“Talking about the secrecy of the first Soviet submarines was simply meaningless. The Americans gave them the humiliating nickname “roaring cows”. The pursuit of Soviet engineers for the other characteristics of the boats (speed, depth, power weapons) did not save the situation. An airplane, a helicopter, or a torpedo would still be faster. A boat, being discovered, turned into a “game”, not having become a “hunter”.
“The task of deadening Soviet submarines in the eighties began to be solved. True, they still remained 3 — 4 was noisier than the American Los Angeles-class submarines.
Such statements are constantly found in Russian journals and books devoted to Russian nuclear submarines (APL). This information was taken not from any official sources, but from American and English articles. That is why the terrible noise of the Soviet / Russian nuclear submarines is one of the myths of the United States.
It should be noted that not only Soviet shipbuilders encountered the problems of noise, and if we were able to immediately create a combat submarine capable of serving, then the Americans had more serious problems with their firstborn. "Nautilus" had a lot of "childhood diseases", which is so characteristic of all experimental machines. His engine gave out such a noise level that sonars, the main means of orientation under water, were practically deaf. As a result, during a hike in the North Seas in the area of. Svalbard, sonars "overlooked" the drifting ice floe, which damaged the only periscope. In the future, the Americans launched a struggle to reduce noise. To achieve this, they abandoned the double-hulled boats, moving to one-and-a-half-hull and single-hull boats, sacrificing the important characteristics of submarines: survivability, depth, and speed. In our country, built double-hull. But were the Soviet designers wrong, and the two-part submarines so noisy that their combat use would be meaningless?
It would, of course, be good to take data on the noise of domestic and foreign nuclear submarines and compare them. But, it is impossible to do this, because official information on this issue is still considered to be secret (it suffices to recall the Iowa battleships, according to which the real characteristics were disclosed only after 50 years). There is no information on American boats at all (and if it does appear, it should be treated with the same care as with information on booking an LC Iowa). On domestic submarines sometimes there are scattered data. But what kind of information? Here are four examples from different articles:
1) When designing the first Soviet nuclear submarine, a set of measures to ensure acoustic secrecy was created ... ... However, shock absorbers for the main turbines were never created. As a result, the submarine noise level of the nuclear submarine of the 627 project increased at high speeds to 110 decibels.
2) The SSGN of the 670 project had a very low level of acoustic visibility for that time (among Soviet second generation nuclear submarines, this submarine was considered the lowest noise level). Its noise at full speed in the ultrasonic frequency range was less than 80, in the infrasonic - 100, in the sound - 110 decibels.
3) When creating the third-generation submarines, it was possible to achieve a reduction in noise level compared to the boats of the previous generation on 12 Decibels, or 3,4 times.
4) Since the 70s of the last century, submarines reduced their noise level by an average of two years for 1 dB. Over the past 19 years alone - from the 1990 of the year to the present - the average noise level of the US NPS has declined tenfold, from 0,1 Pa to 0,01 Pa.
It is in principle impossible to make any reasonable and logical conclusion from this noise level data. Therefore, we have only one way - to analyze the real facts of the service. Here are the most famous cases from the service of domestic submarines.
1) During the autonomous campaign in the South China Sea 1968, the K-10 submarine from the number of the first generation of Soviet atomic submarines (675 project) received an order to intercept the US Navy aircraft carrier. The aircraft carrier Enterprise covered the Long Beach rocket cruiser, frigates and support ships. At a calculated point, Captain 1 of the rank of R.V. Mazin led the submarine through the defensive lines of the American warrant directly beneath the bottom of the Enterprise. Hiding behind the noise of the screws of a gigantic ship, the submarine accompanied the strike force for thirteen hours. During this time, training torpedo attacks on all pennants of the order were worked out and acoustic profiles (characteristic noise of various vessels) were removed. After that, K-10 successfully left the order and ran a training rocket attack at a distance. In the event of a real war, the entire compound would be destroyed to choose: conventional torpedoes or a nuclear strike. It is interesting to note that American experts rated the 675 project extremely low. It was these submarines that they dubbed "Roaring Cows." And precisely they could not detect the ships of the US aircraft carrier. The boats of the 675 project were used not only to monitor surface ships, but sometimes they also “ruined life” for American nuclear powered ships on duty. Thus, K-135 in 1967 for the year during 5,5 hours carried out continuous monitoring of the Patrick Henry SSBN, remaining not detected itself.
