What should the strategic bomber of the near future be like?
Tu-160. An engineering masterpiece, an aircraft with outstanding performance characteristics and one of the most high-tech airframes in the world, it is not really needed. Photo: Rostec
During the ongoing air defense in Ukraine, Russian long-range and strategic bombers – Tu-22M3, Tu-95MS and Tu-160 – are being used quite actively.
All of them are used in the same way - as carriers of cruise and guided (Tu-22M3) missiles with a flight range of hundreds and thousands of kilometers.
These planes do not enter Ukrainian airspace - unlike the Americans, who threw their B-52s under fire from Vietnamese and Iraqi air defense, with inevitable losses, and they sent B-2s into Yugoslav airspace, which did not suffer losses, but the Americans were ready for them.
The biggest mistake would be to smugly claim that missiles are much better than bombs. In fact, these are different tools for different purposes and the attack aircraft must be able to use them all.
The question this article raises, however, is different.
Is it possible to risk a strategic bomber, for example the Tu-160, if the situation demands it?
In Ukraine there are many targets that need to be hit with a massive drop of bombs or bombs of special power, but we do not hit them, since the risk is too great - a strategic bomber lost from fire from the ground cannot be replaced with anything - Russia has not yet mastered production Tu-160M, but it seems that you can simply forget about PAK DA.
Both the Tu-160M and the hypothetical PAK DA are very expensive, technically complex aircraft that simply cannot be lost - even the loss of one aircraft can be a factor of strategic importance.
Because of this, our bombers have finally become missile carriers - the only task they can solve in a war with a relatively developed enemy is to strike with missiles from a long distance, from a safe distance. And against a weak enemy they can be used like the Tu-22M3 in Syria - dropping bombs from medium and high altitudes, again, being completely safe.
And this is where the snake bites its own tail - if bombers can only fire missiles while being safe, and drop bombs on unresponsive and defenseless targets, while being, again, safe, then why are they expensive, complex and difficult to replicate?
Why does the Tu-160 need supersonic power, a variable-sweep wing, a complex design using titanium alloys, and special fuel to reach supersonic speed?
The answer is that a “pure” missile carrier does not need all this.
And proof that all this is unnecessary is the fact that the much more primitive, low-speed, subsonic turboprop Tu-95MS performs all the same tasks as the Tu-160, with the same efficiency, but at the cost of lower costs. The average person is unaware, but the Tu-95MS is more important than the Tu-160; if it were necessary to reduce aircraft for the sake of economy, then it would be the 160s that would have to be taken out of service.
The Tu-95MS performs the same tasks as the Tu-160, with a significantly simpler design. Photo: Dmitry Terekhov
Another example, theoretical. When Boeing was developing a purely missile-carrying aircraft, it without further ado took as a basis the passenger aircraft model 747, which, according to the plan, was supposed to carry a large number of cruise missiles. And it would work! If launching the missile launcher remains the only task, then a complex aircraft is not needed.
American project of a missile carrier based on the Boeing 747
Why do we need the PAK DA with its radar stealth and special modification of special NK-32 engines? How will it surpass the Tu-95MS in terms of striking the enemy?
Theoretically, in a global war, stealth will allow you to gain time over your territory - the Japanese, according to them, see our Tu-95s immediately upon takeoff from Ukrainka, a hypothetical stealth bomber will be detected much later.
But if we don't fly close to Japan and attack it from a safe distance, then what difference does it make? They will still detect the missiles in advance, they just won’t see the carrier. But they can’t reach it in the air with anything, and it doesn’t matter to us whether they see it or not.
Let's formulate the problem - modern bombers have become so expensive and complex that they cannot be produced and cannot be lost in a war, while the tasks they perform do not require such structural complexity and do not justify their cost.
At the same time, it cannot be said that we do not need strategic bombers. We need it - the risks of a global war are getting higher and higher, and there will be a lot of strike aircraft with an intercontinental range, hundreds of them. And they will have to be produced by our meager industry, which exists within our economy, which is not the strongest, to put it mildly.
There is a contradiction; we need to change approaches to creating aircraft. In order to understand what the bomber of the future should be like, it is worth once again recalling the evolution of these aircraft.
From the Flying Fortress to Spirit and Raider
Historically, the development of concepts for the use of a heavy bomber took place in the UK and the USA, and later only in the USA. The USSR and China conceptually copied, and not always successfully, and sometimes just stupidly. The first war where strategic bombing was used was World War II.
The heavy bombers of that time, mainly the B-17, B-24, Lancaster and B-29, were used as high-altitude bombers, delivering strikes from high altitudes for that time. The primary threat was piston fighters, the main means of defense was planning raids to ensure surprise, defensive armament of bombers and a large number of vehicles in the strike group, which made it possible to fire at attacking fighters from multiple machine guns simultaneously.
There were exceptions to the tactical scheme described above, for example, the famous bombing of Tokyo on March 10, 1945, but these were just rarities.
