The US Secretary of Defense, acting on behalf of the President of the country, sent to Congress "The report on weapons U.S.A". A few days later, an official report was published about the main content of US presidential guidance on this strategy. Prior to this, the new strategy was approved by the Minister of Defense, the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (CNS) and the Commander of the Joint Strategic Command (USC). Previous changes in the nuclear weapons strategy (NLP) took place under President George W. Bush in 2002.
The new strategy came into force in August of 2013, and next year (probably before October 1), the working out and distribution to the executive officers of the Minister of Defense and the Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee on emergency plans to the commanders of functional and geographic joint commands will be completed nuclear weapons commander of USC. This strategy is based on the results of the analysis of the requirements for nuclear deterrence with intimidation and the need for modern nuclear planning policies in the interests of safety, carried out by the Ministry of Defense with the participation of the leadership of the CNSC, the USC, the Ministry of Energy, the State Department, national intelligence and the National Security Council staff.
GOALS OF NUCLEAR POLICY AND PURPOSE NW
The presidential guidelines and the report of the Minister of Defense contain a requirement to focus only on those goals and objectives that are necessary to deter deterrence in the twenty-first century. The six objectives of the US nuclear policy are named: preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear terrorism; reducing the role of nuclear weapons in the US security strategy; maintaining strategic deterrence and strategic stability at reduced levels of nuclear forces; strengthening regional deterrence by deterring and reaffirming US commitments to its allies and partners; maintaining a safe, secure and efficient nuclear arsenal; achieving the goals of the US and allies in the event of failure of deterrence deterrence.
The designation of nuclear weapons (NW) is defined in the report as follows: "The fundamental role of the United States nuclear weapons is deterrence by intimidating a nuclear attack on the United States and its allies and partners." It further explains that the country cannot yet endorse such a policy when deterrence by intimidating a nuclear attack is the sole purpose of US nuclear weapons, and it is reported that the use of nuclear weapons will be considered in emergency circumstances "to defend the vital interests of the US or its allies and partners." It also specifies the conditions for non-use of nuclear weapons specified by comparison with the past century: “The United States will not use nuclear weapons or threaten to use nuclear weapons on non-nuclear states that are parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and abide by their nuclear commitments non-proliferation. Judging by the Secretary of Defense's “Nuclear Review 2010 of the Year” (NF-2010) and its report on the NNFX NPS strategy, the US nuclear forces carry out strategic deterrence with deterrence (without indicating restrained countries) and maintain strategic stability (with respect to the Russian Federation and China) they also carry out regional (extended) deterrence by intimidation (having or trying to get nuclear weapons of countries) with non-strategic nuclear weapons already deployed in key areas and located in the United States in readiness for vertyvaniyu in advanced areas, and the forces of the triad. In the American open interpretation, strategic deterrence with intimidation is, first of all, the conviction of any potential adversary that the adverse consequences for him of his attack on the United States or its allies and partners will significantly outweigh any potential benefit for him from the attack. In our understanding, strategic deterrence with deterrence is not a cloud in pants: “conviction” can be forceful and graduated (for example, 2013’s “Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation” 2010 of the year officially includes the use of high-precision weapons in the concept of “strategic deterrence”). Strategic stability usually implies a state of nuclear equilibrium (nuclear stalemate), that is, the inability of any adversary to inflict a first strike with impunity due to the fact that the country under attack would have a guaranteed response potential (second).
FIVE ISGOES OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY
The report lacks a number of conditions for the transition of the United States to the use of nuclear weapons in nuclear and non-nuclear countries and non-state organizations. But they are in the NW-2010 Minister of Defense: “For states that possess nuclear weapons and states that do not comply with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations, there remains a narrow range of emergency situations in which nuclear weapons can still play a role in deterring the the use of conventional or chemical and biological weapons on the United States or its allies and partners. " Therefore, if we discard reservations in the form of a “narrow range of emergencies” and “emergencies”, then the use of nuclear weapons by the United States is due to deterrence intimidating the attacks on the United States, its allies and partners of previously characterized states, which could be used for this as conventional weapons, so and any kind of weapons of mass destruction. Who are these states? The “Strategic Situation” section of the Defense Minister’s report on the PLN strategy does not mention Great Britain, France, Israel, and even India and Pakistan, but instead Al-Qaida with its allies, Iran, the DPRK, the PRC and the Russian Federation. It can be seen from the report that regional deterrence with intimidation of nuclear and conventional weapons is directed against Al-Qaeda’s nuclear-seeking weapons with its allies and against nuclear proliferators - two countries with unpredictable behavior - Iran and the DPRK. In relation to the PRC and the Russian Federation (“Russia and the United States are no longer adversaries, and the prospects for military confrontation between us have drastically decreased,” “the threat of a global nuclear war has become remote”), the United States supports strategic stability.