2) In the next exacerbation of Soviet-American relations in 1979, the nuclear submarine K-38 and K-481 (pr. 671) carried out combat service in the Persian Gulf, where in that period it was up to 50 US Navy ships. The hike lasted 6 months. Member of the campaign A.N. Shporko reported that the Soviet submarines operated in the Persian Gulf very covertly: if the US Navy briefly found them, they could not properly classify, much less organize the prosecution and work conditional destruction. Subsequently, these findings were confirmed by intelligence data. At the same time, tracking the ships of the US Navy was carried out at a distance of weapons and if received, they would be sent to the bottom with a probability close to 100%
3) In March, 1984, the United States and South Korea conducted their regular annual naval drills, Team Spirit .. In Moscow and Pyongyang, they closely followed the exercises. To observe the American carrier-based strike group consisting of the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and seven US warships, the K-314 nuclear submarine (671 Ave., the second generation of nuclear submarines, also reproached for noise) was sent and six warships. Four days later, K-314 was able to detect the US Navy carrier strike group. Monitoring of the aircraft carrier was carried out over the next day 7, then after the discovery of the Soviet nuclear submarine, the aircraft carrier entered the territorial waters of South Korea. "K-314" remained outside the territorial waters.
Having lost hydroacoustic contact with the aircraft carrier, the boat commanded by Captain 1-rank Vladimir Yevseyenko continued the search. The Soviet submarine headed to the proposed location of the aircraft carrier, but it was not there. The US side kept radio silence.
March 21 Soviet submarine found strange noises. To clarify the situation the boat floated to the periscope depth. The clock was the beginning of the eleventh. According to Vladimir Yevseyenko, several American ships were observed that were going to meet each other. It was decided to dive, but it was too late. The aircraft carrier, unnoticed by the crew of the submarine, with running lights off, moved at a speed of about 30 km / h. K-314 was ahead of Kitty Hawk. There was a blow, followed by another. At first, the team decided that the cutting was damaged, but when checking the water in the compartments was not found. As it turned out, the stabilizer was bent during the first collision, the screw was damaged during the second. A huge tug Mashuk was sent to her for help. The boat was towed to Chazhma Bay, in 50 km east of Vladivostok, where she was to undergo repairs.
For Americans, the collision was also unexpected. According to them, after the strike, they saw the receding silhouette of a submarine without navigation lights. Two US anti-submarine helicopters SH-3H were raised. Accompanying the Soviet submarine, they did not detect any visible serious damage. However, when hitting the submarine, the propeller was out of action, and it began to lose speed. Screw was damaged and the body of the aircraft carrier. It turned out that his bottom was proportional to 40 m. Fortunately, no one was hurt in this incident. Kitty Hawk was forced to repair the Subic Bay naval base in the Philippines before returning to San Diego. On examination of the aircraft carrier, a fragment of a K-314 propeller stuck in the hull was found, as well as pieces of a sound-absorbing submarine cover. The exercises were curtailed. The accident caused a lot of noise: the American press was actively discussing how the submarine was able to sail unnoticed at such close distance to the US Navy's aircraft carrier group conducting the exercises, including with an anti-submarine orientation.
4) In the winter of 1996 of the year in 150 miles of the Hebrides. The Russian Embassy in London 29 February appealed to the command of the British Navy with a request to assist the crew member of the submarine 671РТМ (cipher "Pike", second generation +), who underwent appendicitis surgery on board the vessel, followed by peritonitis (its treatment is possible only under hospital). Soon the sick with a helicopter "Lynx" from the destroyer "Glasgow" redirected to the shore. However, the British media was not so much touched by the manifestation of naval cooperation between Russia and Great Britain, but expressed bewilderment about the fact that during London negotiations were being held in the North Atlantic, in the area where the submarine of the Russian Navy was located antisubmarine maneuvers (by the way, the Glasgow EM also participated in them). But the icebreaker was able to detect only after he himself surfaced to transfer the sailor to the helicopter. According to the Times, the Russian submarine has demonstrated its secrecy in tracking anti-submarine forces conducting an active search. It is noteworthy that the British in an official statement made for the media initially attributed the "Pike" to the more modern (lower noise) project 971, and only after they acknowledged that they could not notice the noisy Soviet boat of the project 671РТМ.