Soviet aviation on the DB-3, Il-4, Er-2 and Pe-8 it acted similarly, minus the fact that the USSR could never attack a hundred aircraft in one sortie, which made the bombings both more risky and less effective.
The appearance of the B-29 made it possible to use a new protective factor - the high speed of an aircraft freed from bombs.
A massive group strike from a high altitude is the “calling card” of the bombing of the Second World War.
After the end of World War II, the situation changed only quantitatively - the flight speeds of both bombers and fighters increased.
However, due to the advent of nuclear weapons There was no longer a need for numerous strike groups; now one aircraft often had to go to the target.
The evolution of bombers until the end of the 60s of the twentieth century took place in the context of a nuclear war between the USSR and the USA. All their tactical and technical characteristics were assessed precisely from the point of view of the possibility or impossibility of hitting targets on the territory of the main enemy.
It was believed that the high altitude and flight speed would allow the bomber to break through to a target protected by subsonic fighters with cannon and machine gun weapons.
The American B-36, B-47 and B-52, the Soviet Tu-16, Tu-95 and 3M were supposed to act exactly like this.
Based on the same doctrine, British bombers of the so-called V-series were created.
The expectation of supersonic fighters, guided air-to-air missiles and guided anti-aircraft missiles in the near future has called the success of such a breakthrough into question.
In the United States, work simultaneously began on supersonic bombers and guided missiles for subsonic bombers.
Since 1956, the B-58 supersonic long-range bomber, capable of carrying one nuclear bomb, began to enter service, and since 1959, a guided missile for the B-52 “Hound Dog” began to enter service; one bomber could carry two such missiles on underwing pylons.
In the USSR, the response to the threat was intensive work on arming Tu-4 and Tu-16 bombers with cruise missiles of various types, the appearance of the Tu-22 supersonic long-range bomber and the K-20 missile system for the Tu-95 in the Tu-95K modification.
By inertia, both in the USA and the USSR in the mid-60s, projects of high-altitude heavy attack aircraft (for fundamentally different purposes) were launched at a speed of three “sounds”. In the USA it was the project of the B-70 Valkyrie strategic bomber, and in the USSR it was the medium-range missile carrier (“pure missile carrier”, not capable of carrying bombs) “100” of the Sukhoi Design Bureau.
Both projects did not become serial.
Subsequently, the USA and the USSR, who were neck and neck, split up - the USA got involved in the Vietnam War, which directed the development of the defensive capabilities of bombers along the path of increasing electronic warfare systems on board - with great success, and the Yom Kippur War between Israel and the Arab countries sharply increased the previously hypothetical need for a low-altitude aircraft capable of breaking through air defenses using ultra-low altitude flight at high speed.
By that time, the United States had already created the multi-mode B-1A, capable of both high-altitude flight at speeds greater than two speeds of sound, and low-altitude breakthrough at ultra-low (50 meters) altitudes. In addition, the B-52 was adapted to low-altitude air defense breakthroughs. A breakthrough tactic was created in which the B-52 hits targets with aeroballistic missiles and then breaks through the kill zone to the target with a nuclear bomb, using both low-altitude flight capabilities and electronic warfare capabilities.
Subsequently, the Americans recognized the ability of the B-1A to fly with two “sounds” as meaningless from a tactical point of view, and this aircraft went into production as the B-1B, a low-altitude air defense breakthrough aircraft. The video below shows a training flight at a typical altitude for a nuclear war.
The USSR did not have its own Vietnam and there was no need to make such a breakthrough in development, and certain unrest began there.
The development of intercontinental strike aircraft has stopped. In the class of long-range bombers, Tupolev actually managed to trick the new Tu-22M aircraft under the guise of modernizing the Tu-22 that was already in service.
In general, in the 70s in the USSR, an understanding of the role and place of strategic aviation in a future war was not formed. The end of the 70s was marked by two phenomena.
Firstly, economical long-range cruise missiles with turbojet engines appeared in the United States. They immediately began to convert the B-52 for them.
Secondly, the appearance in the USSR of air defense systems of the S-300 family, as well as an analysis of the prospects for the further development of air defense systems, led the Americans to the conclusion that neither speed nor following the terrain in the future will help to achieve a breakthrough in the air defense of the USSR. The only means that in the future was supposed to help break through the defenses of systems like the S-300 was stealth.
Since 1979, research began in the United States on a future stealth bomber, which then, in the late 80s, gave birth to the “flying wing” B-2, capable of low-altitude flight and having the highest level of stealth in radar, infrared and, according to according to some media reports in the late 80s, in the acoustic spectrum.
The further evolution of bombers in the United States was interrupted by the end of the Cold War. Now the doctrine for using their strategic bombers is almost the same as in the late 80s, adjusted for the high accuracy of modern bombs. The B-1Bs are worn out and will soon require replacement, especially dangerous high-risk missions with unsuppressed air defense will be performed by the B-2s, the B-52s remain carriers of cruise missiles and use free-falling bombs only in the absence of counteraction, in the future instead of the B-2s and B-1Bs B-21 “Raider” will enter service with the same tasks.
