Rocket trains, old and new
At the very end of last year, Russian mass media appeared news regarding a return to an old and almost forgotten idea. According to RIA Novosti, work is already underway to create a new combat railway missile complex (BZHRK) and the first rocket train of the new project can be assembled by 2020 year. Armament of our army already consisted of such systems, but the only ones in stories BZHRK 15P961 "Good for you" were removed from duty in 2005 year, and soon most of the equipment from their composition was disposed of. Trains with rocket armament were rightfully the pride of Soviet designers, and indeed of the whole country. Due to their capabilities, these complexes posed a serious threat to a potential enemy. However, the history of this type of technology can not be called simple. At first, a series of completely unpleasant events at first strongly limited the potential of domestic BZHRK, and then led to their complete disappearance.
Creating a railway missile complex was very difficult. Despite the fact that the corresponding order of the country's leadership and the Ministry of Defense appeared as early as 1969, the first full-fledged launch of the RT-23UTTH rocket took place only in 85. Development BZHRK conducted in Dnepropetrovsk design bureau "Yuzhnoye" them. M.K. Yangel under the leadership of V.F. Utkin. The specific operating conditions of the new system made it necessary to develop a mass of new solutions, from the newly designed car-launcher disguised as a refrigerator to the collapsible fairing of the rocket head part. Nevertheless, more than fifteen years of work have been crowned with success. In 1987, the first regiment of the "Molodtsov" set in on duty. Over the next four years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, three divisions were formed, armed with a total of twelve new BZHRKs.
Unfortunately, soon after the formation of the last third division, several unpleasant things happened, which very badly affected the future service of the BZHRK. In the 1991 year, in the course of international negotiations on a future START I treaty, the Soviet leadership agreed to several unfavorable offers from the American side. Among them was a restriction concerning the patrol routes of “rocket trains”. With the light hand of the President of the USSR, M. Gorbachev and some of his associates, BZhRK could now move only within a radius of several tens of kilometers from the bases. In addition to the obvious military-political drawbacks, this restriction also had economic consequences. Simultaneously with the commissioning of the Molodets complexes, the Ministry of Railways was conducting work to strengthen the routes within a radius of several hundred kilometers from the BZhRK bases. Thus, the Soviet Union lost both the main advantage of the BZHRK and a lot of money that was spent on the reconstruction of the tracks and the preparation of launch positions.
The next international treaty - START II - implied the removal from duty and disposal of all the RT-XNUMHUTTH missiles. The end date for this work was 23 year. Especially for the dismantling and disposal of the Bryansk repair plant of the rocket forces, with the participation of the United States, a cutting line was assembled. Fortunately for BZHRK, shortly before the deadline for the disposal of missiles and trains, Russia withdrew from the START II treaty. However, over the next few years, recycling continued, although it proceeded at a much slower pace. To date, only a few cars of the former BZHRK have been preserved, which are used as museum exhibits.
As you can see, the short history of the Molodets missile systems was difficult and unsuccessful. Almost immediately after the launch of the train with missiles, they lost their main advantage and after that they no longer presented the same threat to the enemy as before. Nevertheless, the complexes remained in service for a decade and a half. Now there is every reason to believe that the “Molodtsov” scrapped only when they had exhausted their resources and the stock of missiles came to an end. One of the most serious attacks on Russian rocket trains was the collapse of the Soviet Union. Because of him, the plant "Yuzhmash", which collected the complexes and missiles for them, remained in the territory of sovereign Ukraine. This country had its own views on the future work of rocket production, and therefore the trains were left without a new weapons.
In the discussions about the beginning of the development of new BZHRK often consider the advantages and disadvantages of this type of technology. The first, of course, can be attributed to the possibility of duty on a long distance from the base. After a train with rockets entered the public railways, finding it becomes very, very difficult. Of course, three diesel locomotives, nine refrigerated wagons (three rocket modules) and a tank wagon produced old BZHRK to some extent, but tremendous efforts were required to ensure tracking of their movements. In fact, it was necessary to “cover” the entire or almost the entire territory of the Soviet Union with intelligence. Also, the advantage of the complex can be considered a successful liquid-propellant rocket RT-23UTTH. A ballistic missile with a launch weight of 104 tons could deliver ten combat units with 10100 kilotons each to a range of 430 kilometers. In the light of the mobility of the missile complex, such characteristics of the rocket gave it simply unique opportunities.
However, it was not without flaws. The main disadvantage of BZHRK 15P961 is its weight. Because of the non-standard "load", several original technical solutions had to be applied, but with their use the starting module of the three cars put too much pressure on the rails, almost at the limit of their capabilities. Because of this, in the late eighties, the railroad workers had to change and strengthen a huge number of paths. Since then, the country's railways have again been worn out and, before putting into service, the new missile complex will most likely need another renewal of tracks.
