North Korean rockets
Let us turn to the "great and terrible" North Korean missiles.
The KPA Rocket Forces, whose command (subordinated directly to Supreme Commander Kim Jong-un), is called the “Bureau of Artillery Control,” are created in the image and likeness of the Rocket Forces (Second Artillery) of the People’s Liberation Army of China. Like the Chinese, North Korean missile forces include units armed with tactical, operational-tactical and strategic missile systems. However, taking into account the doctrinal task of inflicting a military defeat on South Korea with an opportunity, all North Korean missile units can be considered de facto strategic regardless of the launch range of their ballistic missiles (therefore, in Western literature they are called "strategic missile forces "). And if the North Koreans manage to bring to the logical end their program of creating intercontinental ballistic missiles, then the country will join the world club of nuclear missile owners weapons unlimited range, where the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain and France are now (possibly Israel) and where they are seeking to penetrate from the back door, in addition to North Korea, also India, Iran and Pakistan, the latter two with just the North Koreans.
In fact, the rocket troops are not even a separate branch of the armed forces, but an independent type of the armed forces of the DPRK, which in the foreseeable future, as it builds up its nuclear potential, should become the basis of the country's military power. The development of the North Korean rocket forces poses a threat not only to regional security, but also, in the future, directly to the United States, the objects on the mainland of which can fall within the range of their missiles.
The “artillery control bureau” itself was formed in 1999 with the transfer under its commencement of all the army units formerly part of the ground forces armed with ground-to-ground ballistic missiles. Before that, they did not have a single separate command and were under the authority of the KPA artillery command. Now there are at least a thousand deployed and stockpiled unguided and guided ballistic missiles for tactical, tactical and strategic purposes in their arsenal.
The production capacity of North Korean rocket production can produce, for example, up to eight long-range ballistic missiles (operational-tactical) “Hwason-5” and “Hwaseon-6” per month.
Missile manufacturing enterprises are represented by the Yakjen Machine-Building Plant in the suburb of Pyongyang Manganda (also known as the Mangenede Electric Machine-Building Plant; the main workshops employing approximately 1500 people are underground), defense plant No. 7 (located approximately 8 km from the plant in Mangenda; in particular, the Tephodon-1 medium-range ballistic missiles), by the plant No. 26 in Kang (the largest underground enterprise of the military-industrial complex, the total number of workers of which is Thousands of people in 20; in addition to guided and unguided rockets, torpedoes, depth bombs and engineering mines are also produced here, plant number 118 in Kagamri and Kechenkun, plant number 125 in Pyongyang (known by the name Pyongyang Pig Breeding Complex) and factory number 301 in Tegvan-IP. Yakjene Machine-Building Plant and Plant No. 7 are subordinate to the 2 th Research and Development Center of the 4-th General Bureau.
North Korea has launched its own space program, involving the creation of launch vehicles and satellite satellites for dual use - communications, meteorological and geomonitoring (possibly in cooperation with Iran and some other countries). The leadership of the space program in the DPRK is the Korea Space Technology Committee, which is publicly positioned as a civil agency.
True, many experts (and not without reason) believe that this program is to a greater extent a cover for works of the creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles that have an exclusively military focus.
The country has developed an extensive infrastructure to support testing of various types of missiles, including Musudan-ri (Musudan-ni) missile test sites (also known as the Tonghai test site) (Hamgen-Patko Province); this is the main test site for testing medium-range and intercontinental missiles, as well as space launch vehicles), Kitarieng (tests of tactical and operational-tactical missiles, Gangwon Province) and the new Pond-ri missile range (Pond-ni, or the Sohe test range) on the northwest coast of NDR in 50 km from the border with China (Phenan Puk-do province). The landfills of Musudanri and Pond-ri are also considered as cosmodromes.
Export-import operations in the field of rocket technologies are carried out under the auspices of the 2-th Economic Committee, the trade and procurement companies - Yongaksan Trading Company and Changkwang Trading Company.