In the USSR, the evolution of bombers took a different path - they began to be seen primarily as missile carriers. If the long-range bombers Tu-16, Tu-22 and Tu-22M continued to be considered both bombers and missile carriers, then the missions of intercontinental strike aircraft became strictly missile-carrying - the Tu-70MS, developed in the late 95s, was and remains primarily a carrier cruise missiles - at that time the X-55, which were created as a response to the American missile defense.
An anomaly that well reflects the confusion in the minds of Soviet “decision makers” was the Tu-160.
As in the USA, in the USSR in the 60s, in addition to attempts to create a high-altitude supersonic aircraft, they were also puzzled by multi-mode aircraft capable of breaking through enemy air defenses by flying at low altitude.
In 1967, the Council of Ministers issued a decree on the creation of such a machine. There's no point in repeating history its creation, it is widely known, we will voice a key fact - in the course of work on the future bomber, taking into account the customer’s requirements for the tasks to be solved and the composition of the weapons, OKB im. Tupolev proposed to move away from a multi-mode aircraft to a high-altitude aircraft, in many ways similar to the passenger supersonic Tu-144.
The customer rejected this requirement, and as a result, the aircraft was made as a multi-mode aircraft - due to the variable-sweep wing, the Tu-160 could actually fly at low altitudes and fly at twice the speed of sound at high altitudes.
But the aircraft’s armament turned out to be purely missile-carrying. It carries 6 cruise missiles in two weapons bays. Theoretically, the launchers could be dismantled and bombs could be suspended instead of missiles, but in reality, with the exception of a few training bombing missions, the aircraft was and is used strictly as a missile carrier. All its multi-mode capabilities turned out to be a thing in itself, and a very expensive one at that.
And its maintenance requirements make it extremely difficult to use in a nuclear war.
Despite its high cost and complexity, its only advantage over the Tu-95MS was the number of Kh-101 missiles on board - there are 4 more of them. This aircraft does not have any concept of combat use, other than delivering cruise missiles to the launch line and launching them at the target, and for such work it is redundant.
This must be understood very clearly: the Tu-160 is a masterpiece from an engineering and production point of view, but it is simply not needed in its current form, and the simpler Tu-95 is no longer produced, and, to be honest, it is also far from ideal . There is no point in talking about the proposed PAK DA - in theory, the aircraft can be designed and built in such a way that it does not have these flaws.
But the very task of mass construction of very complex technically stealthy bombers is non-trivial even for the United States, and Russia, with sanctions, an ongoing heavy air defense system and unclear economic prospects, is all the more unable to cope with such a task - and this must be admitted. Because it is not enough to create a single aircraft, it needs to be produced, taking into account the foreign policy situation - in huge quantities, and taking into account economic realities - cheaply.
Before outlining the contours of the bomber of the future, it is necessary to decide what tasks it will perform and under what conditions.
Purpose
It must be admitted that irrational, illogical thinking and the low level of intelligence of decision-makers on issues important to the state have more than once played a cruel joke not only on the country and society as a whole, but also on the technical equipment of the Armed Forces. It is for this reason that it is not uncommon for us to have a situation where a weapon is first created, and then we have to come up with a concept for combat use for it.
Primitive consciousness tends to fetishize tactical and technical characteristics, instead of their rational choice, for example, “do it like the Americans” or “supersonic at any cost,” etc. And we also see such examples every day on the Internet or on television.
But nothing prevents, when theorizing about a new bomber, putting the cart before the horse and coming up with everything right.
What tasks can a bomber theoretically perform and under what conditions?
Let's briefly list the main ones:
1. Combat duty on the ground and in the air.
2. Strike with cruise missiles without entering the enemy’s air defense zone.
3. Strike with guided missiles of shorter range than the missile launcher, as well as with gliding bombs without entering the enemy’s air defense coverage area.
4. Bombing from different heights, the use of free-falling or adjustable aerial bombs, conventional or nuclear.
5. Attacking enemy surface ships using long-range anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) without entering the enemy's air defense coverage area.
6. Conducting reconnaissance over the World Ocean and territories without air defense, in the absence of a threat from enemy aircraft.
Which of these things can supersonic speed at high altitude help with?
For nothing.
And why does this require stealth, an unconventional glider shape (for example, a “flying wing”), the ability for transonic or supersonic flight at ultra-low altitude in terrain-following mode?
Only for one task - breaking through unsuppressed air defense and reaching a target covered by this air defense, followed by the use of short-range weapons or bombs on it.
Here, once again, it must be repeated that the Russian Aerospace Forces, even in a nightmare, do not consider such combat missions as real, and do not prepare for them, although they order aircraft that are technically capable of this, and then simply arm them with long-range missiles.
Then let’s pose the question differently - if we discard what the Aerospace Forces have already discarded and consider point 4 only in the form of the “Syrian” option - from a safe height in the absence of a threat from the ground, then which of these tasks can a high-altitude subsonic aircraft with a traditional aerodynamic design be able to perform?
