Fuses of Russian naval artillery during the Russo-Japanese War. Tube arr. 1894

154
Fuses of Russian naval artillery during the Russo-Japanese War. Tube arr. 1894

This material is an addition to my series of articles devoted to domestic naval guns and shells for them. I express my sincere gratitude to the respected Alexey Rytik (among other things, one of the authors of VO) for the assistance provided and the provision of some sources inaccessible to me.

Some theory


During the Russian-Japanese War, in service with the domestic fleet consisted of different types of fuses, also called tubes, including:

1) shock tubes for high-explosive projectiles - ensuring the detonation of the projectile after hitting an obstacle;

2) shock tubes for armor-piercing projectiles - ensuring the rupture of the projectile after passing through the armor;

3) remote tubes - providing detonation at a certain distance from the weapon that fired it;

4) double-action tubes - combining the qualities of spacer and shock tubes. That is, a projectile equipped with such a tube would explode at a given distance, but if even before it had covered this distance the projectile would hit the target, then, unlike a distance tube, the gap would still occur.

The article offered to the dear reader discusses the design and principle of operation of only two tubes, namely:

1) shock tube arr. 1894 (modified by Baranovsky);

2) a double-action shock tube designed by Captain A.F. Brink.

The reason for this selectivity is that it was these tubes that were equipped with domestic medium- and large-caliber steel armor-piercing and high-explosive projectiles, which became the main weapons Russian ships in naval battles of 1904–1905. I will not consider other naval tubes in this article, but for a better understanding of the design features I will present a brief description of the 11DM fuse, which was used for shells of coastal defense guns and occupies, so to speak, an intermediate position between the tube mod. 1894 and a Brink pipe.

The above tubes, including 11DM, were bottom, impact, inertial fuses. In this case, “bottom” refers to the location of the tubes that were screwed into the bottom of the projectile, “impact” refers to triggering as a result of contact with the target, and “inertial” refers to the force that ensures the impact of the striker on the primer.

I note that these pipes may be called slightly differently in the sources (for example, “pipe sample 1894”) but, of course, this does not change the essence.

Shock tube arr. 1894


Description of the design and operating principle of the sample tube. 1894, together with her drawing, I took from the textbook “Naval Artillery Course. Part I. Gunpowder, guns, shells and tubes” by I. A. Yatsyno (second edition, 1900), pp. 205–206. I note that the information given by I. A. Yatsyno is fully confirmed by the “Textbook on artillery for students of the classes of gunners and artillery non-commissioned officers of the artillery training detachment of the Baltic Fleet”, Section VI “Shells, projectile tubes, cartridge tubes for igniting charges and cartridges, flares and rockets", published by the printing house of the Naval Ministry in the Main Admiralty in 1909.

Unfortunately, the quality of the drawing leaves much to be desired, but the principle of operation can be explained on it.


The body was made of yellow copper and had the shape of a cylinder with one bottom. The head bushing (1) had a hole in the center for the passage of fire from the primer directly into the projectile body. This hole was covered with a thin brass gasket (2) to protect the inside of the tube from contamination. Of course, the gasket was thin enough that fire could easily overcome it when the primer was fired.

Below the head sleeve was an internal sleeve containing the capsule. The capsule was a cup of red copper (3), into which a shock composition (4) was pressed, which was a mixture of Berthollet salt, fulminate of mercury and antimonium.

Under the inner sleeve there was an extensor (5) - a cylinder with an internal wide through channel, which was not secured by anything and could move freely inside the tube, but rested on a safety spring (6), which will be discussed below.

And finally, the striker (7), equipped with a sharp sting (8). This striker could also move freely in the tube, but before the shot was fired, it was pressed to the bottom of the tube by an extensor and a safety spring.

The principle of operation was very simple. During the firing of the projectile, the extensor, carried away by the force of inertia, shifted to the bottom of the tube, thereby compressing and straightening the legs of the safety spring.


After this, the drummer was free. But while the projectile was in flight, the striker, like the extensor, was pressed to the bottom of the tube by the same force of inertia directed in the direction opposite to the flight of the projectile. However, when a projectile hits a certain obstacle, it naturally expends energy to overcome it and slows down, losing speed.



At this moment, the striker, carried away by the force of inertia now in the opposite direction (in the direction of movement of the projectile), continued to move at a speed very close to the speed of the projectile before impact, covered the distance to the primer, struck and ignited it. The fire, having pierced the brass gasket, ignited the main charge of the projectile, resulting in an explosion.

It is interesting that V.I. Rdultovsky in his “Historical sketch of the development of tubes and fuses from the beginning of their use to the end of the World War 1914–1918.” contains information about the sample tube. 1883, which has an extremely similar device to the tube mod. 1894 with a minimum of differences.


I can guess the following. Tube arr. 1883 was used in coastal artillery, which means it was created by the Military Department. It is likely that Baranovsky subsequently took its design and modified it for the needs of the fleet, after which it was listed in the Maritime Department as a tube mod. 1894. In this case, the naming of the sample tube becomes clear. 1894 by I. A. Yatsyno as “modified by Baranovsky.”

Tube arr. 1894 in the domestic fleet could be used exclusively in shells filled with smoky or smokeless powder. It was completely unsuitable for shells with pyroxylin filling, since the capsule it contained did not have sufficient power to detonate the pyroxylin charge in the projectile.

About instant fuses


The fundamental difference between an instantaneous impact fuse and an inertial one is their reduced operating time. For an instantaneous fuse it is 0,001 seconds, while for an inertial fuse it is about 0,005 seconds. approximate.

An instantaneous fuse can be a head fuse, which ensures the detonation of ammunition at the moment of contact with the target. As an example, I will give an illustration of their “Fundamentals of the device and design of ground artillery guns and ammunition” (Voenizdat, 1976).


A – before the projectile hits the obstacle; b – when a projectile hits an obstacle; 1 – reaction striker; 2 – membrane; 3 – capsule

Due to the above and despite the fact that in the literature, for example, in the work of V. Polomoshnov “The Battle of July 28, 1904 (Battle of the Yellow Sea (Battle of Cape Shantung)", the tube model 1894 is often called an instantaneous tube (the author of this article also sinned with this), it is inertial, and its action time is longer than that of instantaneous tubes.

Features of inertial fuses using the example of a sample tube. 1894


The operating time of the return tube 1894 consisted of:

1) the period of movement of the striker from the moment of impact with the obstacle until the beginning of detonation of the capsule;

2) duration of detonation of the capsule;

3) the distance between the transfer of the thermal impulse and the distance from the primer to the gunpowder with which the projectile was loaded.

It is believed that inertial fuses have an action time of about 0,005 seconds, but in fact the specified time is not a constant.

Why?

The detonation time of the primer is fixed by its chemical composition and the amount of explosive. Unfortunately, I do not have drawings of the tube arr. 1894, but based on the drawings I have, it can be assumed that the thickness of the detonator capsule does not exceed 1 cm. Taking into account the fact that the detonation speed of fulminate mercury included in its composition is 5 m/s, complete detonation will occur in 400 ,0,00000185 s - that is, a meager time even by the standards of fuses.

As for the thermal impulse, assuming that it will need to travel 3 centimeters to go beyond the tube, and taking into account the propagation speed of the thermal impulse of 300 m/s, we obtain a time of 0,0001 seconds.

Accordingly, the time of detonation of the primer and transmission of the thermal impulse is negligible, and the vast majority of the duration of the fuse operation is occupied by the period of movement of the striker to the primer.

In turn, the time of movement of the striker was determined by two components:

1. The distance that the striker had to move. It consisted of the gap between the tip and the capsule and the so-called puncture depth - the distance that had to travel in the capsule to ensure the detonation of the latter.

In general, the sum of these lengths also tended to a constant. The distance between the firing pin and the primer at the sample tube. 1894 was approximately 9 mm. The penetration depth of the primer required for its detonation for modern ammunition is estimated at 1,2–1,5 mm; it was probably the same for the primer of the sample tube. 1894.

In total, the distance of movement of the striker can be determined as (on average) 14 mm.

2. The speed of movement of the striker relative to the projectile body. It depends on a number of external parameters, such as, for example, the deviation of the projectile’s flight path from the target plane at the moment it hits it, the speed of rotation of the projectile, etc.

There are also internal factors - the drummer of the tube arr. 1894, following to the detonator, will drag behind it a safety spring, the legs of which will come into contact with the extensor, and energy will be spent on this.

There is no need to consider all these factors in this article, and, frankly speaking, it is not possible - I am still not a physicist by training. Therefore, further on, as an example, I will consider a simple case that is understandable even to a non-specialist - a projectile hitting a flat target at an angle of 90 degrees to its surface (the deviation from the normal is zero). I ignore the friction force of the striker during movement as insignificant - you still need to understand that when removing the safety spring with an extension, the striker moved freely inside the tube.

Taking into account the above assumptions, the speed of the striker relative to the projectile body will be equal to the speed that the projectile will lose in the process of overcoming the obstacle - after hitting it, the projectile will fly slower, and the striker inside it will maintain the same speed that the projectile had before hitting the obstacle.

A very simple fact follows from this. The operating time of the return tube 1894 was determined primarily by the strength of the barrier that the projectile equipped with it collided with.

A few calculations


Let's try to simulate the operation of the sample tube. 1894 using the example of a 6-mm projectile hitting a 12-mm steel sheet at a speed corresponding to a distance of 15 artillery cables.

For this we use de Marre’s formula for uncemented armor below 75 mm, given, for example, in the “Course of Naval Tactics. Artillery and armor” by Professor L. G. Goncharov.


We accept:

– “K” for a 12 mm steel sheet equal to 1, which is slightly lower than the resistance value of homogeneous armor recommended by a respected professor;

– striker movement distance 14 mm.

We get that a 6-dm projectile weighing 41,5 kg, fired from a Kane cannon at a distance of 15 artillery cables, will have a speed on the sheet of 509,9 m/s, and after overcoming it - 508,4 m/s. The difference in speed will be 1,495 m/s. This in turn means that the striker, until the moment of contact of the projectile with the steel sheet, was moving at a projectile speed of 509,9 m/s and had a speed relative to the projectile of 0 m/s, and after overcoming the sheet, its speed relative to the projectile increased to 1,495 m/s. Accordingly, the average speed of the striker during the time of overcoming the obstacle was half of this value or 0,7476 m/s.

Let us assume that the projectile lost its speed when overcoming the steel sheet evenly from the moment it touched until the moment the bottom part of the projectile exited the sheet envelope. Then the projectile lost speed at a distance equal to its length plus the thickness of the obstacle; for a 6-inch projectile this would be approximately 0,5 m. The projectile covered this half-meter with an average speed of 509,15 m in approximately 0,00098 seconds.

Consequently, from the moment the projectile came into contact with the obstacle, the striker moved for the first 0,00098 seconds at an average speed of 0,7476 m/s, and then at a speed of 1,495 m/s.

From here it is easy to calculate that the striker will cover 14 mm in 0,0096 seconds. By this time the projectile will be at a distance of 4,51 m (the distance between the bottom of the projectile and the steel sheet). At this moment the capsule detonates. And after another 0,0001 seconds, during which the projectile will cover 5 cm, the thermal impulse will reach the gunpowder with which the projectile is equipped.

But there is a nuance here.

When a projectile is loaded with pyroxylin or another detonating substance, when it is “initiated,” the explosion occurs almost instantly, since the speed of detonation in blasting substances reaches 7 m/s.

However, in the case of gunpowder, everything is different - it does not detonate, but burns in the projectile, and the rate of its combustion depends on the pressure, and it, naturally, increases like an avalanche. Accordingly, it should be expected that some time will elapse between the ignition of the gunpowder in the projectile and the explosion of the projectile. But, again, it is small - if we assume that the rate of combustion of gunpowder in the chamber of the projectile is comparable to the speed of propagation of the thermal impulse, and taking into account the fact that the distance from the bottom tube to the end of the charging chamber is, depending on the caliber and design of the projectile, no more than 40–60 cm, the thermal impulse covers this distance in 0,0014–0,002 seconds, during which the projectile from the above example will cover no more than 0,7–1 m.

But, again, the destruction of the projectile will clearly begin before the thermal impulse reaches the end of the chamber, so it is incorrect to say that the explosion will occur 0,7–1 m after the ignition of the gunpowder with which the projectile is equipped. Here, rather, we will talk about the duration of the explosion, and 0,7–1 m will be the distance that the projectile, which is already collapsing during the explosion, will cover.

Taking into account the above, in the example described above, the explosion of a 6-dm projectile equipped with a sample tube. 1894, you should expect about 5–5,5 meters behind a 12 cm sheet.

