I hasten to make a reservation right away: I am not an “expert on armored vehicles,” moreover, I don't even have the desire to become one. The fact is that among the so-called "experts" who write about "how bad our BMP is" or "what kind of BMP is needed by Russia," I see pundits carefully studying the experience of world and domestic tank building, who know all about our, American and Israeli combat vehicles.
But knowing all this only from scientific articles and theories of each other. I belong to another category - the category of practitioners, those who by fate had not to study articles in journals, but at night to study “Technical Description and Operation Guide”. And in the morning, together with the driver-mechanics, the gunner operators and the senior company technician, bring the subtracted at night, invented on this basis in insomnia and seen under the open hatches, “slate” and “polik” to a common denominator. I am proud that in the quarter century of service in the Armed Forces I have mastered quite well the operation of the BMP-1, and the BMP-2, and the BMP-3. And it was necessary to squeeze out from them everything that they were capable of, not according to TTH, but according to their actual condition. In other words, I am an officer who has extensive experience in operating these machines in the real world of wars and conflicts.
FIRST ACQUAINTANCE WITH "SWALLOWS"
My acquaintance with the BMP-3 and service on these machines were a bit ridiculous. At the school (Omsk VOKU) we were taught on the BMP-2 and the BTR-80, and in the troops the first machine I had to master and operate was the BMP-3. Later, in the North Caucasus Military District, he switched to BMP-2, and then had to fight on BMP-1 and machines based on it. Then again the BMP-2 and, finally, the native swallow - “three points”.
In the school at the department of armament and shooting, we were taught the composition of the armament of the BMP-3, but all according to posters and stands. You could see the car itself while standing on guard at the training car park, and when it went to the training ground when the BMP-3 rushed past the cadets line tank the road. Even then, it was noteworthy how the car goes along irregularities - the body literally floats in the air, and only the road wheels work out all the holes, potholes and bumps.
And so, after graduation and the first lieutenant leave, I was assigned to the 228 Motorized Rifle Regiment of the 85 Motorized Rifle Division in Novosibirsk — my first personal acquaintance with the BMP-3 took place there. The company commander Sasha Lozhkin, who graduated a year earlier from my own school, brought me to the fleet of combat vehicles and, pointing at the equipment, casually said: “These three cars are yours. There is nothing to be afraid of - everything is as simple as a penny. ” For the first time, it was even a little scary to approach this engineering miracle, which, according to the teachers in the school, was stuffed with electronics at the level of a spacecraft.
But after we together climbed the 20-30 minutes on the BMP-3, everything somehow fell into place. Correctly wise people say: "The eyes are afraid, but the hands do." Already all the tumblers and buttons were pressed in the correct sequence, all operations necessary not only to start the engine, but also to transfer weapons to the combat position, to aim and fire, became clear and simple. Half of all the manipulations that the BMP-2 had to perform with a screwdriver and a special hook were simply taken over by the troechk. It even became a little insulting - for which four years were trained to perform the process of loading ammunition and loading a gun for speed, for which hands were knocked into the blood, when you just need to lower the end of the tape into the receiving sleeve and press a button.
The smooth running of the BMP-3 on the head exceeds the "two".
After the first meeting, it was time to work in the park, preparing the equipment for the field exit, during which a close acquaintance with the “swallow” took place. The big advantage was that all the squad leaders, gunner operators and driver mechanics did not just finish the training unit, but were sergeants and instructors there. Considerable assistance in the development of technology provided and factory teams, constantly working in the regiment. I will not, however, recount in detail history his service. Let's get down to business.
BMP-3 FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE PRACTICE
Experts from the press say: the crew is more important than the iron, and the BMP-3 has a huge drawback - the engine is at the back, not the front, like in M2 Bradley, other Western BMPs or the Merkava tank, where the engine is an additional protection for the crew and landing force. You can arbitrarily argue about the advantages of heavy infantry fighting vehicles - the level of protection, firepower, in the same system with tanks ... Or maybe you should start from the stove, from your own, Russian stove? What is the need for BMP Russian army? To perform the tasks defined by the Armed Forces. I think everyone will agree with that.