The creation of missile forces in the DPRK began in the 1960-ies. with the delivery of the USSR tactical missile systems 2K6 "Luna" with unguided short-range orbital-launched ballistic missiles - namely, 3Р8 (FROG-3 according to the conventional classification adopted by NATO) and 3Р10 (FROG-5) on the basis of the emergency forces, XNUMXPXNUMX (FROG-XNUMX).
Then, in 1969, there were deliveries of a more long-range tactical missile complex 9K52 "Luna-M" with an unguided ballistic missile 9М21 (Р-65, Р-70, according to NATO classification - FROG-7) with a high-explosive warhead.
In the DPRK, chemical combat units were created for the Luna and Luna-M missiles.
However, in the 1970-s. the range (respectively, to 45 and 65-70 km) and the low accuracy of firing of these complexes ceased to arrange the command of the KPA.
In this regard, it was decided to purchase an operational tactical missile system 9K72 with a controlled ballistic missile 8K14 (Р-17, according to NATO classification - SS-1C or Scud-B), which has a range of 300 km. However, for some reason, the USSR did not sell it, so the North Koreans bought 9K72 complexes with ammunition (high-explosive missiles) from Egypt, whose president, Anwar Sadat, began to slowly trade Soviet weapons ...
Acquisition in 1976 — 1981 The North Koreans of the 9K72 complexes were of great importance for them in deploying the production of their own ballistic missiles, based on 8K14. DPRK specialists dismantled the 8K14 rocket and constructed their own after thorough study of it, somewhat increasing the launch range (to 330 km) by reducing the mass of the warhead. The first North Korean tactical ballistic missile based on the Soviet 8К14, known as "Hwason-5" (Hwaseon - in Korean Mars), was successfully tested in 1984, launched first in experimental, and in 1987 in serial production and adopted by the KPA. For the Hwason-5 rocket, in addition to the high-explosive, chemical and bacteriological combat units were developed.
The DPRK supplied the Hwaseong-5 missiles to Iran (where they received the name Shahab-1) and, moreover, provided technological assistance to Egypt in launching the production of its Scud-B variant.
Inspired by the success of the Hwason 5, the North Koreans set about creating a new, one and a half times more long-range (with a radius of 500 km by reducing the mass of the warhead and increasing the fuel and oxidizer stock by lengthening the product) of the tactical missile Hwason 6 (in the West, it was called Scud-C or Scud-PIP, product improvement program - "advanced production program").
Tests "Hwason-6" were carried out in 1990, and the rocket, in addition to entering the KPA, was also supplied to Iran, as well as Syria. Moreover, Iran has acquired the technology of their production under the national name "Shahab-2".
According to some experts, by the middle of 1990's. the Hwaseong-6 missiles were allegedly completely replaced by the Hwaseon-5 troops and Egypt’s 8К14 sent for storage.
A further development of operational-tactical missiles of the Hvason family was a rocket, which in the West was given the code name Scud-ER (ER - extended range, “extended range”). Scud-ER has a launch range of 750 — 800 km, 1,5 — 1,6 times as many as Hvason-6, and 2,5 — 2,7 times more than the original Soviet 8-14. This was achieved not only by reducing the mass of the warhead compared to Hwason-6, but also by using a slightly lower maximum thrust of the rocket engine than the 8-14, followed by gradual throttling of thrust to the march level, which provided a more economical expenditure fuel. The development of Scud-ER was completed in 2003 with its adoption and launch into the series. A public demonstration of the new missiles took place at the parade in honor of the 75 anniversary of the KPA 25 on April 2007.
Together with the one-stage tactical missiles of the Scud type, the DPRK mastered the production of self-propelled launchers for them, copying the standard 9P117М launcher of the Soviet operational-tactical missile system 9K72 (on the four-axle heavy vehicle of the MAZ-543 high-terrain vehicle).
