The army at the sight of "reform"
The new look of the Russian army has already become a byword. All sane people criticize him tirelessly. But Medvedev, Putin, Serdyukov and others are stubbornly bending their line. Although any person who is more or less versed in military affairs understands that the results of this new look will be disastrous. However, the main surprise is yet to come. It seems that somewhere around the turn of 2011-2012, just before the presidential election, we are waiting for a campaign with bravura fanfares about tremendous successes in the rearmament of the army and fleet. Televisions will be overwhelmed with stories in which the generals and Serdyukov will enthusiastically broadcast how, thanks to the new look of the Armed Forces, unprecedented successes have been achieved in rearmament of the army and navy. But all these victorious reports will be crafty. The arithmetic of these bravura reports will be primitive, but incomprehensible to the uninitiated. Let's try to give a little explanation. Publication in the newspaper "Soviet Russia".
It is well known to all that the existing structure was declared the main evil for the Armed Forces: the district – army – division – regiment – battalion. As well as an "excessively large" number of officers in the army and navy. The elimination of such a structure and the expulsion of unnecessary officers has been declared a panacea for all ills of the Armed Forces. They say that we will liquidate divisions, drive officers out of the army, and the Armed Forces will immediately acquire inconceivable effectiveness.
The technique of cunning itself is extremely simple. We take 36 divisions of constant readiness, units and formations of army subordination, units and formations belonging to the reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK), as well as cropped units and bases for storing equipment and weapons of the mobilization reserve. For the full provision of the Armed Forces of such a structure with the necessary equipment and weapons (approximately) about 15000 are required tanks, about 36000 armored combat vehicles and up to 30000 artillery pieces, mortars and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). The figures are considerable. And from this number the latest tanks
T-90, infantry fighting vehicles BMP-3, armored personnel carriers BTR-90, as well as the latest models of artillery and high-precision "intelligent" weapons make up the strength of 10% at best. That is, for the rearmament of the Ground Forces, large-scale supply of weapons and military equipment is required. Still, even by 2020, with the current state of the Russian military-industrial complex, the samples mentioned above will, under the most favorable conditions, not more than 50% of the fleet of military equipment and armaments. But at the same time, they themselves will already become obsolete by 2020. And there are no new developments on the way. And what to do?
The way out was found amazing in its Jesuit cunning. If it is impossible to produce new equipment in the required quantities, then it is necessary to send as much of its morally obsolete samples as possible for scrapping in order to artificially raise the percentage of the latest weapons and equipment standing on the army equipment. Indeed, for 36 combined-arms brigades (essentially reinforced regiments), the need for military equipment and armaments will be significantly, several times smaller and will be: in tanks - 2500 – 3000 units; in combat armored vehicles - about 6000 – 7500; in artillery systems, taking into account the remaining few artillery units of the RVGK - 6000 – 6500. Thus, in one fell swoop, due to the transformations of divisions into brigades and the reduction of everything and everyone, the need for armaments and military equipment is sharply reduced. And at the same time, the percentage of the staffing of the troops with the latest models of weapons and equipment grows many times. Small additional purchases and the “stool” Minister of Defense with pathos reports that the army on the 3 / 4 is equipped with the latest models of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers and everything else. Women shout: “Hurray!”, And caps fly up.
Naturally, at the same time, he will diligently hold back that such an army is capable of leading, at best, only local battles and only with an adversary like the Georgian “army”. That any more or less serious conflict will lead to fatal consequences. This "reformers" do not care. They firmly believe that the foreign "class brothers" will never go against them to armed aggression, forgetting, due to their dense historical and cultural ignorance, that many thousands of years of war were fought between "class brothers" - slave owners, feudal lords, bourgeoisie .
NOW let's compare the offspring of the current reform - the brigade and the traditional division. In the motorized rifle division there were: three motorized rifle regiments (tank, artillery and anti-aircraft), a fighter-anti-tank artillery division, as well as battalions: reconnaissance, communications, engineering and security, repair and restoration, material support, medical and sanitary.