In the naval manual's article “Projectile response. Differential part" provides an indication of experimental firing, during which shells equipped with a sample tube. 1894, when a 12-mm steel sheet was hit, it caused a gap 5–6 meters behind it. Unfortunately, the respected author did not provide a direct link to the document from which this information was taken. But what’s even sadder is that there is no data on the caliber of the projectiles, and this is very important, since the drop in speed for projectiles of different calibers and masses when hitting an obstacle of the same resistance will be different.

With the same speed of hitting the target, a heavier projectile will have more “manpower” than a light one. The more “manpower” he has, the less speed he loses when overcoming an obstacle. The smaller the loss of projectile speed when overcoming an obstacle, the slower the striker in the projectile moves relative to the projectile. The slower the striker moves, the later the explosion will occur and the greater the distance the projectile will cover before the explosion.

If the test was carried out with 152-mm shells, then we can say that my calculations are completely correct. But when the same 12-mm steel sheet is hit by a 12-mm projectile weighing 331,7 kg, with the same speed of 509,9 m/s (which corresponds to a range of 5 m), the explosion should occur somewhere around 280 –19,6 m behind the obstacle. This is due to the fact that at a speed of 20,6 m/s on a 509,9-mm steel sheet, a 12-dm projectile loses 6 m/s when overcoming it, and a 1,495-dm projectile loses only 12 m/s. Accordingly, the firing pin of a 0,374-inch projectile will hit the primer many times later than its counterpart on a six-inch one.

Conclusions


I made calculations for distances from 5 to 40 cables for the most powerful 12-dm projectile weighing 331,7 kg for Krupp cemented armor with “K” = 2, as well as for homogeneous armor. I took the time of the explosion to be the moment when the thermal impulse reached the gunpowder with which the projectile was loaded.

Taking into account all of the above and provided that I did not make critical mistakes in my thinking, the following is obtained. When firing a domestic high-explosive 12-inch projectile with a tube arr. 1894 from a standard Obukhov 12-dm gun with a barrel length of 40 calibers:

1. When hitting a spar equivalent in durability to 12 mm steel (say, a metal cable), the projectile should have exploded at 15 m (hit at a distance of 40 cables) - 41 m (5 cables) behind the obstacle.

2. When hitting pipes and superstructures, everything depended on the width of the superstructure, the number and thickness of the bulkheads in it. Overcoming an obstacle equivalent in durability to 36 mm steel should have caused the projectile to explode 4 m (40 cables) - 9 m (5 cables) behind the obstacle. We can, perhaps, say that the explosion must have occurred either inside the superstructure, or behind it, but above the deck of the ship.

3. When hitting uncemented armor 75 mm thick, a 12-inch projectile should have produced a gap of 40 m at 2,5 cables, and approximately 5 meters behind the obstacle at 4 cables.

4. In absolutely all cases of contact with cemented armor, even with a minimum slab thickness of 127 mm (at the end of the XNUMXth – very beginning of the XNUMXth centuries, they were not yet able to cement slabs of smaller thickness) and at all distances, the projectile should have burst in the process of overcoming the armor.

Of course, all of the above is not dogma. We must never forget that fuses, like the projectiles themselves, perform their functions under conditions of extreme acceleration and deceleration and can act without permission. In battle, a twelve-inch projectile equipped with a tube mod. 1894 could easily explode immediately upon contact with the skin or, conversely, rupture after breaking through the armor plate.

Let me remind you that even German fuses from the era of the First World War did not always work as intended, causing premature explosions, which I described in the article “About damage to the battlecruiser Lion in Jutland. Should the Germans have fired armor-piercing weapons?. Of course, the opposite situation is possible, when for some reason the sample tube. 1894 worked later than expected.

The conclusions that I indicated above are, let’s say, some average values ​​to which Russian 331,7 kg high-explosive steel shells equipped with a tube mod. 1894.

Well, we’ll talk about tubes for shells containing pyroxylin in the next article.

To be continued ...
154 comments
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  1. +2
    April 6 2024 06: 11
    Hello Andrey, I constantly read your articles, and I have long had this thought in the form of a question for you: if the main caliber guns, in the sense of barrels, are lengthened by at least a meter, this will also lead to a greater range of fire at the target, and inflict more significant damage on the enemy ship damage? What prevented you from making ship hulls wider and longer in order to arm ships with longer-barreled and longer-range artillery?
    1. +6
      April 6 2024 06: 33
      What prevented us from making ship hulls wider and longer in order to arm ships with longer-barreled and longer-range artillery?

      Industry capabilities, cost (hence, customer’s solvency), shipyard capabilities, dock sizes, etc., etc. smile
    2. +6
      April 6 2024 07: 24
      trunks, lengthen by at least a meter

      It cannot be lengthened, because very expensive equipment purchased at the turn of 1890 did not allow making barrels longer than 500".
    3. +5
      April 6 2024 07: 49
      Three things got in the way - money, money and money. Every meter of length is metal and work. This is where our fleet ran into these savings. They built good ships, but due to financial restrictions they built 13500 tons. We decided to save money. And since on paper they were equal to the English equivalent of 15000 tons, in fact they were the same. Only it was already an overload. Moreover, the British also had it. But not like that anymore.
      Almost all countries are running into this.
      And about the guns... It's not that simple. Increasing length is the science of plowing and plowing. Steel, gunpowder, technology, shells... And then it turns out that a long gun shoots worse than a short one. In terms of accuracy and survivability. Far away, but passing by.
    4. +8
      April 6 2024 10: 59
      Quote: Thrifty
      and I have long had this thought in the form of a question to you: if the main caliber guns, in the sense of barrels, are lengthened by at least a meter, will this lead to a greater firing range at the target and causing more significant damage to the enemy ship?

      a lot of different things. For guns that were still being developed for black powder, lengthening the barrel did not provide any advantages, but for a 305 mm/40 case, yes, that’s a different matter. By the way, the 305-mm/40 was precisely intended to be a 45-caliber gun, but the capabilities of the NEO did not allow a gun of such length to be made. Again, the issue of purchasing new equipment for the 45-caliber artillery system was considered, but this would delay the creation of such guns for 2 years, which was considered unacceptable.
      But above 45 calibers, technical difficulties already began. We and the Germans, between the RYAV and WWII, made very successful 50-52 caliber guns, but the British could not (the EMNIP barrel received vibration when fired, which is why accuracy suffered) - actually, that’s it. that they went with 13,5-inch guns is not due to a brilliant providence, but due to the inability to create a good 12-inch artillery system with a long barrel...
      1. +1
        April 7 2024 15: 51
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        actually, then. that they went with 13,5-inch guns is not due to a brilliant providence, but due to the inability to create a good 12-inch artillery system with a long barrel...

        and they already had 343 mm guns a generation earlier. This means there was something to start with and there were also shells with their production
        1. 0
          April 7 2024 17: 07
          So there was something to start with

          Consider that it was not - those 343 mm were still created for black powder, this experience was completely unsuitable for dreadnought guns.
    5. 0
      April 7 2024 11: 54
      And often do such cool thoughts come to you? laughing
  2. 0
    April 6 2024 07: 21
    2) shock tubes for armor-piercing projectiles - ensuring the rupture of the projectile after passing through the armor;

    3) remote tubes - providing detonation at a certain distance from the weapon that fired it;

    4) double-action tubes - combining the qualities of spacer and shock tubes. That is, a projectile equipped with such a tube would explode at a given distance, but if even before it had covered this distance the projectile would hit the target, then, unlike a distance tube, the gap would still occur.

    Andryusha, as always, gives such gems that you can stand or fall (from laughter).
    Double action means different fuse response times, depending on the thickness of the barrier.
    1. +1
      April 6 2024 07: 27
      2) a double-action shock tube designed by Captain A.F. Brink.

      The author's level of knowledge goes beyond all conceivable limits, below the plinth - the double Brink tube has never been a double-acting tube, to say the least.
      1. +8
        April 6 2024 10: 41
        Quote: Jura 27
        The double Brink tube has never been a double-acting tube, literally at all.

        Alas, for you, but this is the completely official name of this fuse, along with the “Two-capsule fuse of Lieutenant General Brink of the 1896 model.”
        And so yes, it was, of course, not a double-action tube in the form in which Yatsyno’s classification (and not only) gives it. Because the classification divides tubes into percussion tubes separately and double-action tubes separately. Therefore, the word “shock” in the name “Double-action shock tube designed by Captain A.F. Brink" might lead you to think that "double action" is mentioned here without connection with classification.
        But, as usual, she didn’t. You don’t have time to think, you need to write comments :)))
        1. 0
          April 6 2024 13: 11
          Alas, for you, but this is the completely official name of this fuse, along with the “Two-capsule fuse of Lieutenant General Brink of the 1896 model.”

          Yes, even if it’s desitikapsulny, the number of capsules does not affect the double or single action: you don’t understand the basics, - two actions are two different actions, - for example, a Dzerzhkovich tube (if we’re talking about BBS), - with a thin barrier, - an instant explosion, with a thick one, a delayed detonation or, for example, shrapnel (not BBS) is set to impact before the shot, - instantaneous action after contact with an obstacle, a temporary detonation is set, - explosion after a certain time has passed.
          A double tube is only and exclusively one action - even if there are two capsules, or even ten. The action will be the same, detonation after a time specified by the design, which cannot be changed, either before the shot or during contact with the obstacle.
          I’m even ashamed of you that you not only don’t know the basics (which is acceptable, since you can’t know everything), but you don’t even want to understand your mistake.
          1. +4
            April 6 2024 15: 51
            Quote: Jura 27
            Yes, even if it’s desitikapsulny, the number of capsules does not affect double or single action

            Yura, what I like about you is your completely childish desire to replace historical information with your own speculations. And history doesn’t really care how exactly Yura27 interprets the “double action” in the name of the Brink pipe.
            There is a FACT - the fuse in question along with other names was quite officially called the “Double-action shock tube designed by Captain A.F. Brink.” There is a second fact - this is what it is called by a number of historians, such as Vasiliev and Titushkin.
            From this, an intelligent person can conclude that in this case, by calling the Brink tube that way, our ancestors did not mean by “double action” a classification of tubes at all, but something else.
            You did not draw this conclusion. And now you won’t, because you are ashamed - once again trying to put me in a puddle, you sat in it yourself.
            1. 0
              April 8 2024 17: 02
              There is a FACT - the fuse in question along with other names was quite officially called the “Double-action shock tube designed by Captain A.F. Brink.” There is a second fact - this is what it is called by a number of historians, such as Vasiliev and Titushkin.

              Provide a scan of that time, where the double-capsule (double) Brink tube is officially called a double-action tube.
              If someone else wrote the same nonsense as you, it means that they are also stupid ignoramuses.
              Is it really so difficult to understand that the Brink tube has only one action?
              What are her two actions? Can it provide detonation in flight, after a given time, or can it have an instant detonation upon contact with a thin barrier and a delayed detonation upon contact with a thin barrier?
              The answer is no, because the Brink tube has only one action: detonation with a given deceleration when colliding with an obstacle.
              If you are in a puddle, have the courage to admit the obvious.
              1. +2
                April 9 2024 10: 42
                Quote: Jura 27
                Provide a scan of that time, where the double-capsule (double) Brink tube is officially called a double-action tube.

                Andrei Tameev, who pointed out, will be enough for you
                The double pyroxylin shock tube was adopted in 1892 for high-explosive projectiles filled with pyroxylin. Other names for this fuse were also used - “Double-action shock tube designed by Captain A.F. Brink" and "Two-capsule fuse of Lieutenant General Brink, model 1896."

                By the way, he indicated that these naming names were taken by him
                from various sources of those years

                and posted a confirmation scan for the radical on Tsushima, but it is currently unavailable. And the naming of Brink’s fuses as “double shock tubes” can be seen in the same Relation of the MTK of the Investigative Commission
                Quote: Jura 27
                Is it really so difficult to understand that the Brink tube has only one action?

                Well, since you don’t understand my words, maybe you will understand Andrey Tameev
                Double acting tube - in this case double-capsule, in contrast to double-action remote tubes, which had a remote and shock action.

                You think about all this, maybe in a year or two it will dawn on you that whoever in the past called the Brink fuse a “double-action shock tube” did not mean remote tubes capable of acting upon impact.
                Quote: Jura 27
                If someone else wrote the same nonsense as you, it means that they are also stupid ignoramuses.