5) On May 23, 1981, a Soviet nuclear submarine K-211 (SSBN 667-BDR) and an American submarine of the Sturgeon type collided in one of the SF landfills near the Kola Bay. An American submarine rammed the stern of the K-211 with its wheelhouse while she was working out elements of combat training. The American submarine did not emerge in the collision area. However, in the vicinity of the British base of the Navy, Holi Loch, an American nuclear submarine appeared with a pronounced damage to the cabin. Our submarine surfaced, and came to the base under its own power. Here, the submarine was expected by a commission, which consisted of industry experts, fleet, designer and science. K-211 was docked, and during the inspection, holes were found in two stern tanks of the main ballast, damage to the horizontal stabilizer and the blades of the right screw. In damaged tanks, bolts with countersunk heads found pieces of plexus and metal from the wheelhouse of the US Navy submarine. Moreover, the commission on certain details was able to establish that the Soviet submarine was faced precisely with an American submarine such as Sturgeon. The huge SSBNs pr 667, like all SSBNs, were not intended for sharp maneuvers that the American nuclear submarines could not dodge, so the only explanation for this incident was that the Stargent did not see or even suspect that K- was in close proximity 211. It should be noted that boats of the Sturgeon type were designed specifically for combating submarines and carried relevant modern search equipment.
It should be noted that the collisions of submarines are not so rare. The last for the domestic and American nuclear submarines was a collision near the island of Kildin, in Russian territorial waters, 11 February 1992 of the K-276 submarine (commissioned in 1982) under the command of second-rank captain I. Lokty faced the American nuclear-powered submarine Baton Rouge ("Los Angeles"), which, tracking the ships of the Russian Navy in the exercise area, buried the Russian submarine. As a result of the collision at the "Crab" was damaged cabin. The position of the American nuclear submarine turned out to be more difficult, she barely managed to reach the base, after which they decided not to repair the boat, but to withdraw it from the fleet.
6) Perhaps the brightest fragment in the biography of the ships of the 671РТМ project was their participation in major operations "Aport" and "Atrina", conducted by the 33 division in the Atlantic and significantly shaken the United States in the ability of its Navy to solve anti-submarine tasks.
On May 29, 1985, three submarines of Project 671RTM (K-502, K-324, K-299), as well as the K-488 submarine (Project 671RT), left the Western Face. Later, the nuclear submarines of project 671 - K-147 joined them. Of course, the release of a whole combination of atomic submarines into the ocean for US naval intelligence could not go unnoticed. Intensive searches began, but they did not bring the expected results. At the same time, the secretly operating Soviet nuclear submarines themselves monitored the US Navy missile submarines in the area of their combat patrol (for example, the K-324 nuclear submarine had three sonar contacts with the US nuclear submarine for a total duration of 28 hours. And the K-147 equipped with the latest tracking system for The wake submarine, using the indicated system and acoustic means, performed six-day (!!!) tracking of the American SSBN “Simon Bolivar.” In addition, the submarines studied the tactics of the American anti-submarine aviation. The Americans managed to establish contact only with the K-488 that was already returning to base. On July 1, Operation Aport ended.