The artillery regiment of the division ensured the reinforcement of the regimental artillery without the involvement of the RVGK artillery. The anti-tank division was the anti-tank reserve of the division. Thanks to the anti-aircraft missile regiment, the division could provide air defense not only in the line of sight directly above the battlefield by the forces of the anti-aircraft divisions of the motorized rifle regiments, but also significantly expand the area of destruction of enemy aircraft and helicopters and hit the horizon. The engineer-sapper battalion was very powerful, providing both engineering equipment for positions with laying column ways (engineering company rota), installation of minefields and demining (engineer company), and equipment crossing on floating conveyors and self-propelled ferries (airborne transfer company), and guidance of floating bridges (pontoon-bridge company). The repair and restoration battalion provided repair of all types of weapons and equipment. The medical battalion could provide treatment for a significant number of wounded, with the exception of those who required long-term inpatient treatment. But this is in the division, and in the brigade there is nothing of that.
Of particular note is the defenselessness of the brigade in front of NATO air attack weapons. Anti-aircraft missile systems of the anti-aircraft missile regiment of the division had a range of destruction of air targets up to 12-15 and even 20 km. That is, they could hit the enemy Aviation to the turn of the launch of its high-precision weapons. The current brigade has only one anti-aircraft battalion capable of hitting aerial targets only within sight and at a distance of no more than 6-8 km. And most modern high-precision weapons of the Air Force and NATO Army aviation have a range of more than 6-8 km. In addition, this high-precision weapon has a “let-forget” action principle, and therefore it makes no sense to hit planes and helicopters, carriers of such weapons, after its launch. A plane or helicopter, launching a rocket or dropping an adjustable air bomb, turns to the side and hides behind the folds of the terrain. In other words, NATO aviation can arrange for a real beating of the Russian brigade without any harm to itself.
Of course, someone will say that the brigade can be reinforced by the air defense of the higher command. Here are just the means of these - the cat wept, because the army and front brigades of the air defense system are also “optimized”, i.e. simply overclocked. Now, the C-300V air defense system is generally removed from the Ground Forces and transferred to the Air Force. That is, there will be no talk of any close interaction with the combined-arms units and formations. And the remaining Buk air defense missile systems are subordinated to such a high command that the brigade commander will not even have to hope for cover from their side. And in a real battle it may well happen that all these air defense weapons, subordinate to their senior commanders, jump to the place where the brigade is beaten, when there is no need to cover anyone there. Yes, the question is whether the higher command will want to weaken the cover of the beloved from the attacks of enemy aircraft. The fact that the NATO Air Force is beating the brigade is all garbage, the main thing is to survive.
The scanty number of artillery units remaining after the "reform", primarily due to the disbandment of artillery divisions, deprives the brigade of hopes for substantial reinforcement by artillery, since the troops are now deprived of the most powerful means of quantitative and qualitative reinforcement of troop artillery, which are artillery divisions. The newly brigade will have to rely only on its only artillery division. It is sparse, very sparse for a serious fight, and not ostentatious games of soldiers. And no chatter, that now the brigades will receive modern artillery fire controls, will not change the situation. To reliably suppress enemy defenses, a certain amount of ammunition is required, and the more artillery barrels are firing, the less time this task will be accomplished, and the time factor in modern warfare is of paramount importance. Any delay in time gives the enemy a chance for retaliatory steps to correct the situation unfavorable for him.
Due to the “optimization”, the question of the engineering support of combat operations, in particular overcoming water obstacles and engineering equipment of positions, will be very acute. The division could independently provide the crossing of all its equipment through a water barrier of almost any width with the help of floating conveyors and self-propelled ferries, and a floating bridge could be built across the river up to 300 meters wide. And it was not necessary to wait for pontooners from the parts of the RVGK. Brigade is not under force. And it turns out that if the team rests on any river (even a small river), it will have to stand firmly. Yes, the BMP and BTR will be able to cross the water. And what about tanks, artillery, rear units? And the team instead of throwing over a water barrier will long and stubbornly trample on the banks of the river. Or you have to wait for pontooners to crawl from afar (which is not a fact!), Or to return from the other bank the units that have already flown and stomp to where the pontoon bridge has already been hoisted. Only now the long wait for the pontooners will lead to the fact that the enemy will calmly pull up to the springboard seized by our troops and simply drop the units that have crossed over into the river. And the accumulation of several brigades at the single pontoon ferry at once is a tasty prey for enemy aircraft. Yes, and it turns out as a result of a bottleneck, through which the brigades will squeeze through with difficulty, and the enemy will beat them piecemeal. Or would the pseudo-reformers hope that the enemy would kindly leave all the bridges across the rivers in integrity and intact? And take the engineering equipment of the positions of your troops and the laying of column tracks on the road? A company of engineering engineers of the engineering battalion had a large number of earth-moving and road-laying equipment. With this technique, field fortifications could be prepared in the shortest possible time, providing shelter for personnel and equipment. Or, pavement roads were laid for the movement of troops, and debris on existing roads was dismantled. None of this in the brigade is not available. What for? After all, the stool reformers are piously convinced that all these gangs have nothing else to do, apart from the ostentatious "war" before the eyes of the "highest" persons, will not have to participate.
