Tactical lessons of the last two wars of Iraq for an all-arms commander
This article provides a fairly detailed analysis of the actions of the ground forces during the war in Iraq in 2003. There is a good book by Andrei Mikhailov "Iraqi trap" - "Yauza" / "Eksmo", 2004, where the author makes similar conclusions. At the same time, the argument that Arab soldiers are supposedly useless is often used in Russia to explain the rapid defeat of the Iraqi army, given that these same Arabs with superior Iranian forces had been fighting for eight years, and it would seem that Chechnya, Afghanistan and Bosnia Arab Mujahideen showed themselves well.
Of course, this article relies on open sources - but all military theorists from Clausewitz and Jomini to Svechin, Liddel Garth, Simpkin used open sources. True, there is still the secret knowledge of the elders who have gone into the woods, but the elders to fight against tanks after all, they haven’t passed on their knowledge to us yet.
The article touches upon an interesting question about how to transfer armored vehicles from cold, that is, with the engine turned off, to a working state in the conditions of the technological superiority of the enemy has not been studied, because it does not refer to the question “how much the machine will start”, but to the question “how quickly will a car notice the engine warms up the enemy thermal imaging equipment. "
Criticism of other Russian military analysts from this article was confirmed in practice by the fact that the Americans quickly defeated the Iraqi army, despite all predictions, although such analysts predicted that the Americans would be mired in the war against Saddam Hussein (neither Russian nor American analysts then did not think). They did not lose half a thousand killed, as independent analysts from Moscow claimed, and the British lost 139, plus the British lost 32. For an army like Iraq, this is not an indicator in its favor. Data on the state of the allegedly unarmed Iraqis, who at the end of the 80s received the latest technology from France, Yugoslavia and the USSR, is in the book of Mikhailov and in the Jane reference book. No one denies its low combat readiness, but the Iraqi army was not unarmed. That is why 2003 in Moscow hoped that the war would drag on with great losses for the Americans. However, the Iraqi army by the Americans was crushed almost immediately.
Today, the experience of the war in Iraq is being studied all over the world, as is the experience of any war of this scale. In order to prepare competent commanders, one must in fact have the appropriate literature, which they must study. There must be Russian military thought.
At present, perhaps, the experience of Afghanistan is generalized; there is, for example, the book of V.Arunov “The Afghan War”, there is the book of Kvachkov “Special Forces of Russia”, there is the book of Sukholeskiy “Special Forces in Afghanistan”. In Chechnya, such a plan of literature is still scarce, although it exists, for example, “The tactics of actions of illegal armed formations in the Chechen Republic” by the Institute of the Russian Interior Ministry in St. Petersburg. There are a number of articles on such sites as "Bronesite" and "Military Intelligence". However, the fighting ground troops in Iraq, in addition to the book by Andrei Mikhailov "The Iraqi trap", and partly the book by Gennady Korzh "Saddam Hussein", there is no work in Russian. It is unclear in this case, on the basis of which, to prepare the army to fight a high-tech adversary, as required by the General Staff, without studying the experience of the war in Iraq, where the first war in the world took place with a full-scale general military operation supported by a new-type guided weapon. The company 1991 of the year, nevertheless, was still conducted according to the charter of FM 100 about the "air-ground operation".
Of course, the Americans have a very powerful strategic aviationis a fact and this is their main weaponHowever, they are also preparing for battles in the mountains and cities. There is no doubt about the high level of military art in their academies, although sometimes the quality of their army itself is doubtful. In Iraq, in desert areas, this personnel, full of different races and different beliefs, can be kept in closed bases, ensuring a high level of discipline and supplies — which is also a fact.
However, this did not save the Iraqi army from the need to create and most importantly defend their positions at the front, especially since the earthen shelters are not visible by thermal imaging devices. Yes, there are measures for thermal disguise that would have to be observed.
Unfortunately, in Russia, the analysis of the hostilities of the Iraqi army itself has not yet been conducted, and everything is written off either as "insidious Americans" or "lazy Arabs." For any army, it was traditionally considered a duty to collect information on the level of military affairs of other armies. Thus, the author of the article makes his own, albeit small, contribution to the strengthening of Russian military art.
At the end of the 80s and the beginning of the 90s, the Military Herald published good articles on the topic of tactics in modern conditions. There were articles on this topic in the journal "Foreign Military Review," but these were exactly translated articles by foreign authors. Now, for objective and subjective reasons, the former number of materials in journals is not there, therefore articles like the article by Markin are useful for officers of the Russian army, so that they understand what dangers exist when defending against enemy tanks.
Chipboard materials (for official use) now, after the collapse of the Union, have virtually ceased to be, and new materials after 91 years are based on the experience of the war in Chechnya, but relate to the specifics of the operations of special forces, airborne forces, air forces and motorized rifle units for the protection of colonies, mopping up settlements, organizing ambushes and raids, searching for and destroying militant groups in mountainous terrain.
Of course, issues of fighting tanks, raised on the website of Vasily Chobitka "Bronesight", in the article "Clothes for iron or talk about disguise"Colonel Sergei Leonenko, Professor RAVN from the site" Courage ", in the translation article" The vulnerability of the Russian armored vehicles in urban battles: the experience of Chechnya. "Lester W. Grau. Red Military Star, January 1997 ) ”. Translation from English: Yuri Goldaev, in the collection“ Tanks in battles for the Terrible ”, but there are very few works on this topic, and therefore this article makes a significant contribution to the coverage of this topic.
I also hope that the recent experience of South Ossetia will nevertheless be analyzed by someone, since a general military operation took place there, with the use of artillery by both sides, including the MLRS, aircraft and tanks.
