Military Review

Tactical lessons of the last two wars of Iraq for an all-arms commander

98
foreword

This article provides a fairly detailed analysis of the actions of the ground forces during the war in Iraq in 2003. There is a good book by Andrei Mikhailov "Iraqi trap" - "Yauza" / "Eksmo", 2004, where the author makes similar conclusions. At the same time, the argument that Arab soldiers are supposedly useless is often used in Russia to explain the rapid defeat of the Iraqi army, given that these same Arabs with superior Iranian forces had been fighting for eight years, and it would seem that Chechnya, Afghanistan and Bosnia Arab Mujahideen showed themselves well.

Of course, this article relies on open sources - but all military theorists from Clausewitz and Jomini to Svechin, Liddel Garth, Simpkin used open sources. True, there is still the secret knowledge of the elders who have gone into the woods, but the elders to fight against tanks after all, they haven’t passed on their knowledge to us yet.

The article touches upon an interesting question about how to transfer armored vehicles from cold, that is, with the engine turned off, to a working state in the conditions of the technological superiority of the enemy has not been studied, because it does not refer to the question “how much the machine will start”, but to the question “how quickly will a car notice the engine warms up the enemy thermal imaging equipment. "

Criticism of other Russian military analysts from this article was confirmed in practice by the fact that the Americans quickly defeated the Iraqi army, despite all predictions, although such analysts predicted that the Americans would be mired in the war against Saddam Hussein (neither Russian nor American analysts then did not think). They did not lose half a thousand killed, as independent analysts from Moscow claimed, and the British lost 139, plus the British lost 32. For an army like Iraq, this is not an indicator in its favor. Data on the state of the allegedly unarmed Iraqis, who at the end of the 80s received the latest technology from France, Yugoslavia and the USSR, is in the book of Mikhailov and in the Jane reference book. No one denies its low combat readiness, but the Iraqi army was not unarmed. That is why 2003 in Moscow hoped that the war would drag on with great losses for the Americans. However, the Iraqi army by the Americans was crushed almost immediately.

Today, the experience of the war in Iraq is being studied all over the world, as is the experience of any war of this scale. In order to prepare competent commanders, one must in fact have the appropriate literature, which they must study. There must be Russian military thought.


At present, perhaps, the experience of Afghanistan is generalized; there is, for example, the book of V.Arunov “The Afghan War”, there is the book of Kvachkov “Special Forces of Russia”, there is the book of Sukholeskiy “Special Forces in Afghanistan”. In Chechnya, such a plan of literature is still scarce, although it exists, for example, “The tactics of actions of illegal armed formations in the Chechen Republic” by the Institute of the Russian Interior Ministry in St. Petersburg. There are a number of articles on such sites as "Bronesite" and "Military Intelligence". However, the fighting ground troops in Iraq, in addition to the book by Andrei Mikhailov "The Iraqi trap", and partly the book by Gennady Korzh "Saddam Hussein", there is no work in Russian. It is unclear in this case, on the basis of which, to prepare the army to fight a high-tech adversary, as required by the General Staff, without studying the experience of the war in Iraq, where the first war in the world took place with a full-scale general military operation supported by a new-type guided weapon. The company 1991 of the year, nevertheless, was still conducted according to the charter of FM 100 about the "air-ground operation".

Of course, the Americans have a very powerful strategic aviationis a fact and this is their main weaponHowever, they are also preparing for battles in the mountains and cities. There is no doubt about the high level of military art in their academies, although sometimes the quality of their army itself is doubtful. In Iraq, in desert areas, this personnel, full of different races and different beliefs, can be kept in closed bases, ensuring a high level of discipline and supplies — which is also a fact.

However, this did not save the Iraqi army from the need to create and most importantly defend their positions at the front, especially since the earthen shelters are not visible by thermal imaging devices. Yes, there are measures for thermal disguise that would have to be observed.



Unfortunately, in Russia, the analysis of the hostilities of the Iraqi army itself has not yet been conducted, and everything is written off either as "insidious Americans" or "lazy Arabs." For any army, it was traditionally considered a duty to collect information on the level of military affairs of other armies. Thus, the author of the article makes his own, albeit small, contribution to the strengthening of Russian military art.

At the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s, the Military Herald published good articles on the topic of tactics in modern conditions. There were articles on this topic in the journal "Foreign Military Review," but these were exactly translated articles by foreign authors. Now, for objective and subjective reasons, the former number of materials in journals is not there, therefore articles like the article by Markin are useful for officers of the Russian army, so that they understand what dangers exist when defending against enemy tanks.

Chipboard materials (for official use) now, after the collapse of the Union, have virtually ceased to be, and new materials after 91 years are based on the experience of the war in Chechnya, but relate to the specifics of the operations of special forces, airborne forces, air forces and motorized rifle units for the protection of colonies, mopping up settlements, organizing ambushes and raids, searching for and destroying militant groups in mountainous terrain.

Of course, issues of fighting tanks, raised on the website of Vasily Chobitka "Bronesight", in the article "Clothes for iron or talk about disguise"Colonel Sergei Leonenko, Professor RAVN from the site" Courage ", in the translation article" The vulnerability of the Russian armored vehicles in urban battles: the experience of Chechnya. "Lester W. Grau. Red Military Star, January 1997 ) ”. Translation from English: Yuri Goldaev, in the collection“ Tanks in battles for the Terrible ”, but there are very few works on this topic, and therefore this article makes a significant contribution to the coverage of this topic.

I also hope that the recent experience of South Ossetia will nevertheless be analyzed by someone, since a general military operation took place there, with the use of artillery by both sides, including the MLRS, aircraft and tanks.

Oleg Valetsky

In the course of the first war in Iraq (1991) and at the dopartisan stage of the second war (2003), air supremacy solved a lot, but not everything. Fighting between units of the Iraqi army, little affected by air raids, and ground units of the anti-Iraqi coalition, in the absence of air support, took place. All of them were lost by the Iraqi side without causing any significant losses to the enemy. Writing it off against the general superiority of the enemy would be an oversimplification. The Iraqi army was armed, however, not with stones and clubs, and far from everyone deserted from the battlefield. Nor should we limit ourselves to the operational-strategic assessment of the war; we need to consider its tactical lessons. Especially due to the fact that the Russian army is far from always able to rely on material parity with a number of potential adversaries.

Contrary to popular belief, the action of coalition aviation was not always effective. So 20 February 1991, the battalion of Cobra helicopters (AH-1F Сobra) and several Apache helicopters (Apache), as well as two pairs of Thunderbolt attack aircraft (A10-A Thunderbolt II Warthog) ironed 1 positions of the XNXX battalion XXXX battalion of XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX Warthog II helicopter battalion for six hours. After such a bombardment, the bulk of the Iraqi soldiers surrendered, just 841 people. It turned out that not a single Iraqi soldier after the 436 hour-processing of positions by aircraft was even injured. And the positions of the Iraqis were not ground-underground (tunnel) defense, but ordinary field defenses.
Daniel P.Bolger, Death ground - today's American infantry in battle, Ballantine books, New York, 2003, p.91-95

As the commander of 7 recognized by the American corps, air supremacy did not prevent the command of the Iraqi Republican Guard to carry out a tactical maneuver in subdivisions equal to the size of brigades at a distance of 25-50 kilometers.
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.5, 6, 570

Not always American aircraft could support the actions of the ground forces, which did not prevent the Americans from destroying Iraqi units with minimal losses.
In 1991, during the battle along the vertical line of the 73 grid (73 Easting) with the division of the Republican Guard Tawakalna and for the elevation of the Medina division, due to bad weather, the American aviation did not support the attack of the 7 American corps . Prior to ground combat, coalition aircraft destroyed about 24% of the total number of tanks of these Iraqi divisions. However, the defending units of these divisions were routed by the ground forces of the coalition.
One captive commander of the Iraqi tank battalion cited the following figures: when entering his battalion into Kuwait, he had 39 tanks, after six weeks of air strikes, he had 32 left. The rest were lost during the 20 minute battle with American tanks.
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.107

Consider the experience of ground combat clashes more closely.

Tactical surveillance 1

Taking ground positions by subunits of the ground forces does not in itself mean that from these positions the troops can effectively withstand the impact of enemy ground forces.


Incorrect spacing


A very telling example is the defeat of the Iraqi Medina division during the second war. According to the commander of the 2 brigade 3 of the American infantry division Perkins (Perkins), despite a preliminary assessment of damage in 80% of the total number of armored vehicles of the Iraqi division, his team did not encounter a single (!) Iraqi vehicle damaged from the air. The Iraqis used effective cunning - they arranged the usual defense, with the usual positioning of armored vehicles and .... placed all real combat vehicles outside these positions in palm groves, in garages, hid them next to mosques and other buildings. American aviation hit the empty place. But such a concentration, led to the rapid defeat of the division by ground troops. The Iraqis were unable to organize a coordinated fire by these dispersed machines on the attacking US units. Iraqi tanks and other armored vehicles traveled to positions for opening fire one at a time and were quickly destroyed with concentrated fire from the Americans. The fact that the Americans came from the north and hit the Iraqis from the rear played a role. Many Iraqi tanks and infantry fighting vehicles were oriented to the south, they left their positions and tried to turn around, which caused delays in the discovery of fire and contributed to their destruction.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/perkins.html


Erroneous masking


Another method of masking from enemy aviation, which also hit the Iraqis themselves during nightly ground battles. To avoid being detected by thermal radiation at night from American aircraft, Iraqi tankers kept the vehicles off. The armored vehicles had the same temperature as the surrounding background of the terrain, and could not be recognized. The exception was the period of transition from day to night, when different rates of cooling of armor and soil allowed the recognition of Iraqi machines.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/script_b.html


When coalition tanks were on the night attack, the need to start cars increased the mismatch of Iraqi actions. The cars were started at different times for several reasons: different speed of decision making by machine commanders, different distances from the crew’s shelter to the car, different technical condition of the cars, in some cases, the shelling of cars by the Americans, which prevented people from getting into the hatches. Such a mismatch played into the hands of the Americans.

The Americans point out that there have been cases when Iraqi tankers tried to direct guns by turning the turrets of tanks manually without the use of electric drives. The true reason for this is not known. Most likely, the reason was precisely the desire to keep their cars cold under the background of the terrain, so as not to be detected in the thermal sights of American tanks.Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.387

It is possible that the Iraqis simply did not have time to use the electric drive of the rotating mechanism of the tower - it was necessary to shoot. In any case, it turned out to be quite ineffective in terms of camouflage. In many cases, the movement of the gun gave the location of the Iraqi tank, and the Americans, taking advantage of the greater speed of turning the tank tower, managed to take the first shot.
Desert storm monograph, 1LT Donald L. Murray, Ms.Horton
http://www.3ad.org/desertstorm/hist_summaries/history_unit_ds_5_5cav.pdf
Captain Steven G. Wyman, Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

But even in those cases when the Iraqis managed to make the first shot undetected, the disguise against thermal imagers disappeared immediately. The temperature of the tank and especially the gun after the first shot was raised, which made the car visible in thermal imagers. It should be borne in mind that in the thermal imaging can be seen not only the heated armor, but also hot exhaust from the engines of armored vehicles. Since it is rarely possible to arrange exhaust exhaust to the side along flexible pipes, the institution of the engine and its operation will almost always reveal the location of the armored vehicles.


In short, the tactic of keeping cars cold under the background of the terrain until the last moment is wrong. Yes, it significantly helps to reduce losses from air raids, but is ineffective against ground attack. Attempts to fight, both from cold machines, and starting machines directly during the enemy’s ground attack will not work.
It seems that the correct algorithm of actions of the defender for the night battle is as follows. It is necessary to calculate how long it takes to bring camouflaged armored vehicles from the “cold” into a fully operational position, how far the attacker can approach during this time, add the effective range of the attacker's guns. When the enemy approaches this distance, it is necessary to give an order for the establishment of machines, although this violates the disguise of thermal imaging devices. That is, by the time the attackers reach the opening range, the process of bringing the defenders into full combat position should be completed.