                Yura, I completely agree to be a stupid ignoramus in the company of Andrei Tameev, Titushkin, Vasiliev (the latter, by the way, is a candidate of technical sciences) and others.
                And you remain a brilliant scientist. Alone.
                1. +1
                  April 9 2024 14: 34
                  Good afternoon. Good comment, but I’d like to wait for your review of the Brink fuse.
                  1. +1
                    April 9 2024 17: 16
                    Good afternoon, dear Igor! I'll post it this week, next week it will go to the main page hi
                2. -1
                  April 11 2024 07: 28
                  Andrei Tameev, who pointed out, will be enough for you

                  That is, you do not have a scan of the official document. Because it cannot exist (unless some ignoramus makes a mistake).
                  A. Tameev makes the same mistake as you, he simply confuses two different things: a double tube and a double-action tube.
                  So, the question is still the same - what two different actions could a double (two-capsule) Brink tube produce?
                  I will ask you this question in each of your posts until you finally understand the simplest difference between one action and two different actions.
                  1. +1
                    April 11 2024 08: 19
                    Quote: Jura 27
                    A. Tameev, makes the same mistake as you

                    And Vasiliev, and Titushkin... What was the mistake? Is it that the document he posted on radical now cannot be opened?
                    Quote: Jura 27
                    So, the question is still the same - what two different actions could a double (two-capsule) Brink tube produce?

                    By double action, Yura, in this case we meant two capsules :))) First, one capsule fires (first action), then the second capsule fires (second action)
                    Quote: Jura 27
                    I will ask you this question in each of your posts until it finally dawns on you

                    Get this answer until it finally comes to you :))
                  2. 0
                    April 11 2024 13: 54
                    Quote: Jura 27
                    So, the question is still the same - what two different actions could a double (two-capsule) Brink tube produce?

                    Dear Yuri, when Andrey’s article on the Brink tube is published, I will write you an answer to your question about where the expression “double-action shock tube” came from and what two actions are implied. This applies to fuze developments in France and to H. Maxim fuzes.
        2. +3
          April 6 2024 21: 06
          Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
          Because the classification divides tubes into percussion tubes separately and double-action tubes separately. Therefore, the word “shock” in the name “Double-action shock tube designed by Captain A.F. Brink" might lead you to think that "double action" is mentioned here without connection with classification.


          Do you want a double action shock tube? No problem. Illustrations below. Only the Brink tube was in no way a double-acting tube. It was a two-capsule, and nothing more.
    2. +6
      April 6 2024 09: 41
      Quote: Jura 27
      Andryusha, as always, gives such gems that you can stand or fall (from laughter).
      Double action means different fuse response times, depending on the thickness of the barrier.

      DOUBLE ACTION TUBE - An outdated name for a double action (remote and impact) fuse at the end of the fire chain, creating a thermal impulse (flame force) rather than a detonation (explosion) impulse. A reference book on terminology in the defense sector of the Russian Defense Ministry.
      1. +3
        April 6 2024 13: 27
        Quote: 27091965i
        Quote: Jura 27
        Andryusha, as always, gives such gems that you can stand or fall (from laughter).
        Double action means different fuse response times, depending on the thickness of the barrier.

        DOUBLE ACTION TUBE - An outdated name for a double action (remote and impact) fuse at the end of the fire chain, creating a thermal impulse (flame force) rather than a detonation (explosion) impulse. A reference book on terminology in the defense sector of the Russian Defense Ministry.

        This does not apply to BBS, but to shrapnel.
        For BBS, double action is a different detonation time after a collision with an obstacle, depending on its thickness.
        1. +2
          April 6 2024 13: 49
          Very interesting thought.
          For BBS, double action is a different detonation time after a collision with an obstacle, depending on its thickness.

          The author considers the time period from 1890 to 1900. Could you explain how the thickness of the barrier influenced the burning rate of gunpowder and, accordingly, the acceleration, for example, in a Brink tube.
          1. -1
            April 8 2024 17: 08
            Quote: 27091965i
            Very interesting thought.
            For BBS, double action is a different detonation time after a collision with an obstacle, depending on its thickness.

            The author considers the time period from 1890 to 1900. Could you explain how the thickness of the barrier influenced the burning rate of gunpowder and, accordingly, the acceleration, for example, in a Brink tube.

            He also considers BBS and FS, and not segment and shrapnel shells.
            For the first two, during the time period you indicated, there were no double-action fuses in Russia.
            The first double-action fuse for BBS was created by Dzerzhkovich after the REV. And then, he didn’t really work.
    3. +2
      April 6 2024 10: 34
      Quote: Jura 27
      Andryusha, as always, gives such gems that you can stand or fall (from laughter).

      It’s better to fall and crawl and read Yatsyno’s 1900 textbook.
      1. 0
        April 6 2024 13: 14
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        Quote: Jura 27
        Andryusha, as always, gives such gems that you can stand or fall (from laughter).

        It’s better to fall and crawl and read Yatsyno’s 1900 textbook.

        I’m glad that you still read some kind of literature; we can only hope that you will learn and understand the difference between two different actions and one action.
    4. +3
      April 6 2024 13: 48
      Quote: Jura 27
      Andryusha, as always, gives such gems that you can stand or fall (from laughter).
      Double action means different fuse response times, depending on the thickness of the barrier.

      You shouldn’t be so respected Yuri. You fall into the same heresy as the respected Lisitsyn in his series of lectures about Tsushima on YouTube. Re-read the literature of that time. Double action is NOT a variable fuse delay, it is a distance + impact action. However, I will quote. For example, Rdultovsky: “If a tube or fuse operates when it hits an obstacle, then they are called impact; if the explosion occurs in the air before the projectile touches the target, then they are called remote. Double-action tubes combine remote and impact mechanisms.”

      Or below, in the picture, Yatsyno.

      I believe dear Andrey simply made the usual mistake by writing “double-action tube” in reference to the two-capsule Brink tube.

      It is clear that there were no impact fuses with automatically or manually set variable deceleration in the naval war in 1904-1905. not yet used.
      1. -1
        April 8 2024 17: 15
        Double action is NOT a variable fuse delay, it is a distance + impact action.
        I think dear Andrey simply made the usual mistake, writing in the address of the two-capsule Brink tube “double-action tube”

        This is for segmented/shrapnel shells of that time, the author considers armor-piercing shells, and for them, double action, means different detonation times, depending on the thickness of the barrier (Dzerzhkovich fuse).
        This is not a mistake, Andryusha, he stubbornly continues to cling to his mistake.
        If there had been a mistake, he would have immediately admitted it. And so, this is militant ignorance of the topic on which he sprinkles posts.
        1. 0
          April 10 2024 22: 17
          Quote: Jura 27
          This is for segmented/shrapnel shells of that time, the author considers armor-piercing shells, and for them, double action, means different detonation times, depending on the thickness of the barrier (Dzerzhkovich fuse).

          Dear Yuri, I urge you once again to open the literature of that time. This literature clearly states what a “double-acting tube” is. Do not create your own definitions and terms.

          Later, fuses with a double-action percussion mechanism (reactionary and inertial), or double-impact fuses, appeared. I have already given an example of one such fuse, the German head shock tube AZ23 umgm 2V:

          https://gigabaza.ru/doc/107362-p14.html

          "The head tube (Fig. 112) of double impact action, with three settings for reaction action and two delays, non-safety type, was intended for 149-mm and 211-mm high-explosive fragmentation projectiles..."

          But at the same time, the “double (impact) action” was again in no way connected with the manual or automatic setting of the detonation delay, but was associated with the combination of two principles of action of the impact fuse, the reaction principle and the principle of inertial action of the fuse, in one design.

          Therefore, although the same AZ23 umgm 2V could be set to both instant action and two delays, no one called this fuse a “triple action fuse”.

          I repeat - double action is the combination in one design of two different principles of operation of a fuse - for example, the remote principle and the impact principle, or reactionary and inertial for an impact fuse, and not setting “different detonation times” after the collision of a projectile with an obstacle, whether this time was set before the shot, or was determined by the design of the fuse itself and the properties of the barrier, as was the case with the domestic 10DT fuse that appeared after the Russo-Japanese War.

          These are the definitions and terms of the subject area involved. Don't try to enter your own.
          1. 0
            April 11 2024 07: 40
            Dear Yuri, I urge you once again to open the literature of that time.

            I propose to separate the flies from the cutlets: the double Brink tube was not a double-action tube, and this is exactly what Andryusha stubbornly does not understand (or pretends that he does not understand the obvious).
            With this, you categorically agree.
            You don’t have to read further, because... further about flies: at the time under discussion, double-action tubes for BBS did not exist (therefore it is pointless to talk about them in the topic of penetrating armor to REV); Double-action tubes for BBS appeared much later than RYAV; in Russia, such a tube was the Dzerzhkovich fuse.
            Therefore, there is absolutely no heresy, everything is clear, clear and understandable.
            1. 0
              April 17 2024 11: 40
              I completely agree with you, except that Dzerzhkovich’s impact fuse was a double-action fuse.

              Fuses for double-action artillery shells belong to combined-action fuses (where several mechanisms are combined in one design) and are divided into two categories:

              1.) A remote fuse and an impact fuse are combined in one design. Only such double-action fuses existed at the time of the Russo-Japanese War;

              2.) Double impact fuses, the design of which combines a reaction impact mechanism and an inertial impact mechanism.

              Dzerzhkovich's 10DT fuse was a bottom fuse with an inertial impact mechanism and automatically controlled deceleration.

              It is a mistake to classify this fuse as a double impact fuze.

              The 10DT fuse was not the only one of its kind. Examples:

              https://orioncentr.ru/documents/school-museum/metodicheskie-rekomendacii/boepripasy-dlja-nareznoj-stvolnoj-artillerii-germanii-i-ee-sojuznikov-primenjavshiesja-na-territorii-voronezhskoj-oblasti-v-hode-velikoj-otechestvennoj-vojny-v-jekspozicii-shkolnogo-muzeja/?ysclid=lv3k5rqvi5428082551

              Fuse Bd.Z.5127 - bottom, inertial action, non-safety type, with auto-adjustable deceleration.

              https://patents.su/3-26573-donnyjj-vzryvatel-k-artillerijjskim-snaryadam-s-avtomaticheski-reguliruemym-zamedleniem.html

              The proposed fuse can be installed on an ordinary inertial action and on an action with automatically controlled deceleration.
  3. +5
    April 6 2024 10: 29
    The article is interesting, but for an artillery specialist. The reasons for Russia's defeat in that war are much broader and deeper.
    1. +3
      April 6 2024 14: 03
      Such shells and such fuses alone, against the background of Japanese high-explosive ones with Ijuin fuses, were already enough to lose the war at sea. Of course, such fuses and such shells were not enough to cause the Tsushima disaster. We had to try harder. And we tried.

      As for the war on the land front, the weakness of howitzer artillery, the lack of 3" grenades for a modern field gun of the 1900/1902 model and the lack of a modern 3" mountain gun also played a significant role, although apparently not a decisive one. However, our losses from artillery fire in field battles were many times higher than Japanese losses from artillery fire in these battles.
      1. +1
        April 6 2024 14: 49
        I'm not against it, I'm just saying that the problem is much broader than what the article says. The article is of interest to strictly artillerymen, as before, only to narrow specialists in metallurgy and metalworking.
        1. +2
          April 6 2024 15: 55
          The problem is that some modern historians, in their revision of the views of specialists of that time and historians of the Soviet period, agreed to the point that Russian shells (explosives and fuses) during the naval war of 1904-1905. were almost better than the Japanese ones.

          And the Russian shells exploded, penetrating the armor (unlike the Japanese) and, moreover, with sufficient deceleration, and the fragments of the Russian shells gave great penetrating force, and not “dust,” and the number of killed per hit from the Russian shells was higher than from the Japanese .

          It’s amazing how, when studying the damage to the same “Mikasa” at Tsushima, when out of five Russian shells that hit the casemates of a Japanese battleship, only one completely disabled the Japanese cannon, with a direct hit on the gun, the revisionists manage to come to similar conclusions.

          So a technical analysis of the failures of the Russian fleet “in the shell department” is actually still important today in order to stop all this. Otherwise, a whole new “mythology” is being born right now.
          1. +2
            April 6 2024 18: 35
            Again, the problem is much broader than just the quality of shells and fuses. There are fire control devices and training for military personnel, both officers and privates. And the technical condition of the guns - the vertical guidance gears were breaking. And in general, the technical condition of the ships. In the Battle of Tsushima, the squadron speed of the Second Pacific was 9 knots, the Japanese had 14 knots. Russian ships are “filled with” coal to the fullest, so that there is enough from Kamranka to Vladivostok. Togo has just enough coal for the armor belt to be at the optimal depth, Sasebo is nearby. The quality of the coal is also important, as is the training of the stokers. And there are still a lot of problems and problems.
            1. +2
              April 6 2024 19: 33
              Of course the problem was much broader. But against the backdrop of such a weak effect of Russian shells behind the armor, and the structurally determined failure of the Brink fuse to fire against “non-armored” thin barriers and when falling into the water (zeroing), all the other shortcomings of the material part of the naval artillery, shortcomings in l/c training and organization artillery fire - already, as it were, of the second order.

              Well, the fact that the experience of artillery battles of the 1TOE had very little influence on Rozhdestvensky’s understanding of how he should organize an artillery battle of squadrons, here the “role of the individual in history” played to its fullest.