The answer is any.
Appearance
In the summer of 2023, the author had to take part in a non-public event dedicated to the use of unmanned aerial vehicles, and one of the participants, a colonel, a man who combined both combat experience (his first injury back in 1990) and knowledge allowing him to develop command and control systems, expressed the thesis: once upon a time, the locomotive of technical progress was the military-industrial complex, and civilian technology developed as a derivative of achievements in the creation of military equipment.
Now the situation is the opposite: the locomotive of technology is the civilian sector, and the challenge is to quickly and effectively adapt civilian achievements to military applications.
It’s impossible to argue with this - neither the tablets from which artillery fire is controlled, but the distributed acoustic reconnaissance systems cobbled together “on the knee” based on the reprogrammed smartphones of soldiers linked into a network, nor the civilian Maviks, without which it has become simply impossible to fight, nor “ Starlink" won't let you lie.
Scientific and technological progress is now proceeding exactly this way - from the civilian sector to the military.
It makes sense to subordinate the “inventing” of a new attack aircraft to this approach.
In Russia there are obvious and enormous difficulties with the construction of bombers, but, for example, the Superjet-100 was built in the amount of 232 aircraft in 16 years, and in some years several dozen such aircraft came out of KNAAZ, with a record figure of 36 aircraft per year. 2014.
Of course, it won’t be possible to produce a more complex and large bomber this way, and a different plant will have to be chosen, but achieving 10 aircraft per year, using civilian technologies, components and engineering solutions, will not be a problem.
What will this plane be like?
It would be most rational to design an aircraft with dimensions “about the Tu-95”, but with four PS-90 engines, modernized “for a bomber” on underwing pylons, with one weapons compartment for 5-6 Kh-101/102 cruise missiles, and two underwing hardpoints for two more under each wing. The drum launcher in the weapons compartment must be quick-detachable.
In total, the aircraft will be able to carry 9–10 large cruise missiles. The aircraft must also carry up to 25 tons of bombs of various calibers.
We need separate weapons compartments for long-range air-to-air guided missiles for self-defense (the R-37 can be considered as a standard) and anti-radar missiles necessary to break through air defenses if the bomber does end up in a dangerous zone. As well as external pylons for replaceable container sighting stations for adjustable bombs.
Externally, such an aircraft will be similar to the four-engine version of the B-52 that was proposed at one time, just smaller, close to the Tu-95, in size.
The failed project of the four-engine version of the B-52 is the closest analogue of the proposed aircraft.
The entire crew must be placed in ejection seats on one deck, with ejection upward, the height of the fuselage on the ground must allow the crew to climb on board without ladders and stepladders, as on the domestic Il-38 or American B-52, the aircraft must be equipped with an emergency launch system for all engines from a pyrostarter, the height of the engine nacelles above the ground should allow changing the charge of the gas generator (“cartridge” in American terminology) by hand from the ground, without ladders, stepladders, lifts, etc.
The tail compartment, like the Tu-95, is not needed, nor cannon armament.
Since it cannot be ruled out that the aircraft will still have to fly with bombs at low altitude, its airframe must have a large margin of safety, and the load on the wing must be reduced to a level comparable to the Tu-16.
The latter, although not a low-altitude or multi-mode aircraft, flew better near the ground than the B-52.
The fact that for the sake of some, albeit limited, low-altitude flight capabilities, you will have to sacrifice a little speed is quite tolerable - for the application model for which the new bomber is being designed, the extra 50-60 kilometers per hour does not matter.
Design features
When creating an intercontinental strike aircraft, it is always necessary to keep in mind the main task - a strike on US territory during an already ongoing nuclear war.
Such a war implies, for example, the need to use bombers from civilian airfields, the use of the same aviation kerosene that fuels civil aircraft, minimal labor costs and the required time between flights for maintenance, and self-diagnosis systems that make it possible to determine the presence of malfunctions without special equipment.
The design of the aircraft must ensure ease of repair. It needs good takeoff and landing characteristics, ideally comparable to those of the Il-76 (which is not a guarantee that it will work, but we must strive).
It was said above about the need to implement in the aircraft design the function of emergency engine start from a pyrostarter; we add that in general the aircraft should be suitable for long-term combat duty at standstills without loss of technical readiness. The navigation kit should allow quick adjustments right during the climb, in a matter of minutes, as is done by the Americans.
Since in-flight refueling is not always possible, the aircraft must be capable of carrying external fuel tanks.
The communications equipment installed on board must provide the ability to contact the aircraft and transmit a combat order on board at any possible level of electromagnetic interference in the atmosphere caused by the massive use of nuclear weapons on our territory. It should allow the aircraft to act in the interests of the Navy during naval operations, as will be discussed below.
In addition to permanent crew members, the aircraft must have 1-2 workplaces where any equipment can be quickly deployed, for example, a control station for unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) launched from the aircraft, a radio reconnaissance post, or a workplace for the commander of an aviation unit or formation. Operators of this equipment must also be in ejection seats.