Oleg Valetsky
In the course of the first war in Iraq (1991) and at the dopartisan stage of the second war (2003), air supremacy solved a lot, but not everything. Fighting between units of the Iraqi army, little affected by air raids, and ground units of the anti-Iraqi coalition, in the absence of air support, took place. All of them were lost by the Iraqi side without causing any significant losses to the enemy. Writing it off against the general superiority of the enemy would be an oversimplification. The Iraqi army was armed, however, not with stones and clubs, and far from everyone deserted from the battlefield. Nor should we limit ourselves to the operational-strategic assessment of the war; we need to consider its tactical lessons. Especially due to the fact that the Russian army is far from always able to rely on material parity with a number of potential adversaries.
Contrary to popular belief, the action of coalition aviation was not always effective. So 20 February 1991, the battalion of Cobra helicopters (AH-1F Сobra) and several Apache helicopters (Apache), as well as two pairs of Thunderbolt attack aircraft (A10-A Thunderbolt II Warthog) ironed 1 positions of the XNXX battalion XXXX battalion of XXXXXXXXXXXXXXX XXXX Warthog II helicopter battalion for six hours. After such a bombardment, the bulk of the Iraqi soldiers surrendered, just 841 people. It turned out that not a single Iraqi soldier after the 436 hour-processing of positions by aircraft was even injured. And the positions of the Iraqis were not ground-underground (tunnel) defense, but ordinary field defenses.
Daniel P.Bolger, Death ground - today's American infantry in battle, Ballantine books, New York, 2003, p.91-95
As the commander of 7 recognized by the American corps, air supremacy did not prevent the command of the Iraqi Republican Guard to carry out a tactical maneuver in subdivisions equal to the size of brigades at a distance of 25-50 kilometers.
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.5, 6, 570
Not always American aircraft could support the actions of the ground forces, which did not prevent the Americans from destroying Iraqi units with minimal losses.
In 1991, during the battle along the vertical line of the 73 grid (73 Easting) with the division of the Republican Guard Tawakalna and for the elevation of the Medina division, due to bad weather, the American aviation did not support the attack of the 7 American corps . Prior to ground combat, coalition aircraft destroyed about 24% of the total number of tanks of these Iraqi divisions. However, the defending units of these divisions were routed by the ground forces of the coalition.
One captive commander of the Iraqi tank battalion cited the following figures: when entering his battalion into Kuwait, he had 39 tanks, after six weeks of air strikes, he had 32 left. The rest were lost during the 20 minute battle with American tanks.
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.107
Consider the experience of ground combat clashes more closely.
Tactical surveillance 1
Taking ground positions by subunits of the ground forces does not in itself mean that from these positions the troops can effectively withstand the impact of enemy ground forces.
Incorrect spacing
A very telling example is the defeat of the Iraqi Medina division during the second war. According to the commander of the 2 brigade 3 of the American infantry division Perkins (Perkins), despite a preliminary assessment of damage in 80% of the total number of armored vehicles of the Iraqi division, his team did not encounter a single (!) Iraqi vehicle damaged from the air. The Iraqis used effective cunning - they arranged the usual defense, with the usual positioning of armored vehicles and .... placed all real combat vehicles outside these positions in palm groves, in garages, hid them next to mosques and other buildings. American aviation hit the empty place. But such a concentration, led to the rapid defeat of the division by ground troops. The Iraqis were unable to organize a coordinated fire by these dispersed machines on the attacking US units. Iraqi tanks and other armored vehicles traveled to positions for opening fire one at a time and were quickly destroyed with concentrated fire from the Americans. The fact that the Americans came from the north and hit the Iraqis from the rear played a role. Many Iraqi tanks and infantry fighting vehicles were oriented to the south, they left their positions and tried to turn around, which caused delays in the discovery of fire and contributed to their destruction.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/perkins.html
Erroneous masking
Another method of masking from enemy aviation, which also hit the Iraqis themselves during nightly ground battles. To avoid being detected by thermal radiation at night from American aircraft, Iraqi tankers kept the vehicles off. The armored vehicles had the same temperature as the surrounding background of the terrain, and could not be recognized. The exception was the period of transition from day to night, when different rates of cooling of armor and soil allowed the recognition of Iraqi machines.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/script_b.html
When coalition tanks were on the night attack, the need to start cars increased the mismatch of Iraqi actions. The cars were started at different times for several reasons: different speed of decision making by machine commanders, different distances from the crew’s shelter to the car, different technical condition of the cars, in some cases, the shelling of cars by the Americans, which prevented people from getting into the hatches. Such a mismatch played into the hands of the Americans.
The Americans point out that there have been cases when Iraqi tankers tried to direct guns by turning the turrets of tanks manually without the use of electric drives. The true reason for this is not known. Most likely, the reason was precisely the desire to keep their cars cold under the background of the terrain, so as not to be detected in the thermal sights of American tanks.Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.387
It is possible that the Iraqis simply did not have time to use the electric drive of the rotating mechanism of the tower - it was necessary to shoot. In any case, it turned out to be quite ineffective in terms of camouflage. In many cases, the movement of the gun gave the location of the Iraqi tank, and the Americans, taking advantage of the greater speed of turning the tank tower, managed to take the first shot.
Desert storm monograph, 1LT Donald L. Murray, Ms.Horton
http://www.3ad.org/desertstorm/hist_summaries/history_unit_ds_5_5cav.pdf
Captain Steven G. Wyman, Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division
But even in those cases when the Iraqis managed to make the first shot undetected, the disguise against thermal imagers disappeared immediately. The temperature of the tank and especially the gun after the first shot was raised, which made the car visible in thermal imagers. It should be borne in mind that in the thermal imaging can be seen not only the heated armor, but also hot exhaust from the engines of armored vehicles. Since it is rarely possible to arrange exhaust exhaust to the side along flexible pipes, the institution of the engine and its operation will almost always reveal the location of the armored vehicles.
In short, the tactic of keeping cars cold under the background of the terrain until the last moment is wrong. Yes, it significantly helps to reduce losses from air raids, but is ineffective against ground attack. Attempts to fight, both from cold machines, and starting machines directly during the enemy’s ground attack will not work.
