Analysis of the effectiveness of Soviet submarines in the Great Patriotic War

During World War II, the Soviet Navy had 267 submarines, of which 170 (59%) participated in military operations against Germany *. Of which from exposure weapons 81 (48%) submarines died, 8 were blown up by themselves, and another 8 were decommissioned fleet by technical condition.

RJR ерялР° 67% РїРѕРґРІРѕРґРЅС‹ С… Р с СРСРСРРРРР РСС ‚С ‡ РёСЃР» Р ° СѓС ‡ Р ° СЃС‚РІСѓСЋС Р РСС… РІ Р ± РѕРµРІС ‹RС СРС РСРРСРССРРСѓСЋС Р РёС… РІ Р ± оевы СРС РСРСРСРРєРРСРРСРСРСРСРСРС РСРРСРСРРРґР ‹Р ‹Р ‹Р ‹Р ‹Р ‹Р ‹Р »С »РÑСРСРСРСРСРС Р »РЁСЏ - 66%, РЇРїРѕРЅРёСЏ - 77%, Р'ел РёРєРѕР ± ритР° РЅРЁСЏ - 28%, РЎРЁРђ - 21%.

RўRμRїRμSЂSЊ RїRѕSЃRјRѕS,SЂRoRј, RєR ° ± Rє RѕR SЃS,RѕSЏR "of the PS RґRμR" of the PS SЃ SЌS "C" RμRєS,RoRІRЅRѕSЃS,SЊSЋ RїSЂRoRјRμRЅRμRЅRoSЏ RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <C ... P "RѕRґRѕRє RѕSЃRЅRѕRІRЅS <RІRѕSЋSЋS ‰ C ... ... Roes RіRѕSЃSѓRґR ° SЂSЃS,RІ.

РџС ‡ РµРѕС РС ‚ ° ть РєР ° Рє Р ° Р ± СЃРѕР »СЋС, РЅС‹ Рµ С † РСС „СЂС‹. RS, SURFACE есРС‚РРС‚СС‚СС‚СтР° Rђ Roes RєRѕR ... "‡ Roes RμSЃS,RІRѕ RЅRμRѕR ± RѕRґRoRјRѕ C ... P · RЅR S,SЊ ° C ‡ S,Rѕ C ... € RѕSЂRѕS of the PS RІRoRґRЅRѕ RЅR RїSЂRoRјRμSЂRμ ° F" RμSЂRјR ° RЅRoRo, S,R ° Rє RєR ° Рє если Р ± С‹ РІ 1945 Рі. PI P ± RѕRμRІS <Rμ RїRѕS ... RѕRґS <RІS <P From € "Ryo RІSЃRμ RїRѕSЃS,SЂRѕRμRЅRЅS <Rμ RіRμSЂRјR ° RЅSЃRєRoRμ RїRѕRґR" RѕRґRєRo XXI Ryo XXIII SЃRμSЂRoR№, S,Rѕ RїRѕS,RμSЂRo SЃRѕSЋR RЅRoRєRѕRІ · P ± C <P " Рё Р ± С ‹СЃРѕРІРµСЂС € енно РёРЅС‹ Рµ. R ”Rѕ SЃRёS ... їРѕСЂРёРјРµСЋС‚СЃСЏ СЂР ° Р · СЅРѕС ‡ тения РІ РєРѕР» РЁС ‡ естве РїРѕССРРРРРенРСССССРРРРРР РРРРРСCSСРРРРРР РРРРРСCSСРРРРР РРРРРСCССРРРРР РРРРССССРРРРР Р РРРРССССРРРРР РРРРССРСРРРРР РРРРСРСРРРРРРС РСРеѵСССРРРРРРРРРµСтсССЂРЂРРР RћRґRЅR ° RєRѕ, RїSЂRoRІRμRґRμRЅRЅS <Rμ P · RЅR ° C ‡ RμRЅRoSЏ RґR ° SЋS, RѕR ± ‰ With RμRμ RїSЂRμRґSЃS,R ° RІR "RμRЅRoRμ of the PS RїRѕSЂSЏRґRєRμ C † Roes" SЂ Ryo SЃRѕRѕS,RЅRѕS € RμRЅRoRo Roes ... RјRμR¶RґSѓ SЃRѕR ± РѕР№. Рђ, Р · РЅР ° С ‡ РЁС ‚, можно сдел Р ° ть РЅРµРєРѕС‚РѕСЂС ‹Рµ РѕР ± С РёРµ РІС‹ РІРѕРґС ‹.

R'Rѕ-RїRμSЂRІS <C ... SЃRѕRІRμS,SЃRєRoRμ RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅRoRєRo RoRјRμSЋS, RЅR ° RoRјRμRЅSЊS € RμRμ RєRѕR "Roes ‡ RμSЃS,RІRѕ RїRѕS,RѕRїR" RμRЅRЅS <C ... C † RμR "RμR№ *** RЅR ° ° RєR R¶ РґСѓСЋ СѓС ‡ Р ° СЃС‚РІСѓСЋС ‰ СѓСЋ РІ Р ± РѕРµРІС ‹С… действиях РїРѕРґРІРѕРґРЅСѓСЋ Р» Р -РґРєСѓ. РЎР »РµРґСѓСЋС ‰ РёРјРё РїРѕ РґР ° РЅРЅРѕРјРѓРѓРРѕРєР ° Р · Р ° тел СР РРРРРѓСѓС ‚РЎРЁРђ, РЅРѕ СРРСРРРРР СРРРРР СРСРРРРР, Р °РѕР ° Р · РРѕRРR °R °R °RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR °RRRRRR »RR РRёЅ ° С ‡ РОтельно РІС‹ С € Рµ СѓРєР ° Р · Р ° РЅРЅРѕР№, тР° Рє РєР ° Рє С „Р ° РєС‚РёС ‡ ески РІ Р ± оевы С РРРРРРR RІRoSЏS ... RЅR ° RєRѕRјRјSѓRЅRoRєR ° C RoSЏS † ‡ P ... SѓS ° SЃS,RІRѕRІR ° F "of the PS S,RѕR" SЊRєRѕ RїRѕSЂSЏRґRєR ° 50% RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <C ... P "RѕRґRѕRє RѕS, RѕR ± ‰ C ... RμRіRѕ Roes RєRѕR" ‡ Roes ествР° РЅР ° С, еР° С, СЂРµ РІРѕРµРЅРЅС ‹С… дейСС, РІРёР№, остР° Р» СЊРЅС ‹Рµ РІС‹ РїРѕР »РЅСЏР Ryo SЂR ° F · P "‡ Roes RЅS <Rμ SЃRїRμS Röhr ° † P" SЊRЅS <Rμ P · ° F RґR ° C ‡ Ryo.

R'ResHeRaHe, ± РѕРµРІС ‹С… СРРРРеееР…Р …Р …Р ·Р ·Р ·Р ·Р ·Р ·Р ·РµРµРµРЋРЋРЋР ·Р РР РРРРР ·РЋРЋР РР РРРРРРЋРЋРЋР РР РР РРРР РРЋРЋР РР РР РР РРРРР РР РР РР РР РРРРРРРРР РР РР РРРРРРРРЋРРR РRRRRRRRS ° РЅ-РїРѕР ± едитеР”СЊРЅРёС †.

P'-S,SЂRμS,SЊRoS ... RїRѕ RєRѕR "‡ Roes RμSЃS,RІSѓ RїRѕS,RѕRїR" RμRЅRЅS <C ... C † RμR "RμR№ RЅR ° RєR ° R¶RґSѓSЋ RїRѕS,RμSЂSЏRЅRЅSѓSЋ RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅSѓSЋ P" RѕRґRєSѓ RјS <RїSЂRμRІRѕSЃS ... РѕРґРёРј только РЇРїРѕРЅРёСЋ, Рё Р ± Р» РёР · Рё Рё Рє Р С РРР Р »РёРё. RJ R§S,Rѕ RєR ° SЃR ° RμS,SЃSЏ RЇRїRѕRЅRoRo, S,Rѕ PI RєRѕRЅS † Rμ RІRѕR№RЅS <RїSЂRѕRoSЃS RѕRґRoR ... "of the PS RЅR ° SЃS,RѕSЏS RμRμ Röhr ‰ · P ± RoRμRЅRoRμ RμRμ C" P "RѕS,R °, RI C, C, C РЅРµ корректно.

