Early to write off the division in stock
The goal of the military reform being carried out today is, among other things, the creation of well-armed (corresponding to the cost-effectiveness criterion) and highly mobile general-purpose ground forces that meet modern requirements. The main content of the organizational staff measures to reform the formations and formations of the Ground Forces is the elimination of the army level with the transformation of armies into operational commands (which, apparently, is expedient), and combined-arms (tank and motorized rifle) divisions - to the corresponding brigades.
The tank and motorized rifle divisions that Russia inherited from the USSR are really cumbersome and have long ceased to meet the requirements of modern combat control, the introduction of components of which successfully began in NATO countries as early as the 80 years of the last century. Today they are characterized by the formula - command, control, communications, computers and intelligence.
However, in my opinion, the specificity of the potential (albeit hypothetical) military threats to Russia is such that the total transformation of divisions into brigades can only lead to a further “imbalance” of groups of troops in threatened areas. For example, in the Leningrad Military District, such brigades (former divisions) have existed for more than a year, although initially in other (than newly introduced) states. But one thing - the border with Finland and Norway, and quite another - with China.
It seems expedient to have in the NE in an optimal ratio both the combined-arms brigade of the new look and the divisions, but also a new look.
SURFACE ANAHRONISM
I think it should be about creating divisions in the Ground Forces of a fundamentally new type, with the rejection of the traditional, really anachronistic regimental organization. I propose to consider the possibility of creating unified compounds of three types: a heavy division, a light division (instead of the usual tank and motorized rifle divisions) and an air assault (airmobile) division. The proposed DSM should be fundamentally different from simply renamed (without any significant organizational measures) in the assault landing of the existing 7 and 76-th Guards airborne divisions. I shall say more about the Airborne Troops, which are not part of the Ground Forces, below.
What is the quintessence of the proposed "divisions of the XXI century" (divisions-XXI)? This, apparently, should be connected with integrated combat control, based on the creation of “downed” in one computerized system of divisional centers: a combat control center (instead of former division headquarters), an air defense center, a combat support center and a logistics support center.
Fundamentally new for the Russian army should be the inclusion of helicopters in the combined arms divisions (which in itself is not characteristic of the ground forces of the advanced NATO countries), and in heavy divisions (as an experiment), an attack squadron (which has no analogues in the world) . At the same time, the heavy and light divisions will also have airborne capabilities in terms of including an airborne assault brigade in their composition. Taking into account the presence in them of an attack and airborne transport component, these will be divisions of "triple capabilities", but at a different level that meets the challenges of time than the experimental American division of Tricap, model 1971, known to specialists. The idea of its organization was ahead of its time, but it turned out to be incapable due to the limited capabilities of the then command and control technology.
Apparently, the ratio of divisions and brigades should differ for zones to the west and east of the Urals. Divisions should be deployed primarily where the potential enemy relies on large-scale classic offensive operations with massive use of armored vehicles.
Another important point is the unification of the organizational-staff structure of combined-arms battalions and fire divisions, of which, like Lego bricks, brigade combat commands of the most optimal composition should be “assembled” in relation to the tasks being solved at the moment and in this direction. Unification will affect not only structures, but also weapons and military equipment with a decisive deliverance from outdated moral samples.
This raises a lot of problematic issues in terms of equipping the newly formed teams of the SV of the new look. For example, in the armament brigade armament, as far as is known, it is envisaged to have old 100-mm anti-tank guns MT-12 and MT-12Р. As an important tactical advantage of these guns, the possibility of firing from them the ATGM of the "Kastet" complex is being presented. In fact, as a result of such improvements, the ridiculous heavy towed ATGM launcher was obtained.
Classic anti-tank guns, even if adapted for firing anti-tank guided missiles, are an anachronism (including 125-mm heavy towed Sprut-B missiles). They can be considered only as a palliative caused by the lack of a sufficient number of new self-propelled anti-tank systems.
It also raises questions about whether the new rifle 125-mm self-propelled sprint 2C25 “Sprut-SD” anti-tank cannon is in service with the dubious survivability in combat due to the low level of security. This is simply a light tank, created in accordance with the ideology of 70-ies (even with powerful weapons), embodied at one time in the Swedish car IKV-91. Do I need such equipment army?