If the ground opponent continues to draw closer, then, having waited for him to enter the zone of actual fire of the guns of the defender, the armored equipment leaves the shelter for firing positions and opens fire. Under cover, in conditions of a greater range of effective enemy fire and a greater detection range, only a position that hides the vehicle entirely with a turret below ground level can be considered. A tank trench with covering the hull of a tank with ground for the tower is not sufficient, but more on that below.


If the attacking ground enemy stops and directs their aircraft to destroy the defenders' heated and thus manifested armored vehicles, then they will have to launch an attack at the maximum possible speed in order to mix with the attacking units. Unfortunately, there are no other options in the conditions of technological backwardness of the defender. Waiting in a “cold” car while the enemy passes through the positions is too risky. A counterattack must be massed and coordinated with artillery firing at blinding thermal sight sights with lighting projectiles and creating smoke impenetrable for ATGM targeting through a laser beam or through wires. Isolated Iraqi tank counterattacks were easily repulsed by the Americans.


It is also necessary to counterattack if it was not possible to equip shelters. For example, a relatively unexpected maneuver by coalition forces in 1991 (poetically called a boxing left hook) forced the divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard to abandon their previous positions and take on new ones. The change of positions was made about a day or two before the start of the ground battle. In the conditions of the rocky desert, we couldn’t get anything but “thin” parapet from surface sand. And this despite the fact that Iraqi engineering units began to equip new positions about 2 a week before the start of the ground operation of the coalition forces.
Stephen Biddle, Victory Misunderstood: Falling 21, www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html

It is possible that the Iraqis expected that these parapets would at least distribute part of the American fire to empty positions, of which there were many.

73 EASTING BATTLE REPLICATION-A JANUS COMBAT SIMULATION
WM Christenson, Robert A. Zirkle. Institute for defense analisis, September 1993, Alexandria, Virginia


However, the desert relief made the parapet well visible and they were subjected to intense shelling by American tank crews, including in those cases where the Americans did not see armored vehicles behind the parapet.
Stephen Biddle, Victory Misunderstood: Falling 21, www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html

Even if the Americans' statements about the destruction of Iraqi tanks when firing through the parapet are not taken into account (it is argued that on the parapet the recesses in the places of the shells hit were clearly visible), you still have to admit that the paraguay helped the Americans hit the Iraqi tanks.
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.357

Iraqis could not rely on the defense of parapet, and it was necessary to counterattack.

Incorrect reaction


“Aerospace psychology” of defending Iraqis in 1991 fights also led to the fact that at the time of the ground attack, some crews of armored vehicles, considering that another airstrike was beginning, left them to hide in shelters.
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.388


And only after it became clear to them that the ground attack was taking place, the crews began to return to their vehicles. For example, at the site of the attack of the American company G (Ghost troop) at the position of the Iraqi Tavacaln division in 1991, the first Iraqi response shots were approximately 18 (!) Minutes after the start of the clash.
This gave the Americans a significant advantage - they had already shot to kill, and they hadn’t shot back at them yet. Many of the crews were killed in an attempt to get back into the armored vehicles.
Stephen Biddle, Victory Misunderstood: Falling 21, www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html
Tim Ripley, Tank warfare, Compendium, 2003, p.134

Well, probably the most anecdotal incident occurred when the Americans seized the airport in Baghdad. The defense of the airport was designed to counter parachute and helicopter landing with active air support. The Iraqis created a system of underground trenches, where they were ready to wait out the bombing and come to the surface to destroy the landing force. “Airborne Psychology” led to the fact that when American tanks drove into the runway at night, the Iraqis took them for their own. And both parties calmly rested until the morning on the same positions. In the morning there was a battle, but the Iraqis who were not ready for battle against the tanks lost it.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/marcone.html

Preliminary conclusion: measures to shelter from an air attack can complicate the quick and coordinated opening of fire against a ground enemy, up to the state of complete defense ineffectiveness against a massive ground attack. The vulnerable moment is the transition from a sheltered position to firing at the attackers, if this transition is carried out during an enemy attack that has already begun. The risk of mismatched and delayed, and, as a result, ineffective actions is quite large. Defense planning should foresee such undesirable developments and develop countermeasures.

Tactical surveillance 2

The low level of preparedness of shooters and gunners gunners significantly reduces the distance at which effective fire on the enemy, compared with the ranges indicated in official manuals and tables.

This observation is so self-evident that it is often not taken into account. At the same time, the main reason for the loss of ground battles by the Iraqis with a devastating score can be elementary - they simply “smeared”, while their American “colleagues” did not.

During the second Iraq war, 4, April 2003, the Americans landed a Iraqi tank ambush in an area conventionally designated by the Americans as the Montgomery sector (objective Montgomery). Iraqi tanks, which avoided detection from the air, suddenly opened fire on the side view of American armored vehicles from a distance of 800-1000 meters. The result is a complete rout of the Iraqi (!) Unit. Iraqis managed to make 16 shots from their 125 mm guns. Not a single hit. A slip with the “best” result is an undershoot of the target 25 meters.

After the second war, the Americans raised trophy records of the Iraqi firing. In one tank division it turned out that during the year only one shooting was carried out. Tankmen were given a shot at the 4 projectile. In the elite division of the Republican Guard "Baghdad", the same were some shooting, but they gave more fire - for 10 shells. There was a division in which not one shooting was done in a year. The result is obvious.

The Iraqi infantrymen did not “lag behind” the tankers - according to American observations, less than 10% of shots from RPGs hit the target.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003_hr/03-10-21warcollege.pdf

In general, Americans quite often mention a fire that does not fall from an RPG.
http://www.3ad.org/desertstorm/hist_summaries/history_unit_ds_5_5cav.pdf
Captain Steven G. Wyman, Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division

During the first Iraq war there was a case when Iraqi guns didn’t hit the American Bradley BMP from 73 mm guns from a distance of approximately 1 meters, making 400 shots. And the American BMP at this moment did not shoot due to a breakdown in the gun drive system.
Desert storm monograph, 1LT Donald L. Murray, Ms.Horton

Probably the most illustrative example of the defeat due to inability to shoot occurred during a counterattack of two Iraqi brigades (3 and 8 tank) to the upcoming 1 divisions of the US Marine Corps in the morning of 25 February 1991 of the year, on the second day after the start of the land operation in the Al oil field -Burcan (al-Burqan oil field). In service with the Marine Corps were not "Abrams", and the older М60А1 who did not have thermal sights. During the first ninety minutes of the battle, fire and smoke from burning oil wells, morning fog and bad weather brought the Americans no advantage in detecting targets in the far distance. For the same reasons, the American aircraft over the battlefield the first half hour of the battle was not. American artillery also did not fire - wanting to use helicopters, a restricted area was created for flying so that their shells would not damage them. In the chaos of the battle, this zone could not be canceled, although helicopters could not be used, as a result, the American artillery could not fire. The ATGM TOU operators often could not use thermal imaging sights, since the fire from oil wells lit them up, especially if they needed to aim in the direction of a burning oil field. In addition, in the smoke and fog, Iraqi and American parts were mixed, which prevented the American ATGM operators from firing, fearing to hook their own. ATGMs could be effectively used by Americans only for a short distance. Poor visibility led to the fact that the distance to which the opponents began to see each other was 500-800 meters. At such distances, the difference in the technological level М60А1 and Т-55 was largely leveled. The result of the battle - more 100 destroyed Iraqi armored vehicles and not one killed by the Americans. Twice during the battle, Iraqi tanks "stumbled" on the command posts of the Americans. Both times, tank attacks were repulsed by US marines without the help of their tanks.
The effectiveness of the Iraqi fire was extremely low.
Daryl G. Press; Lessons from ground combat in the Gulf: the impact of training and technology.

Due to the neglect of reducing the effective range of shooting with insufficiently trained personnel, in 1991, the Iraqis were not able to realize the advantage of defense on the reverse slope. The Iraqis placed equipment at a distance equal to the firing range of tank guns.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War, p.235
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.421, 422

The calculation was on the defeat of American tanks during the roll over the topographic ridge. The tanks passed through him, and the Iraqis could not get through to them at that distance.

It is difficult to assess how high the level of skill of American gunners in peacetime. But practically throughout the entire period of troop concentration prior to the start of the ground invasion, the American servicemen intensively trained at the shooting ranges. The skill level of gunners and ordinary infantrymen was brought to a very high level by the beginning of hostilities. This greatly increased the likelihood of hitting the target from the first shot and at a longer range, which gave an indisputable advantage to the Americans over the Iraqis during ground battles.

The preliminary conclusion is that if you have to fight poorly trained personnel, then you need to redo all tactics, which are usually written for normally trained soldiers. In such conditions, it is necessary to expect that only fire will be effective almost at an emphasis, at least at first. And the distance between the positions, the firing range and the necessary densities of tanks, guns and manpower, and the possibility of using certain tactics, etc. It is better to still prepare the soldiers normally.

Tactical surveillance 3

The army, which has technological superiority, strives to destroy the enemy without entering the zone of actual fire of his weapon, to fight at the maximum ranges, to turn a clash into shooting an enemy from a safe distance. And it can be done in a leisurely manner.

An example is the 2 battalion of the 327 US infantry regiment (2nd battalion of the 327th Infantry Regiment) led the battle for the city of An-Najaf in the 2003 year. The Iraqis took up positions in apartment buildings on the outskirts of the city and opened fire from window openings at the advancing American infantry and tanks. And the fire was carried out mainly with the undershoot. The Americans stopped the offensive and within a few hours (from about three o'clock in the afternoon until nine in the evening) shot down the firing points of Iraqis from the ATGM TOW from more than 1600 meters. Americans fired more 45 ATGM shots. One Iraqi artillery gun was destroyed by an ATGM. The other two are after shelling by Kiowa helicopters, American artillery and airplanes. Bombs also destroyed the mortar battery. After the Iraqis fired, the American infantry advanced. One firing point of the Iraqis came to life. Two 500-pound bombs were dropped on the building where it was located. After that, the Americans stopped the offensive completely until the next morning, because “they met with more resistance than expected” and fired Iraqi positions with mortars and other artillery guns for some time and bombed them with aircraft. The next morning, putting a smoke screen in front of Iraqi positions, 5 supporting battalion tanks were sent on the way to the city. They, low-vulnerable to Iraqi fire, were supposed to cause fire on themselves, and at that time the rest of the battalion would have shot alive Iraqi firing points from a safe distance. However, the Iraqis surrendered.
Christopher P.Hughes, Colonel, War on two fronts: Pentagon, Philadelphia, Casemate, 2007, p.63-73, 89-91

The concept of attack was not to suppress the enemy’s fire, to get closer to his positions and destroy the enemy in melee due to quantitative and fire superiority in the place where the main efforts were concentrated. The basic idea is to cause the Iraqis to fire on the bait unit in order to destroy the firing points that appear from a safe distance. It is characteristic that for the second day of the battle the plan was the same. The tactical mistake of the Iraqis was that the defeat of the enemy was planned on the basis of the “anti-personnel” habits left over from the Iran-Iraq war - to open fire from the maximum range of the actual fire of their weapons immediately after the first enemy units entered the zone. This “habit” is due to the fact that in the conditions of a “normal” infantry battle, the infantry attacking the run can quite quickly overcome the distance to the trenches of the defenders, so the latter need to knock out the maximum number of attackers before they approach the immediate trenches. However, in the conditions of war with the Americans, this requirement should have been relegated to the background. The main thing - to ensure the survivability of the position of the fire of Americans, conducted from afar. The defense should come to life only when the enemy approached in close proximity to the defended positions. After repelling the attack, it was necessary to go to the shelters and not to respond to provoking fire. It is obvious that the lessons of the first war, the Iraqis did not take into account, apparently, writing off the defeat solely on the rule of the Americans in the air.

Another example, 6, April 2003, during the battle for the Debecka Pass in northern Iraq, the American unit on the Hammer 4 stopped the “classic” Iraqi company’s mechanized attack on MTLB, supported by 4 tanks T-55, after storming PTM “Otr” to attack the crew. A total of 19 missiles were launched) Iraqi armored vehicles for cover behind the embankment. The Iraqis were forced to go on a long-range firefighting from a shelter, where they were methodically destroyed during 4,5 hours caused by the support of American aircraft.
Sean D.Naylor, Battle of Debecka Pass, www.paratrooper.net/commo/Topic12307-24-1.aspx

During the first Iraq war, Americans won ground battles, although not always, but often, due to stand-off tactics.