The organization of the PNP includes the determination of the order of targeting, options and types of attacks. Traditionally, there are two ways of targeting: counter-force and counter-value. Flipping through the KNSH document from 29 of April 1993, “Doctrine of Joint Nuclear Operations”, there we will find the following definitions. “Counter-force targeting is a strategy to use forces to destroy or disable the enemy’s military capabilities.
Typical targets for counter-force targeting are bomber airbases, SSBN bases, ICGM defense tanks, missile defense and air defense facilities, command centers and weapons of mass destruction warehouses. ” “The counter-targeting strategy involves the destruction or neutralization of military and military-related facilities, such as industries, resources, and / or institutions that contribute to the enemy’s ability to wage war.” Recently, the main target for counter-force targeting has become more commonly called weapons of mass destruction, and for counter-targeting targeting - “providing the infrastructure”. At the same time, the category “weapons of mass destruction” (WMD) included everything from the objects of production and storage of weapons of mass destruction to the entities that make decisions on the NWP.
Let us return to the minister’s report, which states that it intends to “maintain substantial counter-force capabilities against potential adversaries” and states that the United States does not rely on a “counter-interest” strategy or a “minimum deterrent” strategy under “new guidelines”. It also speaks of the need to “apply the principles of distinction and proportionality and strive to minimize the collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects. The United States will not deliberately target civilians and civilian objects. ” So, the Americans do not rely on the strategy of “minimum deterrence by deterrence”, which involves the possession of a country with a limited number of nuclear warheads (YABZ) to destroy only cities, and they do not rely on a “counter-value” strategy. (But it is obvious that “not to rely” does not mean at all to completely abandon counter-interest targeting). Consequently, counter-force targeting will act in a somewhat “narrowed” form, and counter-interest targeting in a clearly reduced form. Here, one wonders if you ask yourself: is it not the case that Americans do not rely on a counter-value strategy with the possibility of reducing their credible strategic YBZ by one third, that is, somewhere on 500 YABZ?
IMPACT WILL BE PREVIOUS AND EXTREME
In developing NSP plans, either side should provide four options for delivering nuclear strikes: a sudden (preventive), a preemptive, retaliatory (if an enemy missile launch is detected) and a retaliatory (after nuclear explosions on its territory). If YAO-2010 explicitly states the existence of retaliatory strike plans (“ensuring strategic stability with the possibility of a guaranteed second strike”), then the 2013 report of the year deals only with the option of a retaliatory counter-strike.
Presidential guidelines require the Department of Defense to “investigate and reduce the role of a retaliatory strike in emergency planning, recognizing that the possibility of a sudden disarming nuclear attack is extremely remote. While retaining the ability of the United States to carry out a retaliatory strike, the Department of Defense should focus planning on more likely emergencies in the twenty-first century. ” The text of the statement of this thesis differs from the above one by one caveat: “The Department of Defense should explore additional options to reduce the role of the counter-backlash it plays in US planning, while retaining the ability to strike back-to-face, if ordered.”
Let's try to understand the reasons for this requirement and guess its consequences. The President of the United States has a maximum of 10 – 12 minutes to assess the situation, select and decide on a retaliatory strike, which is clearly not enough. The combat crews of the US ICBM launch control centers are in constant readiness to launch missiles on the orders of the president (as they say, they keep their finger on the trigger), regardless of whether the world is prospering or the clouds are gathering over the US. In the conditions of strategic stability, the United States does not have to wait for thunder from a clear sky (a sudden strike from the Russian Federation and the PRC), therefore, maintaining the ICBM on-duty forces at the existing highest level of readiness is irrational.
The way out of the current situation and adaptation to the reality of our time would be to transfer the USMBR from a state of full combat duty (ready to launch in 1 – 2 minutes) to “modified combat duty” (ready to start, measured in hours) and maintain them in such readiness with a favorable geopolitical situation, but with the possibility of returning these forces to the ICBM for full combat duty (“if there is an order”) when a crisis situation is about to occur. Moreover, the practice of transferring US SSBNs from a state of "modified" combat duty to "full" and vice versa, which began to operate from the 60-s, proved its right to exist. In general, the role of “destabilizing” nuclear ICBMs of the USA in the nuclear triad has been steadily decreasing since 1991.