A number of the requirements stated above are in conflict with ensuring high flight speed; it must be clearly stated that these requirements are more important than speed. In general, the lower limit for maximum speed should be considered that of the Tu-95MS.
Crew members must have means of protection against laser irradiation and special equipment to protect against the light radiation of a nuclear explosion.
There must be a full toilet on board the aircraft.
The cabin must maintain a comfortable temperature for the crew and normal atmospheric pressure at any flight altitude.
Due to the unpredictably difficult conditions of a global war, any bomber must be suitable for use as an aerial tanker, for which provision must be made for the rapid dismantling of the missile launcher in the bomb bay, the installation and connection of additional fuel tanks to the fuel lines and the installation of an UPAZ unit for refueling in air. It is possible that some kind of lifting devices for mounting and dismantling equipment from the weapons compartment should be built into the aircraft.
The rear hemisphere video surveillance system should be standard on all aircraft.
The most important thing for use in a major war is the ability to redirect the aircraft to a new target in flight.
In 2019, the author published an article “Aviation strategic nuclear forces: it seems that we are mistaken about something”, where it was explained why this is necessary. The article is recommended for familiarization to understand the model of combat use of the bomber; here it is worth giving a short fragment:
...using aircraft using the same methods as the United States does will make it possible to have a flexible instrument of war that can be retargeted, recalled, directed again to another target, used to strike with additional reconnaissance on a target whose coordinates are precisely unknown, in some cases , reusing aircraft is not so unrealistic, taking into account the destruction from missile attacks and how they will affect the operation of the enemy’s air defense, his communications, the supply of fuel to airfields, etc.
What do you need?
It is necessary to give strategic aviation the ability to receive a combat mission in flight. In relation to an aircraft that is a “pure” missile carrier, this means the ability to enter a flight mission into the missile directly in flight. Moreover, taking into account the disruptions in communication that will occur after the start of the exchange of nuclear strikes, the aircraft crew should be able to do this.
I would like to be able to retarget the missile in flight, but this could make the missile seriously vulnerable to cyber attacks, and such an improvement should be treated with caution.
What do you need?
It is necessary to give strategic aviation the ability to receive a combat mission in flight. In relation to an aircraft that is a “pure” missile carrier, this means the ability to enter a flight mission into the missile directly in flight. Moreover, taking into account the disruptions in communication that will occur after the start of the exchange of nuclear strikes, the aircraft crew should be able to do this.
I would like to be able to retarget the missile in flight, but this could make the missile seriously vulnerable to cyber attacks, and such an improvement should be treated with caution.
The advantage of aviation over ballistic missiles in an ongoing nuclear war is its flexibility of use. An airplane can take off with a mission to hit a specific target, but if the situation changes, the US Air Force provides for the possibility of changing the target right in flight. To ensure such flexibility in the use of aircraft, the Americans are still relying on the use of nuclear bombs that can be dropped where they are needed right now, without the need to enter a mission on the ground.
We and our plane also need to be able to use nuclear bombs without restrictions, but since cruise missiles are considered the main weapon in our case, we need the crew to be able to retarget them in flight. This is a fundamentally important capability, without which the bomber dramatically loses its value as a means of warfare.
When using nuclear bombs with a UMPC, it is necessary to be able to program the UMPC in flight, changing the target coordinates in it.
An aircraft built taking into account such requirements will be able to perform the widest range of tasks in any war of any scale.
Application model
Now let's evaluate the capabilities of this hypothetical aircraft. First, let's consider whether such an aircraft could replace the long-range and strategic bombers actually used by the Soviet Union and later by Russia.
In Afghanistan, Soviet Tu-16, Tu-22 and Tu-22M were used for massive bombing attacks from a safe height for the aircraft. During the civil war in Tajikistan, the first war in Chechnya and the war in Syria, Tu-22M3 carried out the same bombing attacks.
During the air defense in Ukraine, Tu-22M3 were used to bomb Azovstal in the absence of enemy air defense, and the X-22 missile defense was used against targets covered by air defense (according to some media reports, also the Kh-32 with non-nuclear equipment). The missiles were launched from a high altitude, without entering the range of Ukrainian air defense.
Tu-95MS and Tu-160 bombers were used only as carriers of cruise missiles, which were launched from a great distance from the target, in some cases exceeding 1 kilometers.
Our hypothetical bomber would perform any of these tasks no worse than actual bombers.
Now let’s look at the model for using this aircraft in conditions hitherto unknown to our aviation.
Let's start with the use of an aircraft in a nuclear deterrent system.
How it is possible to make a reliable means of a nuclear retaliatory strike out of manned bombers was described in detail in the article Bombers and Nuclear Retaliation.
Quote from there:
By the beginning of the seventies, the practice of combat duty on the ground, which made it possible, if necessary, to have time to withdraw some bombers from the attack of ballistic missiles, had finally taken shape...