The 7 tank units of the American Corps, which fought with parts of the Iraqi Republican Guard, attacked as follows.
American companies (20-30 armored vehicles) advanced partially in line, partially backward (hybrid-line-abreast-combat-vee-formation), the depth of company formations was approximately 1500 meters.
Stephen Biddle, Victory Misunderstood: What does the war tell us about
International Security, Vol.21, No.2 (Fall 1996), www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html

Another option - all the cars lined up.
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=15295&archive=true
From the S&S archives: The Battle of the 73 Easting,
By Vince Crawley, Middle East Bureau
From the Stars and Stripes 1991 Desert Storm commemorative edition

The fire from the tanks was conducted on the move, and the speed of approach during the attack was 10-15 km / hour, that is, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles literally crawled. On the one hand, this made it difficult to return fire, since the target was still moving, on the other hand, it did not sway the car much and did not interfere with the operation of the weapon stabilization system and aiming at Iraqi tanks.
http://metallicpea.wordpress.com/2007/10/05/not-that-kind-of-republican/38/

In the area of ​​the 2 th battalion offensive, the 34 th tank regiment of the 1 US infantry division, fire was fired from a stop. American tanks stopped at 1,5 - 2 000 meters from a group of Iraqi vehicles and shot them until all were destroyed. Then the battalion moved about another 2000 meters and the procedure was repeated. Moreover, in order to prevent fire, the platoon commander gave permission for the destruction of each target. The attack was carried out "crawling."
Tim Ripley, Tank warfare, Compendium, 2003, p.134

Similarly, that is, shooting the enemy from a stop, the 14 / 20 squadron of the royal hussars of the 4 British Tank Brigade operated.
Tim Ripley, Tank warfare, Compendium, 2003, p.131

However, there is one mention that the 1 squadron division of Americans attacked Iraqi positions at a speed of 32-40 km / h.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/script_b.html

BMP moved behind the tanks, at a distance of about 1000 meters. They fired at the area around the tanks and fired at the tanks themselves, preventing the Iraqi anti-tank groups from approaching the tanks at close range and firing RPGs at the tanks, as well as preventing attempts to climb the tanks and disable them with improvised means.
CORRECTING MYTHS ABOUT THE GULF WAR: THE LAST STANDARDS OF THE TAWAKALNA STEPHEN A. Bourque The Middle East Jounal, Volume 51, Number 4, Autumn 1997

Considering the sandstorm and the night, the Americans recognized Iraqi armored vehicles at different ranges. But the “classic” description of the fighting for Kuwait was the discovery by Americans of Iraqi tanks in thermal imaging sights for 5-6 kilometers, and when approaching the distance 2,5 km, American tanks began to shoot Iraqi. At the same time, the Iraqis, because of the worst observation devices, did not see American tanks and fired, if they fired, only on the outbreaks of shots. Moreover, the shells of Iraqi tanks did not reach the American tanks.
http://www.3ad.org/ds_3bde/67ar_2/Duke6paper.pdf
The “iron duke" world tour monograph
LTC Daniel A. Merritt, US Army War College, 31 May 1994
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.397, 421

In fairness it should be noted that the detection at such ranges was not always. Americans mention 2000 meters, 600 meters, 2300 meters, 3700 meters, 1000 meters, and 3000 meters. But they always emphasize that they were the first to see the enemy.

Thus, the Americans provided themselves with the possibility of shooting the enemy at a distance, while the enemy did not see the targets and could not reach them with fire from his weapon.

Similarly, in 1991, the situation was with the French: their AMX-30 tanks effectively hit the T-55 at a distance of 2000 meters, and the T-55 could hit them only from 1200 meters.
http://www.history.army.mil/documents/swa/dsit/DSIT072.htm
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
Oral History Interview, CPT Michael Johnson
S-2, 4th Regiment of Dragoons
6th (French) Light Armored Division

During the second Iraq war, there was a case when one company (10 tanks Abrams and 4 BMP Bradley) beat off the counterattack of the Iraqi brigade 10, attempting to regain control of the Euphrates bridge (objective area "Peach"). The fight went from 3 hours of the night to 6 in the morning. American tanks fired on the fact that the thermal sights were visible as small luminous points. These were counterattacking tanks and Iraqi infantry fighting vehicles that could not conduct effective fire on American tanks. The battle was won due to a greater target detection range at night and a greater effective range from the Americans.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/marcone.html

The preliminary conclusion is that in a battle it may turn out that you have to use less advanced equipment than the opponent. Measures to parry the technical advantages of the enemy with tactical methods should be specially planned when conducting both defense and offensive. The quantitative superiority of less advanced equipment over the more advanced equipment participating in the battle on the side of the enemy cannot by itself ensure success if it is not combined with tactics that compensate for the technical gap.

Tactical surveillance 4

Armored vehicles can cope with the stripping of trenches without the help of dismounted infantrymen, at least if the defending infantry is not ready to withstand the appropriate tactics of mechanized units.

In 1991, the Americans used the trenching method for destroying positions of Iraqi infantry in the areas of defensive breaches along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders. Bulldozer equipment was mounted on the tank, and he simply drove along the trench line and bombarded them, along with Iraqi soldiers.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/www/www8.htm
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.276

The Americans used tanks in pairs, each of which was driving on one of the sides of the trench. Acting together, a pair of tanks piled the trench simultaneously on both sides. Moreover, the trench was swept along from the BMP, which rode as if riding the trench.
http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/article.asp?ID=3016

Another option: Tanks also went in pairs, from the outside of each of them was the BMP "Bradley", which suppressed the trenches with fire, and also behind the tanks there were two more BMP, which shot everything that was left undone. Tanks marched at a speed of 12 km / h.
Combined Arms and Tactics division,
US Army infantry school, Fort Benning, Georgia
Infantry officer advanced course December 1991
Operation of the Iraqi main defenses operation, 5th infantry regiment (16st infantry division) 1-24 February 28 Operation Desert Storm.

Of course, such a tank, falling asleep trench, very vulnerable. But the whole area around it was shelled by very dense fire from other armored vehicles. I repeat, this was done in the breakout areas, where sufficient concentrations of supporting armored vehicles were created, so that Iraqis could not interfere with the bulldozer work.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War, p.229
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert

The Iraqi grenade launchers or the ATGM operators simply did not have the opportunity to pop out of the trenches to fire shots at the tank with dozer equipment.

During the assault on a small settlement during the 1991 war, the Americans used a group of seven armored vehicles as an assault group: two armored bulldozers (combat earthmovers), one engineering vehicle with a 165 mm short-barreled gun, and the Bredley 4 BMP. The destruction of the defended buildings and the trenches of the Iraqis was pinned on the shells of the engineering vehicle and on the bulldozers that had demolished the walls and filled the trenches. Attached 4 BMP carried out support by fire close, and the remaining tanks and BMP units - at a distance.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War, p.257
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert

Actually, there is nothing new in the idea of ​​a tank collapsing. It was used during the Second World War. The Iraqi infantry was not ready to oppose such tactics, although it could well have expected it from the advancing mechanized parts of the coalition. The countermeasures could be improvised portable land mines laid at the bottom of the trench, or better, into the whiskers that leave it, through which the tanks are forced to move. These land mines are undermined by the passage of a tank with dozer equipment close to them. Mines laid in the parapet are ineffective, they are also removed by a bulldozer. However, nothing was done by the Iraqis.
The breakthrough of their defensive lines occurred so quickly and efficiently that the view was spread that there simply were no breakthroughs.

Preliminary conclusion:
The statutes and manuals should indicate the measures to be taken in preparing the defense, so that the infantry can counteract the tactical reception of the flooding of the trenches with tanks. The same can be said about the removal of minefields by mine sweeps mounted on tanks.

Tactical surveillance 5

Both companies in Iraq were using American thermal imagers. We note a number of tactical moments that emerged when using these devices in combat conditions.

1. On the illumination of thermal sights
During the night battle, thermal sights undergo flare due to the light from burning armored vehicles and outbreaks of explosions, which leads to the blinding of tanks.
CORRECTING MYTHS ABOUT THE GULF WAR: THE LAST STANDARDS OF THE TAWAKALNA STEPHEN A. Bourque The Middle East Jounal, Volume 51, Number 4, Autumn 1997

It is possible that the shelling of enemy armored vehicles during the night battle with lightning projectiles can blind the vehicles.
According to the Americans, the shelling of Iraqi tanks 25mm with the shells of the guns of the American BMP "blinded" the night vision devices of Iraqi tanks.
Top of the spear

2. About shooting at their own night fight
Enemy equipment is detected in thermal imaging sights largely due to flash shots. Hence the likelihood of opening fire on their own.
In combat along the vertical 73 grid (73 Easting), Iraqi anti-tank groups sought to hit the advancing American tanks and BMPs in the rear projection, so a number of American tanks and BMPs deployed their towers back and began firing at them. The American tanks following them took these flashes of shots for the Iraqi fire and started firing at their own armored vehicles.

An enemy projectile or RPG on the armor of an American tank ahead of it hit the thermal imaging sights as a flash of a shot from this tank aimed at the advancing Americans. That is, the tank was classified as Iraqi. It also served as a reason to open fire on its own.
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.391, 396

According to American 1 reports, the American infantry division thus destroyed their tanks and 5 BMP "Bradley" 4.
CORRECTING MYTHS ABOUT THE GULF WAR: THE LAST STANDARDS OF THE TAWAKALNA STEPHEN A. Bourque The Middle East Jounal, Volume 51, Number 4, Autumn 1997

Trying to distinguish their tanks from strangers, the Americans opened fire on them from 25 mm BMP guns. If the crew on the radio reported that she was fired, the tank was determined as his own. If no one answered - the tank was classified as enemy and fire would fire on it.
To identify their tanks, the Americans also used this method: they gave a signal to stop the vehicles, and those vehicles that continued to go were viewed as enemy.
http://yarchive.net/mil/gulf_war_tf.html

Similar problems exist for infantrymen. For example, any flicker, such as from turning the flashlight on, can be interpreted as a flash of a shot directed at the viewer at a night vision device. This may cause a desire to shoot "in response."
Aircraft pilots may perceive as fragments that did not have time to cool down the fragments of previously dropped bombs.
Evan Wright, Generation Kill, Berlely Caliber, New York, 2004, p.163, 180

3. On detection
“Cold” Iraqi tanks were in some cases detected by Americans on strange white dots hanging in the air. These were the faces of the commanders of Iraqi tanks, crawling out of the hatches to better look around. Therefore, observers who give commands to leave the shelter must be located outside the tanks in order not to give out the position of the machines prematurely.

There were cases when Iraqi ambushes in groves in the course of the second war were detected by the Americans on the thermal trail given on the displays of devices by human bodies. Therefore, the Iraqis in ambush began to cover themselves with blankets so as not to be detected. Evan Wright, Generation Kill, Berlely Caliber, New York, 2004, p.239, 291


4. On infantry attacks under cover of darkness
The Iraqi infantry, attempting to counterattack in night battles, despite being promoted by short dashes, was destroyed from infantry fighting vehicles, whose crews perfectly saw the infantrymen running into thermal imaging sights.
CORRECTING MYTHS ABOUT THE GULF WAR: THE LAST STANDARDS OF THE TAWAKALNA STEPHEN A. Bourque The Middle East Jounal, Volume 51, Number 4, Autumn 1997

One of the unsuccessful attacks of the Iraqi infantry took place 25 March 2003, just north of the city of Nasiriyah. During an attempted night attack on a group of stopped American armored vehicles, about 400-500 Iraqis were killed without firing a single shot. The 25mm Bushmaster cannon mounted on armored vehicles has a double-action night sight - as determining the temperature difference as well as enhancing the existing light. The gun can conduct effective fire at night at a distance of 1000 meters. Iraqi grenade throwers simply could not approach the American vehicles at a distance of an RPG shot. Many died due to the fact that they did not see that other infantrymen were cutting off with fire from American armored vehicles, and continued to come closer under the deadly fire.
Evan Wright, Generation Kill, Berlely Caliber, New York, 2004, p.119

In general, references to the constant but unsuccessful attempts of attacks by Iraqi grenade launchers during night battles are quite common in American sources.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War, p.284
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert


Preliminary conclusion: the presence of thermal imaging devices does not make the night fight a day. There are a number of features associated with the action of appropriate devices that must be considered.
So, according to the caustic remark of one American author, the use of night vision goggles attached to a helmet is equivalent to playing football, looking at the field through two rolls of toilet paper.
Daniel P.Bolger, Death ground: Today's American Infantry, Ballantine books, New York, 1999, p.77


The instruments give a flat image and lead to tunnel vision, when everything located on the periphery is cut off, giving a false sense of security.
Conducting a night battle with the extensive use of instruments for observation in the dark requires training. The side that can provide the best training for the night battle, even if the technical parameters of the instruments used by the warring parties are equal, will receive significant advantages in the night battle. It may be appropriate to conduct exercises in which one of the parties has a clear advantage in the quantity and quality of instruments for observation in the dark over the other side.