In addition to operational-tactical, the DPRK began to develop its own tactical ballistic missiles of the earth-to-earth class. The Soviet controlled ballistic missile 9М79 tactical missile system 9K79 "Point" was taken as a basis. Syria helped the North Koreans with the delivery of the complex in 1996, which received such missiles from the USSR in 1983. Syria also sent military personnel to the DPRK to help the North Koreans study the “Point”. The purpose of creating a new missile system was the replacement of obsolete Luna and Luna-M complexes with unguided rockets. The North Koreans managed to create their own version of KN-9 based on 79М02, with a range of 110 — 120 km (some experts give 140), which corresponds to the Soviet tactical missile 9М79М1 of the improved Tochka-U complex. Tests of the KN-02 took place in 2004 — 2007, and in 2007, the new missile system was adopted by the KPA. The self-propelled KN-02 launcher on the chassis of a high-performance three-axle vehicle was created on its own, based on the chassis of the Romanian truck (6X6) DAC, but unlike the launchers of the Tochka and U tactical missile systems, it is not floating .
The total number of non-strategic KPA missile systems to 2010 was estimated as follows: 24 launchers of Luna and Luna-M tactical missile systems, 30 - KN-02 and more 30 - operational-tactical type Scud (9-72, "Hwason-XNUM "," Hwason-5 "and Scud-ER with a common ammunition over 6 missiles; some sources give an indicator of 200 missiles, there is also information about 400" Hwaseon-180 "and more 5" Hwaseon-700 ").
The next stage in the development of long-range ballistic missiles was the development of the DPRK's production of strategic ballistic missiles Tepkhodon and Nodon.
The first in the Tepkhodon family was the two-stage Tephodon-1 (also known in Western sources as TD-1, Scud Mod.E and Scud-X), calculated on the average 2000 range — 2200 km, which is comparable to the Soviet ballistic TX medium-range missiles P-12 and its Chinese counterpart "Dunfen-3", entered service, respectively, in 1958 and 1971.
The second rocket of this family, “Tepkhodon-2” (also known as TD-2, possible North Korean “Hwaseon-2” and “Moxon-2”; Moxon is Jupiter in Korean) is already intercontinental. Its range in a two-stage version is estimated at 6400 — 7000 km, in a three-stage version (sometimes called “Tephodon-3”) —8000 — 15 000 km.
A significant disadvantage of the Tepkodon-1 and Tepkhodon-2 missiles, which determine their vulnerability from the preemptive strikes of the enemy, is that they are launched from stationary ground launch complexes, including the launch pad and the service mast. Refueling and oxidizing fuel of these missiles is carried out immediately before launch and takes a long time.
Single-stage, liquid medium range ballistic missiles, "Rodong-A" and "Nodong-B" are deployed to the self-propelled ground units, the first of which is modeled on the launcher 9P117M operational-tactical missile system 9K72 chassis chetyrehosnogo heavy car-terrain MAZ-543, but with lengthening due to an additional fifth axis (as a result, the wheel formula 10x10 was obtained), and the second - modeled on the launcher of the Soviet strategic medium-range missile system RSD- 10 "Pioneer" on the chassis of a six-axle heavy car all-terrain MAZ-547. Perhaps the production technology of these launchers or sets of parts and assemblies for their assembly (which most likely) was supplied by the DPRK to Belarus.
For the first time, American reconnaissance artificial satellites of the Earth discovered the Tepkodon-1 and Tepkhodon-2 missiles in 1994. There are no reliable data on their operational deployment in the troops. Some experts believe that the KPA for 2010 had Tepehodon-1 missiles in quantities from 10 to 25 — 30 pieces.
The “Nodon-A” rocket (also known as “Nodon-1”, “Rodon-1” and Scud-D), like the Hwason and Tephodon missiles, is based on the same 8-14. The firing range of the Nodon-A is 1350 — 1600 km, which is enough to hit targets in the allied US Far Eastern states, from Tokyo to Taipei. The increase in the start-up range, which required an increase in the fuel supply, was achieved by increasing the length and diameter of the hull. Placing the Nodon-A on a highly mobile chassis (speed on the highway to 70 km / h, power reserve 550 km) allowed this rocket complex to be concealed and durable, but the lengthy preparation for the launch (60 minutes), including due to the need for refueling components of fuel, should be considered a significant drawback of this system of strategic weapons.
