Last week, information came from the Ministry of Defense that provoked a wide response in that segment of Russian society that is not indifferent to the situation with the Armed Forces of the country. We are talking about a plan for a kind of revision of the reformist attempts, which at one time was undertaken by such a person as Anatoly Serdyukov. The revision was expressed in the fact that the Ministry of Defense is now ready to begin partial restoration of the institution of ensigns and warrant officers in the army and navy respectively. According to opinion polls in the military environment, Sergei Shoigu, it supports the vast majority of respondents. The idea of restoring a special stratum of servicemen occupying a niche between privates and sergeants on the one hand, and officers on the other, looks quite productive for a modern army. Why? Because the very idea that the army was “cleansed” by Mr. Serdyukov from the ensigns did not fully justify itself.
Here it is worth recalling that a few months after his ascent to the "military Olympus" Anatoly Serdyukov told the public that for the conversion of the Russian army to a professional and always combat-ready in the army itself must be almost completely eliminated the category of military personnel in the ranks of warrant officers. Total - about 142 thousands of people. Then this idea was motivated by the fact that the alleged non-commissioned officers - it is absolutely superfluous layer, the representatives of which - entirely thieving gentlemen, rushes their views solely on those items of material equipment of military units that (things) "bad lie". In addition, the idea of leading the main military department in 2008 was that the vacant niche of the midshipmen and warrant officers would either be occupied by professionally trained contract service sergeants or civilian personnel (for example, in terms of warehouse management).
As a result, the public in its majority, if the idea of Mr. Serdyukov did not applaud, then reacted calmly to it. Silent (in bulk) and soldiers themselves, as discussed in the army orders not accepted. So it happened that in 2009, the Russian navy and army 142 lost thousands of soldiers as the midshipmen and ensigns, and a deep and mysterious silence from all parties was a kind of indulgence reformist ideas of ex-minister.
Says the former senior warrant officer of the Ministry of Defense Sergey Polyansky (Vladimir region).
Before getting the status of a military pensioner, I had about 2009 years left in 7. During his military career he managed to pass the steps from a regular ordinary conscript to a senior warrant officer. After I swept the military reform in the country, as well as thousands of other warrant, was in the army superfluous. We are in the rank of ensigns and senior warrant officers in the military unit was, in my opinion, a 22 person. All were collected and brought to the attention that we fall under the reduction, but each of us still has a chance to remain in the army. We were offered to continue the service, but already in sergeant positions. Accordingly, funding decreased, there were uncertainties with the range of responsibilities, the schedule was changing. Given time to think. I and a few other guys went to the denial and decided to try their luck in the system of the Ministry of Interior. Attempts were mostly successful. Others (in particular, those who remained for a year and a half to full service) agreed to the proposals of the commander.
If we evaluate the words of our respondent, it turns out that the total “cleansing” of ensigns and midshipmen was sharpened, including to transfer servicemen to other positions with actual lowering of ranks. Optimization ... That is, the disbandment of such a category of servicemen as a midshipman and ensign was actually positioned as a kind of restructuring of junior commanding officers who are not part of the officer segment.
Obviously, the ideological inspirers of the reform thought that the majority of ensigns would continue to serve with other epaulets. They say, it was an ensign, and become a sergeant - what difference to him ... And we say, kill two birds: report back on cost reduction, optimization of personnel structure and stated that we were able to draw on military service "new" contract sergeants.
As the saying goes, “they wanted the best ...” But it turned out what happened - the absolute majority of ensigns and midshipmen were left behind by the Ministry of Defense, and not everyone wanted to go a couple of steps down the career ladder.
Thus, the army really lost that working cluster, whose representatives were not only related to warehouses and commodity bases. After all, the ensigns and warrant officers were mostly engaged in monitoring the work on the material and technical support of the service, monitoring communication systems, staff and guard activities, and even in special cases acted as platoon commanders. After the actual liquidation of the institute of ensigns and midshipmen, it turned out that the army had lost those very professional military men whom the leadership of the Ministry of Defense had dreamed of bringing "under its banner". It is showing great question: What was the need for left and right to distribute information declarative slogans to increase the number of professional soldiers in the Army and Navy, if the leadership of the main military department with their hands thousands of professional military personnel sent "under the knife"?
In general, the reduction of 142 by thousands of midshipmen and ensigns did not lead to a massive increase in the number of professional sergeants and foremen in the Russian army. Was there a gap in the staffing to plug something? But what? .. The only way out was the option of restoring the cadre composition of the very midshipmen and ensigns. It is on this path that the new leadership of the Ministry of Defense decided to go. At first, we are talking about the restoration of 55 thousands of posts for military personnel in the rank of ensign and midshipman. In other words, about 38% of the personnel structure of this link is being restored.
Everything seems to be great. But there is one nuance. And from what reserves the Ministry of Defense is going to recruit these 55 thousands? If you offer to return to those who were sent in time "for the fence", then it is hardly worth expecting that the majority of persons will enter the position of the ministry. Someone already and age, shall we say, left. Someone found an equivalent job in other departments: the police, Interior Troops of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, for example; and someone will not return simply because pride does not allow. And it’s quite possible to understand such people: first they called them the Hapugs and “plunderers of capitalist property,” and now you will forgive us and go back as soon as possible. But not a week or even a decade has passed, but already 4 of the year. This is more than a serious time.
It turns out that now either it is necessary to transfer back those who were sent to sergeant posts at one time, or to announce a new training of ensigns and midshipmen. While trying to go in both ways. In particular, representatives of the General Staff state that in October 2013 of the year will be announced to be enrolled in the school of ensigns, which, on 2009, would seem to be ordered to live long. That is, now it is not enough for the Ministry of Defense to simply announce the partial restoration of the disbanded institute of ensigns and midshipmen, but it is also necessary to restore the training system of these servicemen. As the saying goes, "to the ground, and then ..." Classic national reform school, and only.
It now remains to calculate the damage to the federal budget, which was inflicted by the implementation of the reformist idea of a total reduction in the number of ensigns and midshipmen in the army and navy. Perhaps, even a professional financier is not able to give an exact figure of damage, but even without an exact figure, it is quite obvious that here it smacks of many billions again. Reduction; striving to replace one another; fixing that the aspirations did not lead to a positive result; ideas about restoration, implementation of restoration with the “re-opening” of the schools of ensigns and midshipmen — all this flows into large sums for the country's budget. And who will answer for all this?
If no one, then it seems that the failure to implement reform plans, or obviously its counterproductive course, does not imply the presence of those responsible. They say that the person did not manage, he took a lot of himself, could not carry it away, so why should you shoot him for that? .. Yes, now you have to at least regret it ...
It turns out that the kind of responsible for reform and there, but at the same time and ask not with anyone. There are no others, but those are far away ...
That is why I want to sincerely hope that the new top Defense Ministry not only has a thoughtful plan of personnel changes in the Russian army and the desire to implement the plan before the end, but also the realization that the "responsibility" - is not just an abstract concept of an explanatory dictionary.