Other observations

A. About parapet for tank trenches.
One thing is connected with the parapet of the Tavakalna division in 1991. The bulk of the positions of armored vehicles was deployed to the direction of the expected attack at an angle from 20 to 60 degrees.
73 EASTING BATTLE REPLICATION-A JANUS COMBAT SIMULATION, p.13
WM Christenson, Robert A. Zirkle
Institute for defense analisis, September 1993, Alexandria, Virginia

Often it was only possible to shoot from positions in the direction in which the position was oriented. It was impossible to turn the gun to the other sides because of the height of the parapet.
In American sources there are various explanations for why the Iraqis made parapet. There is a point of view that this was done in order to reduce the likelihood of detection and destruction from the air. At the very least, to ensure that only one car can be hit in one go.
- http://es.rice.edu/projects/Poli378/Gulf/gwtxt_ch8.html
- http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0423.pdf
Achieving Victory by Avoiding Defeat By ROBERTH. SCALES, JR.

Another point of view is that the main goal is to build a defensive fire system on an oblique fire. This was supposed to allow direct targeting without fear of defeat in the side view of the tank.
73 EASTING BATTLE REPLICATION-A JANUS COMBAT SIMULATION, p.13
WM Christenson, Robert A. Zirkle
Institute for defense analisis, September 1993, Alexandria, Virginia

Anyway, the high breastwork often worked for the Americans. Since ground attacks were not always from the expected direction, such a high parapet prevented the gun from being deployed in the direction of the attacking American tanks. This forced Iraqis to leave because of the parapet, which caused the loss of precious seconds at the moment when the enemy attacks.
Along with the slow turn of the turret, the departure from the parapet, which prevented the gun from being sent to an American tank or BMP, is often mentioned by Americans as the reason why they had time to hit the Iraqi tank before it fired the first shot.
see also http://www.history.army.mil/documents/swa/dsit/DSIT072.htm
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
Oral History Interview, CPT Michael Johnson
S-2, 4th Regiment of Dragoons
6th (French) Light Armored Division

B. Illumination of the battlefield at night
In the course of a night battle, for using anti-tank guided missiles that do not have night sights, one can and should use the lighting of the area with lighting projectiles or think about the lighting of the area by other means, including improvised. After the battles, the Americans found large stocks of Malyutka ATGM in Iraqi positions that were not used by Iraqis in night battles.
By John Fialca, Wall Street Journal, Pentagon Press Pool, March 1, 1991
http://www.3ad.com/history/gulf.war.htm

In general, the lack of funds to illuminate the terrain led to the fact that the Iraqi infantry often could not conduct aimed fire from an RPG, even when enemy armored vehicles were located at 100-200 meters.
Desert storm monograph, 1LT Donald L. Murray, Ms.Horton


AT. On requirements for infantry trenches
During the shelling of Iraqi trenches with artillery, the Americans sought air gaps over the trenches, the infantry was amazed at the splinters from above. The Iraqi trenches, which had no overlap, did not save from such a fire.
http://www.hoskinson.net/gulfwar/dstorm.html

To survive under bombardment, Iraqi infantrymen left the main trenches to their side branches (tranchée à alvéoles / bay trench). Thus, at the time of the bombing attack, the main trenches were empty. The blow accounted for an empty space.
Le journal de guerre d'un soldat irakien
Midi Libre, le jeudi 2 avril 1991
http://guerredugolfe.free.fr/journal.htm

In general, this tactic is not new. During the fighting on the Ebro River during the civil war in Spain in 1938, the Republicans left the main positions during the bombing and occupied them only before the approach of the ground forces of the Franco in close proximity to them.
Ilya Ehrenburg, Spanish reports 1931-1939, Moscow, Press Agency Press News, 1986, p.311, 313.


G. Some tricks of disguise
For misleading the American pilots, Iraqis burned tires near tanks that were not wounded, which created the impression that the vehicles had already been destroyed.
For the same purpose, entire combat vehicles were placed next to the wounded.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert

With this type of disguise - under the destroyed equipment - only during the first raid, the Americans were sure that any machine could be bombed. On subsequent raids, American pilots saw only wrecked cars, not knowing which of them were really hit and which ones were not.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0423.pdf
Achieving Victory by Avoiding Defeat By ROBERT H. SCALES, J R.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert

In American sources, there are allegations that tire ignition was used by Iraqis to remove bombs induced by a laser beam or by thermal drawing of a target to the side.
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.357

Separate rifle cells were also disguised as already destroyed. For these purposes, stones were scattered around the position. At the same time, it was given such a general view, as if a shell had already hit the point, and the stones from the parapet were scattered by the explosion.
http://www.history.army.mil/documents/swa/dsit/DSIT072.htm
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
Oral History Interview, CPT Michael Johnson
S-2, 4th Regiment of Dragoons
6th (French) Light Armored Division

D. About artillery
Iraqi artillery opened fire, mainly on pre-shot zones. These zones were marked by the installation of 55-gallon (200-liter) drums on the ground. Under them, little bonfires were made at night so that the barrels could be seen in night-vision equipment. In theory, when American armored vehicles passed by these barrels, it was possible to open high-aimed fire. However, the Americans began to go around the places indicated by these barrels. And instead of being useful, they did harm to the Iraqis, because they pushed the American units into sections of terrain that were not shot in advance.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War, p.257
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert

Aimed counter-battery fire from the MLRS opened by the Americans on Iraqi artillery a few minutes after the Iraqis opened fire. Iraqi artillery failed to provide substantial support to its units.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert


Е. About the unusual non-explosive boom
Curiously enough, but built long before the war to fight smugglers and the unguarded and not protected 3 bulk sandstone shaft on the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Iraqi’s first line of defense was approximately a kilometer away from the border)
http://es.rice.edu/projects/Poli378/Gulf/gwtxt_ch8.html
served as a serious hindrance to the logistics of the Americans even after the advance units had gone far ahead. They significantly limited the throughput of the desert and delayed the supply of fuel and ammunition. Val retained his tactical and not even operational value and continued to detain the Americans, after the American engineers were given complete freedom of action to make passes in it. Perhaps, in the presence of a large number of civilian bulldozers and the absence of a large number of mines, such shafts may be included in the defense system.

G. How to make life difficult for yourself
Bomb craters of American B-52 bombers became a significant obstacle for American tanks. There have been cases when equipment fell into them.
http://yarchive.net/mil/gulf_war_tf.html

H. During the second Iraqi company, during a sandstorm, Iraqis managed to destroy two Abrams tanks from anti-aircraft guns mounted on pickups. The car drove into the rear and the tank was shot in the rear projection.
Christopher P.Hughes, Colonel, War on two fronts: Pentagon, Philadelphia, Casemate, 2007, p.53

Conclusion

1. Military Institute stories The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in 2008 published the 764's page work “Military Art in Local Wars and Armed Conflicts”. Concerning the wars in Iraq, the following conclusion was made. “Characteristic of the war in the Persian Gulf zone was the fact that ... in this war, the main place belonged to strategic and operational assets, represented by ... aircraft, as well as rocket means. Tactical formations and their actions (infantry, tank, and artillery formations and units) did not determine the “face” of the operation .., its course and outcome. ”
A.V. Usikov, G.A. Burutin, V.A. Gavrilov, S.L. Tyshlykov, under the general editorship of Colonel-General A.S. Rukshin, Moscow, Military Publishing, 2008, p. 308

This conclusion is controversial. Presumably, it is based on impressions from information received through the media. The defeat of the Iraqis was also directly related to the loss of ground battles at the tactical level.
The final conclusion about the reasons for the virtually bloodless victories of the forces of the anti-Iraq coalition can only be made after a detailed analysis and perhaps the replay of land battles in the exercises in which the coalition forces did not play any significant role. We are talking about a counterattack of Iraqi tanks on 25 units of the US 1991 February February near Al-Burkan oil field, fights along the vertical line of the 73 (73 Easting) grid with the division of the Republican Guard Tawakalna and the Medina sublimity Ridge) in 1991, the Medina division combat with the 2 brigade of the US Infantry Division 3 in the 2003 year. While there is no detailed information, these conclusions cannot be considered reliable.

2. Probably one of the main problems facing Russian military science is how to wage war in the conditions of the technological superiority of the enemy and his supremacy in the air. The most important conclusion from the Iraqi experience is that it can only be dispersed to a certain limit, beyond which the effectiveness of actions against a land-based enemy drops sharply. Apparently, the antidote should be sought in camouflage on the principle of "oversaturation of the area with false targets" and "under the destroyed object." Wide spreading is possible only in the rear.

The remaining advantages of a technologically advanced enemy - a large firing range, quickness of opening response (especially counter battery) fire and better visibility at night can be parried with tactical techniques, provided that the troops are trained by them.


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  1. Same lech
    Same lech 25 January 2014 08: 27 New
    15
    Properly painted.
    Conclusion - the Iraqis were not ready for the new generation wars.
    Ignorance of the enemy’s features and their weapons is a loss in battle.
    1. chunga-changa
      chunga-changa 25 January 2014 13: 05 New
      17
      Perhaps the reason for the defeat is not in the new generation war. Perhaps the reason is simply the low combat readiness of the Iraqi army. The commanders had no experience of such a war, which is not surprising. And ordinary people did not know how to act as expected, which is surprising. There was a long war between Iraq and Iran, and the training of personnel, in theory, should have been effectively worked out for a long time. Conclusion, the preparation of the rank and file should be intense and effective, this is the basis of victory in a war with any opponent. Even a brilliant plan to defeat the enemy can not be implemented if the gunners stupidly smear. Against this background, it would be interesting to know how many firing and shells per year our tankers pass.
      1. The comment was deleted.
      2. avg
        avg 25 January 2014 16: 00 New
        +1
        Quote: chunga-changa
        Conclusion - the Iraqis were not ready for the new generation wars.

        Of course you are right. But by and large, how could they prepare? They simply had nowhere to take such weapons as the coalition had. Of course, this does not relieve the leadership of the responsibility for the complete unpreparedness of all specialists, but take-off classes were not conducted not from a good life. Saddam climbed into Kuwait because the money ran out, and then sanctions were added. And the Americans were slowly preparing, like hunters for a boar corral.
        And here is what I want to add.
        As in any war, new tactical methods appear, mainly due to the emergence of new types of weapons and equipment. But, the American principle - to equalize everything with the earth due to technological and numerical superiority, and then pass the winner on scorched earth, remains the same.
        1. kplayer
          kplayer 25 January 2014 23: 15 New
          +1
          Лажа! Американцев, как и вермахт конечно можно упрекать за грамотность ведения БД при достатке средств и ресурсов, мы же всегда воюем благородно и по "чесТноку" и даём "фору" противнику, сначала пробуем на зуб пехотой (нам не жалко!), экономя снаряды, высокоточные бомбы и керосин, а то вдруг в решающий момент они пригодятся! - видимо так, или все-таки без придури?