7) In March-June 87 of the year carried out a similar operation “Atrina”, in which five submarines of the project 671РТМ - К-244 (under the command of the captain of the second rank V. Alikov) took part, К-255 (under the command of the captain of the second rank) B. Yu. Muratova), K-298 (commanded by Captain Second Rank Popkov), K-299 (commanded by Captain Second Rank NI Klyuev) and K-524 (commanded by Captain Second Rank AF Smelkov) . Although the Americans found out about the withdrawal of nuclear submarines from West Faces, they lost ships in the North Atlantic. “Underwater hunting” started again, in which almost all the anti-submarine forces of the American Atlantic fleet were attracted — coastal and deck-based aircraft, six anti-submarine nuclear submarines (in addition to the submarines already deployed by the United States naval forces in the Atlantic), the 3 powerful naval search groups and 3 of the newest vessels of the Stolworth type (ships of hydroacoustic observation), which used powerful underwater explosions to form a sonar pulse. The ships of the English fleet were involved in the search operation. According to the stories of the commanders of the domestic submarines, the concentration of anti-submarine forces was so great that it seemed impossible to podsplipit for air pumping and a radio session. For Americans who failed in 1985, they needed to regain face. Despite the fact that all possible anti-submarine forces of the US Navy and their allies were pulled into the area, the nuclear submarines managed to reach the Sargasso Sea area unnoticed, where the Soviet “veil” was finally discovered. The Americans managed to establish the first short contacts with submarines only eight days after the operation “Atrina” began. The 671RTM submarine of the project was mistaken for missile strategic submarines, which only increased the concern of the US naval command and the country's political leadership (it should be recalled that these events came at the height of the Cold War, which could turn into "Hot"). During the return to the base, the submarine commanders were allowed to use secret means of hydroacoustic counteraction from the US Navy anti-submarine weapons, until this point the Soviet submarines successfully hid from the anti-submarine forces solely due to the characteristics of the submarines themselves.
The success of the operations "Atrina" and "Aport" confirmed the assumption that the naval forces of the United States with the massive use of modern nuclear submarines by the Soviet Union will not be able to organize any effective counteraction against them.
As we see from the available facts, the American anti-submarine forces were not able to ensure the detection of Soviet submarines, including those of the first generations, and to protect their naval forces from sudden strikes from the depths. And all the statements that “Talking about the secrecy of the first Soviet nuclear submarines was simply meaningless” have no basis.
Now let us analyze the myth that high speeds, maneuverability and depth of immersion do not give any advantages. And again we turn to the known facts:
1) In September-December, the 1971 of the Soviet nuclear submarine of the 661 project (number K-162) made its first trip to full autonomy with a combat route from the Greenland Sea to the Brazilian Depression. In October, the submarine embarked on intercepting an aircraft carrier strike of the US Navy, in the head of which was the aircraft carrier "Saratoga". They were able to detect the submarine on the covering ships and tried to drive it away. Under normal conditions, marking a submarine would mean disrupting a combat mission, but not in this case. K-162 developed speed over 44 nodes in a submerged position. Attempts to drive away the K-162, or break away at speed, were not successful. There were no chances for Saratoga with a maximum of 35 nodes. During the many hours of chase, the Soviet submarine worked out training torpedo attacks and several times went out to the favorable angle for launching Amethyst missiles. But the most interesting thing is that the submarine maneuvered so quickly that the Americans were sure that they were being pursued by a “wolf pack” - a group of submarines. What does it mean? This suggests that the appearance of the boat in the new square was for the Americans so unexpected, or rather unexpected, that they considered this a contact with the new submarine. Consequently, in the event of hostilities, the Americans would produce a search and attack at a completely different square. Thus, it is almost impossible to avoid an attack, nor to destroy a submarine in the presence of high-speed submarines.
2) Initially 1980's. One of the USSR nuclear submarines, which operated in the North Atlantic, was set a kind of record, it watched the “potential enemy” nuclear-powered vessel during the 22 hours, being in the aft sector of the tracking object. Despite all the attempts of the commander of the NATO submarine to change the situation, it was not possible to throw the enemy off the tail: the tracking was stopped only after the commander of the Soviet submarine received relevant orders from the shore. This incident occurred with the nuclear submarine 705-th project - perhaps the most ambiguous and bright ship in stories Soviet submarine shipbuilding. This project deserves a separate article. The 705 APS submarines had a maximum travel speed, which is comparable to the speed of universal and anti-submarine torpedoes of “potential opponents”, but most importantly, due to the power plant features (no special transition to the increased power plant parameters was required when increasing speed, as it was on watermarked submarines reactors), were able to develop a full stroke in minutes, having almost “aircraft” acceleration characteristics. Significant speed allowed for a short time to enter the “shadow” sector of the underwater or surface ship, even if Alpha was previously detected by the enemy’s hydroacoustics. According to the memoirs of Rear Admiral Bogatyrev, who in the past was the commander of K-123 (project 705K), the submarine could turn around "on the patch", which is especially important during active tracking of the "enemy" and its submarines one after another. Alpha did not allow other submarines to enter the course feed corners (i.e., in the zone of sonar shadow), which are particularly favorable for tracking and delivering sudden torpedo attacks.