Then let's start by comparing the conditions in which our motorized infantry troops are to perform the task, and not the Israel Defense Forces or the US Armed Forces. The Constitution, Military Doctrine and other governing documents of the RF Armed Forces state that our army must protect the country from external aggression and participate in counter-terrorism operations in the territory of the Russian Federation, as well as to participate in peacekeeping missions in accordance with international agreements of Russia within the UN.
Consequently, the main theater of military operations for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, and therefore for infantry fighting vehicles, will be the territory of Russia and the adjacent states. Based on the characteristics of the geographical zones of our Motherland, it must be admitted that we need a floating BMP that is able to overcome water obstacles without preparation, and a heavy BMP cannot be such.
The Israel Defense Forces in its theater of operations with a small number of rivers do not need floating infantry fighting vehicles. Infantry (motorized and mechanized) parts of the US Army are armed with an infantry fighting vehicle M2 Bradley, which initially has limited buoyancy. Recently, the US Armed Forces have been fighting mainly in the sands, and further deterioration of M2 Bradley’s properties to overcome water obstacles on their own as a result of increased booking is not a significant problem for them.
In our country, from the Dnieper to the Ussuri and Amur, the whole territory lies between the watersheds and the river beds.
I want to ask the community of experts: who of you drove the BMP-1 (BMP-2) and BMP-3? And not a trial lap in the park or along the aligned path of the headmistress at the test site, but at least in the old broken tank-course, in which for three or four months already tanks, BMP, MTLB and SAU were worn. I will not even ask about driving along the spurs of the Terek Range, about climbing the “serpentines” of the Kharami Pass and the Chuisk Road, about the mud of rice “checks” under Engel-Yurt and clay under Novogroznensky and Alleroi. Who shot from regular weapons and small weapons from the troop compartments of these machines?
I foresee the answer: no one.
And I ask this question as follows: the one who drove a BMP with a front-mounted MTO (BMP-1, BMP-2) and BMP-3, knows the difference between them.
If motorized infantry prefer to go on armor, then the open hatches of the amphibious assault unit BMP-3 turn into additional protection.
Anyone, even an inexperienced driver, knows how a “penny” and a “dvuhchek” “wind” with their nose, how to turn the car so that it doesn’t catch a hole in the dive, and then you can pierce the shock absorbers and torsions with balancers scatter along the road or even “catch a dolphin” - dive into a puddle with your head.
Peres on the BMP-3, you immediately feel that centering and balancing on it, thanks to the transfer of the engine to the stern, have changed for the better, and the use of double torsions in the undercarriage design further improved the driving performance.
The good smoothness of the BMP-3 makes life easier not only for the driver, but also for the gunner-operator, who no longer needs to find a pause between jumps and dives, he can fire practically in polygon conditions, even when driving over bumps, pits and potholes. The gunner-operator does not live by the stabilizer.
Another argument of the opponents of the BMP-3 is the location of the landing and the need to fully open the upper stern projection of the vehicle with the landing of troops on top of the engine.
Well, let's look at it from the point of view of practice.
First, the landing is very comfortable for making long marches - practically in the center of mass of the BMP, which means that the motorized infantry does not wind up, as in the BMP with the front engine, where they are located on the long end of the lever. Let us ask an ordinary motorized infantry rider: “What do you think, son, on the march for a hundred kilometers to fly in the landing party, mixed with knapsacks, weapons and neighbors”? In addition, the motorized infantrymen quickly realized what benefits they could get from footboards, handles, and doors with hatches on the stern of the car. At the first demonstrative tactical doctrine, which we conducted for the members of the military council of the district, I was surprised when the soldiers, overcoming the passage in the mine-blast barriers, did not run after the car on tracked tracks, which were difficult to guess on dry ground, and immediately jumped on steps, grabbed the handles and drove the aisles behind the stern of the car, hiding behind her armor. The rate of overcoming the minefield was three times higher than when it was passed on foot behind the machine, the risk of stumbling and stepping on a mine dropped to almost zero.