RR SЃSЃRјR ° ° ° S,SЂRoRІR SЏ SЌS "C" RμRєS,RoRІRЅRѕSЃS,SЊ RґRμR№SЃS,RІRoR№ SЃRѕRІRμS,SЃRєRoS ... RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <C ... P "RѕRґRѕRє RЅRμR" SЊR · SЏ RЅRμ RєRѕSЃRЅSѓS,SЊSЃSЏ RμS ‰ Rμ RѕRґRЅRѕRіRѕ C ‰ епетильного РІРѕРїСЂРѕСЃР °. RJ »РѕРґРєРё Рё темШ РЅР ° деждР° РјРё, которы Рµ РЅР ° РЅРЁС… РІРѕР · Р »Р ° РіР ° Р» РёСЃСЊ. RћR †µµµµµ ° C, P С C Р R R Р R Њ S Њ R Ѕ S Р P Р P Р P С S C С S Р R С C С S Ѕ R Ѕ R Ѓ S Ѓ R ґ S R ґ R Р R Р ё № є ѕ ё ° ° ј ё ё ё ё № № № І »ё ± ± ± · ї ё ё ё № № № І ё ± ± ї ї ї ї № ° Р РїСЂР ° РІРёР »Рѕ, РЅРµ отрР° жР° Р» Рё реР° Р »СЊРЅСѓСЋ стоимость. РћРґРЅР ° РєРѕ косвенно СЌС‚РѕС ‚РІРѕРїСЂРѕСЃ СЂР ° СЃСЃРјРсС СРРРСССЌмжно. P 'RїSЂRμRґRІRѕRμRЅRЅS <Rμ RіRѕRґS <RїSЂRѕRјS <C € P "RμRЅRЅRѕSЃS,SЊ RїRμSЂRμRґR ° P" P ° SЃRѕRІRμS,SЃRєRѕRјSѓ With "P" RѕS,Sѓ RєSЂRμR№SЃRμSЂR ° 4, 35 SЌSЃRјRoRЅS † RμRІ Ryo P "RoRґRμSЂRѕRІ, 22 SЃS, РѕСЂРѕР¶РµРІС ‹С… РєРѕСЂР ° Р ± Р» СЏ Рё Р Р Р Р Р Р »РµРµ 200 (!) РїРѕРґРІРѕРґРЅС <С… Р» РѕРґРѕРє. R Р ё ё »‹ ‹‹ ‹

The table shows that until the third five-year plan, the lion's share of the appropriations for military shipbuilding went to the creation of submarines, and only with the laying of battleships and cruisers in 1939 the picture began to change. Such dynamics of financing fully reflects the views on the use of fleet forces that existed in those years. Until the end of the thirties, the main striking force of the fleet was considered submarines and heavy aviation. In the third five-year plan, priority was given to large surface ships, but even by the beginning of the war, submarines remained the most popular class of ships and, if the main stake was not made on them, then hopes were very high.

Р 'В «РќР ° стР° РІР» ении РїРѕ веденШю РјРѕСЂСЃРєРёС… оперР° С † РёР№В »1940 Рі. РіРѕРІРѕСЂРёР »РѕСЃСЊ, С ‡ то

RџRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <Rμ P "RѕRґRєRo SЏRІR" SЏSЋS,SЃSЏ SЂRѕRґRѕRј RјRѕSЂSЃRєRoS SЃRoR ... "RїSЂRμRґRЅR ° F · RЅR ° C ‡ RμRЅRЅS <Rј RґR" SЏ RґRμR№SЃS,RІRoR№, RіR "P ° RІRЅS <Rј RѕR ° F ± SЂR · РѕРј, РЅР ° РјРѕСЂСЃРєРёС… СЃРѕРѕР ± С ‰ енРОСЏС…. P '... S,RμS SЃR "SѓS ° SЏS ‡ P ... RєRѕRіRґR RѕSЃRЅRѕRІRЅRѕR№ ° F · F ° C ° RґR RμR№ ‡ C" P "RѕS,R ° SЏRІR" SЏSЋS,SЃSЏ RґRμR№SЃS,RІRoSЏ RЅR ° RјRѕSЂSЃRєRoS ... SЃRѕRѕR RμRЅRoSЏS ± ‰ C ... RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <Rμ P "RѕRґRєRo RїSЂRo RґRѕSЃS,R ° S,RѕS RЅRѕRј Roes ... ‡ ‡ C RoSЃR" Rμ SЃRѕSЃS,R ° RІR "SЏSЋS, RѕSЃRЅRѕRІRЅRѕR№ SЂRѕRґ SЃRoR" C "P" RѕS, P °. P & P in the PFR. S,RoRІRЅRѕRј RІR · ° F ° RoRјRѕRґRμR№SЃS,RІRoRo SЃ RЅR ° RґRІRѕRґRЅS <RјRo RєRѕSЂR ° F ± F "SЏRјRo, RјRѕSЂSЃRєRѕR№ RІRoR ° F ° C † P ± Pd RoRμR№ RμSЂRμRіRѕRІRѕR№ RѕR ± RѕSЂRѕRЅRѕR№.

RS, R & R Р№ РіР »Р ° СЃРёР», С ‡ то

RџRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <Rμ P "RѕRґRєRo SЃRїRѕSЃRѕR ± RЅS <Rє RґR" RoS,RμR "SЊRЅS <P ± Rј RѕRμRІS <Rј RѕRїRμSЂR ° C † RoSЏRј Ryo RЅR ° RЅRμSЃRμRЅRoSЋ RјRѕS ‰ RЅRѕRіRѕ Ryo SЃRєSЂS <S,RЅRѕRіRѕ S,RѕSЂRїRμRґRЅRѕRіRѕ Ryo RјRoRЅRЅRѕRіRѕ SѓRґR ° SЂR RїRѕ ° F ± RѕRμRІS <Rј RєRѕSЂR ° F ± F "SЏRј Ryo S,SЂR ° RЅSЃRїRѕSЂS,R ° Rј RїSЂRѕS,RoRІRЅRoRєR °, RЅRμR · P RІRoSЃRoRјRѕ RѕS ° C ‡ RoSЃR" RμRЅRЅRѕRіRѕ SЃRѕRѕS,RЅRѕS € RμRЅRoSЏ SЃRoR "PI Р ± РѕСЋ.

RџRѕRґRґRІRІRЅRЅR ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹RЅR ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹RRЅRRЅRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR on on onaMe ‹Рј РѕР ± СЂР ° Р · РѕРј, Сѓ РїРѕР ± ережяЏ РЁ Р ± Р ° Р · РїСЂРѕСЂРёРРёРєРєРєРєР °Р °Р °Р °РІРІ то же время СЏРРР »СРєРєРєРєР °Р °РІ торжРРеРРвремя СЏРРРS SСRРєRєRЏROOR »СЏ РѕРє РѕСЂРѕРЅС‹ РїРѕРґС… РѕРґРѕРІ Рє Р Р Р ± Р ° Р · Р ° Рј, Рє СѓРСРРРРРР »РµРРРЅS РїРѕР ± ережья, угрожР° РµРјС ‹Рј РІ РѕС‚РЅРѕС € ении РІС‹ СЃР ° РґРєРё десР° нтР° противникР°.

РћРЅРЅРёРёРЃСССРС (РєРѕРјРјСѓРЅРёРєР ° С † РЁСЏС…) противникР°. RџSЂRo RѕRіSЂR ° RЅRoS ‡ RμRЅRЅRѕSЃS,Ro SЂR ° RґRoSѓSЃR ° RґRμR№SЃS,RІRoSЏ RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <C ... P "RѕRґRѕRє, SЃRєRѕSЂRѕSЃS,Ro RѕRґR ° C ... ... RїRѕRґ RІRѕRґRѕR№ Roes, ° F ° S,R RєR¶Rμ RЅRμR ± RѕR "SЊS € RѕR№ RґR ° F" SЊRЅRѕSЃS,Ro RІRoRґRoRјRѕSЃS,Ro C ‡ · RμSЂRμR RїRμSЂRoSЃRєRѕRї, RѕSЃRѕR RѕRμ ± R · RЅR ° C ‡ RμRЅRoRμ RoRјRμRμS, RІR · P ° RoRјRѕRґRμR№SЃS,RІRoRμ RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <C ... P "RѕRґRѕRє SЃ РЅР ° РґРІРѕРґРЅС ‹РјРё РєРѕСЂР ° Р ± Р» СЏРјРё Рё Р ° РІРёР ° С † ией.