              However, Rozhdestvensky was “helped” as best they could. For example, just one story of how he was waiting for a transport with shells near Madagascar, and the transport arrived without ammunition. The ammunition was unloaded from the ship and sent by rail directly to Vladivostok - a wonderful episode of such “help”.

              I believe you and I have very similar views on the preconditions for the Tsushima disaster.

              It’s just that in post-Soviet times, a whole generation of historical revisionists appeared trying to tell the public that Russian shells were better than Japanese ones, that Rozhdestvensky was not to blame for anything, and in general was almost a great naval commander, that a chain of accidents was to blame for everything, or that shimosa was in fact not ordinary picric acid, etc. etc. driving the public into cognitive dissonance with their stories.

              From the outside, it looks like a person who has been told everything he needs to know about Tsushima by Soviet historical science as an orgy of historical post-truth in our today’s postmodern world. :)
              1. +2
                April 6 2024 20: 44
                Quote: AlexanderA
                However, Rozhdestvensky was “helped” as best he could. For example, just one story of how he was waiting for a transport with shells near Madagascar, and the transport arrived without ammunition.

                Are you also one of Rozhdestvensky’s guards, like Andrey? ZPR stupidly forgot his shells in Libau, he had no time to think about such nonsense. wassat
                1. 0
                  April 6 2024 20: 55
                  I seem to clearly write in my messages that I am a traditionalist. What disgusts me are modern stories about high-quality Russian shells, about the fact that Rozhdestvensky was not to blame for anything, and in general an outstanding naval commander, about the fact that the MTK was run by smart people, not retrogrades and idiots, about the fact that Grand Duke Alexei Alexandrovich was the greatest organizer of construction Russian fleet, etc. and so on.

                  But no, it turns out I am NOT writing clearly, since you mistook me for a historical revisionist of Tsushima. :)
                  1. +2
                    April 6 2024 21: 14
                    Quote: AlexanderA
                    But no, it turns out I’m NOT writing clearly

                    I cited a specific phrase from your text that led me to such conclusions. More than justified by the way.
              2. +1
                April 6 2024 21: 01
                Well, during the Union there were normal books about the Russian-Japanese, Kostenko, Melnikov - the “Wonderful Ships” series. Polenov "Cruiser Aurora". Then there were more sources, but the quality dropped significantly. All sorts of alternativeists are especially amusing; they come up with something like this - it makes your hair stand on end. Although, from my point of view, it is an alternative history, based on real facts and possibilities, simply alternative paths that history could take. For example, if Admiral Makarov had not died.
                1. +1
                  April 6 2024 22: 59
                  Quote: TermNachTER
                  Although, from my point of view, it is an alternative history, based on real facts and possibilities, simply alternative paths that history could take. For example, if Admiral Makarov had not died.

                  I will write my opinion honestly, Admiral Makarov was not the outstanding naval commander that recent contemporaries, and later Soviet historians, portrayed him after his death.

                  For example, the fact that a control trawling was not “automatically” organized before the squadron’s departure characterizes the work of Makarov’s headquarters in a far from best way.

                  And the fact that by the time of the Russo-Japanese War the shells of the Russian fleet were what they were was partly Makarov’s fault.

                  What you cannot take away from Makarov is his energy and charisma. He inspired people, yes. However, in the war of the era of steam, electricity, smokeless powder and highly explosive explosives, you will not get far on energy and charisma alone. Makarov, who advocated against armored ships and for the open placement of guns on warships, clearly poorly understood the power that naval artillery had gained by the beginning of the 20th century.

                  If Makarov had not died in the Petropavlovsk explosion, he would have died later, for example, in the style of Vitgeft. A large-caliber high-explosive projectile kills those who are close to the site of its explosion, “regardless of their faces.”
                  1. +2
                    April 6 2024 23: 10
                    And the fact that by the time of the Russo-Japanese War the shells of the Russian fleet were what they were was partly Makarov’s fault.

                    Without Makarov, the RIF would have armor-piercing shells like in the ground department: with sand and sawdust. And they don't need a fuse.
                    1. +1
                      April 7 2024 12: 37
                      Quote: rytik32
                      Without Makarov, the RIF would have armor-piercing shells like in the ground department: with sand and sawdust. And they don't need a fuse.

                      I don’t think this could have happened; the same Kane provided not only guns, but also shells with fuses.
                      1. +1
                        April 7 2024 13: 12
                        The same shells and fuses from Kane also hit the ground department, but by the beginning of the war, the coastal batteries of Port Arthur had a sad picture with shells
                      2. +1
                        April 7 2024 15: 21
                        Quote: rytik32
                        The same shells and fuses from Kane also hit the ground department, but by the beginning of the war, the coastal batteries of Port Arthur had a sad picture with shells

                        The actions of the Land Department are difficult to understand, just like the Marine Department. They themselves asked that permission for the production of Canet guns and shells be extended to them, received a batch of shells from France for testing, and then fell into a “stupor.” What they wanted to do is not clear.
                    2. 0
                      April 10 2024 23: 21
                      With inert equipment at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War for coastal artillery, the military department had only armor-piercing shells for high-ballistic guns - for the same 6" Kane, 10"/45. But with shells for coastal mortars everything was okay.

                      And if for the 6" Kane coastal artillery, armor-piercing shells filled with smokeless powder (weight 0,435 kg) and a bottom tube model 1896 were accepted by the military department after the start of the war, in 1904, then armor-piercing shells filled with pyroxylin (weight with case 1,13, 11 kg) and 1904DM fuse were adopted already in the same 1,23, and armor-piercing ones equipped with melinite (weight 11 kg) and 1905DM fuse were accepted in XNUMX.

                      I would say that the military department in this regard, after the start of the war, demonstrated much greater efficiency than the naval department, which admitted that 12" high-explosive shells with pyroxylin explosive charges for 2 TOE were "unready".

                      However, as a result, 12" shells with explosive charges of smokeless powder and a shock tube model 1894 at least exploded properly at Tsushima, although they demonstrated a relatively weak effect on targets.

                      If shells for the RIF had been handled by the military, and not the naval department, by the beginning of the century, then it is quite possible that in 1904 ships would have had both 12" high-explosive shells with 5DM fuses and 6" steel shells with 11DM fuses.

                      Life would force us to quickly introduce these fuses for high-ballistic gun shells, rather than using the “gloomy” Brink fuze for all types of “pyroxylin” steel shells of high-ballistic naval guns from 6" and above.

                      And by the way, in the 10" high-explosive projectile of the military department of the "old model", with the head shock tube model 1884, the explosive charge was 9,6 kg of a mixture of gun and coarse-grained gunpowder (filling coefficient 0,0426). At least some similarity to a high-explosive projectile in comparison with the 12" "high-explosive" of the naval department, the powder explosive charge of which was a third smaller.
                      1. +1
                        April 10 2024 23: 49
                        With inert equipment at the beginning of the Russo-Japanese War, the military department had only armor-piercing shells for high-ballistic guns for coastal artillery

                        Yeah, but there were no high-explosive ones at all, at least in the PA.

                        If by the beginning of the century the shells for the RIF had been handled by the military and not the naval department

                        Then we would have to fight with cast iron shells with black powder...

                        with 5DM fuses, and 6" steel shells with 11DM fuses

                        Are these good fuses? In what war were they tested?

                        in a 10" high-explosive shell of the military department "old model"

                        Isn't it cast iron?
                      2. 0
                        April 17 2024 12: 37
                        Yeah, but there were no high-explosive ones at all, at least in the PA.


                        There were no high-explosive PA guns for modern guns. As for the rest of the PA guns... can, for example, in 1904 a steel high-explosive powder bomb for a field 6" mortar model 1885 be considered a modern high-explosive projectile (after all, 5,4 kg of gunpowder in a 27,4 kg projectile) , decide for yourself.

                        >Then we would have to fight with cast iron shells with black powder...

                        Even a 6" field mortar model 1885 had a steel high-explosive bomb. Without a pyroxylin or melinite explosive charge, yes, but a steel one.

                        In any case, by 1904 the Military Department already had 6" shells with melinite equipment for fortress, siege artillery and coastal mortars.

                        “The methods for producing picric acid and the design of the equipment were entirely borrowed from France, where the military engineer Gelfreich was sent to study this matter in 1894. The production of picric acid was installed and launched in 1896.
                        As for the equipment, initially only one type of shell was installed, namely 6-dm mortar shells. Subsequently, equipment for other projectiles was gradually introduced, namely for 6-dm guns weighing 120, 190 and 200 poods and, finally, for 42-lin. guns. For the equipment, the method of pouring molten picric acid directly into the cavity of the projectile was used, where it cooled under air pressure.
                        In addition to the listed medium calibers, deck-piercing bombs were installed in 1897 for 9- and 11-inch mortars. These calibers were loaded using the “case” method, which consisted in the fact that a copper case, shaped like the inside of a projectile, was filled with picric acid, sealed and inserted into the projectile.
                        The case method did not last long and was canceled due to gun explosions that occurred when firing melinite shells at the Main Artillery Range. Several thousand equipped cases that remained unused were subjected to discharge at the factory, which seemed to be a very dangerous job. The work was carried out personally by the head of the workshop and the foreman. The melinite obtained from the discharge was purified according to a method developed by the plant and put into use.
                        In 1903, the picrine workshop of the Okhten Explosives Plant was stopped due to the accumulation of melinite reserves and stood for 1,5 years in complete inactivity."

                        And what is closer to naval artillery, to field artillery or fortress/siege artillery, decide for yourself.

                        If the problem of melinite high-explosive shells for naval artillery had fallen on the GAU in the mid-1890s, they would have somehow solved it. Gelfreich and Filimonov solved the problem of bottom fuses clearly better than the specialists from the RIF Naval Artillery Corps.

                        Isn't it cast iron?

                        Cast iron. A 10" high-explosive steel "old model" could only hold 8,7 kg of pyroxylin. How long would it take to successfully reduce the mass of the explosive charge in a steel "high-explosive" projectile in comparison with a cast iron one? Some succeeded.
                      3. 0
                        April 21 2024 14: 02
                        Gelfreich and Filimonov solved the problem of bottom fuses clearly better

                        So give examples of the exemplary action of shells with Gelfreich or Filimonov fuses on Japanese ships during the shelling of Port Arthur or Vladivostok. How they pierced, how they tore...
                        Otherwise, it is not at all clear what exactly they decided.
                  2. +3
                    April 7 2024 12: 05
                    I am by no means exaggerating Makarov’s talents, but what was left after him - Vitgeft and Ukhtomsky, excuse me - is generally a clinic. Yes, the fact that the trawling was not carried out was a serious mistake that cost the lives of many, including Makarov himself. But at least he tried to do something. the rest waited by the sea for weather.
                    1. -1
                      April 7 2024 17: 05
                      Quote: TermNachTER
                      Vitgeft and Ukhtomsky, excuse me, they’re basically a clinic.

                      However, it was this couple who organized an active mine laying, which led to the death of 2 Japanese EDBs hi
                      1. +4
                        April 7 2024 18: 15
                        This couple has a very distant connection to this event. Everything was planned and done by the commander of the minefield "Amur". It seems like cap two Ivanov.
                      2. -1
                        April 8 2024 13: 40
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        This couple has a very distant connection to this event.

                        Let's just say you're wrong... request This couple gave the order to Ivanov to go to sea, and more than once... bully
                      3. 0
                        April 8 2024 18: 17
                        Well, giving an order and going out to sea yourself, under Japanese shells and torpedoes, are somewhat different things. Were any of them on the Amur during the mine laying? And their further actions, in terms of squadron command, evoke only obscene definitions.
                      4. 0
                        April 8 2024 18: 26
                        I'm afraid your opponent is not able to understand that Vitgeft gave the order to place mines not where the Japanese battleships sailed feel
                      5. 0
                        April 8 2024 18: 32
                        As far as I remember, Togo near Port Arthur always followed the same course and route. Therefore, take bearings from several points on the shore to clarify the location and direction, and then place mines across the course. Togo caught Makarov doing the same. Makarov constantly pulled his figure eight along Port Arthur, practically in the same place, with the same courses and turning points.
                      6. 0
                        April 9 2024 12: 55
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        I'm afraid your opponent is unable to understand

                        As far as I remember, in another thread you refused to answer 2 simple questions... bully
                      7. 0
                        April 9 2024 19: 13
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        As far as I remember, in another thread you refused to answer 2 simple questions...