          The 2003 campaign was poorly studied - this is to the question of numerical superiority, technological superiority without question. Scorched earth, apparently an Arabian desert?
          1. The comment was deleted.
          2. kplayer
            kplayer 26 January 2014 21: 02 New
            0
            Т.е. что, написано мной неверно (раз кое-кто натыкал мне "минусов"), что военные во всём мире при достатке огневых средств поражения и ресурсов пытаются беречь своих людей до последней возможности? Видать изложил недоступно к пониманию средних умов.
        2. The comment was deleted.
        3. commbatant
          commbatant 2 February 2014 00: 08 New
          0
          Quote: avg
          As in any war, new tactical methods appear, mainly due to the emergence of new types of weapons and equipment. But, the American principle - to equalize everything with the earth due to technological and numerical superiority, and then pass the winner on scorched earth, remains the same.


          What are the new tactics? some of the things described in the article are known from V.O.V., the officer corps of Iraq having 10 years of experience in the war with Iran and the student we trained could not help knowing them ...
          Of course, the selected British and American units are not Iran, but Iraq had enough time to train troops from the moment it occupied its former 19th province
      3. vladkavkaz
        vladkavkaz 25 January 2014 19: 15 New
        -1
        chunga-changa
        вСЕ РАСПИСАНО,ВСЕ ПРОПИСАНО-КАК РАЗ С ТОЧКИ ЗРЕНИЯ АМЕРИКАНЦЕВ И ИХ"НЕПОБЕДИМОЙ"АРМИИ,ТОГДА КАК ОБЪЯСНИТЬ,ТУ ЖЕ эЛЬ-фАЛЛУДЖУ?
        And it would not be worth fooling so many words when it is known that the bribery of a considerable number of generals of the Iraqi army led to the fact that, by pack, the army fled.
        1. alicante11
          alicante11 26 January 2014 03: 01 New
          0
          А это можно объяснить как раз "ассимметричным ответом".
        2. commbatant
          commbatant 1 February 2014 23: 37 New
          0
          истинная правда все это хорошо расписано в "ЗВО" за 91-й год
          in addition, everything that is written in the article can be used as a training manual for contract soldiers, and not for conscripts, they will not have time to learn ...
          the material itself is interesting, probably even for officers, however, in order to learn all this, like a bible, you need to love your profession
      4. Ivan Petrovich
        Ivan Petrovich 25 January 2014 23: 45 New
        +4
        а это показали в передаче "Танковый биатлон" , один танк (и там был не худший экипаж ВС РФ)выцеливал около 3-х! минут по неподвижной мишени
      5. Alekseev
        Alekseev 26 January 2014 12: 16 New
        +6
        Quote: chunga-changa
        Perhaps the reason for the defeat is not in a new generation war. Perhaps the reason is simply the low combat readiness of the Iraqi army.


        In my opinion, this is exactly what. In the total technical, technological, managerial and psychological superiority of the forces of the Coalition. And also in the terrain, excluding the deployment of a large-scale guerrilla warfare. (unlike, for example, from Vietnam)
        Translations of articles about the experience of various battles, of course, need to be studied, but the main reason for the defeat of the Iraqi armed forces is not here.
        I explain the example of the war with Georgia in 2008.
        This war was so fleeting, mainly because the Georgian troops fled. But they did not scatter at all because of the lack of weapons and military equipment or poor training, but simply because any Georgian officer and soldier were well aware of the fact that against the Russian army, with its powerful weapons, in the first place, of course, operational-strategic - aviation, missile systems, they have no chance.
        Despite the fact that our troops, both numerically and in terms of preparedness, level of command and quality, say, armored personnel carriers and artillery weapons, did not at all exceed the Georgians by an order of magnitude.
      6. zvereok
        zvereok 26 January 2014 18: 13 New
        0
        Quote: chunga-changa
        Even a brilliant plan to defeat the enemy can not be implemented if the gunners stupidly smear. Against this background, it would be interesting to know how many firing and shells per year our tankers pass.


        As if a tank biathlon showed that the level is on the 3 box.
      7. Cormorants
        Cormorants 27 January 2014 11: 38 New
        0
        On average, 6–12 full-time projectiles per year and 10–15 projectiles per year were allocated for training a gunner in the Soviet army during tactical exercises with live shooting. I don’t know now.
        1. Alekseev
          Alekseev 27 January 2014 16: 34 New
          0
          Quote: Cormorants
          On average, 6–12 full-time projectiles per year and 10–15 projectiles per year were allocated for training a gunner in the Soviet army during tactical exercises with live shooting.

          The number of staff shells is important, but that’s not all. This is just the tip of the iceberg. A high level of fire training of tankers is achieved at the TST, or as they are now called fire training, it depends on the ability to prepare tank weapons for firing.
          And regular shooting ..., this is polishing, a necessary truth, the ability to shoot from a tank.
      8. TAHKIST
        TAHKIST 27 January 2014 18: 42 New
        0
        служил в далеком 99 в части "повышенной боевой готовности" стреляли раз в квартал 3 ыесовых имитатора давалось, и пулемета (день, ночь) стреляли раза 2-3 в неделю, насколько знаю сейчас полк расформировали (((( в гарнизоне вроде бы танковая бригада
    2. valerei
      valerei 25 January 2014 18: 25 New
      0
      The same LEKHA, where competently? Full of spelling mistakes.
    3. Starina_hank
      Starina_hank 25 January 2014 20: 30 New
      0
      I wonder what the advisers taught them and where did they look?
      1. commbatant
        commbatant 2 February 2014 00: 15 New
        0
        Quote: Starina_Hank
        I wonder what the advisers taught them and where did they look?


        taught by the standards of the Soviet army
    4. Su24
      Su24 26 January 2014 20: 33 New
      0
      Yes, normal air defense is needed, and normal training of personnel. The author, it seems to me, has taken on the insoluble task - to develop tactics in which the parties could fight on equal terms, while one of the parties is inferior to the other in all respects.
      1. commbatant
        commbatant 2 February 2014 00: 21 New
        0
        Quote: Su24
        set about the insoluble task - to develop tactics in which the parties could fight on equal terms, while one of the parties is inferior to the other side in all respects.


        why insoluble? For some reason, during the initial period of the Second World War, Chuikov could organize and use tactical ambush groups from separate units of his mechanized corps and use tank / artillery ambushes, it all depends on senior comrades who are entrusted with units and military units
  2. Pinochet000
    Pinochet000 25 January 2014 08: 29 New
    +2
    Читал эту статью в "Солдате удачи", полезная информация...
    1. 123dv
      123dv 25 January 2014 13: 15 New
      0
      Better than nothing.
      It makes you think a lot.
      1. M. Peter
        M. Peter 26 January 2014 10: 00 New
        +1
        Quote: 123dv
        It makes you think a lot.

        Our tank biathlon, shown to us, made us think.

        This observation is so self-evident that it is often not taken into account. At the same time, the main reason for the loss of ground battles by the Iraqis with a devastating score can be elementary - they simply “smeared”, while their American “colleagues” did not.


        Вы видели сколько было попадний и сколько наши "лучшие из лучших" наматывали штрафных кругов.
  3. Strashila
    Strashila 25 January 2014 08: 39 New
    +7
    As the conflicts of recent decades have shown ... the most effective weapon used by the Americans ... the Golden Donkey ... treason and betrayal at all levels in the army. We must pay tribute to the basic postulate of the war ... without reconnaissance and communications on the battlefield of which, as without means to counter them.
    1. clidon
      clidon 25 January 2014 13: 52 New
      +2
      Чтобы такой "ослик" прошёл в крепость, нужно сделать приличную дырку. Статья о том как эта дырка делалась.
  4. borisjdin1957
    borisjdin1957 25 January 2014 09: 56 New
    +9
    from the Don.
    ; Learn, study, and again, study!: - This is more relevant than ever! The more exercises will be conducted, the more firing, flights, and going out to sea, the more a warrior will be ready for military operations. And such an analysis of his and others is needed actions of the armies! The analysis of the author is very out of place!
  5. likurg1
    likurg1 25 January 2014 10: 30 New
    +3
    +++ great article
  6. NKVD
    NKVD 25 January 2014 10: 33 New
    +1
    In general, Iraqis showed cowardice and betrayed their homeland, and they still pay for it.
    1. ICT
      ICT 25 January 2014 11: 28 New
      +1
      Quote: NKVD
      showed cowardice and betrayed their homeland

      I agree for two wars, in my memory, there were only people in the city of Basra who tried to fight


      (I didn’t read the article (only the first paragraph). A big request to dilute large articles with photographs to make it easier to read)
  7. Rider
    Rider 25 January 2014 10: 43 New
    +7
    Well.
    On the example of Iraq, we can safely say that the postulate -
    People who do not want to feed their army will feed someone else's
    - faithful as ever.
  8. Blackmokona
    Blackmokona 25 January 2014 10: 51 New
    0
    Well written, but I would like to discuss an important point. The measures that were used to reduce the effectiveness of coalition aviation, and gave the main advantage in ground battles.
  9. Turkestan
    Turkestan 25 January 2014 11: 25 New
    +8
    And there is an opinion of the leading military analysts of the world that the main reason for the defeat of the Iraqi Army in the second war with the coalition is not the poor preparedness of the Iraqi army for the war, but MASS betrayal of the command staff of the four Iraqi army corps who abandoned their troops.
    1. Blackmokona
      Blackmokona 25 January 2014 11: 52 New
      +4
      Taki throw their troops without gold in your pocket.
      For example, in the Finnish War of 40, the commander of the Wingrad division with his friends distinguished himself so much.
      http://www.istor-44gsd.ru/Html/person_1.html#vinogr
      Under these difficult conditions, the command of the 44th division was unable to organize counteraction to the Finnish attack and, abandoning equipment and heavy weapons, began to withdraw on the night of January 6, which then, including due to the lack of control by the division commander, headquarters and political department, grew into an erratic retreat and led to significant losses.

      Division commander A. Vinogradov, chief of staff Colonel O. I. Volkov and chief of the political department regimental commissar I. T. Pakhomenko on January 11, 1940, were convicted by a military tribunal of the 9th army and shot before the division’s formation.

      А ведь та война шла при полном превосходстве сил СССР, и проиграть её было нереально, однако попав в хреновую ситуацию, немало "героических в мирное время" вояк, устремляются в бегство.
      1. alone
        alone 25 January 2014 12: 44 New
        +6
        You know, without justifying the command of the Iraqi military units, which abandoned their troops or switched to the enemy’s side, I’ll say that this is no less than the merit of Saddam himself. Fighting, as we know, can not always bring only good luck, there are failures. During Iran of the Iraq war, several Iraqi generals were unjustifiably shot on the orders of Saddam. I will cite 2 facts
        1) General Shavkat Ata. Commanded the troops in the Fao Peninsula. Due to environmental threats he was forced to leave the Fao Peninsula. He was called to Baghdad and executed.
        2) General Adin Tavfid. I received an order to take the city of Mehran, which the Iranians turned into an UR. Having extremely limited forces, could not fulfill the task, was summoned to Baghdad and also executed.