Full combat readiness does not happen in any part of the Air Force. Therefore, it was practiced to allocate part of the forces on combat duty. Then a replacement was made. The aircraft were parked with suspended thermonuclear bombs and cruise or aeroballistic missiles, also with a thermonuclear warhead.
The personnel were located in specially built buildings, which de facto represented a dormitory with a developed household and entertainment infrastructure to maintain good morale among all personnel. The living conditions at these facilities differed favorably from those in other branches of the US Armed Forces...
The room was directly adjacent to the bombers' parking lot. Upon leaving it, the personnel immediately found themselves directly in front of the aircraft.
At each airbase, it was distributed which aircraft crews should get into their planes at a run, and which - in cars. For each aircraft, a separate vehicle on duty was allocated, which was supposed to deliver the crew to it. This order has not been interrupted for many decades and is still in effect. The cars were taken from the air base's fleet.
Further, it was required to ensure the fastest possible leaving the parking lot. To ensure this, there were certain design features of the B-52 bomber.
Full combat readiness does not happen in any part of the Air Force. Therefore, it was practiced to allocate part of the forces on combat duty. Then a replacement was made. The aircraft were parked with suspended thermonuclear bombs and cruise or aeroballistic missiles, also with a thermonuclear warhead.
The personnel were located in specially built buildings, which de facto represented a dormitory with a developed household and entertainment infrastructure to maintain good morale among all personnel. The living conditions at these facilities differed favorably from those in other branches of the US Armed Forces...
The room was directly adjacent to the bombers' parking lot. Upon leaving it, the personnel immediately found themselves directly in front of the aircraft.
At each airbase, it was distributed which aircraft crews should get into their planes at a run, and which - in cars. For each aircraft, a separate vehicle on duty was allocated, which was supposed to deliver the crew to it. This order has not been interrupted for many decades and is still in effect. The cars were taken from the air base's fleet.
Further, it was required to ensure the fastest possible leaving the parking lot. To ensure this, there were certain design features of the B-52 bomber.
It is easy to see that the proposed bomber also has these same design features - the possibility of long-term parking without loss of combat readiness, emergency start of all engines from a pyrostarter, a quickly put into operation navigation system, the ability for the crew to climb on board without ladders or ladders. All this will also make it possible to lift the bomber into the air literally in a few minutes from the moment the combat alert is announced.
As a result, the Aerospace Forces will have the opportunity, if necessary, to deploy the same combat duty at airfields with nuclear weapons as the Americans conducted at that time. And, like the Americans in their time, our pilots will be able to take off with only a designated backup target, which will be struck only if it is not possible to transfer on board a combat mission dictated by the situation.
And then, having received a combat mission, the crew will be able to program cruise missiles or UMPCs for nuclear bombs properly, to hit those targets that the current situation will require to hit.
If necessary, some of the bombers will be able to remain on duty as tankers, or later, during a second combat sortie, to make up for losses in tankers, if any.
If the proposed bomber can deliver a cruise missile strike on some country like Ukraine with the same efficiency as the Tu-95MS or Tu-160, then during a nuclear war it will be many times more effective than them (especially the Tu-160 with its monstrous interflight maintenance), moreover, it will surpass in its efficiency even such a “champion” as the B-52.
When launching a cruise missile strike on US territory, there is a risk that the Americans will be able to, having detected in advance the approach of the bombers to the launch line, throw there a group of interceptors, supported by an early warning aircraft and an aerial tanker.
In our case, the risk is partly countered by the bomber's ability to attack an air target with long-range air-to-air missiles. No matter how weak the hope of fighting off interceptors in this way may be, the same Tu-160, in principle, does not have such an opportunity.
When conducting combat operations against a weak enemy, the aircraft can use not only unguided bombs or gliding bombs with UMPC, but also use heavy adjustable bombs, for example KAB-1500, this opportunity will be given to it by a containerized optical-electronic sighting station that it can carry.
If you place a powerful electronic warfare complex on board an aircraft, the operator of this complex, then, having anti-radar missiles as part of its armament, such an aircraft will be able to operate even against unsuppressed air defense, although such actions will involve risk.
What deserves special mention is that such an aircraft can be used as part of a single strike complex with a long-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV).
It was said above that it should be possible to place refueling equipment in the aircraft's weapons compartment. It was also indicated that a UAV operator or even a UAV crew could be on board the aircraft as a temporary crew member.
Thus, the bomber can carry UAV operators on board, a supply of fuel for it in internal volumes, and its strike weapons on an external sling.
Then it becomes possible to send a heavy jet drone for various purposes on a combat mission together with the bomber, which will fly part of the flight together with the bomber and receive fuel from its board by refueling in the air.
When approaching a target, the UAV, depending on its design and purpose, can be used for additional reconnaissance of the target, air combat with enemy fighters, guidance of missiles launched from a bomber, suppression of air defense along the bomber’s flight route and other tasks.
He can even strike an area where air defense systems are concentrated with a powerful nuclear bomb, clearing the way for a bomber.