As a result, we see that the brigade is something slightly stronger than the regiment, but much weaker than the division, which is not able to solve any significant combat mission on its own, but is not able to count on significant reinforcement from the higher command.
The armed conflict in South Ossetia has revealed the enormity of the situation in the Armed Forces as a result of the notorious Yeltsin-Putin “reforms” in the country. However, instead of recognizing this fact, instead of recognizing that a crime was actually committed when the army was destroyed, it was decided to use a peculiar trick. As already mentioned, the entire blame for the terrible condition of the army was laid not on the power, but on the structure of the army. They say that it is not the Yeltsin-Putin reform that is to blame, but the structure in the army is bad, and therefore there is no rearmament.
The bottom line is that in the “new look” the Armed Forces will be able to fight only with an operetta army like Georgian warriors. Meeting with a strong, numerous and well-armed enemy will lead to a quick and inevitable defeat.
The new form will cost the Russian army 25 billion rubles
Within three years, army and navy personnel will switch to a new uniform. This was stated by Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Defense Viktor Ozerov. Funds will be allocated from the federal budget. (RSN)
I WANT to take advantage of such a remark. All the nonsense that a small but exceptionally well-equipped army will give a hundred points ahead to a mass army is a fairy tale for sbrendivshih liberal intellectuals. One example. In 1914 – 1915 on the Black Sea, the German battle cruiser “Goeben” was far superior in combat power to any of the outdated Russian battleships. Meeting one on one for any of these ships would be fatal. But Russian armadillos always sailed into the sea only by a brigade of three ships. And not once “Goeben” did not dare to enter the decisive battle immediately with three Russian battleships. For one simple reason. Calculations showed that as a result of this battle, one of the Russian battleships would be sunk, the second one was heavily damaged, but the third one would get rid of moderate gravity damage. But "Goeben" is also guaranteed to go to the bottom. After that, the German-Turkish fleet on the Black Sea virtually ceases to exist as a real force. The loss of "Goeben" will be fatal for him. Since the damaged Russian battleships will eventually return to the system, and the “Geben” cannot be reached from the bottom of the sea. The Russian fleet will retain its combat capability, albeit somewhat reduced, but the combat capability of the German-Turkish fleet will be undermined irreplaceably. Therefore, for a mass army, the loss of even several formations in battles is not fatal, these losses can be compensated for by mobilizing a reserve, deploying new divisions based on storage bases or cropped formations, military production. But for the notorious “small, well-equipped” army, the loss of only one unit or even one unit becomes an irreplaceable loss, leading to a complete loss of combat capability and the death of the whole army.
Last remark. On the eve of World War II, the Grand Fleet of the British Empire consisted of 17 battleships. Of these, 10 ships of the types "Rivend" and "Queen Elizabeth" built 1915 – 1916. were already outdated, and two battleships - "Lord Nelson" and "Rodney" - were, to put it mildly, not quite modern. And only 5 of the battleships of the type "King George the Fifth" were put into operation just before the war. That is, the latest battleships accounted for only 30% of the number of battleships. However, the Admiralteys lords could not even dream of fraud even in a terrible dream: write off ten obsolete battleships in one fell swoop and report cheerfully that the number of the newest battleships in the British Grand Fleet now amounts to 70% of the number of linear forces. For such tricks they would inevitably wait for the gallows. But in the British fleet such frauds would not have passed, and in the Russian army everything will be very much even in chocolate. First, the write-off of wholesale equipment to scrap, and then vigorous reports, triumphant reports, the delight of the limp media.