        The Iraqi generals remembered this. Fighting against an opponent who had a huge preponderance for everyone meant losing, and this automatically meant that the generals would be executed. Because of this, many fled, leaving their troops to their fate. How did these people know the true situation of their troops and understood that they were resisting uselessly.
      2. smile
        smile 25 January 2014 19: 14 New
        +1
        Blackmokona
        Yes, I agree, they throw their troops even without gold in their pockets - during the Second World War, the Poles and the French were out of any competition in this regard. Naturally, the Germans did this least of all.
        1. commbatant
          commbatant 2 February 2014 00: 38 New
          0
          Quote: smile
          least of all did we and the Germans.


          do not console yourself with illusions, why then in the first 6 months of the war the USSR lost the entire personnel army, which the people were humped into in the pre-war period, and now
          the flyer who has now received an apartment for free will be surrendered to the empirialists (and will find an excuse), and they will pull me out of my communal apartment and make me fight for it, the difference is that the people were hunchbacked before the war, but not for me ... I feel sorry for me, because I'm not a career soldier ...
    2. Pilat2009
      Pilat2009 25 January 2014 20: 24 New
      +3
      Like this:
      Quote: Turkestan
      this is not a bad preparedness of the Iraqi army for war, but MASS betrayal of the command staff of the four corps of the Iraqi army who abandoned their troops.

      refers to This:
      "В ходе попытки ночной атаки на группу остановившихся американских бронемашин примерно 400-500 иракцев было убито, не сделав ни одного выстрела. 25мм орудие Бушмастер, установленное на бронемашинах, имеет ночной прицел двойного действия - как определяющий разницу температур так и усиливающий имеющийся свет. Орудие может вести эффективный огонь ночью на дистанции 1000 метров. Иракские гранатометчики просто не могли подойти к американским машинам на дистанцию выстрела из РПГ. Многие погибли из-за того, что они не видели, что других пехотинцев срезает огнем из американских бронемашин, и продолжали подходить ближе под убийственный огонь"
      Definitely a technological advantage. The same with tanks.
  10. rumpeljschtizhen
    rumpeljschtizhen 25 January 2014 12: 50 New
    12
    so it seems to happen that with our army there will be a technical backward weak training of personnel.
    although on the forums of heroes it’s full to knock on the clave
  11. alicante11
    alicante11 25 January 2014 14: 36 New
    +1
    Tactical aspects are, of course, interesting. But I want to note two aspects.
    1. The article only proves the decisive role of air superiority. Iraqi forces, in orders that provide protection from aviation, were destroyed by the ground forces of the coalition. The main reason is that you have to disperse troops against aircraft, which is very ineffective in ground combat. It does not massage the fire. And it allows the enemy to beat the compounds as if in parts. And here no tactical tricks will help.

    2. Extremely low training of the Iraqi army. The experience of officers and generals that they gained during the Iran-Iraq war could not correct the lack of experience of the lower ranks. Indicative in d.s. question about the teachings.

    By the way, given the situation with financing, spare parts and, apparently, ammunition after the first campaign, it would be better for the Iraqis to have not a large and low-efficient draft army, but a compact professional army for counterattacking the enemy with mobile units, placing the defense of settlements in the militia.
    1. EvilLion
      EvilLion 25 January 2014 16: 53 New
      +6
      Откуда вы такие беретесь, маленькая армия небоеспособна по определению независимо от способа комплектования. Нужна не маленькая "профессиональная" армия, а большая первоклассно обученная призывная.
      1. alone
        alone 25 January 2014 16: 56 New
        +2
        Quote: EvilLion
        Нужна не маленькая "профессиональная" армия, а большая первоклассно обученная призывная.


        Iraq so had a millionth army. And what did it decide? The army ran away to where. A large first-class is not for everyone
        1. EvilLion
          EvilLion 26 January 2014 00: 32 New
          +3
          Господи, откуда же вы такие беретесь? Ирак с населением в 20кк человек имел армию в 400к. Америкосы собрали группировку в 500к человек. Можно задать простой вопрос, если бы Ирак имел армию в 100к человек в которой на стрельбах выдавалось бы не 3 снаряда в год, а 12, то что, он смог бы отбиться? Так что засуньте идею "маленькой профессиональной" армии в задний проход, когда против этой "маленькой и профессиональной" приходит большая и профессиональная или хотя бы достаточно подготовленная и способная решить проблемы нехватки скилла перевесом в материальном оснащении, то "маленькая и профессиональная" прекращает свое существование дня за 3, максимум за неделю. Вообще непризывная армия в принципе неспособна вести сколь-нибудь интенсивные боевые действия с заметными потерями, сейчас не те времена, когда всегда можно было найти молодых парней, которым просто некуда податься, а шансы подохнуть на гражданке были немногим меньше, чем в бою.
          1. alicante11
            alicante11 26 January 2014 02: 48 New
            +2
            You can ask a simple question, if Iraq had an army in 100, in which 3 shells would not be issued per year, but 12 at the firing, could it fight back?


            Вряд-ли. Даже с использованием ополчения и без бегства/предательства генералов. Но вот потери амерам нанесли бы явно более высокие. У Саддама и не стояло задачи именно "отбиться". Это было просто не реально, как в первой, так и во второй кампании. Господство авиации НАТО, "закладки" в системах ПВО, равнинный рельеф местности, эти факторы вместе исключали военный успех иракцев. Расчет иракского командования был на затягивание военных действий и нанесение противнику неприемлемых людских и экономических потерь. Конечно, для России эта надежда весьма призрачна. Поскольку если будут драться с нами, то трупов считать не будут с обеих сторон. Да и в глобальной войне о деньгах тоже особо не думают. А вот в локальном конфликте лишние потери и экономическая нагрузка вполне могли толкнуть амеров на компромисс.
            In general, sometimes you should think with your head. And do not say where and what to stick to, so that your wishes do not put you in the same place where you are offering.
      2. alicante11
        alicante11 26 January 2014 02: 38 New
        0
        Я говорю, если что, не о РА, а об иракской, которая оказалась в очень сложном и специфическом положении. Поскольку противник имел перед ней как технологическое, так и численное превосходство, плюс слабая обученность иракских ВС. Каковы будут ваши предложения? Довести армию до 1млн чел а "калашами"? Ну так я об этом и написал, когда говорил об ополчении. А смысл во всех этих горах железа, в которое превратилась морально и физически устаревшая иракская военная техника? Стоило отобрать наиболее современные и исправные боевые единицы и на их базе сформировать боеспособные соединения. Что вышло бы гораздо дешевле, и, в то же время, эффективнее. Кстати, если режет слух именно "профессиональная" армия. То ни кто не предлагает обязательно отказаться от призыва. Просто проводить призыв на конкурсной основе, как китайцы.
        1. commbatant
          commbatant 2 February 2014 01: 16 New
          0
          Quote: alicante11
          I say, if anything, not about Armenia, but about Iraq, which turned out to be in a very difficult and specific situation.


          and I’m talking about ours, the Imperial, Soviet, Russian Army was never ready FOR ANY WAR in the entire history of our state, it lost all the battles of the initial stage of the war and then later rocked after it was again formed from the militia ...
          and not one drop ... the military never said where the money allocated to it in peacetime (to the detriment of the civilian population) went to and why during the war we always had more casualties in people than the enemy did, depending on the nature of the war ...
      3. kplayer
        kplayer 26 January 2014 13: 30 New
        +1
        Первоклассно обученная призывная - это как? это не маленький Израиль. Форсированно за ГОД службы что-ли? такое быстрое натаскивание и освоение сложного оружия и ВТ не возможно (не по всем ВУС - точно!), что может освоить 18-летний солдат живущий в хаосе казармы с двухярусными кроватями и думающего "поскорей бы вернуться домой"? и это сколько надо вбухивать только по статье военного бюджета "боевая подготовка и МТО войск"? что останется на закупки и оснащение современными образцами оружия и ВТ? а какая будет аварийность и смертность? не одна субмарина затонет, и ОБУЧИВ БОЙЦА ОТПУСТИТЬ ДОМОЙ ПОСЛЕ ГОДА СЛУЖБЫ, такая армия будет дороже профессиональной с минимальным сроком службы 3 года, если учитывать, что в профессиональной армии США все-таки большинство служит по убеждениям и получка солдата чисто символическая и она в 1,5-2 раза меньше чем средняя в гражданском секторе, но срок(3 года) контракта чаще продляется.
        It is only in Russia that Putin (why did he get it !?) paid the military and the cop better than civilians, for example, working in the same factories, erasing the difference between service and work, like making money, now the proud name of a Russian soldier will be replaced by a deer .
      4. The comment was deleted.
      5. commbatant
        commbatant 2 February 2014 00: 58 New
        0
        Quote: EvilLion
        Нужна не маленькая "профессиональная" армия, а большая первоклассно обученная призывная.


        apparently they wanted to say the army according to the mixed principle of manning (60-70% of contract soldiers and 40-30% of conscripts), where it will come from, if those who trained officers for a multi-million-strong mobilization army (military education and training system are taught at military universities) the same where the initiative of the middle and lower level commander is not supposed), etc.
    2. Pilat2009
      Pilat2009 25 January 2014 22: 08 New
      0
      Quote: alicante11
      and a compact professional army for delivering counterattacks against the enemy with mobile units,

      All this is tracked from air and from space in real time and is bombed, especially in the desert. It is necessary to pay attention to the thermal masking of fighters - applying special creams to open areas of the body
      1. alicante11
        alicante11 26 January 2014 02: 50 New
        +1
        Well, in this matter I am not strong. Therefore, the main recipe is the application of short counterattacks using the minimum amount of time to advance. Which, of course, greatly discounts operations from a strategic point of view. However, judging even by the articles that have been posted here, NATO’s ability to control information over the territory is somewhat exaggerated.
    3. commbatant
      commbatant 2 February 2014 00: 44 New
      0
      Quote: alicante11
      The main reason is that you have to disperse troops against aircraft, which is very ineffective in ground combat. It does not massage the fire. And it allows the enemy to beat the compounds as if in parts. And here no tactical tricks will help.


      The experience of the Second World War shows that even in such conditions it is possible to harm the enemy, while maintaining B and BT ...
  12. SPACE
    SPACE 25 January 2014 15: 08 New
    +2
    Quote: Author
    During the first war in Iraq (1991) and the pre-partisan stage of the second war (2003), air supremacy decided a lot, but not all.

    That's exactly what it all decided! Having electronic warfare equipment, space and aviation reconnaissance, knowing in advance practically everything about the location of military facilities, bases, airfields, the deployment of units and their movement, having unlimited means and resources, having advantages in time and military initiative, you can slowly plan everything and strike . First, they launched air defense missiles, opening the way for aviation, then, together with aviation, destroyed almost all military infrastructure, strategic facilities, command, warehouses, fuel, etc. What could those who remained without control, without supplies, limited in movement, without the support of aviation and reconnaissance, open like Iraqi troops on the table? What resistance?laughing Author, are you serious? Believe that the brave American ground forces, showing miracles of courage in orderly rows of Abrams and Stryker, blindly and almost single-handedly "melee" stormed the hidden entrenched Iraqi positions and thereby decided the outcome of the war? laughing
    And even if the best and most trained wars were sitting in Iraqi trenches and tanks, I’m more than sure that the result would be the same! Chopped walnut with a steam hammer!
    Errors in the defense of Iraq were made by the supreme military command itself long before the start of the operation, which predetermined the defeat and disruption of air defense, one of the main reasons, although without them they would have been rolled out in any case, but at a very expensive price. Of course, it is necessary to study the experience of others, but conclusions should be made all the same correct. There is no need to build a strategy on the wars of the Second World War, now the 21 century.
    1. avg
      avg 25 January 2014 16: 10 New
      0
      I also got the impression that the author only confirms with his article what he wanted to refute. laughing
    2. clidon
      clidon 25 January 2014 16: 51 New
      13
      Забавно, что в начале 90-х, когда войны ещё не было, тон публикаций был абсолютно другим. С одной стороны хлипкие "кокакольные" американцы, которые ни разу не воевали в пустыне, на неприспособленной для этого технике, которую наспех перегнали из Европы. У них там даже, смешно сказать, национальные гвардейцы (воскресные солдаты) и танки со 105 мм пушками. С другой стороны железная гвардия Саддама, закалённая многолетней войной с Ираном, только что одним мизинцем выбившая из Кувейта тамошних неженок. Которая воюет в знакомых местах, оснащена преимущественно суровой техникой одной суровой страны.
      "Красная звезда" пестрела заметками-мемуарами советских инструкторов, которые рассказывали о чудесных подземных аэродромах, где дежурят суровые современные машины F-1, Миг-29, Су-24, Су-25, Миг-25, Ми-23. О "невидимках" F-117, которые легко будут видны на экранах летающих радаров иракских ДРЛОиУ Ил-76. О ПВО, которую создавали советские специалисты, о хитростях и смекалке солдатов Саддама. И и т д и т п.
      "Известия" размещали "инсайдерскую" информацию о тайной закупке Пентагоном 100 000 пластиковых гробов для своих солдат - тут же был комментарий полковников ГШ, которые оценивали возможные потери союзников в 40-50 тысяч человек и говорили о том, что для более менее успешного наступления потребуется трёхкратное "классическое" преимущество, которого нет.
      And then the fighting began and there was silence, interrupted by reports. And just a ringing confusion ...
      Do you remember that? Now it’s easy to say that there was a nut, and there was a hammer ... when everyone knows everything.
      1. Pashhenko Nikolay
        Pashhenko Nikolay 25 January 2014 21: 17 New
        +2
        Yes, yes. Sam was struck by Sadam's helplessness.
      2. alicante11
        alicante11 26 January 2014 02: 59 New
        +1
        Были такие моменты. Разве что по поводу ПВО и ВВС такого оптимизма не было. А ДРЛО на базе Ил-76 у Саддама был только один, если правильно помню. И, кстати, не смотря на весь "оптимизм" ни кто не сомневался в окончательно победе "коалиции". Пусть и с нанесением больших потерь. Кстати, не факт, что если бы американцы не остановились на освобождении Кувейта и продолжили бы наступление вглубь Ирака, что они не понесли бы те потери, о которых говорилось. Ведь тогда иракская армия была еще в более боеспособном и технически исправном состоянии.
        1. clidon
          clidon 26 January 2014 11: 55 New
          0
          Regarding the Air Force, there have been repeated statements about the great combat experience of the Iraqi Air Force (including against US-made aircraft, like the F-14), about the presence of a large number of modern aircraft. But there was no doubt that the coalition was stronger in aviation.
          ДРЛО у Саддама было 4 штуки (все на базе Ил-76) - с лицензионной французской РЛС "Thompson-CSF" -3 под названием Aldan1 (кормовая установка РЛС) и один Adnan-2 с круговой вращающейся антенной.
          А насчёт "что было бы, если продолжили движение", хорошо показали события 2003 года.
          1. alicante11
            alicante11 26 January 2014 16: 59 New
            0
            ДРЛО у Саддама было 4 штуки (все на базе Ил-76) - с лицензионной французской РЛС "Thompson-CSF" -3 под названием Aldan1 (кормовая установка РЛС) и один Adnan-2 с круговой вращающейся антенной.