Secondly, the exit through the engine is no more difficult than through tight feed doors or a ramp.
Thirdly, in the conditions of local conflicts in a mountainous and wooded area, for example, in the Chechen Republic, when motorized infantry prefer to ride armor rather than inside the car, the open hatches of the troop compartment turn into an armor type of open top armored armor.
Some critics of the BMP-3 reproach the creators of the car with the fact that the infantrymen, who play the role of the gunners of the course machine guns, must land under enemy fire through the upper hatches located in front of the machine.
To respond to this claim, we need to touch upon such concepts as the capacity of the troop compartment, the organizational structure of the motorized rifle squad and the tactics of offensive combat.
The BMP-3 was created in Soviet times under the motorized infantry branch of the USSR Armed Forces. According to the state, it included: the squad leader — the commander of the combat vehicle (KO-MSC), the gunner-operator (BUT), the driver-mechanic (MV), the machine-gunner (P), the gunner-gunner (SG), the gunner-assistant of the grenade launcher (LNG ), senior shooter and shooter. Total - eight people in the department.
For coursework PCT to become a means of destroying the enemy, driver mechanics need to be taught how to shoot them.
The troop compartment freely accommodates five people, although it can accommodate six paratroopers without any problems. Fighting compartment - two people (KO-KBM and BUT). Department of Management - three people. Total - 10 people. There are two free places in the car.
In the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, the number of personnel in the motorized infantry unit either decreased, increased, but never exceeded eight people.
I turn to tactics. There are two types of offensive - on prepared defense and on unprepared enemy defense.
When attacking a prepared defense, personnel dismount and attack on foot with the support of the BMP.
When attacking an unprepared defense, an offensive is planned without dismounting motorized riflemen.
After breaking through the enemy defenses - even with the current views on the conduct of hostilities, all leading countries pay special attention to advancing the enemy along the withdrawal routes with the task of preventing his organized retreat and organizing defense at intermediate lines. This is where we will summarize our GSAs and technical capacity with tactics.
When attacking the enemy’s prepared defenses, the entire landing force is located in the troop compartment and only the crew take their places through the top hatches of the tower and the control compartment. The places of gunners of course machine guns remain free, while the course machine guns themselves are placed on the stoppers and transferred under the control of the driver.
If, however, we have to attack a weaker enemy - without dismounting, then the firepower of the combat vehicle will come to the fore. It is in this case that the FCT coursework with separate control is needed.
During the pursuit of the enemy and his advancing with access to intermediate lines, an important characteristic of a combat vehicle is the ability to fire forward and to the flanks without dismounting the landing force. In this case, the course guns and the possibility of firing arrows through the embrasures are no less important than the fire of a tower installation.
I don’t know if there are other BMPs now that have such a comfortable opportunity to fire from small arms through side embrasures or not, but the fact that the BMP-3 is a head taller than the BMP-1 and BMP-2, - that's for sure.
I remember how to do the exercise of shooting from small arms from the airborne unit of the BMP-1. It was a miracle if it succeeded in a narrow glazed sector to precisely release a line at a target dancing in front of my eyes - I already mentioned the driving characteristics of the BMP-1 and BMP-2.
When installing the BMP-3 machine gun for the first time, I was surprised that there is no window for aiming and monitoring the target. It turned out that in this car the soldier does not need to aim, clinging to the machine gun, for this purpose the aiming mark is provided in the viewing device of the gunner of TNPO, which moves where the rifle gun turns. The five-minute exercise in motion, and the crosshair of the aiming mark in the circle, became firmly held on the chosen object. The combination of double torsions, rear centering and placement of the landing force in the center of mass of the vehicle ensures effective fire without the need to keep both the weapon and the target in sight in line with the eye.
The main caliber of the BMP-3 - 100-mm gun 2А70.
It is inconvenient to shoot only through the stern loophole: in order to open fire from it, the machine gunner needs to crawl into the tunnel, in the darkness to prepare the weapon to the touch, and then fire in this cramp. But in what cases do you need to shoot through the stern loophole? Is that in terms of the environment of the machine with the troops inside. In other words, this loophole is needed as a last resort, when it will be no time for crowding and darkness.