CONCEPT NEEDS TO CHANGE
I would also like to draw attention to the erroneous, in my opinion, military-technical concept of the development of domestic Airborne Forces (Airborne Forces).
Not so long ago, information about the adoption of the new BMD-4 combat vehicle, the “winged” analogue of the BMP-3, became available to the public interested in military affairs. Public responses about this novelty, of course, are complementary - how, equipping the airborne forces with it "increases (in 2,5 times) the firepower of the amphibious units, allows you to solve any tasks without the support of tanks and artillery, which is offensive, that in defense" (I quote one from online sources). Indeed, the 100-mm gun - the launcher firing the Arkan ATGM and the 30-mm BMD-4 cannon look solid. But is this airborne vehicle needed? The question is not idle - Russian taxpayers should not be indifferent to how effectively money is spent out of their pocket.
Domestic definition of the main combat properties of the Airborne Forces includes:
- the ability to quickly reach remote theater areas;
- the ability to deliver sudden blows at the enemy;
- ability to conduct general combat.
There is something to seriously question.
As applied to the main tasks solved by the Airborne Forces (quick capture and retention of important areas and objects in the deep rear of the enemy, violation of his state and military control), these abilities are unequal. Obviously, being a “long-range scalpel” (but not a “club”) in the hands of the command, the Airborne Forces cannot and should not conduct a combined-arms battle in the same tactical parameters as the combined-arms (tank and motorized rifle) troops. Combined-arms combat with a serious opponent for the airborne units is an extreme case, and they have little chance of defeating him.
All over stories domestic airborne forces observed the desire of the military leadership to give them just general military qualities, although obviously worse than those of purely ground forces. First of all, this was expressed in the desire to equip the airborne troops with expensive armored vehicles - first, more or less suitable for the weight and size, and then specially designed. Although if you think about it, this is clearly contrary to the golden rule of the combination of cost and efficiency.
HOW THE “WINGED TAKE-HOUSE” HAS BEEN BORN
A brief historical excursion is appropriate here. Our first airborne unit, an experienced freelance airborne assault assault detachment of the Leningrad Military District, created in 1930, was armed with light tanks MC-1 (initially, of course, non-vehicle transportable). Then, the Airborne Forces received the T-27 tankettes, the T-37A, T-38 and T-40 light amphibious tanks, which can be airlifted by low-speed heavy bombers TB-3. Such machines (up to 50 units) were equipped with individual light tank battalions, which were part of the airborne corps (1941 staff), landed with a landing method. In the years of the Great Patriotic War, an attempt was made to create an exotic planning system “KT” - a hybrid glider and a light tank T-60.
In fact, the Airborne Forces did not need any of these tanks. After all, motorcycles and light all-terrain vehicles (such as the GAZ-64 and GAZ-67, the American Willis and Dodge, which soon appeared) were quite suitable for reconnaissance, and in a battle with a serious opponent with powerful artillery and heavy tanks, to use small armored and lightly armed light tanks would still be meaningless. In general, right up to the end of the 40-x - the beginning of the 50-s in the USSR weapons and military equipment for the Airborne Forces was not created, except for ridiculous in its caliber for the end of the Second World 37-mm airborne cannon of the 1944 model of the year (moreover, in principle, the Sudaev compact submachine gun - PPS-43) was very suitable for paratroopers.
It should be noted that during the war, the Red Army airborne for the intended purpose were used limitedly and not very successfully. Mostly they were used as ordinary, although the most well-trained rifle troops. In the same landings that they landed, the airborne armored vehicles practically did not take part, and in 1942, the tanks with the weapons of the Soviet airborne formations were removed.
It should be recognized as unsuccessful and specially created airborne tanks of the United States and Great Britain during the Second World War - Locust, Tetrarch and Harry Hopkins. For the most part, they did not participate in hostilities due to weak weapons and armor, as well as constructive flaws. The English "Tetrarchs" even had a tragic history when disembarking landing gliders during the Normandy landing operation 1944, some of them got stuck, entangled on the ground in the lines of parachutes lying around.