In addition to the multi-axle self-propelled launcher of the Nodon-A ballistic missile, a launcher was created for it on a three-axle semi-trailer with a truck tractor (6X6) on a chassis similar to the Romanian truck DAC.
Unlike the Nodon-A, the Nodon-B missile was developed on the basis of not the 8K14, but another Soviet prototype, the single-stage ballistic missile P-27, adopted by the USSR Navy in 1968, as part of the D- 5 for strategic missile submarines of the 667A project. The DPRK was able to obtain the relevant technical documentation between the 1992 and 1998 years. A public display of the rocket took place on October 10 on 2010, when the 65 anniversary of the WPK was celebrated.
The firing range of the Nodon-B (estimated at 2750 — 4000 km) exceeds that of the P-27 (2500 km), which was achieved by increasing the length and diameter of the hull in comparison with the prototype - this made it possible to use more capacious fuel tanks and oxidant, although it worsened its flight characteristics. Nodon-B can hit US military facilities in Okinawa and even (if the range estimate in 4000 km is correct) on Guam, that is, on its own American territory. If the DPRK places Nodon-B on board disguised merchant ships, it will allow the North Koreans to threaten cities on the west coast of the United States.
The North Koreans also developed the mine version of the Nodon-B missile, which received the name BM25 (BM - ballistic missile, “ballistic missile”, 25 - 2500 km firing range) and Musudan-1 in a number of sources.
Eight-axis chassis for self-propelled launchers of the DPRK's new missiles were provided by China, although he himself was not in awe of Pyongyang’s rocket plans. This new chassis - WS51200, the largest of the total mass produced in the PRC (apparently meaning the weight of the machine and maximum load) in 122 tons - was made by North Korean order by the famous Chinese manufacturer of similar machines Wanshan Special Vehicle, which in 2011 delivered them to the North Koreans .
The total number of Nodon-A and Nodon-B missiles is estimated by different sources in strongly divergent numbers. For example, the well-known English Military Balance reference book in the 2010 edition gives for both types a number of launchers “about 10” and the number of missiles “more than 90”. Americans assume that Nodon-A released more than 200, and Nodon-B - about 50.
In addition, rockets are one of the main exports of the DPRK. In the company of "rocket clients" of the DPRK appear:
- Vietnam (in 1998, acquired 25 OTR "Hwaseong-5");
- Egypt (received technological documentation for the establishment of the production of OTR "Hvason-5" and "Hwaseon-6");
- Iran (except for the above-mentioned deployment under the national names "Shahab-1" and "Shahab-2" missiles "Hwasel-5" and "Hwaseon-6", he started the production of medium-range missiles "Nodon-A" under the name "Shahab -3 "and allegedly acquired even more long-range North Korean ballistic missiles BM18 for 25);
- Yemen (in the 1990-s bought Scud-type missiles in North Korea);
- Both African states of the Congo (the Republic of the Congo acquired the Hwaseong-5 missiles, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo acquired the Hwaseong-6);
- Libya, (which assembled from the set nodes of the Nodon-A rocket, but under pressure from the West destroyed them in 2004);
- United Arab Emirates (acquired 25 Xvason-5 missiles, but because of the likely lack of qualifications of its staff did not deploy them and stockpiled);
- Syria (has missiles "Hwason-6" and "Nodon-A"), Sudan (possibly, received through Syria North Korean Scud-type missiles);
- Finally, Ethiopia (may have received "Hwason-5").
Meanwhile, in the DPRK ...
On the materials of the sites:
http://imp-navigator.livejournal.com
http://forums.airbase.ru/
http://www.militaryphotos.net/
http://www.militaryparitet.com/
http://shushpanzer-ru.livejournal.com/
http://strangernn.livejournal.com/
http://spioenkop.blogspot.ru
The KPA Rocket Forces, whose command (subordinated directly to Supreme Commander Kim Jong-un), is called the “Bureau of Artillery Control,” are created in the image and likeness of the Rocket Forces (Second Artillery) of the People’s Liberation Army of China. Like the Chinese, North Korean missile forces include units armed with tactical, operational-tactical and strategic missile systems. However, taking into account the doctrinal task of inflicting a military defeat on South Korea with an opportunity, all North Korean missile units can be considered de facto strategic regardless of the launch range of their ballistic missiles (therefore, in Western literature they are called "strategic missile forces "). And if the North Koreans manage to bring to the logical end their program of creating intercontinental ballistic missiles, then the country will join the world club of nuclear missile owners weapons unlimited range, where the United States, Russia, China, Great Britain and France are now (possibly Israel) and where they are seeking to penetrate from the back door, in addition to North Korea, also India, Iran and Pakistan, the latter two with just the North Koreans.