However, the main armament of the BMP is, of course, a gun in the tower.
Now they argue a lot about what kind of weapons are more suitable for cars of this class. There is an opinion that it is necessary to dwell on the 30-40 mm, there is an opinion on the need to strengthen the cannon armament up to 57 mm or even on the installation of tank guns. You can talk a lot on this topic, but an option that combines the powerful 100-mm and the rapid-fire 30-mm guns has long been created - this is the Bakhcha combat module.
The 100-mm gun 2А70, which is also the ATGM launcher, has in its ammunition set high-explosive fragmentation shells (OFS) and anti-tank guided missiles. There is a “P-100” position on the ballistics type switch. Few people know that it is intended to carry out an air explosion of a projectile on approaching the target. This allows you to fight with the enemy's manpower, located on the reverse slopes of heights, in ravines, behind walls and in trenches, and also to conduct effective fire on aerial targets.
In order to characterize the excellent characteristics of the BMP-3 fire control system, I will tell you again a case from my practice. Once, during night firing at the control classes, my sergeant was told from the tower that he had got two flights for the estimated clearance (the exercise was performed shooting from the 100-mm guns according to the gun crew, the target was a gun shield and 5 growth figures). He was angry with the inspector and gave the air straight: “I lift the lift with the third projectile!” The head of the test site knew what that meant and cried: “Don't!” Then, when we went to see the shooting results, it turned out: two blanks flashed the shield in the center, and the third hit right under the base of the target, breaking the stance.
On the BMP-3, in parallel with the 100-mm gun, an 30-mm 2-72 gun was installed. It, in contrast to the more well-known 2А42, is recharged due to the long stroke of the barrel. This not only reduces gas pollution in the fighting compartment of the vehicle, but also creates a larger ellipse of dispersal of projectiles in flight, which makes it possible to more effectively fire at high-speed low-flying air targets.
The energy of this weapon is such that a long line can stop the T-80 tank at full speed. You can imagine what will be inside the tank with such a "braking". There is no need to talk about the presence of any observation devices, target designation, fire control, active defense of the machine or anti-aircraft machine-gun installations after such a “rainstorm” - the tower looks like a freshly shaved skull.
Now about ATGW. ATGM on the BMP-3 is launched through the gun - launcher. On the BMP-1 and the BMP-2 with the Fagot or Konkur anti-tank missile systems, in order to prepare the ATGM for launch, it was necessary to lean out, insert the launch container into the guides, and then lead the missile to the target. In the BMP-3 rocket need only be sent into the barrel, pointing through the main unit-sight. The only advantage of the previous machines in comparison with the "troika" is that they had the possibility of carrying out the ATGM from the machine and working with a portable launcher. It would not hurt the BMP-3.
Shooting loophole BMP-3 is really uncomfortable to shoot. But it is needed only in case of emergency.
In conclusion, a brief review of the armament of the machine I want to dwell on the FCT course machine guns.
Yes, the driver has the problem of driving the machine and firing machine guns during the battle, but on other machines there is no such possibility. How many times did it happen that the driver sees the target and the arrows in the chain do not observe it, while the gunner – operator is busy destroying another target, so leave the enemy uncased? Even just turn in the direction of the target - this is target designation, as well as the disruption of targeted firing by the enemy. It’s not so easy to take aim when two machine guns are shooting at you.
However, two course-based FCTs are not just a means of psychological influence on an adversary, but first and foremost a means of destroying it. Driver mechanics need to learn how to shoot from machine guns. Therefore, it is necessary to introduce appropriate exercises into the training program and into the course of firing and develop a methodology for teaching such shooting.
We now return to the layout of the BMP-3 and try to figure out how much the front engine position influences the level of crew and airborne protection.
The BMP-3 has a fuel tank in the nose with partitions and floats to dampen fuel vibrations, the protective walls of which prohibit its detonation. This tank, in the case of penetration of armor, will assume all that flew in front of the car.