Unlike their opponents, the Germans did not burden their own paratroopers with not only useless armored vehicles, but also transport in general, limiting it mainly with motorcycles. Among them was the original half-track motorcycle tractor HK-101 "Kettenkrad" company NSU (the latter was the first in the history of the vehicle, specially designed for the Airborne Forces). And despite the fact that the Luftwaffe received the world's largest military transport aircraft Me-323 "Giant" with a payload of 11 tons, which, in principle, allowed light tanks to be taken on board.
It was precisely a clear understanding of the tasks facing the "winged infantry" (including the assumption that paratroopers would capture the transport on the spot after disembarkation), which allowed Hitler's German Airborne Command to avoid mistaken decisions to equip them with unnecessary equipment. But Germany managed to create, in addition to "Kettenkrada", also a series of samples of special landed fire weapons.
After the end of the Second World War there was a revival of the Soviet Airborne Forces. They did not receive tanks (although prototypes of air transportable light tanks appeared), but the participation of paratroopers in combined arms battles was still envisaged. To this end, already in 50, the Airborne Forces began to equip the airborne forces with heavy (as applied to this type of troops) armament: 85-mm self-propelled SD-44 guns, 140-mm rocket launchers RPU-14, airborne self-propelled anti-tank guns - IH-57 -NOX -NOX -GNNXX 57 (9 for each parachute regiment) and further 85-mm ASU-85 (31 for the airborne division), as well as armored personnel carriers BTR-40. CD-44, RPU-14 and ASU-57 parachuted, and ASU-85 and BTR-40 - landing method.
It is curious that in the States in 1947, the armored vehicles provided for the airborne division were completely absent. But the saturation of the American airborne division with cars (593) and light anti-tank bazookas (545) drew attention to itself. However, at the end of the 50s, the Americans developed the states of the so-called pentomical divisions, optimized (as it was thought) for conducting combat operations under conditions of a hypothetical nuclear war. In these states, the US Airborne Division was supposed to have 615 armored personnel carriers, its own nuclear missile weapons (the Little John tactical missile system) and, importantly, the 53 helicopter.
Very soon, the Americans were convinced of the bulkiness of such an organizational structure. As a result, according to the 1962 states, armored personnel carriers from the airborne division, like the Little Johns, were removed, but the number of cars was increased to 2142, and helicopters to 88. True, the Yankees also didn’t do without the enthusiasm of the airborne self-propelled anti-tank artillery - I mean the tracked tank destroyer “Scorpion” with an openly positioned 90-mm cannon. However, the Scorpions were superior to ASU-57 in the power of armament, and favorably differed from ASU-85 by a smaller mass and the possibility of paratroop landing (the parachute assault system of ASU-85 was created much later, when ASU-85 was completely outdated).
Refusing to create a solid bulletproof booking, dubious in terms of the protective properties of a solid bulletproof booking, the Scorpion approached the creation of the most optimal for their time tactical and technical characteristics of a mobile artillery system for the Airborne Forces. Something similar, but not on tracks, but on wheels, was tried to create in the USSR (85-mm semi-armored self-propelled SD-66 self-propelled gun using the chassis elements of the GAZ-63 vehicle). "Bring to mind" CD-66 did not succeed.
Subsequently, however, a battalion of light tanks (54 Sheridan tanks with 152-mm guns - launchers firing the Shilleyl ATGMs) became part of the US Airborne Division. The combat value of this unit turned out to be very controversial, especially taking into account the Sheridan’s shortcomings identified during the Vietnam War (unreliability of the engine, missile-cannon weapons complex, etc.). Now there is no tank battalion in the American airborne division, but there is a whole army brigade aviation and a helicopter reconnaissance battalion (at least 120 helicopters).
The arrival (starting with the 60-s) of the anti-tank guided missile complexes (first “Bumblebees” with a self-propelled launcher on the GAZ-69 chassis, and then light portable ones) practically solved the issue of equipping Soviet airborne forces with light, powerful and long-range anti-tank weapons. In principle, equipping parts of the Airborne Forces with a special parachute variant of the GAZ-66 truck - GAZ-66B - also solved the issue of their mobility.