It seems that the correct algorithm of actions of the defender for the night battle is as follows. It is necessary to calculate how long it takes to bring camouflaged armored vehicles from the “cold” into a fully operational position, how far the attacker can approach during this time, add the effective range of the attacker's guns. When the enemy approaches this distance, it is necessary to give an order for the establishment of machines, although this violates the disguise of thermal imaging devices. That is, by the time the attackers reach the opening range, the process of bringing the defenders into full combat position should be completed.
If the ground opponent continues to draw closer, then, having waited for him to enter the zone of actual fire of the guns of the defender, the armored equipment leaves the shelter for firing positions and opens fire. Under cover, in conditions of a greater range of effective enemy fire and a greater detection range, only a position that hides the vehicle entirely with a turret below ground level can be considered. A tank trench with covering the hull of a tank with ground for the tower is not sufficient, but more on that below.
If the attacking ground enemy stops and directs their aircraft to destroy the defenders' heated and thus manifested armored vehicles, then they will have to launch an attack at the maximum possible speed in order to mix with the attacking units. Unfortunately, there are no other options in the conditions of technological backwardness of the defender. Waiting in a “cold” car while the enemy passes through the positions is too risky. A counterattack must be massed and coordinated with artillery firing at blinding thermal sight sights with lighting projectiles and creating smoke impenetrable for ATGM targeting through a laser beam or through wires. Isolated Iraqi tank counterattacks were easily repulsed by the Americans.
It is also necessary to counterattack if it was not possible to equip shelters. For example, a relatively unexpected maneuver by coalition forces in 1991 (poetically called a boxing left hook) forced the divisions of the Iraqi Republican Guard to abandon their previous positions and take on new ones. The change of positions was made about a day or two before the start of the ground battle. In the conditions of the rocky desert, we couldn’t get anything but “thin” parapet from surface sand. And this despite the fact that Iraqi engineering units began to equip new positions about 2 a week before the start of the ground operation of the coalition forces.
Stephen Biddle, Victory Misunderstood: Falling 21, www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html
It is possible that the Iraqis expected that these parapets would at least distribute part of the American fire to empty positions, of which there were many.
73 EASTING BATTLE REPLICATION-A JANUS COMBAT SIMULATION
WM Christenson, Robert A. Zirkle. Institute for defense analisis, September 1993, Alexandria, Virginia
However, the desert relief made the parapet well visible and they were subjected to intense shelling by American tank crews, including in those cases where the Americans did not see armored vehicles behind the parapet.
Stephen Biddle, Victory Misunderstood: Falling 21, www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html
Even if the Americans' statements about the destruction of Iraqi tanks when firing through the parapet are not taken into account (it is argued that on the parapet the recesses in the places of the shells hit were clearly visible), you still have to admit that the paraguay helped the Americans hit the Iraqi tanks.
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.357
Iraqis could not rely on the defense of parapet, and it was necessary to counterattack.
Incorrect reaction
“Aerospace psychology” of defending Iraqis in 1991 fights also led to the fact that at the time of the ground attack, some crews of armored vehicles, considering that another airstrike was beginning, left them to hide in shelters.
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.388
And only after it became clear to them that the ground attack was taking place, the crews began to return to their vehicles. For example, at the site of the attack of the American company G (Ghost troop) at the position of the Iraqi Tavacaln division in 1991, the first Iraqi response shots were approximately 18 (!) Minutes after the start of the clash.
This gave the Americans a significant advantage - they had already shot to kill, and they hadn’t shot back at them yet. Many of the crews were killed in an attempt to get back into the armored vehicles.
Stephen Biddle, Victory Misunderstood: Falling 21, www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html
Tim Ripley, Tank warfare, Compendium, 2003, p.134
Well, probably the most anecdotal incident occurred when the Americans seized the airport in Baghdad. The defense of the airport was designed to counter parachute and helicopter landing with active air support. The Iraqis created a system of underground trenches, where they were ready to wait out the bombing and come to the surface to destroy the landing force. “Airborne Psychology” led to the fact that when American tanks drove into the runway at night, the Iraqis took them for their own. And both parties calmly rested until the morning on the same positions. In the morning there was a battle, but the Iraqis who were not ready for battle against the tanks lost it.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/marcone.html
Preliminary conclusion: measures to shelter from an air attack can complicate the quick and coordinated opening of fire against a ground enemy, up to the state of complete defense ineffectiveness against a massive ground attack. The vulnerable moment is the transition from a sheltered position to firing at the attackers, if this transition is carried out during an enemy attack that has already begun. The risk of mismatched and delayed, and, as a result, ineffective actions is quite large. Defense planning should foresee such undesirable developments and develop countermeasures.
Tactical surveillance 2
The low level of preparedness of shooters and gunners gunners significantly reduces the distance at which effective fire on the enemy, compared with the ranges indicated in official manuals and tables.
This observation is so self-evident that it is often not taken into account. At the same time, the main reason for the loss of ground battles by the Iraqis with a devastating score can be elementary - they simply “smeared”, while their American “colleagues” did not.
During the second Iraq war, 4, April 2003, the Americans landed a Iraqi tank ambush in an area conventionally designated by the Americans as the Montgomery sector (objective Montgomery). Iraqi tanks, which avoided detection from the air, suddenly opened fire on the side view of American armored vehicles from a distance of 800-1000 meters. The result is a complete rout of the Iraqi (!) Unit. Iraqis managed to make 16 shots from their 125 mm guns. Not a single hit. A slip with the “best” result is an undershoot of the target 25 meters.
After the second war, the Americans raised trophy records of the Iraqi firing. In one tank division it turned out that during the year only one shooting was carried out. Tankmen were given a shot at the 4 projectile. In the elite division of the Republican Guard "Baghdad", the same were some shooting, but they gave more fire - for 10 shells. There was a division in which not one shooting was done in a year. The result is obvious.