If instead of the fuel tank to place the engine and protect the crew with its price, how long will this extend the life of people? The machine, which has lost its mobility and power supply of all the power supply circuits of the instruments and control of armament due to the engine, is doomed to live on the battlefield for only a few seconds.
The BMP-3 with a broken fuel tank, even if one of the crew members is lost, will be able to stand up for itself, and get out of the blow, and close itself and its troops with smoke. It is the increase in survivability of the BMP, its ability to continue to “snap” to the last, which allows us to save people's lives, and not the dubious gain of a few seconds at the cost of the life of the machine.
PROBLEMS OF BMP-3 ARE PROBLEMS OF ALL RUSSIAN ARMY
During the service, I heard a lot of complaints about the BMP-3 and from the officers, but when I asked them how long they had served it, it turned out that none of them had the good fortune even to get acquainted with the car. All the talk about the excessive complexity of the BMP-3 and the inability to repair in the field is based on the words of someone from the outside. These conversations even went to our school at the turn of 1980-1990. However, I did not hear from officers of the 228 Motorized Rifle Regiment complaints about the complexity; driver mechanics who were called up from collective farms and from mines, digging into engines, did not say that it could not be repaired. Soldiers of military service quite successfully master the machine, they just need to be taught this, taught in training units, taught daily in parts, trained and educated. The machine, along with simplicity, requires detailed training of personnel for its operation and use for combat purposes. Then she will show herself in all the brilliance of steel and fire.
Of the 326 cases of failure of the BMP-3, recorded over two years in the 19 ombsbr, almost 99% are faults that arose during the operation due to personnel, and a rather large part of the claims are not confirmed at all by the repair crews: often their inability and shortcomings in the preparation of personnel simply trying to shift to the car.
In early-release machines, the rangefinder transceiver was located above the barrel, and after each march it had to be reconciled.
And what do we want when there are no training units that train specialists for maintenance and repair of the BMP-3, there are no repair teams in the states of the brigade (only the service units), there is not even a battery in the staff of the motorized rifle brigade, although the first place in the list of faults it is the dead batteries that occupy, not to mention the fact that cadets are still taught in BMP-2 and BTR-80 in schools. When I took photographs for this material, I asked the lieutenant about his impressions of the car. In response, I heard: “I don’t know yet — we haven’t studied it at the school, but here I’ve spent it all around in the summer, and that's it.” But I asked him my question already in the winter.
On the one hand, the army was relieved of its unusual tasks - they gave all the equipment repair to factory structures, but on the other hand - by doing so, we deprived the soldier of daily communication with the machine, studying not the equipment in the classroom, but the lively equipment assigned to it with all its individual features . The driver turned into an ordinary rider, unable to do anything but push the pedals and turn the steering wheel.
After all, there is no more effective technical training than a hand-made repair of the equipment entrusted under the supervision of a specialist, but also the positions of senior technicians have moved into the category of sergeants. And who is the sergeant now? The sergeant is the same “conscript” who served from six months to a year and, like all the others, has no experience in troop repair of the machine. From whom, then, to raise senior technicians, if all the repair work is carried out by factory brigades?
Over time, the machines leave the factory warranty service, and the personnel cannot repair them - this is what led to the outsourcing.
At one time, I had to command a combined platoon of training vehicles, and then a combined company of training BMP-3s at the proving ground in Shilovo. The task of these units was actually the repair, restoration and preparation of the combat training group machines for classes.
And the first thing I had to do was learn from driver mechanics and artmasters. It was already later that I, without getting into the engine, could tell any soldier what had broken and what had to be done, but at first I was learning. Yes, I say this, not at all embarrassed, - I learned from the soldiers and sergeants, consulted with warrant officers and officers, bored with questions from the guys from the factory brigades. I do not see anything shameful. But pay attention - he studied with soldiers and sergeants of military service, and not with professional military personnel under contract, and this already speaks about their level of training.
Like any other machine, the BMP-3 has its weaknesses and shortcomings. Can anyone show me a car without them?