So, if we take into account the fact that the United States has never officially abandoned the use of nuclear weapons first, it becomes obvious that the Americans consider a retaliatory strike forced, a reciprocal counter-strike unlikely, and proactive and sudden acceptable. US nuclear forces must "ensure the ability to convincingly threaten a wide-range nuclear response if deterrence deterrence does not work."
The types of nuclear strikes by the triad in the report of the Minister of Defense did not find a place for themselves. If we recall the past decade, then four of these types were planned: emergency response options, selective strike options, primary strike options, and options for strikes ordered / as part of adaptive planning.
Types of wars in the report of the Minister found a half-coverage. While in 2005, such types of military conflicts and military operations as global nuclear war, strategic nuclear operations, and nuclear operations in a theater of war featured in the official draft of the KNSH document, then only global nuclear war was named in the 2013 report of the year. sense that her threat has become distant.
COMPOSITION OF NUCLEAR FORCES
US thermonuclear warheads W87 are designed for installation on intercontinental ballistic missiles
The United States will retain the strategic nuclear triad. The level of force that the USC would have achieved after the full implementation of the 2018 agreement in the 2010 year would be “more than enough for the needs of the United States to fulfill its national security goals”. Additional changes in the envisaged quantitative composition of the forces are not planned. The report does not say about the planned composition of non-strategic nuclear forces and the number of nuclear weapons for them.
The Defense Minister’s report does not contain specific requirements for the readiness of nuclear forces (although YAO-2010 provided for continued patrols in the sea of a significant number of SSBNs, combat duty on almost all ICBMs targeting the ocean, abandoning constant alert duty on air bases of heavy bombers with nuclear weapons on board). But in the report it is said about maintaining the ability to deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons aboard heavy bomber and dual-purpose fighters in the interests of regional deterrence by intimidation. It should be noted that the report did not intentionally characterize both the quantitative ammunition of non-strategic US nuclear-guided missiles in Europe, and the composition and readiness of US-based dual-purpose fighters allocated to the strategic command of NATO operations. The information on the allocation of strategic YAB to NATO (recall the allocation of a specific number of YAB to NATO on the SLBM of the US SSBN during the Cold War and after its termination) remains equally closed.
It is declared that "the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal that guarantees the defense of the United States and its allies and partners." "US policy is to have a convincing deterrent force of deterrence with the smallest possible number of YaBZ." In 2013, the US president came to the conclusion that it is possible for the United States to safely reduce by one-third the number of countable strategic strategic missiles of this country (counting from the 1550 numbers of the YABZ in 2018 under the 2010 agreement) and called on the Russian Federation to negotiate such a mutual reduction. This confirms the redundancy of strategic YABZs (in 2012, the USC had about 2150 really deployed strategic YABZs). In connection with this president’s conclusion, it should be noted that in the US 2011 – 2012, the possibility of successive reductions in US nuclear ammunition to 1000 – 1100, 700 – 800 and 300 – 400 YABZ was officially investigated. It can be assumed that behind the idea of such radical reductions there was also a passing goal - engaging China in the multilateral negotiations on limiting and reducing nuclear weapons (from the level in 500 – 1000 YABZ) and then other states (from the level in 300 – 400 YABZ) . Incidentally, in the same 2011, the National Agency for Nuclear Safety believed that by 2023, the country's nuclear capacity would decrease by 30 – 40%, from 5000 to 3000 – 3500 active, replacement, and backup YABZ. By removing the redundant W78 MBR, W76-0 SLBM, W84 KRNB, B61 and B83-0 / 1 bombs and other YABZ, US Forces from the 5113 YABZ level in the 2009 year, we went to the top XNUMN, U.S. But let us return to the report, in which a significant place is given to the stock (“reserve”) of non-deployed YaBZ. A large, albeit smaller than it is now, reserve of undeployed YABZ will be saved in case of technical or geopolitical surprises. One part of it will be made up of YaBZ of those types that are in service with the strategic nuclear triad, and the other - YaBZ of the types that are legacy weapons.
Provision is made for the preservation of “a sufficient number” of undeployed YABZs in service so that in the event of a YABZ failure of one of a deployed type or a failure of any type of carrier / delivery system, the YABZ of a failed deployed type can be replaced with an undeployed YABZ of another type from the reserve. At the same time, the replacement of nuclear warheads of the failed type will be made both within each component of the triad and between its components (probably, based on the interchangeability of the YABZ W78 and W87 on the ICBM, W76 and W88 on the SLBM, the YaBZ MBR and the YABZ SLBM, etc.) .