The Iraqi infantrymen did not “lag behind” the tankers - according to American observations, less than 10% of shots from RPGs hit the target.
http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2003_hr/03-10-21warcollege.pdf
In general, Americans quite often mention a fire that does not fall from an RPG.
http://www.3ad.org/desertstorm/hist_summaries/history_unit_ds_5_5cav.pdf
Captain Steven G. Wyman, Task Force 5-5 Cavalry, 3d Armored Division
During the first Iraq war there was a case when Iraqi guns didn’t hit the American Bradley BMP from 73 mm guns from a distance of approximately 1 meters, making 400 shots. And the American BMP at this moment did not shoot due to a breakdown in the gun drive system.
Desert storm monograph, 1LT Donald L. Murray, Ms.Horton
Probably the most illustrative example of the defeat due to inability to shoot occurred during a counterattack of two Iraqi brigades (3 and 8 tank) to the upcoming 1 divisions of the US Marine Corps in the morning of 25 February 1991 of the year, on the second day after the start of the land operation in the Al oil field -Burcan (al-Burqan oil field). In service with the Marine Corps were not "Abrams", and the older М60А1 who did not have thermal sights. During the first ninety minutes of the battle, fire and smoke from burning oil wells, morning fog and bad weather brought the Americans no advantage in detecting targets in the far distance. For the same reasons, the American aircraft over the battlefield the first half hour of the battle was not. American artillery also did not fire - wanting to use helicopters, a restricted area was created for flying so that their shells would not damage them. In the chaos of the battle, this zone could not be canceled, although helicopters could not be used, as a result, the American artillery could not fire. The ATGM TOU operators often could not use thermal imaging sights, since the fire from oil wells lit them up, especially if they needed to aim in the direction of a burning oil field. In addition, in the smoke and fog, Iraqi and American parts were mixed, which prevented the American ATGM operators from firing, fearing to hook their own. ATGMs could be effectively used by Americans only for a short distance. Poor visibility led to the fact that the distance to which the opponents began to see each other was 500-800 meters. At such distances, the difference in the technological level М60А1 and Т-55 was largely leveled. The result of the battle - more 100 destroyed Iraqi armored vehicles and not one killed by the Americans. Twice during the battle, Iraqi tanks "stumbled" on the command posts of the Americans. Both times, tank attacks were repulsed by US marines without the help of their tanks.
The effectiveness of the Iraqi fire was extremely low.
Daryl G. Press; Lessons from ground combat in the Gulf: the impact of training and technology.
Due to the neglect of reducing the effective range of shooting with insufficiently trained personnel, in 1991, the Iraqis were not able to realize the advantage of defense on the reverse slope. The Iraqis placed equipment at a distance equal to the firing range of tank guns.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War, p.235
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.421, 422
The calculation was on the defeat of American tanks during the roll over the topographic ridge. The tanks passed through him, and the Iraqis could not get through to them at that distance.
It is difficult to assess how high the level of skill of American gunners in peacetime. But practically throughout the entire period of troop concentration prior to the start of the ground invasion, the American servicemen intensively trained at the shooting ranges. The skill level of gunners and ordinary infantrymen was brought to a very high level by the beginning of hostilities. This greatly increased the likelihood of hitting the target from the first shot and at a longer range, which gave an indisputable advantage to the Americans over the Iraqis during ground battles.
The preliminary conclusion is that if you have to fight poorly trained personnel, then you need to redo all tactics, which are usually written for normally trained soldiers. In such conditions, it is necessary to expect that only fire will be effective almost at an emphasis, at least at first. And the distance between the positions, the firing range and the necessary densities of tanks, guns and manpower, and the possibility of using certain tactics, etc. It is better to still prepare the soldiers normally.
Tactical surveillance 3
The army, which has technological superiority, strives to destroy the enemy without entering the zone of actual fire of his weapon, to fight at the maximum ranges, to turn a clash into shooting an enemy from a safe distance. And it can be done in a leisurely manner.
An example is the 2 battalion of the 327 US infantry regiment (2nd battalion of the 327th Infantry Regiment) led the battle for the city of An-Najaf in the 2003 year. The Iraqis took up positions in apartment buildings on the outskirts of the city and opened fire from window openings at the advancing American infantry and tanks. And the fire was carried out mainly with the undershoot. The Americans stopped the offensive and within a few hours (from about three o'clock in the afternoon until nine in the evening) shot down the firing points of Iraqis from the ATGM TOW from more than 1600 meters. Americans fired more 45 ATGM shots. One Iraqi artillery gun was destroyed by an ATGM. The other two are after shelling by Kiowa helicopters, American artillery and airplanes. Bombs also destroyed the mortar battery. After the Iraqis fired, the American infantry advanced. One firing point of the Iraqis came to life. Two 500-pound bombs were dropped on the building where it was located. After that, the Americans stopped the offensive completely until the next morning, because “they met with more resistance than expected” and fired Iraqi positions with mortars and other artillery guns for some time and bombed them with aircraft. The next morning, putting a smoke screen in front of Iraqi positions, 5 supporting battalion tanks were sent on the way to the city. They, low-vulnerable to Iraqi fire, were supposed to cause fire on themselves, and at that time the rest of the battalion would have shot alive Iraqi firing points from a safe distance. However, the Iraqis surrendered.
Christopher P.Hughes, Colonel, War on two fronts: Pentagon, Philadelphia, Casemate, 2007, p.63-73, 89-91
The concept of attack was not to suppress the enemy’s fire, to get closer to his positions and destroy the enemy in melee due to quantitative and fire superiority in the place where the main efforts were concentrated. The basic idea is to cause the Iraqis to fire on the bait unit in order to destroy the firing points that appear from a safe distance. It is characteristic that for the second day of the battle the plan was the same. The tactical mistake of the Iraqis was that the defeat of the enemy was planned on the basis of the “anti-personnel” habits left over from the Iran-Iraq war - to open fire from the maximum range of the actual fire of their weapons immediately after the first enemy units entered the zone. This “habit” is due to the fact that in the conditions of a “normal” infantry battle, the infantry attacking the run can quite quickly overcome the distance to the trenches of the defenders, so the latter need to knock out the maximum number of attackers before they approach the immediate trenches. However, in the conditions of war with the Americans, this requirement should have been relegated to the background. The main thing - to ensure the survivability of the position of the fire of Americans, conducted from afar. The defense should come to life only when the enemy approached in close proximity to the defended positions. After repelling the attack, it was necessary to go to the shelters and not to respond to provoking fire. It is obvious that the lessons of the first war, the Iraqis did not take into account, apparently, writing off the defeat solely on the rule of the Americans in the air.