The essence of our main claims to the design of the machine was that the rangefinder transceiver was installed above the gun barrel, which made it necessary to carry out its reconciliation after each march in preparation for firing.
However, now the brigade is replacing the BMP-3 with the same location of the device on the machines in which the transceiver is transferred to the armor of the tower to the right of the gun.
Initially, the design of the BMP-3 was the possibility of changing the clearance, but the mechanism was weak and constantly broke down, so it was first blocked, and then removed altogether. So until now, the car has not received a new mechanism for changing the clearance (MIC). But its presence contributes to improving the accuracy of fire on rough terrain, improving maneuverability and increases the possibilities for covert location behind the elements of the terrain or landscape, and together it increases the fire abilities and survival of the machine on the battlefield.
Taking into account the wishes of the military in the newer BMP-3 transceiver moved.
The operation mode of the loading mechanism (MV) of 100-mm 2А70 guns, called the “series”, which allows sending another projectile to the bore without additional pressing of the button MZ, has not yet been worked out. The fact is that when operating in this mode, the locking mechanism of the locking arm of the projectile knocks inwards, which leads to a delay in firing. Moreover, the question is still not resolved - is this regime necessary at all? In my opinion, it is easy to do without him, and in some cases, the “series” mode can also do a disservice when it is urgently necessary to shoot with the wrong projectile that has already been automatically loaded into the gun. In the army, at least, they do not use it at all.
On the other hand, I am glad that there have been changes in the manual reloading system of the 30-mm gun 2А72 - the arrangement of the mechanism and its handle have changed for the better.
However, the mechanism of loading guns is far from the first place in the list of faults BMP-3. Here among the leaders is still the starter, the frequency of which is out of order for one reason or another is even ahead of malfunctions in the pump or hydro-volumetric transmission (GOP).
There are other minor technical details that were sometimes confused by personnel, for example, under the engine there are two nozzles, coming from the oil tank and from the coolant tank. Access to them is possible through the technological hatch, but they are located so that to replace the oil line, you must first disconnect the cooling system pipe and drain the coolant, and only then deal with the replacement of the oil line.
But it is very encouraging that the Kurgan plant listens to the opinion of the troops and gradually brings the car, constantly improving it, eliminating unpleasant moments, even if it is just the location of switches, toggle switches or instruments. For example, it was inconvenient, not looking up from the sight, to act with a ballistics switch on the block sight of the gunner-operator. Now they are putting up an updated block sight on the machines, the switch of the ballistics type has been removed from it and transferred to the left side of the turret tower so that the soldier could easily find it and switch without interrupting the view of the battlefield. At the base of the block sight a periscope appeared with a wider field of view than that of the sight.
There used to be such a disadvantage - with a long stay of the car without engine charging, the oil flowed into the engine cylinders, which, with insufficient training of the driver, resulted in a hydraulic shock. On the current models of the BMP-3 there is already a reversible oil pump, which first pumps the oil into the tank, and only then pumps it into the system - the threat of engine outage for this reason is almost a thing of the past.
The only wish that the gunners-operators from among the military personnel under contract to designers and manufacturers now state in conversations is: “Give us a more powerful sight, with a longer range of fire, the gun allows you to fire a long range, and the scope limits this possibility. Give a sight like a tank. "
The new leadership of the Defense Ministry of the Russian Federation has decided to increase the number of hours devoted to technical training, as well as to restore the repair units in the structure of the crews. And this is already a positive thing, but the factory brigades are forced to eliminate even such faults as: oil leakage from the GOP; coolant flow from the thermostat; unlocked the limit switch angle; the limit switch of the hatch is bent; blown fuse.
But almost a quarter of the list of faults is occupied by such insignificant details that any driver can fix himself, provided that he is trained in this. I would have tried earlier one of the drivers to give a hint that he needs specialists from the plant to replace the fuse. At least he would have been ridiculed. What in combat conditions and on the march for this, too, we will wait for representatives of the plant?
Failure of the BMP-3 is really a lot, but let's look at the reasons for this.
The first is, as I said, the low level of training of personnel and the lack of everyday practice in the maintenance and operation of equipment.