P Р P Р P ј P ј C ј C, P Р C С C Р C С C, P ё C Р C Ѓ є Ѓ ° Р Р Р Р Р ѕ ѕ ѕ ‹ѕ‹ ‹ѕ ѕ ѕ ѕ ѕ ѕ ѕ ѕ RўRµSЌRR °R °RґR °R °R °R °R °R ‹R °R °R °R °R °R °RґRґRґR ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R °RґRґRґRґR ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹R ‹RRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR. RsReste SЃRoR "RѕR№ SЃRїRѕSЃRѕR ± RЅRѕR№ RІRѕR · RґRμR№SЃS,RІRѕRІR ° S,SЊ RїRѕ RїSЂRѕS,RoRІRЅRoRєSѓ PI RѕS,RєSЂS <S,RѕRј RјRѕSЂRμ RѕSЃS,R ° RІR ° F" RoSЃSЊ RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <Rμ P "RѕRґRєRo Pd ° F РІРёР ° С † РёСЏ. RќRμRѕR C ± ... RѕRґRoRјRѕ S,R RєR¶Rμ RїRѕRјRЅRoS,SЊ ° C ‡ S,Rѕ RґR "SЏ S,R RєRoS ° C ..." P "RѕS,RѕRІ, RєR ° Rє RЎRμRІRμSЂRЅS <R№ Ryo RўRoS ... RѕRѕRєRμR ° RЅSЃRєRoR№ RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <Rμ P "RѕRґRєRo, RЅR ° SЂSЏRґSѓ SЃ RјR ° F» ‡ RѕS RoSЃR "RμRЅRЅS <RјRo SЌSЃRјRoRЅS † ° F RјRo, RІRѕRѕR C ± ‰ Rμ SЏRІR" SЏR "RoSЃSЊ SЃR ° RјS <RјRo RєSЂSѓRїRЅS <RјRo RєRѕSЂR ° R ± R "SЏRјRё.

RџRѕRRІRšRґSЏ ROS, RѕR_RЅRµR ± RѕR »SURRESTERN ROSEDјSЌRSєRSARRїS °SЃ-R'ROOR 'AREA'S AREA'SAIRDRAINSѓR ·RѓRѓRѓRѓRѓRёR ·R ·R ±R ·R ·R РR РRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR ±R ±RRRRRRRRRR ·R ·R ·R ·R ·R ·R ·R ·R ·R ·R ·R ·R ·RRR ·RRRRRRRRRsRRRRSRR RμRєS,RoRІRЅRѕSЃS,SЊ RґRμR№SЃS,RІRoR№ SЃRѕRІRμS,SЃRєRoS ... RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <C ... P "PI RѕRґRѕRє RіRѕRґS <R'S,RѕSЂRѕR№ RјRoSЂRѕRІRѕR№ RІRѕR№RЅS <± F C <F" P ° RѕRґRЅR ° Röhr · SЃR ° RјS ‹S… RёRёR · · RєRёС… SЃCЂRµR ±RРRєRєRєRєRєRµRRRRRoRoRnRєRoR …R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R °R СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СR СRµRµRµRµRRµRµRµRRµRRRRRРRРRРRРRРRРRРR ° РЅРёСЏ, РЎРЁРђ, Р “ермР° РЅРЁСЏ. R'ROSE ROCKSHIP Рґ Рё РІР »РѕР¶РµРЅРЅС‹ С… РІ РЅРёС… средств. R'R °R °R СRµRµRµRLєRR.CN Р ° С € Шстских РІРѕР№СЃРє РёР · РСЂС ‹РјР ° 9.04 - 12.05.44 Рі. R'SEARSTER RџRѕ RґRѕRєR "P ° RґR ° Rј RєRѕRјR RЅRґRoSЂRѕRІ SЏRєRѕR ± ° C <± F C <F" Ryo RїRѕS,RѕRїR "RμRЅS <RЅRμSЃRєRѕR" C † SЊRєRѕ RμR "RμR№, RЅRѕ RїRѕRґS,RІRμSЂR¶RґRμRЅRoSЏ SЌS,RѕRјSѓ RЅRμS,. Р ”Р ° это Рё РЅРµ РѕС ‡ ень РІР ° жно, пусть Р ± С‹ Р »Рѕ потопл ено 11, 20 С † елей. РќРѕ Р · Р ° Р ° прель Рё РґРІР ° РґС † Р ° ть дней РјР ° СЏ противник провел 1 РєРѕРЅРІРррР Р ”Р ° же есл РЁРІ РєР ° ждом РєРѕРЅРІРѕРµ Р ± С <Р »Рѕ РїРїРѕ РѕРґРЅРѕРјСј трР° РЅСЃРїРССРРРРРРС, СЌСРРСРСРРРРРРРС СРСРРРРРРРССРРРССРРРРРРСРРРРССРРРРРРСРРРРРРССРРРРРРРРСРРРРРРРРРЅР °Р »РРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРеР±Р РРѓР РР °РСРРРРРРРРРР ±Р РРЅР РР °Р °РІРѓРѓРѓРѓРСРСРРРРРРРРРРРРР РР ±РРей! РђРЅР ° РЃРѕРіРёС ‡ РЅР ° СЏ РєР ° СЂС‚RoRR ° СЃР »РѕР¶РёР» Р ° ССЃ РЅР ° Р'Р ° Р »С‚РёРєРµ РІ РїРѕСЃР» еднРСРСРСРСРСРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРРє РРРРР РР РР РР РР РР РР РР РР РР РР РР РРRRRRRRR RR RR RR RR RR RR RR ROS SЃSЃRѕRІRѕR№ SЌRІR ° RєSѓR ° C † RoRo RІRѕR№SЃRє Ryo RјRoSЂRЅRѕRіRѕ RЅR ° SЃRμR "RμRЅRoSЏ SЃ RљSѓSЂR" SЏRЅRґSЃRєRѕRіRѕ RїRѕR "SѓRѕSЃS,SЂRѕRІR ° Ryo SЂR ° R№RѕRЅR ° F" P † RoRіSЃRєRѕR№ RЅS ° F ± SѓS ... C WITH<. РџСЂРё РЅР ° Р »РЁС ‡ РёРЁРРґРµСЃСЏС‚РєРѕСІСЃС С РµР» ей, РІ том С Ð РЁСЃР »Рµ РєСєСѓРїРЅРѕС..РСРРРРР РРРР СCSCS СSСРСРСРРРРРРСССРРРРРРРРРРС СSСРСРСРРРРСССРРРР, ввяяятЂосяЏЏРРР РР РР РРЏРЏР РР РР РР Р С РЏРЏРјР Р СЏР РЏР Р Р Р СЏРЏРЏРјС С СЏРЏРЏР РР Р СЏРЏРЏРјС ј СЃРѕРІРµСЂС € енно СѓСЃР »РѕРІРЅС <Pј противол РѕРґРѕС ‡ РЅС ‹Рј РѕРѕС… СЂР ° ненРРРРРРР Р Р Р РРРРРРРРРРРРРРРР Р Р Р РРРРРРРРРРРРРРРР Р Р Р РРРРРРРРРРРРРРРР Р Р РРРРРРСС… СЂР ° РЅРµРРРСРРРРРРРРРРРРР »Р »Р »Р ‹СРСРРС… XNUMBeR ° РІР ± Р ° С, Р ° рею.

P "of the PS RЅRμRґR ° RІRЅRμRіRѕ RІSЂRμRјRμRЅRo SЃS,RѕR" SЊ RЅRoR · RєR ° SЏ SЌS "C" RμRєS,RoRІRЅRѕSЃS,SЊ RґRμR№SЃS,RІRoR№ SЃRѕRІRμS,SЃRєRoS ... RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <C ... P "RѕRґRѕRє PI RіRѕRґS <RІRѕR№RЅS < РЅРёРєР ° Рє РЅРµ комментировР° Р »Р ° СЃСЊ. РўРѕС ‡ нее, РѕРЅР ° просто тР° РєРѕРІРѕР№ РЅРµ РїСЂРёР · РЅР ° РІР ° Р »РѕСЃСЊ. R'Rѕ-RїRμSЂRІS <C ... C † Roes "SЂS <SѓSЃRїRμS € RЅRѕSЃS,Ro S,RѕSЂRїRμRґRЅS <C ... P ° ° S,R Rє PI RѕS" Roes † Röhr ° F "SЊRЅS <C ... RoSЃS,RѕS ‡ РЅРёРєР ° С… Р ± С ‹Р» Рё Р · Р ° РІС ‹С € ены. Р'Рѕ-РІС‚РѕСЂС ‹С…, этР° РёРЅС„ РѕСЂРјР ° С † РЁСЏ СЏРІР »СЏР» Р ° СЃСЊ секреСРРРРРР. RџSЂRoS ‡ RμRј SѓR¶Rμ PI RІRѕSЃSЊRјRoRґRμSЃSЏS,S <Rμ RіRѕRґS <RјRЅRѕRіRoRμ SЃS ... RѕRґRoR "RoSЃSЊ RІRѕ RјRЅRμRЅRoRo C ‡ ‡ S,Rѕ RїSЂRoS RoRЅR ° R · R ° SЃRμRєSЂRμS ‡ RoRІR ° RЅRoSЏ SЂRμR · SѓR" SЊS,R ° C , RѕRІ P ± RѕRμRІRѕR№ RґRμSЏS,RμR "SЊRЅRѕSЃS,Ro SЃRѕRІRμS,SЃRєRѕRіRѕ R'RњR¤ PI RіRѕRґS <R'RμR" RoRєRѕR№ RћS,RμS ‡ RμSЃS,RІRμRЅRЅRѕR№ RІRѕR№RЅS <RєSЂRѕRμS,SЃSЏ RЅRμ PI RІRѕR · RјRѕR¶ ностѴтСС‚СЅС ‚ P 'S,SЂRμS,SЊRoS ... RЅRμ RїSЂRoRЅSЏS,Rѕ P ± C <P "of the PS SЃSЂR ° RІRЅRoRІR S,SЊ ° C † Roes" SЂS <C ... P ° ° SЂR RєS,RμSЂRoR · SѓSЋS ‰ RoRμ SѓSЃRїRμS € RЅRѕSЃS , SЊ RґRμR№SЃS,RІRoR№ RЅR ° C € Roes ... SЃRoR "SЃ RЅR P ° P °" RѕRіRoS RЅS ‡ <† RјRo With Roes "SЂR ° RјRo, RѕS,RЅRѕSЃSЏS ‰ RoRјRoSЃSЏ Rє With" P "° RѕS,R Рј РґСЂСѓРіРёС… РіРѕСЃСѓСѓРґР ° рств.

