Strategic bomber for the Russian Armed Forces: it’s not that simple
The reason for writing this material was the recently published article by Alexander Timokhin “What should a strategic bomber of the near future be like?”. In part, the author’s views on the problem of a promising strategic bomber coincide with the theses set out in the above article; moreover, for a long time, the author saw the ideal mass-produced missile-carrying bomber as something like a domestic analogue of the American B-52 strategic bomber, which has a colossal margin of safety, the highest maintainability and modernization potential .
However, recent events have largely corrected the point of view on the prospects for creating a number of weapons and military equipment.
Firstly, this is due to the fact that Russia is now actually in the pre-war period, and secondly, with the implementation by our opponents (primarily the United States) of a number of defense programs that can in the near future significantly affect the appearance of promising combat vehicles .
First, let's talk about today.
Features of the pre-war period
Perhaps the formulation “features of the pre-war period” is not entirely correct - high-intensity combat operations, in which our strategic bombers are also used, are already underway, however, formally we are not in a state of war, and the impact on our facilities , located in the deep rear, Ukraine carries out on a very limited scale. And the point here is not that Ukraine does not want, but that it cannot. But it cannot because our true enemy, the Western countries, allocate to Ukraine a limited number and range of long-range weapons.
Maps of attacks by kamikaze UAVs and cruise missiles on targets on the territory of Ukraine - the main thing is that the same maps of our country do not appear
Thanks to the above, our industry can operate at full capacity, but everything can change at any moment, now we are closer than ever to a direct collision with the United States and its allies, and therefore, yes, in fact we are in the pre-war period.
At the moment when we move into the “hot phase” of a clash with the United States and its allies, even in the version of a conventional war, the industry’s capabilities for the production of high-tech weapons will be radically reduced due to precision strikes weapons long-range strikes against targets deep within the territory of our country, not to mention a war using nuclear weapons.
Thus, we will mainly fight with what was created before the war or at its beginning, at least in relation to strategic missile-carrying bombers this fully applies.
Three options for the development of a strategic bomber force can be distinguished: aviation in our country:
– maintenance and development of the existing fleet of strategic bombers;
– development and construction of wartime strategic bombers, which can be produced as quickly as possible on the basis of existing aircraft;
– development and production of promising strategic bombers, taking into account future threats, the contours of which are already visible.
Resource allocation
It is obvious that in the pre-war period the maximum amount of resources is allocated to current needs, in relation to strategic bombers - these are points No. 1 and 2, while resources will be allocated to the third point, if at all, then in very limited quantities.
The author of this article is often reproached for promoting “wunderwaffes,” that is, complex combat vehicles that go beyond the usual looks and concepts. Yes, the creation of such machines is vital for the development of the military-industrial complex (DIC) and military science, otherwise you can become “eternal catch-ups”, blindly copying the enemy’s successful developments - such a strategy is economically beneficial, but carries the risk of not being tracked in time any promising development that could change the balance of power, and fail - remember the Manhattan Project, what would have happened if the USSR had not appreciated in time the importance and reality of creating nuclear weapons?
However, during the war and in the pre-war period, it is possible to direct resources to any “wunderwaffe” only if you are fully confident that they can really change the course of the war.
Let’s imagine for a second that during the Second World War the Germans did not waste funds on the construction of battleships, “mammoth-tanks"and ballistic missiles, for which they had neither high-precision guidance systems nor nuclear warheads, but would focus on anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), anti-aircraft guided missiles (SAMs) and guided glide bombs, deploying their large-scale production, for example, in 1943? What would be the outcome of the war then?
According to the author, the transition to trench warfare and excessive prolongation of the Second World War, up to the exhaustion of the warring parties, in this case could well become real.
German missile defense "Wasserfall" W10 - had the Germans correctly assessed their prospects, the intensity of American bombing could have dropped by several orders of magnitude, industrial facilities in the rear of Nazi Germany would have remained safe and sound
But a strategic bomber, whatever it may be, is unlikely to affect the outcome of the war - namely a strategic bomber, because, it is possible that the American B-21 Raider is already something more than just a bomber, that it is something like a “flying destroyer” capable of autonomously fighting ground, surface and air targets deep in enemy territory, but you can’t build such a machine “quickly and a lot.”
Proposed in the article “What should a strategic bomber of the near future be like?” the concept of a missile-carrying bomber for our design bureaus (KB) and industry will be the same “wunderwaffe” as the PAK-DA, perhaps even more complex, since everything will have to start all over again. In Russia there is simply no civilian aircraft that could be quickly converted into a bomber, in the form in which it is indicated in the article.
The development of the Skhoi Superjet 100 aircraft was started by the Sukhoi Corporation back in 2000, the first prototype was presented in 2007, the first flight took place a year later, and the first deliveries of production aircraft began only in 2011. The development of the Superjet aircraft was carried out with the support of large Western companies, with extensive use of Western technologies, in the “pre-sanctions era”. Since 2019, the “import-substituted” Superjet NEW has been developed, but even now, after 5 years, work on it is still not fully completed.
Superjet. Image by SuperJet International
With a combat aircraft, everything will be much more complicated, with all these GOST standards and “letters” of ours, even if serial engines will be used (it is possible that they will be used in the PAK-DA), avionics units (avionics) and others Components. To collect all this into a single complex, test it, and most importantly - organize large-scale production - this will take at least ten to fifteen years, especially in the conditions of the Northern Military District and the pre-war period.
Do we have an urgent need for a new strategic bomber right now?
If we talk about nuclear deterrence, the role of strategic aviation in it is minimal. What are the chances of survival of strategic bombers in the event of a sudden disarming strike, with the flight time of nuclear warheads (NCU) and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) being on the order of 5–7 minutes? Even if the planes manage to take off, will they escape the nuclear explosion zone? Will the enemy really not think of adding 2-4 nuclear warheads along their possible course of movement, taking into account the danger of the “strategists”?
And in any case, we will receive a strategic bomber developed from scratch in quantities of about a hundred units only in a quarter of a century, hardly earlier, just look at the pace at which the Il-76 is currently being produced.
As for the tasks solved by strategic bombers within the framework of conventional conflicts, everything is more complicated here, and they need to be considered in the context of the three options for the development of strategic bomber aviation outlined above:
– maintenance and development of the existing fleet of strategic bombers;
– development and construction of wartime strategic bombers, which can be produced as quickly as possible on the basis of existing aircraft;
– development and production of promising strategic bombers, taking into account the threats, the contours of which are already visible.
Each of these options, which do not replace, but complement each other, is a topic for a separate discussion.
Conclusions
Creating a strategic bomber, simple, reliable, without distortions into stealth or supersonic speed is a great idea, had it been implemented thirty, or better yet, sixty years ago. Yes, unfortunately, in the USSR, and then in Russia, there was no aircraft comparable to the American B-52 bomber - it’s really a pity that we didn’t borrow this concept. But there is nothing fatal in this - we’ll get by.
The B-52 is the workhorse of strategic bombers, with the service life of an aircraft carrier or battleship.
However, to predict and predict the development of military equipment for a long period is a rather difficult task, in the solution of which there is always a factor of chance.
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