            Interestingly, they were used against the coalition? Or were they also drowned with bookmarks? I only know that in 2003 one flew to Iran.

            А насчёт "что было бы, если продолжили движение", хорошо показали события 2003 года.


            Is not a fact. Then the preparation and technique of the Iraqis was the best.
            1. clidon
              clidon 26 January 2014 17: 14 New
              0
              alicante11
              Two ended up with the Iranians, two were destroyed at the airfields. The radars were made by the Iraqis themselves under license, so I don’t think that the main reason for their non-use was bookmarks, rather the general passivity of the Air Force, which Saddam was more interested in than using.

              Is not a fact. Then the preparation and technique of the Iraqis was the best.

              Не думаю. Иракцы что то приобрели (теперь они лучше знали противника, имели больше возможностей к подготовке и т Д), что то потеряли (в первую очередь время и боевой дух). Но не думаю, что ситуация в корне переменилась за десяток лет. Тогда "на плечах" запросто вьехали бы ещё дальше и проще. Причины "останова", как мне думается были больше политическими - ведь никто не давал полномочий свергать Саддама. Речь то шла об освобождении Кувейта. В целом они тогда правильно поступили.
      3. SPACE
        SPACE 26 January 2014 14: 30 New
        0
        Quote: clidon
        Now it’s easy to say that there was a nut, and there was a hammer ... when everyone knows everything.

        What are you talking about and what is your meaning, easy? The author also summarizes past experience, the true state of things we learn only after the events themselves. So it is not necessary to assert, for others, that which you do not know.
        1. clidon
          clidon 26 January 2014 17: 16 New
          0
          So it is not necessary to assert, for others, that which you do not know.

          Вы всерьёз думаете, что могут вскрыться факты доказывающие - "На самом деле это была победа Саддама, а в пустыне лежат закопанные десятки тысяч американских солдат и сотни сбитых самолётов"?
          This is not like a branch of Ren-TV ...
  13. EvilLion
    EvilLion 25 January 2014 15: 34 New
    +3
    how to wage war in the face of technological superiority of the enemy and his air supremacy


    На самом деле никак, 100 лет назад было "у нас есть пулемет, у вас его нет", сейчас "у нас есть самолет, у вас его нет". Обеспечить же численный перевес порядка 5-10 на одного удается крайне редко. Хотя были случаи, в 1929-ом на КВЖД советские войска успешно разгромили китацев при соотношении сил порядка 7:1.

    But the conclusion is that there is no sense in considering the war in the Gulf at least as a significant indicator, the Iraqi army was only combat-capable on a local scale and the war with Iran ended in a stalemate after 8 years.
    1. likurg1
      likurg1 25 January 2014 16: 51 New
      +1
      then get ready for an asymmetric war !! and you need to try to level the superiority of the enemy !!
      1. Rider
        Rider 25 January 2014 17: 30 New
        +3
        Quote: likurg1
        then get ready for an asymmetric war !! and you need to try to level the superiority of the enemy !!

        that is why many states are eager to acquire a nuclear club.
        it’s easier than maintaining and upgrading multimillion-dollar armies.

        Do you want our oil (land of water, etc.)?
        Be prepared for nuclear mushrooms to bloom in your cities.
      2. 222222
        222222 25 January 2014 21: 03 New
        +1
        Как там в фильме про войну: "Главное – выбивайте танки!"..
  14. likurg1
    likurg1 25 January 2014 16: 44 New
    +3
    Iraqis marched well in parades, but fought poorly !! for example, hezbollah is preparing for an asymmetric war with Israel, air superiority does not mean that resistance is useless !!
    1. alone
      alone 25 January 2014 16: 49 New
      +3
      Well, you compared. Hezbollah is a paramilitary organization of a terrorist type. They operate by ambush and shelling methods. At the same time, they do not disdain terrorism.
      1. Power
        Power 25 January 2014 22: 11 New
        +1
        If you fight against Israel are you a terrorist? And if against America-a double terrorist?
        1. alone
          alone 2 February 2014 00: 55 New
          0
          Quote: Strength
          If you fight against Israel are you a terrorist? And if against America-a double terrorist?


          Если ты воюешь против Израилья чисто военными методами,т.е.против военных,значит ты не террорист.А вот если прикрываясь борьбой против Израилья атакуеш ПТУРСАМИ школьный автобус,взрываеш городской транспорт,обстреливаеш ракетами град спальные районы городов,то это и есть самый натуральный терроризм.И самое главное то,что делая это прикрываются исламом.ислам по поводу войны имеет достаточно ясную суру в Коране,который переводится так:"Воюйте!Воюйте с теми кто с Вами воюет.но при этом не переходите грани дозволенного"!

          You say that Israel also bombed the cities of Palestine, etc. During the war, the Germans also bombed cities and massively burned and destroyed civilians. If, according to your logic, the Soviet army also had to shoot, burn and destroy all Germans indiscriminately. But this was not done.
  15. likurg1
    likurg1 25 January 2014 16: 48 New
    +1
    the DPRK has no tamahawks, but there are 200 kamikaze pilots on the ancient MIGs, from the same opera can a suicide bomber be considered a high-precision weapon for the poor ?? !!!
  16. Massik
    Massik 25 January 2014 16: 56 New
    +2
    in Petersburg
    -Author like Russian .... Tom Clancy - of course credibility ...
  17. gallville
    gallville 25 January 2014 17: 39 New
    +4
    Much is described in the article on the account of thermal imagers and the identification of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in defense - the main way to solve this situation was the installation of an auxiliary power plant.
    What about the training of generals and personnel.
    If the Iraqis dug in the cities all the American advantage would have come to naught - they would have received a dozen Stalingrad and formidable. Since in cities the range of use of weapons is limited by the difference in small arms training, the target detection, the striking effect of weapons is not so noticeable, especially considering the number of Iraqi l / s.
    The extremely weak use of minefields also played into the hands of the Americans.
    Already silent about the conduct of reconnaissance and target designation of the Iraqi army.
    1. Pilat2009
      Pilat2009 25 January 2014 22: 15 New
      +1
      Quote: gallville
      If the Iraqis dug in the cities all the American advantage would have come to naught - they would have received a dozen Stalingrad and formidable

      Americans are not fools like our generals.
      Quote: gallville
      installation of auxiliary power unit.

      Extra bomb is not a pity. If they even see their faces ....
      1. gallville
        gallville 26 January 2014 11: 49 New
        0
        Quote: Pilat2009
        Americans are not fools like our generals.

        And how will they enter the city?) Undermines? and dig a lot in the sand? =)
        Quote: Pilat2009
        installation of auxiliary power unit.
        Extra bomb is not a pity. If they even see their faces ....

        Is that carpeted. In the presence of a power plant, the suo of the tank and the tower units work from it, while the tank does not change the thermal signature. With suo running, why stick your head out?
    2. Pimply
      Pimply 26 January 2014 02: 08 New
      +1
      Quote: gallville
      If the Iraqis dug in the cities all the American advantage would have come to naught - they would have received a dozen Stalingrad and formidable.

      No, stripping would just go a little slower. Cities would be taken in rings, cut off from supplies, and slowly squeezed. The difference in approach, technique and level of training at times
      1. gallville
        gallville 26 January 2014 11: 53 New
        0
        Quote: Pimply
        No, stripping would just go a little slower. Cities would be taken in rings, cut off from supplies, and slowly squeezed. The difference in approach, technique and level of training at times

        Of course, there were enough uranium shells for Fallujah, but what if there were 10-15 times more? And would the military stand, not the partisans?
    3. Blackmokona
      Blackmokona 26 January 2014 08: 13 New
      0
      Iraqis visited to dig in Fallujah. Ambush tactics were used, and fortifications in the houses. As soon as the Americans understood the chip, they immediately began to equal the city. Therefore, no Stalingrad will go against the Americans, they will surround the city, and will equal it with sea level.
      1. gallville
        gallville 26 January 2014 11: 54 New
        +1
        Quote: BlackMokona
        Therefore, no Stalingrad will go against the Americans, they will surround the city, and will equal it with sea level.

        Iraq 40 million country. Can you imagine leveling the ground with at least two or three cities with a population of 500 thousand or more?
        1. Blackmokona
          Blackmokona 27 January 2014 07: 40 New
          0
          Read about Dresden.
          5-10 mass air raids and there would be nothing valuable from these 2-3 cities.
          A couple of weeks of aviation work.
    4. svp67
      svp67 26 January 2014 11: 57 New
      0
      Quote: gallville
      Much is described in the article on the account of thermal imagers and the identification of tanks and infantry fighting vehicles in defense - the main way to solve this situation was the installation of an auxiliary power plant.
      APUs are put mainly to preserve the motor resources of the main engine, and the fight against thermal visibility is mainly carried out by engineering methods ...
    5. Fofan
      Fofan 26 January 2014 12: 22 New
      +1
      Quote: gallville

      If the Iraqis dug in the cities all the American advantage would have come to naught - they would have received a dozen Stalingrad and formidable. Since in cities the range of use of weapons is limited by the difference in small arms training, the target detection, the striking effect of weapons is not so noticeable, especially considering the number of Iraqi l / s.