And the latest remark. Everyone now knows the latest know-how of the current minister, who has decided that the army does not need officers - platoon commanders. Enough and sergeants. And to teach the four years of a platoon commander for this is not necessary. And therefore the recruitment to military schools has been suspended. The absurdity of this statement is visible to the naked eye to any more or less military-minded person. Yes, in order to revenge the parade ground, to dig a ditch or paint fences for four years to teach a person to an officer is not necessary. And to fight? After all, an officer - a graduate of a military school - was trained to organize military operations to the level of a battalion (division) inclusive. The failure of a company or battery commander in combat was not fatal for the unit, did not mean the loss of control of the unit, any platoon commander was prepared to immediately replace the company or battery commander. And even the commander of a battalion or division, if necessary. If we have platoon commanders from sergeant dropouts, then one successful hit of high-precision ammunition can turn not only a company or a battery, but even a battalion or division into a herd, into a helpless uncontrollable crowd, when no one will know what to do. This is especially true of artillery. Any lieutenant artilleryman could perform all the fire missions of the artillery battalion. But this is an officer who spent four or five years studying at a military college. And what will the sergeant be capable of? At best, palnut direct fire. This is at best. And how do grief reformers think about war? Ask the enemy to wait until they train the sergeants to take command of the battery company or battalion division? Or to persuade the adversary not to fight until we find someone in the rear who can take command of the units?
And WHERE will the commanders of companies and battalions take then? Immediately we will produce them, without going through the primary command post? Or will these posts be immediately reserved for generals' sons from military training centers at civilian universities? When my son is general and five years old at home, when daddy and mommy is found, he immediately makes his career dizzy. Almost as with the autocrat of all-Russian Elizabeth Petrovna. From the time they made their little nails, they recorded the undead while in the regiment, he sat at home with the nurse mothers, and the service went on. By the age of eighteen - already a colonel. What is not an example for the current "stool"? This is what the scope will be for the current generals! When they were sons, they did not serve a day in the army, they will immediately become colonels in 18 years! I give this know-how. Is free.
One gets the impression that the army is being prepared only for demonstrative maneuvers, when in advance three hundred times everyone will rehearse before showing to the “highest” persons. And do not even think about what the consequences will be in a real battle from platoon dropouts. Well, everything is clear with the minister and his advisers, but do not the multi-star generals singing along with this bacchanalia understand this? Or, in the desire to please a high official, are they ready to go for any mockery of the army, just to sit in their chairs and not lose access to bread places?
Of course, the problem requires much more serious coverage than is possible in such an article. In particular, no one thought how the transfer of aircraft engineers and aircraft technicians to civilian personnel would affect the combat capability of the Air Force. After all, flights must be carried out day and night, with no time limit, and
civilian personnel live under the Labor Code, they have a working day from 9: 00 to 18: 00. And how to fly at night, how to conduct exercises? A civilian specialist is not giving the order that flights from six in the morning should go, he does not care, he will demand to change his labor contract, collective agreement. And no orders, if they contradict labor legislation, are not decreed for him. Imagine a picture: flights are flying, and here all the ground staff is going and going home, his working day is over. And they wanted to sneeze on the orders of the commander, they are not servicemen. Or the minister-furniture maker is seriously convinced that the dismissed officers simply have nowhere to go, and they will still crawl on their knees with a request to take them by civilian specialists to feed their families?
And the "optimization" of logistics? The great stool strategist made a sudden discovery that the army’s logistical support is not necessary, which, they say, civilian commercial structures can do. Only now the land is filled with rumors that parts are coming to the training ground, to the training center, and the merchants refuse to go there or such prices for services are breaking, that there is not enough military budget. And the officers have to buy for their money any “doshiraki" to feed the soldiers. And if an armed conflict? After all, it is not customary for us to declare mobilization and introduce a state of emergency. The troops will go to war, and suddenly they will grab, but there is no fuel, there is no ammunition, there is no food, the merchants refused to go under the bullets. And the doctors from the civil polyclinics too - they have nothing written about the war in their employment contract. And how are we going to fight? How will we save the wounded? Again the heroic efforts of the soldiers? Again, a soldier for himself and for that guy will plow? And the "stool" then reap the laurels, all the success attributed to yourself? If these successes will be.