Also BZhRK regularly accused of insufficient strength and vitality, especially in comparison with the mine launchers. To test survivability in the eighties began the relevant tests. In 1988, the works on the Shine and Thunderstorm topics were successfully completed, the purpose of which was to test the performance of trains with missiles under conditions of strong electromagnetic radiation and thunderstorms, respectively. In 1991, one of the line-up trains took part in the Shift test. At the 53 research site (now the Plesetsk cosmodrome), several tens of thousands of anti-tank mines were laid with a total explosion power of about 1000 tons of TNT. At a distance of 450 meters from the ammunition, butt to them, put the rocket module of the train. A little further - in 850 meters - placed another launcher and command center of the complex. Launchers were equipped with electric missiles. During the detonation of mines, all BZHRK modules suffered only slightly — the windows flew out and the work of some minor equipment modules was disrupted. Training launch with the use of the electric rocket was successful. Thus, a kiloton explosion less than a kilometer from the train is not able to completely disable the BZHRK. To this it is worthwhile to add more than a low probability of an enemy missile’s combat unit hitting the train while driving or near it.
In general, even the short-term operation of the Molodets BZHRK with serious restrictions on the routes clearly demonstrated both the advantages and the difficulties associated with this class of military equipment. Probably, precisely because of the ambiguity of the very concept of the railway complex, which simultaneously promises greater mobility of missiles, but at the same time requires strengthening the ways, not to mention the complexity of creating a train and missiles for it, the design work on creating new “rocket trains” has not been resumed . According to the latest data, at present the employees of design organizations and the Ministry of Defense are analyzing the prospects of the BZHRK and determine the necessary features of its appearance. Therefore, now we can not talk about any nuances of the new project. Moreover, due to the use in service of mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK) Topol, Topol-M and Yars, which do not need a strong railway track, the creation of a new BZHRK can be completely canceled.
Now there are a variety of opinions about the possible appearance of promising BZHRK. For example, it is proposed to equip it with missiles of existing projects, such as the PC-24 "Yars". With a starting mass of about 50 tons, a similar rocket, which is also already used on the PGRK, can be a good substitute for the old PT23UTTH. With similar dimensions and half the mass of the new rocket with certain modifications can become a weapon for new BZHRK. At the same time, the combat characteristics of the complex will remain approximately at the same level. Thus, the range gain (up to 11000 km) will be compensated by a smaller number of warheads, because only 24-3 (according to other data, six) charges are placed at the head of the PC-4. However, the Yars missile will be in operation for about ten years by the expected date of the launch of the new BZhRK. Thus, for the new rocket trains will need a new ballistic missile. It is possible that its appearance will be formed along with the requirements for the entire complex.
At the same time, rocket engineers can use the experience gained in creating relatively small rockets like the Topol or Yars. In this case, it will be possible to create a new rocket with a wide use of mastered solutions and technologies, but at the same time suitable for use in railway complexes. As a basis for a new missile for BZHRK, the existing Topoli-M or Yarsy are also suitable due to the fact that they are adapted for operation on mobile complexes. However, the final decision regarding the "origin" of the rocket and the requirements for it, it seems, has not yet been made. Given the duration of the development and testing of new missiles, in order to be in time for the 2020 year, rocket engineers should receive requirements over the coming years or even months.
Finally, account must be taken of the need to build infrastructure. Judging by the information available on the state of the old BZhRK bases, everything will have to be rebuilt. For a few years old depot, control rooms, etc. turned out to be decommissioned, devoid of a large number of special equipment, are rendered unusable and sometimes even partially looted. It is quite clear that for effective combat work the new railway missile complexes will need the appropriate facilities and equipment. But the restoration of existing buildings or the construction of new ones will significantly increase the cost of the entire project.
Thus, if we compare railway and ground-based missile systems, the comparison may not be in favor of the former. The hypothetical mobile ground launcher, with the same rocket with the railway, is less demanding on the condition of the road, much easier to manufacture, and does not need to coordinate travel routes with third parties, for example, with the leadership of the railway. An important advantage of ground-based missile systems is also the fact that all the necessary infrastructure for them is simpler and, as a result, cheaper than for railroad ones. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the mid 2000s, the command of the Strategic Missile Forces officially announced the abandonment of the BZhRK in favor of the PGRK. In the light of such a decision, the resumption of work on railway complexes looks solely as an attempt to expand the capabilities of nuclear forces and, if there are certain prospects, equip them with another type of technology.