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Р • СЃР »РЁ РЅР ° С ‡ Р ° ть СЂР ° Р · Р ± РёСЂР ° ться РґР ° Р СЊС € Рµ, СРРР РѕРєР ° жетя, С З СРРРѕРЅ Є ° С ° µ µ µ µ µ µ ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ° ‹РµС ‡ РµРССС ° РЅРЅС ‹Рµ СЃ РЅРѕРІС‹ РјРё тех РЅРѕР »РѕРіРёСЏРјРё. Rљ RЅRoRј RјRѕR¶RЅRѕ RѕS,RЅRμSЃS,Ro C € SѓRјRЅRѕSЃS,SЊ, SѓRґR ° ± SЂRѕSЃS,RѕR№RєRѕSЃS,SЊ RїSЂRoR RѕSЂRѕRІ Ryo RјRμS ... P · ° RЅRoR RјRѕRІ, SЃRїRѕSЃRѕR ± RЅRѕSЃS,SЊ RѕR RЅR ° ± ° SЂSѓR¶RoRІR C, C, C ность применения торпедного оружия Рё СЂСЏРґ РґСЂСѓРіРёС…. Rљ SЃRѕR¶R ° F "RμRЅRoSЋ, RѕS,RμS ‡ RμSЃS,RІRμRЅRЅS <Rμ RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <Rμ P" RѕRґRєRo Rє RЅR ° C ° F ‡ P "Sѓ RІRѕR№RЅS <RЅRμ RoRјRμR" Ryo SЃRѕRІSЂRμRјRμRЅRЅS <C ... 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RљRѕRјR ° RЅRґRoSЂS <RіRμSЂRјR ° RЅSЃRєRoS ..., ± P ° SЂRoS,R RЅSЃRєRoS ..., P ° RјRμSЂRoRєR ° RЅSЃRєRoS ... RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅS <C ... P "RѕRґRѕRє RoRјRμR" Ryo PI SЃRІRѕRμRј SЂR ° SЃRїRѕSЂSЏR¶RμRЅRoRo RіRoRґSЂRѕR ° RєSѓSЃS,RoS ‡ RμSЃRєRoRμ SЃS, Р ° РЅС † Ryoro. RћRЅRo SЂR ° F ± RѕS,R ° F "Ryo PI SЂRμR¶RoRјRμ C € SѓRјRѕRїRμR" RμRЅRіRѕRІR ° RЅRoSЏ Röhr "PI Pd ° F RєS,RoRІRЅRѕRј SЂRμR¶RoRјRμ, RєRѕRіRґR ° RіRoRґSЂRѕR ° RєSѓSЃS,RoRє RјRѕRі RѕRїSЂRμRґRμR" RoS,SЊ RЅRμ S,RѕR "SЊRєRѕ RЅR ° RїSЂR ° RІR" RμRЅRoRμ RЅR ° C † RμR "SЊ, Ryo RЅRѕ RґRoSЃS,R ° RЅS † RoSЋ RґRѕ RЅRμRμ. P "RμSЂRјR ° RЅSЃRєRoRμ RїRѕRґRІRѕRґRЅRoRєRo RїSЂRo With ... 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R'R P ґ R ґ ґ , RІSЃRμ SЂRμS € RμRЅRoSЏ RѕRЅ RїSЂRoRЅRoRјR ° F "RμRґRoRЅRѕR" Roes RЅRѕ ‡, † F ° C ° RμRЅR RμRіRѕ RѕS € Röhr ± RѕRє C ± F <R "P ° RґR" SЏ RІSЃRμS ... RѕRґRoRЅR ° RєRѕRІR °. In this sense, the submarine is like an airplane: the entire crew can consist of highly qualified professionals and work extremely competently, but the helm is in the hands of the commander and he will be the one to land the aircraft. Pilots, like submariners, usually either all come out victorious, or all die.

During the war years, 358 people acted as commanders of submarines in active fleets, 229 of them participated in this position in military campaigns, 99 died (43%).

229 participants of the 135 combat campaigns (59%) at least once went into a torpedo attack, but only 65 (28%) of them managed to hit targets with torpedoes. Two of them sank four goals, six - three goals, thirteen - two goals, and the rest on one goal. The greatest success achieved:

Vlasov Vladimir Yakovlevich - six reliably sunk targets (3736 brt), 12,5 days at sea for one submerged target, died;
Lisin Sergey Prokofievich, Hero of the Soviet Union - five reliably sunk targets (9164 brt) and one possibly damaged, 18 days on target;
Kotelnikov Viktor Nikolaevich - five motobots sunk by artillery fire, 17,8 days on target;
Shchedrin Grigory Ivanovich, Hero of the Soviet Union - four reliably sunk targets (10152 brt) and one damaged, 31,2 days on target;
Mokhov Nikolay Konstantinovich - four reliably sunk targets (6080 brt) and one damaged, 9 days on target, died;
Greshilov Mikhail Vasilyevich, Hero of the Soviet Union - four reliably sunk targets (2293 brt) and one damaged, 64,7 days on target;
Trofimov Ivan Yakovlevich - four reliably sunk targets (13857 brt), 41 day on target, died;
Konovalov Vladimir Konstantinovich, Hero of the Soviet Union - three reliably sunk targets (6641 brt) and allegedly killed one vehicle (762 brt) and one warship, 18,4 days on target;
Osipov Evgeny Yakovlevich, Hero of the Soviet Union - three targets were reliably sunk (3974 brt) and one was damaged, 16,3 days on target, died;
Bogorad Samuel Nakhmanovich, Hero of the Soviet Union - three reliably sunk targets (6100 brt), 34,3 days on target;
Matiyasevich Alexey Mikhailovich - one reliably sunk target (2414 brt) and four vehicles (5067 brt) and two warships were allegedly killed on the exposed mines, one wrecked ship and two more warships sunk unreliable, 10,3 days on target;
Avgustinovich Mikhail Petrovich - six transports (16052 brt) and two warships, 21,5 days on target, were allegedly killed on the mines exposed;
Mogilyov Sergey Sergeevich - two authentically sunken targets (105 brt); one vehicle (749 brt) and three warships allegedly died on the exposed mines, one target was sunk by torpedoes not reliably, 13,3 days on target;
Gryshchenko Petr Denisovich - one reliably sunk target, allegedly five transports (16352 brt) died on exposed mines, 13,5 days on target;
Polyakov Evgeny Petrovich - two reliably sunk targets; two vehicles (2304 brt) and one warship were allegedly killed on the exposed mines, one ship was damaged, 41,6 days on target.

The greatest success in one attack was achieved by the commander of the "C-56" GI. Shchedrin. 17 May 1943, he hit two vehicles at once with a four-torpedo salvo. One of them sank, and the second only received damage - the torpedo did not explode. The most objective commander is N.K. Mokhova, all the victories he declared were subsequently confirmed. As an opposite example, one can cite I.V. Travkin, who declared 13 victories, approved 7 victories for him, in fact he sank the 1 transport, for which he spent a total of 50 torpedoes, which is a kind of record. The next torpedo consumption is followed by M.V. Greshilov - 49 (16,3 per drowned target) and N.A. Lunin - 47 (23,5 per drowned target).

