The Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy needs "Kolchuga": either protection on ships, or ships at the bottom
Image generated by the DALL·E 3 neural network
The latest events that occurred very recently in the Black Sea force us to return again to the problem of increasing the security of ships of the Navy fleet Russian Federation (RF Navy), primarily ships of the Black Sea Fleet, from attacks carried out by the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) and the Main Intelligence Directorate (GUR) of Ukraine using unmanned kamikaze boats (BEC).
Unfortunately, the forecasts announced back in May 2023 in the material With the delay of the NMD, the destruction of the ships of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy by Ukrainian naval drones is just a matter of time and in June 2023 in the material The attack on the Ivan Khurs and the American exercise "Millennium Challenge 2002" as an example of future threats for which no fleet in the world is yet ready, are coming true, and trends towards further deterioration of the situation are clearly visible.
It is characteristic that in the land theater of operations there is a similar problem - these are numerous kamikaze unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). Their appearance on the battlefield significantly influenced both the tactics of using ground units and the design of combat and auxiliary vehicles, as well as shelters for personnel, both the RF Armed Forces and the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Has become the norm equipping combat and auxiliary vehicles with protective nets and gratings, trenches appeared, closed from detection from above and protected by metal mesh and additional camouflage nets.
Nets and gratings on combat vehicles are clearly not made for a good life, and certainly not for aesthetic pleasure
Unfortunately, we haven’t seen anything like this in the Navy yet. It is possible that some measures are being taken - electronic warfare equipment (EW) is being installed, personnel are being trained, cover is being provided from BEC kamikazes from helicopters, but all this is clearly not enough, and in the future the situation will only get worse.
Most recently, in the material dated February 9 this year Extreme measures are needed to protect surface ships from attacks by unmanned kamikaze boats we have considered a range of passive and active means to counter this threat. Considering that the presence of the considered countermeasures on ships of the Russian Navy is not currently visible, we will consider the issue open and will try to consider the problem in more detail.
Anti-torpedo nets on ships of the First and Second World Wars
The problem of protecting surface ships from BEC kamikazes can be divided into two subtasks: the first is the need to detect and destroy attacking BEC kamikazes, the second is minimizing damage in the event that the BEC kamikaze still managed to break through to the protected surface ship.
The defeat of any target is a probabilistic value; no means will ensure the guaranteed absence of enemy BEC-kamikaze breakthroughs to the side of the protected ship, therefore, as a priority, we will consider the creation of an active-passive system for protecting surface ships from BEC-kamikazes under the symbol “Kolchuga”, including two subsystems “Network” (passive) and “Wave” (active), as well as a set of additional protection.
Passive subsystem "Network"
The “Network” subsystem is an element of passive protection. As the name implies, it should be based on the widespread use of nets, modern analogues of anti-torpedo nets, which were actively used during the First and Second World Wars. The task of the “Network” subsystem is to withstand one or at most two explosions of enemy kamikaze BECs that have broken through other defensive lines, that is, in essence, it should give the ship’s crew “the right to make mistakes.”
The “Network” subsystem should include a metal frame – “skeleton” and the mesh structures themselves. Presumably, the “skeleton” can be made of steel or aluminum I-beams welded into U/H-shaped structures, attached to the ship’s hull using brackets welded to the deck and/or stiffening ribs of the ship.
The length of the beams outside the ship's hull will be determined by a compromise between the need to maintain the stability and maneuverability of the ship and its protection from a close explosion of a kamikaze BEC - the further we move the "skeleton" beams, the better the ship will be protected, but the less maneuverable it will be and sustainable. In horizontal projection, the profile of the “skeleton” will decrease towards the water, so as not to impair visibility of the water surface and not interfere with the operation of the ship’s active defense systems.
Protective nets must be hung on the “skeleton”. It is unlikely that these will be metal structures - they are too heavy, and there is no point. Most likely, strong networks made of polymeric materials will be sufficient, although the inclusion of reinforcing metal elements is possible. Presumably, the nets should be weighted at the bottom and go under water to a depth of about 1-1,5 meters.
Proposed location of the “skeleton” and two rows of protective networks of the “Network” subsystem
Also, presumably, the networks on the “skeleton” will be placed in at least two rows - in the event of a kamikaze BEC detonation and the first line of passive defense breaking through, it will be more difficult for the second kamikaze BEC to break through to the ship’s hull. It is extremely important to ensure protection of the ship’s stern projection so that it does not lose speed and maneuverability, while the design of the “Network” subsystem should not interfere with the operation of the rudders and propeller group.