Another example, 6, April 2003, during the battle for the Debecka Pass in northern Iraq, the American unit on the Hammer 4 stopped the “classic” Iraqi company’s mechanized attack on MTLB, supported by 4 tanks T-55, after storming PTM “Otr” to attack the crew. A total of 19 missiles were launched) Iraqi armored vehicles for cover behind the embankment. The Iraqis were forced to go on a long-range firefighting from a shelter, where they were methodically destroyed during 4,5 hours caused by the support of American aircraft.
Sean D.Naylor, Battle of Debecka Pass, www.paratrooper.net/commo/Topic12307-24-1.aspx
During the first Iraq war, Americans won ground battles, although not always, but often, due to stand-off tactics.
The 7 tank units of the American Corps, which fought with parts of the Iraqi Republican Guard, attacked as follows.
American companies (20-30 armored vehicles) advanced partially in line, partially backward (hybrid-line-abreast-combat-vee-formation), the depth of company formations was approximately 1500 meters.
Stephen Biddle, Victory Misunderstood: What does the war tell us about
International Security, Vol.21, No.2 (Fall 1996), www.comw.org/rma/fulltext/victory.html
Another option - all the cars lined up.
http://www.stripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=15295&archive=true
From the S&S archives: The Battle of the 73 Easting,
By Vince Crawley, Middle East Bureau
From the Stars and Stripes 1991 Desert Storm commemorative edition
The fire from the tanks was conducted on the move, and the speed of approach during the attack was 10-15 km / hour, that is, tanks and infantry fighting vehicles literally crawled. On the one hand, this made it difficult to return fire, since the target was still moving, on the other hand, it did not sway the car much and did not interfere with the operation of the weapon stabilization system and aiming at Iraqi tanks.
http://metallicpea.wordpress.com/2007/10/05/not-that-kind-of-republican/38/
In the area of the 2 th battalion offensive, the 34 th tank regiment of the 1 US infantry division, fire was fired from a stop. American tanks stopped at 1,5 - 2 000 meters from a group of Iraqi vehicles and shot them until all were destroyed. Then the battalion moved about another 2000 meters and the procedure was repeated. Moreover, in order to prevent fire, the platoon commander gave permission for the destruction of each target. The attack was carried out "crawling."
Tim Ripley, Tank warfare, Compendium, 2003, p.134
Similarly, that is, shooting the enemy from a stop, the 14 / 20 squadron of the royal hussars of the 4 British Tank Brigade operated.
Tim Ripley, Tank warfare, Compendium, 2003, p.131
However, there is one mention that the 1 squadron division of Americans attacked Iraqi positions at a speed of 32-40 km / h.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/gulf/script_b.html
BMP moved behind the tanks, at a distance of about 1000 meters. They fired at the area around the tanks and fired at the tanks themselves, preventing the Iraqi anti-tank groups from approaching the tanks at close range and firing RPGs at the tanks, as well as preventing attempts to climb the tanks and disable them with improvised means.
CORRECTING MYTHS ABOUT THE GULF WAR: THE LAST STANDARDS OF THE TAWAKALNA STEPHEN A. Bourque The Middle East Jounal, Volume 51, Number 4, Autumn 1997
Considering the sandstorm and the night, the Americans recognized Iraqi armored vehicles at different ranges. But the “classic” description of the fighting for Kuwait was the discovery by Americans of Iraqi tanks in thermal imaging sights for 5-6 kilometers, and when approaching the distance 2,5 km, American tanks began to shoot Iraqi. At the same time, the Iraqis, because of the worst observation devices, did not see American tanks and fired, if they fired, only on the outbreaks of shots. Moreover, the shells of Iraqi tanks did not reach the American tanks.
http://www.3ad.org/ds_3bde/67ar_2/Duke6paper.pdf
The “iron duke" world tour monograph
LTC Daniel A. Merritt, US Army War College, 31 May 1994
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.397, 421
In fairness it should be noted that the detection at such ranges was not always. Americans mention 2000 meters, 600 meters, 2300 meters, 3700 meters, 1000 meters, and 3000 meters. But they always emphasize that they were the first to see the enemy.
Thus, the Americans provided themselves with the possibility of shooting the enemy at a distance, while the enemy did not see the targets and could not reach them with fire from his weapon.
Similarly, in 1991, the situation was with the French: their AMX-30 tanks effectively hit the T-55 at a distance of 2000 meters, and the T-55 could hit them only from 1200 meters.
http://www.history.army.mil/documents/swa/dsit/DSIT072.htm
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
Oral History Interview, CPT Michael Johnson
S-2, 4th Regiment of Dragoons
6th (French) Light Armored Division
During the second Iraq war, there was a case when one company (10 tanks Abrams and 4 BMP Bradley) beat off the counterattack of the Iraqi brigade 10, attempting to regain control of the Euphrates bridge (objective area "Peach"). The fight went from 3 hours of the night to 6 in the morning. American tanks fired on the fact that the thermal sights were visible as small luminous points. These were counterattacking tanks and Iraqi infantry fighting vehicles that could not conduct effective fire on American tanks. The battle was won due to a greater target detection range at night and a greater effective range from the Americans.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/invasion/interviews/marcone.html
The preliminary conclusion is that in a battle it may turn out that you have to use less advanced equipment than the opponent. Measures to parry the technical advantages of the enemy with tactical methods should be specially planned when conducting both defense and offensive. The quantitative superiority of less advanced equipment over the more advanced equipment participating in the battle on the side of the enemy cannot by itself ensure success if it is not combined with tactics that compensate for the technical gap.