      so it was.
      the marines began to storm the first fallofujah, the Iraqis reminded them that the Americans did not know how to storm the city.
      private traders (such as blackwater) and locals (expected heavy losses?) were already sent to the second assault on Fallujah, providing them with good air support, even by American standards. the city was razed in about two weeks. strange why the steep marines did not participate wink. but the forbidden white phosphorus took part.
  18. rate
    rate 25 January 2014 18: 39 New
    +1
    Текст автора напоминает разбор 1941 г. у Ю. Мухина "Война и мы"
    http://sovnarkom.ru/BOOKS/MUHIN/VOINA_2/muhin2.htm
    Approximately in the same colors, the German and Soviet approaches to the war of that time are analyzed.
    As for this text - the impression is as if they were hunting for helpless Iraqis.
  19. xomaNN
    xomaNN 25 January 2014 18: 51 New
    0
    The Iraqis did not live up to the hopes that it was in their skins that one could study the experience of using Soviet / Russian tanks in battles with more modern state tanks. And on the performance characteristics and battle tactics. Maybe even the grains of those battles the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation studied and found countermeasures. I really want to believe in it am
  20. Power
    Power 25 January 2014 21: 16 New
    0
    An article on C grade is a little misinformation, a little truth, and a lot, a lot of imagination. The main human factor, but it just did not exist.
  21. Pilat2009
    Pilat2009 25 January 2014 22: 17 New
    -1
    Or maybe they just got tired of fighting for alien interests? Who wants to die? They live happily no worse
    1. alicante11
      alicante11 26 January 2014 05: 06 New
      0
      Hmm, that’s cool saying ... Murders, abductions, explosions, now almost a civil war. It’s good to live ...
  22. kplayer
    kplayer 25 January 2014 23: 27 New
    0
    В НАТО всё давно затачивается на видение дистанционной все-суточной войны, что особенно ясно начинает просматриваться в 80-е годы, с появлением концепции "воздушно-наземная операция (сражение)" и "борьба со вторыми эшелонами (резервами) противника", исходя из этих концепций формировались положения, требования и тактические приемы к полевому (боевому) уставу и наставлениям армии США.
  23. Fofan
    Fofan 26 January 2014 12: 08 New
    +2
    a long time ago there was no such a cool article.
    In one tank division, it turned out that only one firing was carried out during the year. Tankers were given 4 shells to fire. In the elite division of the Republican Guard Baghdad, there were the same firing, but they gave more shots - 10 shells each. There was a division in which not a single firing was carried out during the year. The result is obvious.
    especially pleased. Straight Russian army sample 90s, early 2000s.
    1. kplayer
      kplayer 26 January 2014 13: 46 New
      +2
      Was it only the beginning of the 2000s? so in the yard of 2014! What, saw a couple of exercises on TV and got touched?
    2. The comment was deleted.
  24. Wurger
    Wurger 26 January 2014 12: 18 New
    +4
    Quote: M.Pyotr
    Quote: 123dv
    It makes you think a lot.

    Our tank biathlon, shown to us, made us think.

    This observation is so self-evident that it is often not taken into account. At the same time, the main reason for the loss of ground battles by the Iraqis with a devastating score can be elementary - they simply “smeared”, while their American “colleagues” did not.


    Вы видели сколько было попадний и сколько наши "лучшие из лучших" наматывали штрафных кругов.


    A plus. The speaker choked with delight, lovers here too. Those who are interested in tanks were not swept by the cold sweat from the fact that tanks with laser rangefinders at a distance of 1700 meters could not get into a stationary target the size of a tank. And these are the best crews. A drill then what? And they call the NATO competitors. Bring shame on the fill.
    1. askold
      askold 26 January 2014 13: 27 New
      +1
      And we will change the rules to level them all, for example, to aim through the barrel. request He was also discouraged and depressed by the results of the shooting, but the idea itself was still pleasant.
  25. APASUS
    APASUS 26 January 2014 17: 57 New
    0
    It seemed to me that the author was adding points to the Americans. Everything was described a little one-sided. Well, all this ultramodern car took Basra for so long. The fighting lasted almost 2 months, but how bad it turned out ................ .?
    The main merit of the Americans was not the destruction by invisible planes controlled by the Iraqi army missiles that, before the military operations, they were able to bribe part of the general corps. The army was left without control and was demoralized from the inside. And where the Iraqis were able to establish control, the Americans did not get weak, despite all the apparent ease of defeating Iraq!
    1. The comment was deleted.
    2. kplayer
      kplayer 26 January 2014 18: 17 New
      -1
      You, as a participant in the database in Iraq (2003) - Basra was taken by the British. The author refers to documented sources that he apparently could find without speculation and fantasy.
      1. APASUS
        APASUS 26 January 2014 18: 26 New
        -1
        Quote: kplayer
        You, as a participant in the database in Iraq (2003) - Basra was taken by the British. The author refers to documented sources that he apparently could find without speculation and fantasy.

        Oh yes, I forgot, because the British fought with sticks ....... well then it is clear why they could not take the city for 2 months.
        1. kplayer
          kplayer 26 January 2014 18: 53 New
          0
          Да, вы эксперт по ведению БД в крупных н/п ("населенных" -понимать буквально), вам то АК-74 в руки, всех "шапками закидаете". Торопится только Красная конница.
          1. APASUS
            APASUS 26 January 2014 19: 41 New
            0
            Quote: kplayer
            Да, вы эксперт по ведению БД в крупных н/п ("населенных" -понимать буквально), вам то АК-74 в руки, всех "шапками закидаете". Торопится только Красная конница.

            And what made you so angry?
            Is it the fact that I called the British the Americans or the fact that they piled on them at the most I can not?
            1. The comment was deleted.
            2. kplayer
              kplayer 26 January 2014 20: 46 New
              0
              Никакого гнева! сайт не носит название "Военные слухи и сплетни".
              Was it piled up during a military operation, or during a period of many years of occupation? The article is devoted to the first aspect, as an expert on anti-sabotage / anti-terrorism operations, can this time share your knowledge !? Stupidly gloat over those or others I can myself.
            3. Pilat2009
              Pilat2009 26 January 2014 23: 13 New
              0
              Quote: APASUS
              Is it the fact that I called the British the Americans or the fact that they piled on them at the most I can not?

              The fact that 2 months is a short period, if the soldier is protected
              It was necessary for our New Year
        2. The comment was deleted.
  26. karavay1982
    karavay1982 26 January 2014 18: 24 New
    +4
    And again began throwing bananas ...
    Для меня статья стала определенным "открытием".
    Как уж повелось армии у диктаторов умеют только красиво маршировать. И зная, что американцы в своих военных операциях "любят" массированно применять авиацию и после уничтожения ВВС, ПВО и сухопутных войск противника - вторгаться.
    And then it turns out that the Iraqis were able to outwit to a certain extent the coalition air force.
    Но вылезли другие аспекты поражения иракцев и объяснение- почему "русское оружие" не стреляло.
    And here it is NECESSARY to draw conclusions of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defense of Russia and develop measures to counter the offensive operation in the same scenario.
    Of course, the conflict between NATO and Russia or Russia and China (in any combination) will proceed with the use of nuclear weapons. It is anyway.
    А вот как как обоснование продажи российского вооружения странам где нет "демократии" само то.
    I mean - having described the whole strategy and tactics of the NATO members - to offer a package of military equipment and how to apply it (for example: the banana republic had a desire not to build democracy. So, based on the territory and budget, to offer the supply of one or another weapon).
    Вот если сейчас брать Сирию- что ей надо - от внешнего противника - ПВО, А ВНУТРИ- это системы связи, перехвата и подавления средств связи террористов, РПГ можно и ПТУРсы, огнеметы "Буратино", боевые машины поддержки танков типо "Теминатор", беспилотники, и подготовка спецподразделений по ведению боев в городских условиях.
    Of course, it can be suggested that the NATO people will be philanthropic and will not press the red button or that the Russian Defense Ministry will stop the 100 millionth army of China at the expense of ... I really do not know what can stop the Chinese army from being non-nuclear.
    То тоже можно по планировать".
    И тут вылезают тысячи вопросов по нашу российскую армию. И танковый биатлон это показал и про выцеливание и заклинивание башни, и про матчасть. С учётом того, что "готовились".
    But we have a big question, in the strategy itself. We don’t have an understanding at the state level that it is possible to buy a mountain of weapons like Saudi Arabia, and it will just stand for beauty, but in fact the Saudis are financing those who will fight for them.
    Yes, for the first time they began to purchase new equipment. Good deal.
    But the question is who will fight and what kind of knowledge he has.
    Modern Russia went through 2 Chechen battles, which combined urban fights and fights in the highlands. Conclusions were drawn and measures taken ?!
    As the company of 2008 showed, no. Just as there was no connection in the army and no, just as there was no coordination between the various branches of the army, it was absent. This I say, what they wrote in open sources.
    Why is the conversation about special purpose in the Russian army, but nothing is being done.
    Or for example, why T-90 is not being purchased, well, at least 200 pieces so that the plant can invest in a new project.
    So the question arises - what will the Russian army learn as usual during the war or study in other people's wars.
  27. go
    go 26 January 2014 20: 03 New
    +3
    Хорошая статья, хороший анализ источников, написанных теми, кто принимал участие, а не теми, кто смотрел СМИ, причём отечественные, с комментариями "профессиональных" журналюг. На эту тему бы док фильм снять учебный, чтобы у многих соображалка включилась, хотя бы по поводу современных тепловизров, которых в России до сих пор не разрабатывают.

    Regarding the domestic analysis of this experience:

    "К сожалению в России до сих пор анализа боевых действий самой армии Ирака проведено не было и все списывается либо на "коварных американцев", либо "ленивых арабов". Для любой армии, традиционно считалось долгом собирать информацию о уровне военного дело других армий. Таким образом автор статьи делает свой, пусть небольшой вклад, в укрепление российского военного искусства."

    - абсолютно согласен, от этих паркетных стратегов, которые пытаются по советски какие то труды и уставы писать и потом ещё сравнивать это с ВОВ, со времён которой много что изменилось, только вред (им бы только написать что-нибудь, пропихнуть, получить за это причитающееся и спокойно поехать на дачу). Афган и Казказ не раз это доказывали, когда учились на горьком опыте, который уходит, когда "уходят" людей, обладающих этим опытом. Профессионального анализа, документирования, выводов и адаптации подготовки к новым вызовам не хватает. американцы кстати охотно анализируют не только ВОВ, но и Афган и Чечню...потому что там профессионально работают в аналитических центрах.
  28. CHILD
    CHILD 28 January 2014 15: 30 New
    +1
    excellent article, the site hasn’t been pleased for a long time ..... thanks to the author, there is something to think about ...
  29. CHILD
    CHILD 29 January 2014 16: 47 New
    0
    господа))))у меня вопрос?а современные прицельные комплексы через дымовую завесу видят?(то есть является ли она и ночью завесой)...и почему нельзя было подогретыми бочками их танки на минные поля загнать?можно ли имитировать лазерную подсветку цели при вызове авиации?("дружественный огонь")
  30. coserg 2012
    coserg 2012 29 January 2014 19: 31 New
    0
    Thank you, it’s very interesting. I would also like to know from real officers what is the difference between an ordinary contractor and a super-conscript under the USSR, in terms of battalion and not at the expense of living conditions?
  31. commbatant
    commbatant 2 February 2014 13: 00 New
    0
    CONTEXT FROM ARTICLE:
    В "Военном вестнике" в конце 80-ых годов-начале 90-ых выходили хорошие статьи на тему тактики в современных условиях. Выходили статьи на данную тему и в журнале "Зарубежное Военное обозрение", но это были именно переводные статьи иностранных авторов. Ныне по обьективным и субьективным причинам былого числа материалов в журналах нет, потому и статьи подобные статье Маркина полезны для офицеров российской армии, дабы те понимали какие опасности существуют при обороне от танков противника.

    Выписываю журнал "ЗВО" с 16 лет (ранее брал с 11 лет у соседа, бывшего военного), видел, как он менялся по своей информированности
    in the late 80s tactical puzzles disappeared, in the late 90s crosswords.
    в старых журналах 80-х - середины 90-х можно было прочитатъ такие интересные статъи: "Ведение боевых действий в джунглях", "Ведение боевых действий в городе", "Контрзасадные и контрпартизанские действия", "Боръба с туманами на аэродромах", "Маскировка пеной", "Бронетанковая дивизия Великобритании в основных видах боя", давалисъ статъи с физико-географическом описании какой-нибудъ страны (и не токо НАТО), и т.д. сейчас журнал стал похож на газету "МК"

    it turns out we have and the military education also fell below the plinth? such magazines developed thinking not only among SA officers, but also among soldiers ...
  32. Arbatov
    Arbatov 14 February 2014 17: 29 New
    0
    I read how I got drunk tea. Thank! Competently, sensibly, reasonably, in short, professionally.
  33. Faceless
    Faceless 27 June 2018 12: 09 New
    0
    The author is well done. There is nothing to add.