In general, it must be admitted that the Soviet submariners fought in extremely difficult conditions. And it's not just the uniqueness of the anti-submarine line in the Gulf of Finland. The complexity of the conduct of hostilities for Soviet submariners often did not lie in the objective physiographic conditions of the regions, not in the characteristics of the enemy’s anti-submarine warfare, but in the absence of the necessary support and effective combat training. This applies to both purely technical issues (hydroacoustics, communications, the noise of instruments and mechanisms, etc.) and operational-tactical (reconnaissance, control, deployment support from bases and return). As for combat training, it was of poor quality even in peacetime, which predetermined the low success of submarines in the initial period of the war. In these conditions, on the one hand, it is necessary to recognize the unconditional courage shown by the absolute majority of submariners in literally every combat campaign. On the other hand, it was objectively difficult to expect greater effectiveness from Soviet submarines than it actually took place.

---------------------------------------

* The Baltic submarines L-1, M-72-76 (total 6 units) are not included here. By the beginning of the war, they were under repair, soon they were mothballed and never put into operation. In addition, B-1, which came out of the UK but did not arrive at Polarnoe, was not taken into account.

** In this table, when determining the number of submarines participating in hostilities, the submarines commissioned in 1945 (for Italy in 1943) were deducted from their total payroll number as they did not complete the course of combat training; transport submarines, because we are interested in the success of the use of weapons, as well as submarines which are reliably aware of their non-participation in hostilities. In particular, it is known that of all the German submarines of the XXI series, only one actually participated in the hostilities. The exception was made by the US submarines, which, unlike all other countries, participated in the hostilities on the principle of rotation and the largest number of them in the theater of operations did not exceed 182. The number of sunk targets included only transports and submarines. This is done for correctness of the comparison, since all surface warships sunk by Soviet submariners were either self-propelled barges or escort ships converted from civilian ships.

*** Often, the effectiveness of submarine actions is judged by the tonnage sunk. However, this indicator largely depends on the quality of potential targets, and in this sense is absolutely unacceptable for the Soviet fleet. Indeed, in the North, the bulk of the enemy transports were medium tonnage vessels, and on the Black Sea such targets could be counted on the fingers. For this reason, in the future, we will mostly talk about sunken targets, merely highlighting among them warships.

**** By the way, the depth of immersion and the rate of immersion in reference books are also, as a rule, not indicated.

Comments

[aszzz888]

Good detailed article. +
Well, our submariners were always on top!

[Sakhalininsk]

To be honest, the article is mixed.
Firstly, there is no information on the same Marinesko, Gadzhiev ... besides, comparing the boats operating on the ocean expanses with the boats cluttered at the theater with overloaded PLO facilities are two big differences, but the point is not that, but that one should not blindly consider dry statistics are an unconditional indicator.

[Delta]

Quote: Sakhalininets

in addition, comparing the boats operating in the open spaces of the oceans with the boats jammed at the theater overloaded with PLO means are two big differences, but this is not the point, but that dry statistics should not be blindly considered an unconditional indicator.

but what else to navigate, if not according to existing statistics? by emotions?
as for the conditions of hostilities, then you obviously think that the submarine operating on the ocean expanses is only busy with what was hiding in these expanses. No, she was looking for a target and attacked, which means that she attracted the attention of PLO forces. In addition, let's not forget about conditions such as passage through the Bay of Biscay. The Germans, in order to lead one boat to the Atlantic at the end of the war, had to lose one or two.

[ka5280]

Well, if statistics are oriented, then the Nazis waged a war. This is if judged by the ratio of losses in technology.
And if you objectively look at this topic, then the conclusions were made when designing the next generation of submarines, drawing up combat manuals of the Navy, organization of service, etc.

[Sakhalininsk]

Quote: Delta

In addition, let's not forget about conditions such as passage through the Bay of Biscay. The Germans, in order to lead one boat to the Atlantic at the end of the war, had to lose one or two.

Have you read about boat exits to the Baltic through the Gulf of Finland?
Squeak compared to this seed.

[Bongo]

Considering our loss in boats and relatively small productivity, we should probably learn how unfavorable conditions our submariners had to operate in the first half of the war, especially in the Baltic.

[hohryakov066]

Become highly specialized, analytical. I didn't quite understand the meaning of its writing. If the authors wanted to understand the low effectiveness of the combat use of our submarines, then the main question "why?" they never gave an answer. If this is another attempt to denigrate everything Soviet ... In addition, the authors use very controversial statistics.

[carbofo]

I agree, quite controversial material.
The calculations are interesting, but the volume of material is one-sided, more like fluent statistics in comparison, with what? TVDs are completely different.
And then there is the captain’s experience, and luck, and in war these are sometimes very serious arguments.

[uhu189]

Well, if we compare the effectiveness of surface ships and torpedo boats, then the numbers will be even more striking, just if we analyze, we need to indicate the peculiarity of warfare at each theater of operations. If you understand it, then there were simply no worthy targets for submarines on the Black Sea (enemy transports had a very modest tonnage, and there were practically no warships, the Germans transported several light submarines from the Baltic only in the middle of the war, and there were Italian and German torpedo boats) - therefore, the boats were engaged in unusual work for the delivery of goods to Sevastopol and the evacuation of the wounded, often becoming the target for German aviation, the main enemy of the Soviet fleet on the Black Sea. Plus, the main bases of the submarine fleet were disabled or captured (in the fall of 1942, the ports of Tuapse and Poti were operational, while Tuapse was constantly bombed by German aircraft) ...
In the Baltic, at the beginning of the war, many exits to the sea of ​​boats were associated with minefields, and not with the direct hunt for German transporters. But even despite this, it was precisely the successful raids at the beginning of the submarine war that forced the Germans to set an anti-submarine line in 1942, which was overcome only in 1944, in the course of the developing offensive of the ground forces in the Baltic states (and it was during attempts to break it that many Baltic submarines were lost ) And those who will argue that the anti-submarine guarding of German convoys from the Baltic and surrounded by Courland was symbolic - openly cunning.
Well, speaking of the Northern Fleet, the number of submarines there was not so large (if I was not mistaken at the beginning of the war there were 15 pieces) to cover all the spectrum of tasks in blocking enemy communications, protecting our bases and strategic straits from raiders, and covering for Allied convoys, given the vast expanses from Norway to Novaya Zemlya. And all this under the condition of a rather difficult climatic situation and an insufficient number of incoming intelligence used to plan military operations.
All this, besides the reasons mentioned in the article, left its mark on relatively low efficiency.

[carbofo]

Quote: uhu189

All this, besides the reasons mentioned in the article, left its mark on relatively low efficiency.

Apparently, We acted quite successfully.
I would prefer the alignment of actions on theater of operations, including by year.

[tlauicol]

Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Scheer, Hipper in the north; Gneisenau, Lutzow, Schleswig-Holstein, Schlesien "Deutschland", "Seydlitz", "Prince Eugen" and again "Hipper" in the Baltic - almost all in a sky-ready state and in the fattest years for us 44-45. Not a single one was sunk! On the night of the sinking of the Gustlov, the Hipper TKR was crawling in the same area on one serviceable turbine; he left his only escort destroyer to pick up the drowning (this is by the way of German convoys)

[uhu189]

One trouble, all the ships you named were in closed bays under the cover of anti-submarine barriers and the protection of coastal and anti-aircraft batteries, which did not allow the submarines to even get close to them, and all their basing points were covered by German aircraft. And do not forget about the huge number of destroyers and German watchdogs who accompanied the German convoys and guarded the bases. And almost all of them were eventually sunk or damaged precisely by the Allied aircraft, and by no means by the Allied submarines.
You just do not consider the Germans idiots, they have never been ...

[tlauicol]

Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Scheer, Hipper never went to sea? some of the raiders reached Obi! Eugen, Deutschland and others. Our advancing troops went to fire both in the Finnish and Riga gulfs. Hipper and his "powerful" escort have already been mentioned. There were more than enough targets for the submarines.
By the way, the counter-question is what did our aviation in the Baltic do at 44-45? What did our cruisers and battleship in 44-45 do? Keniksberg, Gottenhafen - yes the whole of Vost. Prussia and the Baltic states were clogged with cruisers and armadillos, and everything was in very poor condition.

[uhu189]

Well, let's understand, I quote your message:

Quote: Tlauicol

Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Scheer, Hipper in the north; Gneisenau, Lutzov, Schleswig-Holstein, Schlesien


"Deutschland", "Seydlitz", "Prince Eugen" and again "Hipper" in the Baltic - almost all in a sky-ready state and in the fattest years for us 44-45. Not a single one was sunk! On the night of the sinking of the Gustlov, the Hipper TKR was crawling in the same area on one serviceable turbine, he left his only escort destroyer to pick up the drowning (this is by the way of German convoys)

Did they go to 43 - 45 year? Please tell us, where did you get such information? The latter went to the Arctic into our waters, Scharnhorst, reached Dixon in the autumn of 1942, where after several hours of battle with the coastal battery and patrol ships he went back. After that, only German submarines went to the Arctic.