In fact, the rocket troops are not even a separate branch of the armed forces, but an independent type of the armed forces of the DPRK, which in the foreseeable future, as it builds up its nuclear potential, should become the basis of the country's military power. The development of the North Korean rocket forces poses a threat not only to regional security, but also, in the future, directly to the United States, the objects on the mainland of which can fall within the range of their missiles.
The “artillery control bureau” itself was formed in 1999 with the transfer under its commencement of all the army units formerly part of the ground forces armed with ground-to-ground ballistic missiles. Before that, they did not have a single separate command and were under the authority of the KPA artillery command. Now there are at least a thousand deployed and stockpiled unguided and guided ballistic missiles for tactical, tactical and strategic purposes in their arsenal.
The production capacity of North Korean rocket production can produce, for example, up to eight long-range ballistic missiles (operational-tactical) “Hwason-5” and “Hwaseon-6” per month.
Missile manufacturing enterprises are represented by the Yakjen Machine-Building Plant in the suburb of Pyongyang Manganda (also known as the Mangenede Electric Machine-Building Plant; the main workshops employing approximately 1500 people are underground), defense plant No. 7 (located approximately 8 km from the plant in Mangenda; in particular, the Tephodon-1 medium-range ballistic missiles), by the plant No. 26 in Kang (the largest underground enterprise of the military-industrial complex, the total number of workers of which is Thousands of people in 20; in addition to guided and unguided rockets, torpedoes, depth bombs and engineering mines are also produced here, plant number 118 in Kagamri and Kechenkun, plant number 125 in Pyongyang (known by the name Pyongyang Pig Breeding Complex) and factory number 301 in Tegvan-IP. Yakjene Machine-Building Plant and Plant No. 7 are subordinate to the 2 th Research and Development Center of the 4-th General Bureau.
North Korea has launched its own space program, involving the creation of launch vehicles and satellite satellites for dual use - communications, meteorological and geomonitoring (possibly in cooperation with Iran and some other countries). The leadership of the space program in the DPRK is the Korea Space Technology Committee, which is publicly positioned as a civil agency.
North Korean leader Kim Jong-un smokes a cigarette in the Command Center after launching the Quanmenson-3 satellite on the Unha-3 (3 Milky Way) launch vehicle
True, many experts (and not without reason) believe that this program is to a greater extent a cover for works of the creation of intercontinental ballistic missiles that have an exclusively military focus.
The country has developed an extensive infrastructure to support testing of various types of missiles, including Musudan-ri (Musudan-ni) missile test sites (also known as the Tonghai test site) (Hamgen-Patko Province); this is the main test site for testing medium-range and intercontinental missiles, as well as space launch vehicles), Kitarieng (tests of tactical and operational-tactical missiles, Gangwon Province) and the new Pond-ri missile range (Pond-ni, or the Sohe test range) on the northwest coast of NDR in 50 km from the border with China (Phenan Puk-do province). The landfills of Musudanri and Pond-ri are also considered as cosmodromes.
Export-import operations in the field of rocket technologies are carried out under the auspices of the 2-th Economic Committee, the trade and procurement companies - Yongaksan Trading Company and Changkwang Trading Company.
The creation of missile forces in the DPRK began in the 1960-ies. with the delivery of the USSR tactical missile systems 2K6 "Luna" with unguided short-range orbital-launched ballistic missiles - namely, 3Р8 (FROG-3 according to the conventional classification adopted by NATO) and 3Р10 (FROG-5) on the basis of the emergency forces, XNUMXPXNUMX (FROG-XNUMX).
