What is heavier: a kilogram of cotton or a kilogram of lead?
This material is a logical continuation of the recent discussion about the mystical "disappearance" of articles of load on modern ships - http://topwar.ru/33625-pochemu-sovremennye-korabli-tak-slaby.html
Engineers of past generations inexplicably managed to “squeeze” into the cruiser hull with a displacement of ≈10 thousand tons of large-caliber guns in massive rotating towers, place bulky machine rooms with steam turbine power plants, provide housing for 900 people of the crew and cover all the crews. mnogosantimetrovaya steel armor!
The trouble is that modern shipbuilders hardly have enough of the same 10 thousand tons for the construction of a bezbronnaya "tin" with computers and light launchers for missiles. Weight and dimensions of the modern weapons little resemble the performance characteristics of the main caliber of the cruiser “M. Bitter ”(pr.26-bis, 1938 year) - 247 tons without ammunition, thick steel barbets and the mechanization of artillery grabs.
Modern computers, antennas and radars look very funny against the background of the 110-meter armored belts of the old ship (steel plates width - 3,4 meters; thickness - 70 mm). The total mass of the armor of the cruiser "M. Bitter "- 1536 tons!
At the same time, the full displacement “M. Gorky "was only 9700 tons. Like a modern cruiser or destroyer!
Cruiser project 26-bis
Armor, heavy weapons, engine rooms with fuel oil boilers, “extra” 360 tons of fuel ... it all disappeared. The crew dropped three times. But why is the displacement of modern ships remained at the same level?
The paradox has a number of simple explanations:
1. Jokes with metacentric height and stability were not in vain. Modern radar antennas are quite lightweight, compared with armor cruisers of the war years, but look where the antenna devices are located - on the roofs of the superstructures and the tops of the masts! The “lever rule” comes into effect - in order to avoid tipping and keeping the value of metacentric height in the normal range, you have to add hundreds of tons of ballast in the underwater part of the ship.
2. Electronics units weigh a little, but their placement requires a lot of free space. Tomahawks can no longer be delivered here or tons of fuel poured. Internal compartments "swell" in size - the designers "squeeze" them into huge superstructures. Compared with their glorious predecessors, modern cruisers have a less dense layout, but larger dimensions - as a result, a similar amount of water spills out from under their bottoms (“If the body is thrown into the water, it will not sink”, Greek Archimedes said ).
In addition, bulky superstructures have a large sail area, which also adversely affects stability - it is necessary to compensate for their influence with a regular portion of ballast (filled with lead and blocks of depleted uranium along the ship's keel).
3. Fresh shipbuilding trends:
- elevators and conveyor belts along the whole ship hull;
- automated systems for the localization of combat damage and the struggle for survivability (smoke and water detectors, automatic locking of hatches and doors, video cameras, signal processors, automatic fire extinguishing systems);
- sealing and elements of anti-nuclear protection (overpressure is maintained inside the cruiser hull, preventing incoming air from entering outside the ventilation system filters);
- increased requirements for power supply, cooling systems and air conditioning in the compartment where the electronics are installed;
- comfortable living conditions on board - gyms, swimming pools, restaurant meals ...
As a result, all these items and "devoured" the reserve load, freed up after the refusal of large-caliber artillery and heavy armor.
However, there was no intrigue here from the very beginning. We compared ships of different countries and epochs: despite some common displacement and dimensions, the Orly Burk series IIA and the cruiser M. Bitter "- completely unlike ships, designed at different times by different schools of shipbuilding for different tasks. It is clear that an explanation of the mysterious "disappearance" of load items should be sought in the differences between the level of technical development and the standards of ship design - now and 70 years ago.
But here come into force the laws of thriller. Happy End is not close yet ...
The Tale of the collapsing Teremka
The paradox with the mysterious "disappearance" of articles of the load, in an even more rigid form, is also observed today. Moreover, in contrast to the previous, purely theoretical comparison, the current situation threatens to become a textbook example in shipbuilding.
Ticondeur-class missile cruiser and destroyer URO of the Orly Burk.
One country One flag. One time. The same tasks - escort and launching missile attacks with SLCM. The cruiser and the destroyer use similar types of weapons, the same means of detection and communication under the control of the Aegis BIUS. Identical electronics. Identical mechanisms. Identical GEM - four gas turbines LM2500 on each of the ships ...
And yet they are different. So much so that the differences between "Tika" and "Burke" cause a considerable amount of controversy among lovers of naval subjects.