Moreover, its loss does not lead to losses in the flight personnel, nor to the loss of a bomber, and in some cases will not lead to the failure of the combat mission.
This method of action is especially important when attacking surface ships, which a heavy and large aircraft will not be able to approach during a real war. But an unobtrusive UAV, for example, a special modification of the Okhotnik, controlled directly from the bomber, will be able to get close to the target and provide target designation for it on board the aircraft, which will use anti-ship missiles from a safe distance.
Thus, it is clear that, despite the technical simplicity, traditional airframe, subsonic maximum speed, serial engines of the same type as those installed on transport and even passenger aircraft, the proposed bomber will be completely superior in its combat capabilities to both the Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3, and Tu-160, and in some cases PAK DA (joint use with UAVs, for example).
In fact, for him, the fulfillment of only one combat mission is in question, one that the Tu-95MS cannot normally perform either. The Tu-160 could if it had the appropriate weapons, the Tu-22MZ can, but only over terrain with relatively flat terrain, and the PAK DA, apparently, could do it without restrictions if it were built. But no one will send him to such a task because of the price and complexity of production.
We are talking about the task for which the Americans at one time radically modernized the B-52 and changed the crew combat training program; why the American B-1 and our Tu-22M and Tu-160 received a wing with variable sweep (and which the Tu-160 will never implement due to its price and complexity of production); and in the States they switched to stealth bombers (B-2 and B-21), and we and the Chinese are planning to switch.
We are talking about a bomber overcoming unsuppressed air defense with free-falling bombs or short-range guided missiles.
It’s also worth mentioning how our plane will behave if the crew is given just such an order.
A special challenge
So, that's the point.
There is a target protected by zone air defense. It is impossible to suppress or destroy air defenses before launching an airstrike against this target.
The task is to break through the air defense coverage area to the target, hit it with short-range weapons or even bombs.
The consistent evolution of the bomber was built around this problem for decades; in order to solve it, planes went to low altitudes, then to ultra-low altitudes (30–50 meters); at the same time, speed was increased when flying at such altitudes, up to supersonic; then it turned out that a person can fly a plane with such speeds only over flat terrain, automatic terrain following systems appeared, and then, finally, in the 80s of the last century in the United States they relied on stealth.
Those who follow the combat use of the Russian Aerospace Forces in Ukraine will easily remember the video with Su-24M bombing strikes from ultra-low altitudes - this is it, a breakthrough through working air defense. Su-25s also operate only from low altitudes.
Our attack aircraft and Ukrainian air defense systems. In a war with the United States, bombers will find themselves in the same situation. American ones - for sure, ours - perhaps. Photo: telegram.
This is exactly how the Americans were going to break through to important targets in the USSR on their B-1s, and on the B-52s too.
Could our hypothetical bomber do the same?
Let's start with the conditions under which such a task can be performed.
Considering the risk it entails, it makes sense to send a bomber on such a flight only in a war for existence.
This can only be nuclear, which means that the bomber strike will be carried out on territory that has already been attacked by intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
The fact that planes will invade the airspace of a country that has already been seriously destroyed by massive nuclear strikes, including on air defense systems, air bases and the notorious “decision-making centers.”
This will significantly complicate the enemy’s defense from aviation and will make it easier for bombers to break through to the target.
A breakthrough will be made even easier by the delivery of complexly planned strikes by large aviation forces, when some aircraft strike with hypersonic missiles like the same “Dagger” and cruise missiles, all with a nuclear warhead, in areas where air defense systems are located, in places where dispersed enemy fighters may be located. , or anti-radar missiles on its radar, etc., clearing the route for the main strike group and distracting enemy aircraft with its actions.
And under these conditions, the speed with which the aircraft flies at low altitude ceases to be critically important - on the one hand, the chances of encountering an enemy fighter are small, on the other hand, if it does, then let it be at least some speed - an air-to-air missile is faster .
Why work with bombs when there are rockets?
There is no particular need, but missiles tend to run out; in the case of the United States, there will be many times more targets for a nuclear strike than any conceivable number of cruise missiles and warheads on ballistic missiles. And prolonging a nuclear war in the same way as the war with Ukraine was protracted is fraught.
Thus, the task of low-altitude air defense breakthrough for a bomber may arise, and situational conditions under which it will be feasible may also arise.
But can the proposed bomber technically accomplish it? After all, its closest analogue will be the B-52 - an aircraft designed as a high-altitude aircraft. Let's look at the photo.
B-52 at low altitude
A B-52 flies past an American aircraft carrier at an altitude less than the height of the flight deck above the waterline
Low-altitude air defense breakthrough exercises for North America (NORAD), 80s. The exercises showed that bombers pass through air defense almost unhindered
The B-52s are quite capable of flying at low altitude, and while their tasks included striking with nuclear bombs, they practiced these flights. And this despite the fact that the plane has a high wing load, the wing itself is long and thin, but it turned out to be capable of such things.
