The Geranium UAV with a video camera and 4G modem promises us more confirmed cases of destruction of HIMARS MLRS and Patriot air defense systems
Image: twz.com
Recently, in March of this year, a number of Ukrainian and Western resources published information that the wreckage of a Russian unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) of the Geran-2 type, on which a PTZ video camera was additionally installed, had been found. It is characteristic that earlier, back in November 2023, enemy specialists discovered the alleged remains of a UAV of the “Geran-2” type, with an installed 4G cellular modem with broadband MIMO antennas, with a SIM card of the Ukrainian telecommunications company “Kievstar” installed in the modem "
Some Ukrainian experts have suggested that cellular communications were used to obtain telemetry from the Geranium-2 UAV, in addition to the fact that this solution was carried out in a makeshift manner and is not serial. And also that the presence of a cellular modem allows you to adjust the flight mission of a kamikaze UAV in real time.
Today we will try to take a closer look at the possibilities and associated risks of introducing cellular modems and video cameras into the design of the Kamikaze UAV “Geran-2”.
Kamikaze UAVs and cellular communications
As we said above, potentially a 4G cellular modem as part of the Geran-2 kamikaze UAV can be used to receive telemetry data, as well as to issue target designations - both of these tasks have the right to life and are quite relevant.
An alleged image of a 4G cellular modem on board the Russian Geran-2 UAV. Image: twz.com
Obtaining telemetry data during the flight of the kamikaze UAV "Geran-2" will allow the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (RF Armed Forces) to obtain important information, in particular, by launching kamikaze UAVs at different altitudes, it is possible to understand their survivability at these altitudes, taking into account the impact of enemy fire weapons . For example, in the material Climb: new tactics for using the Geran-2 UAV will make it possible to deplete Ukrainian air defense as much as possible the author suggested that by increasing the flight altitude of the Geranium, we can avoid losses of kamikaze UAVs from fire from man-portable anti-aircraft missile systems (MANPADS), anti-aircraft artillery systems (ZAK) and small arms weapons.
However, an assumption is one thing; in reality, everything can be more complicated, and it is the presence of feedback that will make it possible to confirm or refute the theory with practice, to understand at what altitudes kamikaze UAVs will reach the target with minimal losses.
In the same way, you can evaluate the impact of making various changes to the design, for example, painting the housings black instead of white or equipping the kamikaze UAV "Geran-2" with towed decoys.
In addition, other data can be indirectly obtained, for example, the density/effectiveness of the air defense (air defense) of the attacked object, the approximate location of anti-aircraft missile systems (SAM), and if their type is known, then their effectiveness against such UAVs type.
Soldiers of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (AFU) dig up the body of an unexploded kamikaze UAV "Geran-2"
Finally, it is indirectly possible to assess the effectiveness of striking a target; at least, based on the last transmitted coordinates of a kamikaze UAV with a 4G modem, it will be clear whether it reached the designated target or not.
Well, and the most important thing is the possibility of retargeting the Kamikaze UAV “Geran-2” in flight, after its launch (if this feature is implemented).
These UAVs have a fairly low speed, for this reason a number of targets can change their location after the launch of a kamikaze UAV, for example, the launcher of an air defense system can be moved several hundred meters to the side - in the usual case this means that the kamikaze UAV "Geranium-2" will be spent without any benefit, however, having received information from space or human intelligence means about a change in the target's location, the "Geranium-2" kamikaze UAV, equipped with a 4G modem, will receive updated coordinates, resulting in a change location will not allow the target to avoid being hit.
Of course, both receiving telemetry and retargeting a kamikaze UAV in flight are only possible if it is within the coverage area of enemy cellular networks. One more factor must be taken into account - the radiation pattern of cell tower antennas is usually oriented along the surface, and therefore sometimes problems with the signal occur even on the upper floors of high-rise buildings (if special cell towers are not oriented towards them), and therefore, It is possible that it will be possible to provide cellular communications only for kamikaze UAVs flying at a relatively low altitude, or after they descend from a high altitude on the final leg of the flight.
Of course, the best solution for organizing two-way communication is to use our own high-speed data transmission satellite networks, but we don’t have them yet. In some cases it is possible use enemy satellite infrastructure, such as commercial Starlink communications satellites, but cases of its use are unlikely to be widespread, since in order to access the enemy’s satellite network it is necessary to obtain and activate a sufficient number of corresponding ground terminals somewhere, and it is necessary to keep all this secret from the network owners and enemy intelligence services, otherwise you yourself can become a target for striking with long-range precision weapons.
Kamikaze UAV - live broadcast
One of the most important differences of the current war in Ukraine has been the widespread coverage of hostilities by the warring parties - information counteraction. The task of “correctly” displaying events taking place on the battlefield is often as important as the victories and defeats themselves.