You yourself are well aware that our heavy surface fleet did not take part in hostilities in the Baltic Sea, it simply didn’t make sense (there was no point in risking large ships where the aircraft did well, but light forces took an active part - they supported and carried out landings, as well as German groups fired on the coast, patrolled areas.

And what our aviation did - and in fact exactly what it was supposed to do - supported the troops and sank the ships. Bombed naval bases. Attacked vehicles and facilitated ground operations. Many losses in German transport were precisely on the account of aviation. Kiel and Wilhelmshaven, of course, did not bomb, but this was not necessary - they were methodically bombed by the Americans and the British. There was an unspoken scheme of separation of objects for bombing in Germany, the main bases in Germany were within the borders of the allies. But Pilau, Koenigsberg and Libau were bombed with enviable regularity. The fact that they couldn’t get Prince Eugen didn’t work, but they sank a lot of transports, and the same cruiser Niobe in Kotka. And if you return to Marinesco, then Hipper went in another convoy to another channel and Marinesco simply did not see him ... Moreover, he did not get one torpedo out of the torpedo tube, in such circumstances it was necessary to leave quickly from the attack area ...
Once again, the boats were primarily tasked with fighting precisely the enemy’s transports, and their main goals were precisely transports

[tlauicol]

semicolon seen? read the first post again and you will understand: who is in the north and who is in the Baltic in 44-45. In the north in 41-42gg. - is that more clear? why didn’t they drown? why didn’t they attack the cruisers firing at the Soviet troops? What, transport involved? something is not enough! and the cruisers stood in the bases and received the Guard ranks? didn't want to risk it? “You tell this to infantry Van, to a simple soldier.” Why the hell did these cruisers with submarines get built?
about "the aviation did great" . Is the Niobe Cruiser the one that Aurora is good for in a mother? removed from service in 1920 and converted into a training artillery ship, in May 1940 captured by the Germans and converted into a floating air defense battery? sunk somehow instead of the Finnish armadillo? Well, five! Thanks to the creators, that all the heavy ships were buried under our nose

[Day 11]

Here you can see a man trying to figure it out. So I'm not alone. Plus to you ... For courage

[uhu189]

I saw your semicolon, you just made the accent on the fat years, but these years cannot be called fat.
Well, if you want to figure it out thoroughly, then let's.
Irember.ru has very good recollections of an artillery officer who describes the assault on the island of Saaremaa captured by the Germans (I unfortunately do not remember the author). He very well describes this moment when our units walked along the dam, and field artillery and a squadron of German cruisers started shelling them. He was injured during these battles, but he described that as soon as the Germans opened fire, our artillery answered both the batteries and the ships, and then he saw our bombers go wave after wave to the ships and batteries. A few hours later, the entire squadron went to sea, losing the destroyer, which was burning and began to sink, and the batteries were crushed ... This is one of the episodes about the infantry Vanya. Everyone did their job. And the crews of the ships did not voluntarily go out to sea, for this there is a higher command ...
Are you familiar with the composition of naval aviation groups? What types of aircraft did they enter? If not, then I can tell you the main ones - DB-3F and A-20 torpedo bombers, dive and top-mast bombers - the same A-20 and Pe-2. If my memory serves me until the summer of 44, the airfield of the location of torpedo bombers was in Borovichi, the bombers were also in the same areas. Sea fighters were mainly Yaks of various modifications and P-40, the nearest one was based near Leningrad. From Borovichi to Konigsberg, fly in a straight line for about 1000 km. What effective fighter cover can be created on such a radius to effectively attack ships at their bases, all the more well protected by fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft artillery? As soon as it became possible to accompany the bombers with fighters, massive attacks on German ports began, and before that, the actions were carried out in attempts to attack single ships or small convoys discovered by the reconnaissance that were not covered by enemy aircraft. Letting bombers go to slaughter for the sake of a ghostly attempt to get to Admiral Scheer, which by and large did not solve anything (and the German SS tank divisions that counterattacked our advancing troops decided), was a stupid and senseless undertaking.
Now about Niobe ... Yes, the cruiser was not new, but when the Germans damaged Marat, none of them downplayed the significance of this ship, saying that it was an old vessel. You keep in mind that Kotka was very well covered by anti-aircraft guns, and the air defense cruiser itself was a rather dangerous enemy for the aircraft attacking it, so its destruction is a fairly successful and well-planned operation that is worth taking pride in.
You understand one simple thing - heavy German ships simply couldn’t enter the shallow part of the Gulf of Riga and Finland, and therefore the only thing they could do was fire at the approaching troops at the places of their permanent station and go into the sea, in case of danger, receive return fire from heavy artillery of ground units or the advent of the Boston and Pe-Xnumx. Bombers did not constantly hang over the battlefield during the attack, as attack aircraft did (and even then not always), and the Il-2 was frankly weak in armament to attack a destroyer or cruiser. Therefore, a group of ships was formed that had a relatively small draft for operations in the eastern Baltic, which included mainly light forces and several cruisers (led by Prince Eugen) who delivered precision strikes and then went back to sea avoiding air strikes.

[tlauicol]

About the destroyer of the bike. Z 28 was damaged by a bomb, sunk again by the British.
They allocated a bunch of planes against Niobe, but did it mean breaking against cruisers? To German cruisers in the bays it means not small, but ours, with the support of coastal artillery and complete air supremacy, is small?
Look what happens: Germans, Japanese, British, even Franks and Italians drowned both submarines and old biplanes, and even went to the cruisers ram, and went into the fjords themselves! - and we are mainly looking for excuses for the lack of results

[uhu189]

Well, you yourself can see where Kotka is located and where Koenigsberg is from Pilau. Kotka is much closer to our main bases, and Pe-2 bombers took part in the raid, which by no means can be called long ago ... Moreover, the sinking of Väinämöinen (for which Niobe was mistaken) was not so much a military as a political action, an additional argument to force the Finnish government to peace.
The organization of the attack on Niobe was planned in advance after the unsuccessful first attack, it was coordinated and prepared. The shelling of the German destroyers and cruisers was not constant, and there was simply no episodic character and time to plan a large-scale operation, so only duty forces were allocated for attacks on ships. You just confuse the specifics of naval bombers and attack aircraft. Cruisers were not an end in themselves, it was much more important to disrupt the transfer of troops and cargo to the Baltic, and forces and means of both aviation and submarines were allocated for this. If you pay attention to the statistics of German submarines (and aviation too), their main goals were also transport ships. Yes, it was certainly possible to act more efficiently, but not you, not me, was not sitting in the cockpit of the bomber, and it was very difficult for us to judge what could have been pilots and what was impossible ...

Quote: Tlauicol

To German cruisers in the bays it means not small, but ours, with the support of coastal artillery and complete air supremacy, is small?
Look what happens: Germans, Japanese, British, even Franks and Italians drowned both submarines and old biplanes, and even went to the cruisers ram, and went into the fjords themselves! - and we are mainly looking for excuses for the lack of results

So ours drowned, but their victories are not so noticeable. In addition, if you conduct an analysis and comparison with the activity of the British and the USA, then most of the ships were sunk at their bases with massive raids of strategic bombers in the amount of at least several dozen, if not hundreds. And no one spared the bombs there, heaped up over the squares

[Su-9]

This is certainly a shame to admit, but both the article and tlauikol speak on the case.
The only thing that has not been discussed is the low level (apparently) of the training of fleet headquarters officers, since many operations were not planned at all.
The effectiveness of the application (due to a number of objective reasons) of the submarine fleet in the Baltic was low even in the 45th year.
The liberation of Tallinn, if anyone does not remember, was in September 44th. Dates from the war with the USSR have come out too. The exit from the Gulf of Finland was controlled by the USSR (of course, risky due to mines). But:
- January 29, 45, Hipper moved from Gdynia to Kiel.
- Luttsov fired on our troops along the coast throughout the 45th to the middle of April. Including helped the Germans recapture Elblag ...
- Prince Eugene fired on our troops from February to April 8, until he crossed with Luttsev in Swinovice, and then 20! April fled to Copenhagen.

On the Black Sea - the Germans / Italians had almost no PLO, but the Black Sea suffered heavy losses, and we missed our chance to win back on convoys from the Crimea. And it is true.