But the USSR Ministry of Defense still dreamed of combined-arms battles in the rear of the enemy. Therefore, specialized airborne volley fire systems “Grad” (airborne BM-21V Grad-V on the GAZ-66B chassis) and conventional 122-mm howitzer D-30 began to arrive in the Airborne Forces. And most importantly - the BMD-1 airborne combat vehicle was adopted, the clone of which was the BTR-D armored personnel carrier, viewed as a chassis for a command and control vehicle, a self-propelled launcher of the Kommersant ATGM system, a carrier of man-portable air defense missile systems, and so on. It turned out, of course, impressively, but expensive. And it makes no sense in terms of protective properties - to solve specific tasks facing the Airborne Forces, armor is not needed at all, and in a heavy all-arms battle without the support of the main battle tanks and helicopters, the chances of surviving all this Soviet armored parachute (including the BMD-2 that also appeared later) and BMD-3) was not any.
When conducting special operations in the North Caucasus, paratroopers preferred to ride “on horseback” to BMD (as, incidentally, infantry — to BMP), rather than inside ...
In terms of the “cost-effectiveness” criterion, it also appears that the GAZ-66 vehicles (or even the UAZ-469) towed by cheap 120-mm universal Nona-K guns are much more preferable for the Airborne Forces than the non-armored self-propelled guns Nona-K WITH".
Thus, in terms of their composition, the Soviet airborne divisions (at the time of the collapse of the USSR - more than 300 BMD, around 200 BTR-D, 72-74 of the CJSC "Nona-S" and X-NUMX-6 howitzers D-8 in each) for use For the intended purpose, the armor was obviously over-heavy, and as air transportable motorized rifle formations, they turned out to be too weak to successfully counter a tank and motorized infantry units of a potential enemy in a direct clash, with a large number of helicopters carrying ATGM in the case of NATO countries. So these divisions remain in essence today.
So why do our Airborne Forces need a new expensive BMD-4? By itself, without interacting with the main battle tank (which cannot be dropped on parachutes), she does not represent any special value in general combat, like her predecessors, no matter what the armor apologists say for the Airborne Forces. Maybe it is better to think about how to reform the Airborne Forces (including technically) in relation to the tasks that they must perform?
DESANTA NEEDS HELICOPTERS AND OFF-ROADS
In my opinion, the airborne forces need not easily combustible BMD, but cheaper unified off-road vehicles (they are also platforms for various weapon systems) such as the American Hammer and our Vodnik, light Buggy fighting vehicles like the British Cobra or American FAV and universal wheeled transporters on the model of, say, the German "Kraki" (the distant analogue of which can be considered the front end conveyor LuAZ-967М, on which Soviet paratroopers installed 73-mm easel anti-tank arms CNG-9 natomet, 30-mm automatic grenade launcher AGS-17, etc.). And - helicopters. Airborne troops that do not have their own multi-purpose tactical helicopters today are an anachronism.
Russian "Hummers" (unfortunately, the multi-purpose army vehicle "Vodnik" is still not a "Hummer"), "Cobras", "Krak" and even more than divisional combat, transport-combat and reconnaissance helicopters of the Russian Airborne Forces, and, apparently, equipping them with such equipment is not planned at all (air squadrons of An-2 and Mi-8, assigned to the airborne divisions exclusively for parachute training, do not count).
It is completely incomprehensible why the anti-aircraft missile divisions in the airborne divisions are converted into regiments. It turns out anti-aircraft missile regiments whose armored personnel carriers are BTR-ZD armored personnel carriers with Strela-3 man-portable air defense systems, that is, "armored personnel carrier regiments". This, in my opinion, is some kind of pure profanation.
But in their commanding "asset" the current Russian military leaders have the heroic death of the 6 Company of the 104 Guards Parachute Regiment in Chechnya. At the line marked in the order in the area of Ulus-Kert, that company was leaving on its own two feet. And fought against the Ichkerian militants as desperately as many "dismounted" Soviet paratroopers during the Great Patriotic War - without air support, causing their own artillery fire on themselves.
The commanders, who did not understand the role of the helicopter in the modern war, are looking at the new armored vehicles, created in accordance with the outdated philosophy of the armored fist of the middle of the last century. It is not just expensive - it is completely ineffective.
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