It would seem that it makes no difference - it is enough for both sides to shoot ordinary patriotic videos, but now this is not enough. Visual confirmation of the results of victories and defeats serves as justification for the supply of (or refusal to supply) weapons, financial resources and other quite material items to Ukraine. So both sides strive not only to destroy the enemy, but also to do it publicly, with confirmation.
For example, in the material Destruction with confirmation: the use of the Lancet-3 kamikaze UAV from the Orion UAV carriers will defiantly destroy Ukrainian Patriot air defense systems and HIMARS MLRS we considered the possibility of destroying the designated targets in such a way that no one would have any doubts about the reality of what happened.
Video recordings of targets being hit on the battlefield have become a vital component of information warfare.
Of course, no less important is the possibility of carrying out objective control - was the target destroyed, was it a mock-up, and was anything at all destroyed, or was the attacking ammunition destroyed on approach?
And finally, the presence of video surveillance equipment on the ammunition, in combination with feedback, allows it to be accurately aimed at the attacked object, eliminating the possibility of a miss, for example, if the object has slightly changed its location or the attacking ammunition has deviated - no artificial intelligence (AI) will not replace a living person - an operator assessing the image through a high-resolution video camera.
In contrast to the simple transmission of telemetry, coordinates and retargeting of a UAV in flight, the transmission of photos, and even more so video images, will require much greater communication channel capacity, and ensuring direct control of the UAV will also require minimal delays in data transmission.
Apparently, the modified Geran-2 UAV is equipped with a completely ordinary security video camera; it looks like it has two lenses, most likely with or without magnification (the image is shown as an example, the exact model of the camera could not be found)
Is it possible to provide telecontrol of a kamikaze UAV using a 4G cellular modem?
It is possible, but unlikely, most likely the connection will be unstable, there will be interruptions and delays - everyone can try to organize video communication from their smartphone on the move, at a speed of over a hundred kilometers per hour, except that in large cities something like this can happen.
But obtaining photos and video images, both intelligence data and facts confirming the destruction of targets by ahead “blind” kamikaze UAVs, is much more realistic.
By combining “blind” kamikaze UAVs “Geran-2” and their modifications equipped with video cameras, it is possible to organize raids in waves, when the kamikaze UAVs “Geran-2” equipped with video cameras will provide confirmation of the facts of the destruction of targets in the first wave and simultaneously carry out reconnaissance of new targets for second and subsequent waves.
Risks
The first group of risks is an increase in the likelihood of the enemy detecting our kamikaze UAVs equipped with cellular modems with “enemy” SIM cards. In fact, there are quite simple ways to get around this problem, but we will not discuss them here, since the enemy can also use them, let’s hope that ours have thought of this themselves.
The second group of risks - you need to understand that the enemy can organize something similar, that is, equip their long-range kamikaze UAVs with cellular modems and video cameras, obtain Russian SIM cards and significantly increase the efficiency of striking particularly important targets located deep in the territory Russian Federation.
What can we say about the second group of risks - well, firstly, Russian cellular operators and their controlling structures must be prepared to detect such SIM cards, for example, based on an analysis of the speed and trajectory of their movement across the territory of Russia, such a task is quite Even existing artificial intelligence (AI) models can cope - they can’t still draw pictures, or even simpler algorithms that work using equipment installed by cellular operators.
Second, the do not neglect visual camouflage and other methods of protecting objects, even located in the deep rear, it is still not noticeable that any comprehensive measures are being taken to protect Russian cities and industrial facilities - all problems are transferred to air defense. Meanwhile The enemy may have so many kamikaze UAVs and other high-precision long-range weapons that no air defense can cope.
Conclusions
The use of 4G modems with SIM cards from enemy telecom operators in combination with video cameras on board the Geran-2 UAV, and probably also on long-range kamikaze UAVs of other types, potentially allows for additional advantages, including the possibility of reconnaissance route, retargeting a UAV in flight, additionally searching for targets and assessing the results of an attack by a kamikaze UAV or other long-range weapon not equipped with video recording and communications equipment.
At the same time, there are certain risks in the form of an increase in the likelihood of the enemy detecting such UAVs and taking measures to destroy them, however, these risks can largely be neutralized with the help of measures that will not be discussed in this article. At the same time, it is necessary to take into account the possibility of the enemy using symmetrical measures in terms of equipping its long-range kamikaze UAVs with similar solutions and SIM cards of Russian telecom operators.
Of course, such a solution is a compromise due to Russia’s lack of its own constellations of high-speed Internet communication satellites; their creation and deployment, in my opinion, should become one of the most important priorities of our country.
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