In the North Sea, the Germans drove strategically important convoys from Kirkines until the end of their stay there. And then they even managed to evacuate "a little" when their Finnish former allies stabbed them in the back. Of course, intercepting cruisers in the Arctic is practically impossible given those boats and the reconnaissance that the Northern Fleet had. But the situation with transports could be better.

It seems to me that the main reason for the debate here is that many people think that "inefficiency" = "cowardice or deafness." This is exactly the case. No one denies the courage and devotion to the cause of Soviet submariners.

[uhu189]

Of course, the actions of the submarines during the evacuation of Germans from Crimea cannot be called effective, but still the bombers did their best. Of course, they could not stop the evacuation of course, but the pilots inflicted significant losses ...

[avt]

Correct me if not so, judging by this article, Marinesco did not even supposedly drown anyone. But I don’t want to talk about the Baltic Sea, which the authors tacked on in passing, saying that they could have drowned more in the North, as well as about the Black Sea. In general, there’s a twofold impression of the article. Clumsy submariners hiding behind the specifics ?? Well, the factors indicated by the authors regarding the technical backwardness are objective reality. It was not possible for the Germans and allies to modernize ships and conduct training during the war, there was no physical possibility.

[carbofo]

What is true is that during the war we had no time for updating and building the fleet, we had more serious tasks on land.
But still, the fleet did not stand at the pier, most of the ships worked in one way or another, including containment.
In the north was the most difficult DVD according to the working conditions and the little experience that German crews trained in European transport had.
And for the sake of objectivity, ours probably had orders not to be exchanged for a trifle, and perhaps had priority on warships, this greatly limits the activity of boats.
These are just assumptions, there are so many factors that you can study documents all your life and not answer some of the questions.

[poccinin]

and what the author wanted to say with this article. "that our FLEET is not worth a penny. but this will only show the future of" SOMEONE-WHOM "and the graves of heroes should not be disturbed. all died for the HOMELAND. who as he could and defended the country. sea ​​in real combat conditions and then how lucky.

[pr 627]

The effectiveness of the use of any type of weapon lies in its technical superiority over its counterpart, which the enemy has at its disposal, including perfect tactical techniques, high-quality intelligence, trained personnel, and the ability to plan military operations. It seems that these factors were absent in the submarine forces of the Second World War. defend the country as much as possible and receive training in battle is the heroism of some and the crime and negligence of others.

[Fuzeler]

Such a normal libel.
The authors only forgot to say that Soviet submariners, unlike their counterparts from Germany, did not come up with white flags.

[Fuzeler]

Such a normal libel.
The authors only forgot to say that Soviet submariners, unlike their counterparts from Germany, did not come up with white flags.

[Walking]

Where is Marinesco?

[Civil]

And where are the duty slops for Captain Marinescu? (((((

[report4]

The authors are two scribblers claiming to be analytics. "Sunk targets" is so much scope for obtaining "desired" statistics results.

[report4]

The authors are two scribblers claiming to be analytics. "Sunk targets" is so much scope for obtaining "desired" statistics results.

[Day 11]

The article is controversial. The chances really drowned a lot (and many died), but the theater of war was not comparable with them. One can speak with confidence, both they knew how and fought. Only one S-1 fight says a lot. I advise you to read. I have a Talmud on the actions of ALL S-ok. Impressions are not encouraging. I think that according to K-am the situation is no better

[uhu189]

And what is the name of your Talmud, do not tell me?

[Day 11]

No question! The book is called "Eski in battle" Miroslav Morozov, Konstantin Kulagin. A lot of lyrics, but drag the facts from there. FOR EVERYONE! Schemes, plans, photos

[uhu189]

Thanks, I read

[Fotoceva62]

Everyone imagines himself a strategist seeing the battle from afar. A minus point for the complete lack of analysis. On the Chernivsky theater of operations, the opponents of our submarines were mostly small-tonnage boats of the BDB type and Ziebel ferries with very little draft. Moreover, the convoys were led along the coastal channels with shallow depths. There are known cases when the submarines were forced to crawl along the ground and, when approaching, protruded above the surface with superstructures + a unmasking silt trace and returned to the base with damage to retractable devices from in-arms, and this happened under the complete domination of enemy aircraft. When worthy targets appeared, such as Italian tankers we tried to transport fuel from Romania, we didn’t get lost. Regarding the supply of the besieged Sevastopol, we could supply it as much as possible. Before writing about the supply, the authors would have to go to DPL and think.
Baltika is generally a soup with dumplings and at the same time, our submariners drowned reptiles.
In the North, the authors should study the forces of the Northern Fleet and imagine how to fight there on the coastal and fjord fairways.
In general, an article from the series "corpses filled up".
The Americans should not be given an example with the peculiar attitude of the Japanese Navy to anti-submarine defense.
Read normal materials such as Hilainen, although the name could be slightly distorted - "Actions pl in 1914-1945"

[Fotoceva62]

Everyone imagines himself a strategist seeing the battle from afar. A minus point for the complete lack of analysis. On the Chernivsky theater of operations, the opponents of our submarines were mostly small-tonnage boats of the BDB type and Ziebel ferries with very little draft. Moreover, the convoys were led along the coastal channels with shallow depths. There are known cases when the submarines were forced to crawl along the ground and, when approaching, protruded above the surface with superstructures + a unmasking silt track and returned to the base with damage to retractable devices from in-arms, and this happened with the complete domination of enemy aircraft. When worthy targets appeared, they tried we were not lost in transporting fuel from Romania. Regarding the supply of the besieged Sevastopol, we could supply it as much as we could. Before writing about the supply, we would have to go to DPL and think about it.
Baltika is generally a soup with dumplings and at the same time, our submariners drowned reptiles.
In the North, the authors should study the forces of the Northern Fleet and imagine how to fight there on the coastal and fjord fairways.
In general, an article from the series "corpses filled up".
The Americans should not be given an example with the peculiar attitude of the Japanese Navy to anti-submarine defense.
Read normal materials such as Hilainen, although the name could be slightly distorted - "Actions pl in 1914-1945"

[Dovmont]

From where the author took the facts, I do not know, but I have completely different data! So on account of Grishchenko P, D. commander of the L-3 "Frunzovets" submarine mine, there are not 5 victories, as the author of this article, but 18 sunk enemy pennants with a total tonnage of more than 65 thousand tons. When overcoming anti-submarine lines in the Gulf of Finland, his boat was blown up 5 times by antenna mines, once he brought the boat to Kronstadt after ramming without any periscopes at all. After Grishchenko in 1943 was removed from the post of commander of the L-3, this ship was commanded by V. Konovalov. Under his command, the crew of the boat will sink 10 more and damage 1 enemy ship. Although the author recognizes only 5 pennants for Konovalov, and 2 of them are dubious. And although I agree with the author in the low efficiency of the Soviet submarine in the Second World War, I cannot agree with the indicated figures in terms of effectiveness.

[drop]

I liked the article. When I wrote the story "Maskitniki", I got acquainted with the actions of the submarine in the North. Interestingly, in the first months of the war, the British taught us to fight on submarines. Now, if such an article were prepared on the use of torpedo boats. Readers, I think it would be interesting. Then everyone would have seen a place in the world ranking of our famous Hero A.O. Shabalin, on whose account more than 2 divisions of the Nazis were destroyed, Sent to the bottom with the ships of the Germans. This commander knew how to fight, he was a born naval commander.

[Day 11]

Shabalin ... I didn’t hear, enlighten. Very interesting. Although I would (be a writer) write about the S-7 commander S.P. Lisin. That's Hero! Although he lost the battle to the Finnish submarine --- but what is it further fate! On such need to be equal!

[drop]

Alexander Osipovich Shabalin twice Hero of the Soviet Union, He started the war as commander of the TC. More than 140 times he attacked Nazi ships. He was never wounded, did not lose a single TC. He ended up serving as admiral, my good friend. He was buried at the Serafimovsky cemetery. He proposed a lot of tactics for attacks TC. His name is called BDK. monuments were erected to him, streets were named.

[Day 11]

Thank you. The country is OBLIGED to know its heroes. Especially young people. And is there literature? It is advisable without lyrics - I went to the specified area, at that time made a launch, sank so many barrels, etc.

[Djozz]

Shaw, for so many barrels?

[Day 11]

Old man, he didn’t put it right (although you understood me). Is it brighter? (Gross register ton). The site does not forgive mistakes, I agree.

[drop]

Alexander Osipovich Shabalin twice Hero of the Soviet Union, He started the war as commander of the TC. More than 140 times he attacked Nazi ships. He was never wounded, did not lose a single TC. He ended up serving as admiral, my good friend. He was buried at the Serafimovsky cemetery. He proposed a lot of tactics for attacks TC. His name is called BDK. monuments were erected to him, streets were named.