                        Because these questions in the context of the discussion are absolutely meaningless and were asked not in order to find the truth, but in an attempt to talk about the problem.
                        Yes, Vitgeft gave the order lay mines, but not where the Japanese went. Therefore, there is no reason to attribute this success to him.
                        Since you have little imagination, let’s try to consider the situation using another example. Let's say Vitgeft is the commander of a partisan detachment, and Ivanov is a sabotage group. And so Ivanov reports to his superiors that the Germans regularly move along a certain road and it would be a good idea to mine it. Vitgeft agrees, but... it’s a bit boring on the road. Again, punitive forces may arrive. In general, he gives the order to lay mines, but not to leave the forest.
                        - So the Germans don’t go there? – Ivanov is surprised.
                        “It’s okay,” Vitgeft blithely waves his hand, “perhaps tomorrow they will go not along the road, but along the edge of the forest.”
                        Ivanov does not listen to him and nevertheless places a mine on the road, as a result of which a large number of enemies die.
                        Now this is a really easy question. More precisely two.
                        1) Who gets the credit for the successful sabotage?
                        2) What will Comrade Abakumov say about this?
                      8. 0
                        April 10 2024 13: 16
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Vitgeft gave the order to lay mines,

                        So you flogged yourself... Ivanov carried out the orders of Loschinsky and the VKV, and there is no other way in military structures...
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        Because you have little imagination

                        I have to point out once again that you are being rude... did your mom and dad raise you poorly or did they bring you up well? request Let me remind you that last time you were rude about my knowledge, then apologized for the gaps in yours... hi
                        Quote: Senior Sailor
                        And so Ivanov reports to his superiors that the Germans regularly move along a certain road and it would be a good idea to mine it.

                        1) you don't know the subject well... request The decision to establish the Ministry of Health was made at a meeting with the VKV...
                        2) your fairy tale only reveals the level of your lack of understanding - nothing more!
                      9. 0
                        April 10 2024 14: 57
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        So you flogged yourself...

                        only in your fantasies)
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        you're being rude...

                        Yes. The supply of beads, you know, is not limitless request
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        you don't know the subject well...

                        Compared to whom?
                        I already wrote that if facts and documents contradict your fantasies, you don’t see them point-blank
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        then they apologized

                        Yes. Unlike you, I am able to admit my mistakes.
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        your fairy tale

                        Didn’t you leave one stone unturned from your constructions?
                      10. -1
                        April 9 2024 12: 53
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        Well, giving an order and going out to sea yourself, under Japanese shells and torpedoes, are somewhat different things.

                        Okay, I’ll say it differently - could Amur, under the command of Ivanov, go out to set up the MZ without an order? hi
                        I believe you have an extremely distorted understanding of the mechanics of how military structures work...
                      11. 0
                        April 9 2024 13: 24
                        I have the correct understanding, after all, I served in the Soviet Army))) I’m saying that sitting at headquarters - in a warm office and an easy chair - is one thing. But standing on the bridge of a mineload filled with mines and waiting for a Japanese torpedo to come on board is another thing.
                      12. +1
                        April 9 2024 13: 31
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        Could Amur, under the command of Ivanov, go out to set up the MZ without an order?

                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        I have the right understanding

                        unfortunately you don't answer the question... hi
                        in my opinion, this means that you unconsciously understand that you are wrong... request
                        As for the warm offices of the authorities, they are responsible for the decisions made, and this is not an easy burden...
                      13. 0
                        April 9 2024 17: 58
                        Just don’t tell me about the hard lot of the authorities))) otherwise I’ll burst into tears right now))) after the Soviet Army, I worked for 17 years in the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The boss is only risking his warm chair, well, at most his shoulder straps, but I’m going to detain a particularly dangerous repeat offender who has nothing to lose - it’s still life. And you want to tell me that we are taking the same risks?))) That’s how “cap two” Ivanov walked on a minefield chock full of mines, waiting for Japanese destroyers. And poor, unfortunate Vitgeft and Ukhtomsky sat in the admiral's salon of the Tsarevich, sipping wine, weighed down by an unprecedented weight: “What if something goes wrong, who should we blame on?)))
                      14. 0
                        April 9 2024 18: 21
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        otherwise I'm about to start crying)))

                        give me a handkerchief? :) to the question

                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        Could Amur, under the command of Ivanov, go out to set up the MZ without an order?

                        there will be no answer?
                      15. 0
                        April 9 2024 21: 38
                        Essen took the Sevastopol out of Port Arthur without orders, and then sank it in deep water rather than donate it to the Japanese. Any questions?
                      16. 0
                        April 10 2024 13: 18
                        question
                        Quote: DrEng02
                        Could Amur, under the command of Ivanov, go out to set up the MZ without an order?

                        answer
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        Essen withdrew the Sevastopol from Port Arthur without orders

                        That's usually how girls answer... finished the discussion - that's enough for me hi The level of your knowledge and understanding of the subject is clearly visible below - about coal in Togo request
                      17. 0
                        April 10 2024 13: 25
                        Do you consider yourself a great expert on the Russo-Japanese War?))) Take it easy, your knowledge is at the level of a rural school.
                      18. 0
                        April 10 2024 13: 53
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        be scared

                        Do you understand what you are writing? bully
                        Let's just say - your opinion doesn't interest me, because... I checked the level of your knowledge - they are exactly what you yourself write about mine... psychologically this is understandable - replacement... request
            2. +1
              April 7 2024 17: 03
              Quote: TermNachTER
              Togo has just enough coal for the armor belt to be at the optimal depth, Sasebo is nearby.

              and evil tongues say that Togo took the full supply of coal, because... was preparing to go to La Perouse... request
              1. 0
                April 7 2024 18: 14
                This option was considered, but no serious preparations were made for it. Japanese intelligence quickly established where the Second Pacific was heading.
                1. +2
                  April 7 2024 23: 24
                  According to Tsushima combat reports, the ships had coal reserves on the upper deck. After leaving the parking lot, coal from the upper deck was loaded into pits. Whatever didn't fit was thrown overboard. So we can assume that the Japanese battleships began the battle with full coal pits.
              2. 0
                April 8 2024 08: 12
                and evil tongues say that Togo took the full supply of coal, because... was preparing to go to La Perouse...

                Yes, you are completely right. Moreover, some of the additional coal stock was located in bags directly on the upper deck. And as soon as Togo received a report that Rozhdestvensky’s squadron appeared right in front of them in the Korea Strait, all Japanese ships began to hastily dump these bags of coal right in the bay. But the Japanese probably still had a lot of extra coal left for the duration of the battle.
            3. +4
              April 8 2024 01: 46
              Quote: TermNachTER
              Russian ships are “filled with” coal to the fullest, so that there is enough from Kamranka to Vladivostok. Togo has just enough coal for the armor belt to be at the optimal depth, Sasebo is nearby.

              dear colleague,
              Sorry to interfere, but you are mistaken. In fact, Mikasa, for example, was overloaded to such an extent that the upper edge of the battleship's main armor belt sank about forty centimeters under water.
              Anyone who is curious can determine this based on the report of the English naval attache.

              We read the text of the report: “This was a dull day, it being foggy at sea. The Adzuma received 200 tons of coal, stowing a good deal on the upper deck. Several other ships also coaled, some for the second time in three days. At 5 pm the Mikasa went up harbor. She had a large amount of coal on the upper deck, and was very deep in the water, the heels all her torpedo net booms being submerged. All destroyers and torpedo boats have a deck cargo of coal.

              In the evening steam boats and launches were sent off from the shore to all ships and were hoisted in. No explanation was received, but it is supposed to be due to the possibility of the Russians attempting to reach Vladivostok by either the Tsugaru or La Perouse Straits, which will entail upon the Japanese fleet the necessity of operating at some distance from its present base
              . "

              It can be translated something like this: “It was a dull day, with fog hanging over the sea. "Adzuma" received 200 tons of coal, which completely covered the upper deck. Several other ships also took on coal, some for the second time in three days. At 17:00 "Mikasa" entered the harbor. It had a large amount of coal on the upper deck and sat very deep in the water, so that the heels of the mine net poles were completely submerged in the water. All fighters and destroyers had a load of coal on their decks. In the evening, steam and motor boats were sent from the shore to all the ships and were raised by them. No explanation has been given, but it is believed to be due to a possible Russian attempt to reach Vladivostok via the Tsugaru or La Perouse Straits, which would force the Japanese fleet to operate some distance from its current base.»

              The report is attached.
              1. 0
                April 8 2024 08: 48
                If my memory serves me correctly, the Azuma is an armored cruiser, a very unfortunate one, built in France. She is not a flagship ship, but an ordinary one; the commander decided how much coal to take on board. As for Captain Pakenham, he was also not allowed access to all Japanese secrets, despite all the respect for him. He might not have known something. Here they already corrected me that the Japanese simply threw the excess coal overboard. Be that as it may, under Tsushima, the Japanese had a squadron speed of 14 knots, versus our 9, which allowed Togo to occupy the most convenient and advantageous positions for him.
                1. +2
                  April 8 2024 09: 02
                  Quote: TermNachTER
                  As for Captain Pakenham, he was also not allowed access to all Japanese secrets, despite all the respect for him.

                  There were no secrets there - the Japanese were seriously afraid that 2TOE would bypass Japan. Early in the morning of May 24, 1905, the Japanese MGSH received an urgent telegram from the naval attache from London, according to which, with reference to the English Navy Ministry, on Russian ships coal was loaded into all possible premises, including the commanders’ cabins, and the squadron itself was ready for 33-day transition.
                  The Japanese were not sure that the Russians would take a detour, but they prepared for all possible scenarios. Including the fact that you will have to run headlong to the La Perouse Strait
                  Quote: TermNachTER
                  Here they already corrected me that the Japanese simply threw the excess coal overboard.

                  So yes, if from the deck, but you can’t easily throw it out of the pits. On our battleships, coal was different - on the morning of May 13, on the Borodino battleships, with a maximum reserve of 1288 tons, it was from 1095 to 1205 tons, on Oslyab - 1415 tons. From here we need to subtract another day of travel (for the Borodino ships this is approximately 110 tons) - we get the amount of coal with whom they went into battle.
                  1. 0
                    April 8 2024 11: 15
                    The option around Japan was considered, I don’t deny it. However, taking into account the technical condition of the ships:
                    1. Long transition - worn-out condition of boilers and machines.
                    2. Prolonged stay in warm waters, fouling of the underwater part.
                    3. The last bunkering in Kam Rani, given that the range of Russian electronic warfare units
                    not a record at all. And “Oslyabya” is generally a “coal eater”.
                    What conclusion can be drawn from the above? Whatever information comes from London, Washington or Paris, the passage around Japan is not possible, purely for technical reasons.
                    Finally, what advantages does such a bypass give the 2nd Pacific?
                    Togo from Sasebo to the Sangar Strait is much closer than to the Russians around.
                    The Japanese have ports there too, and even the Maizuru naval base, even if it’s poor.
                    Regarding the coal pits. I agree, it’s not so easy to throw it away, but it’s quite possible, at least from the most easily accessible ones - the top ones.
                    1. +1
                      April 8 2024 11: 25
                      Quote: TermNachTER
                      The option around Japan was considered, I don’t deny it

                      2TOE didn't go around Japan for a bunch of different reasons, all of them correct. However, within the framework of the issue under discussion (coal on Japanese ships), it is not these reasons that are important, but the fact that the Japanese allowed this option and were forced to prepare for it too, which necessitated the need to load up with coal to capacity. Regardless of what conclusions Rozhestvensky came to.
                      Quote: TermNachTER
                      Regarding the coal pits. I agree, it’s not so easy to throw it away, but it’s quite possible, at least from the most easily accessible ones - the top ones.

                      Loading is easier than unloading. But even loading means a tired crew, then putting things in order (so that the wounded don’t have blood poisoning when they fall on deck) and doing all this in anticipation of the battle - well, that’s it
                      1. 0
                        April 8 2024 12: 50
                        The loading and unloading processes are largely the same. A barge with coal approaches the side. The sailors go down to the barge and load large bags with coal, which they then lift on board with hoists, drag them to the necks of the coal pits and empty them out. However, coal in a coal pit also needs to be scattered over the entire area so that it does not pile up under the neck - that’s another pleasure.
                        So, the reverse process is not much more difficult than loading. This process was practiced by the crews. For example, before docking, the ship had to be unloaded as much as possible from everything that could be removed overboard. And coal was in one of the first places here.
                      2. +2
                        April 8 2024 13: 02
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        So, the reverse process is not much more difficult than loading.

                        You just couldn’t imagine how you would pack coal into bags in filled to capacity coal pits :)))))
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        For example, before docking, the ship had to be unloaded as much as possible from everything that could be removed overboard.