A variant of the “skeleton” design with movable power structures extended outside the hull, mounted on hinges on the hull side, and supported on the outer side by floats made in the form of a composite or metal body and filled with buoyant, non-flammable material, can be considered - in this case the ship will become something like a trimaran. Of course, the optimal design can only be determined based on the results of a detailed study in relation to specific models of ships being equipped/protected.
Subsystem "Network" in the "trimaran" version
Active subsystem "Volna"
The Volna subsystem is designed to actively deter BEC kamikazes. Ships have access to an unlimited amount of seawater, which, when released under high pressure, effectively becomes a lethal element. Accordingly, the “Volna” subsystem should include powerful pumps and water jets along the perimeter of the ship’s hull.
For example, one German company has developed an “Automatic Pirate Protection System,” which includes infrared (IR) all-round video cameras and powerful automatic water cannons, capable of throwing 1 tons of water each at a distance of up to 10 meters in 90 minute, under a pressure of 5 atmospheres. Such a “water cannon” is capable of turning over a fairly large boat with pirates, what can we say about the BEC kamikaze - it will either turn it over or throw it aside, giving the ship’s crew additional time to destroy it.
Accordingly, there are two options - the creation of some kind of automated system similar to the one discussed above, but its design and commissioning may be delayed. The second option is to place a group of water cannons that transfer a stream of water from one extreme position to another along the fences of the “Network” subsystem. In the second case, no complex automation and control systems are required. If the enemy approaches the protective networks, he will most likely be thrown back or knocked over by a water jet, or satellite communications antennas or other equipment may be damaged on him.
The DALL·E 3 neural network, of course, is somewhat expressive, nevertheless it conveys the idea - it would be extremely difficult to approach a ship with such BEC-kamikaze water cannons
In any case, even if the BEC kamikaze tries to slip “between the jets,” his actions will be slowed down by the need to carry out additional maneuvers necessary to evade the jets of water cannons. Also, an additional deterrent will be the strong water spray created by the jets of water cannons. Since the guidance of the BEC kamikaze is carried out manually, limited visibility will significantly complicate the work of operators.
Additional protection
Armor film on both sides of the glass elements will not withstand a close explosion, but will protect the crew from fragments.
It is necessary to install nets and gratings on the most vulnerable elements of the ship, where this is structurally permissible - this is no longer from the BEC-kamikaze, but from the kamikaze UAVs, with which surface ships also have a chance of meeting, and the attack of the kamikaze UAV can be preceded by BEC kamikaze attack.
The enemy carries out attacks mainly at night; accordingly, the detection of the target ship is carried out using thermal imagers. The option of supplementing the Volna subsystem with a device for cooling the ship’s hull with sea water, of which, as we said earlier, we have an unlimited amount, may be considered. The technical implementation of this function should be as simple as possible - a hose with sprayers around the perimeter of the housing, aimed at the walls of the housing.
The upper part of the ship's hull, which cannot be cooled with sea water, can be partially covered with the material used to make the "Cape" camouflage system for armored vehicles.
Cooling the ship's hull with seawater and camouflage nets can significantly complicate the aiming of BEC-kamikazes at the ship at night
Conclusions
Yes, it is possible that ships protected by “Kolchuga” will not look as fast and beautiful as they do now, and armored vehicles with meshes and bars become like a mobile chicken coop, nevertheless, the realities of war dictate their requirements.
Although the “Kolchuga” system can potentially reduce the speed and maneuverability characteristics of the protected ship, but, as practice shows, neither speed nor maneuverability can save you from BEC kamikazes - it’s better to have difficulty maneuvering and mooring than to simply and unsightly sink.
Now we are talking about the survival of the Black Sea Fleet of the Russian Navy in principle, since against the backdrop of the failures of the summer counteroffensive, the intensity and effectiveness of attacks carried out by the Ukrainian Armed Forces and the Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine will only increase.
It is possible that the time has already come to build hangars for ships, since they are extremely vulnerable when parked. They, of course, won’t protect against cruise missiles, but against kamikaze UAVs with a low-power warhead, that’s quite possible; however, we should first build shelters for aircraft in sufficient quantities. Image generated by the DALL·E 3 neural network
Don’t forget about the ships of other fleets of the Russian Navy. The Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine may well organize the “delivery” of a dozen BEC kamikazes, for example, to the Baltic, or even to the area of responsibility of the Northern or Pacific fleets - there is nothing overly complicated about this, Ukraine will have assistants, and due to the effect of surprise, the results may be for us extremely unpleasant, so there is no need to relax.
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