[avt]

Quote: Drop

I liked the article

Well, how much I liked this ============== ,,, in fact, he sank 1 transport, for which he spent a total of 50 torpedoes, which is a kind of record. The next in terms of torpedo consumption are M.V. Greshilov - 49 (16,3 per sunk target) and N.A. Lunin - 47 (23,5 per sunk "=========== And how many torpedoes did the opponents and allies spend? The authors do not want to compare? Especially at the initial stage, when the same Prien shouted that he was with a wooden they fired a sword to fight. Well, and how the Japanese came to the base, stuck like hedgehogs with amer's torpedoes in the hull. Well, this is when both of them dabbled with proximity fuses. No, this analysis does not delight.

[Snoop]

The consumption of torpedoes among the British and Yankees was much greater. They had practice spitting torpedo packs at the target, a high probability of defeat. Yes, and for the consumption of BC, no one particularly boned them. Unlike our submariners, especially in 41-42, you yourself understand the problems with the evacuation of industry, etc.

[Snoop]

The consumption of torpedoes among the British and Yankees was much greater. They had practice spitting torpedo packs at the target, a high probability of defeat. Yes, and for the consumption of BC, no one particularly boned them. Unlike our submariners, especially in 41-42, you yourself understand the problems with the evacuation of industry, etc.

[newcomer]

Quote: Fotoceva62

In the North, the authors should study the forces of the Northern Fleet and imagine how to fight there on the coastal and fjord fairways.

for some reason, the Germans were not prevented by the complex "coastal fjord" situation to dominate our northern waters. a prime example of this: the defeat of the infamous convoy PQ-17 ...

[uhu189]

Dear Beginner, the PQ17 example is not a vivid example at all, but rather the exception. If you look at the course of the caravan PQ17 at least from the same Wikipedia, you will see that the convoy was disbanded off the coast of Svalbard, quite far from the Kola Peninsula. Ships scattered wherever, completely without the cover of warships, each on its own and were individually sunk by submarines and German aircraft. The destroyers of the Northern Fleet, with all their desire, could not save the convoy, which was dispersed over many hundreds of kilometers along the Barents Sea. Whoever met was brought to Murmansk. Part of the ships reached Arkhangelsk. But it was physically impossible for the Northern Fleet to block and reliably control such water spaces - there simply weren’t enough ships and planes.

[newcomer]

Quote: Fotoceva62

In the North, the authors should study the forces of the Northern Fleet and imagine how to fight there on the coastal and fjord fairways.

for some reason, the Germans were not prevented by the complex "coastal fjord" situation to dominate our northern waters. a prime example of this: the defeat of the infamous convoy PQ-17 ...

[saramb]

Quote: newbie

Quote: Fotoceva62

In the North, the authors should study the forces of the Northern Fleet and imagine how to fight there on the coastal and fjord fairways.

for some reason, the Germans were not prevented by the complex "coastal fjord" situation to dominate our northern waters. a prime example of this: the defeat of the infamous convoy PQ-17 ...

Because the convoy was betrayed by our allies, as always, a point played when they learned that "Tirpitz" and "Admiral Scheer" went to sea. The main losses of the convoy were from aviation and submarines.

[saramb]

Yes, the article is one-sided, our fleet during the Second World War was the smallest in warships. And if you look at the statistics on the number of sunken ships, especially transparencies, it was the convoys who suffered losses from our allies. Even the American sailors from the transports admitted that if the Russian watchmen arrived, then to sleep calmly.

[Delta]

Quote: saramb

Even the American transport sailors admitted that if the Russian watchmen approached, then you can sleep peacefully.

is it according to Pikul? is not it?

[saramb]

I honestly do not know, I read about this in the book "On the Sea Roads" It just described the actions of our fleet, as well as the memories of the captains of ships and sailors, ours and allied ships. Basically, the book touches on the topic of escorting convoys from England and America to Murmansk ...

[Boris63]

I don’t remember where I read, but I read this - the main "victories" of the German submarines fell on the "open" waters + more than half were unsecured.

[Achtaba1970]

Quote: newbie

Quote: Fotoceva62

In the North, the authors should study the forces of the Northern Fleet and imagine how to fight there on the coastal and fjord fairways.

for some reason, the Germans were not prevented by the complex "coastal fjord" situation to dominate our northern waters. a prime example of this: the defeat of the infamous convoy PQ-17 ...

Convoys PQ and QP tried to go away from the coast of Norway, as far as pack ice allowed in winter. Accordingly, the Germans conducted their convoys as close to the shore as possible, which means - air cover, observation posts. As soon as German aircraft discovered a convoy of allies, submarines were sent to this area, and due to the fact that the convoy wiring routes to their shores were closer and easier to detect, respectively.

[newcomer]

Quote: saramb

Because the convoy was betrayed by our allies, as always, a point played when they learned that "Tirpitz" and "Admiral Scheer" went to sea. The main losses of the convoy were from aviation and submarines.

the convoy from "our allies" our northern fleet, according to the agreement, was supposed to take the north cap off the cape, and lead it further. But our sailors at that time were very busy with another, more important thing - they celebrated with fanfare and roast pigs the "attack of the century on the tirpitz" of the hero of the submariner Lunin ... although later it turned out that Lunin had not hit anywhere with a single torpedo. and about the point that someone played and the sailors of the allied convoys, who could sleep peacefully only in the area of ​​responsibility of our navy, so you dear saramb, look through the materiel a little. who drowned "Bismarck", "Tirpitz", etc., and in general how many Britons drowned German warships and how many are we? what losses did even the same PQ-17 suffer after passing half the land until it entered our territorial waters?

[Fedya]

You can talk a lot about who how many pros .. al, well, and Pearl = Harbor, we also pros .. al?

[Ruslan Gareev]

Are you confused in time? Is it okay that the British knocked down the points of transfer of responsibility much earlier?

[mko]

Fisanovich Israel Ilyich (1914-1944). In the Navy since 1932. Member of the war since June 1941. Submarine commander in the Northern Fleet. By the beginning of 1942, his submarine had eight sunk enemy ships. For heroism and courage in sea battles, Lieutenant-Commander I.I. in April 1942 he was awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union. In 1943, he became a 2nd rank captain and commander of a submarine division. From the blows of the hero-submariner, 13 Nazi transports found themselves a grave at the bottom of the sea. On September 19, 1944, a brave sailor and his crew were killed in the waters of the Atlantic, ferrying the Italian submarine "B-1" from the English port to the Northern Fleet. In 1950, the captain of the 2nd rank Fisanovich I.I. was enlisted forever in the lists of the crew of one of the submarines of the Northern Fleet.

[xomaNN]

With regret, I have to agree with the author in many ways. Effectively, the submarines of the Soviet fleet did not become a "punishing sword" during the war. Largely for technical reasons, and their management was not up to par. But from this hero-submariners of the Soviet Navy during the war, glory does not diminish!

[ValeraKrasovski]

The article is simply Goebelsian. For some reason, Vinogradov’s memoirs in the memoirs of the submarine commander of the Northern Fleet have completely different figures. S-56, commander Shchedrin has 10 confirmed victories. The given other commanders simply spread rot 2-3 times reducing their victories. Good anti-Soviet and anti-Russian article.

[Djusha]

Article of norms. and our submariners had problems. BUT, in fairness! German submariners were able to drown exactly 0 (zero) of our transports in the Baltic. (True, the Finns drowned, but this is not about them). All their production - a pair of minesweepers and a little more than a dozen boats. Their cost is much less than the cost of torpedoes launched by the Germans.

[ValeraKrasovski]

The author is clearly from the "truths" who removed the libel about WWII. Lunin is not mentioned. And the analysis of the conditions of action of the submarine in the conditions of counteraction to the enemy is not carried out. Not a word is said about the breakthroughs of 42_43 Baltic submariners from the Marquise Puddle. In a word, the author is clearly from liberals and Russophobes, and an article from the variety "was filled up with corpses."

[Ruslan Gareev]

The case when stupid accountants are trying to prove that the Second World War was won by the Americans.
It is difficult to de ..... understand that it is not debit and credit that is at war. And Private Petrov is at war. And that he can completely free of charge, without spending a penny, strangle a dozen Germans, just for the fact that they killed his relatives, and Private Johnson, having received a bunch of dough, stupidly shirts himself in his official trousers, which will cause further damage.
It is one thing when the Germans went out on a free hunt and sank the unarmed ships of the same pq17, which were thrown by the brave small British fighters. Our eyeliners are another matter. Those that operated in the Baltic Sea. They first had to overcome many minefields, then a steel net, then the anti-submarine defense of the Germans and their allies.