Then, in 1969, there were deliveries of a more long-range tactical missile complex 9K52 "Luna-M" with an unguided ballistic missile 9М21 (Р-65, Р-70, according to NATO classification - FROG-7) with a high-explosive warhead.
In the DPRK, chemical combat units were created for the Luna and Luna-M missiles.
However, in the 1970-s. the range (respectively, to 45 and 65-70 km) and the low accuracy of firing of these complexes ceased to arrange the command of the KPA.
In this regard, it was decided to purchase an operational tactical missile system 9K72 with a controlled ballistic missile 8K14 (Р-17, according to NATO classification - SS-1C or Scud-B), which has a range of 300 km. However, for some reason, the USSR did not sell it, so the North Koreans bought 9K72 complexes with ammunition (high-explosive missiles) from Egypt, whose president, Anwar Sadat, began to slowly trade Soviet weapons ...
Acquisition in 1976 — 1981 The North Koreans of the 9K72 complexes were of great importance for them in deploying the production of their own ballistic missiles, based on 8K14. DPRK specialists dismantled the 8K14 rocket and constructed their own after thorough study of it, somewhat increasing the launch range (to 330 km) by reducing the mass of the warhead. The first North Korean tactical ballistic missile based on the Soviet 8К14, known as "Hwason-5" (Hwaseon - in Korean Mars), was successfully tested in 1984, launched first in experimental, and in 1987 in serial production and adopted by the KPA. For the Hwason-5 rocket, in addition to the high-explosive, chemical and bacteriological combat units were developed.
The DPRK supplied the Hwaseong-5 missiles to Iran (where they received the name Shahab-1) and, moreover, provided technological assistance to Egypt in launching the production of its Scud-B variant.
Iranian Shahab-1 rocket on SPU 9P117M
Launcher Shahab-1 based on a semitrailer. I draw attention to the sliding awning, under which the rocket can be hidden in the stowed position, in this form it will be difficult to distinguish this launcher on the road from conventional trucks with semi-trailers
Inspired by the success of the Hwason 5, the North Koreans set about creating a new, one and a half times more long-range (with a radius of 500 km by reducing the mass of the warhead and increasing the fuel and oxidizer stock by lengthening the product) of the tactical missile Hwason 6 (in the West, it was called Scud-C or Scud-PIP, product improvement program - "advanced production program").
Tests "Hwason-6" were carried out in 1990, and the rocket, in addition to entering the KPA, was also supplied to Iran, as well as Syria. Moreover, Iran has acquired the technology of their production under the national name "Shahab-2".
Iranian Shahab-2 rocket on SPU 9P117M
According to some experts, by the middle of 1990's. the Hwaseong-6 missiles were allegedly completely replaced by the Hwaseon-5 troops and Egypt’s 8К14 sent for storage.
A further development of operational-tactical missiles of the Hvason family was a rocket, which in the West was given the code name Scud-ER (ER - extended range, “extended range”). Scud-ER has a launch range of 750 — 800 km, 1,5 — 1,6 times as many as Hvason-6, and 2,5 — 2,7 times more than the original Soviet 8-14. This was achieved not only by reducing the mass of the warhead compared to Hwason-6, but also by using a slightly lower maximum thrust of the rocket engine than the 8-14, followed by gradual throttling of thrust to the march level, which provided a more economical expenditure fuel. The development of Scud-ER was completed in 2003 with its adoption and launch into the series. A public demonstration of the new missiles took place at the parade in honor of the 75 anniversary of the KPA 25 on April 2007.
Together with the one-stage tactical missiles of the Scud type, the DPRK mastered the production of self-propelled launchers for them, copying the standard 9P117М launcher of the Soviet operational-tactical missile system 9K72 (on the four-axle heavy vehicle of the MAZ-543 high-terrain vehicle).