The reader will certainly calculate the ratio of the deployed and non-deployed YaBZ required for this. The “inherited” non-deployed YABZs will be stored in case of failure of YABZs undergoing modernization under the life extension program until confidence in the success of each modernization program is achieved. In the event of a geopolitical surprise, all these non-deployed, but workable YABs will return to the carriers and delivery systems, increasing their nuclear load.
The report acknowledges the fact that the “large number” of non-deployed YABZ will exist as a return potential for a period of ten or more years until the country's nuclear weapons complex is modernized. The report reiterates the statement that, in the area of nuclear capabilities, “the need for numerical equality between countries is no longer as mandatory as it was during the Cold War.” But in the USA they are aware of their superiority in strategic nuclear weapons for a long time (the Russian Federation planned to catch up to all the parameters of the 2010 treaty only by 2028).
It is also known that the United States is aware of the concern of the Russian Federation with the proximity of nuclear weapons to it so far from five Asian countries and its need to have more non-strategic nuclear weapons than the United States. Nevertheless, the US leadership calls on the Russian Federation to negotiate a reduction in the arsenal of not only strategic, but also non-strategic GAS. But getting approval in the country to conduct a one-third unilateral reduction seems difficult for us, and reaching a bilateral agreement on such reduction seems problematic due to the complete rearmament of the US strategic triad in 2025 – 2042 and the modernization of its nuclear stockpile.
The report reports the start of an advance “planning for non-nuclear strike options” and an upcoming assessment of “integrated non-nuclear strike options” (perhaps an integration of nuclear and non-nuclear strikes?). Despite the fact that non-nuclear weapons and "is not a substitute for nuclear weapons, planning options for non-nuclear strikes is a central part of reducing the role of nuclear weapons." “Although nuclear weapons have proven to be a key component in guaranteeing US commitments to allies and partners, the United States is increasingly relying on non-nuclear elements to strengthen the regional security architecture.” So, it is obvious that in the American shock "quadriga" non-nuclear forces (offensive kinetic and non-kinetic) are pushing the nuclear triad. The shagreen skin of a nuclear monster is gradually shrinking.
A small digression in 1992 year, when the report to the Congress of the then Secretary of Defense and future US Vice President R. Cheney contained the following passage: “Somewhere in the future, Russia's nuclear weapons will no longer be a threat to the United States and its allies; and when that happens, the United States will no longer have to hold at the sight of what future Russian leaders will treasure. This would require ... the possession of Russia by such nuclear forces that would not threaten the West (having a small number of nuclear warheads, having single-charge missiles, being in a low degree of readiness), possessing such usual capabilities that would not threaten the neighbors. " How little the United States needs for complete happiness!
What seems to be central to the “modifications” to the USSW strategy? In NLP planning, counter-force targeting displaces the countercenter. The role of a retaliatory strike decreases. With the possibility of reducing the deployed triad ammunition on 500 YABZ, the quantitative composition of the triad provided earlier is preserved without additional changes and a large number of non-deployed YaBZs are maintained for ten years as a return potential. In an effort to dispel the fears of its allies and partners in the reliability of the American “nuclear umbrella”, the United States declares increased regional deterrence by intimidation by expanding response options with non-strategic nuclear weapons and the triad. It is recognized that the accumulated undeniable potential of non-nuclear weapons plays a major role in reducing the role of American nuclear weapons, and that advance planning of non-nuclear strikes will be carried out.
Let us try to understand the North American way of thinking based on the open texts of the presidential guidelines and the report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the strategy of using nuclear weapons, which became known in June of this year.
In the conditions of maintaining the strategic stability of the great powers, the usefulness of large arsenals of nuclear weapons decreases, since they cannot be used by such powers against each other. This circumstance leads to the following consequences: the adaptation of nuclear forces to the new situation; transferring the real possibility of using nuclear weapons from the strategic level (by the great powers among themselves) to the regional level (by the great powers against other states and private organizations professing nuclear terrorism); reduction of the excess deployed strategic nuclear weapon and partial compensation of the created vacuum of force by non-nuclear kinetic and non-kinetic means of warfare; maintaining, just in case, a significant number of undeployed nuclear warheads as return capacity; “Humanizing” the strategy of using nuclear weapons with the temporary abandonment of certain types of counter-interest targeting and with an emphasis on counter-force targeting (mainly against weapons of mass destruction); efforts to plan the use of nuclear weapons in strategic deterrence with intimidation in retaliatory strike, and regional deterrence with intimidation in pre-emptive strike options.
What will be concretely contained in the real and detailed new plans for the use of nuclear weapons by the United States, hidden behind seven seals, will be learned later. In the meantime, the components of the US strategic nuclear triad, acting on command training orders, rehearse nuclear operations several times a day according to the previously provided scenarios for such operations.