Unfortunately, society is not alarmed by the fact that once again they are doing with the army. But only if it is, and the army will not be able to accomplish the tasks of defending the Fatherland, from whom shall we ask? Nobody wants to ask themselves, and the tandem will not allow to ask the minister. Anyone and everything will be the cause, but not the thoughtless reforms of the minister-furniture maker and his patrons. And will anyone already ask when foreign patrols will be on the streets?
It is well known to all that the existing structure was declared the main evil for the Armed Forces: the district – army – division – regiment – battalion. As well as an "excessively large" number of officers in the army and navy. The elimination of such a structure and the expulsion of unnecessary officers has been declared a panacea for all ills of the Armed Forces. They say that we will liquidate divisions, drive officers out of the army, and the Armed Forces will immediately acquire inconceivable effectiveness.
The technique of cunning itself is extremely simple. We take 36 divisions of constant readiness, units and formations of army subordination, units and formations belonging to the reserve of the Supreme High Command (RVGK), as well as cropped units and bases for storing equipment and weapons of the mobilization reserve. For the full provision of the Armed Forces of such a structure with the necessary equipment and weapons (approximately) about 15000 are required tanks, about 36000 armored combat vehicles and up to 30000 artillery pieces, mortars and multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS). The figures are considerable. And from this number the latest tanks
T-90, infantry fighting vehicles BMP-3, armored personnel carriers BTR-90, as well as the latest models of artillery and high-precision "intelligent" weapons make up the strength of 10% at best. That is, for the rearmament of the Ground Forces, large-scale supply of weapons and military equipment is required. Still, even by 2020, with the current state of the Russian military-industrial complex, the samples mentioned above will, under the most favorable conditions, not more than 50% of the fleet of military equipment and armaments. But at the same time, they themselves will already become obsolete by 2020. And there are no new developments on the way. And what to do?
The way out was found amazing in its Jesuit cunning. If it is impossible to produce new equipment in the required quantities, then it is necessary to send as much of its morally obsolete samples as possible for scrapping in order to artificially raise the percentage of the latest weapons and equipment standing on the army equipment. Indeed, for 36 combined-arms brigades (essentially reinforced regiments), the need for military equipment and armaments will be significantly, several times smaller and will be: in tanks - 2500 – 3000 units; in combat armored vehicles - about 6000 – 7500; in artillery systems, taking into account the remaining few artillery units of the RVGK - 6000 – 6500. Thus, in one fell swoop, due to the transformations of divisions into brigades and the reduction of everything and everyone, the need for armaments and military equipment is sharply reduced. And at the same time, the percentage of the staffing of the troops with the latest models of weapons and equipment grows many times. Small additional purchases and the “stool” Minister of Defense with pathos reports that the army on the 3 / 4 is equipped with the latest models of tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, armored personnel carriers and everything else. Women shout: “Hurray!”, And caps fly up.
Naturally, at the same time, he will diligently hold back that such an army is capable of leading, at best, only local battles and only with an adversary like the Georgian “army”. That any more or less serious conflict will lead to fatal consequences. This "reformers" do not care. They firmly believe that the foreign "class brothers" will never go against them to armed aggression, forgetting, due to their dense historical and cultural ignorance, that many thousands of years of war were fought between "class brothers" - slave owners, feudal lords, bourgeoisie .
NOW let's compare the offspring of the current reform - the brigade and the traditional division. In the motorized rifle division there were: three motorized rifle regiments (tank, artillery and anti-aircraft), a fighter-anti-tank artillery division, as well as battalions: reconnaissance, communications, engineering and security, repair and restoration, material support, medical and sanitary.
The artillery regiment of the division ensured the reinforcement of the regimental artillery without the involvement of the RVGK artillery. The anti-tank division was the anti-tank reserve of the division. Thanks to the anti-aircraft missile regiment, the division could provide air defense not only in the line of sight directly above the battlefield by the forces of the anti-aircraft divisions of the motorized rifle regiments, but also significantly expand the area of destruction of enemy aircraft and helicopters and hit the horizon. The engineer-sapper battalion was very powerful, providing both engineering equipment for positions with laying column ways (engineering company rota), installation of minefields and demining (engineer company), and equipment crossing on floating conveyors and self-propelled ferries (airborne transfer company), and guidance of floating bridges (pontoon-bridge company). The repair and restoration battalion provided repair of all types of weapons and equipment. The medical battalion could provide treatment for a significant number of wounded, with the exception of those who required long-term inpatient treatment. But this is in the division, and in the brigade there is nothing of that.