                        Therefore, it is obvious that before the planned loading into the dock, the ships were made as light as possible by natural fuel consumption, burning coal in the furnaces and without loading new ones :)))
                        In general, loading or unloading coal before a battle is a very bad idea. Going into battle with a tired crew is not good at all. But it’s still the people who fight
                      3. 0
                        April 8 2024 18: 23
                        And when, during loading, coal had to be pulled over the entire area so that it did not accumulate under the neck, in a mound, was there any way to cope? What prevents the reverse process? Moreover, it was necessary to unload not 1000 tons, but less. What if docking is an emergency? Grounding or battle damage. Whereas? Ride on the sea until we burn the coal? What if the ship sinks during this time? Whereas?
                      4. 0
                        April 8 2024 17: 49
                        I can't imagine how you can get a bag through the mouth of a coal pit. It's too narrow. If only a bag))) If only the coal is shoveled into the boiler room and then through skylights or other hatches, whoever had which...
                      5. 0
                        April 8 2024 18: 14
                        But the sailors somehow squeezed into these necks, which means the size allowed. Yes, and pour out a half-ton bag in one fell swoop - does that mean the neck should be wide enough?
                      6. 0
                        April 8 2024 20: 38
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        that means the dimensions allowed

                        I looked at the drawings - about half a meter in diameter
                      7. 0
                        April 8 2024 21: 37
                        Well, that is, the bag will fit through. And if you string these bags in a bunch on a cable and lift the waist, heels or ten at once? How many such necks? Again, what was on the decks was simply swept overboard. So, in order to raise the upper edge of the GP to the optimal height, it was necessary to unload 300 - 400 tons.
                    2. +1
                      April 8 2024 14: 02
                      Quote: TermNachTER
                      And “Oslyabya” is generally a “coal eater”.

                      That's what his sisterships in the Port Arthur squadron called him.
                      But in VTE "Oslyabya" he did not receive such a nickname. Perhaps because the Russian clones of “Tsesarevich” themselves ate like crazy request
                      1. 0
                        April 8 2024 17: 59
                        How did Oslyabya differ from Peresvet and Pobeda? Only one of them did not have copper bottom plating, I don’t remember which one. However, practice has shown that this did not help much.
                      2. 0
                        April 8 2024 18: 22
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        How did Oslyabya differ from Peresvet and Pobeda?

                        Quality and place of construction.
                        But I'm talking about something else. Compared to the Borodino residents, “Oslyabya” was not a coal eater request
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        I don’t remember which one anymore.

                        "Victory" hi
                      3. 0
                        April 8 2024 18: 26
                        But the coal eaters at the Pacific Fleet were nicknamed “Pobeda” and “Peresvet”. But this was not said about the Borodino soldiers, perhaps because they were in service for only a short time and there were no special statistics on them. In terms of overexposure, I don’t remember that there were any complaints about any particular ship due to the poor quality of work. They were scolded about the same.
                      4. 0
                        April 8 2024 18: 35
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        But the coal eaters at the Pacific Fleet were nicknamed “Pobeda” and “Peresvet”

                        Because their expenses were higher than most of their colleagues.
                        In the second squadron, it’s the other way around. The Borodino residents ate no less, but “Oslyabi” has structurally larger pits. And therefore it is easier to place coal. Accordingly, there was no negativity.
                        Quote: TermNachTER
                        They were scolded about the same.

                        No. "Peresvet" is the fastest battleship of the squadron. It and Pobeda were built at the Baltic Shipyard.
                        "Oslyabya" is the brainchild of the New Admiralty with the largest overload of all three
                      5. 0
                        April 8 2024 21: 31
                        This is how the “overexposures” were conceived and designed, with increased range and speed, cruisers and battleships. But in the end, neither one nor the other worked out. The range was 6 thousand miles and there was no smell, the speed was 18,5 knots. achieved only in tests. If “Oslyabi” has the highest construction overload, I’m sorry, I didn’t go into such details, then accordingly its fuel consumption cannot be less than that of sisterships. And as part of the 2nd Pacific, he stood out for his “moderate appetite”, only against the background of the “Borodinites”. But from that, its range did not increase at all.
                2. +1
                  April 9 2024 02: 18
                  Hello, Nikolay
                  Quote: TermNachTER
                  If my memory serves me correctly, Azuma is an armored cruiser, very unsuccessful.

                  I can't judge due to lack of data. However, Mikasa did not shine with the quality of its construction.
                  As we remember, the construction overload of "Mikasa" was equal to 784 t. For comparison, the similar indicator of the "Eagle", according to the naval ship engineer V.P. Kostenko, was 635 so
                  Quote: TermNachTER
                  As for Captain Pakenham, he was also not allowed access to all Japanese secrets, despite all the respect for him.

                  The author of the report is Captain Jackson (RN), he did not need security clearance, since he saw with his own eyes that the main armor belt of Togo's flagship went under water.
                  Attached to this comment is a photo of Mikasa after the Battle of Tsushima. For clarity, I drew a red line over the heels of the anti-mine net poles.
                  Quote: TermNachTER
                  Here they already corrected me that the Japanese simply threw the excess coal overboard.

                  So what ?
                  Since Mikasa's displacement per inch of draft was 63,5 tons, even if the Japanese had thrown two hundred tons of coal overboard, the battleship would have floated only eight centimeters.
                  Still, the main armor belt remains under water.
                  Quote: TermNachTER
                  Be that as it may, at Tsushima, the Japanese had a squadron speed of 14 knots, against our 9

                  We were afraid of breakdowns, so we went as hard as we could.
                  1. -2
                    April 9 2024 07: 15
                    Be that as it may, at Tsushima, the Japanese had a squadron speed of 14 knots, against our 9
                    We were afraid of breakdowns, so we went as hard as we could.

                    You are wrong. They walked so slowly because Rozhdestvensky, along with warships, dragged useless transports into battle, which simply could not go faster - after all, the speed of the squadron was equal to its slowest ship.
                    transport Irtysh 10,5 knots, Korea 12 knots, Kostroma 11 knots, Anadyr 13 knots, Svir 13,5 knots.
                  2. 0
                    April 9 2024 10: 05
                    Good afternoon. I present my thoughts point by point, responding to yours.
                    1. According to "Azuma". I read somewhere that the ship was French-built, the worst in Kamimura’s detachment. It had the lowest speed of 20 knots, very unreliable cars.
                    It was very well identified from long distances - the stern pipe was separate from the two forward ones.
                    2. I can’t say anything about the poor quality of construction of “Mikasa”, but I have never seen any complaints from the Japanese anywhere. Regarding the construction overload, I only learned from you; in general, the British are quite careful shipbuilders. Although the large VI EDB of the Asahi type has always surprised me. The fact that "Mikasa" is sitting deep after Tsushima may have another explanation - they took in water through holes and while putting out fires.
                    3. Regarding “displacement - inch of draft”. 400 tons of coal is half a foot. What is the width of the Mikasa's gas tank? 15 cm is quite sufficient.
                    4. Regarding 14 knots. - the squadron movement, the old Fuji-type nuclear warheads, were no longer squeezed out, and after the loss of Shikishima and Yashima, it was simply impossible not to take them, the difference in the broadside became completely incomparable.
                  3. +1
                    April 11 2024 07: 50
                    Attached to this comment is a photo of Mikasa after the Battle of Tsushima. For clarity, I drew a red line over the heels of the anti-mine net poles.


                    Greetings Valentin!
                    And how long after the battle was the photo taken, otherwise the fender is much higher than the water level, and it was on the GBP.
                    1. 0
                      April 11 2024 16: 35
                      Hello, Yura.
                      This is in Sasebo already upon arrival.
                      1. 0
                        April 12 2024 02: 04
                        Quote: Comrade
                        Hello, Yura.
                        This is in Sasebo already upon arrival.

                        What's the date ? On the day of arrival? Or is it unknown when later?
                      2. 0
                        April 12 2024 04: 05
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        What's the date ? On the day of arrival? Or is it unknown when later?

                        I don’t know the exact date, it seems like three to five days after arrival. It can be seen that there are already patches on the pipes, while at the same time the top of the mainmast is missing. So, we haven’t taken it on yet.
                      3. 0
                        April 12 2024 04: 24
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        What's the date ? On the day of arrival? Or is it unknown when later?

                        I just found something about this photo on an English-language site. From the context of the caption under the photo it follows that the photo was taken on the day of arrival.
                        The article is dedicated to "Mikasa".
                      4. 0
                        April 19 2024 06: 52
                        Quote: Comrade
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        What's the date ? On the day of arrival? Or is it unknown when later?

                        I just found something about this photo on an English-language site. From the context of the caption under the photo it follows that the photo was taken on the day of arrival.
                        The article is dedicated to "Mikasa".

                        Mikasa “floated up” very much, relative to the level of the heels of the poles of the nets. The distance from the latter to the waterline is about a meter (if not more), and this means unloading about 2500 tons.
                        Naturally, the coal consumption for three days and the spent coal cannot be given such a figure.
                      5. 0
                        April 20 2024 01: 19
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        The distance from the latter to the waterline is about a meter (if not more)

                        Surely more.
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        Naturally, the coal consumption for three days and the spent coal cannot be given such a figure.

                        Reasonable. It turns out that the photo could not have been taken immediately upon arrival in Sasebo.
                        I am not clinging to the date of the shooting, but for the sake of theoretical interest I will assume that on the eve of the battle there were excess reserves of not only coal, but also boiler water. And since they threw coal from the deck into the water, why not dump the excess water as well?
                        In addition, we do not know the daily consumption of coal. The heels went under water two days before Tsushima.
                      6. 0
                        April 20 2024 04: 29
                        I am not clinging to the date of the shooting, but for the sake of theoretical interest I will assume that on the eve of the battle there were excess reserves of not only coal, but also boiler water.

                        If the pipes are already patched, then this is probably a day or two after arrival (I can’t see what they were patched with and how).
                        But the coal consumption in the parking lot is minimal, even if Mikasa stood in Sasebo for three days.
                        Naturally, excess water was also taken, in proportion to the excess coal, at a minimum.
                        But, nevertheless, the unloading is gigantic, relative to the waterline at the level of the heels of the poles.
                        The consumption of coal in battle is, of course, significant, but much less than on the Tsarevich with its torn pipes. Estimated - 800t in three days (the commander’s report must be read, of course). Another minus is the used water, 200 tons, so let’s just pump out 500 tons of water.
                        Where else is 1000 or more tons? You can't pile that much coal on the deck.
                        Are there any photos in higher resolution? Or the source of the photo?
                      7. 0
                        April 21 2024 02: 30
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        If the pipes are already patched, then this is probably a day or two after arrival (I can’t see what they were patched with and how).

                        Low quality photo, from a book. When you zoom in, the offset grid is visible, so there's nothing to catch there.
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        But coal consumption in the parking lot is minimal

                        Tens of tons per day.
                        Quote: Jura 27
                        But, nevertheless, the unloading is gigantic, relative to the waterline at the level of the heels of the poles.

                        "Eagle" also surfaced like an adult.
                        According to Kostenko, on the morning of May 14, water approached the surface torpedo tubes, and here is the picture the next morning. There are people on the nose, suitable for scale.
                      8. 0
                        April 21 2024 15: 47
                        Tens of tons per day.

                        At 63t/in, this does not greatly affect the reduction in draft.
                3. 0
                  April 9 2024 07: 30
                  Here they already corrected me that the Japanese simply threw the excess coal overboard. Be that as it may, under Tsushima, the Japanese had a squadron speed of 14 knots, versus our 9, which allowed Togo to occupy the most convenient and advantageous positions for him.

                  You are wrong. Of course, the excess coal was thrown out, but not for the purpose of increasing speed. the fact is that a small increase in displacement has very little effect on speed, although sometimes even additional half knots can be useful, and the loss of the same half knots, for example, over twenty years of a ship’s service is a waste. but the overload could not lead to a decrease in speed from 14 knots to 9 knots. You, like most non-specialist readers, do not know that there is a so-called Admiralty formula for determining speed from displacement. So there it is - the CUBIC root of the displacement!. They walked so slowly because Rozhdestvensky, along with warships, dragged useless transports into battle, which simply could not go faster - after all, the speed of the squadron was equal to its slowest ship.
                  transport Irtysh 10,5 knots, Korea 12 knots, Kostroma 11 knots, Anadyr 13 knots, Svir 13,5 knots.
                  1. +1
                    April 9 2024 09: 22
                    And I didn't even talk about speed. I talked about having the armor belt rise out of the water to the optimal height, providing the best protection. Of course, I’m not a shipbuilding engineer, I completed a simple average sailing boat, but I understand the relationship between draft and speed.
  4. +4
    April 6 2024 11: 00
    Interesting and informative as always
  5. +5
    April 6 2024 11: 52
    I can guess the following. Tube arr. 1883 was used in coastal artillery, which means it was created by the Military Department. It is likely that Baranovsky subsequently took its design and modified it for the needs of the fleet, after which it was listed in the Maritime Department as a tube mod. 1894. In this case, the naming of the sample tube becomes clear. 1894 by I. A. Yatsyno as “modified by Baranovsky.”