In the current situation, it is not worth waiting for news regarding the start of construction of the first rocket train of the new project, because it has not even been decided what it will be and whether it will be at all. Therefore, it remains to hope that the analysis of opportunities and prospects, including comparative (BZHRK or PGRK), will be carried out with all the responsibility and its results will only bring benefit to our rocket forces.
Base BZHRK
On the materials of the sites:
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/
http://pentagonus.ru/
http://armscontrol.ru/
http://rian.ru/
Creating a railway missile complex was very difficult. Despite the fact that the corresponding order of the country's leadership and the Ministry of Defense appeared as early as 1969, the first full-fledged launch of the RT-23UTTH rocket took place only in 85. Development BZHRK conducted in Dnepropetrovsk design bureau "Yuzhnoye" them. M.K. Yangel under the leadership of V.F. Utkin. The specific operating conditions of the new system made it necessary to develop a mass of new solutions, from the newly designed car-launcher disguised as a refrigerator to the collapsible fairing of the rocket head part. Nevertheless, more than fifteen years of work have been crowned with success. In 1987, the first regiment of the "Molodtsov" set in on duty. Over the next four years before the collapse of the Soviet Union, three divisions were formed, armed with a total of twelve new BZHRKs.
Unfortunately, soon after the formation of the last third division, several unpleasant things happened, which very badly affected the future service of the BZHRK. In the 1991 year, in the course of international negotiations on a future START I treaty, the Soviet leadership agreed to several unfavorable offers from the American side. Among them was a restriction concerning the patrol routes of “rocket trains”. With the light hand of the President of the USSR, M. Gorbachev and some of his associates, BZhRK could now move only within a radius of several tens of kilometers from the bases. In addition to the obvious military-political drawbacks, this restriction also had economic consequences. Simultaneously with the commissioning of the Molodets complexes, the Ministry of Railways was conducting work to strengthen the routes within a radius of several hundred kilometers from the BZhRK bases. Thus, the Soviet Union lost both the main advantage of the BZHRK and a lot of money that was spent on the reconstruction of the tracks and the preparation of launch positions.
The next international treaty - START II - implied the removal from duty and disposal of all the RT-XNUMHUTTH missiles. The end date for this work was 23 year. Especially for the dismantling and disposal of the Bryansk repair plant of the rocket forces, with the participation of the United States, a cutting line was assembled. Fortunately for BZHRK, shortly before the deadline for the disposal of missiles and trains, Russia withdrew from the START II treaty. However, over the next few years, recycling continued, although it proceeded at a much slower pace. To date, only a few cars of the former BZHRK have been preserved, which are used as museum exhibits.
As you can see, the short history of the Molodets missile systems was difficult and unsuccessful. Almost immediately after the launch of the train with missiles, they lost their main advantage and after that they no longer presented the same threat to the enemy as before. Nevertheless, the complexes remained in service for a decade and a half. Now there is every reason to believe that the “Molodtsov” scrapped only when they had exhausted their resources and the stock of missiles came to an end. One of the most serious attacks on Russian rocket trains was the collapse of the Soviet Union. Because of him, the plant "Yuzhmash", which collected the complexes and missiles for them, remained in the territory of sovereign Ukraine. This country had its own views on the future work of rocket production, and therefore the trains were left without a new weapons.
In the discussions about the beginning of the development of new BZHRK often consider the advantages and disadvantages of this type of technology. The first, of course, can be attributed to the possibility of duty on a long distance from the base. After a train with rockets entered the public railways, finding it becomes very, very difficult. Of course, three diesel locomotives, nine refrigerated wagons (three rocket modules) and a tank wagon produced old BZHRK to some extent, but tremendous efforts were required to ensure tracking of their movements. In fact, it was necessary to “cover” the entire or almost the entire territory of the Soviet Union with intelligence. Also, the advantage of the complex can be considered a successful liquid-propellant rocket RT-23UTTH. A ballistic missile with a launch weight of 104 tons could deliver ten combat units with 10100 kilotons each to a range of 430 kilometers. In the light of the mobility of the missile complex, such characteristics of the rocket gave it simply unique opportunities.
However, it was not without flaws. The main disadvantage of BZHRK 15P961 is its weight. Because of the non-standard "load", several original technical solutions had to be applied, but with their use the starting module of the three cars put too much pressure on the rails, almost at the limit of their capabilities. Because of this, in the late eighties, the railroad workers had to change and strengthen a huge number of paths. Since then, the country's railways have again been worn out and, before putting into service, the new missile complex will most likely need another renewal of tracks.