Of particular note is the defenselessness of the brigade in front of NATO air attack weapons. Anti-aircraft missile systems of the anti-aircraft missile regiment of the division had a range of destruction of air targets up to 12-15 and even 20 km. That is, they could hit the enemy Aviation to the turn of the launch of its high-precision weapons. The current brigade has only one anti-aircraft battalion capable of hitting aerial targets only within sight and at a distance of no more than 6-8 km. And most modern high-precision weapons of the Air Force and NATO Army aviation have a range of more than 6-8 km. In addition, this high-precision weapon has a “let-forget” action principle, and therefore it makes no sense to hit planes and helicopters, carriers of such weapons, after its launch. A plane or helicopter, launching a rocket or dropping an adjustable air bomb, turns to the side and hides behind the folds of the terrain. In other words, NATO aviation can arrange for a real beating of the Russian brigade without any harm to itself.
Of course, someone will say that the brigade can be reinforced by the air defense of the higher command. Here are just the means of these - the cat wept, because the army and front brigades of the air defense system are also “optimized”, i.e. simply overclocked. Now, the C-300V air defense system is generally removed from the Ground Forces and transferred to the Air Force. That is, there will be no talk of any close interaction with the combined-arms units and formations. And the remaining Buk air defense missile systems are subordinated to such a high command that the brigade commander will not even have to hope for cover from their side. And in a real battle it may well happen that all these air defense weapons, subordinate to their senior commanders, jump to the place where the brigade is beaten, when there is no need to cover anyone there. Yes, the question is whether the higher command will want to weaken the cover of the beloved from the attacks of enemy aircraft. The fact that the NATO Air Force is beating the brigade is all garbage, the main thing is to survive.
The scanty number of artillery units remaining after the "reform", primarily due to the disbandment of artillery divisions, deprives the brigade of hopes for substantial reinforcement by artillery, since the troops are now deprived of the most powerful means of quantitative and qualitative reinforcement of troop artillery, which are artillery divisions. The newly brigade will have to rely only on its only artillery division. It is sparse, very sparse for a serious fight, and not ostentatious games of soldiers. And no chatter, that now the brigades will receive modern artillery fire controls, will not change the situation. To reliably suppress enemy defenses, a certain amount of ammunition is required, and the more artillery barrels are firing, the less time this task will be accomplished, and the time factor in modern warfare is of paramount importance. Any delay in time gives the enemy a chance for retaliatory steps to correct the situation unfavorable for him.
Due to the “optimization”, the question of the engineering support of combat operations, in particular overcoming water obstacles and engineering equipment of positions, will be very acute. The division could independently provide the crossing of all its equipment through a water barrier of almost any width with the help of floating conveyors and self-propelled ferries, and a floating bridge could be built across the river up to 300 meters wide. And it was not necessary to wait for pontooners from the parts of the RVGK. Brigade is not under force. And it turns out that if the team rests on any river (even a small river), it will have to stand firmly. Yes, the BMP and BTR will be able to cross the water. And what about tanks, artillery, rear units? And the team instead of throwing over a water barrier will long and stubbornly trample on the banks of the river. Or you have to wait for pontooners to crawl from afar (which is not a fact!), Or to return from the other bank the units that have already flown and stomp to where the pontoon bridge has already been hoisted. Only now the long wait for the pontooners will lead to the fact that the enemy will calmly pull up to the springboard seized by our troops and simply drop the units that have crossed over into the river. And the accumulation of several brigades at the single pontoon ferry at once is a tasty prey for enemy aircraft. Yes, and it turns out as a result of a bottleneck, through which the brigades will squeeze through with difficulty, and the enemy will beat them piecemeal. Or would the pseudo-reformers hope that the enemy would kindly leave all the bridges across the rivers in integrity and intact? And take the engineering equipment of the positions of your troops and the laying of column tracks on the road? A company of engineering engineers of the engineering battalion had a large number of earth-moving and road-laying equipment. With this technique, field fortifications could be prepared in the shortest possible time, providing shelter for personnel and equipment. Or, pavement roads were laid for the movement of troops, and debris on existing roads was dismantled. None of this in the brigade is not available. What for? After all, the stool reformers are piously convinced that all these gangs have nothing else to do, apart from the ostentatious "war" before the eyes of the "highest" persons, will not have to participate.