A brief acquaintance with the paper description of the cruiser and destroyer (the number and type of radar / fuel supply / number of CWP cells) can cause a confusion among the layman: why did the Americans abandon the construction of such wonderful ships as Ticonderox and concentrated all their efforts on Berkov? ”
Even the most sophisticated of the Orly Burke modifications looks like a complete misery against the background of the missile cruiser. Judge for yourself:
- The cruiser on the 25% surpasses the destroyer in the number of rocket launchers - 122 UVP cells against 90 ... 96 cells onboard the "Burke".
- The cruiser has a twofold advantage in artillery - in contrast to the Ticonderoga, the Burke is deprived of aft 127 mm gun;
- The cruiser has more fuel on the 18%. Ticonderog sailing range - 6000 miles versus 4890 Burke miles at 20 economic speed.
- The cruiser has a significant advantage in the field of detection tools and fire control systems: four radar target illumination AN / SPG-62 against three radar lights on the "Orly Burke."
In addition, the cruiser has a "bonus" in the form of an additional airborne radar AN / SPS-49. Why did the Aegis-cruiser need the old two-coordinate radar? According to one version, the Yankees did not trust the newest AN / SPY-1 and decided to install a backup radar. In addition, the duplication of detection tools increased the combat stability of the ship - in the event of the failure of the main radar, the proven SPS-49 entered into force.
According to the opposite version, the installation of the SPS-49 had a much deeper sacred meaning. The decimeter SPS-49 in its work covers the frequency range 902-928 MHz. Radio waves at these frequencies are weakly reflected from the surface of the water, which is of critical importance when detecting low-flying targets.
Whatever it was, the AN / SPS-49 radar was installed on each of the Ticonderog. A highly located antenna post weighing 17 tons shifted the center of gravity of the cruiser up to 0,152 m, which, of course, led to a decrease in its stability. To compensate for the negative effect, 70 tons of ballast were added.
But even more surprisingly, the following fact will be heard - the displacement of "Ticonderoga" and "Orly Burke" is the same.
Or, if to speak in exact figures:
"Ticonderoga" - 9600 "long" tons (or 9750 metric)
"Orly Burke" Series IIA - 9515 "long" tons (or 9670 metric)
- according to the Naval Vessel Register
But let me! - the surprised reader exclaims, - We removed a significant part of the weapon, dismantled several radars and reduced the fuel supply by 200 tons ... how did the displacement stay the same? !!
Surely Tikondery has its own terrible secret. But where to find the truth in this confusing case?
Let's take a brief visual inspection of the "crime scene."
Oh wow! (Amazed exhalation.) One glance at the cruiser is enough to be terrified by its stability margin - it's amazing how this clumsy box still hasn't turned over!
What is one helicopter pad "Tikonderogi" - located closer to the center of the body (where the amplitude of oscillations is less with longitudinal pitching), it is two decks tallerthan the Orly Burke stern helipad! It is not difficult to guess how this affects the stability of the cruiser ... And what will be the result (a hundred tons of additional ballast).
Even with the naked eye it is noticeable what a huge “tower” of the superstructure is in “Ticonderoga”. Moreover, there are two superstructures - fore and aft. Mass of structures + additional ballast = cumulative effect of increasing displacement.
Compare the installation height of the Phalanx anti-aircraft guns and fire control radars on the cruiser and destroyer.
Be sure to check out the 40-meter bulwark in the cruiser's bow.
Such tricks are not in vain - compared to the Orly Burke, the cruiser must expend a significant part of its displacement by the dead lead load in the lower part of the hull. And besides, he carries a lot more weapons, fuel and electronic systems than Orly Burk!
It’s just incredible how the cruiser displacement remains at the same level as the simpler, lighter and weaker armed destroyer. Miracles?
Hardly. There must be a logical explanation for everything.
Some mysterious element in the “Orly Burke” design “devoured” the entire allocated displacement reserve - after optimizing the appearance, removing thousands of tons of excess ballast, abandoning a number of weapons and systems?
What if a battalion is hiding inside the Burke’s corps? tanks Abrams? No, what if it’s true?
Or, maybe, the displacement reserve was spent on armor and increasing the level of protection of the destroyer?
Hell no! The real level of security of the Orly Burke, clearly demonstrated the case of undermining USS Cole (DDG-67) - Port of Aden, 2000 year. Close explosion equivalent in power 200 ... 300 kg TNT completely destroyed the destroyer. 17 dead. 39 wounded sailors.
