a headless corpse, then this is either extrasensory perception or zakazukha. So what was the "state secret" that Ustinov and Ryazantsev skillfully concealed?
    And also Ryazantsev's quote from the article: “I inform you that torpedoes have two levels of protection: mechanical and another (I cannot talk about it in the open press). These two levels are available both on the torpedo warhead and on the torpedo's power plant. When the mechanical level on the torpedo warhead is removed, the warhead can explode if it is severely destroyed without removing another level of protection. ... On the Kursk nuclear submarine, due to violations of the rules for preparing a torpedo for a shot, a practical torpedo without a warhead exploded first. "
    As far as I know, in the navy, practical ammunition is simply called, so to speak, "blanks" without a warhead, as Ryazantsev himself says, "a practical torpedo exploded without a warhead." A question for knowledgeable people, how can something that does not contain explosive explode? I have already read about hydrogen in the propulsion system of a torpedo, but I believe in this version.
    1. 0
      7 December 2014 21: 59
      Quote: Captain45
      I have read the article at the link you provided. Thank you, as this article will go to my archive for Kursk. The only thing that I didn’t understand was you cited this article to refute Leskov’s words? Then it makes sense to say who Ryazantsev is (this is from the comments to the article) 9. Posted by Slavan39

      When you pointed to Leskov (but without a link), I found this message of his, read the commentary thread there. Its version / versions look somehow not very good, especially hit by its own coastal surface-to-surface missile. Ryazantsev seems to be more convincing, including the periscope depth. In general, the version with the explosion of the torpedo / torpedoes seems convincing and logical to me.
      Slavan39’s commentary quoted by you is a lot of talk, but in fact there are only 2 comments on Ryazanov’s exposition - the edges of the explosion and the explosion of a torpedo without an ammunition charge. Still, it seems in the 40s, the English diesel submarine suffered from such a torpedo, peroxide, after which the British abandoned such. This topic was debated in the press, how the explosion occurred and subsequent events, too. Therefore, Remark 2 - it seems to me - is untenable.
      Regarding 1 remark, it is necessary to re-read which side of the region and whether there were and, of course, specialists to read.
      Summarizing - Leskov evokes less trust than Ryazanov, there is nothing to say about Slavan39.
  14. 0
    9 December 2014 12: 53
    Quote: Captain45
    Quote: Leader
    However, it is the inability of our Navy to carry out rescue operations that causes great casualties.
    Until now, in each of our fleets there are no specialized rescue ships capable of going to sea in any weather, equipped with the necessary list of means, and having a trained rescue team on board.

    I would not be so categorical in claiming the inability of our fleet to rescue operations. ... So there are positive shifts in this direction.

    What is needed is not "shifts", but a radical revision of the attitude towards incidents!
    First of all, it is necessary to legitimize the provision on "priority rescue of the crew"! And only then - save the iron. (Naturally, in peacetime; we are not talking about war). With tough criminal conclusions to those who by their actions doomed people to death.
    Give an example of at least one SUCCESSFUL rescue operation in the Soviet / Russian Navy - when did you take measures in time and save everyone? They only collect corpses ...
  15. +1
    10 December 2014 01: 05
    No technique will help when the crew is oak. The article is about nothing and makes no sense. The situation with 1 accident is altogether wrong. In almost all cases of submarine deaths, the crew was to blame for the loss of the submarine 100% or very much. And when the crew was trained and the commander was not an oak tree, it usually happened like that of the S-99. There was also an example of a well-trained and bossy commander. I will not name the boat, I will just tell you that during the Anglo-Argentine war, an arg boat fired at a submarine. she got hit by a torpedo, but left. And the same "K-278" would have been saved if:
    1 - the crew knew what longitudinal stability is. After the death of the boat, it turned out that no one knew about this and could not count, because the control was not carried out. So how the heck to control the trim?
    2 - if the crew knew how to use the airborne commander's reserve. But no one bothered from the crew before the trip to figure out how to use it. As a result, when it was required, no one could use it and blow out the feed.

    The situation with "K-8" is similar. The crew, knowing about the flow of water into the aft compartments, left them by the morning of April 9 and did not visit or examine them again. By the evening of the day, information appeared that water was entering the aft compartments. The boat began to land astern into the water. But the crew did nothing to stop its arrival or pump out. As a result, the boat gradually flooded between 9 and 12 April when it sank. The crew gathered in compartments 1 and 2 and the wheelhouse and did not take any action to save the boat since the morning of April 9. With such a crew, the death of the boat was inevitable.

    As for the "K-219", after the collision, the missile was damaged in the mine, which led to the formation of acid and the consumption of the solid hull. Structurally, protection from the situation with the formation of acid was not provided, therefore there was little chance of saving the boat.

    So I can say that the situation is really terrible. And no chance to fix it. Because to correct the situation it is necessary that at least the boat commanders understand and realize their inferiority based on the length of service or command of the boat. Because the approach in time of command leads to the fact that the commander scores on everything. The latest example was the recent trick of the boat from the dock at the Pacific Fleet, when the commander decided that he could control the sea and ordered him not to pour into the open covers of the torpedo tubes. And the crew was so smart that before diving the dock did not check outboards. As a result, water went from there. The boat barely had time to cram back into the dock. Another 10 minutes and that’s all - there would be 1 less boat and 70 more corpses. To improve the situation you need to remove the naval dolboebizm. And this is already fantastic.
    1. 0
      10 December 2014 02: 57
      Again you are about a collision ... There was no collision! We read and think.
      http://www.deepstorm.ru/DeepStorm.files/45-92/nbrs/667A/k219/k219.html
      1. 0
        10 December 2014 15: 45
        Why do I need to read nonsense? I personally saw a photograph of the boat, with a clearly visible trace of a keel strike on the fence of the boat’s shafts. This photo is in the public domain and accessible to all. But this does not mean that everyone who sees is able to understand what he saw.

        And this site - deepstorm - I do not read in principle. Because there the level of reliability is lower than the plinth and personally I don’t consider that site a reliable source that should be looked at in terms of our submarines. Although sometimes I go there to find out the correct number of our boat in the postwar period. More that site is good for nothing. And I know personally what the military are like, since I lived in Severomorsk for many years. I can say in Putin's words: he was asked if he reads KGB certificates about someone. Putin replied that he wasn’t reading. Since he himself served there for over 20 years and knows how those certificates are made. And in the references he reads one thing, but in practice he sees the opposite. So I can say that Deepstorm is the site of professional submariners. And since I myself know how they serve and think, I personally do not consider that site a worthy source. Just by the fact that he was born in Severomorsk and began to study the history of submarines back in 1985.
      2. 0
        10 December 2014 16: 45
        And a little more about the competence of professionals:
        "Early in the morning, during the non-tracking maneuver (known by the American military as 'Crazy Ivan'), missile silo number 6 was completely depressurized and water was poured into it. Attempts to pump out the water were unsuccessful."
        This is not written on that site. Professionals ... But the bottom line is that the Amov boat went right behind us and, with a turn, passed a keel along the hull of our boat. Anyone can see this by looking at the photos of a dying boat from the air. Because if they write, then you have to admit your own stupidity. And most cannot be fools. Most never make a mistake. ;) because the recognition by professionals of their moronism is unrealistic. They are already mired in lies and continue to lie on that site. Because if you stop lying, you will need to admit that a lot of everything on that site is lies. That's why I don’t read that site. Because I know what really happened, but was not seen by alkanauts and professionals at the bottom of the glasses.