As a result, we see that the brigade is something slightly stronger than the regiment, but much weaker than the division, which is not able to solve any significant combat mission on its own, but is not able to count on significant reinforcement from the higher command.
The armed conflict in South Ossetia has revealed the enormity of the situation in the Armed Forces as a result of the notorious Yeltsin-Putin “reforms” in the country. However, instead of recognizing this fact, instead of recognizing that a crime was actually committed when the army was destroyed, it was decided to use a peculiar trick. As already mentioned, the entire blame for the terrible condition of the army was laid not on the power, but on the structure of the army. They say that it is not the Yeltsin-Putin reform that is to blame, but the structure in the army is bad, and therefore there is no rearmament.
The bottom line is that in the “new look” the Armed Forces will be able to fight only with an operetta army like Georgian warriors. Meeting with a strong, numerous and well-armed enemy will lead to a quick and inevitable defeat.
The new form will cost the Russian army 25 billion rubles
Within three years, army and navy personnel will switch to a new uniform. This was stated by Chairman of the Federation Council Committee on Defense Viktor Ozerov. Funds will be allocated from the federal budget. (RSN)
I WANT to take advantage of such a remark. All the nonsense that a small but exceptionally well-equipped army will give a hundred points ahead to a mass army is a fairy tale for sbrendivshih liberal intellectuals. One example. In 1914 – 1915 on the Black Sea, the German battle cruiser “Goeben” was far superior in combat power to any of the outdated Russian battleships. Meeting one on one for any of these ships would be fatal. But Russian armadillos always sailed into the sea only by a brigade of three ships. And not once “Goeben” did not dare to enter the decisive battle immediately with three Russian battleships. For one simple reason. Calculations showed that as a result of this battle, one of the Russian battleships would be sunk, the second one was heavily damaged, but the third one would get rid of moderate gravity damage. But "Goeben" is also guaranteed to go to the bottom. After that, the German-Turkish fleet on the Black Sea virtually ceases to exist as a real force. The loss of "Goeben" will be fatal for him. Since the damaged Russian battleships will eventually return to the system, and the “Geben” cannot be reached from the bottom of the sea. The Russian fleet will retain its combat capability, albeit somewhat reduced, but the combat capability of the German-Turkish fleet will be undermined irreplaceably. Therefore, for a mass army, the loss of even several formations in battles is not fatal, these losses can be compensated for by mobilizing a reserve, deploying new divisions based on storage bases or cropped formations, military production. But for the notorious “small, well-equipped” army, the loss of only one unit or even one unit becomes an irreplaceable loss, leading to a complete loss of combat capability and the death of the whole army.
Last remark. On the eve of World War II, the Grand Fleet of the British Empire consisted of 17 battleships. Of these, 10 ships of the types "Rivend" and "Queen Elizabeth" built 1915 – 1916. were already outdated, and two battleships - "Lord Nelson" and "Rodney" - were, to put it mildly, not quite modern. And only 5 of the battleships of the type "King George the Fifth" were put into operation just before the war. That is, the latest battleships accounted for only 30% of the number of battleships. However, the Admiralteys lords could not even dream of fraud even in a terrible dream: write off ten obsolete battleships in one fell swoop and report cheerfully that the number of the newest battleships in the British Grand Fleet now amounts to 70% of the number of linear forces. For such tricks they would inevitably wait for the gallows. But in the British fleet such frauds would not have passed, and in the Russian army everything will be very much even in chocolate. First, the write-off of wholesale equipment to scrap, and then vigorous reports, triumphant reports, the delight of the limp media.