Security “Burke” is not fundamentally different from security “Ticonderoga” - local booking of important premises with the use of Kevlar and 25 mm plates made of aluminum-magnesium alloy.
You can begin to argue from the reverse - the reserve load for the installation of new systems and huge add-ons could not appear from nowhere. The creators of Tikonderoga obviously saved on something. And saved considerably. But on what?
Gas turbine GEM cruisers are almost identical to the destroyer. Fuel supply? He, on the contrary, has been increased. It remains the last option - the body ...
... During operation, cruisers were detected in 27 add-ons over 3000 cracks
- www.navytimes.com, “The epidemic of cracking on Ticonderogs”
In 1983, the supership was launched on the sea - the USS Ticonderoga missile cruiser (CG-47), equipped with the advanced combat information-control system "Aegis". At the stern of the cruiser, a huge banner flared in the wind: “Stand by admiral Gorshkov:“ Aegis ”- at sea!” (Watch out, Admiral Gorshkov! Aegis at sea!).
If you look at the event without the star-striped pathos, it becomes obvious that the Yankees brought to the sea an incompatible rusty bucket. Superpuper cruiser cracks at the seams under the weight of its own weight and falls apart even without any fire influence from the enemy.
The Aegis system was also not that cool. The only trophy of American sailors is IranAir’s passenger Airbus, which Aegis’s radars have identified as a fighter. 290 passengers at once to the other world. The commander of the cruiser "Vincennes" - thanks for composure and fearlessness in a combat situation. And the characteristic statement of George W. Bush: "I will never apologize for America."
In an effort to "shove" into the modest hull inherited by the Ticonderomes inherited from the Spruens type ships, the maximum number of weapons and radio electronics, the Americans did not find anything better than using the aluminum-magnesium alloy 5456 as a construction material for superstructures.
In principle, the decision is quite logical - despite its potential fire hazard, light AMG alloys were widely used on ships around the world. But the Yankees outdid everyone - the Ticonderog superstructures were monstrously overloaded, their design was carried out at the limit of its strength. The result was not long in coming - the cruiser began to burst at the seams right in front of the amazed sailors.
And these are not some small microcracks visible only through a microscope. The cruiser is cracking quite seriously and truly.
A new crack of length 8 feet (2,4 meters) has been discovered in the superstructure of the cruiser Port Royal.
- Post for September 2009 of the year. It is noteworthy that Port Royal suffered - the newest of Tikonderog, which was commissioned in 1994 and just returned from major repairs after landing on a reef in February 2009.
The cruiser was out of action for six months. Restoration of a cracked deck, along with work aimed at preventing similar scenarios in the future (ha-ha), cost the Pentagon $ 14 million dollars. The Yankees, if possible, reinforce the design, apply special welding methods (Ultrasonic Impact Treatment), try to extend the life of their Ticonderox to 2028 year. However, there are serious suspicions that the number of cruisers will begin to gradually decline in the coming years - the Crack Plague epidemic (the plague of cracking) leaves seafarers no other choice.
Port Royal, firmly seated on a reef near the coast of. Oahu
Already in the spring of 2013 of the year, it was planned to write off four cruisers - USS Cowpens (CG-63), USS Anzio (CG-68), USS Vicksburg (CG 69) and USS Port Royal (CG-73), which have the greatest damage to superstructures. However, the fleet still defended their ships, "knocking out" the necessary funds for their regular overhaul.
Returning to the main theme of this story - namely lightweight aluminum superstructures with minimal safety margin, provided the Tikonderom with the necessary reserve of displacement, which was spent on the installation of additional weapons, radar and increased fuel reserves.
However, when the deck cracks beneath your feet, and the “tower” of the superstructure all the time threatens to tumble to the side, drowning the entire command staff of the ship in waves - this situation hardly contributes to increasing the morale among the crew members of the super cruiser.
The next time the Americans were more cautious: when creating a destroyer of the Orly Burk type, it was decided to sacrifice part of the weapon, radio electronics blocks and navigation range in favor of increasing the strength of the hull and increasing its stability margin. The “Burke”, in contrast to the cruiser, has completely steel superstructures - they, together with a new, more “stocky” and robust hull, as a result “absorbed” the entire released reserve load.
Written off "Ticonderoga" rust at the pier of Philadelphia Naval Shipyard