In addition to operational-tactical, the DPRK began to develop its own tactical ballistic missiles of the earth-to-earth class. The Soviet controlled ballistic missile 9М79 tactical missile system 9K79 "Point" was taken as a basis. Syria helped the North Koreans with the delivery of the complex in 1996, which received such missiles from the USSR in 1983. Syria also sent military personnel to the DPRK to help the North Koreans study the “Point”. The purpose of creating a new missile system was the replacement of obsolete Luna and Luna-M complexes with unguided rockets. The North Koreans managed to create their own version of KN-9 based on 79М02, with a range of 110 — 120 km (some experts give 140), which corresponds to the Soviet tactical missile 9М79М1 of the improved Tochka-U complex. Tests of the KN-02 took place in 2004 — 2007, and in 2007, the new missile system was adopted by the KPA. The self-propelled KN-02 launcher on the chassis of a high-performance three-axle vehicle was created on its own, based on the chassis of the Romanian truck (6X6) DAC, but unlike the launchers of the Tochka and U tactical missile systems, it is not floating .
The total number of non-strategic KPA missile systems to 2010 was estimated as follows: 24 launchers of Luna and Luna-M tactical missile systems, 30 - KN-02 and more 30 - operational-tactical type Scud (9-72, "Hwason-XNUM "," Hwason-5 "and Scud-ER with a common ammunition over 6 missiles; some sources give an indicator of 200 missiles, there is also information about 400" Hwaseon-180 "and more 5" Hwaseon-700 ").
The next stage in the development of long-range ballistic missiles was the development of the DPRK's production of strategic ballistic missiles Tepkhodon and Nodon.
The first in the Tepkhodon family was the two-stage Tephodon-1 (also known in Western sources as TD-1, Scud Mod.E and Scud-X), calculated on the average 2000 range — 2200 km, which is comparable to the Soviet ballistic TX medium-range missiles P-12 and its Chinese counterpart "Dunfen-3", entered service, respectively, in 1958 and 1971.
The second rocket of this family, “Tepkhodon-2” (also known as TD-2, possible North Korean “Hwaseon-2” and “Moxon-2”; Moxon is Jupiter in Korean) is already intercontinental. Its range in a two-stage version is estimated at 6400 — 7000 km, in a three-stage version (sometimes called “Tephodon-3”) —8000 — 15 000 km.
A significant disadvantage of the Tepkodon-1 and Tepkhodon-2 missiles, which determine their vulnerability from the preemptive strikes of the enemy, is that they are launched from stationary ground launch complexes, including the launch pad and the service mast. Refueling and oxidizing fuel of these missiles is carried out immediately before launch and takes a long time.
Single-stage, liquid medium range ballistic missiles, "Rodong-A" and "Nodong-B" are deployed to the self-propelled ground units, the first of which is modeled on the launcher 9P117M operational-tactical missile system 9K72 chassis chetyrehosnogo heavy car-terrain MAZ-543, but with lengthening due to an additional fifth axis (as a result, the wheel formula 10x10 was obtained), and the second - modeled on the launcher of the Soviet strategic medium-range missile system RSD- 10 "Pioneer" on the chassis of a six-axle heavy car all-terrain MAZ-547. Perhaps the production technology of these launchers or sets of parts and assemblies for their assembly (which most likely) was supplied by the DPRK to Belarus.
For the first time, American reconnaissance artificial satellites of the Earth discovered the Tepkodon-1 and Tepkhodon-2 missiles in 1994. There are no reliable data on their operational deployment in the troops. Some experts believe that the KPA for 2010 had Tepehodon-1 missiles in quantities from 10 to 25 — 30 pieces.
The “Nodon-A” rocket (also known as “Nodon-1”, “Rodon-1” and Scud-D), like the Hwason and Tephodon missiles, is based on the same 8-14. The firing range of the Nodon-A is 1350 — 1600 km, which is enough to hit targets in the allied US Far Eastern states, from Tokyo to Taipei. The increase in the start-up range, which required an increase in the fuel supply, was achieved by increasing the length and diameter of the hull. Placing the Nodon-A on a highly mobile chassis (speed on the highway to 70 km / h, power reserve 550 km) allowed this rocket complex to be concealed and durable, but the lengthy preparation for the launch (60 minutes), including due to the need for refueling components of fuel, should be considered a significant drawback of this system of strategic weapons.