Also BZhRK regularly accused of insufficient strength and vitality, especially in comparison with the mine launchers. To test survivability in the eighties began the relevant tests. In 1988, the works on the Shine and Thunderstorm topics were successfully completed, the purpose of which was to test the performance of trains with missiles under conditions of strong electromagnetic radiation and thunderstorms, respectively. In 1991, one of the line-up trains took part in the Shift test. At the 53 research site (now the Plesetsk cosmodrome), several tens of thousands of anti-tank mines were laid with a total explosion power of about 1000 tons of TNT. At a distance of 450 meters from the ammunition, butt to them, put the rocket module of the train. A little further - in 850 meters - placed another launcher and command center of the complex. Launchers were equipped with electric missiles. During the detonation of mines, all BZHRK modules suffered only slightly — the windows flew out and the work of some minor equipment modules was disrupted. Training launch with the use of the electric rocket was successful. Thus, a kiloton explosion less than a kilometer from the train is not able to completely disable the BZHRK. To this it is worthwhile to add more than a low probability of an enemy missile’s combat unit hitting the train while driving or near it.
In general, even the short-term operation of the Molodets BZHRK with serious restrictions on the routes clearly demonstrated both the advantages and the difficulties associated with this class of military equipment. Probably, precisely because of the ambiguity of the very concept of the railway complex, which simultaneously promises greater mobility of missiles, but at the same time requires strengthening the ways, not to mention the complexity of creating a train and missiles for it, the design work on creating new “rocket trains” has not been resumed . According to the latest data, at present the employees of design organizations and the Ministry of Defense are analyzing the prospects of the BZHRK and determine the necessary features of its appearance. Therefore, now we can not talk about any nuances of the new project. Moreover, due to the use in service of mobile ground-based missile systems (PGRK) Topol, Topol-M and Yars, which do not need a strong railway track, the creation of a new BZHRK can be completely canceled.
Now there are a variety of opinions about the possible appearance of promising BZHRK. For example, it is proposed to equip it with missiles of existing projects, such as the PC-24 "Yars". With a starting mass of about 50 tons, a similar rocket, which is also already used on the PGRK, can be a good substitute for the old PT23UTTH. With similar dimensions and half the mass of the new rocket with certain modifications can become a weapon for new BZHRK. At the same time, the combat characteristics of the complex will remain approximately at the same level. Thus, the range gain (up to 11000 km) will be compensated by a smaller number of warheads, because only 24-3 (according to other data, six) charges are placed at the head of the PC-4. However, the Yars missile will be in operation for about ten years by the expected date of the launch of the new BZhRK. Thus, for the new rocket trains will need a new ballistic missile. It is possible that its appearance will be formed along with the requirements for the entire complex.
At the same time, rocket engineers can use the experience gained in creating relatively small rockets like the Topol or Yars. In this case, it will be possible to create a new rocket with a wide use of mastered solutions and technologies, but at the same time suitable for use in railway complexes. As a basis for a new missile for BZHRK, the existing Topoli-M or Yarsy are also suitable due to the fact that they are adapted for operation on mobile complexes. However, the final decision regarding the "origin" of the rocket and the requirements for it, it seems, has not yet been made. Given the duration of the development and testing of new missiles, in order to be in time for the 2020 year, rocket engineers should receive requirements over the coming years or even months.
Finally, account must be taken of the need to build infrastructure. Judging by the information available on the state of the old BZhRK bases, everything will have to be rebuilt. For a few years old depot, control rooms, etc. turned out to be decommissioned, devoid of a large number of special equipment, are rendered unusable and sometimes even partially looted. It is quite clear that for effective combat work the new railway missile complexes will need the appropriate facilities and equipment. But the restoration of existing buildings or the construction of new ones will significantly increase the cost of the entire project.
Thus, if we compare railway and ground-based missile systems, the comparison may not be in favor of the former. The hypothetical mobile ground launcher, with the same rocket with the railway, is less demanding on the condition of the road, much easier to manufacture, and does not need to coordinate travel routes with third parties, for example, with the leadership of the railway. An important advantage of ground-based missile systems is also the fact that all the necessary infrastructure for them is simpler and, as a result, cheaper than for railroad ones. Therefore, it is not surprising that in the mid 2000s, the command of the Strategic Missile Forces officially announced the abandonment of the BZhRK in favor of the PGRK. In the light of such a decision, the resumption of work on railway complexes looks solely as an attempt to expand the capabilities of nuclear forces and, if there are certain prospects, equip them with another type of technology.
In the current situation, it is not worth waiting for news regarding the start of construction of the first rocket train of the new project, because it has not even been decided what it will be and whether it will be at all. Therefore, it remains to hope that the analysis of opportunities and prospects, including comparative (BZHRK or PGRK), will be carried out with all the responsibility and its results will only bring benefit to our rocket forces.
Base BZHRK
On the materials of the sites:
http://rbase.new-factoria.ru/
http://pentagonus.ru/
http://armscontrol.ru/
http://rian.ru/
Information