    I would like to clarify on which page of which edition of I.A.’s books. Yatsyno (I’m currently looking through the second edition, 1900) You greeted the words about the pipe “model 1894” as “modified by Baranovsky.” There is no such mention in the 1900 edition.

    As is known to the developer of tubes arr. 1883 and arr. 1884 there was Filimonov (in Rdultovsky’s book these tubes are written as tubes of the “Lieutenant Colonel Filimonov system”). It is not surprising that Filimonov continued to improve his pipes. Eg:

    https://army.ric.mil.ru/upload/site175/fDWVJLU1eu.pdf стр. 19

    “In 1890, for the final loading of shells with wet pyroxylin, Lieutenant Colonel Filimonov equipped his tube with a fuse glass with a detonator made of dry pyroxylin, i.e., essentially creating the first fuse for pyroxylin shells.”

    We also know the “bottom shock tube of Lieutenant Colonel Filimonov, model 1896”:

    http://www.library.voenmeh.ru/jirbis2/files/contents/sod02100.pdf

    What about Pyotr Viktorovich Baranovsky, he, together with Vladimir Stepanovich Baranovsky (who died in 1879), in 1877 founded a plant in St. Petersburg for the production of artillery tubes (fuzes) and cartridge cases (later the Mechanical and Case Plant of the heirs of P.V. . Baranovsky"). In 1891, for the first time in Russia, this plant began producing steel shells for small-caliber guns. Since 1889, he has been producing for the Navy Department solid-drawn nickel-plated brass cases for 6-dm explosive charges. and 10-dm. bombs and, since 1895, shock tubes for the same shells.

    In 1881-1882, P.V. Baranovsky designed and built a machine for strengthening the 2,5-inch V.S. gun. Baranovsky on landing boats, but nowhere is there any mention of the fact that P.V. Baranovsky was involved in improving the design of Lieutenant Colonel Filimonov’s tubes.

    Thus, “Baranovsky’s tube” is, in the context we are interested in, “a tube from the Baranovsky plant”, but not a tube designed by P.V. Baranovsky. By analogy with the “pipe of the Nordenfeld plant”, for example with the “8-sec. double-action tube of the Nordenfeld plant”.
    1. +3
      April 6 2024 15: 53
      Quote: AlexanderA

      I would like to clarify on which page of which edition of I.A.’s books. Yatsyno (I’m currently looking through the second edition, 1900) You greeted the words about the pipe “model 1894” as “modified by Baranovsky.”

      This is in another source - “Textbook on artillery for students of the classes of gunners and artillery non-commissioned officers of the artillery training detachment of the Baltic Fleet”, Section VI “Projectiles, projectile tubes, cartridge tubes for igniting charges and cartridges, flares and rockets”
      1. +1
        April 6 2024 16: 10
        Please indicate the page in the 1904 edition:

        https://djvu.online/file/Y4L9sbrMWSYYS?ysclid=luo3rvr25i789447522

        And I didn’t find the words “modified by Baranovsky”.
        1. +2
          April 6 2024 16: 27
          Quote: AlexanderA
          Please indicate the page in the 1904 edition:

          Edition 1909 page 12
          1. +3
            April 6 2024 20: 04
            Well, I couldn’t find the 1909 edition in electronic form. Therefore, I cannot check whether any of the compilers of this textbook believed that the owner of the Baranovsky plant, P.V. Baranovsky, contributed his design efforts to K.I. Filimonov’s tube. It is well known that K.I. Filimonov continued to develop new versions of his pipes even after the death of P.V. Baranovsky.

            And yes, a drawing of a French-style shock tube, which was mentioned in the gunners’ textbook of the 1904 edition, authored by A.E. Shpynev.

            Illustration from D.E. Kozlovsky "History of the material part of artillery", M, -1946, Artillery Order of Lenin and Order of Suvorov Academy of the Red Army named after Dzerzhinsky.

            And “Fig. 145-3 shows a bottom shock tube screwed into a point located in the bottom of the projectile. It is constructed in the same way as the French tube described earlier.”
  6. +4
    April 6 2024 12: 41
    And yes, dear Andrey, how do you, in connection with your estimated calculation of the deceleration time of the 1894 model tube, assess the actual deceleration of the explosion of 6" steel shells with these tubes fired from the Kane cannon during experimental firing in the Vladivostok detachment in 1905?

    In the photo below, unfortunately, there are only holes left for targets by shells with a Brink tube.
    1. +4
      April 6 2024 16: 32
      Good afternoon!
      A little later, maybe tomorrow.
    2. +2
      April 7 2024 09: 11
      Alexander, I’m reporting :)))))
      Quote: AlexanderA
      How do you, in connection with your estimated calculation of the deceleration time of the 1894 model tube, estimate the actual deceleration of the explosion of 6" steel shells with these tubes fired from a Kane cannon during test firing in the Vladivostok detachment in 1905?

      Unfortunately, the speed of the projectile when it hits an obstacle is unknown. But if we assume that it was almost at the muzzle (750 m/s), then the first shot, which after passing more than three inches of iron gave a gap 2 feet behind the barrier, perfectly coincides with the calculation (64 cm). But the second one - 3 walls of 14 inches, the gap 3 feet from the first touch looks premature.
      But there are many nuances here - it is unknown at what angle the projectile entered, speed, etc. Therefore, I will say this - Jessen’s tests do not contradict what was said in the article. By the way, in the report itself, the tendency of Baranovsky tube projectiles to explode not at the moment of passing an obstacle, but with a slight deceleration, is especially noted.
    3. +1
      April 7 2024 13: 17
      Alexandra
      In your estimation, at what distance from the ground is the hole in the bed net?
      1. 0
        April 10 2024 22: 26
        The center of the entrance hole is tens of centimeters from the earth's surface.
        1. +1
          April 10 2024 23: 37
          tens of centimeters from the earth's surface

          Yeah, as much as two dozen)))
          The targets are close to the ground.
          The guns on the ship are ten meters above sea level and the shells fly from top to bottom, this is clearly visible in the photo with the bed grid.
          Just all the conditions to understand at what distance the shells explode laughing
  7. +4
    April 6 2024 13: 12
    To the message above:

    https://keu-ocr.narod.ru/Uroki/

    “One of the weakest points of the Russian fleet in the Russian-Japanese War turned out to be shells. This topic deserves a separate serious discussion. For the purposes of this article, we will only note that serious doubts about the quality of ammunition among the artillerymen of the detachment appeared only after the Battle of Tsushima. Experimental shooting from a cruiser “ Russia" on old ship boilers, bunk nets and a tank showed that the 152-mm high-explosive shells in service with bottom double-capsule Brink tubes and loaded with 920 g of wet and 45 g of dry pyroxylin pierced through light barriers and exploded only when they hit the ground (in in this case - 30 meters behind the target, that is, at a distance exceeding the width of the ship). This was explained by the fact that the Brink tubes were designed for armor-piercing shells, and therefore gave too much of a burst delay. The depth of the craters in soft clay soil did not exceed 40-50 cm. The number of fragments was too small, and they themselves were large.

    Japanese shells of similar caliber were equipped with sensitive tubes of the Iujina system and carried 8,8 times more explosive*. [*RGAVMF. F.470. Op.1. D. 14. L. 14 vol.] Comments, as they say, are unnecessary.

    At the same time, ammunition filled with smokeless powder and Baranovsky tubes was tested. The result turned out to be completely different - explosions occurred 0,5-1 m behind the first obstacle, the old boiler used for the experiments was damaged by the first hit.

    Under pressure from the Commander-in-Chief of the ground and naval forces operating against Japan, Infantry General N.P. Linevich, the Chairman of the Naval Technical Committee, Vice Admiral F.V. Dubasov, in a telegram dated July 9, 1905, authorized the reloading of the cruisers' ammunition from pyroxylin to smokeless powder and the transition to Baranovsky tubes**. [**RGAVMF. F.470. Op.1. D. 15. L. 17 rev.]"


    In addition, I will once again voice my own opinion. The problem was not the slowing down of Brink's fuse. In terms of its deceleration, the Brink fuse was no different from the inertial two-capsule fuse 11DM, the deceleration of which, according to Rdultovsky, “after hitting the plate did not exceed 0,005 seconds.”

    The problem was the extremely low sensitivity of the Brink fuse, which simply did not work when the projectile fell into the water or when it collided with thin obstacles, for example, the walls of an old ship’s boiler, which was fired at in the experimental firing of the Vladivostok detachment. And this fuse was triggered during the mentioned experimental firing only when it collided with the shore behind the target.
    1. +2
      April 6 2024 14: 56
      for example, with the walls of an old ship boiler

      The walls of the boiler were not thin.
      Front wall 5/8 inch,
      two 1/2 inch firebox walls,
      several smoke tubes,
      back wall - two sheets of 5/8" overlap
      Jessen wrote that the total thickness of the pierced metal was about 3 inches.
      The pyroxylin shell exploded 20 feet from the rear wall of the boiler or 30 feet from the front.
      1. +2
        April 6 2024 15: 40
        Quote: rytik32
        The pyroxylin shell exploded 20 feet from the rear wall of the boiler or 30 feet from the front.

        1. The boiler was a spaced multilayer barrier of several relatively thin sheets of metal along each of which the flat tip of the Brink inertial fuse striker did not create sufficient pressure on the rifle primer. It was not for nothing that Rdultovsky expressed the energy consumption for igniting the primer not in Joules, but in units of pressure “at least 13 g/cm” (square).

        2. The important thing is that the shells exploded upon collision with the soil of the shore. If there were a bank without a slope and a target at the height of the line of fire, it would be a pure experience with shells flying hundreds of meters away from the target before exploding upon impact with the ground.

        3. The main “no analogues” of the Brink fuse was the designer’s intentionally lowering the sensitivity of the fuse, and not the addition of a powder moderator to the fuse design (which was not there). The powder moderator was in the 5DM fuse, in the British large bottom tube No. 11 m. V of approximately the same years of development.

        There was no powder moderator in the 11DM fuse and in the Brink fuse.
        1. +2
          April 6 2024 17: 51
          It was not for nothing that Rdultovsky expressed the energy consumption for igniting the capsule not in Joules, but in units of pressure “at least 13 g\cm

          In vain or not in vain - this still needs to be sorted out. Have you seen anywhere else that the primer initiation conditions are expressed in units of pressure?
          If there were a coast without a slope and a target at the height of the line of fire, there would be a pure experience with shells flying hundreds of meters away from the target before exploding upon impact with the ground

          Well, there were such experiments, the shells exploded after passing through a sheet of 1/2 inch, without touching the ground. But why Jessen chose such a training ground - questions for him.
          and not adding a powder moderator to the fuse design (which was not there)
          What would you call the moderator design in a Brink fuze?
          1. -2
            April 6 2024 19: 04
            Quote: rytik32
            In vain or not in vain - this still needs to be sorted out. Have you seen anywhere else that the primer initiation conditions are expressed in units of pressure?

            I was not at all interested in literature on the production of capsules, especially ancient ones.
            Well, there were such experiments, the shells exploded after passing through a sheet of 1/2 inch, without touching the ground. But why Jessen chose such a training ground - questions for him.

            I haven’t read about experiments where shells with Brink fuses exploded before falling to the ground after passing through a 1/2-inch steel sheet. In what source can I read about such experiments?
            What would you call the moderator design in a Brink fuze?

            The same as Rdultovsky called powder moderators. “A powder moderator was pressed into the lower part of the bushing”, “part of the fuses of this system were equipped with a powder moderator in front of the capsule”, “the flame broke through the lead ring 21 to the moderator 12, which transferred it to the firecracker”, “The flame from the capsule 5, impaled on the sting, will pass along the axial channel of the striker into channel 14, will ignite the powder columns 15, penetrate to the powder firecracker 16 in the circular groove under the cover 9 and reach the explosive charge through the outlet holes 10. The transition of the flame through these channels causes a slight slowdown."

            And a powder firecracker is a powder firecracker, not a moderator.

            "A firecracker is a charge of compressed black powder used to amplify and transmit fire in remote fuses and primer bushings, create sound effects, etc."

            Dictionary of military terms. - M.: Military Publishing House. Comp. A. M. Plekhov, S. G. Shapkin.. 1988

            According to the principle of its operation, the double-capsule fuse A.F. Brinka was no different from the 11DM two-capsule fuse developed by P. O. Gelfreich. After the igniter primer, there was a powder firecracker in both. There was no bushing or column of powder retarder in either one.

            Only the fuse A.F. Brink's design had a greatly reduced sensitivity and this was his “analogue”.
            1. +1
              April 6 2024 22: 09
              I was not at all interested in literature on the production of capsules, especially ancient ones

              But in vain. The firing pin of the Mosin rifle was also blunt, so Rdultovsky’s remarks look at least strange.
              In what source can I read about such experiments?