The second is the increased intensity of conducting classes with the practical implementation of driving exercises. But the low technical literacy of the personnel has not disappeared anywhere! At the same time, there is no necessary maintenance during the operation of the BMP of the combat training group (UBG). They are simply driven into the tail and into the mane until they begin to crumble, and in return for the "dead" machines they put the equipment of a combat group that is waiting for the same fate.
Third, simultaneously with the content of the equipment of the combat training group, units contain counter-terrorism units, company and battalion tactical groups, which is especially important for formations and units of the North Caucasus (Southern) Military District. Apart from the fact that all the equipment of these units must be technically sound, it still cannot contain UBG machines, and hence the need to re-attach machines for staffing tactical groups - shuffling equipment between divisions. When a temporary worker sits on a car, it is difficult to expect from him a proper attitude towards the equipment entrusted to him. Not mine - not sorry. This is where unmanned rechargeable batteries appear, unsurpassed Durites, burnt and un-replaced fuses, bent and turned limit switches, flow of oils and liquids, which then lead to engine seizure or a tower mask break, unclosed hatches and traffic jams in the bottom of the car, due to which the cars drown during swimming. But the BMP-3 of the first batch came to the brigade not from the factory, but from parts of the Moscow Military District, where they were operated since 1990. It is they who fail in the first place.
But is it the fault of the car? First of all, it is the fault and shortcomings of the people who made such decisions.
And how to repair equipment, how to maintain it in the necessary technical condition, when spare parts are needed, but they are not? After all, someone must monitor the need for parts in spare parts, order them in the content agencies, keep records of faults, work performed and parts replaced. But of the entire technical part in the brigade, only the head of the armored service remained - this is also a consequence of the "optimization of the control system" in the troops. He alone is not enough to be at the same time in the fleet of combat vehicles, in the storage of equipment units, in the maintenance and repair center with the factory brigade, on the range and in the field park, as well as in the office to perform routine paperwork.
If you continue to list everything that has a very negative impact on the image of the car, then I am afraid that the article will turn out not about the BMP-3 itself, but about the problems of the army.
In the car laid a huge modernization potential. In particular, it easily fits into the network-centric management system - it is enough to provide it with appropriate means of receiving and exchanging information, navigation and telecommunications. The internal space of the BMP-3 allows you to put it all.
Already developed 100-mm guided shot of increased power with increased firing range, unguided 100-mm shot with high-explosive fragmentation projectile and increased firing range and 30-mm high-power armor-piercing projectile. Only the absence of the sight does not allow to increase the range of aimed shooting with the Arkan missile to 5500 m, and 100-mm OFS - to 7000 m.
It has long been the groundwork and to improve the security of the BMP-3: it can be equipped with dynamic protection, and active protection system, and generators of interference to remote means of detonation.
If you need a single base for the deployment of various weapons systems, the BMP-3 will do an excellent job with this. At its base, ATGM “Chrysanthemum”, SPTO “Sprut”, BRM “Lynx” have already been developed. But on the BMP-3 it is quite possible to place the weapons of the Nona and Vena, anti-aircraft complexes of various configurations, packages of the MLRS guides.
Maybe such a well-developed base has already appeared, which exceeds the base of the BMP-3 and foreign cars of this class? By no means. Kurganets is still under development.
An attempt to transfer the BMP to a wheel drive was initially doomed to failure, since the wheelbase is inferior to the track-type propulsion unit. This option is acceptable for action in the Arabian and Asian sands, but not in the conditions of our dirt, clay and road directions, replacing the roads themselves.
So the final question suggests itself: is it not too early that we are abandoning the car, which we didn’t even know to the end, for the sake of a new, but not yet approved project? Perhaps, it is worthwhile to start loading the industry with orders for a modernized BMP-3 with a high level of security and adapted for combat day and night in the conditions of a modern war? Then there will be time, money and opportunity for the development of the new BMP, which is ahead of everything existing in the world. It is only necessary to wait for the views of military science about what and what kind of infantry fighting vehicle the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation need, and then, I think, the matter of design thought will not be.