And the Tu-95 turned out to be just as capable, albeit worse.
Quote from the book by Colonel General of the USSR Air Force, Hero of the Soviet Union Vasily Vasilyevich Reshetnikov “What happened, happened”:
Andrei Nikolaevich also disadvantaged us in terms of low-altitude flights. We wouldn’t be pressed to the ground, but our on-board radio countermeasures were, to put it mildly, somewhat weak to effectively counter enemy air defense detection and targeting stations. A low altitude could protect us much more reliably from premature detection in dangerous sections of the flight, since the radio emissions of the locators almost did not touch the earth's and sea surfaces.
In training with the domestic air defense, if the flight plan could be kept secret, our ships at low altitude passed unnoticed and untouched through vast spaces. With your own - so what? But the fact is that the radar fields of the potential enemy, the general picture of which was well known to us, were not much different from the Soviet ones. And this gave us a considerable chance.
We started flights at altitudes of 100, 200, 300 meters, as usual, also “without asking”, without seeing any sedition in it, but, as it turned out, the aircraft structure, especially in the summer, in turbulent air from terrestrial evaporations, undergoes increased loads. And Tupolev awarded: one hour at low altitude - two hours of aircraft resource.
It’s expensive, of course, and it’s not a good idea to waste resources, but at that time we couldn’t refuse this, perhaps, the only reliable opportunity to penetrate to targets more or less unnoticed. And later, when new, stronger, but still weak radio countermeasures and even long-range anti-radar missiles appeared, we did not disown low altitudes.
In training with the domestic air defense, if the flight plan could be kept secret, our ships at low altitude passed unnoticed and untouched through vast spaces. With your own - so what? But the fact is that the radar fields of the potential enemy, the general picture of which was well known to us, were not much different from the Soviet ones. And this gave us a considerable chance.
We started flights at altitudes of 100, 200, 300 meters, as usual, also “without asking”, without seeing any sedition in it, but, as it turned out, the aircraft structure, especially in the summer, in turbulent air from terrestrial evaporations, undergoes increased loads. And Tupolev awarded: one hour at low altitude - two hours of aircraft resource.
It’s expensive, of course, and it’s not a good idea to waste resources, but at that time we couldn’t refuse this, perhaps, the only reliable opportunity to penetrate to targets more or less unnoticed. And later, when new, stronger, but still weak radio countermeasures and even long-range anti-radar missiles appeared, we did not disown low altitudes.
You can see a fundamental difference from the Americans - we have local initiative, they have a widespread system. But the planes survived!
Later, low-altitude flights were no longer practiced with such frequency, but in principle, over relatively flat surfaces, long-range aviation crews can perform them even now. On-board radio-electronic equipment will not allow you to fly over more complex terrain.
In general, the Tu-95 airframe is really not suitable for this.
But the new aircraft can be made somewhat more suitable for low altitudes, perhaps at the expense of speed - let us once again remember the Tu-16, which could easily fly at low altitudes, better than the B-52.
The Tu-16 behaved quite normally at low altitudes - to the extent that an aircraft can fly normally at low altitudes
At the same time, one must understand that no low altitude will provide a bomber with the same level of stealth that the American B-21 will have, and the same capabilities for high-speed low-altitude air defense breakthrough that the B-1B has.
The capabilities of the proposed strike aircraft for low-altitude air defense breakthrough will be limited and will be significantly worse than that of enemy bombers (except for the B-52). However, they will not be zero.
And, naturally, the likelihood that such aircraft will be assigned the task of low-altitude air defense breakthrough with bombs is relatively small.
Therefore, you will simply have to come to terms with the insufficient capabilities of the new bomber in terms of low-altitude air defense breakthrough - in order to be able to quickly, cheaply and en masse build intercontinental strike aircraft for future wars.
We need quantity!
The example of the Superjet, which was built in the hundreds, suggests that Russia can easily produce relatively simple subsonic bombers with serial “civilian” systems (for example, engines) in at least an air division within 10 years.
Unlike the complex and expensive Tu-160M and PAK DA.
In future wars, among which, with some degree of probability, a global war with the use of nuclear weapons looms, a lot of aircraft will be needed.
The economy will not be the most efficient for a long time, and the processes of deindustrialization, which slowed down after the start of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, will be accelerated again after its end - there are too many forces interested in this, both within the country and outside it.
In such conditions, there is only one way to build a large number of strike aircraft with an intercontinental range - to make them very simple.
It is important to understand that the hundred bombers proposed in the article are much stronger than 5-6 Tu-160Ms, and building these hundred in the end will be easier than 5-6 Tu-160Ms.
At the same time, the proposed technical solutions may well make this aircraft more efficient than the expensive and complex Tu-160M or the non-existent PAK DA.
The only thing that such a bomber will not do is repeat mantras on TV on the topic “analog.” But this is not the biggest problem that will face our country in the future, and it can easily be ignored.
The main thing is that we have the opportunity to build many bombers, and we need to take advantage of it.
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