In addition to the multi-axle self-propelled launcher of the Nodon-A ballistic missile, a launcher was created for it on a three-axle semi-trailer with a truck tractor (6X6) on a chassis similar to the Romanian truck DAC.
Unlike the Nodon-A, the Nodon-B missile was developed on the basis of not the 8K14, but another Soviet prototype, the single-stage ballistic missile P-27, adopted by the USSR Navy in 1968, as part of the D- 5 for strategic missile submarines of the 667A project. The DPRK was able to obtain the relevant technical documentation between the 1992 and 1998 years. A public display of the rocket took place on October 10 on 2010, when the 65 anniversary of the WPK was celebrated.
The firing range of the Nodon-B (estimated at 2750 — 4000 km) exceeds that of the P-27 (2500 km), which was achieved by increasing the length and diameter of the hull in comparison with the prototype - this made it possible to use more capacious fuel tanks and oxidant, although it worsened its flight characteristics. Nodon-B can hit US military facilities in Okinawa and even (if the range estimate in 4000 km is correct) on Guam, that is, on its own American territory. If the DPRK places Nodon-B on board disguised merchant ships, it will allow the North Koreans to threaten cities on the west coast of the United States.
The North Koreans also developed the mine version of the Nodon-B missile, which received the name BM25 (BM - ballistic missile, “ballistic missile”, 25 - 2500 km firing range) and Musudan-1 in a number of sources.
Eight-axis chassis for self-propelled launchers of the DPRK's new missiles were provided by China, although he himself was not in awe of Pyongyang’s rocket plans. This new chassis - WS51200, the largest of the total mass produced in the PRC (apparently meaning the weight of the machine and maximum load) in 122 tons - was made by North Korean order by the famous Chinese manufacturer of similar machines Wanshan Special Vehicle, which in 2011 delivered them to the North Koreans .
The total number of Nodon-A and Nodon-B missiles is estimated by different sources in strongly divergent numbers. For example, the well-known English Military Balance reference book in the 2010 edition gives for both types a number of launchers “about 10” and the number of missiles “more than 90”. Americans assume that Nodon-A released more than 200, and Nodon-B - about 50.
In addition, rockets are one of the main exports of the DPRK. In the company of "rocket clients" of the DPRK appear:
- Vietnam (in 1998, acquired 25 OTR "Hwaseong-5");
Vietnamese OTR "Hwaseong-5"
- Egypt (received technological documentation for the establishment of the production of OTR "Hvason-5" and "Hwaseon-6");
- Iran (except for the above-mentioned deployment under the national names "Shahab-1" and "Shahab-2" missiles "Hwasel-5" and "Hwaseon-6", he started the production of medium-range missiles "Nodon-A" under the name "Shahab -3 "and allegedly acquired even more long-range North Korean ballistic missiles BM18 for 25);
Iranian medium-range rocket "Shahab-3"
- Yemen (in the 1990-s bought Scud-type missiles in North Korea);
- Both African states of the Congo (the Republic of the Congo acquired the Hwaseong-5 missiles, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo acquired the Hwaseong-6);
- Libya, (which assembled from the set nodes of the Nodon-A rocket, but under pressure from the West destroyed them in 2004);
- United Arab Emirates (acquired 25 Xvason-5 missiles, but because of the likely lack of qualifications of its staff did not deploy them and stockpiled);
- Syria (has missiles "Hwason-6" and "Nodon-A"), Sudan (possibly, received through Syria North Korean Scud-type missiles);
- Finally, Ethiopia (may have received "Hwason-5").
Meanwhile, in the DPRK ...
Yes, I do not need your "Kalash". Bring back rice, bad man, puppet of the South, I will forgive everything ...
On the materials of the sites:
http://imp-navigator.livejournal.com
http://forums.airbase.ru/
http://www.militaryphotos.net/
http://www.militaryparitet.com/
http://shushpanzer-ru.livejournal.com/
http://strangernn.livejournal.com/
http://spioenkop.blogspot.ru
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