And the latest remark. Everyone now knows the latest know-how of the current minister, who has decided that the army does not need officers - platoon commanders. Enough and sergeants. And to teach the four years of a platoon commander for this is not necessary. And therefore the recruitment to military schools has been suspended. The absurdity of this statement is visible to the naked eye to any more or less military-minded person. Yes, in order to revenge the parade ground, to dig a ditch or paint fences for four years to teach a person to an officer is not necessary. And to fight? After all, an officer - a graduate of a military school - was trained to organize military operations to the level of a battalion (division) inclusive. The failure of a company or battery commander in combat was not fatal for the unit, did not mean the loss of control of the unit, any platoon commander was prepared to immediately replace the company or battery commander. And even the commander of a battalion or division, if necessary. If we have platoon commanders from sergeant dropouts, then one successful hit of high-precision ammunition can turn not only a company or a battery, but even a battalion or division into a herd, into a helpless uncontrollable crowd, when no one will know what to do. This is especially true of artillery. Any lieutenant artilleryman could perform all the fire missions of the artillery battalion. But this is an officer who spent four or five years studying at a military college. And what will the sergeant be capable of? At best, palnut direct fire. This is at best. And how do grief reformers think about war? Ask the enemy to wait until they train the sergeants to take command of the battery company or battalion division? Or to persuade the adversary not to fight until we find someone in the rear who can take command of the units?
And WHERE will the commanders of companies and battalions take then? Immediately we will produce them, without going through the primary command post? Or will these posts be immediately reserved for generals' sons from military training centers at civilian universities? When my son is general and five years old at home, when daddy and mommy is found, he immediately makes his career dizzy. Almost as with the autocrat of all-Russian Elizabeth Petrovna. From the time they made their little nails, they recorded the undead while in the regiment, he sat at home with the nurse mothers, and the service went on. By the age of eighteen - already a colonel. What is not an example for the current "stool"? This is what the scope will be for the current generals! When they were sons, they did not serve a day in the army, they will immediately become colonels in 18 years! I give this know-how. Is free.
One gets the impression that the army is being prepared only for demonstrative maneuvers, when in advance three hundred times everyone will rehearse before showing to the “highest” persons. And do not even think about what the consequences will be in a real battle from platoon dropouts. Well, everything is clear with the minister and his advisers, but do not the multi-star generals singing along with this bacchanalia understand this? Or, in the desire to please a high official, are they ready to go for any mockery of the army, just to sit in their chairs and not lose access to bread places?
Of course, the problem requires much more serious coverage than is possible in such an article. In particular, no one thought how the transfer of aircraft engineers and aircraft technicians to civilian personnel would affect the combat capability of the Air Force. After all, flights must be carried out day and night, with no time limit, and
civilian personnel live under the Labor Code, they have a working day from 9: 00 to 18: 00. And how to fly at night, how to conduct exercises? A civilian specialist is not giving the order that flights from six in the morning should go, he does not care, he will demand to change his labor contract, collective agreement. And no orders, if they contradict labor legislation, are not decreed for him. Imagine a picture: flights are flying, and here all the ground staff is going and going home, his working day is over. And they wanted to sneeze on the orders of the commander, they are not servicemen. Or the minister-furniture maker is seriously convinced that the dismissed officers simply have nowhere to go, and they will still crawl on their knees with a request to take them by civilian specialists to feed their families?
And the "optimization" of logistics? The great stool strategist made a sudden discovery that the army’s logistical support is not necessary, which, they say, civilian commercial structures can do. Only now the land is filled with rumors that parts are coming to the training ground, to the training center, and the merchants refuse to go there or such prices for services are breaking, that there is not enough military budget. And the officers have to buy for their money any “doshiraki" to feed the soldiers. And if an armed conflict? After all, it is not customary for us to declare mobilization and introduce a state of emergency. The troops will go to war, and suddenly they will grab, but there is no fuel, there is no ammunition, there is no food, the merchants refused to go under the bullets. And the doctors from the civil polyclinics too - they have nothing written about the war in their employment contract. And how are we going to fight? How will we save the wounded? Again the heroic efforts of the soldiers? Again, a soldier for himself and for that guy will plow? And the "stool" then reap the laurels, all the success attributed to yourself? If these successes will be.
Unfortunately, society is not alarmed by the fact that once again they are doing with the army. But only if it is, and the army will not be able to accomplish the tasks of defending the Fatherland, from whom shall we ask? Nobody wants to ask themselves, and the tandem will not allow to ask the minister. Anyone and everything will be the cause, but not the thoughtless reforms of the minister-furniture maker and his patrons. And will anyone already ask when foreign patrols will be on the streets?
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