Tactical surveillance 4
Armored vehicles can cope with the stripping of trenches without the help of dismounted infantrymen, at least if the defending infantry is not ready to withstand the appropriate tactics of mechanized units.
In 1991, the Americans used the trenching method for destroying positions of Iraqi infantry in the areas of defensive breaches along the Kuwaiti and Saudi Arabian borders. Bulldozer equipment was mounted on the tank, and he simply drove along the trench line and bombarded them, along with Iraqi soldiers.
http://www.history.army.mil/books/www/www8.htm
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.276
The Americans used tanks in pairs, each of which was driving on one of the sides of the trench. Acting together, a pair of tanks piled the trench simultaneously on both sides. Moreover, the trench was swept along from the BMP, which rode as if riding the trench.
http://www.thetruthseeker.co.uk/article.asp?ID=3016
Another option: Tanks also went in pairs, from the outside of each of them was the BMP "Bradley", which suppressed the trenches with fire, and also behind the tanks there were two more BMP, which shot everything that was left undone. Tanks marched at a speed of 12 km / h.
Combined Arms and Tactics division,
US Army infantry school, Fort Benning, Georgia
Infantry officer advanced course December 1991
Operation of the Iraqi main defenses operation, 5th infantry regiment (16st infantry division) 1-24 February 28 Operation Desert Storm.
Of course, such a tank, falling asleep trench, very vulnerable. But the whole area around it was shelled by very dense fire from other armored vehicles. I repeat, this was done in the breakout areas, where sufficient concentrations of supporting armored vehicles were created, so that Iraqis could not interfere with the bulldozer work.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War, p.229
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert
The Iraqi grenade launchers or the ATGM operators simply did not have the opportunity to pop out of the trenches to fire shots at the tank with dozer equipment.
During the assault on a small settlement during the 1991 war, the Americans used a group of seven armored vehicles as an assault group: two armored bulldozers (combat earthmovers), one engineering vehicle with a 165 mm short-barreled gun, and the Bredley 4 BMP. The destruction of the defended buildings and the trenches of the Iraqis was pinned on the shells of the engineering vehicle and on the bulldozers that had demolished the walls and filled the trenches. Attached 4 BMP carried out support by fire close, and the remaining tanks and BMP units - at a distance.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War, p.257
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert
Actually, there is nothing new in the idea of a tank collapsing. It was used during the Second World War. The Iraqi infantry was not ready to oppose such tactics, although it could well have expected it from the advancing mechanized parts of the coalition. The countermeasures could be improvised portable land mines laid at the bottom of the trench, or better, into the whiskers that leave it, through which the tanks are forced to move. These land mines are undermined by the passage of a tank with dozer equipment close to them. Mines laid in the parapet are ineffective, they are also removed by a bulldozer. However, nothing was done by the Iraqis.
The breakthrough of their defensive lines occurred so quickly and efficiently that the view was spread that there simply were no breakthroughs.
Preliminary conclusion:
The statutes and manuals should indicate the measures to be taken in preparing the defense, so that the infantry can counteract the tactical reception of the flooding of the trenches with tanks. The same can be said about the removal of minefields by mine sweeps mounted on tanks.
Tactical surveillance 5
Both companies in Iraq were using American thermal imagers. We note a number of tactical moments that emerged when using these devices in combat conditions.
1. On the illumination of thermal sights
During the night battle, thermal sights undergo flare due to the light from burning armored vehicles and outbreaks of explosions, which leads to the blinding of tanks.
CORRECTING MYTHS ABOUT THE GULF WAR: THE LAST STANDARDS OF THE TAWAKALNA STEPHEN A. Bourque The Middle East Jounal, Volume 51, Number 4, Autumn 1997
It is possible that the shelling of enemy armored vehicles during the night battle with lightning projectiles can blind the vehicles.
According to the Americans, the shelling of Iraqi tanks 25mm with the shells of the guns of the American BMP "blinded" the night vision devices of Iraqi tanks.
Top of the spear
2. About shooting at their own night fight
Enemy equipment is detected in thermal imaging sights largely due to flash shots. Hence the likelihood of opening fire on their own.
In combat along the vertical 73 grid (73 Easting), Iraqi anti-tank groups sought to hit the advancing American tanks and BMPs in the rear projection, so a number of American tanks and BMPs deployed their towers back and began firing at them. The American tanks following them took these flashes of shots for the Iraqi fire and started firing at their own armored vehicles.
An enemy projectile or RPG on the armor of an American tank ahead of it hit the thermal imaging sights as a flash of a shot from this tank aimed at the advancing Americans. That is, the tank was classified as Iraqi. It also served as a reason to open fire on its own.
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.391, 396
According to American 1 reports, the American infantry division thus destroyed their tanks and 5 BMP "Bradley" 4.
CORRECTING MYTHS ABOUT THE GULF WAR: THE LAST STANDARDS OF THE TAWAKALNA STEPHEN A. Bourque The Middle East Jounal, Volume 51, Number 4, Autumn 1997
Trying to distinguish their tanks from strangers, the Americans opened fire on them from 25 mm BMP guns. If the crew on the radio reported that she was fired, the tank was determined as his own. If no one answered - the tank was classified as enemy and fire would fire on it.
To identify their tanks, the Americans also used this method: they gave a signal to stop the vehicles, and those vehicles that continued to go were viewed as enemy.
http://yarchive.net/mil/gulf_war_tf.html
Similar problems exist for infantrymen. For example, any flicker, such as from turning the flashlight on, can be interpreted as a flash of a shot directed at the viewer at a night vision device. This may cause a desire to shoot "in response."
Aircraft pilots may perceive as fragments that did not have time to cool down the fragments of previously dropped bombs.
Evan Wright, Generation Kill, Berlely Caliber, New York, 2004, p.163, 180
3. On detection
“Cold” Iraqi tanks were in some cases detected by Americans on strange white dots hanging in the air. These were the faces of the commanders of Iraqi tanks, crawling out of the hatches to better look around. Therefore, observers who give commands to leave the shelter must be located outside the tanks in order not to give out the position of the machines prematurely.