High maneuverability and speed characteristics of the nuclear submarine of the 705 project made it possible to work out effective maneuvers of evading enemy torpedoes with further counterattack. In particular, the submarine could be circulated at 180 degrees at maximum speed and, after 42 seconds, could begin to move in the opposite direction. The commanders of nuclear submarines project 705 A.F. Zagryadsky and A.U. Abbasov said that such a maneuver made it possible, while gradually increasing the speed to the maximum and at the same time making a turn with a change in depth, to force the enemy following them in the direction-finding mode to lose target, and to the Soviet nuclear submarine to go "at the fighter".
3) 4 August 1984 nuclear submarine K-278 "Komsomolets" made an immersive immersion in the history of world military navigation - the arrows of its depth gauges first froze at the 1000-meter mark, and then crossed it. K-278 sailed and maneuvered at a depth of 1027, and at a depth of 1000 meters fired a torpedo. To journalists, this seems to be the usual whim of the Soviet military and designers. They do not understand why it is necessary to achieve such depths, if the Americans at that time limited themselves to 450. To do this, you need to know ocean hydroacoustics. Increasing the depth reduces non-linear detection. Between the upper, highly heated layer of ocean water and the lower, colder layer, lies the so-called temperature jump layer. If, say, the sound source is in a cold dense layer, over which a warm and less dense layer is located, the sound is reflected from the boundary of the upper layer and propagates only in the lower cold layer. In this case, the upper layer is a “silence zone”, a “shadow zone”, which is not penetrated by the noise from the submarine’s propellers. Simple submarine anti-submarine navigators are not able to grope it, and the submarine can feel safe. There may be several such layers in the ocean, and each layer additionally hides a submarine. An even greater concealing effect has the axis of the terrestrial sound channel below which the working depth K-278 was. Even the Americans recognized that detecting submarines at a depth of 800 m and more is impossible by any means. And anti-submarine torpedoes are not designed for such depth. Thus, the K-278 reaching the working depth was invisible and invulnerable.
Do questions arise after this about the importance of maximum speeds, depth, and maneuverability for submarines?
And now we give the statements of officials and institutions, which for some reason, domestic journalists prefer to ignore.
According to scientists from MIPT, cited in the work “The Future of Strategic Nuclear Forces of Russia: Discussion and Arguments” (ed. Dolgoprudny, 1995) even under the most favorable hydrological conditions (the probability of their occurrence in the northern seas not more than 0,03) of the nuclear submarine of 971 ave. For reference: serial construction began in the distant 1980 year) can be detected by American Los Angeles submarines with GACAN / BQQ-5 at distances of no more than 10 km. Under less favorable conditions (that is, with 97% weather conditions in the northern seas), it is impossible to detect Russian submarines.
There is also a statement by a prominent US naval analyst N. Polmoran made at a hearing in the National Security Committee of the US House of Representatives: "The appearance of 3 Russian boats showed that Soviet shipbuilders closed the noise gap much earlier than we could imagine . According to the US Navy, at the operational speeds of the 5-7 nodes, the noise of the Russian 3-generation boats, recorded by the US hydroacoustic reconnaissance, was lower than that of the most advanced Navy submarines of the United States Improved Los Angeles. ”
According to the head of the operational department of the US Navy, Admiral D. Burd (Jeremi Boorda) made in 1995, the American ships are not able to accompany the third-generation Russian submarines at speeds of 6-9 nodes.
This is probably enough to assert that the Russian “roaring cows” are able to accomplish the tasks facing them with any opposition from the enemy.