              RGA Navy fund 421 inventory 2 file 1541
              There is a discussion of the results of Jessen's experiments
              Just as Rdultovsky called powder retarders

              You wrote a lot, but it’s not at all clear
              1. -2
                April 11 2024 00: 04
                Quote: rytik32
                But in vain. The firing pin of the Mosin rifle was also blunt, so Rdultovsky’s remarks look at least strange.

                Firstly, the firing pin of the Mosin rifle had a smaller diameter compared to the firing pin of the inertial part of the Brink fuse. Secondly, the firing pin sting of the Mosin rifle had a hemispherical shape (I even gave an illustration from the repair manual earlier), and not a flat-cut shape, like the firing pin sting in the inertial part of the Brink fuse.

                To have a flat tip of the striker... no one did that, and Rdultovsky wrote that of course it shouldn’t have been done that way.

                In the design of the Brink inertial fuse, the sensitivity was deliberately sharply reduced in comparison with its predecessor tubes, so that the fuse simply would not trigger on thin barriers, on the same skin of an unarmored side.

                The idea is working when you shoot from a rapid-fire cannon with 5 cables at the side of the enemy ship, hoping to get to where, under the outer plating, there is a projection of the bevel of the carapace deck at the ends. But with the increase in the characteristic distances of artillery combat, the Brink fuse with such an idea instantly became outdated. Brink should have placed a powder retarder between the igniter primer and the powder firecracker, and not reduced the sensitivity of the fuse.
  8. +6
    April 6 2024 15: 05
    Andrey, good afternoon! Thank you very much for the article, for the theoretical substantiation of the mechanism of operation of the fuse. Unfortunately, in practice large deviations in the fuse response time were observed. And this is not a problem with RIF, but with the technological level of that time. Even the English post-Jutland fuses demonstrated in tests a decent spread in the distance traveled from the obstacle to the explosion site.
    1. +3
      April 6 2024 15: 55
      Good afternoon.
      Quote: rytik32
      Unfortunately, in practice large deviations in the fuse response time were observed. And this is not a problem with RIF, but with the technological level of that time.

      Dear Alexey, I think this should not be surprising, in 1897 a study was conducted on fuses, not in Russia, they used 30 fuses from one batch, the average difference in operation was 0,2 seconds, at a distance of 50 meters. We came to the conclusion that it was necessary to improve the technology for making gunpowder.
      1. +2
        April 6 2024 22: 11
        Dear Igor, good afternoon!
        We came to the conclusion that it is necessary to improve the technology for making gunpowder

        Thanks, this explains a lot
    2. +3
      April 6 2024 16: 30
      Hello, Alexey!
      Quote: rytik32
      Unfortunately, in practice large deviations in the fuse response time were observed.

      This is undoubtedly true.
      Quote: rytik32
      Even the English post-Jutland fuses demonstrated in tests a decent spread in the distance traveled from the obstacle to the explosion site.

      I didn’t know about this, so as an example of how a fuse works “as God bestows on my soul,” I referred to the hits in Lyon in Jutland :)
      1. +3
        April 6 2024 22: 20
        Experiments in 1918. At what distance after a 1-dm barrier did the gap occur? The fuse is the same No. 16D. Armor-piercing shells 12, 13,5, 14 and 15 inches. Results range from 5 to 75 feet.
  9. +1
    April 6 2024 15: 51
    Author, in the presence of such pictures, it would have been a sin not to indicate the part number that was causing problems with the detonation of our shells in the REV. Maybe you can write in the comments?
    1. +3
      April 6 2024 16: 32
      In general, the Baranovsky tube had no problems with detonation. But among steel shells they were placed exclusively on high-explosive 12-dm shells loaded with gunpowder
      1. +1
        April 6 2024 16: 40
        Quote: Andrey from Chelyabinsk
        In general, the Baranovsky tube had no problems with detonation.
        Yes, the new tubes had problems. So I’m wondering what part number was missing (as far as I remember, in the new tubes it was not the design that was changed, but the materials used).
        1. +2
          April 6 2024 20: 12
          And I’ll come back to this when I post material on the Brink tube... Although most likely not even that way - later.
        2. 0
          April 6 2024 22: 00
          The disadvantages of the Brink tube are well described by Rdultovsky. And practically nowhere else.

          “A tube with a detonator made of dry pyroxylin, shown in Fig. 63, was used for these projectiles. In body 1 of this tube: a striking mechanism was assembled, consisting of a striker 3, a fuse 4, an extensor 5, a blunt steel striker 6 and a lead circle for the striker 7. A sleeve 8 with an anvil was screwed into the body from above, containing an ordinary rifle primer 9 and a powder firecracker 11, above which was located an aluminum firing pin 10, covered by a sleeve with cut edges 12, which held it until the shot was fired. This sleeve was pressed in sleeve 13. There were two sticks of dry pyroxylin 2 and 15 and a detonator cap 16 with 14 g of mercury fulminate in the ignition cup 2. When fired, the striking mechanism was cocked in the usual manner and was not kept in flight by any safety devices, since the blunt firing pin touched the rifle capsule with a thick bottom it was quite safe. When meeting an obstacle, the firing pin broke this capsule, and the aluminum firing pin had to puncture and explode the capsule with fulminate of mercury and thereby cause an explosion of the projectile. The fuse was screwed into the bottom or bottom screw of the projectile from the inside.

          At the time of development of this system, it was still difficult to obtain aluminum of sufficient purity, and the aluminum used to make the tube parts contained random impurities of other metals, which increased the hardness of the striker. By the time of the war, aluminum began to be made much cleaner, the strikers became softer and therefore did not give sufficient impact to the mercury fulminate and did not always ensure the action of the fuses. After the war, this part was made of steel.

          When projectiles indirectly encounter thin obstacles and when they hit water, the forward force of the striker, which causes puncture of the igniter primer, especially in heavy large-caliber projectiles, is small. That's why in bottom fuses, highly sensitive primers and sharp tips must be used for such projectiles. Modern Japanese war tube primers gave 100% ignition with an energy consumption of about 1600 g/cm. Rifle primers are ignited by impact with a blunt striker with an energy expenditure of at least 13 g/cm. Therefore, this fuse should have performed poorly against weak barriers and water.

          When hitting thicker plates, the front part of the fuse could break off due to the low strength of the connection with the body. This created an unsecured fuse action."

          Add to the above-cited intermediate detonator with only 45 grams of dry pyroxylin (for example, the author considered “only 55,5 g of picric acid” in the intermediate detonator of the 11DM fuse to be insufficient) and we can say that the shortcomings of the Brink fuse are fully described.
          1. 0
            April 6 2024 22: 53
            That is, item 8. Thank you
            1. +1
              April 6 2024 23: 29
              According to Rdultovsky’s qualified opinion, several details were missing. The aluminum firing pin, designed to hit the detonator capsule, turned out to be too soft; after the war, the material of this firing pin was changed to steel.

              The sleeve with an intermediate detonator was not made in a single body with the entire fuse (as in the 5DM and 11DM fuses), but was screwed to this body and was made of thin-walled brass, as a result of which it could come off when the projectile hit a solid barrier due to the low strength of the connection.

              And the main “highlight” of the fuse is its structurally sharply reduced sensitivity. This reduction was achieved due to the firing pin with a flat tip designed to hit the relatively insensitive primer of a rifle cartridge in the inertial “stage” of the fuse. This approach was recognized by Rdultovsky as completely erroneous. “Therefore, in bottom fuses it is necessary to use highly sensitive primers and sharp tips for such projectiles (heavy projectiles of large calibers).”.

              Plus a weak intermediate detonator containing only 45 grams of dry pyroxylin, which apparently did not always guarantee complete detonation of the main explosive charge of wet pyroxylin.

              We still need to figure out how else to structurally worsen the performance of the fuse. Perhaps instead of a detonator cap and an intermediate detonator from a highly sensitive high explosive, make a powder firecracker and bags of potassium nitrate and ammonium picrate, like the British did with their lyddite shells of that time, which “almost never gave a complete detonation.”
      2. +1
        April 6 2024 21: 45
        In addition to the 12-inch high-explosive ones, they used all cast iron and steel ones from 120 mm (the 120 mm Kane did not have a projectile with pyroxylin equipment - it is clear why the Novik was doomed in the battle with the cruiser Tsushima) and a smaller caliber.
  10. +1
    April 7 2024 11: 46
    Apart from the description of the fuses, the rest of the text is pure theosophy - it seems that the author is simply drawn to the very possibility of counting - no matter what or why. If we take the conclusions, then what is the point of determining the distance from the point of impact of the projectile to the point of explosion - only for two distances - 5 and 40 kb - at other distances - what is it forbidden to shoot? - Or when firing at a 127mm plate, the projectile explodes (and absolutely should ) “in the process of overcoming the armor” - i.e. without breaking through the plate, we must understand that we cannot wait for an explosion after breaking through the armor even in our dreams? - even of such thickness and regardless of the distance - the question arises - why use large thicknesses and how were guns and shells chosen?
  11. +1
    April 7 2024 15: 42
    Quote: AlexanderA
    Thus, “Baranovsky’s tube” is, in the context we are interested in, “a tube from the Baranovsky plant,” but not a tube designed by P.V. Baranovsky.

    Not true. Baranovsky tubes, internal and external, were used for 37 mm and 47 mm projectiles. Based on them, a sample tube was created. 1894
  12. 0
    April 7 2024 16: 55
    yellow copper is brass - the choice of material is clear - you need to cut a thread, it’s difficult on copper, red - just copper, very plastic - the choice of material for the body for the capsule is clear, but what was the firing pin made of? Some sources talked about aluminum - to limit its mass, i.e. increase sensitivity? Is the spring most likely made of bronze?
  13. 0
    April 8 2024 09: 46
    The direction of movement of the projectile in the first drawing of the fuse is indicated incorrectly.
    1. 0
      April 8 2024 10: 11
      Quote: gromila78
      The direction of movement of the projectile in the first drawing of the fuse is indicated incorrectly.

      You are mistaken, everything stated there is correct. The bottom tube is screwed into the bottom of the projectile. The following picture shows the head tube
      1. 0
        April 8 2024 11: 07
        With this direction, during a shot, the fuse should immediately pierce, since the moving part is in the upper position.
        1. 0
          April 8 2024 11: 26
          Quote: gromila78
          With this direction, during a shot, the fuse should immediately pierce, since the moving part is in the upper position.

          The moving part is at the bottom, in the picture above it is marked with a red arrow and the number 7
          1. 0
            April 8 2024 11: 30
            Now it’s clear, it’s just that in the picture the red arrows indicate downforce, and not the direction of movement, which was misleading.
            1. 0
              April 8 2024 11: 38
              Quote: gromila78
              It’s just that in the picture the red arrows indicate downforce, not the direction of movement

              Absolutely right. Happy to help!
  14. +1
    April 9 2024 18: 33
    Comrade experts, please tell me where to find firing tables for the main caliber guns of the Russian fleet during the RYAV era?
    1. +1
      April 10 2024 23: 53
      For 12-dm there is https://tsushima.su/RU/libru/i/Page_7/page_18/page_22/organizaciy-strelby/
      1. 0
        April 11 2024 01: 07
        Quote: rytik32
        For 12-dm there is

        Yeah thanks.

        The tables, however, are scanty and there is very little information. How did they get anywhere with such tables?

        But apparently they didn’t know how to do others back then.
  15. 0
    April 11 2024 00: 27
    Quote: Andrey Tameev
    Not true. Baranovsky tubes, internal and external, were used for 37 mm and 47 mm projectiles. Based on them, a sample tube was created. 1894

    What was called the Baranovsky tube in the literature of that time, Rdultovsky called the Nordenfeld tube of a “different device.” If you find in the description of the biography of P.V. Baranovsky a mention that he developed the Baranovsky pipe, I will take back my opinion that the pipe was called after the Baranovsky plant that launched its production in 1895, and not by the name of the designer.

    And yes, naturally, at the beginning of the 1894th century, the Baranovsky tube was used in naval artillery for all shells with a bottom fuse, where the Brink tube was not used. Baranovsky's pipe was a pipe of the XNUMX model.
    Whereas the Brink tube was a tube of the 1896 model.
  16. -1
    April 11 2024 00: 32
    Quote: Andrey Tameev
    .
    What was called the Baranovsky tube in the literature of that time, Rdultovsky called the Nordenfeld tube of a “different device.” If you find in the description of the biography of P.V. Baranovsky a mention that he developed the Baranovsky pipe, I will take back my opinion that the pipe was called after the Baranovsky plant that launched its production in 1895, and not by the name of the designer.

    And yes, naturally, at the beginning of the 20th century, the Baranovsky tube was used in naval artillery for all shells with a bottom fuse, where the Brink tube was not used.

    The pipe (from the Baranovsky plant) was a pipe of the 1894 model.

    Whereas the Brink tube was a tube of the 1896 model.