There were cases when Iraqi ambushes in groves in the course of the second war were detected by the Americans on the thermal trail given on the displays of devices by human bodies. Therefore, the Iraqis in ambush began to cover themselves with blankets so as not to be detected. Evan Wright, Generation Kill, Berlely Caliber, New York, 2004, p.239, 291
4. On infantry attacks under cover of darkness
The Iraqi infantry, attempting to counterattack in night battles, despite being promoted by short dashes, was destroyed from infantry fighting vehicles, whose crews perfectly saw the infantrymen running into thermal imaging sights.
CORRECTING MYTHS ABOUT THE GULF WAR: THE LAST STANDARDS OF THE TAWAKALNA STEPHEN A. Bourque The Middle East Jounal, Volume 51, Number 4, Autumn 1997
One of the unsuccessful attacks of the Iraqi infantry took place 25 March 2003, just north of the city of Nasiriyah. During an attempted night attack on a group of stopped American armored vehicles, about 400-500 Iraqis were killed without firing a single shot. The 25mm Bushmaster cannon mounted on armored vehicles has a double-action night sight - as determining the temperature difference as well as enhancing the existing light. The gun can conduct effective fire at night at a distance of 1000 meters. Iraqi grenade throwers simply could not approach the American vehicles at a distance of an RPG shot. Many died due to the fact that they did not see that other infantrymen were cutting off with fire from American armored vehicles, and continued to come closer under the deadly fire.
Evan Wright, Generation Kill, Berlely Caliber, New York, 2004, p.119
In general, references to the constant but unsuccessful attempts of attacks by Iraqi grenade launchers during night battles are quite common in American sources.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War, p.284
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert
Preliminary conclusion: the presence of thermal imaging devices does not make the night fight a day. There are a number of features associated with the action of appropriate devices that must be considered.
So, according to the caustic remark of one American author, the use of night vision goggles attached to a helmet is equivalent to playing football, looking at the field through two rolls of toilet paper.
Daniel P.Bolger, Death ground: Today's American Infantry, Ballantine books, New York, 1999, p.77
The instruments give a flat image and lead to tunnel vision, when everything located on the periphery is cut off, giving a false sense of security.
Conducting a night battle with the extensive use of instruments for observation in the dark requires training. The side that can provide the best training for the night battle, even if the technical parameters of the instruments used by the warring parties are equal, will receive significant advantages in the night battle. It may be appropriate to conduct exercises in which one of the parties has a clear advantage in the quantity and quality of instruments for observation in the dark over the other side.
Other observations
A. About parapet for tank trenches.
One thing is connected with the parapet of the Tavakalna division in 1991. The bulk of the positions of armored vehicles was deployed to the direction of the expected attack at an angle from 20 to 60 degrees.
73 EASTING BATTLE REPLICATION-A JANUS COMBAT SIMULATION, p.13
WM Christenson, Robert A. Zirkle
Institute for defense analisis, September 1993, Alexandria, Virginia
Often it was only possible to shoot from positions in the direction in which the position was oriented. It was impossible to turn the gun to the other sides because of the height of the parapet.
In American sources there are various explanations for why the Iraqis made parapet. There is a point of view that this was done in order to reduce the likelihood of detection and destruction from the air. At the very least, to ensure that only one car can be hit in one go.
- http://es.rice.edu/projects/Poli378/Gulf/gwtxt_ch8.html
- http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0423.pdf
Achieving Victory by Avoiding Defeat By ROBERTH. SCALES, JR.
Another point of view is that the main goal is to build a defensive fire system on an oblique fire. This was supposed to allow direct targeting without fear of defeat in the side view of the tank.
73 EASTING BATTLE REPLICATION-A JANUS COMBAT SIMULATION, p.13
WM Christenson, Robert A. Zirkle
Institute for defense analisis, September 1993, Alexandria, Virginia
Anyway, the high breastwork often worked for the Americans. Since ground attacks were not always from the expected direction, such a high parapet prevented the gun from being deployed in the direction of the attacking American tanks. This forced Iraqis to leave because of the parapet, which caused the loss of precious seconds at the moment when the enemy attacks.
Along with the slow turn of the turret, the departure from the parapet, which prevented the gun from being sent to an American tank or BMP, is often mentioned by Americans as the reason why they had time to hit the Iraqi tank before it fired the first shot.
see also http://www.history.army.mil/documents/swa/dsit/DSIT072.htm
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
Oral History Interview, CPT Michael Johnson
S-2, 4th Regiment of Dragoons
6th (French) Light Armored Division
B. Illumination of the battlefield at night
In the course of a night battle, for using anti-tank guided missiles that do not have night sights, one can and should use the lighting of the area with lighting projectiles or think about the lighting of the area by other means, including improvised. After the battles, the Americans found large stocks of Malyutka ATGM in Iraqi positions that were not used by Iraqis in night battles.
By John Fialca, Wall Street Journal, Pentagon Press Pool, March 1, 1991
http://www.3ad.com/history/gulf.war.htm
In general, the lack of funds to illuminate the terrain led to the fact that the Iraqi infantry often could not conduct aimed fire from an RPG, even when enemy armored vehicles were located at 100-200 meters.
Desert storm monograph, 1LT Donald L. Murray, Ms.Horton
AT. On requirements for infantry trenches
During the shelling of Iraqi trenches with artillery, the Americans sought air gaps over the trenches, the infantry was amazed at the splinters from above. The Iraqi trenches, which had no overlap, did not save from such a fire.
http://www.hoskinson.net/gulfwar/dstorm.html
To survive under bombardment, Iraqi infantrymen left the main trenches to their side branches (tranchée à alvéoles / bay trench). Thus, at the time of the bombing attack, the main trenches were empty. The blow accounted for an empty space.
Le journal de guerre d'un soldat irakien
Midi Libre, le jeudi 2 avril 1991
http://guerredugolfe.free.fr/journal.htm
In general, this tactic is not new. During the fighting on the Ebro River during the civil war in Spain in 1938, the Republicans left the main positions during the bombing and occupied them only before the approach of the ground forces of the Franco in close proximity to them.
Ilya Ehrenburg, Spanish reports 1931-1939, Moscow, Press Agency Press News, 1986, p.311, 313.
G. Some tricks of disguise
For misleading the American pilots, Iraqis burned tires near tanks that were not wounded, which created the impression that the vehicles had already been destroyed.
For the same purpose, entire combat vehicles were placed next to the wounded.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert
With this type of disguise - under the destroyed equipment - only during the first raid, the Americans were sure that any machine could be bombed. On subsequent raids, American pilots saw only wrecked cars, not knowing which of them were really hit and which ones were not.
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/jfq_pubs/0423.pdf
Achieving Victory by Avoiding Defeat By ROBERT H. SCALES, J R.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert
In American sources, there are allegations that tire ignition was used by Iraqis to remove bombs induced by a laser beam or by thermal drawing of a target to the side.
Tom Clancy with General Fred Franks, Jr. (Ret.), Into the storm - a study in command, GPPutnam's Sons, New York, 1997, p.357
Separate rifle cells were also disguised as already destroyed. For these purposes, stones were scattered around the position. At the same time, it was given such a general view, as if a shell had already hit the point, and the stones from the parapet were scattered by the explosion.
http://www.history.army.mil/documents/swa/dsit/DSIT072.htm
OPERATIONS DESERT SHIELD AND DESERT STORM
Oral History Interview, CPT Michael Johnson
S-2, 4th Regiment of Dragoons
6th (French) Light Armored Division
D. About artillery
Iraqi artillery opened fire, mainly on pre-shot zones. These zones were marked by the installation of 55-gallon (200-liter) drums on the ground. Under them, little bonfires were made at night so that the barrels could be seen in night-vision equipment. In theory, when American armored vehicles passed by these barrels, it was possible to open high-aimed fire. However, the Americans began to go around the places indicated by these barrels. And instead of being useful, they did harm to the Iraqis, because they pushed the American units into sections of terrain that were not shot in advance.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War, p.257
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert
Aimed counter-battery fire from the MLRS opened by the Americans on Iraqi artillery a few minutes after the Iraqis opened fire. Iraqi artillery failed to provide substantial support to its units.
Scales, Robert H., Certain victory: the US Army in the Gulf War
http://cgsc.leavenworth.army.mil/carl/resources/csi/content.asp#cert
Е. About the unusual non-explosive boom
Curiously enough, but built long before the war to fight smugglers and the unguarded and not protected 3 bulk sandstone shaft on the border between Kuwait and Saudi Arabia (Iraqi’s first line of defense was approximately a kilometer away from the border)
http://es.rice.edu/projects/Poli378/Gulf/gwtxt_ch8.html
served as a serious hindrance to the logistics of the Americans even after the advance units had gone far ahead. They significantly limited the throughput of the desert and delayed the supply of fuel and ammunition. Val retained his tactical and not even operational value and continued to detain the Americans, after the American engineers were given complete freedom of action to make passes in it. Perhaps, in the presence of a large number of civilian bulldozers and the absence of a large number of mines, such shafts may be included in the defense system.
G. How to make life difficult for yourself
Bomb craters of American B-52 bombers became a significant obstacle for American tanks. There have been cases when equipment fell into them.
http://yarchive.net/mil/gulf_war_tf.html
H. During the second Iraqi company, during a sandstorm, Iraqis managed to destroy two Abrams tanks from anti-aircraft guns mounted on pickups. The car drove into the rear and the tank was shot in the rear projection.
Christopher P.Hughes, Colonel, War on two fronts: Pentagon, Philadelphia, Casemate, 2007, p.53
Conclusion
1. Military Institute stories The Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in 2008 published the 764's page work “Military Art in Local Wars and Armed Conflicts”. Concerning the wars in Iraq, the following conclusion was made. “Characteristic of the war in the Persian Gulf zone was the fact that ... in this war, the main place belonged to strategic and operational assets, represented by ... aircraft, as well as rocket means. Tactical formations and their actions (infantry, tank, and artillery formations and units) did not determine the “face” of the operation .., its course and outcome. ”
A.V. Usikov, G.A. Burutin, V.A. Gavrilov, S.L. Tyshlykov, under the general editorship of Colonel-General A.S. Rukshin, Moscow, Military Publishing, 2008, p. 308
This conclusion is controversial. Presumably, it is based on impressions from information received through the media. The defeat of the Iraqis was also directly related to the loss of ground battles at the tactical level.
The final conclusion about the reasons for the virtually bloodless victories of the forces of the anti-Iraq coalition can only be made after a detailed analysis and perhaps the replay of land battles in the exercises in which the coalition forces did not play any significant role. We are talking about a counterattack of Iraqi tanks on 25 units of the US 1991 February February near Al-Burkan oil field, fights along the vertical line of the 73 (73 Easting) grid with the division of the Republican Guard Tawakalna and the Medina sublimity Ridge) in 1991, the Medina division combat with the 2 brigade of the US Infantry Division 3 in the 2003 year. While there is no detailed information, these conclusions cannot be considered reliable.
2. Probably one of the main problems facing Russian military science is how to wage war in the conditions of the technological superiority of the enemy and his supremacy in the air. The most important conclusion from the Iraqi experience is that it can only be dispersed to a certain limit, beyond which the effectiveness of actions against a land-based enemy drops sharply. Apparently, the antidote should be sought in camouflage on the principle of "oversaturation of the area with false targets" and "under the destroyed object." Wide spreading is possible only in the rear.
The remaining advantages of a technologically advanced enemy - a large firing range, quickness of opening response (especially counter battery) fire and better visibility at night can be parried with tactical techniques, provided that the troops are trained by them.
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